

August 31, 2021

#### SENT BY ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: nsus@citizensforethics.org

Attorney Nikhel Sus Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) 1101 K Street, NW, Suite 201 Washington, DC 20005,

**Re:** Case 1:21-cv-00572-RC3:

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) vs. DHS 2021-IALI-00005 Release 2

Dear Attorney Sus,

This letter is a response to the above litigation regarding your electronic Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Headquarters Privacy (HQ PRIV), dated January 10, 2021, and received on that date. This request was subsequently referred to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and received in this office on February 22, 2021.

#### DHS I&A's Production

This is the second production in this litigation. For this production, I&A processed one-hundred-forty (140) pages that were found to be responsive to your request. Of those pages, thirty-one (31) pages will be released in full, one-hundred-nine (109) pages will be withheld in part and released in part.

Redactions have been made to protect information exempted as follows:

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552			Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
552(b)(1)	552(b)(5)	552(b)(7)(C)	
552(b)(2)	∑ 552(b)(6)	552(b)(7)(D)	$\square$ 552a(k)(2)
∑ 552(b)(3)	552(b)(7)(A)	∑ 552(b)(7)(E)	
552(b)(4)	552(b)(7)(B)	552(b)(7)(F)	Other:

**Exemption 3** protects "information specifically exempted from disclosure by [another] statute." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). In this instance, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(9) exempt(s) information regarding intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

I&A is withholding information which would lead to the revelation of intelligence sources and methods.

**Exemption 6** protects from disclosure personnel or medical files and similar files the release of which would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. This requires a balancing of the public's right to discourse against the individual's right to privacy. The types of documents and/or information that I&A has withheld may consist of names. The privacy interests of the individuals in the records you have requested outweigh any minimal public interest in disclosure of the information. Any private interest you may have in that information dos not factor into the aforementioned balancing test.

If you have any questions regarding this case, please contact Trial Attorney Bradley Craigmyle, United States Department of Justice, Federal Programs Branch by email at Bradley.T.Craigmyle@usdoj.gov. Please be sure to reference civil action no1:21-cv-00572-RC3 in any correspondence regarding this case.

Sincerely,

Priscilla Waters

Pricilla Waters Assistant FOIA Officer

#### Civil Unrest Washington, D.C. 1-6-2021

Ops Period 1-6-21 1300 1-7-21 0800

#### **Current Situation**

Around 1330 protestors breached the barrier to the Capitol and entered the building.
 Vice President Pence was evacuated from the Capitol and senate staff and members
 sheltered in place in the Russell Senate office building. One civilian sustained a gunshot
 wound to the chest on the second floor of the Capitol building. All federal buildings
 were put on lockdown following this incident. The Washington, D.C. Mayor issued a
 mandatory curfew to go into effect at 1800 and remain in effect until 0600.

#### **Commander's Intent**

- Remain focused on I&A's intelligence mission and authorities regarding threats related to civil disobedience.
- Think analytically to develop quality products for dissemination as appropriate.
- Keep I&A Leadership apprised of situational developments.
- Ensure employee health and safety.

#### **Authorities**

• Based on the situation present in the field, I&A will exercise DHS authorities to protect critical infrastructure and validated intelligence requirements.

#### **Posture**

- I&A will approach this situation from an analytically, operationally, and strategically to determine what I&A can contribute to the mission to provide a comprehensive overview of the intelligence. I&A will utilize this approach to (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) and others. We play a critical role in coordination and operational planning to identify groups who engage in civil unrest.
- Situational Reports will be shared internally. If this information merits dissemination outside of I&A it will be written so that it can be easily transferred to the National Operations Center (NOC).

#### **Deliverables**

- Immediate deliverables will include Situational Reports, Significant Incident Reports (SIRs), and Organic Collection Requirements (OCRs).
- Pending deliverables will include Field Intelligence Reports (FIRs), Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), and a Counterterrorism Mission Center analytical product linking violent actors/ideologies as appropriate.

#### **Operating Status**

- Current and Emerging Threats Center (CETC)
  - o (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) for information related to calls or plans for violence. Items of note included calls to set fire to the Capitol building,

- reported shots fired within the Capitol, and calls for actors to stand their ground when confronted by law enforcement.
- Situation updates will be disseminated at 0800 and 1630. Information to be included in those situational updates should be provided to CETC by 0600 and 1430, respectively. Any significant incidents will be reported via significant incident reports (SIRs) to the (b) (6)
- o CETC is fully staffed. No unmet needs were reported.

# • Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC)

- CTMC will have a team call to determine a duty schedule going forward as appropriate.
- o CTMC is conducting open source collections and is on standby for official reporting. CTMC has crafted a list of requirements they are focusing on and will provide those to the Collection Management Division (CMB) and the Office of General Counsel Intelligence Legal Division (OGC-ILD) for review. These requirements are based upon current information seen on online forums.
- o No unmet needs were reported.

#### • Open Source Collection Operations (OSCO)

- OSCO will have collectors on staff until 2300. This staffing will reduce to collectors until 0500 the following day, whereupon it will increase to collectors.
- The (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)
   (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) These will be put into Situational Reports as they push the formalized OSIR process.
- OSCO is fully staffed with personnel in reserve if needed. No unmet needs were reported.

#### • Cyber Mission Center (CYMC)

- o CYMC has staff members available.
- CYMC will focus on potential foreign influence and will prioritize monitoring for information on foreign media calling for violence.
- CYMC reported a precautionary delay in the vote counting for the Georgia runoff election based upon threats.

#### • Field Operations Division (FOD)

- O The Mid-Atlantic Region (MAR) has employees stationed at the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC) with remaining staff on ready reserve. There will be at least at the NTIC at all times.
- o Regional Directors (RDs) across the U.S. have been sensitized for threats.
- o Partner Engagement (PE) will reach out to State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) partners with any messages from I&A.
- The HUMINT Collection Operations Manager for the MAR is maintaining a (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) and will continue to monitor the situation.
- FOD posture will be reevaluated overnight to determine if any changes need to be made. Personnel from neighboring regions are available if needed.
- o No unmet needs were reported.

#### • Partner Engagement (PE)

- O PE is preparing standard communication to SLTT partners. SLTT partners have been notified that the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau (b) (3) (A), (b) are monitoring the situation.
- The National Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Sitroom is up and running. A private D.C. Sitroom is also running. Information from the Sitroom is being transferred to the National HSIN Sitroom. CETC is also maintaining a presence in these sitrooms.
- A telephone call with the major city chiefs will be held to discuss concerns about potential violence erupting around the country.
- Office of General Counsel Intelligence Legal Division (OGC-ILD)
  - o (b) (6) are available 24/7 for any questions or concerns.
  - Much of I&A's activity will depend upon the Collection Management Division's requirements.
- Collection Management Division (CMD)
  - o The Election Related reporting policy will be recirculated.
  - Requirements include 1221 HCR; 1228 HCR; Election EEIs; physical threats to critical infrastructure; World Wide SIGINT requirement for SIGINT with a (b) (3) (A). (b)
  - CMD will review information that is shared by FOD. If the understanding of the type of actors involved in these incidents shifts, then that will impact the requirements used.

  - The election related reporting policy, collection requirements, and points of contact (POCs) for OGC-ILD and CMD will be provided.
- (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) (LNO)
   (b) LNO (b) (6) is available.

#### **Briefing Schedule**

- Routine 0800 and 1630 briefings will occur.
- Ad hoc briefings will be driven by significant events.

#### **Other Considerations**

- Nationwide messaging.
- National Threat Advisory System (NTAS)
- In the event of outside requests for services consult the OGC-ILD.

# **Appendices**

Collection Requirements

# **OSCAR-MS**

# Standing

# Requirement 902650883

Domain

**Originating System** 

**Current State** 

**JWICS** 

OSCAR

PARTIALLY RESPONDED

# **Overall Requirement Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

# **Highest Desired Classification Level of Product**

# Requirement Title

(U//FOUO) Threats of targeted, non-ideologically motivated violence to eight Commercial Facilities Critical Infrastructure Sub-sectors.

# Intelligence Topic

# (b) (3) (A),

# Category of Information Need

(U//FOUO) I. Threats to the US Homeland, Key Resources, and Critical Infrastructure

# **Intelligence Topic Information Need**

# **Local Tracking Codes**

# **Owning Organization**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Requirement Owner

Name: (b)

Email: (b) (6)

@dhs.ic.gov

Username: (b) (6)

Phone: N/A

Requirement POCs

Email:

Name: (b) (6)

@dhs.ic.gov

Title: N/A Phone: N/A

**Collection Start Date** 

2019-11-13T00:00:00.000Z

Information Requested By

2019-11-18T00:00:00.000Z

**Collection End Date** 2021-11-18T00:00:00.000Z

Validation Date 2019-11-15T19:01:46.000Z

#### Background

(U//FOUO) There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. The Commercial Facilities Sector is one of those 16 critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Commercial Facilities Sector is further subdivided into 8 sub-sectors including: Entertainment and Media (e.g., motion picture studios, broadcast media), Gaming (e.g., casinos), Lodging (e.g., hotels, motels, conference centers), Outdoor Events (e.g., theme and amusement parks, fairs, campgrounds, parades), Public Assembly (e.g., arenas, stadiums, aquariums, zoos, museums, convention centers), Real Estate (e.g., office and apartment buildings, condominiums, mixed use facilities, self-storage), Retail (e.g., retail centers and districts, shopping malls), and Sports Leagues (e.g., professional sports leagues and federations). There has been an increase in the number of non-ideologically motivated threats of violence targeting individuals and facilities associated with these eight sub-sectors. Justification (U//FOUO) DHS I&A has a vested interest in being alerted to any threats targeting one of the DHS designated critical infrastructure sectors. The knowledge of these threats will assist with DHS I&A's ability to better understand the various threats posed to the various DHS designated critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors. Our mission is to assist federal, state, local, territory, and tribal government agencies and authorities as well as private sector security partners in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to attacks against any one of the DHS designated critical infrastructure sectors in United States. All EEI's are referencing non-ideologically motivated threats by individual(s) to any business (es), person(s), or entities apart of or associated with the eight sub-sectors comprising the Commercial Facilities Sector. Please follow the guidance listed for reporting procedures: 1. Please do not break up reporting if multiple EEIs are addressed on the same target. 2. Please identify in all reporting if target was previously cited or found in a previous report. This requirement directly supports and helps answer the following PIR: DHS-IA-TER.3: What is the threat posed by U.S. based violent extremists.

#### Justification

(U//FOUO) DHS I&A has a vested interest in being alerted to any threats targeting one of the DHS designated critical infrastructure sectors. The knowledge of these threats will assist with DHS I&A's ability to better understand the various threats posed to the various DHS designated critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors. Our mission is to assist federal, state, local, territory, and tribal government agencies and authorities as well as private sector security partners in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to attacks against any one of the DHS designated critical infrastructure sectors in United States. All EEI's are referencing non-ideologically motivated threats by individual(s) to any business (es), person(s), or entities apart of or associated with the eight sub-sectors comprising the Commercial Facilities Sector. Please follow the guidance listed for reporting procedures: 1. Please do not break up reporting if multiple EEIs are addressed on the same target. 2. Please identify in all reporting if target was previously cited or found in a previous report. This requirement directly supports and helps answer the following PIR: DHS-IA-TER.3: What is the threat posed by U.S. based violent extremists.

