

(U) Prepared by the Counterterrorism Mission Center. Coordinated within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (CBP, CWMD, ICE, TSA, USCG).
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§ 2-534(a)(3)



Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Ferraro, Alexandra (HSEMA) </O=DC GOVERNMENT/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=AA04E9A90A014BE29A48AD566D9D0015-ALEXANDRA>

Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 8:17 AM

To: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET); Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); §2-534(a)(2) (MPD); Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); Hawkins, Derron (FEMS); Gilliard, Darrell K.; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; stephebj@nctc.gov; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Michael_Libby@nps.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO); Cardella, Alex; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Andres, Alyse; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil; Barbieri, Michael (MPD); Phillips, Steve; Dillon, Joseph; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; John.Erickson@uscg.gov; ADonald@wmata.com; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; paige.vandenneever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; Cook, James A.; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); usman.saleem@uscg.gov; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Chite, Mark; Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA); elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; MICHAEL EBEY (PID); Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Jackson, Keishea (FEMS); Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Lay, Amy L.; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; john.donohue@uscg.gov; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; john.nugent@uscg.gov; david.millard@uscg.gov; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Mccray, Jonice; douglas.m.trippary.mil@mail.mil; Delegan, John; Mein, John (EOM); Harvin, Donell (HSEMA); Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); Waller, Markiest; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA)

Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI); Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI); WF-ID-INCIDENT-2; Loftus, Ashlea (WF) (FBI); Kukowski, Jed (WF) (FBI)

Subject: RE: SITREP from OPE17 Jan and bulletin on DVE Use of Amateur HAM Radios

Attachments: image001.png; image002.png; (U--LES) 1500 SITREP 18 Jan.pdf; (U--LES) NTIC 2000 SITREP 18 Jan .pdf

Categories: Green

Good morning all,

Sharing the past two NTIC sitreps FYSA.

Thank you!

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Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 7:56 AM

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Subject: RE: SITREP from OPE17 Jan and bulletin on DVE Use of Amateur HAM Radios

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Subject: SITREP from §2-534(a)(3), 2-534(a)(10)

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Subject: Muriel Bowser Threat and conspiracy theories

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From: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>

Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:50 AM

To: §2-534(a)(2) <[§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov)> <[§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov)>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Michael.Libby@nps.gov <Michael.Libby@nps.gov>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil <William.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO) <richard.rogers@usss.dhs.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO) <christina.fabac@usss.dhs.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@usss.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@usss.dhs.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil <Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil>; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov <Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; John.Erickson@uscg.gov <John.Erickson@uscg.gov>; ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; paige.vandenhoeffer@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <paige.vandenhoeffer@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil <Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov>; Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; MICHAEL EBEEY (PID) <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; Mark.varanelli@nps.gov <Mark.varanelli@nps.gov>; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil <marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov <Keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov

<Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; john.donohue@uscp.gov <john.donohue@uscp.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil <Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil>; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov <Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov>; john.nugent@uscp.gov <john.nugent@uscp.gov>; david.millard@uscp.gov <david.millard@uscp.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@usss.dhs.gov>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov <jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov>; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil <douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil>; Deegan, John <john.deegan@uscp.gov>; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil <wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil <lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil>; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>
Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI) <HLEE5@FBI.GOV>; Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI) <psbrown@fbi.gov>; WF-ID-INCIDENT-2 <WF-ID-INCIDENT-2@ic.fbi.gov>

Subject: 1/17 Inauguration Virtual Command Post

Good morning. 2-534(a)(3)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thank you
Hope


-


On Jan 13, 2021 1:56 PM, "MICHAEL EBEEY (PID)" <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov> wrote:

>
> All –
>
> Please see the attached USSS Protective Intelligence Assessment for the 59th Presidential Inauguration.
>
> Please do not disseminate this product outside your agency without contacting Steve Phillips or myself.
>
>
>
> Thank you
>
>
>
> Mike Ebey
>
> § 2–534(a)(2)
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>
>
>

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA) <david.l.graves6.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 7:13 AM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: LE-1 [MAY CONTAIN USPER INFO]
Attachments: [DHS NOC] Operational Summary--NOC Media Monitoring--19 January 2021 (0330).pdf; USCG Daily OPSUM 18 January 2021.pdf; FEMA National Situation Report 01-19-21 (0300 ET).pdf; La Vergne K9 officer dies after being shot in deadly shootout.pdf; CDC COVID-19 Guidelines - What's New 01-19-2021.pdf; Ohio police officer fatally shot in standoff with arson suspect - Fox News.pdf; PoliceOne Law Enforcement News 01-19-2021.pdf; DMWA210119.pdf; (U_LES) Officer Safety_Threat to Texas Capitol_SWEDENBURG.pdf; NYPD_Weekend Terrorism Brief_18 January 2021.pdf; U_LES_VFC SITREP 21-15_ 2021 General Assembly Lobby Day.pdf; 20210118_US_Capitol_Riot_Likely_to_Inspire_Further_Criminal_Activity.pdf; 01-19-2021 DailyIntelBriefing (FOUO_LES).pdf

Categories: Green

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2-534(a)(3)



§ 2-534(a)(3)

Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)

To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: FW: [DHS NOC] Operational Summary--NOC Media Monitoring--19 January 2021 (0330)

From: NOC Media Monitoring
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 3:29 AM
Subject: Operational Summary--NOC Media Monitoring--19 January 2021

MEDIA MONITORING OPERATIONAL SUMMARY (OPSUM)

24 Hour Summary, January 19, 2021

TODAY'S OPSUM COVERS THE FOLLOWING NOC PRIORITIES

- **NOC Priority Items with New Information**
 - COVID-19 – U.S. < #COVID >
 - Presidential Inauguration – Washington, DC < #presidentialinauration >
 - Southwest Border Operations – U.S. Southwest Border < #border >
- **Other Significant Events**
 - Security Incident U.S. Capitol – Washington, DC < #capitol >
 - Global Terrorism < #Terrorism >
- **NOC Priority or Numbered Items with Nothing Significant to Report**
 - Southwest Border Events with U.S. Homeland Security Implications
 - CBRNE Threats/Incidents Targeting U.S. Interests
 - Mass Migration in the Caribbean with U.S. Homeland Security Implications
 - Global Aviation Cargo Incidents Targeting U.S. Interests
 - Suspicious Activity Reporting:
 - Religious, Cultural, and Educational Facilities
 - Postal Shipments
 - National Critical Infrastructure
 - Mass Transit
 - Mass Gatherings and Special Events

NOC 0051-20: COVID-19 – U.S.

United States

- As of 1:22 a.m. ET Tuesday, the United States has confirmed a total of 24,074,657 coronavirus cases and 398,981 deaths, according to Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins University (COVID-19 Map) < Caution-
[1](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Frnjqnnh&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151656914%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWlJoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=vMRg7w3xHqSf4xGYcpz%2BuhNppaz5hTSaQR%2FJjBRrlt4%3D&reserved=0 >• <i>It took 304 days for the United States to reach its first 12 million COVID-19 cases and only 59 days to reach the second 12 million mark, according to Johns Hopkins University data (Social Media)Twitter [cnnbrk] < Caution-</i></div><div data-bbox=)

<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4o935my&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151666909%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=GVjIAsi%2FEmua%2F2yHRA86yU5O4OkHlGt4KjlpMWpGjeQ%3D&reserved=0> >

- On Sunday, the country logged under 200,000 new cases in a 24 hour period for the first time in two weeks (Social Media) Twitter [ABC News] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy2mg3dxc&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151666909%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=ZVmXgm69FU6BUT6qa8OwSLpBruWPk0RAYM7H00%2B1kJA%3D&reserved=0> >

California

- California has surpassed the three million mark of coronavirus cases, according to a tally by NBC NewsKXAS < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy6gkvdkq&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151676907%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Jdjme%2FyqNjYuxON0QD8nrHSdGXKwHibPXv3nxB%2Fk2vw%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The state confirmed 3,007,420 cases and 33,595 deaths Sunday night
 - The state reported 432 deaths on Sunday, a day after recording the second-highest daily count of 669, according to the California Department of Public Health
- California health officials are recommending a temporary halt to distribution of a particular lot of Moderna's COVID-19 vaccine out of concern over allergic reactions KABC < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4pmgzfx&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151676907%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=pGWpNp2PfpUsnkM90nfB%2FN9vM55sMRI%2BVHvmSBRUW%2FI%3D&reserved=0> >
 - More than 330,000 doses of the particular lot were distributed to 287 health-care providers across California earlier this month
 - One community vaccination clinic reported up to 10 allergic reactions to the vaccine within a 24-hour period, considered an unusually high number
 - State officials say the expected rate of reaction to similar vaccines is normally around one in 100,000

Maryland

- As the reported number of infections continue to spike in Maryland, so are hospitalizations, media reported on SundayWBFF < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4srrj8j&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151686897%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=F5tkN4q1LzH9K6nc2xwraoIIQ5L75Lk5TPsn%2BytUkDA%3D&reserved=0> >
 - "Our hospital utilization rates remain very high with ICUs at 91 percent capacity and our acute care units following closely behind at 90 percent capacity," said a Baltimore health official
 - "We are at a level of COVID-19 hospitalizations that is higher than we have seen since the pandemic," a health official said

- The official said that currently the state has about 10 percent hospital capacity available, as more than 7,000 COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 patients occupy the little over 8,000 beds in the state hospital system

Utah

- The Utah Department of Health is reporting seven new coronavirus-related deaths in Utah since its release of Sunday numbers, bringing the total in the state to 1,500 Deseret News < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy2jm8ml6&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151696893%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=gW0XBKLfan0%2Fao3dU2QzkiEliVaockMFrj51XUBr6ZA%3D&reserved=0> >
 - 568 people remain hospitalized, with intensive care beds at or near capacity
 - The rolling seven-day average for positive tests is 2,154 per day with a 21.1 percent positive test average
 - The state has reported 324,919 positive coronavirus cases since the beginning of the pandemic

Virginia

- The Virginia Department of Health reported its highest daily increase of COVID-19 cases so far, with nearly 10,000 new coronavirus cases along with 23 new COVID-19 deaths for Sunday WAVY < Caution-
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- The commonwealth is at its highest seven-day average of new cases, reporting roughly 5,778 new cases per day CNN < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy67rrq43&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151706888%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=5zyDYLyQr%2BXwi7RCBsj45UYoh45vhtYKDPXUoq8k9OY%3D&reserved=0> >
 - New cases have risen by 15 percent since last week

Brazil

- China's Sinovac Biotech said on Monday that a clinical trial in Brazil showed its COVID-19 vaccine was almost 20 percentage points more effective in a small sub-group of patients who received their two doses longer apart Reuters < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5wozz3w&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151706888%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=pS1GVEjykoQqn2uPMaQL6cpAX96STeMd3Mi5cAJ0QU%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The protection rate for 1,394 participants who received doses of either CoronaVac or placebo three weeks apart was nearly 70 percent, a Sinovac spokesman said
 - Brazilian researchers announced last week that the vaccine's overall efficacy was 50.4 percent based on results from more than 9,000 volunteers, most of whom received doses 14 days apart, as outlined in the trial protocol

Cuba

- Cuba reported a record of 650 new COVID-19 cases on Sunday, according to the country's health ministry CNN < Caution-
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6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151716879%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZs b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000 &sdata=wR6%2Fq4fvwFIAd2c5rWInTpg9GTNZiHPV%2B2FkgiY95A4%3D&reserved=0 >

- o The Caribbean island nation also recorded four new deaths Sunday
- o Cuba's total number of COVID-19 cases as of Sunday stands at 18,151
- o The country has also recorded a total of 170 coronavirus deaths since the start of the pandemic, according to official data