# **Previous Research Conducted**

#### **EEI 92560**

# **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED

# **EEI Description**

(U) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI Keywords**

Targets

**Inactive Targets** 

Source Formats

**Product Types** 

Geographic Location

**Nominated Providers** 

# **EEI 92561**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED

# **EEI Description**

(U) Report on any (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI Keywords**

Targets

**Inactive Targets** 

**Source Formats** 

**Product Types** 

Geographic Location

**Nominated Providers** 

#### **EEI 92562**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED

**EEI Description** 

(U) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**EEI Keywords** 

**Targets** 

**Inactive Targets** 

Source Formats

**Product Types** 

Geographic Location

**Nominated Providers** 

**EEI 92563** 

Overall EEI Classification

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**EEI Keywords** 

**Targets** 

**Inactive Targets** 

**Source Formats** 

**Product Types** 

Geographic Location

**Nominated Providers** 

**Notices** 

# **OSCAR-MS**

# Standing

# Requirement 902650564

Domain

**Originating System** 

**Current State** 

**JWICS** 

OSCAR

ACCEPTED

# **Overall Requirement Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

# **Highest Desired Classification Level of Product**

# Requirement Title

(U//FOUO) Cyber Malign Foreign Influence Activities Targeting United States (U.S.) Political Parties, Processes, or Infrastructure

# Intelligence Topic

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# Category of Information Need

(U) Plans, Intentions, Motivation, Strategy, and Doctrine

# **Intelligence Topic Information Need**

b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **Local Tracking Codes**

# **Owning Organization**

DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Requirement Owner

Name: (b) (6) Email: (b) (6) (a) dhs.ic.gov Username: / Phone:

Requirement POCs

Name:

Email: (b @DHS.ic.gov

Name: @nsa.ic.gov

Title: Analyst Phone: (b) (6)

Title: Collection Requirements Manager

Phone: (6)

Collection Start Date 2019-03-27T00:00:00.000Z

**Collection End Date** 2021-03-31T00:00:00.000Z

Information Requested By 2020-03-27T00:00:00.000Z

Validation Date 2019-03-29T17:47:52.000Z

Background

(U//FOUO) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) are interested in reporting on foreign malign foreign influence activities targeting U.S. political parties, processes, infrastructure, or the U.S. electorate in the cyber domain. Reporting on foreign-backed cyber actors or foreign influence agents conducting activities in advance of United States elections is required to provide indications of activities or intentions to disrupt the U.S. electoral process, alter the election results or otherwise threaten the integrity of the U.S. electoral process. Additionally, we require reporting to identify disruptive or destructive cyber events against election infrastructure, including voter registration systems, voting machines, ballot transmission networks, and tabulation systems (e.g., deny access to data/systems, alter data/system/network, extract data, and destroy data/system). During the 2018 mid-term election primary season the Department of Homeland Security observed numerous examples of malicious cyber activity against state election networks using techniques designed to establish access, compromise data, or disrupt systems. US election networks in 2016 were targeted by a nation-state advanced persistent threat (APT), as well as cyber criminals and criminal hackers. Consistent among the various actors targeting election network infrastructure since 2016 has been the use of common tools and techniques complicating attribution to any specific entity or group. Reporting is required to identify the goals, strategy and doctrine driving foreign malign foreign influence activity against U.S. election processes. This includes how U.S. targets are determined, the level of supervision of the cyber activities (e.g. are the activities controlled, monitored, or independent), who the operators of the cyber activities are and who pays them for their work. These malign foreign influence activities include, but are not limited to: Operating on U.S. social media to promote narratives or generate controversy surrounding hot-button U.S. social issues, Hacking e-mails or social media accounts of political organizations or affiliated individuals, Stealing and selling or publicly releasing data related to political parties or candidates or masquerading as a U.S. individual or entity

#### Justification

(U//FOUO) Reports should take care to avoid the unnecessary collection of U.S. Person information and constitutionally protected activity, such as speech protected by the First Amendment. The nature of social media platforms and the ability to anonymize communication may make attribution to foreign influence actors and determination of malicious intent difficult. The use or amplification of particular messaging by foreign influence networks does not necessarily mean all similar content from within or without the networks is aligned with foreign actors. Absent definitive attribution of social media activity to a foreign influence actor, it may not be possible to know the extent to which many of the social media accounts are actual malicious actors versus U.S. Persons engaged in First Amendment-protected speech. Likewise, social media users disseminating overt foreign government statements, and foreign government-influenced media reporting, including those who are U.S. Persons engaged in First Amendment-protected activities, may be acting as unwitting agents of influence, and can have the same type

of effect, perhaps unintentionally, as foreign-controlled or –directed accounts, and there may be no malicious intent associated with their protected activity.

# **Intelligence Source**

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **Previous Research Conducted**

(U//FOUO) 902649982 L-C-2018-131

#### **EEI 91416**

# **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

#### **EEI Description**

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91417**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

#### **EEI Description**

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91418**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

#### **EEI Description**

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91419**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

**EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91420** Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91421 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91422** Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91423 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91424**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91425**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91426**

# **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91427**

# **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91428**

#### Overall EEI Classification

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI 91429 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91430 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91431 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91432** Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91433 Overall EEI Classification**

**EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91434 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91435** Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91436 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI 91437 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI 91438**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91439**

# **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91440**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI 91441**

#### Overall EEI Classification

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI 91442**

#### **Overall EEI Classification**

EEI Description
(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**EEI 91443** 

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

EEI Description
(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**Notices** 



# **OSCAR-MS**

# Standing

# Requirement 902651228

Domain

**Originating System** 

**Current State** 

**JWICS** 

**OSCAR** 

**ACCEPTED** 

# **Overall Requirement Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

# **Highest Desired Classification Level of Product**

TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN

#### **Requirement Title**

(U//FOUO) Violent Extremist and Domestic Terrorist Threats or Use of Violence Dangerous to Human Life

# **Intelligence Topic**

Terrorism

# **Category of Information Need**

(U//FOUO) I. Threats to the US Homeland, Key Resources, and Critical Infrastructure

# **Intelligence Topic Information Need**

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 1) Threats to the Homeland and US interests abroad to include facilities, infrastructure, and personnel

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 10) Cyber disruptions, threats of attacks on CIKR and SLTP networks

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 11) Implementation of terrorist plans, methods, targets and operations, including CBRN facilities

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 12) Efforts to evade/defeat security/safety measures at CIKR sites and high profile events

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 13) Evidence of efforts to research response procedures associated with facilities or events such as .swatting. or false alarms (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 14) Attack execution instructions referring to specific targets, timing, and tactics or weapons to be used

(U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 15) Individuals, groups, organizations, or networks outside or within the Homeland suspected of planning or executing attacks, or assisting, supporting, or facilitating foreign terrorists entering the Homeland (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 16) Activity associated with interest in or acquisition of weapons or vehicles by groups or individuals suspected to be radicalized to violent extremism

- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 2) Communications associated with terrorist operations
- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 3) Pre-attack training/dry-runs or testing of security
- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 4) Surveillance and casing (e.g., photography, fly-over, sketching maps, possession of structure/facility blueprints, use of stand-off listening devices)
- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 5) Attempted recruitment or radicalization of individuals with authorized access to sensitive facilities/areas or Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CIKR) who could conduct or enable an attack or who could acquire documents, uniforms, vehicles or other equipment that could facilitate access to sensitive facilities
- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 6) Activity associated with unexplained interest in or acquisition of explosives, hazardous materials, or equipment or electronic components used in the production of improved explosive devices (IEDs) (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 7) Travel and pre-positioning of equipment and personnel to staging areas
- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 8) Estimated maturity of attack planning or readiness to conduct the attack
- (U//FOUO) a. Indications and Warning of Imminent Attack 9) .Calls to action. or increased or intensified propaganda campaigns
- (U//FOUO) b. Indications of Mobilization Who are Suspected to be Radicalized to Violent Extremism
- (U//FOUO) b. Indications of Mobilization by Individuals Who are Suspected to be Radicalized to Violent Extremism 1) Display of increasingly intense negative attitudes towards targets or imputing inhuman qualities to targets
- (U//FOUO) b. Indications of Mobilization by Individuals Who are Suspected to be Radicalized to Violent Extremism 2) Justification for targeting and perceived obligation to act (against civilians or other)
- (U//FOUO) b. Indications of Mobilization by Individuals Who are Suspected to be Radicalized to Violent Extremism 3) Receiving social encouragement to take violent action from others, reinforcing violent extremist values
- (U//FOUO) b. Indications of Mobilization by Individuals Who are Suspected to be Radicalized to Violent Extremism 4) Statements regarding their ability to carry through with desired intentions
- (U//FOUO) b. Indications of Mobilization by Individuals Who are Suspected to be Radicalized to Violent Extremism 5) Pre-operational behaviors associated with impending death (e.g., completing last will and testament, giving possessions away)
- (U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process
- (U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process 1) Specific execution of attack, including Terrorist use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN-T): target, location, timing, tactics, weapons, and personnel
- (U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process 2) Identity and characterization of potential terrorist targets, terrorists preexisting knowledge of targets, and perception of target vulnerabilities and value to accomplishing their goals.
- (U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process 4) Events or

circumstances that could provoke an attack on US or western targets (U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process 5) Facilities, operations, or personnel under surveillance or other indicators of pre-operational planning. (U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process 6) Terrorist target preferences based on geographic location, physical target ownership characteristics, group/organization characteristics (e.g. nationality, religion, affiliations, lines of business/occupations)

(U//FOUO) c. Potential Terrorist Targets and Target Selection Process 7) Reference to or mention of facilities, operations or personnel, within propaganda or campaigns or radical media

# **Local Tracking Codes**

DHS-IA-TER.2 DHS-IA-TER.3

# **Owning Organization**

DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Requirement Owner

Name:

Email: (b) (6) @DHS.ic.gov

Requirement POCs

Name:

Email: dhs.ic.gov

Name: Christopher Martin Email: (6) adhs.ic.gov

**Collection Start Date** 

2020-09-03T00:00:00.000Z

**Collection End Date** 

2021-09-03T00:00:00.000Z

Username:

Phone: N/A

Phone

Title: N/A Phone: N/A

**Information Requested By** 

2021-09-03T00:00:00.000Z

Validation Date

2020-09-03T14:42:08.000Z

#### Background

(U//FOUO) Domestic terrorism is defined for the purpose of this collection requirement as any act of unlawful violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. This act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by and does not

take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power. DHS I&A analysts believe there are roughly 9 types of domestic terrorist groups that fit into three general categories. There are roughly three broad categories of domestic extremism that encompass the 9 DHS- defined domestic terrorist groups: racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups include white supremacist extremists, racist skinhead extremists, and black supremacist extremists; "Anti-Government" violent extremist groups included anarchist extremists, anti-government extremists, sovereign citizen extremists and militia extremists; "Single Issue" violent extremist groups include animal rights extremists, environmental rights extremists, and anti-abortion extremists.

- 1. Anarchist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society.
- 2. Anti-Government Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local law enforcement, other government officials, critical infrastructure or government facilities in order to affect the conduct of a government or influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, based upon their belief that their liberties are being taken away by the perceived unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate actions of government officials or law enforcement. Some form of this belief is common to several violent extremist ideologies, including sovereign citizen extremism and militia extremism; anti-government extremists differ from these other categories in that they do not subscribe to these violent extremist ideologies in total but often adopt elements of these ideologies, including the use of violence in furtherance of their ideology.
- 3. Black Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or integrate in acts of unlawful violence as a means to oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-Black people and Jewish people.
- 4. Militia Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure based upon their belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations, (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.
- 5. Racist Skinhead Extremists Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that facilitate, support, or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed towards the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people. Racist skinheads consider themselves to be the front-line soldiers of white supremacist extremists, and frequently distinguish themselves from other violent white supremacist extremists by a distinctive style of dress.
- 6. Animal Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals.

- 7. Anti-Abortion Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against the providers of abortion related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end.
- 8. Environmental Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.
- 9. White Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish people in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people.
- 10. Sovereign Citizen Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.

#### Justification

(U//FOUO) DHS I&A has a vested interest in understanding how individuals become radicalized and mobilized to violence. Domestic and homegrown violent extremist remain the largest threat to federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal government agencies and authorities, especially when an event is taking place that corresponds to their core ideology. Our mission is to assist federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal government agencies and authorities in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks against the United States relating to an existing or emerging threat of terrorism by advancing stakeholders' understanding of the pathways of radicalization to violence and how they might impact individuals or groups vulnerable to recruitment. All EEI's are referencing known or suspected domestic terrorists and those that have made direct threats to conduct violent attacks against persons or property within the United States, specifically against federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement or government personnel. Please follow the guidance listed for reporting procedures: 1. Please do not break up reporting if multiple EEIs are addressed on the same target. 2. Please identify in all reporting if target was previously cited or found in a previous report. 3. Please identify in all reporting any information that would indicate the target subscribes to or was motivated by violent extremist ideology. This requirement directly supports and helps answer the following PIR: DHS-IA-CVE.1.2: Which violent domestic extremist organizations or individuals pose a threat to federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal personnel, U.S. special events, and critical infrastructure?


#### **Previous Research Conducted**

(U) IC Reporting and requirement databases, OSCAR-MS.

**EEI 93968** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 



#### **EEI Keywords**

#### **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

**EEI 93969** 

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

EEI Description

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI Keywords**

#### **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

#### **EEI 93970**

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI Keywords**

**Nominated Providers** 


Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED


**EEI 93971** 

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 






# **EEI Keywords**

# **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

**EEI 93972** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



**EEI Keywords** 

**Nominated Providers** 


Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

#### **EEI 93973**

# **Overall EEI Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 



# **EEI Keywords**

#### **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

**EEI 93974** 

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

#### **EEI Keywords**


#### **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

#### **EEI 93975**


# **Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


**EEI Description** 



#### **EEI Keywords**

**Targets** 





(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)		



**Nominated Providers** 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

Notices

# **OSCAR-MS**

# Standing

# Requirement 902651278

Domain

**Originating System** 

Current State
ACCEPTED

**JWICS** 

**OSCAR** 

**Overall Requirement Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**Highest Desired Classification Level of Product** 

TOP SECRET//SI/TK

Requirement Title

(U//FOUO) Physical Threats to Election Security 2020

Intelligence Topic

Homeland Security

Category of Information Need

(U) Infrastructure and Facilities

**Intelligence Topic Information Need** 

(U) Information related to a significant degradation of any segment of the U.S. critical infrastructure

**Local Tracking Codes** 

DHS-IA-CYB.2 DHS-IA-TER.2

DHS-IA-TER.3

Owning Organization

DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Requirement Owner

Name: (b) (6) Email: (b) (6) @DHS.ic.gov

Username: (b) (6) Phone: N/A

Requirement POCs

Name: (b) (6)

Email: (b) (6) @dhs.ic.gov

Title: Collection Manager

Phone: (b) (6)

Name: (b) (6)
Email: (b) (6)

Name: (b) (6) Email (b) (6) Title: N/A Phone: N/A

Title: Collection Manager

Phone: (6)

Collection Start Date 2020-10-21T00:00:00.000Z

Collection End Date 2021-10-21T00:00:00,000Z Information Requested By 2021-10-21T00:00:00.000Z

Validation Date

2020-10-21T14:32:05.000Z

## Background

(U//FOUO) DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is seeking open source and publicly available Information (PAI) collection and reporting on both foreign and domestically derived physical threats to US election security in 2020. The potential physical threats to this year's election cycle are wide ranging and diverse. Physical threats could come in the form of individuals or groups attempting to destroy, corrupt or adulterate election systems, polling sites, and ballot delivery, storage, and tabulation processes. Other physical threats could be threats of violence to voters in the process of or attempting to vote, including to deny them access to polling stations, or attempts to incite violence against election infrastructure, as defined below. DHS I&A is also concerned about the potential for ideologically motivated threats or acts of violence to be directed at political parties, politicians, their staffs, and their supporters. DHS is concerned these violent threats present significant potential to endanger human life before, during, and after the elections.

(U//FOUO) Potential threat actors are also wide ranging and diverse. Some threat actors do not pose a violent threat to individual people. These threat actors may seek to access, steal, corrupt, destroy, or adulterate elections infrastructure, voting machines, and vote tabulation and ballot custody processes. Other threat actors, however, may seek to deny voter access to polling stations, threaten elections officials with violence, or incite or commit acts of violence directed at elections infrastructure, election officials, Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal (FSLTT) supporting agencies, adjacent supporting infrastructure and targeted violence against politicians, individuals associated or affiliated with political parties, and political supporters.

(U//FOUO) Threat actors could include but are not limited to insider threats, ideologically motivated violent domestic actors, foreign nation-state sponsored saboteurs, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), state and non-state sponsored foreign terrorists, lone offenders inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, foreign or domestically inspired domestic terrorists, and foreign-inspired Home-Grown Violent Extremists (HVE).

(U//FOUO) Regardless of the ideological motivation of the perpetrators, DHS I&A requires informational collection and reporting on physical threats to election infrastructure. This information will serve to provide early indicators and warnings to our FSLTT partners and inform key leaders and policy makers.

(U//FOUO) COVID-19 precautions may result in SLTT partner use of unconventional polling places such as various sports arenas and other large venues. All references to polling sites or places in the questions below include structures not traditionally used in years past as election infrastructure that are nevertheless currently properly designated as polling locations.

(U//FOUO) NOTE: DHS I&A does not seek collection and reporting on individuals engaging in the constitutionally protected exercise of free speech and assembly. DHS I&A only seeks collection and reporting on those threatening or attempting to incite acts intended to physically compromise election infrastructure security and integrity or those that threaten, attempt to incite violence, or engage in acts of violence dangerous to human life.

(U//FOUO) For the purposes of this requirement, "critical infrastructure" and "election infrastructure" specifically mean the Election Infrastructure sub-sector of the Government Facilities critical infrastructure sector. Election Infrastructure includes but is not limited to:

- Voter registration databases and associated IT systems
- IT infrastructure and systems used to manage elections (such as the counting, auditing and displaying of election results, and post-election reporting to certify and validate results)
- Voting systems and associated infrastructure
- Storage facilities for election and voting system infrastructure
- Polling places, to include early voting locations

Election Infrastructure does not include:

- Political action committees
- Campaigns
- Or any other non-state or local government election related group

#### Justification

(U//FOUO) DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) analysts require collection and reporting concerning physical threats to all aspects US Election Security in 2020. The information gathered in this effort will be used to provide early threat indications and warnings to our Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal (FSLTT) partners and enable analysis that informs key leaders and policy makers. Please report on foreign originating and domestic physical threats to free and fair elections in the Homeland.

#### Previous Research Conducted

(U//FOUO) IC Reporting, Open Source, and OSCAR-MS

**EEI 94304** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

# **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: **Targets** (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94305 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: **Targets** (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94306 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: **Targets** (U) Worldwide


# **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94307 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: **Targets** (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94308 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: **Targets** (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

## **EEI 94309**

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) Targets (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94310 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: **Targets** (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94311 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)



## **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

## **EEI 94314**

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**EEI Keywords** 

(U)

OR:

(b) (3) (A) (b) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**Targets** 

(U) Worldwide

**Nominated Providers** 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

## **EEI 94315**

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**EEI Keywords** 

(U)

OR:

(b) (3)

**Targets** 

(U) Worldwide

**Nominated Providers** 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

**EEI 94316** 

**Overall EEI Classification** 

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) Targets (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94317** Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** (U) OR: (b) (3) b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) Targets (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94318 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

**EEI Keywords** OR: (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) (U) **Targets** (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94319 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** OR: b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) (U) Targets (U) Worldwide **Nominated Providers** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED **EEI 94320 Overall EEI Classification** UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO **EEI Description** (U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) **EEI Keywords** OR: (U)



## **Nominated Providers**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - ACCEPTED

Notices

## **OSCAR-MS**

## Standing

## Requirement 902651317

Domain JWICS Originating System

OSCAR

Current State
VALIDATED

Overall Requirement Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

# Highest Desired Classification Level of Product TOP SECRET//NOFORN

## Requirement Title

(U//FOUO) Violent Extremist Methods to Recruit and/or Radicalize Others to Violence, and Plans to Conduct Acts of Violence

## Intelligence Topic

**Terrorism** 

## Category of Information Need

(U//FOUO) VIII. Radicalization and Countering Violent Extremism

## **Intelligence Topic Information Need**

(U//FOUO) a. Foreign Regional Stability and Foreign Nation Plans/Ambitions that may Influence Terrorists or Susceptible Populations

(U//FOUO) a. Foreign Regional Stability and Foreign Nation Plans/Ambitions that may Influence Terrorists or Susceptible Populations 1) Impact (positive and negative) of civil unrest and political events on terrorist activities

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 1)

Socioeconomic, family, cultural, interpersonal relationship and psychological factors

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 10)

Vulnerability of diasporas, immigrant and migrant communities to radicalization message

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 11) Known or suspected radicalizers, radicalization centers of gravity

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 12) Role of U.S. prisons, jails, detainment and detention facilities as a driver of radicalization

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 13)

Worldwide events or causes such as western CT and counterinsurgency operations to galvanize support among groups to include, ethnic diasporas and target audiences

(U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 2) Demographics and migration

- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 3) Ideology and religion
- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 4) Role of enablers of terror
- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 5)
- Resonance of extremist message and globalization of violent jihad movements
- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 6) Use of the Internet and social networking platforms
- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 7) Political factors (lawlessness, insurgencies) and the perception of state institutions
- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 8) Role of familial, personal, tribal or other connections, including the role of women
- (U//FOUO) b. Ideology and Sources of Radicalization Leading to Acts of Terrorism 9) Role of educational institutions, charities, or state-supported proselytization
- (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization
- (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization 1) Travel and immigration policies, regulations and enforcement capabilities that may affect the ability of terrorists to move across international borders (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization 2) Political, policy, and diplomatic efforts and programs to counter extremism
- (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization 3) Organization(s), personnel, doctrine, tactics, training, and funding
- (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization 4) International intelligence cooperation, especially with the US (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization 5) National policy intentions, objectives, negotiating positions, and actions likely to support or conflict with US counterterrorism strategies and goals (U//FOUO) c. Foreign Partner Government Strategies, Responses, and Support to Counter Extremism and Radicalization 6) Problems of corruption, terrorist sympathizers, and leaks (U//FOUO) d. Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization and Rehabilitation 1) Social, cultural,
- situational, ideological, or other factors that constrain or prevent the radicalization process (U//FOUO) d. Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization and Rehabilitation 2) Activities, methods, and mechanisms that support de-radicalization and counter-radicalization (U//FOUO) d. Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization and Rehabilitation 3) Individuals and organizations that effectively counter radicalization and prevent the mobilization of violent extremists
- (U//FOUO) d. Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization and Rehabilitation 4) Activities, methods, mechanisms, and programs that support rehabilitation of violent extremists (U//FOUO) d. Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization and Rehabilitation 5) Effectiveness of counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, and rehabilitation programs
- (U//FOUO) e. Counter-messaging to Undermine Violent Extremism
- (U//FOUO) e. Counter-messaging to Undermine Violent Extremism 1) Alternative views/themes

to violent extremism

(U//FOUO) e. Counter-messaging to Undermine Violent Extremism 2) Existing and emerging individuals and organizations that counter the extremist message

(U//FOUO) e. Counter-messaging to Undermine Violent Extremism 3) Effectiveness of counter-messaging efforts employed by state and non-state entities

(U//FOUO) f. Terrorist Reengagement

(U//FOUO) f. Terrorist Reengagement 1) Factors encouraging former violent extremists return to terrorism

(U//FOUO) f. Terrorist Reengagement 2) Organizations, networks, and command, control, and communications developed while in custody and utilized post-detainment

(U//FOUO) f. Terrorist Reengagement 3) Post-release recruitment of violent extremists to conduct terrorist attacks

(U//FOUO) f. Terrorist Reengagement 4) Instances of former violent extremists returning to terrorism

Local Tracking Codes DHS-IA-TER.2 DHS-IA-TER.3 DHS-IA-TER.5

Owning Organization
DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Requirement Owner

Name: (b) (6) (b) (6) Email: (b) (6)

Phone: (b) (6)

Requirement POCs

Collection Start Date 2020-11-03T00:00:00.000Z

Collection End Date 2022-11-02T00:00:00.000Z

Information Requested By 2021-11-03T00:00:00.000Z

Username: (b) (6)

Validation Date 2020-11-03T16:11:23.000Z

#### Background

(U//FOUO) Groups identified within this section are collectively referred to as "Violent Extremists." • Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. For the purpose of this requirement, this includes known or suspected terrorists who are believed to be members of such organizations. • Domestic terrorism is defined for the purpose of this collection requirement as any act of unlawful violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based

and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. This act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by and does not take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power. The DHS I&A Extremist Lexicon defines the following groups: o Anarchist Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society. o Animal Rights Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals. o Anti-Abortion Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against the providers of abortion related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end. o **Anti-Government Extremists** • Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local law enforcement, other government officials, critical infrastructure or government facilities in order to affect the conduct of a government or influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, based upon their belief that their liberties are being taken away by the perceived unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate actions of government officials or law enforcement. Some form of this belief is common to several violent extremist ideologies, including sovereign citizen extremism and militia extremism; anti-government extremists differ from these other categories in that they do not subscribe to these violent extremist ideologies in total but often adopt elements of these ideologies, including the use of violence in furtherance of their ideology. o **Black Supremacist** Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or integrate in acts of unlawful violence as a means to oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-Black people and Jewish people. o

Environmental Rights Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment. o Militia Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure based upon their belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations, (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government. o

Racist Skinhead Extremists - Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that facilitate, support, or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed towards the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people. Racist skinheads consider themselves to be the frontline soldiers of white supremacist extremists, and frequently distinguish themselves from other violent white supremacist extremists by a distinctive style

of dress. o Sovereign Citizen Extremists – Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws. o White Supremacist Extremists - Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish people in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people. Including those advocating a version of accelerationism. •

Homegrown violent extremists - A homegrown violent extremist (HVE) is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor. • Lone Offender – An individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor. Radicalization is defined as the process through which an individual changes from a nonviolent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use unlawful violence as a method to effect societal or political change. Note that the radicalization process could include conduct that on its own might be Constitutionally protected. Means of dissemination of violent extremist literature can include but are not limited to: finished publications (e.g. magazines, manuals, manifestos) disseminated online or in print; books; web forums; websites; blogs; social media; secured and/or unsecured messaging applications (apps); spoken word communications such as podcasts, radio and/or livestreaming across social media platforms. Means of radicalization can include but are not limited to finished publications (e.g. magazines, manuals, manifestos) disseminated online or in print; books; web forums; websites; blogs; social media; secured and/or unsecured messaging applications (apps); spoken word communications such as podcasts, radio and/or livestreaming across social media platforms. Types of violent extremist material can include but are not limited to finished publications; transcripts or screen captures of websites and/or web forums; discussion boards; transcripts of secured and/or unsecured social media applications (apps); social media; graffiti; iconography; translations; professional journals; captured or recovered documents; traditional media; polling and survey data; summaries of open source data; transcripts; electronic databases; maps and/or charts. Violent extremist incidents or activities can include foreign conflict targeting terrorist organizations; domestic and overseas attacks by violent extremists; disrupted attacks attributed to violent extremists.

#### .lustification

(U//FOUO) Understanding and combating radicalization within the United States remains a high priority for DHS I&A. It is critical that I&A analysts be notified and have immediate access to violent extremist publications, plans by violent extremists to cause a mass casualty event, plans by violent extremists to target critical infrastructure, emanating from organizations

(foreign or domestic) to determine if there is a direct or imminent threat to the Homeland.1 This material is of great use to DHS 1 Immediate access is defined as within 48 hours of publication and translated to English language if applicable. I&A analysts tasked with providing accurate and timely reporting through DHS leadership to federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector (FSLTTP) partners on changes to the Homeland threat picture. Please follow the guidance listed for reporting procedures: 1. Please do not break up reporting if multiple essential elements of information (EEI) are addressed on the same target. 2. Please identify in all reporting if target was previously cited or found in a previous report. 3. Please identify in all reporting any information that would indicate the target subscribes to or was motivated by violent extremist ideology.

### **Previous Research Conducted**

(U) (U) 1C Reporting and requirement databases, OSCAR-MS

EEI 94403


Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

EEI Description
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
EEI Keywords
(U//FOUO)

Targets
(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)









Inactive Targets

Source Formats

**Product Types** 


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Nominated Providers
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

**EEI 94404** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI** Description




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
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Targets









## Inactive Targets

### Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets

Social Media Polling Data

Blogs/Wikis

Theses/Dissertations Radio/Podcasting Internet Newsgroups

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization) Court/Property Records

Captured Documents

Product Literature

Proprietary Data (Corporate)

Maps and Charts

Commercial Databases

Books Graffiti Television

Remote Sensing Information

Newspapers & Journals

Conference Proceedings

Gray Literature Youtube/Webcams

Web Sites

Government Records Research Reports Subject Matter Expertise

Public Health Information

## **Product Types**

Summaries of Open Source Data

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Order of Battle reports News Media subscriptions

Full text Translations Maps and charts Video Analysis

Media analysis Foreign

Multi-Open Source analysis Website analysis **Electronic Databases** 

## Geographic Location

#### Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

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
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
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
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
**EEI Keywords** 

Targets









## Inactive Targets

Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets

Social Media

Polling Data

Blogs/Wikis

Theses/Dissertations Radio/Podcasting

Internet Newsgroups

(Academic, Think-Tank, Court/Property Records

Captured Documents

Product Literature

Proprietary Data (Corporate)

Maps and Charts

Commercial Databases

Books Graffiti

Television

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Remote Sensing Information Newspapers & Journals Conference Proceedings

Gray Literature Youtube/Webcams

TOULUOU W CO

Web Sites

Government Records Research Reports

Subject Matter Expertise

Public Health Information

Product Types

Summaries of Open Source Data

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions

Order of Battle reports News Media subscriptions Full text Translations

Maps and charts Video Analysis Media analysis Foreign

Multi-Open Source analysis

Website analysis Electronic Databases

Geographic Location

Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

EEI 94406


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
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
(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

EEI Keywords (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

Targets









# (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

## Inactive Targets

Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Product Literature Conference Proceedings

Social Media Proprietary Data (Corporate) Gray Literature
Polling Data Maps and Charts Youtube/Webcams

Blogs/Wikis Commercial Databases Web Sites

Theses/Dissertations Books Government Records
Radio/Podcasting Graffiti Research Reports
Internet Newsgroups Television Subject Matter Expertise

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Court/Property Records Remote Sensing Information Public Health Information

Captured Documents Newspapers & Journals

**Product Types** 

Summaries of Open Source Data Media analysis Foreign

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Source analysis
Order of Battle reports Maps and charts Website analysis
News Media subscriptions Video Analysis Electronic Databases

Geographic Location

Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED


**EEI 94407** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


(b)(3)(A),(b)(3)(B)


**EEI Keywords** 

Targets









Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Product Literature Conference Proceedings

Social Media Proprietary Data (Corporate) Gray Literature
Polling Data Maps and Charts Youtube/Webcams

Blogs/Wikis Commercial Databases Web Sites

Theses/Dissertations Books Government Records
Radio/Podcasting Graffiti Research Reports
Internet Newsgroups Television Subject Matter Expertise

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Court/Property Records Remote Sensing Information Public Health Information Newspapers & Journals

Product Types

Summaries of Open Source Data Media analysis Foreign

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Source analysis
Order of Battle reports Maps and charts Website analysis
News Media subscriptions Video Analysis Electronic Databases

Geographic Location

Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED


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
Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)









Source Formats
Pamphlets/Leaflets
Social Media
Polling Data
Blogs/Wikis
Theses/Dissertations

Product Literature
Proprietary Data (Corporate)
Maps and Charts
Commercial Databases
Books

Conference Proceedings Gray Literature Youtube/Webcams Web Sites Government Records

Radio/Podcasting

Graffiti

Internet Newsgroups

Captured Documents

Television

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Court/Property Records

Remote Sensing Information

Newspapers & Journals

Research Reports

Subject Matter Expertise

Public Health Information

Product Types

Summaries of Open Source Data

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Order of Battle reports News Media subscriptions Full text Translations Maps and charts Video Analysis

Media analysis Foreign

Multi-Open Source analysis Website analysis

**Electronic Databases** 

Geographic Location


Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

EEI 94409


Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** ) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)









# Inactive Targets

Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Product Literature Conference Proceedings

Social Media Proprietary Data (Corporate) Gray Literature
Polling Data Maps and Charts Youtube/Webcams

Blogs/Wikis Commercial Databases Web Sites

Theses/Dissertations Books Government Records
Radio/Podcasting Graffiti Research Reports

Internet Newsgroups Television Subject Matter Expertise

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Court/Property Records Remote Sensing Information Public Health Information

Captured Documents Newspapers & Journals

**Product Types** 

Summaries of Open Source Data Media analysis Foreign

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Source analysis
Order of Battle reports Maps and charts Website analysis