France

- France is expanding its vaccination campaign Monday to allow anyone over the age of 75 to be inoculated CNN < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyyclu7tw&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151716879%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZs b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000 &sdata=5KHweuGCF48HICtaoK9QkqQclDvC2yL1wa08FdGt4%2BE%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - o Previously, only residents of nursing homes and medical staff aged 50 and over were eligible to receive a vaccine
 - o The new phase of the nationwide push comes as the country's coronavirus death toll surpassed 70,000 over the weekend

Germany

- Germany has administered coronavirus vaccine doses to at least 1,048,160 people, according to the country's disease control agency, the Robert Koch Institute CNN < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy6qx257m&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151726876%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=sZaila4UfIPUbZ8AxkSkacMXDFWDz%2F6hh0wcNEf7QBs%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - o To date, there have been 2,040,659 confirmed cases of the virus in Germany, with another 7,141 added on Sunday, according to the institute's dashboard
 - o Another 214 fatalities were also recorded Sunday, bringing the country's death toll to 46,633

Norway

- Norway will ease some coronavirus restrictions after extra measures in place for the past two weeks seem to have had the desired effect, the country said on Monday Reuters < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy52kuaan&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151726876%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZs b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000 &sdata=v3tUF%2BZGzyqg7rFliz8mUP7nTuFLcZWQEkBbTsThKY%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - o Norway will ease some restrictions and allow households to receive up to five visitors, while schools will also face lighter restrictions, with less reliance on remote learning
- Norway had 4,642 new cases of COVID-19 in the week ending January 10, a record high, according to data from the Norwegian Institute of Public Health

Pakistan

- Pakistan's Drug Regulatory Authority has granted approval for the use of a vaccine developed by Sinopharm, a state-run Chinese firm CNN < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyxshy6tj&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151736867%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZs b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000 &sdata=ABuflwtkBbK9wRBOw9W5rcKaQgrcotIws0nARQltnI%3D&reserved=0 >>

Philippines

- Coronavirus infections in the Philippines have surged past 500,000 in a new milestone, with the government facing criticism for failing to immediately launch a vaccination program amid a global scramble for COVID-19 vaccines Associated Press < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy6ozv55b&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151746861%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=f6iiZA4H6MnAzF3plB%2Fa2iDIwy3VWqF3x0xcCj48m58%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The country's Department of Health reported 1,895 new infections Sunday, bringing confirmed coronavirus cases in the country to 500,577, the second highest in Southeast Asia
 - There have been at least 9,895 deaths

Russia

- Russia plans to vaccinate more than 20 million people against COVID-19 in the first quarter of this year, an official said Monday Reuters < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5o5khk9&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151746861%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=jS6jmFc8jOr4MEjwP2PdIHt8lsZA3bsN39K4QQLoXpE%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The official added that Russia, which has registered two vaccines against the virus, plans to register a third vaccine on February 16

United Arab Emirates

- The United Arab Emirates reported 3,471 new coronavirus cases on Monday, the highest daily number of infections recorded since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic Al Arabiya < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy3ask5mc&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151756853%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=GvXUHTyOhusMw%2B%2FvUQXVMuvyXZuNoFjgUuZtHdNZaFc%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The country's health ministry also recorded 2,990 recoveries and six COVID-19 related deaths on Monday

Worldwide

- As of 1:22 a.m. ET Tuesday, there were 95,555,763 coronavirus cases and 2,040,669 related deaths worldwide, according to Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins University (COVID-19 Map) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Ffrnjqnnh&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151756853%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=TZ29G9IIqZBIMT3MMhja2srrlk2fsZfM5lMm%2B7JQHSQ%3D&reserved=0> >

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NOC 1060-20: Presidential Inauguration – Washington, DC

- *The FBI privately warned law enforcement agencies Monday that far-right extremists have discussed posing as National Guard members in Washington, D.C., and others have reviewed maps of vulnerable spots in the city (Social Media)Twitter [The Washington Post - Reporter] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy62d88jc&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151766853%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=oPEhlzAI15JB8f7Vc6bFlVIXVidzzVPOUCYoxII1N0nU%3D&reserved=0> >*

- *In a summary of threats in a Monday intelligence briefing, the FBI warned that both "lone wolves" and adherents of the QAnon extremist ideology have indicated that they plan to come to D.C. for the inauguration (Social Media)*
 - *People affiliated with QAnon have shown interest in infiltrating security checkpoints at the inauguration, according to the report (Social Media)*
- *The FBI also said it had observed people downloading and sharing maps of sensitive locations in D.C. and discussing how those facilities could be used to interfere in security during the inauguration (Social Media)*
- *The intelligence briefing did not identify any specific plots to attack the inaugural events (Social Media)*
- A senior U.S. Department of Defense official said Monday that there is "no intelligence indicating an insider threat," but National Guard members arriving in D.C. for the inauguration are being vetted by law enforcement for the inauguration CNN < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4q2xeuo&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151776846%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=uJjUSzecqEROF29Sd52qtYDaINV4XRV%2FCcW1uNKKuKbI%3D&reserved=0> >
- Amtrak said it is taking extra steps to ensure the safety of employees and customers in Washington, D.C., and across the nation ahead of the presidential inauguration WAVY < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyy8y3p4q&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151776846%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=EkO4ZvhYDhQajRsw4Vj3oAWLpXWz8ys72gjMc6dDHkE%3D&reserved=0> >
 - Detours, as well as pedestrian and traffic patterns, have been put in place around Union Station in Washington, D.C.
 - Officials are increasing police enforcement to ensure strong compliance, remove non-complying customers, and ban those that don't follow Amtrak's policies
- Hundreds of Oklahoma National Guard Members are in Washington, D.C., to help with inauguration security procedures, media reported Monday KOTV < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy3mz35ls&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151786841%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=aklFXnnhi4bQnpe6TVQzT6Y9RMiOgHMGkbKCryO%2Bevc%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The troops departed for the nation's capital from the Will Rogers Air Base early Sunday morning local time
- *More than 620 Indiana National Guard members have departed for Washington, D.C., to assist with the presidential inauguration, according to the National Guard Bureau Sunday (Social Media) Twitter [National Guard] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyy98bc5m&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151786841%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=tCukeCYVI5ENAC9b2ClmnJd2iIoRrRbyleB9Ms0fWSO%3D&reserved=0> >*
- *Forty-five Miami-Dade Police Department officers from Florida have flown to the nation's capital to assist in security efforts during the presidential inauguration (Social Media) Twitter [wsvn] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy43w7kcm&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151796832%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6IjEhaWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=aklFXnnhi4bQnpe6TVQzT6Y9RMiOgHMGkbKCryO%2Bevc%3D&reserved=0> >*

Zsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000
&sdata=iAG2hUIq3jJvcz5Z0%2BI21KK97cxClEyEF7NcQY147wY%3D&reserved=0 >

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NOC 0602-18: Southwest Border Operations – U.S. Southwest Border

- *The President of the United States (POTUS) extended the national border emergency until February 2022 as a number of Central American migrants appear to be heading to the U.S.-Mexico border area via caravans (Social Media)Twitter [The Epoch Times] < Caution-*
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4xpc3ny&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151796832%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=lXKHZN1%2Bmyhd6bzC1PStmbTR%2FkirWdJWTrPk6ssByRo%3D&reserved=0 >
 - *The announcement cited threats to national security, including the effect of the pandemic (Social Media)*
 - *The extension continues the emergency that POTUS declared in February 2019 (Social Media)*
- On Monday, Guatemalan security forces cleared a road where hundreds of people in a migrant caravan, comprised mostly of Hondurans, had camped out overnight when authorities banned the caravan from advancingReuters < Caution-
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy383ufub&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151806826%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=C0XXmuXfEq4yVHqyjxjtqHniA6ZuTLigUOkOI9Up%2Fw%3D&reserved=0 >
 - Media reported that officers responded with tear gas as they attempted to drive the group back towards the Honduran border, clearing the road for trucks
 - The group was said to be approximately 8,000 people advancing toward the United States from HondurasFrance 24 (AFP) < Caution-
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4gyvo3l&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151816823%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=yeHBpI9D42V4ckDvFFWDn2fS1atwbOMnqkT5pRpu2fQ%3D&reserved=0 >
 - Approximately 2,000 of the group installed themselves on the road after they clashed with Guatemalan security forces on Sunday
 - On Monday, Guatemalan migration authorities said that more than 1,500, including 208 children, have since returned to Honduras
 - Some 800 people were stuck in a neighboring town to Vado Hondo
- On Sunday, the Honduran government asked Guatemala “to investigate and clarify the actions carried out by the Guatemalan security forces” EFE < Caution-
*https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-
www.efc.com%2Fefe%2Famerica%2Fsociedad%2Fhonduras-exhorta-a-guatemala-investigar-represion-
contra-migrantes%2F20000013-4442535&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151816823%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=yHy1x1IKexM%2FfT1FvAVrgOWXyXC3dp4iEn4ocxZGgA%3D&reserved=0 >* (Translated by Google) < Caution-
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftranslate.google.com%2Ftranslate%3Fhl%3D%26sl%3Des%26tl%3Den%26u%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252FCaution-

www.efe.com%252Fefe%252Famerica%252Fsociedad%252Fhonduras-exhorta-a-guatemala-investigar-represion-contra-migrantes%252F20000013-4442535&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151826820%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=0wKUwMMcaK3NM%2FGTncq0Bt%2FEUKUDsmTe45u789RufGk%3D&reserved=0 >

- A motorist ran over two Honduran migrants in Usumatlan, Guatemala; all three were taken to the Regional Hospital of Zacapa Explica < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcaution-www.explica.co%2Ftwo-hondurans-and-two-guatemalans-are-injured-in-accidents-related-to-the-migrant-caravan%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151826820%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=M1BuQLynv3pwCyZsDuz2oWuCsLUiCRcXYPzHaMm0BUk%3D&reserved=0> > (Translated by Google) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftranslate.google.com%2Ftranslate%3Fsl%3Des%26tl%3Den%26u%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fcaution-www.explica.co%2Ftwo-hondurans-and-two-guatemalans-are-injured-in-accidents-related-to-the-migrant-caravan%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151836814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=iZlw5aY4swScLXYQUyTZIMr1VErr3aZxXSgwF6bZ4bI%3D&reserved=0> >
- Separately, a journalist covering the progress of the migrants was run over by a vehicle and taken to the same hospital

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Other Significant Events

NOC 0378-20-2: Security Incident U.S. Capitol – Washington, DC

- A Pennsylvania woman accused of being one of the Capitol rioters told a former "romantic partner" she planned to steal a laptop computer from a member of Congress' office and sell it to Russian intelligence, court documents revealed MondayNBC News < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5w2uxs3&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151846806%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=vwZpaMqbXqQ96ej4EXLEhrzelWkNif6qFmZv%2Ft0YX84%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The former partner called the FBI and told them she "intended to send the computer device to a friend in Russia, who then planned to sell the device to SVR, Russia's foreign intelligence service"
 - An FBI special agent says the device and circumstances of what the woman was doing with it remain under investigation
- A Silver Spring, Maryland, man, who prosecutors say is a professed white supremacist, was arrested on Sunday for his alleged connection with the U.S. Capitol security incident, media reported MondayDCist < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4ltmju7&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151846806%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=vwZpaMqbXqQ96ej4EXLEhrzelWkNif6qFmZv%2Ft0YX84%3D&reserved=0> >

b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000
&sdata=EgxCZD3jPIeTXMvx8YuErKw7zGnmAFzQdPN82detcXo%3D&reserved=0 >