News Media subscriptions

Video Analysis

Electronic Databases

Geographic Location


Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

**EEI 94410** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI** Description











# Inactive Targets

Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Product Literature Conference Proceedings

Social Media Proprietary Data (Corporate) Gray Literature
Polling Data Maps and Charts Youtube/Webcams

Blogs/Wikis Commercial Databases Web Sites

Theses/Dissertations Books Government Records
Radio/Podcasting Graffiti Research Reports
Internet Newsgroups Television Subject Matter Expertise

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Court/Property Records Remote Sensing Information Public Health Information

Captured Documents Newspapers & Journals

**Product Types** 

Summaries of Open Source Data Media analysis Foreign

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Source analysis
Order of Battle reports Maps and charts Website analysis
News Media subscriptions Video Analysis Electronic Databases

## Geographic Location


Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

**EEI 94411** 

Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


EEI Description











# Inactive Targets

Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Product Literature Social Media

Gray Literature Proprietary Data (Corporate) Youtube/Webcams Maps and Charts Polling Data

Blogs/Wikis Commercial Databases Web Sites

Government Records Theses/Dissertations **Books** Radio/Podcasting Graffiti Research Reports Television Subject Matter Expertise Internet Newsgroups

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization) Court/Property Records Remote Sensing Information

Captured Documents Newspapers & Journals Public Health Information

Conference Proceedings

**Product Types** 

Summaries of Open Source Data Media analysis Foreign

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Source analysis

Website analysis Order of Battle reports Maps and charts News Media subscriptions Video Analysis Electronic Databases

Geographic Location

**Nominated Providers** 


Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

EEI 94412


Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


EEI Description











Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Product Literature Conference Proceedings

Social Media Proprietary Data (Corporate) Gray Literature
Polling Data Maps and Charts Youtube/Webcams

Blogs/Wikis Commercial Databases Web Sites

Theses/Dissertations Books Government Records
Radio/Podcasting Graffiti Research Reports
Internet Newsgroups Television Subject Matter Expertise

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)
Court/Property Records Remote Sensing Information Public Health Information

Captured Documents Newspapers & Journals

**Product Types** 

Summaries of Open Source Data Media analysis Foreign

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Sourc

Journal Subscriptions Full text Translations Multi-Open Source analysis
Order of Battle reports Maps and charts Website analysis
News Media subscriptions Video Analysis Electronic Databases

Geographic Location

Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

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
Overall EEI Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

**EEI Description** 





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
Targets











#### Source Formats

Pamphlets/Leaflets Social Media Polling Data Blogs/Wikis Theses/Dissertations Product Literature Proprietary Data (Corporate) Maps and Charts Commercial Databases Books

Conference Proceedings Gray Literature Youtube/Webcams Web Sites Government Records

Radio/Podcasting

Graffiti

Internet Newsgroups

Television

Subject Matter Expertise

Research Reports

(Academic, Think-Tank, Non-Government Organization)

Court/Property Records **Captured Documents** 

Remote Sensing Information Newspapers & Journals

Public Health Information

**Product Types** 

Summaries of Open Source Data

Language Transcripts

Journal Subscriptions

Order of Battle reports News Media subscriptions Full text Translations Maps and charts

Video Analysis

Media analysis Foreign

Multi-Open Source analysis

Website analysis **Electronic Databases** 

Geographic Location

Nominated Providers

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - NOMINATED

Notices

# Requirement ID ODHS2750002019 Tearline

Subject: OCR: Indications, Warning, and Targeting of U.S. Infrastructure with Cyber Operations (U/FOUO).

# Summary

(U//FOUO) Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Cyber Mission Center (CYMC) intelligence gaps related to malicious cyber activities that take place on state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector (SLTTP) networks. Reporting responding to this requirement supports the DHS/I&A/CYMC mission to deliver estimative analysis on cyber threats to SLTTP networks that usefully informs DHS leadership, DHS operational components, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, the Intelligence Community, and critical infrastructure owners/operators.

# Background


(U//FOUO) 1. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Cyber Mission Center (CYMC) seeks information on cyber activity (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(U//FOUO) 2. This information is intended to be used for intelligence purposes only, such as the development of classified or unclassified intelligence products for the US Intelligence Community (IC), DHS Intelligence Enterprise, cleared state, local and industry partners, and senior DHS leadership.

(U//FOUO) 3. DHS/I&A/CYMC analyzes, evaluates, and monitors reporting on emerging cyber threats to the United States and produces intelligence products related to those threats. CYMC's partners include Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as infrastructure in the public private sectors. CYMC analyzes the adversary's capability and intent to attack or exploit cyber systems, networks, or infrastructure based on Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and open source reporting. CYMC requests additional reporting to augment CYMC's ability to assess these threats.

(U//FOUO) 4. This requirement is intended to augment existing requirements and provide clarification on collection needs specifically relevant to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.

## Questions



(UIIFOUD) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) (UILFOUD)

# Requirement ID QDHS2400000720 Tearline

# Subject: U.S. BASED SPECIAL EVENTS RELATED TERRORIST INDICATIONS AND WARNING (U//FOUO).

#### Summary

(U//FOUO) National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and events with a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) are U.S.-based events of national or international significance that DHS assesses to be at a higher risk of being targeted for terrorist, transnational, or cybersecurity criminal activity related to the NSSE or SEAR event. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) requests reporting on indications and warning of threats to NSSEs and SEAR events.

## Background

(U//FOUO) 1. Federal, state, and local authorities plan special events and NSSEs every year to celebrate various holidays, memorials, or other significant occasions. A NSSE may be defined as a national or international, government, or privately sponsored event or gathering of national significance that is deemed by DHS to be a potential target for terrorist or transnational, or cybersecurity criminal activity. These events are often attended by thousands of U.S. citizens, key political figures, and foreign dignitaries.

(U//FOUO) 2. Domestic violent extremists, homegrown violent extremists, foreign terrorist organizations, and/or transnational criminal organizations may wish to exploit these events or use these events as an opportunity to target U.S. citizens, U.S. infrastructure, foreign leaders, disrupt continuity of operations within the government, or to draw greater attention to their cause. DHS is usually the lead Federal Department for the planning and execution of the security of these events. DHS works with other Federal partners as well as state and local partners to ensure the safety of these events. As such, DHS I&A requests reporting on indications and warning of potential threats to NSSEs and SEAR events to better inform and shape security operations of these events.

(U//FOUO) 3. The following are a few examples of events that have been designated as NSSEs or SEAR 1 or 2 vents. This list is not an exhaustive list and can change from year to year, but is meant to familiarize collectors to some of the types of events that are designated as NSSE or SEAR events: Presidential State of the Union Addresses; UN General Assembly; major holiday celebrations in some cities throughout the United States (Independence Day; New Years Eve, Macys Thanksgiving Day Parade, etc.); Democratic and Republican National Conventions; and major sporting events (the Super Bowl, Indianapolis 500, New York Marathon, Boston Marathon, Chicago Marathon, and the College Football Championship games etc.).

#### Questions



(U//FOUO)

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(U//FOUO)SN: QDHS340B001221

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Physical Threats Potentially Destructive to US Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Dangerous to Human Life

SUMMARY: (U//FOUO) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) seeks reporting on foreign originating and domestic physical threats targeting US Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) and foreign originating and domestic threats intended to endanger human life. DHS requires this information to provide early indictors and warnings to Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal (FSLTT) partners, and to inform key leaders and policy makers to safeguard human life and protect infrastructure and resources vital to Homeland security. Please report on foreign originating and domestic physical threats potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources and dangerous to human life.



(U//FOUO) Threat actors could include but are not limited to state sponsored saboteurs, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), state and non-state sponsored foreign terrorists, lone offenders inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, foreign and domestically inspired Domestic Terrorists (DTs), and foreign inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs). These potential foreign and domestic threat actors will be referred to hereafter in the questions below as

[foreign and domestic threat actors]

(U//FOUO) Definitions:

1. (U//FOUO) Critical Infrastructure: There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure.


(U//FOUO) The 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors are:


- -Chemical
- -Commercial Facilities
- -Communications
- -Critical Manufacturing
- -Dams
- -Defense Industrial Base
- -Emergency Services
- -Energy
- -Financial Services
- -Food and Agriculture
- -Government Facilities
- -Healthcare and Public Health
- -Information Technology
- -Nuclear Reactor, Materials, and Waste
- -Transportation
- -Water and Wastewater Systems
- 2. (U//FOUO) Trans National Organized Crime: Transnational Organized Crime refers to crime committed by self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption / violence or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. TOC networks vary widely in their structure, from loose affiliations of criminals, to centralized, hierarchical organizations.
- 3. (U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorism/Terrorist: Any act of unlawful violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. This act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by and does not take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power.


(U//FOUO) Types of Domestic Terrorism:

- A. (U//FOUO) Anarchist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society.
- B. (U//FOUO) Anti-Government Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local law enforcement, other government officials, critical infrastructure or government facilities in order to affect the conduct of a government or influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, based upon their belief that their liberties are being taken away by the perceived unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate actions of government officials or law enforcement. Some form of this belief is common to several violent extremist ideologies, including sovereign citizen extremism and militia extremism; anti-government extremists differ from these other categories in that they do not subscribe to these violent extremist ideologies in total but often adopt elements of these ideologies, including the use of violence in furtherance of their ideology.
- C. (U//FOUO) Black Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means to oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-Black people and Jewish people.
- D. (U//FOUO) Militia Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure based upon their belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations, (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.
- E. (U//FOUO) Racist Skinhead Extremists Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that facilitate, support, or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed towards the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people. Racist skinheads consider themselves to be the frontline soldiers of white supremacist extremists, and frequently distinguish themselves from other violent white supremacist extremists by a distinctive style of dress.
- F. (U//FOUO) Animal Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals.


- G. (U//FOUO) Anti-Abortion Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against the providers of abortion related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end.
- H. (U//FOUO) Environmental Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.
- I. (U//FOUO) White Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish people in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people.
- J. (U//FOUO) Sovereign Citizen Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.
- K. (U//FOUO) HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMIST (HVE): A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a FTO, but is acting independently of a FTOs direction. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.
- L. (U//FOUO) Lone Offender: An individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.
- REQMT: 1. (U//FOUO) Threats to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources







3. (U//FOUO) Threats to FSLTT Governmental Operations




4. (U//FOUO) Violence dangerous to human life directed against government or other Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (FSLTT) officials and destructive of critical infrastructure







5. (U//FOUO) Anti-Immigrant and Ethnic/Religious Violence



6. (U//FOUO) Land Use Issues Driving Violence



7. (U//FOUO) Threats to Aviation



E/C

# Intelligence Law Division Job Aid 2020-002: DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) Portland Surge Operation (July 9, 2020)

This job aid is provided in conjunction with the deployment of I&A Field Operations Division (FOD) and Current and Emerging Threat Center (CETC) personnel in support of I&A's "Portland Surge Operation." I&A is supporting federal, state, and local authorities responding to sustained violent attacks by Violent Opportunists (VOs) targeting law enforcement officers (LEOs) and federal buildings, as well as monuments and other statues within the city of Portland, OR. These attacks, seemingly conducted by Violent Opportunist (VO) actors, have been occurring sporadically since May 28, 2020. More recent attempts to incite further attacks, however, signal the near-term continuation/escalation of VO activities. As a result, I&A has decided to surge personnel to Portland immediately. While the scope of this job aid is limited to Portland Surge Operation deployments, it may relate more broadly to I&A intelligence activities undertaken in response to sustained VO activities occurring at other protests.<sup>2</sup>

**Your Reasonable Belief**. As a first matter, to engage in any intelligence activity addressed in this job aid, you must have a reasonable belief that it supports a mission described below. Concluding your belief is reasonable is an individual obligation and must be based on information available to you. You yourself are responsible for articulating your conclusion. You establish reasonable belief as follows:

- By supporting your reasonable belief with facts and circumstances you can articulate.
- By avoiding relying on "hunches" and intuitions, which are insufficient.
- By basing your reasonable belief on your own experience, training, and knowledge, while being able to state how you have applied your expertise to the facts before you.