- He admitted to being a member of several white supremacy groups, and has "voiced homicidal ideations, made comments about conducting a school shooting and has researched mass shootings" and has also "made increased verbalizations about his desire to be a 'lone wolf killer'"
- A Wiley, Texas, man was arrested in connection with the security incident at the U.S. Capitol on charges of obstruction and knowingly entering a restricted building or grounds without lawful authority, media reported MondayWFAA < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy3u2uka5&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151856799%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=x4bAy6%2FtD1gqNHI0cA%2BB06qOrt3wUCHwESwTLi1TtA0%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - Authorities believe the man is a member of "a militia extremist group" and allege he threatened members of his family following the attack
- A New Mexico county commissioner was charged Sunday in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for breaching the U.S. Capitol grounds on January 6, the U.S. Department of Justice reported (Social Media)Twitter [FBI] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy64bgkwb&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151856799%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=0%2BX1xHSy8XJPPP8Z7fGGsh5sKXF2S3PJsTVGuTogLW8%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - Law enforcement received a tip that the man was present at the U.S. Capitol on January 6 and had posted videos to his Facebook page indicating that he intended to return to Washington, D.C., on January 20 and "plant our flag" on a member of Congress' desk (Social Media)
- A Kentucky man was arrested Saturday in Louisville on multiple charges related to the storming of the U.S. Capitol, federal authorities said (Social Media) Twitter [WKRN] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy6o4y46n&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151866800%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=5wk5%2FCiqMlBil6jcLwM24%2BxTtlexPqVi00EgDoOMVPg%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - He was charged with assault on a federal officer, certain acts during a civil disorder, destruction of government property over \$1,000, obstruction of justice, unlawful entry on restricted building or grounds, violent entry, and disorderly conduct on Capitol grounds (Social Media)
- An Indiana man was arrested on Sunday in connection with the U.S. Capitol riot earlier this month, according to the FBI Fox News < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5euzr7v&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151866800%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=7FzU5C9FhBtx51NcXbw7T%2BDCzlmibLZ%2BVjHQbG3XImo%3D&reserved=0 >>
 - He faces six charges, including engaging in an act of physical violence in a Capitol building, according to the FBI Indianapolis Field Office
 - "[PII removed] was allegedly among rioters who sprayed U.S. Capitol police with 'bear spray,'" the FBI said
- Two New York men were arrested Saturday night by FBI agents, media reported SundayWABC (AP) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4fkpu24&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151866800%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=7FzU5C9FhBtx51NcXbw7T%2BDCzlmibLZ%2BVjHQbG3XImo%3D&reserved=0 >>

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
- One is charged with entering a restricted building without lawful authority and disrupting government business and the other is charged with assaulting an officer, civil disorder, and other crimes
- The FBI arrested an Iowa man on Monday for his alleged connection with the security incident at the U.S. CapitolWUSA < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4nevuuw&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151886785%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWlIjojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ikl1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=O5MIJEnyUaPu4nwfYjBrOzZUew5UnoAdjRSUNK8aBA%3D&reserved=0> >
 - He is charged with knowingly entering or remaining in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority and violent entry with intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official business and disorderly conduct on Capitol grounds


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
Global Terrorism


Afghanistan(Social Media)


- *The U.S. Embassy in Kabul said terrorist and criminal incidents in the city are likely to escalate and urged all U.S. citizens to refrain from traveling to Afghanistan, media reported Monday Twitter [khaama] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy2h8e74g&data=04%7C01%7Cmfarrukh%40techopsolutions.net%7C35ecf99579634268069208d8bc521c6d%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637466408151886785%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWlIjojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ikl1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=MOl32j5Z%2BvB6ZlaUInl90ga0uypjmVdzCtDxe1zP69g%3D&reserved=0> >*
 - *The embassy also stated that American citizens in Afghanistan should leave the country immediately*
 - *Terrorist attacks, kidnappings, criminal offenses, and other similar incidents have increased across Afghanistan in recent weeks, according to the U.S embassy's security alert*
 - *The embassy indicated that "Hotels, residential compounds, international organizations, embassies, and other locations frequented by foreign nationals, including U.S. citizens, are known to be under enduring threat"*
















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MTA Metro-North Railroad MTA New York City Transit




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
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
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



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
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








































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STAC-20210118

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Rates of COVID-19 Among Residents and Staff Members in Nursing Homes - United States, May 25-November 22, 2020

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How to Make 0.1% Chlorine Solution to Disinfect Surfaces in Healthcare Settings

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How to mitigate COVID-19 transmission in densely populated areas globally

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Guidance for U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Staff for the Establishment and Management of Public Health Rapid Response Teams for Disease Outbreaks: COVID-19 Disease Supplement Infographic

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Time from Start of Quarantine to SARS-CoV-2 Positive Test Among Quarantined College and University Athletes - 17 States, June-October 2020

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HHS Announces \$22 Billion in Funding to Support Expanded Testing, Vaccination Distribution

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Interim Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines for Handling and Processing Specimens Associated with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

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Interim Guidelines for Collecting, Handling, and Testing Clinical Specimens for COVID-19

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Understanding Viral Vector COVID-19 Vaccines

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8 Things to Know about Vaccine Planning

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Considerations for Owners and Operators of Multifamily Housing Including Populations at Increased Risk for Complications from COVID-19

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Federal Register Notice: Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19

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[COVID-19-Stats: COVID-19 Incidence, by Urban-Rural Classification - United States, January 22-October 31, 2020](#)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2020

[Characterization of COVID-19 in Assisted Living Facilities - 39 States, October 2020](#)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2020

COVID-19 Outbreak - New York City, February 29-June 1, 2020

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Implementation of a Pooled Surveillance Testing Program for Asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections on a College Campus - Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, August 2-October 11, 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2020

Travel Planner

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2020

Cleaning, Disinfection, and Hand Hygiene in Schools – a Toolkit for School Administrators

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2020

Operational Considerations for Personal Protective Equipment in the Context of Global Supply Shortages for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic: non-US Healthcare Settings

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Interim Operational Considerations for Public Health Management of Healthcare Workers Exposed to or Infected with COVID-19: non-US Healthcare Settings

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2020

COVID-19 Science Update released: November 17, 2020

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2020

Tribal Communities

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2020

Social Distancing

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2020

Monitoring and Evaluating Covid-19 Mitigation Strategies in K-12 Schools: Interview Guide

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Monitoring and Evaluating Covid-19 Mitigation Strategies In K-12 Schools: Focus Group Guide

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Monitoring and Evaluating Mitigation Strategies in Child Care Programs

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Late Sequelae of COVID-19

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Airport Personnel and COVID-19

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Clinical decision algorithm to guide care advice messages

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Considerations for Monitoring and Evaluation of Mitigation Strategies Implemented in K-12 Schools

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Long-Term Effects of COVID-19

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

What Utility Workers Need to Know about COVID-19

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Investigating the Impact of COVID-19 during Pregnancy

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

COVID-19 Employer Information for Offshore Oil and Gas

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

What Offshore Oil and Gas Workers Need to Know about COVID-19

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COVID-19 Employer Information for Warehousing

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

What Warehousing Workers Need to Know about COVID-19

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eCR Now: COVID-19 Electronic Case Reporting

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2020

Multistate Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Seroprevalence in Blood Donors

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An Approach for Monitoring and Evaluating Community Mitigation Strategies for COVID-19

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Open Burning during the COVID-19 Pandemic

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Meat and Poultry Processing Facility Assessment Toolkit

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Guidance for Pharmacies

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Community, Work, and School

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Erratum: Vol 69, No 43

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2020

Erratum: Vol 69, No 43

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Multiple COVID-19 Outbreaks Linked to a Wedding Reception in Rural Maine - August 7-September 14, 2020

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Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at Designated U.S. Airports, January 17-September 13, 2020

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COVID-19 Outbreak in an Amish Community - Ohio, May 2020

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Characteristics of Hospitalized COVID-19 Patients Discharged and Experiencing Same-Hospital Readmission - United States, March-August 2020

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Declines in SARS-CoV-2 Transmission, Hospitalizations, and Mortality After Implementation of Mitigation Measures - Delaware, March-June 2020

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COVID-19 Employer Information for Beauty Salons and Barbershops

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CDC Science Agenda for COVID-19

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2020

What Hotel, Resort, and Lodge Workers Need to Know about COVID-19

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What Beauty Salon and Barbershop Employees Need to Know about COVID-19

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What Gym and Fitness Center Employees Need to Know about COVID-19

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COVID-19 Employer Information for Gyms and Fitness Centers

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What Bus Transit Operators Need to Know about COVID-19

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[What Nail Salon Employees Need to Know about COVID-19](#)

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[What Long-haul Truck Drivers Need to Know about COVID-19](#)

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[What School Nutrition Professionals and Volunteers at Schools Need to Know about COVID-19](#)

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[Meat and Poultry Processing Workers and Employers](#)

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[What Food and Grocery Pick-up and Delivery Drivers Need to Know about COVID-19](#)

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[COVID-19 Science Update released: November 10, 2020](#)

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[Funeral Home Workers](#)

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[Protecting Seafood Processing Workers from COVID-19](#)

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[Agriculture Workers and Employers](#)

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[Manufacturing Workers and Employers](#)

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[Guidance Documents](#)

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[COVID-19 Science Update released: November 6, 2020](#)

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[What Firefighters and EMS Providers Need to Know about COVID-19](#)

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[What Law Enforcement Personnel Need to Know about Coronavirus Disease 2019 \(COVID-19\)](#)

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[Communication Resources](#)

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[Notes from the Field: Development of an Enhanced Community-Focused COVID-19 Surveillance Program - Hopi Tribe, June-July 2020](#)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

A SARS-CoV-2 Outbreak Illustrating the Challenges in Limiting the Spread of the Virus - Hopi Tribe, May-June 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Telework Before Illness Onset Among Symptomatic Adults Aged ≥ 18 Years With and Without COVID-19 in 11 Outpatient Health Care Facilities - United States, July 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Update: Characteristics of Symptomatic Women of Reproductive Age with Laboratory-Confirmed SARS-CoV-2 Infection by Pregnancy Status - United States, January 22-October 3, 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Birth and Infant Outcomes Following Laboratory-Confirmed SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Pregnancy - SET-NET, 16 Jurisdictions, March 29-October 14, 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Transmission of SARS-COV-2 Infections in Households - Tennessee and Wisconsin, April-September 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Network Characteristics and Visualization of COVID-19 Outbreak in a Large Detention Facility in the United States - Cook County, Illinois, 2020

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Maternal, Neonatal, and Child Health Services during COVID-19

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Text Illness Monitoring (TIM)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Toolkit for People 15 to 21

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

Children, Teens, and Young Adults

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 05, 2020

COVID-19 Science Update released: November 3, 2020

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 03, 2020

I wear a mask because...

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 03, 2020

Additional Tools and Resources

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 03, 2020

Your Health

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 03, 2020

Using Antibody Tests for COVID-19

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Considerations for Optimizing the Supply of Powered Air-Purifying Respirators (PAPRs)

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Serology Testing for COVID-19 at CDC

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Interim Guidance for Homeless Service Providers to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 03, 2020

EARLY RELEASE: Update: Characteristics of Symptomatic Women of Reproductive Age with Laboratory-Confirmed SARS-CoV-2 Infection by Pregnancy Status - United States, January 22-October 3, 2020

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 02, 2020

EARLY RELEASE: Birth and Infant Outcomes Following Laboratory-Confirmed SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Pregnancy - SET-NET, 16 Jurisdictions, March 29-October 14, 2020

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Understanding How COVID-19 Vaccines Work

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About COVID-19 vaccines

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FAQs for Medicolegal Death Investigators

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COVID-19 Electronic Laboratory Reporting Implementation by State

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Evidence used to update the list of underlying medical conditions that increase a person's risk of severe illness from COVID-19

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Frequently Asked Questions: Funeral and Burial Services for American Indians and Alaska Natives

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Covid-19 Videos

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Tips for Voters to Reduce Spread of COVID-19

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EARLY RELEASE: Transmission of SARS-COV-2 Infections in Households - Tennessee and Wisconsin, April-September 2020

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2020

COVID-19 Science Update released: October 30, 2020

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Sick Parents and Caregivers

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2020

COVID-19 Employer Information for Transit Maintenance Workers

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2020

SARS-CoV-2 Exposure and Infection Among Health Care Personnel - Minnesota, March 6-July 11, 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19 Outbreak at an Overnight Summer School Retreat - Wisconsin, July-August 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

Trends in the Use of Telehealth During the Emergence of the COVID-19 Pandemic - United States, January-March 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19 Outbreak Among a University's Men's and Women's Soccer Teams - Chicago, Illinois, July-August 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19 Mitigation Behaviors by Age Group - United States, April-June 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19-Associated Hospitalizations Among Health Care Personnel - COVID-NET, 13 States, March 1-May 31, 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

Adoption of Strategies to Mitigate Transmission of COVID-19 During a Statewide Primary Election - Delaware, September 2020

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19 Employer Information for Public Health Inspectors

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19 Employer Information for Banks

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

COVID-19 Employer Information for Nail Salons

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

Test for Past Infection

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

Implementation of Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local COVID-19 Transmission

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2020

Deciding to Go Out

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
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
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
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NEWS



La Vergne K9 officer dies after being shot in deadly shootout



A K9 officer is fighting to survive after being shot multiple times inside a patrol car Tuesday afternoon.



By: Kyle Horan

Posted at 6:03 PM, Nov 18, 2020 and last updated 9:42 PM, Nov 18, 2020

NASHVILLE, Tenn. (WTVF) — A La Vergne K9 officer died one day after being shot multiple times inside a patrol car during a shootout Tuesday afternoon.



dog. We ask everyone to keep Officer Darby, his family, and all of the La Vergne officers in your thoughts and prayers as we deal with this loss.”

K9 Officer Sjaak was inside a patrol car with his handler, Officer Justin Darby, when officials say 39-year-old Javon Brice pulled up beside them and opened fire into the car. Officer Darby was not hit, but Sjaak was shot three times.

According to the TBI, police began to chase Brice to a housing complex, where a shootout began. Brice was shot and killed.

Sjaak was taken to a veterinary hospital and doctors where he fought to survive.

“When I arrived at the veterinarian this morning, his handler had just arrived there and he is doing well. As much as he can be. Of course, these two, they’ve spent a lot of time together,” said La Vergne Interim Chief Chip Davis.

Sjaak became a part of the La Vergne Police Department in 2014. He chose Officer Darby as his handler.

"In the beginning, we let the dog choose the handlers. So, we send the office to K9 school and we let the dog actually choose them. Then they spend six weeks living together. Then they’re partnered from that point on," said Davis.

Sjaak underwent surgery Wednesday but did not survive the procedure.

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


The Cost Of The 2020 Cadillac CT5 May Surprise You

Cadillac CT5 | Sponsored Listings

homeland security, and other appropriate government agencies and officials. Dissemination to the public, the news media, or other unauthorized persons or entities is prohibited.

Counterterrorism officers in East Midlands, UK arrested a 34-year-old man on terrorism charges—specifically, suspicion of encouraging terrorism—on the morning of January 13. He was able to post bail the following day. According to a



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OHIO • Published 8 hours ago

Ohio police officer fatally shot in standoff with arson suspect

Chief George Kral identified the officer as 24-year-old Brandon Stalker.

By [Sam Dorman](#) | Fox News

Biden vows to crack down on police departments accused of 'systemic misconduct'

An [Ohio](#) police officer has died after a shooting standoff with a suspect, the Toledo [Police Department](#) said Monday.

Chief George Kral identified the officer as 24-year-old Brandon Stalker. According to Kral, Stalker was hit once by the suspect, who brandished two firearms while leaving a house which he entered after an exchange with police.

"This is a very dark and horrific day for the city of Toledo," Mayor Wade Kapszukiewicz said at the press conference.

At around 3:53 p.m. ET, officers noticed the suspect, wanted in an earlier vandalization and arson at a city cathedral, having a cigarette on Fulton Street.


According to [abc13](#), the historic Rosary Cathedral was vandalized with graffiti that read "Jesus is Black" and "Black Jesus." The damage was reportedly estimated to cost \$5,100. Kral said police had warrants out for the suspect.

[CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP](#)

After Stalker and at least one other officer approached the suspect, he brandished a firearm and entered a home.

Police set up a perimeter and called in negotiators and swat teams.

Sam Dorman is a reporter with Fox News. Follow him on Twitter [@DormanInDC](#) or at [facebook.com/SamDormanFoxNews](#)



LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS

- [San Francisco transit cop tries to help homeless, mentally ill, drug addicts](#) – Yesterday at 2:25 PM
BART Senior Officer Eric Hofstein has spent years patrolling downtown stations, trying to assist people in crisis
- [Finally, a modern duty pistol for small cops](#) – Yesterday at 1:46 PM
The Glock Model 48 slimline 9mm is a state-of-the-art fighting pistol with a small grip frame any cop can master
- [Tribal police officer dies of medical emergency while responding to call](#) – Yesterday at 1:37 PM
Officer Jay Hughes was remembered as a kind soul with a good sense of humor
- [Ammo review: Federal's .380 ACP and .38 Special Hydra-Shok Deep](#) – Yesterday at 1:25 PM
These new Hydra-Shok Deep loads provide levels of ammunition performance previously restricted to service-size calibers and guns
- [Bill introduced to award Capitol officer Congressional Gold Medal](#) – Yesterday at 1:17 PM
Officer Eugene Goodman has so far been quiet on the matter
- [Police chief releases statement on Va. cops charged in Capitol siege](#) – Yesterday at 1:14 PM
Two Rocky Mount police officers face charges stemming from their presence inside the Capitol building on Jan. 6
- [FN America announces FN 509 Compact model](#) – Yesterday at 11:13 AM
The 9mm pistol is designed with concealed carry users in mind
- [Video: Cops, firefighter jump into frigid river to rescue woman](#) – Yesterday at 9:57 AM
Police bodycam video shows Tarrytown first responders jumping into the Hudson River
- [Colo. lawmakers preparing more police, criminal justice reform bills](#) – Yesterday at 9:06 AM

The slate of bills will propose restrictions on ketamine use and no-knock warrants

- [Heavily fortified statehouses around US see small protests](#) – Yesterday at 8:38 AM

Small groups, some armed, gathered at state capitols on Sunday but remained peaceful

- [FBI vetting Guard troops in DC amid fears of insider attack](#) – Yesterday at 8:34 AM

Officials say the vetting hasn't flagged any issues or evidence of threats so far

- [Ban on tear gas, neck restraints, unleashed K-9s among changes proposed in Wash. reform bill](#) – Jan 17, 2021

Language in the bill creates "unacceptable consequences" and puts the public and officers in "unnecessary danger," said one LE official

- [Man arrested with invalid credentials, handgun, ammo at DC checkpoint](#) – Jan 17, 2021

The man was arrested for possession of an unregistered firearm and possession of unregistered ammunition

- [Atlanta sees deadliest year in decades](#) – Jan 17, 2021

Atlanta Police investigated 157 homicides in 2020, up from 99 in 2019

- [Police, National Guard scramble to secure DC, state capitols](#) – Jan 17, 2021

Airlines have tracked a recent increase in passengers checking firearms to D.C. as National Guard troops descend on the city

- [Prioritizing your personnel in 2021](#) – Jan 17, 2021

LE leaders share advice and top tips for improving officer wellness, safety and morale in 2021

- [Digital Edition: What cops want in 2021](#) – Jan 16, 2021

4,000 officers speak up about police reform, recruitment and more in Police1's State of the Industry survey

- [Converting officers with 5-10 years of experience into career employees](#) – Jan 16, 2021


Let's decode the data from Police1's State of the Industry survey to address this critical issue


- [NYPD outlines plan to keep city safe in wake of Capitol siege](#) – Jan 16, 2021


There haven't been any specific threats, but NYPD officials say security will be heightened as a precautionary measure


- [Feds make drug bust right out of 'Miami Vice'](#) – Jan 16, 2021

Authorities found 294 bricks of cocaine during a routine baggage inspection









Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Varanelli, Mark <Mark_Varanelli@nps.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 5:47 AM
Subject: 1.19.2021 USPP WMA Daily LE Operational Snapshot
Attachments: (U--LES) USPP Information Note 21-03156 (1.19.2021 Operational Snapshot).pdf

Categories: Green

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Sgt. Mark S. Varanelli
Assistant Commander
Intelligence & Counterterrorism Branch
United States Park Police
Office: 202-610-8763
Cell: § 2-534(a)(2)
STE: 202-433-7281
mvaranelli@nps.gov
mark.varanelli@dhs.gov (SIPR)
mvaranelli@doi.id.ic.gov (JWICS)

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Loftus, Ashlea (WF) (FBI) <ALOFTUS@fbi.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 6:26 PM
To: Madeline Marcenelle (HSEMA); Bovia, Darrin (HSEMA); Donell, Harvin; Randolph, Sedley (HSEMA)
Cc: Larubbio, Joseph (WF) (FBI); Stenger, Kathleen E. (WF) (FBI)
Subject: Fw: OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep, 18 January 2021
Attachments: OPS 2021 Inauguration Daily Sitrep-20210118002_TLP-AMBER.pdf
Categories: Green

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Good evening,

Please see below regarding the attached OPS Sitrep. Note this document is TLP:AMBER and should be handled accordingly.

V/R,

Ashlea Loftus (née Pettengill)

Intelligence Analyst | FBI | Washington Field Office

Liaison Officer | National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium

§ 2-534(a)(2)

From: Snyder, Marc R. (OPE) (FBI) <MRSnyder@fbi.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 6:09 PM

To: HQ-DIV15-ASSOC-PARTNERS <HQ-DIV15-ASSOC-PARTNERS@ic.fbi.gov>; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-POCs <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-POCs@ic.fbi.gov>; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DIRECTORS <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DIRECTORS@ic.fbi.gov>; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DEPUTY-DIRECTORS <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DEPUTY-DIRECTORS@ic.fbi.gov>; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-PARTNERS <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-PARTNERS@ic.fbi.gov>; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-MGMT <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-MGMT@ic.fbi.gov>

Subject: OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep, 18 January 2021

Good evening,

Please see the attached OPS Inauguration Daily SITREP for Monday, 01/18/2021.

This report is classified at the **TLP: AMBER** level and should be shared accordingly.

TLP: AMBER documents contain information that may be shared with members of your own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm.

Thank you,

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Snyder, Marc R. (OPE) (FBI) <MRSnyder@fbi.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 6:22 PM
To: HQ-DIV15-ASSOC-PARTNERS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-POCs; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DIRECTORS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DEPUTY-DIRECTORS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-PARTNERS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-MGMT
Subject: DHS Intelligence In Focus - Threats to Civil Aviation Surrounding Presidential Transition
Attachments: (U--FOUO) IIF - Heightened Threat Environment Surrounding Presidential Transition May Increase Potential for 01172021.pdf

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Good evening,


Please see the attached UNCLASS//FOUO Intelligence in Focus (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) that was issued by DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis.

Dissemination of this product is intended for federal, state, local, tribal, territorial authorities, and private sector partners.


Please share this U//FOUO product with your peers and partners within the relevant communities or sectors accordingly.