<u>Appropriate Missions</u>. This job aid applies to intelligence activities in furtherance of one or more of the following missions<sup>3</sup> in the context of recent protests:

- 1. Threats of or actual violence to law enforcement personnel, facilities, or resources;
- 2. Threats of or actual violence against other individuals (including lawful protestors); and
- 3. Threats of or information related to damaging, destroying, or impeding the functions of government facilities.

<u>Appropriate Intelligence Activities:</u> You may access intelligence or information where you reasonably believe that viewing it would further one or more of the missions described above,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Portland Surge Operation CONOPS, Civil Unrest – Threats to Law Enforcement/Federal Facilities (July 7, 2020).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In addition to FOD personnel, I&A is also seeking to deploy Open Source Collections Office (OSCO) personnel to Portland. Previous guidance provided to OSCO applies to these individuals' activities (*see* July 2018 memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) Intelligence Law Division (ILD) and the June 2020 job aid). However, should these OSCO personnel be surged to support FOD's efforts, this job aid would apply to their activities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Note this guidance in no way limits how I&A personnel execute other missions in accordance with the Attorney General-approved Office of Intelligence and Analysis Intelligence Oversight Guidelines (IO Guidelines) (Jan. 11, 2017).

and may collect, retain, and report it only in accordance with the sections below. However, you are prohibited from engaging in any intelligence activity for (1) the **sole purpose** of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other Constitutional or legal rights, or (2) for the **purpose** of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent. Following this job aid can help you steer clear of such Constitutional concerns.

#### 1. Collecting, Retaining, and Reporting Information from Law Enforcement Partners

Collection. To proceed from access to collection of information you are required to use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible and may **intentionally** collect United States Persons Information (USPI) only where you reasonably believe it (1) furthers a national or departmental mission **and** (2) will result in permanently retainable USPI.

You may collect from law enforcement partners—state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) as well as Federal LEOs—so long as you do so overtly.

Retention. Any properly collected USPI can be permanently retained so long as it meets one of the standard or supplemental information categories in I&A's IO Guidelines.<sup>4</sup> Any USPI collected that does not (1) further a national or departmental mission and (2) meet an information category must be purged for operational purposes within 180 days of collection.

Dissemination.<sup>5</sup> Any permanently retained USPI may be disseminated to other elements of DHS, to federal, state, local tribal, or territorial (FSLTT) government entities with law enforcement (LE), counterterrorism (CT), or national or homeland security related functions, or to private sector entities or individuals with responsibilities relating to homeland security **only** where you have a reasonable belief that such a dissemination would assist the recipients in fulfilling one or more of their lawful intelligence, LE, CT, or other homeland security-related functions.

#### 2. Collecting, Retaining, and Reporting Information from Individuals in Custody

Collection. You may also collect from incarcerated, detained, or arrested persons so long as you do so overtly. Overt collection from such sources requires that you disclose at the outset to these individuals that you are employed with the United States Government. I&A policy further requires that you state to them that you are an employee of DHS, and also inform them that their participation is voluntary, that your interview can be terminated by either of you at any time, and that they will receive no preferential treatment in speaking with you and have no right to edit your notes. These requirements are especially important to remember in the context of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See IO Guidelines at 11-15. Note that these information categories track with the exemption codes in HOT-R and CHROME.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The dissemination rules described here and below apply regardless of the format of dissemination, including by email, orally, or informally passing information. Note also that any internal transmission of information (to I&A headquarters) in the form of a Daily Rollup, for instance, would not be considered a dissemination under the IO Guidelines.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See IA-907-00, Overt Human Collection Program at 9 (June 29, 2016).

interviewing sources who may be facing criminal charges and who might think they could curry favor with law enforcement by engaging voluntarily with I&A.

Retention. Any properly collected USPI can be permanently retained, so long as it meets one of the standard or supplemental information categories in the IO Guidelines.<sup>7</sup> Any USPI collected that does not (1) further a national or departmental mission and (2) meet an information category must be purged for operational purposes within 180 days of collection.

Dissemination. Any permanently retained USPI may be disseminated to other elements of DHS, to FSLTT government entities with LE, CT, or national or homeland security related functions, or to private sector entities or individuals with responsibilities relating to homeland security **only** where you have a reasonable belief that dissemination would assist these recipients in fulfilling one or more of their lawful intelligence, LE, CT, or other homeland security-related functions.

#### 3.. Additional Support to Law Enforcement Partners and Other Activities

As set forth in the IO Guidelines, assistance to law enforcement and other civil authorities beyond that described above—including the provision of technical support and specialized equipment—requires coordination with and approval in each case by ILD.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, I&A may not engage in physical surveillance, except for limited counter-intelligence purposes involving other I&A personnel or applicants not relevant to this job aid.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>IO Guidelines at 11-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See id. at 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See id. at 7.



# (U//FOUO) Collection Posture: Violent Extremist and Domestic Threats to Critical Infrastructure or Use of Violence Dangerous to Human Life

06 January 2021



(U//FOUO) This Collection Posture was prepared by the I&A Collection Management Division to highlight standing all-source DHS requirements and outputs aligned to the primary areas of focus related to violent extremist and domestic threats or use of violence dangerous to human life and critical infrastructure.



#### HUMINT

# (U) Requirements:

(U//FOUO) QDHS340B001221: Physical Threats Potentially Destructive to US Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Dangerous to Human Life


(U//FOUO) XDHS340001021: Physical Threats to US Election Infrastructure and Human Life

(U//FOU0) ODHS2750002019: Indications, Warnings, and Targeting of U.S. Infrastructure with Cyber Operations

(U//FOUO) QDHS150A001521: Worldwide Threats from Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

(U//FOUO) QDHS2400000720: U.S. Based Special Events Related Terrorist Indications and Warning

(U) Essential Elements of Information:



# **OSINT**

# (U) Requirements:

(U//FOUO) 902651228: Violent Extremist and Domestic Terrorist Threats or Use of Violence Dangerous to Human Life

(U//FOUO) 902641519: Potential Targets of Malicious Cyber Attacks (threats against LE, military, federal government, or local/state government)

(U//FOUO) 902650883: Threats of targeted, nonideologically motivated violence to eight Commercial Facilities Critical Infrastructure Sub-sectors

(U//FOUO) 902651317: Violent Extremist Methods to Recruit and/or Radicalize Others to Violence, and Plans to Conduct Acts of Violence

(U//FOUO) 902650564: Cyber Malign Foreign Influence Activities Targeting United States (U.S.) Political Parties, Processes, or Infrastructure

(U//FOUO) 902651278: (U//FOUO) Physical Threats to Election Security 2020

(U) Essential Elements of Information:



# **SIGINT**

## (U) Requirements:

(U//FOUO) DHS Authored SIGINT Information Need (Classified)

(U//FOUO) Sponsoring element to Dept of State Information Needs (Classified: Ongoing)

# **GEOINT**

(U//FOUO) DHS Authored GEOINT Information Need (Classified)

(U//FOUO) Commercial Imagery Support Requests

(U) Proposed Focus Topics As Requested:

- (U//FOUO) Security Planning
- (U//FOUO) Response Efforts
- (U//FOUO) Post Event Damage Assessments

# **Collection Deliverable**

## (U) Collection Primers:

(U//FOUO) DHS Collection Primer - Extremist Threats, Use of Violence in the US

- (U) Focus: Identify and report on threats to the Homeland posed by Violent Extremist and Domestic Terrorist Threats or Use of Violence Dangerous to Human Life in the United States.
  - (U) Exploitation of lawful protests and civil unrest
  - (U//FOUO) Violence dangerous to human life
  - (U) Violent extremism
  - (U//FOUO) Anti-immigrant and ethnic/religious violence
  - (U) Perceptions of government overreach driving violence
  - (U//FOUO) Foreign malign influence/disinformation campaigns

(U//FOUO) DHS Collection Support Primer - Counterterrorism Mission Center State

 (U//FOUO) Focus: Terrorist Travel, Motivations, Targets, and Tactics.

# Extremist Threats, Use of Violence in the US COLLECTION PRIMER

Office of Intelligence & Analysis Collection Management Division

JULY 2020












(U//FOUO) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Collection Management Division prepared this Collection Primer to assist DHS Enterprise elements and Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal (SLTT) partners in identifying and reporting threats to the homeland posed by Violent Extremist and Domestic Terrorist Threats or Use of Violence Dangerous to Human Life in the United States.



(U//FOUO) We are additionally concerned that some (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) (b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B) . This information will assist DHS

in better understanding nation state adversaries and foreign non-state actors who seek to exploit crises in the US. This information is required to answer DHS Priority Intelligence Requirements and enable analysis to inform key leaders and decision makers in the Homeland.

(U//FOUO) The nation has experienced violence or significant threats of violence that endanger human life from domestic terrorists and violent extremists over the past several years. Flashpoint issues that may spur violent acts that endanger human life include violence against minority groups and government entities, or anger over perceived government overreach. In addition, ideologically motivated violence against minority groups, such as the 2015 shooting of a predominantly African American church in Charleston, SC and a disrupted 2016 plot targeting Muslim communities and mosques in Kansas demonstrate the threat of violent extremist attacks against ethnic and religious groups and places of worship.

(U) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) WARNING: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY(U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need-to-know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official.







(U//FOUO) Whether you are an Intelligence Officer, Reports Officer, Counterintelligence professional, investigator, law enforcement professional, or another Federal, state, local, territorial or tribal employee who observes any of the following activities or behaviors, DHS I&A will benefit from your reporting to your local Homeland Security entity.

#### **General Definitions**

**TERRORISM:** Any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

**DOMESTIC TERRORISM**: An act of unlawful violence, or a threat of force or violence, that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and is intended to effect societal, political, or other change, committed by a group or person based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories. Unlike homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), domestic terrorists are not inspired by a foreign terrorist group.

**FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO)**: A foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity or terrorism or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity and terrorism, which threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States regardless of whether the group has been placed on the U.S. Department of State's Foreign Terrorist Organization List.

**RADICALIZATION:** The process through which an individual changes from a non-violent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use unlawful violence as a method to effect societal or political change.

(U//FOUO) This document conveys no authority to engage in law enforcement or intelligence activities outside of preexisting authorities. Recipients of this document are reminded to operate within their lawful and proper authorities. Questions regarding authorized activities should be addressed to your designated agency legal advisor.