Thank you,

FBI Office of Partner Engagement



(U) Prepared by the Counterterrorism Mission Center. Coordinated within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (CBP, CWMD, ICE, TSA, USCG).
For questions, contact [REDACTED]



§ 2-534(a)(3)

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA) <david.l.graves6.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 5:20 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: LE-4 [MAY CONTAIN USPER INFO]
Attachments: U_LES_VFC SITREP 21-14_ 2021 General Assembly Lobby Day.pdf; Rail Watch_January_18_2021.pdf; Railway Alert Network (RAN) Situational Awareness Message 59th Presidential Inauguration – Joint Interagency Threat Assessment 01172021.pdf; Railway Alert Network (RAN) Security Awareness Message Summary – TSA Surface All Modes Teleconference on Presidential Inauguration Threats and Security Implications 01172021.pdf; Railway Alert Network (RAN) Security Awareness Message Summary – DHS CISA Teleconference on Presidential Inauguration – Threats and Security Implications 01142021.pdf; OSAC Afernoon Newsletter 1-18-2021.pdf; (LES) NYPD Tactical Assessment - Service Weapon Theft Remains Viable Threat against Law Enforcement Officers UPDATE.pdf; (LES) NYPD Tactical Assessment - Impersonating Law Enforcement a Viable Tactic for Malicious Actors UPDATED.pdf; (U FOUO) US Dept of Justice Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) - Cyber Summary - 20210115.pdf; (U) ST-ISAC - Over the Road Bus Info Sharing and Analysis Center (OTRB ISAC) Daily Report - 20210108.pdf; (U FOUO) TSA IA UPFRONT - 20210115.pdf; (U FOUO) TSA IA UPFRONT - 20210116.pdf; (U FOUO) TSA IA UPFRONT - 20210117.pdf; (U) TSA Surface Security Message (SAM) - 2021-SAM-200-002 - 20210115.pdf; DHS OSIR-04001-0210-21 - Anonymous dark web image board user encourages other to attack electrical infrastructure.pdf; [Non-DoD Source] Pence Thanks Fort Drum Soldiers for Accomplishments, Sacrifices.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller on National Guard Support in Washington, D.C..msg; [Non-DoD Source] Medal of Honor Monday: Marine Corps PFC Robert Jenkins Jr..msg; [Non-DoD Source] Thursday, Jan 21, 12EST - Energy Security with Ambassador Kauzlarich.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Medal of Honor Monday: Marine Corps PFC Robert Jenkins Jr..msg; [Non-DoD Source] What Is Unlimited Access Anyway?.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Illinois Democrats Ignore CAIR's Pro-Terror, Anti-Israel Radicalism As Israel Adjusts to Mounting Terror Threat.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Pence Lists Administration's Accomplishments, Thanks Service Members.msg; [Non-DoD Source] U.S. Department of Justice DOJ Press Releases & News Update.msg; [Non-DoD Source] (ai) A Really Bad Idea! "Caught on video: Japan emergency callers will be able to send footage to police".msg; [Non-DoD Source] (ai) COVID-19: Reinfections Update from the UK.msg; [Non-DoD Source] (ai) COVID-19 Update: Will vaccines stop transmission?.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Department of Defense Highlights January 2021.msg; [Non-DoD Source] U.S. Department of Justice DOJ Press Releases & News Update.msg; [Non-DoD Source] U.S. Department of Justice DOJ Press Releases & News Update.msg; [Non-DoD Source] U.S. Department of Justice DOJ Press Releases & News Update.msg; [Non-DoD Source] U.S. Customs and Border Protection Newsroom Update.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller on Operation Warp Speed Vaccine Doses Delivered Today.msg; [Non-DoD Source] DEA Announces Expansion of Operation Crystal Shield.msg; [Non-DoD Source] Today in DOD: Jan. 17, 2021.msg; [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] EBB: Norquist to serve as acting defense secretary; acting service secretaries named.msg; [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] Jamestown Strategic Digest Vol. 7, Issue 1.msg; [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] Belarus Warning Update: Belarus Confirms Plans to Purchase Advanced Air Defense Systems from Russia.msg; [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] Discover the secrets of the Tempest.msg

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Mon 1/18/2021 4:09 PM

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§ 2-534(a)(3)


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
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
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
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
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










































Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)

To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: FW: OSAC Afternoon Newsletter

From: OSAC Admin
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 4:01 PM
Subject: OSAC Afternoon Newsletter



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Research and Information Support
Center
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
U.S. Department of State

Afternoon Newsletter

Dear David Graves,

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01-18-2021

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
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
§ 2-534(a)(3), § 2-534(a)(10)



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







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



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


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


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



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



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

































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



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


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









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
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
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



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
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













































Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: U.S. Department of Defense <govdelivery@subscriptions.defense.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 1:28 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Medal of Honor Monday: Marine Corps PFC Robert Jenkins Jr.

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Medal of Honor Monday: Marine Corps PFC Robert Jenkins Jr. Jan. 18, 2021 | By Katie Lange Marine Corps Private 1st Class Robert Jenkins was only 20 years old when he was killed saving the life of a fellow Marine during the Vietnam War. For his valor, courage and selflessness that day, Jenkins earned the Medal of Honor.
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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: U.S. Department of Defense <govdelivery@subscriptions.defense.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 3:25 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Pence Thanks Fort Drum Soldiers for Accomplishments, Sacrifices

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Pence Thanks Fort Drum Soldiers for Accomplishments, Sacrifices Jan. 18, 2021 | By Jim Garamone Vice President Mike Pence thanked the troopers of the 10th Mountain Division in Fort Drum, New York, for their service, saying their mission in Afghanistan has been vital to the security of the American people.
Read More [Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2474974/pence-thanks-fort-drum-soldiers-for-accomplishments-sacrifices/?source=GovDelivery>]

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From: U.S. Department of Defense <govdelivery@subscriptions.defense.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 2:14 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller on National Guard Support in Washington, D.C.

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Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller on National Guard Support in Washington, D.C. Jan. 18, 2021 Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller released a statement on National Guard support in Washington, D.C. Read More [Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2474963/statement-by-acting-secretary-of-defense-christopher-miller-on-national-guard-s/?source=GovDelivery>]

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From: Steven Emerson <steven@ctnews.org>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 3:21 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Illinois Democrats Ignore CAIR's Pro-Terror, Anti-Israel Radicalism As Israel Adjusts to Mounting Terror Threat

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
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The Iranian-backed terror army Hizballah may have its hands full dealing with Lebanon's ongoing conflict but its secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah still found time to threaten revenge against Israel for last July's death of an operative in an alleged Israeli air strike in Syria.



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
How Israel is Adapting to the Growing Threat of Terror Armies

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In November 2019, when the Israel Defense Forces and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fought a brief conflict, the IDF's military helped detect targets in record time, accelerating Israel's strike rate, boosting the IDF's ability to destroy terror operatives and their rocket launchers.

Click here to read the full story < Caution-<https://www.investigativeproject.org/8690/how-israel-is-adapting-to-the-growing-threat>



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Illinois Democrats Line Up to Help CAIR Fundraise < Caution- <https://www.investigativeproject.org/8689/illinois-democrats-line-up-to-help-cair-fundraise> >


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In yet another example of political expediency overcoming better judgment, Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker, Mayor Lori Lightfoot and other top Democrats are all slated to speak Jan. 17 to help the Council on American-Islamic Relations' (CAIR) Chicago chapter raise money during its annual banquet.

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
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
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
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On Tuesday morning, an EU-funded NGO, B'Tselem, published a report titled, "A regime of Jewish supremacy in Israel: From the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River: This is apartheid."

Click here to read the full story < Caution-<https://www.camera.org/article/the-associated-press-and-foreign-funding-amplifies-apartheid-smear/> >




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Left-Wing Jewish, Israel Groups Issue Statement Against Adoption of Anti-Semitism < Caution-<https://www.jns.org/left-wing-jewish-israel-groups-issue-statement-against-adopting-universal-definition-of-anti-semitism/> >

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Left-wing Jewish and Israel groups have issued a joint statement in opposition to adopting the universal definition of anti-Semitism set by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).


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A new study of educational materials used by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees, has found that the materials contain anti-Israel and antisemitic racism, encouragement of violence, and a lack of peace with the Jewish state.


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Kristen Clarke, President-elect Joe Biden's pick to lead the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, has promoted theories of black racial superiority and organized an event with a notorious anti-Semite as a


student at Harvard University.

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US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Tuesday accused Iran of harboring al-Qaeda, saying it was a threat for the terror group.

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From: U.S. Department of Defense <govdelivery@subscriptions.defense.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 9:12 AM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Medal of Honor Monday: Marine Corps PFC Robert Jenkins Jr.

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Medal of Honor Monday: Marine Corps PFC Robert Jenkins Jr. Jan. 18, 2021 | By Katie Lange Marine Corps Private 1st Class Robert Jenkins was only 20 years old when he was killed saving the life of a fellow Marine during the Vietnam War. For his valor, courage and selflessness that day, Jenkins earned the Medal of Honor.
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
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From: HDIAC Webinar <webmaster@hdiac.org>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 11:50 AM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Thursday, Jan 21, 12EST - Energy Security with Ambassador Kauzlarich

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HDIAC Webinar Energy Security

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Thursday, January 21, 1200-1300 EST

Join HDIAC Thursday, January 21, from 1200 to 1300 EST for a webinar presentation titled "Energy Security." Please register in advance for the webinar at: Caution-<https://www.anymeeting.com/PIID=EF58D688844C3B> < Caution-<https://www.anymeeting.com/PIID=EF58D688844C3B> >

This webinar describes the sophisticated global setting where energy security, national security, and geopolitics intersect. People everywhere want abundant, reliable, clean, and affordable energy. Nation-states have a geopolitical identity and geopolitical aspirations for influence. Energy security is an essential factor in those aspirations. Nation-states can influence developments beyond their borders regarding access to, processing, and transportation of natural resources, such as carbon-based energy and minerals essential for renewable energy development.

This webinar addresses the relationship between energy security/homeland security and unhindered access to energy supplied from domestic or foreign sources, the role of energy transportation at competitive world prices, and the relationship between local and international energy infrastructure.

Presenter:

Ambassador (ret.) Richard D. Kauzlarich is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Since 2014, Ambassador Kauzlarich has been Co-Director of the Center for Energy Science and

Policy, and he previously served as Deputy Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at George Mason from 2011-2013. Ambassador Kauzlarich joined the Institute in spring 2002 after a 32-year career in the Foreign Service in which he served as United States Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997-99 and to Azerbaijan in 1994-97.

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The Continued Threat of Infectious Diseases to the U.S. Military

The US military is an expeditionary force and constantly engaged in global missions. During deployment, servicemembers are often at risk from infectious diseases which have the potential to make the individual and the unit mission incapable and cause significant morbidity and mortality. Diseases such as malaria, dengue, diarrheal diseases, and many others threaten the force and require medical countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate the risk.

This webinar builds on Dr. Tim Endy's infectious disease webinar in February of 2020 and the HDIAC Infectious Disease State of the Art Report published in April of 2020; in this latest webinar, Dr. Stephen Thomas explores the historical beginnings of global infectious disease threats. Dr. Thomas reviews the epidemiology, clinical presentation, and current status of therapeutic and preventive measures for common threats. Additionally, U.S. military contributions to countermeasure development are discussed.

Presenter:

Dr. Stephen Thomas, (Colonel, US Army (Retired)), has nearly 30 years of experience in infectious disease research. He is currently the Chief of the Division of Infectious Disease at SUNY Upstate Medical University, a professor in both the Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Department of Medicine, and is an Infectious Diseases Consultant for the Syracuse Veterans Army Medical Center. Prior to his work in Syracuse, Dr. (COL) Thomas was the Deputy Commander, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and WRAIR Chief of Virology, an Infectious Disease Consultant to

the Surgeon General in US Army Medical Command, and the Director of Dengue Vaccine Development for the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences in Bangkok. Dr. Thomas has authored numerous publications, most recently focusing on Zika and Dengue. He is a member of the Infectious Disease Society of America, the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, and the American College of Physicians. He received his BA from Brown University and his MD from Albany Medical College.

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
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Pence Lists Administration's Accomplishments, Thanks Service Members Jan. 17, 2021 | By Jim Garamone In what amounted to a valedictory speech, Vice President Mike Pence touted the Trump administration's defense achievements and thanked sailors at Lemoore Naval Air Station, California, for their service.

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Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 7:31 PM
To: 'access@g2-forward.org'
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] (ai) A Really Bad Idea! "Caught on video: Japan emergency callers will be able to send footage to police"

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Visual Anthropology of Japan - 日本映像人類学: A Really Bad Idea! "Caught on video: Japan emergency callers will be able to send footage to police" [1] Story and photo from The Japan Times, 12/10/2020.

The National Police Agency will introduce in fiscal 2021 a nationwide system by which callers to the emergency police number 110 can send video of the incidents concerned, such as crimes, accidents and fires, according to informed sources.