#### **Violent Extremist Definitions**

**HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMIST (HVE):** A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a FTO, but is acting independently of a FTO's direction.

**ANARCHIST EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society.

**ANIMAL RIGHTS EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals.

**ANTI-ABORTION EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence against the providers of abortion-related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end.

**ANTI-GOVERNMENT EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local law enforcement, other government officials, critical infrastructure or government facilities in order to affect the conduct of a government or influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, in response to their belief that their liberties are being taken away by the perceived unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate actions of government officials or law enforcement.

**BLACK SUPREMACIST EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means to oppose racial integration, to eliminate non-black or Jewish people, or to enact revenge upon police related/officer involved shootings of African-Americans.

**ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.

**MILITIA EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure in response to their belief that the government is deliberately stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal authorities' laws and regulations (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups.


**SOVEREIGN CITIZEN EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.

WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISTS: Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.

**RACIST SKINHEAD EXTREMISTS:** Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that facilitate, support, or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed toward the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.







#### (U) Exploitation of Lawful Protests and Civil Unrest

(U//FOUO) DHS is interested in behaviors involving exploitation of lawful protests to engage in violence dangerous to human life, to include domestic terrorists or violent extremists' using protests as cover for acts of violence against law enforcement personnel or persons engaging in activities protected by the U.S. Constitution, or furtherance of their illegal activities. Report known or suspected Domestic Terrorist exploitation of civil unrest to engage in violence against U.S. law enforcement or against others engaging in activities protected by the U.S. Constitution, or any communicated plans or intentions of individuals or groups to engage in acts of violence dangerous to human life against law enforcement personnel or critical infrastructure.

(U//FOUO) Identify and report on domestic terrorists, or violent extremists' efforts to incite violence through the use of misinformation; plans or intentions to violently coopt legal protests to foment rioting or engaging in violence; or stated or perceived plans or intentions to usurp peaceful activities protected by the U.S. Constitution to move (forward a violent agenda.

(U//FOUO) The Department is interested in instances of instances of radicalization where domestic terrorists or violent extremists have expressed or written how their beliefs, including conspiracy theories, motivated them to commit or threaten violence, or acquire or attempt to acquire weapons, explosives, or explosive precursor material in order to commit violence in furtherance of those beliefs. Include personally identifiable information (PII) of violent extremists if available. We are additionally concerned that some violent extremist acts may shut down

(U) U.S. persons linking, citing, quoting, or voicing the same arguments raised by these influence activities likely are engaging in First Amendment-protected activity, unless they are acting in concert with a threat actor. Furthermore, variants of the topics covered in this product, even those that include divisive terms, should not be assumed to reflect foreign influence or malign activity absent information specifically attributing the content to malign foreign actors.



(U) Responses to this collection request should only include PII if there is a reasonable belief that the persons being reported on acted unlawfully and to the detriment of homeland security. Collection of PII should generally be avoided in the course of observing and reporting of intelligence information, unless explicitly permitted by law and policy. The PII of individuals peacefully exercising their rights under the US Constitution should not be collected or reported. If DHS personnel or partners have any question about what PII may be reported, they should contact their respective privacy officer, legal counsel, or the DHS Privacy Office.



or endanger even minimal government operations. This information will assist DHS in better understanding transnational criminal organizations, nation state adversaries, and foreign non-state actors who seek to exploit crises in the US.

# (U) Timely Information to Provide for Appropriate Response

(U//FOUO) Helpful information to assist with an appropriate government response includes information on violent actions of individuals or groups to the extent they are so disruptive they endanger the minimal operations of state and local governments to protect from, respond to, or otherwise address.

#### (U//FOUO) Violence Dangerous to Human Life

(U//FOUO) DHS is interested in information

regarding violence dangerous to human life when it is directed against government or other Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (FSLTT) officials and infrastructure, including ideologically motivated violent threats directed against government officials or law enforcement, including threats to arrest, kill, shoot, detain, or forcefully remove, any government official; details of ideologically motivated attacks dangerous to human life against law enforcement or government officials. Include PII of violent extremists if available.

(U//FOUO) Information related to individuals conducting suspicious surveillance, such as individuals attempting to photograph or access restricted or sensitive areas, or individuals who

(U//FOUO) Include information on target selection and methodology, including specific locations, buildings, people, modes of transportation, or information systems. Include information about what characteristics were considered when selecting a location for attack.

have expressed plans to endanger the life of personnel or potentially destroy critical infrastructure is also of interest.

(U//FOUO) Share and describe suspicious incidents of apparent or intentional damage, destruction, manipulation, or dismantling of critical infrastructure operational components or equipment where the

intention or motivation of the perpetrator could reasonably be believed to be to interrupt service, endanger human life or potentially destroy critical infrastructure, conduct surveillance, or evade or hinder security.

#### **Provide for Government Response**

#### (U//FOUO) Topics of interest include:

- Threats to critical infrastructure and key national resources;
- Significant threats to the national economic security, national public health, or national public safety;
- Violence or disorder of such magnitude that it hinders the execution of the laws of that State, or the laws of; the United States within that State, to such a degree as to deprive any individuals of rights or protections guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution;
- Threats of such severity and magnitude that they exceed State and local government capabilities such that federal assistance would be necessary and authorized as a matter or law; and
- Major disasters and catastrophes.



(U//FOUO) The Department is interested in any known or suspected plans, intentions, capabilities, motivations, preparations, strategies, or goals of individuals or groups plotting to attack US FLSTT law enforcement and/or government, or critical infrastructure targets.

Describe violent extremist ideologies whose adherents advocate, plan, facilitate, or engage in specific acts of violence dangerous to the lives of US FSLTT law enforcement and/or government personnel, or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure targets.

(U//FOUO) DHS is also interested in individuals conducting online research, target selection, or other preparation online in order to plan or carry out a terrorist attack against US FSLTT law enforcement and/or government, or critical infrastructure, including the methods used to conduct research and describe any results or findings.

(U//FOUO) The Department is interested in the theft, loss, suspicious purchase, manufacture,

(U//FOUO) Identify and report on Violent Extremists or Domestic terrorists' plans, policies, and intents to incite violence dangerous to human life to FSLTT partners and potentially destructive of critical infrastructure, for example:

- Efforts damage, interrupt, or destroy critical infrastructure and lines of communication.
- Threats to destroy or impact the minimal operations of federal and FSLTT government buildings and facilities.
- Threats or acts of violence dangerous to human life against federal and FSLTT civil servants and LE personnel.
- Threats or acts of terrorism against the local population and businesses.

or other suspicious acquisition of uniforms, vehicles, or access keys that could be used to circumvent security or allow access to restricted or otherwise sensitive critical infrastructure locations to enable their destruction. Provide details of plans to acquire and/or use uniforms or vehicles as part of preparation for or conducting of an attack, as well as the theft, loss, or other suspicious acquisition of blueprints or other proprietary or sensitive materials that could assist malicious actors in preparing for or conducting an attack by providing information on critical infrastructure security measures or vulnerabilities.

(U) The Federal Government has a role in addressing terrorism and targeted violence when the severity and magnitude of an attack would overwhelm the capacity of State and local government prevention, protection, and response efforts. The Federal Government primarily does this through informing, training, and equipping our SLTT partners. The capabilities or capacity developed from Federal investments also benefit other aspects of SLTT partners' missions. For example, enhanced analysis and information-sharing capabilities may be invested in by the Federal Government to ensure we have an effective two-way information sharing capability between SLTT and the Federal Government to share terrorism threat information, but the capability may also be leveraged by the SLTT partner to address local criminal challenges.

-- Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, Sept. 2019



#### (U) Violent Extremism

(U//FOUO) DHS is interested in planned illegal acts or suspicious activity in preparation or execution of violence dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure by any *violent extremists* (anarchist, anti-government, militia, animal rights, sovereign citizen, anti-abortion, environmental rights, white supremacist, black supremacist) who threaten law enforcement with physical acts of life-endangering violence because of their extremist views. Examples include, the making, acquiring, or researching of explosives or

explosive material for these purposes. The Department will benefit from information regarding violent encounters between law enforcement officials and these extremists, including during traffic stops or calls to residences that resulted from violent beliefs where such causation is supported by actual evidence (e.g., words or statements by the offender, or physical evidence). Include PII of violent extremists if available.

(U//FOUO) Report attempts to destroy, disrupt, impede the regular working order of, deny access to, or shut down critical infrastructure—including government facilities—through violent threats or armed takeover.

#### (U) Anti-Immigrant and Ethnic/Religious Violence

(U//FOUO) The Department is interested in incidents of ideologically motivated violent threats or attacks incited by adversarial nation state actors against the lives of specific ethnic or religious groups and/or organizations, violent threats to life through intimidation tactics such as armed confrontations or mock "interviews" (also termed "inspections") by violent extremists at places of worship, community centers, or similar institutions used by or identified with immigrant, religious, or ethnic groups, and incidents of violent extremists planning or preparing for the forceful, violent, or illegal removal of ethnic or religious groups from a locality, as well as violent criminal acts such as arson or assault when they endanger human life directed against ethnic or religious groups and related facilities by ideologically motivated actors. Describe incidents of adversarial nation state actors encouraging, planning or preparing for the forceful, violent, or illegal removal of ethnic or religious groups from a locality.

#### (U) Perceptions of Government Overreach Driving Violence

DHS would benefit from details of unsanctioned or illicit events planned on or adjacent to government land or facilities through the use of force or violence by domestic terrorists or violent extremists that endangers human life, poses a threat of destruction of critical infrastructure, or otherwise endangers government operations.

(U//FOUO) DHS would benefit from information on domestic terrorist or violent extremist threats, plots, or actions endangering human life related to violent extremists' perception of government overreach, to include those related to the use of federal land, against federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials or agencies with opposing views. Include PII of violent extremists if available.



#### (U//FOUO) Foreign Malign Influence/Disinformation Campaigns

(U//FOUO) The Department is interested in any foreign malign influence and disinformation (foreign political, military, or intelligence entities and personalities) efforts threatening or encouraging, executing or supporting acts of violence against Federal or SLTT employees, officials, infrastructure, private entities and individuals, or protestors; efforts to incite violence, foment public unrest, or encourage racially or ideologically motivated acts of violence; the nature of influence and disinformation messaging, objectives, processes and infrastructure used for dissemination, and the target audience for the influence/disinformation efforts.

(U//FOUO) Identify and report on foreign malign influence and disinformation efforts i.e.

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (3) (B)

with the intent to threaten or incite violence against them; foreign malign influence/disinformation efforts to mischaracterize Federal and SLTT partner responses to crises and events to sow distrust of government, foment public unrest, or incite violence; and foreign individuals, entities, and platforms disseminating foreign malign influence/disinformation to include, but not limited to biographical information, addresses, phone numbers, emails, and preferred communication applications.



(U//FOUO) Increased information sharing with colleagues and partners to the widest extent possible is essential for collection efforts. Information responsive to this primer should be reported to your local DHS field intelligence officer for collating and analysis in collaboration with Federal partners and law enforcement agencies throughout the Nation.