People calling to report these incidents will be asked to take videos via their smartphones if needed. The system is expected to help police officers check the situation before arriving at the scenes and take appropriate first steps, the sources said.

A similar system has been used by the police department of Hyogo Prefecture since October.

Under the new system, police officers receiving reports of incidents in the command rooms will ask callers for video of the incidents if deemed necessary. If this is accepted, police will send a URL link for a special website to the callers' smartphones and ask them to take video from a safe location, the sources said.

When the URL link is opened, the callers' smartphone cameras will automatically turn on, and videos taken on the phones will be sent to the command rooms. Officers in the command rooms will then give information obtained from the videos to officers dispatched to the sites.

The NPA will also consider whether to introduce a system for forwarding such videos to dispatched officers' devices, according to the sources.

The agency does not plan to request such video in emergency calls seeking rescue, the sources said.

As the videos may include private information of people, such as those wounded in incidents, the agency wants to "operate the system in a way that does not result in invasion of privacy" in matters such as the storage of the videos, an NPA official said.

The NPA launched a website in August for receiving images and videos of damage from natural disasters, such as typhoons and earthquakes, so that the extent of damage to roads, buildings and other properties and infrastructure can be checked.

Fire departments around the country are also introducing video transmission systems for calls to the emergency number 119 for fires and accidents.

The Tokyo Fire Department launched such a system in the capital's 23 special wards on a trial basis in September, instructing callers on how to give, for example, cardiopulmonary resuscitation to people affected by the incidents based on the videos.

Some fire departments in Aichi and Hyogo prefectures have fully introduced such systems.

Source:

Caution-<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/12/10/national/japan-emergency-video-calls/>

Which is worse, encouraging people to violate privacy rights to bust neighbors and strangers alike -or- giving access of your smartphone to the police?

Links:

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From Nature Briefing:Nature Briefing (campaign-archive.com) [1]

Most people who catch and recover from COVID-19 appear to be immune for at least five months afterwards . Interim results from a study of more than 20,000 health-care workers in the United Kingdom have found that repeat infections are unusual — they occurred in fewer than 1% of about 6,600 participants who had already had COVID-19. The handful of people who do become reinfected can carry high levels of the virus in their nose and throat. Such viral loads have been associated with a high risk of transmitting the virus to others.

[3]

COVID reinfections are unusual — but could still help the virus to spread [4]Most people who catch and recover from COVID-19 are likely to be immune for several months afterwards, a study of more than 20,000 health-care workers in the United Kingdom has found. The study ...Caution-www.nature.com

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Wednesday 13 January 2021
Nature Briefing

Hello Nature readers,
Explore what COVID vaccines might mean for transmission:

COVID-19 coronavirus update
Will vaccines stop transmission?

LPG / TAKE AWAY >>> Scientists don't yet know whether vaccinated people can spread COVID-19.

Although vaccines have been proven to protect recipients from getting ill, research has yet to determine whether they prevent the virus from replicating altogether.

Vaccines are known to prompt the body to make the IgG antibodies inside our bodies. But whether they also trigger IgA antibodies, which exist in the outward-facing mucosal surfaces such as the nose and throat (OUTSIDE BODY) -- is not known, and these could be more important in preventing transmission.

For now, the takeaway message is that vaccinated people should stay vigilant about protecting others.

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Department of Defense Highlights January 2021 Jan. 16, 2021 [Caution-
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A federal grand jury in Honolulu, Hawaii, returned an indictment charging Kaulana Alo Kaonohi and Levi Aki, Jr. with a hate crime for their racially motivated attack on a Caucasian man who was attempting to move into the defendants' Native Hawaiian neighborhood of Kahakuloa on Maui.

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Man Charged with \$5 Million COVID-Relief Fraud < Caution-


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01/15/2021 12:00 AM EST

A Texas man has been charged in the Eastern District of Texas with allegedly filing bank loan applications fraudulently seeking more than \$5 million dollars in forgivable loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA) under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.

 < Caution-

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
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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

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Former Government Contractor Sentenced for Role in Bribery and Kickback Scheme < Caution-

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01/15/2021 12:00 AM EST

A former government contractor was sentenced today for his role in a bribery and kickback scheme where he paid bribes to secure U.S. Army contracts.

Compounding Pharmacy Mogul Sentenced for Multimillion-Dollar Health Care Fraud Scheme < Caution-

<https://lnks.gd/l/eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJidWxsZXRpbGl9saW5rX2lkIjoxMDEsInVyaSI6ImJwMjppbGljayIsImJ1bGxldGluX2lkIjoiaWMyMTAxMTYuMzM0MzA5MDEiLCJ1cmwiOiJodHRwciovL3d3dy5qdXN0aWNILmdvdi9vcGEvcHIvY29tcG91bmRpbmctcGhhcm1hY3ktbW9ndWwtc2VudGVuY2VklW11bHRpbWlsbGlvbi1kb2xsYXIta>

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PRGHtKhYuIipL4hk/s/1376074233/br/93226392608-I >**

01/15/2021 12:00 AM EST

A Mississippi businessman was sentenced today for his role in a multimillion-dollar scheme to defraud TRICARE, the health care benefit program serving U.S. military, veterans, and their respective family members, as well as private health care benefit programs.

 < Caution-

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JKk/s/1376074233/br/93226392608-I > | GovDelivery Privacy Policy < Caution-

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Defense News

Caution-

Military Times

Overseas Operations

Iran tests missiles under apparent watch of US Navy nuclear sub

The Associated Press

Iran fired cruise missiles Thursday as part of a naval drill in the Gulf of Oman, state media reported, under surveillance of what appeared to be a U.S. nuclear submarine dispatched to the region amid heightened tensions between the countries.

Caution-

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Army's command team in Europe receives coronavirus vaccine

Stars & Stripes

Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli and Command Sgt. Maj. Robert V. Abernethy, the command team of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, received the Moderna vaccine Thursday at the Wiesbaden Army Health Clinic in Germany.

Caution-

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Two German lawmakers urge greater control of criminal cases involving US troops

Stars & Stripes

Two German lawmakers are calling for changes in an international treaty that leaves most criminal cases involving U.S. troops in the hands of the military justice system, saying local authorities should have more say in such matters.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RyaXBicy5jb20vbmV3cy9ldXJvcGUvdHdvLWdlcm1hbi1sYXdtYWtlcnMtdXJnZS1ncmVhdGVyLWNvbRyb2wtb2YtY3JpbWluYWwtY2FzZXMTaW52b2x2aW5nLXVzLXRyb29wcy0xLjY1ODQ2OQ/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78D507a8501>

New coronavirus infections hover above 1,500 in Tokyo; US military in Japan reports 13 cases

Stars & Stripes

Japan's capital city counted more than 1,400 new coronavirus cases for a second consecutive day, while the U.S. military listed 13 across the country as of 6 p.m. Thursday.

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Pentagon officials said Thursday that the Defense Department has "no place" for those espousing extremist views, and is doing everything it can to eliminate extremism in the department.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudXBpLmNvbS9EZWZlbnNlU5ld3MvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9Eb0Qtbm8tcGxhY2UtZm9yLXRob3NlLVVzcG91c2luZy1leHRyZW1pc3Qtdmld3Mtb2ZmaWNpYWxzLXNheS8zMzIxNjEwNjcwNDY5LWw5758863d498edb7fd6780f78D0aa15712>

Congress & Politics

US military has 'failed' to counter white nationalism in its ranks, lawmakers say

Business Insider

Democratic lawmakers are urging the Defense Department to "immediately" investigate extremist activity within the US military and implement a plan to prevent the ideology from further spreading within its ranks,

Caution-

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GOP lawmaker and Army veteran who voted for Trump's impeachment says he's buying body armor over death threats

Business Insider

Republican Rep. Peter Meijer of Michigan, an Army veteran, on Thursday said that he and fellow lawmakers are taking precautions such as purchasing body armor in the wake of President Donald Trump's second impeachment over the Capitol siege.

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Lawmakers ask Army to send cots for National Guard in US Capitol

Military.com

If images of sleeping National Guard members wedged between statues and using marble stairs as pillows have tugged at your heartstrings, you're not alone.

Caution-

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We salute these military veterans who stood up to rioters on Capitol Hill

Task & Purpose

When rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol Building on Jan. 6 after a post-election rally to support President Donald Trump devolved into a riot, the news cycle was flooded with photos and footage most viewers never expected to see.

Caution-

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National Security

FBI tracking 'extensive' online chatter about armed protests

The Associated Press

The FBI is tracking an "extensive amount of concerning online chatter," including calls for armed protests leading up to next week's presidential inauguration, Director Chris Wray said Thursday.

Caution-

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National Guard on lookout for IEDs with culprit behind RNC, DNC bombs still on the loose

Fox News

Wednesday's security briefing prep is the same one that troops receive before being deployed for Baghdad or Kabul

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZm94bmV3cy5jb20vdXMvbmF0aW9uYWwtZ3VhcmRzbWVuLW9uLXRoZS1sb29rb3V0LWZvci1pZWZLWFmdGVyLWRuYy1ybmMtc3VzcGVjdC13aG8tcGxhY2VklWRldmljZXMtYXQtaHFzLXN0aWxsLW9uLXRoZS1sb29zZQ/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Dac55139c>

Army

Navy SEAL pleads guilty in 2017 strangulation death of Green Beret

Army Times

A Navy SEAL charged in the strangulation death of an Army Green Beret staff sergeant in 2017 pleaded guilty to reduced charges today.

Caution-

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Man gets life prison sentence for killing newly commissioned 2nd lieutenant

The Associated Press

A white man who stabbed a Black college student to death at a bus stop on the University of Maryland's flagship College Park campus was sentenced Thursday to life in prison for what prosecutors claimed was a racially motivated hate crime.

Caution-

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Army to conduct extra background screening on soldiers at Biden inauguration

Task & Purpose

Some troops assisting with security at next week's inauguration for President-elect Joe Biden will undergo additional background screening and be trained on reporting suspected extremist behavior, according to Army officials.

Caution-

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Army offering \$25,000 reward for information on 'senseless murder' of drill sergeant

Task & Purpose

The Army is offering up to \$25,000 for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the person responsible for the murder of an Army drill sergeant on New Year's Day.

Caution-

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Fort Benning hunkers down in hopes of avoiding post-holiday COVID-19 surge

Task & Purpose

Soldiers at Fort Benning are nearing the end of a two-week lockdown put in place in hopes to get ahead of a potential post-holiday surge of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).

Caution-

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Woman found dead at Hawaii base was Army veteran; soldier taken into custody

Stars & Stripes

A soldier has been placed in pre-trial confinement in connection with a homicide investigation into the death of a 25-year-old wife of a soldier Wednesday at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the Army said Thursday.

Caution-

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Green Beret earns Soldier's Medal for aiding retired Army Ranger

Stars & Stripes

An Army physician assistant earned the Soldier's Medal for his bravery and decisiveness when he strapped a makeshift tourniquet on his own mangled arm and treated his badly wounded mentor after motorcyclists slammed into them at high speed.

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Navy

Hypersonics, unmanned ship teaming ahead for Zumwalt destroyer

Breaking Defense

The Navy plans to install hypersonic missiles on its troublesome Zumwalt destroyers, after Congress gave them the green light to start studying the move in the 2021 budget.

Caution-

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Wolfe: Navy plans to start development of nuclear sea-launched cruise missile in 2022

Seapower

The Navy plans to wrap up an analysis of alternatives (AoA) for a ship-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile in 2021 and begin development of the missile in 2022, said the admiral in charge of strategic weapons.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly9zZWFWb3dlcm1hZ2F6aW5lMm9yZy93b2xmZS1uYXZ5LXBsYW5zLXRvLXN0YXJ0LWRIbmVsb3BtZW50LW9mLW51Y2x1YXItc2VhLWxhdW5jaGVkLWNydWlZS1taXNzaWxhLWl1LWl1Mjlv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ddb41fd3b>

Naval Academy begins vaccinating faculty, staff

Capital Gazette

The Naval Academy started vaccinating staff and faculty against the coronavirus on Thursday, the academy announced.

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Air Force

Gen. Brown, Chief Bass receive COVID vaccines; urge airmen to do the same

Air Force Times

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne Bass on Tuesday received their vaccinations against COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus.

Caution-

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Air Force veteran aimed ‘to take hostages’ during US Capitol riot, prosecutor says

The Associated Press

A retired Air Force officer who was part of the mob that stormed the U.S. Capitol last week carried plastic zip-tie handcuffs because he intended “to take hostages,” a prosecutor said in a Texas court on Thursday.

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Roper hints NGAD could replace F-35; Why? Life-cycle costs

Breaking Defense

The F-35 fighter jet’s exorbitant life-cycle costs means the Air Force cannot afford to buy as many aircraft as it needs to fight and win a war today, which makes the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program all the more important, says outgoing Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper.

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Roper makes his pitch to Biden team: 'I want to be part of the China fight'

Defense One

The Air Force acquisition chief says he keeps politics out of his work at the Pentagon — and that the U.S. will lose against China without agility.

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Former Air Force chief Goldfein joins Blackstone

Defense One

The retired general picked the investment firm over opportunities at defense companies.

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Air Force planning hangar construction for future B-21 stealth bombers

Military.com

The U.S. Air Force held a virtual B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber industry day this week to discuss construction projects to house the new stealth bomber, known as the Raider, according to a release.

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Air Force comptroller to step in as acting secretary after inauguration

Air Force Magazine

Air Force comptroller John P. Roth will temporarily take over as acting Air Force secretary before President-elect Joseph R. Biden names his pick to run the department, among a slew of other fiscal officials who will oversee their respective services.

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Marine Corps

Oldest living Marine, who joined after Pearl Harbor attack, dies at age 107

Dorothy “Dot” Cole, who enlisted as one of the earliest female Marine reservists in response to the 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor and was widely celebrated around her birthday in September as the country’s oldest living Marine, died of a heart attack last Thursday at her daughter’s home in Kannapolis. She was 107.

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Army to review more than 3,500 'bad paper' discharges for post-9/11 vets

Military.com

The U.S. Army plans to review all other-than-honorable discharges given between April 17, 2011, and Nov. 17, 2020, to soldiers who were diagnosed or had symptoms of a mental health condition or brain injury.

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Gulf War vet reflects on 30th anniversary of conflict through his photography

Stars & Stripes

Three decades ago, Kirby Lee Vaughn prepared to cross into Iraq as part of Operation Desert Storm.

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Pay & Benefits

Jill Biden names director for military families program Joining Forces

The Associated Press

Days before Joe Biden becomes president, incoming first lady Jill Biden took a step Thursday toward fulfilling a promise to revive a program for military families that she and former first lady Michelle Obama once led.

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Podcasts

Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Jan 14, 21] Lockheed Martin's Rambeau on Aegis, HELIOS, unmanned & more

Defense & Aerospace Report

Jon Rambeau, the new vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin's Integrated Warfare Systems and Sensors unit, discusses the outlook for the company's Aegis combat system, SPY-7 radar, HELIOS laser weapon, unmanned systems and cyber role, and growth strategy.

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Defense Industry

Indian government clears \$6.5 billion deal for homemade Tejas fighter jets

Defense News

India on Wednesday cleared the country's largest-ever indigenous defense deal worth \$6.5 billion for the purchase of 83 LCA MK1A Tejas light combat aircraft.

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L3Harris to build prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons

C4ISRNET

The Missile Defense Agency awarded L3Harris Technologies a \$121 million contract to build a prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons, the agency announced Jan. 14.

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Thales UK secures Indian partner for selling its Starstreak air-defense missile

Defense News

The Northern Ireland arm of Thales UK has struck a partnering arrangement with Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) as part of its effort to secure a deal with the Indian military to purchase the British-developed Starstreak man-portable, air-defense system.

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UK grows national F-35 support with LANCE contract

IHS Jane's 360

The United Kingdom is growing the level of organic sustainment and support it is able to provide for its fleet of Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning combat aircraft.

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US Air Force downselects Northrop Grumman for F-16 electronic warfare suite

IHS Jane's 360

The US Air Force (USAF) has downselected Northrop Grumman as the sole contractor to complete final project efforts to provide the electronic warfare (EW) suite for the service's Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fleet.

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Cyber, Space & Unmanned

Pentagon testing office finds problems — again — with network security system

C4ISRNET

For the fourth year in a row, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester recommended Thursday that components stop migrating to a fraught network security system until the department proves that the system can effectively help defend against cyberattacks.

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JADC2 may be built to fight the wrong war

Breaking Defense

Although it is one of the U.S. military's highest priorities, service and industry leaders remain confused about Joint All-Domain Command and Control, variously describing it as a communication architecture, a data-sharing approach, an operational concept, or a decision-making tool.

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International

NATO leader calls for justice over US Capitol mob siege

The Associated Press

The head of NATO said Thursday that all those responsible for last week's deadly siege at the U.S. Capitol should be held accountable, and he expressed confidence that American institutions are up to the job.

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Romanian government approves Naval Strike Missile buy

Defense News

The Romanian government has approved and sent to the parliament a draft bill that will allow the country to buy Naval Strike Missile coastal defense systems through a foreign military sales (FMS) procedure.

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Commentary & Analysis

Trump's behavior demonstrates that Biden must change US nuclear policy

Defense News

President Donald Trump's role in inciting the shocking events at the Capitol on Jan. 6 and concerns about his state of mind highlight the grave risks posed by the policy that gives presidents the sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons — without the need for consultation or agreement by anyone.

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Pentagon won't throw traditional farewell ceremony for Trump

Defense One

It's a shame, and a missed opportunity — not despite recent events but because of them.

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SR-71 Blackbird: Why the fastest plane ever was grounded

19FortyFive

No other U.S. Air Force aircraft could fly faster or higher than the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbird," and on its final flight, it set a truly impressive record.

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From Trump to Biden: The way forward for US national security

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

America must learn from these last four years.

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The six blind men and the elephant: Differing views on the US defense budget

War On The Rocks

In the Indian parable of "The Blind Men and the Elephant," six blind men come across an elephant by the side of the road.

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Why overseas military bases continue to make sense for the United States

War On The Rocks

Every president in the post-Cold War period has sought to close U.S. military bases overseas, particularly in Europe.

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The Pentagon must learn to do more with less

Bloomberg

The U.S. military is stronger than it was four years ago, but the country's defense programs still need a lot of work.

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Overseas Operations

Iran tests missiles under apparent watch of US Navy nuclear sub

The Associated Press

Iran fired cruise missiles Thursday as part of a naval drill in the Gulf of Oman, state media reported, under surveillance of what appeared to be a U.S. nuclear submarine dispatched to the region amid heightened tensions between the countries.

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Army's command team in Europe receives coronavirus vaccine

Stars & Stripes

Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli and Command Sgt. Maj. Robert V. Abernethy, the command team of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, received the Moderna vaccine Thursday at the Wiesbaden Army Health Clinic in Germany.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RyaXBlc3Y5b20vbmV3cy9ldXJvcGUvdGhpcy1pcy1vdXIibmF2eS8yMDIxLzAxLzE1L2lyYW4tdGVzdHMtbWlzc2lsZXMTdW5kZXItYXBwYXJlbnQtdF0Y2gtb2YtdXMtbnF2eS1udWNsZWYlXN1Yi8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E3b027342>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnl0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy95b3VyLW1pbGl0YXJ5LzlwMjEvMDEvMTQvY2FuLXR0ZS1wZW50YWdvbi1wcm9zZW50dGUtbWlsaXRhcnktdmV0aXJlZXMtZW5kZltdGhllXVjbWotbWF5YmUtaXQtZGVvZW5kcy8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Edc85b614>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RyaXBlc5jb20vbmV3cy91cy9hY3RpbmctZGVmZW5zZS1zZWNYZXRhcnktb3JkZXJlZC1yZXZpZXctb2YtcGVudGFnb24tcy1leHRyZW1pc20tcG9saWNpZXMtMS42NTg1NjU/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E979bfb7a>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudXBpLmNvbS9EZWZlbnNlU5ld3MvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9Eb0Qtbm8tcGxhY2UtZm9yLXRob3NlLVVzcG91c2luZy1leHRyZW1pc3Qtdmllld3Mtb2ZmaWNPYWxzLXNheS8zMzIxMjEwNjcwNDY5Lw/5758863d49edb7fd6780f78E0aa15712>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYnVzaW5lc3NpbmNpZGVyLmNvbS91cy1taWxpZGFyeS13aGl0ZS1uYXRpb25hbGlzbS1pbi1pdHMtcmFua3MtMjMjYyMS0x/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E94e40f99>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYnVzaW5lc3NpbmNpZGVyLmNvbS9tZWlqZXIt>

YnV5aW5nLWJvZHktYXJtb3Itb3Zlci1kZWFOaC10aHJIYXRzLXRydW1wLWltcGVhY2htZW50LXZvdGUtMjAyMS0x/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E7641cfaf

Lawmakers ask Army to send cots for National Guard in US Capitol
Military.com

If images of sleeping National Guard members wedged between statues and using marble stairs as pillows have tugged at your heartstrings, you're not alone.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnkuY29tL2RhaWx5LW5ld3MvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9sYXdtYWtlcnMtYXNrLWFyXktc2VuZC1jb3RzLW5hdGlvbmlsLWd1YXJkLXVzLWNhcGl0b2wuaHRtbA/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E6e3799ab>

We salute these military veterans who stood up to rioters on Capitol Hill

Task & Purpose

When rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol Building on Jan. 6 after a post-election rally to support President Donald Trump devolved into a riot, the news cycle was flooded with photos and footage most viewers never expected to see.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly90YXNrYW5kcHVycG9zZS5jb20vbmV3cy9oZXJvaWMtdmV0ZXJhbnMtY2FwaXRvbC1yaW90cy8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E5b912e72>

National Security

FBI tracking 'extensive' online chatter about armed protests

The Associated Press

The FBI is tracking an "extensive amount of concerning online chatter," including calls for armed protests leading up to next week's presidential inauguration, Director Chris Wray said Thursday.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnl0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy9wZW50YWdvbi1jb25ncmVzcy8yMDIxLzAxLzE1L2ZiaS10cmFja2luZy1leHRlbnNpdml0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy9wZW50YXN0YXRoZXItYWJvdXQtdmV0ZXJhbnMtY2FwaXRvbC1yaW90cy8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ee464ce0b>

National Guard on lookout for IEDs with culprit behind RNC, DNC bombs still on the loose

Fox News

Wednesday's security briefing prep is the same one that troops receive before being deployed for Baghdad or Kabul

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZm94bmV3cy5jb20vdXMvbmF0aW9uYWwtZ3VhcmRzbWVuLW9uLXRoZS1sb29rb3V0LWZvci1pZWZlLW5hdGlvbmlsLWd1YXJkLXVzLWNhcGl0b2wuaHRtbA/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Eac55139c>

Army

Navy SEAL pleads guilty in 2017 strangulation death of Green Beret

Army Times

A Navy SEAL charged in the strangulation death of an Army Green Beret staff sergeant in 2017 pleaded guilty to reduced charges today.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYXJteXRpbWVzLmNvbS9uZXdzL3lvdXItYXJteS8yMDIxLzAxLzE0L25hdnktc2VhbC1wbGVhZHMtZ3VpbHR5LWluLTlwMTctc3RyYW5ndWxhdGlvi1kZWFOaC1vZi1ncmVlbi1iZXJldC8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E65078bfb>