(U) You can contact the Collection Management Division—to request assistance or ask questions—using the following email address: (b) (6)



# (U) COLLECTION SUPPORT PRIMER (CSP) - Counterterrorism Mission Center

MAY 2020



(U//FOUO) The Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC) serves as the Department's information hub; enabling a unified and coordinated approach to protect the Homeland from targeted violence and terrorism threats, both foreign-inspired and domestic.\* I&A is your primary medium to report state and local intelligence to the Intelligence Community and greater Federal Government. If you have information that you believe may meet any of the collection foci below, please contact your local FBI JTTF and I&A field intelligence officer located at your local FBI field office or state or major urban area fusion center.

# **Terrorist Travel**

(U//FOUO) Terrorists may attempt to conceal their movements across international and domestic points of entry. This movement could offer security partners insight into terrorist pattern of life, facilitation networks, operations, or targets.

# **Collection Focus**

(U//FOUO) How are terrorists attempting to enter the United States?



# **Terrorist Radicalization, Motivations**

(U//FOUO) Expression of terrorist intent and access to sources of information used to radicalize potential terrorists may offer an early detection point to disrupt aspiration plotting. The means that terrorist use to communicate their violent ideologies may to inform security partners of potential indicators.

## **Collection Focus**

(U//FOUO) What societal, economic, media, or geopolitical factors or influences motivate terrorist activity and what is the earliest possible point of identification for potential radicalization to violence attacks?

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radicalization to violence attacks?

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# **Terrorist Targets**

(U//FOUO) Terrorist targets can be physical facilities/critical infrastructure, public spaces, groups or individuals Terrorist expression of interest in specific targets or analysis or previous attacks can provide insight to our security partners to equip them to detect, prevent, disrupt, protect and mitigate damage from future attacks.

#### **Collection Focus**

(U//FOUO) What targets are of specific interest to terrorists and how do we best share this information with security partners?

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# **Terrorist Tactics**

(U//FOUO) Provide assessments of terrorist access to the means to conduct an attack, including commercially available products, emerging technology, or direct material support. Sharing previous and emerging tactics and techniques enables security partners to refine indicators.

#### **Collection Focus**

(U//FOUO) What tactics, techniques and procedures are used by terrorists to conduct attacks within the Homeland?

# **Opportunities for Collection**



International information Technical and sharing partnerships scientific studies



Engagements: State, local and private sector partners, critical infrastructure operators, professional forums, and working groups



OUTPUT: Timely, accurate, relevant, accessible all-source analysis of terrorist threats to the Homeland Security Environment



Open Source terrorist-affiliated social media; terrorist manuals describing tactics, techniques and procedures



technology manufacturers

Private sector emerging Cla



Classified Sources and Methods

\*(U//FOUO) Definitions and thresholds for targeted violence currently are being coordinated across I&A's analytic, policy, and field operations offices.

Policy and legal guidance



October 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CURRENT AND EMERGING THREATS CENTER

FROM:

Joseph B. Maher Julia Mul.
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis

SUBJECT:

Temporary Procedures for Review of Civil Unrest and Certain Election-

Related Raw Intelligence

Background: We anticipate that the period leading up to, including, and immediately following the presidential election on 3 November may give rise to physical violence, civil unrest, and other threats related to the election, as well as to federal personnel and locations. Given the role of the Current and Emerging Threats Center (CETC) in collecting open source intelligence within the United States, we likely will generate increased reporting on such issues. At the same time, we recognize that this mission space carries sensitivities and complexities that are not always anticipated or that do not lend themselves to bright line advanced guidance. Civil unrest and election- or voter-related issues often invoke U.S. Persons and First Amendment-protected activity.

To ensure all open source collectors have the necessary resources and guidance to achieve their mission, CETC will implement a pre-dissemination review of all open source intelligence reports (OSIRS) on election-related threats, and any other threats or acts of violence encountered or observed in conjunction with civil unrest arising during this time period, to serve as an additional safeguard to meet valid collection requirements and all legal and oversight standards.

Guidance: Beginning 1 November, all OSIRs will undergo pre-release review, per the below steps, when they contain authorized intelligence information and pertain to any one of the following activities: (i) civil unrest in the United States, (ii) civil disobedience or protest, (iii) threats of violence to critical infrastructure in the United States, including election infrastructure (as defined in requirements) and government resources, and (iv) election-related issues (as further outlined in the following requirements). This specifically includes reports aligned to OSINT: 9026512281 and 902651278.2 Serialized reports excluded from review are reports focused solely on existing validated foreign malign influence agents conducting influence activities targeting United States political parties, processes, infrastructure, or the United States electorate in the cyber domain (i.e., specifically excluding OSINT: 9026505643 and 9026512894).

<sup>(</sup>U//FOUO) Violent Extremist and Domestic Terrorist Threats or Use of Violence Dangerous to Human Life

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> (U//FOUO) Physical Threats to US Election Security 2020

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> (U//FOUO) Cyber Malign Foreign Influence Activities Targeting US Political Parties, Processes, or Infrastructure

<sup>4 (</sup>U//FOUO) Lead Generation Requirement

Prior to release, CETC will send draft OSIRS related to the election or associated civil unrest for coordination with the Collection Management Division (CMD), Office of General Counsel-Intelligence Law Division (ILD), and the Intelligence Oversight Officer (IOO).

- CMD will validate requirements and Essential Elements of Information citations and recommend any modifications, as necessary.
- ILD will review for compliance with I&A authorities and legal sufficiency.
- IOO will otherwise ensure compliance with I&A Intelligence Oversight Guidelines.
- ILD and IOO will individually communicate clearance or comments directly back to CETC.

This process in no way limits a collector from consulting with CMD, ILD, and IOO on any topic, including those specified above, at any time prior to, during, or following the drafting of any report.

To ensure timeliness, CMD, ILD, and IOO will operate under expanded hours, be on-call, and hold daily synchronization calls for I&A collectors. CMD, ILD, and IOO will provide operational leadership with a roster of contacts for collections personnel to call or email with exigent questions.

Nothing addressed in these temporary procedures is intended to preempt, interfere, or otherwise be carried out in a manner inconsistent with I&A's Intelligence Oversight Guidelines. Any violation of these temporary procedures shall be reported as a Questionable Activity in accordance with IA-1000 and the I&A Intelligence Oversight Program.

All I&A personnel shall have direct access to ILD, CMD, and IOO without needing pre-approval to seek and receive advice from those offices.

Requirement ID XDHS340001021 Tearline

SUBJ: Physical Threats to US Election Infrastructure and Human Life (U//F0U0).

SUMMARY: (U//FOUO) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) seeks reporting on foreign originating and domestic physical threats targeting US elections in 2020. DHS requires this information to provide early indictors and warnings to Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal (FSLTT) partners, inform key leaders and policy makers, and to secure free and fair elections in the Homeland. Please report on foreign originating and domestic physical threats dangerous to human life and or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources which directly or indirectly support the conduct of elections in 2020.

EXPYRMO: (U) 20210201.

BACKGD: 1. (U//FOUO) DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis requests intelligence collection on foreign entities and their agents (specifically persons acting under foreign entity direction or control), foreign terrorists, domestic terrorists, and Home-Grown Violent Extremists physically threatening, inciting, or committing acts of violence dangerous to human life and directed at all aspects of US Election Infrastructure. I&A analysts are interested in all foreign and domestic-originating physical threats and threats of violence incited by foreign and domestic entities intended to destroy, damage, or corrupt physical elections infrastructure, or deny voter access to physical elections infrastructure by threats of violence dangerous to human life. These targets could include, but are not limited to polling stations, voting machines, poll workers/volunteers, election officials, the mail in ballot supply chain and chain of custody in its entirety, voters, demographic groups, and adjacent supporting infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and telecommunications networks. I&A analysts also request reporting on any foreign and domestic originating physical threats or acts of violence incited against political parties, candidates, staff, and their supporters before, during, and following the conclusion of voting in 2020. These potential foreign and domestic threats will be referred to hereafter in the questions below as [foreign and domestic threats.]

(U//FOUO) Threat actors could include but are not limited to state sponsored saboteurs, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), state and non-state sponsored foreign terrorists, lone offenders inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, foreign and domestically inspired Domestic Terrorists (DTs), and foreign inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs). These potential foreign and domestic threat actors will be referred to hereafter in the questions below as [foreign and domestic threat actors.]

(U//FOUO) Definitions:

1. (U//FOUO) Critical Infrastructure: There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating

effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. For the purposes of this requirement, critical infrastructure specifically means the Election Infrastructure subsector of the Government Facilities critical infrastructure sector. Election Infrastructure includes but is not limited to:

-Voter registration databases and associated IT systems
-IT infrastructure and systems used to manage elections (such as
the counting, auditing and displaying of election results, and
post-election reporting to certify and validate results)
-Voting systems and associated infrastructure
-Storage facilities for election and voting system infrastructure
-Polling places, to include early voting locations

(U//FOUO) Election Infrastructure does not include:

- -Political action committees
- -Campaigns
- -Or any other non-state or local government election related group
- 2. (U//FOUO) Trans National Organized Crime: Transnational Organized Crime refers to crime committed by self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption / violence or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. TOC networks vary widely in their structure, from loose affiliations of criminals, to centralized, hierarchical organizations.
- 3. (U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorism/Terrorist: Any act of unlawful violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. This act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by and does not take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power.

(U//FOUO) Types of Domestic Terrorism:

- A. (U//FOUO) Anarchist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society.
- B. (U//FOUO) Anti-Government Extremists: Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local law enforcement, other government officials,

critical infrastructure or government facilities in order to affect the conduct of a government or influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, based upon their belief that their liberties are being taken away by the perceived unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate actions of government officials or law enforcement. Some form of this belief is common to several violent extremist ideologies, including sovereign citizen extremism and militia extremism; anti-government extremists differ from these other categories in that they do not subscribe to these violent extremist ideologies in total but often adopt elements of these ideologies, including the use of violence in furtherance of their ideology.

- C. (U//FOUO) Black Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence as a means to oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-Black people and Jewish people.
- D. (U//FOUO) Militia Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure based upon their belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities laws and regulations, (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.
- E. (U//FOUO) Racist Skinhead Extremists Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that facilitate, support, or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed towards the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish people. Racist skinheads consider themselves to be the frontline soldiers of white supremacist extremists, and frequently distinguish themselves from other violent white supremacist extremists by a distinctive style of dress.
- F. (U//FOUO) Animal Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals.
- G. (U//FOUO) Anti-Abortion Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against the providers of abortion related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end.
- H. (U//FOU0) Environmental Rights Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.
- I. (U//FOUO) White Supremacist Extremists Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish people in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by

Jewish people.

- J. (U//FOUO) Sovereign Citizen Extremists: Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.
- K. (U//FOUO) HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMIST (HVE): A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a FTO, but is acting independently of a FTOs direction. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.
- L. (U//FOUO) Lone Offender: An individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.
- M. (U//FOUO) Physical Threats: For the purposes of this requirement, [physical threat] means any act of violence dangerous to human life or a physical act that causes the potential destruction or theft of, tampering with, or impeding access to Election Infrastructure, as defined in this requirement.

(U//FOUO) COVID-19 precautions may result in the use of unconventional polling places such as various sports arenas and other large venues. All references to polling stations, sites, or places in the questions below include structures not traditionally used in years past as election infrastructure that are nevertheless currently properly designated as polling locations.