Man gets life prison sentence for killing newly commissioned 2nd lieutenant

The Associated Press

A white man who stabbed a Black college student to death at a bus stop on the University of Maryland's flagship College Park campus was sentenced Thursday to life in prison for what prosecutors claimed was a racially motivated hate crime.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYXJteXRpbWVzLmNvbS9uZXdzL3lvdXItYXJteS8yMDIxLzAxLzE1L21hbi1nZXRzLWxpZmUtcHJpc29uLXNlbnRlbnNlWZvci1raWxsaW5nLW5ld2x5LWNvbW1pc3Npb25lZC0ybmQtbGlldXRlbnFudC8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E5c7a0b7f>

Army to conduct extra background screening on soldiers at Biden inauguration

Task & Purpose

Some troops assisting with security at next week's inauguration for President-elect Joe Biden will undergo additional background screening and be trained on reporting suspected extremist behavior, according to Army officials.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly90YXNrYW5kcHVycG9zZS5jb20vbmV3cy9uYXRpb25hbC1ndWFyZC1pbmF1Z3VyYXRpb24tc2NyZWVuaW5nLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E3e838bb8>

Army offering \$25,000 reward for information on 'senseless murder' of drill sergeant

Task & Purpose

The Army is offering up to \$25,000 for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the person responsible for the murder of an Army drill sergeant on New Year's Day.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly90YXNrYW5kcHVycG9zZS5jb20vbmV3cy9hcm15LWRyaWxsLXNlcmduYW50LW11cmRlci1yZXdhcmQv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E95a544dc>

Fort Benning hunkers down in hopes of avoiding post-holiday COVID-19 surge

Task & Purpose

Soldiers at Fort Benning are nearing the end of a two-week lockdown put in place in hopes to get ahead of a potential post-holiday surge of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly90YXNrYW5kcHVycG9zZS5jb20vbmV3cy9mb3J0LWJlbm5pbmctY29ybz25hdmlydXMtcmVzdHJpY3Rpb24tbW92ZW1lbnQv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E2b2f3576>

Woman found dead at Hawaii base was Army veteran; soldier taken into custody

Stars & Stripes

A soldier has been placed in pre-trial confinement in connection with a homicide investigation into the death of a 25-year-old wife of a soldier Wednesday at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the Army said Thursday.

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RyaXBlc3Yjb20vbmV3cy9wYWNPZmllL3dvbWFWuLWZvdW5kLWRlYWQtYXQtaGF3YWlpLWJhc2Utd2FzLWFyYXktVmV0ZXJhbi1zb2xkaWVyLXRha2VuLWlwudG8tY3VzdG9keS0xLjY1ODU4NA/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ef61b4917>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RyaXBlc5jb20vbmV3cy9hcm15L2dyZWVuLWJlcmV0LWVhcm5zLXNvbGRpZXItcy1tZWRhbmC1mb3ItYWlkaW5nLXJldGlyZWQtYXJteS1yYW5nZXItMS42NTg0Nzg/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E94a5f592>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly9icmVha2luZ2RlZmVuc2UuY29tLzlwMjEvMDEvaHlwZSJzb25pY3MtdW5tYW5uZWQtc2hpcC10ZWFTaW5nLWFOZWZkLWZvci16dW13YWx0LWRlc3Ryb3llci8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ec551a30c>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly9zZWFWb3dlcm1hZ2F6aW5lMm9yZy93b2xmZS1uYXZ5LXBsYW5zLXRvLXN0YXJ0LWRldmVsb3BtZW50LW9mLW51Y2xiYXItc2VhLWxhdW5jaGVkLWNydWlzZS1taXNzaWxlLWluLTIwMjlv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Edb41fd3b>

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2FwaXRhbGdhemV0dGUuY29tL2VkdWNhdGlvbi9uYXZhbmC1hY2FkZW15L2FjLWNUbXZlY2NpbmUtbnF2YWwtYWVhZGVteS1jb3JvbmF2aXJ1cy0yMDIxMDE5NC1odnNlYXNueGh6ZHY3ZGJzZmRkeG1od2l0ZS1zdG9veS50dG1s/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ecb88d87e>

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Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne Bass on Tuesday received their vaccinations against COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus.

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYWlyZm9yY2V0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy95b3VyLWFpci1mb3JzS8yMDIxLzAxLzE0L2dlbi1icm93bi1jaGlGZi1iYXNzLXJlY2VpdmdUtY292aWQtdmFjY2luZXMtdXJnZS1haXJtZW4tdG8tZG8tdGhlLXNhbwUv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ee0d97d94>

A retired Air Force officer who was part of the mob that stormed the U.S. Capitol last week carried plastic zip-tie handcuffs because he intended “to take hostages,” a prosecutor said in a Texas court on Thursday.

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYWlyZm9yY2V0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy9wZW50YWdvbi1jb25ncmVzcy8yMDIxLzAxLzE1L2Fpci1mb3JjZS12ZXRIcmFuLWFPbWVkbXRXRvLXRha2UtaG9zdGFnZXMtZHVyaW5nLXVzLWNhcGl0b2wtcmldC1wcm9zZW51dG9yLXNheXMv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E8c58f72a>

The F-35 fighter jet's exorbitant life-cycle costs means the Air Force cannot afford to buy as many aircraft as it needs to fight and win a war today, which makes the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program all the more important, says outgoing Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper.

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly9icmVha2luZ2RlZmVuc2UuY29tLzlwMjEvMDEvcml9wZXItaGludHMTbmdhZC1jb3VsZC1yZXBsYWNIWYtMzUtd2h5LWxpZmUtY3IjbGUTy29zdHMv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ef2a4d0e5>

The Air Force acquisition chief says he keeps politics out of his work at the Pentagon — and that the U.S. will lose against China without agility.

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW9uZS5jb20vcG9saWN5LzlwMjE vMDEvc m9wZXItbWFrZX MtaGlzLXBpdGNoLWJpZGVuLXRlYW0taS13YW50LWJlLXBhcncQtY2hpbmEtZmlnaHQvMTcxNDEw Lw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E5a10cae8>

The retired general picked the investment firm over opportunities at defense companies.

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW9uZS5jb20vYnVzaW5lc3MvMjAyMS8wMS9mb3JtZXItYWlyLWZvcmlWNoaWVmLWdvcGRmZWluLWpvaW5zLWJsYWNRc3RvbmlUvMTcxMzk5Lw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E7db33564>

Air Force planning hangar construction for future B-21 stealth bombers

Military.com

The U.S. Air Force held a virtual B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber industry day this week to discuss construction projects to house the new stealth bomber, known as the Raider, according to a release.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnkuY29tL2RhaWx5LW5ld3MvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9haXltZm9yY2UtcGxhbm5pbmctaGFuZ2FyLWNvbnN0cnVjdGlvbi1mdXR1cmUtYi0yMS1zdGVhbHRoLWJvbWJlcnMuaHRtbA/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E4e25bc11>

Air Force comptroller to step in as acting secretary after inauguration

Air Force Magazine

Air Force comptroller John P. Roth will temporarily take over as acting Air Force secretary before President-elect Joseph R. Biden names his pick to run the department, among a slew of other fiscal officials who will oversee their respective services.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYWlyZm9yY2VtYWcuY29tL2Fpci1mb3JjZS1jb21wdHJvbGxhci10by1zdGVwLWluLWFzLWFjdGluZy1zZWNYZXRhcnkYXZ0ZXItaW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E6b006faa>

Marine Corps

Oldest living Marine, who joined after Pearl Harbor attack, dies at age 107

War Is Boring

Dorothy "Dot" Cole, who enlisted as one of the earliest female Marine reservists in response to the 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor and was widely celebrated around her birthday in September as the country's oldest living Marine, died of a heart attack last Thursday at her daughter's home in Kannapolis. She was 107.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93YXJpc2JvcmluZy5jb20vb2xkZXN0LWxpdmVudm9yY29tL2Fpci1mb3JjZS1jb21wdHJvbGxhci10by1zdGVwLWluLWFzLWFjdGluZy1zZWNYZXRhcnkYXZ0ZXItaW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ee682572d>

Space Force

Space Force joins the intelligence community

C4ISRNET

The intelligence arm of the Space Force is an official part of the U.S. intelligence community.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYzRpc3JuZXQuY29tL2JhdHRsZWZpZWxkLXRIY2gvc3BhY2UvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9zcGFjZS1mb3JjZS1qb2lucy10aGUtaW50ZWxsaWdlbmNILWNvbnW11bml0eS8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Eb5a2c1cb>

National Guard

Up to 21,000 National Guard troops now authorized in DC for Biden inauguration

Military Times

Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy has now authorized up to 21,000 National Guard troops from around the country to assist law enforcement with security surrounding the inauguration of President-elect Joe Biden, according to the National Guard Bureau. That's an increase of 1,000 from the up to 20,000 previously authorized.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnl0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy95b3VyLW1pbGl0YXJ5LzlwMjEvMDEvMTQvbmF0aW9uYWwtZ3VhcmQtZGMtcHJlc2VuY2Utd2lsbC1zd2VsbC10by0yNjAwMC1mb3ltYmlkZW4taW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Eb347b5d1>

A fake National Guard memo warning of nationwide lockdown is circulating again

Military.com

Some scams just won't go away, such as the fake memo, sporting a National Guard logo, warning that troops are being mobilized to enforce a nationwide quarantine.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnkuY29tL2RhaWx5LW5ld3MvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9mYWtILW5hdGlvbmlldy1tY29tZ3VhcmQtZGMtcHJlc2VuY2Utd2lsbC1zd2VsbC10by0yNjAwMC1mb3ltYmlkZW4taW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E18f1e60f>

Veterans

Tens of thousands of veteran caregivers now eligible for the coronavirus vaccine through VA

Military Times

Tens of thousands of caregivers providing critical medical support to disabled veterans will be eligible to receive coronavirus vaccine doses soon under a new policy announced by the Department of Veterans Affairs this week.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnl0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy9wZW50YWdvbi1jb25ncmVzcy8yMDIxLzAxLzE0L3RlbnMtY29tZ3VhcmQtZGMtcHJlc2VuY2Utd2lsbC1zd2VsbC10by0yNjAwMC1mb3ltYmlkZW4taW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ee47633fd>

Army to review more than 3,500 'bad paper' discharges for post-9/11 vets

Military.com

The U.S. Army plans to review all other-than-honorable discharges given between April 17, 2011, and Nov. 17, 2020, to soldiers who were diagnosed or had symptoms of a mental health condition or brain injury.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnkuY29tL2RhaWx5LW5ld3MvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9hcm15LXJldmldy1tY29tZ3VhcmQtZGMtcHJlc2VuY2Utd2lsbC1zd2VsbC10by0yNjAwMC1mb3ltYmlkZW4taW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ebc51d23b>

Gulf War vet reflects on 30th anniversary of conflict through his photography

Stars & Stripes

Three decades ago, Kirby Lee Vaughn prepared to cross into Iraq as part of Operation Desert Storm.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RyaXBlc3VhcmV3cy9taWRkbGUtZWZdC9ndWxmLXdhci12ZXQtcmlldy1tY29tZ3VhcmQtZGMtcHJlc2VuY2Utd2lsbC1zd2VsbC10by0yNjAwMC1mb3ltYmlkZW4taW5hdWd1cmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E2505dc4c>

Pay & Benefits

Jill Biden names director for military families program Joining Forces

The Associated Press

Days before Joe Biden becomes president, incoming first lady Jill Biden took a step Thursday toward fulfilling a promise to revive a program for military families that she and former first lady Michelle Obama once led.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cubWlsaXRhcnl0aW1lcy5jb20vbmV3cy95b3VyLW1pbGl0YXJ5LzlwMjEvMDEvMTUvamlsbC1iaWRlbi1uYW1lcy1kaXJlY3Rvci1mb3ltbWlsaXRhcnktZmFtaWxpZXMtcHJvZ3JhY2tpbmctaHlwZXJzb25pYy13ZWZvbW5uZWQtbW9yZS8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E11eea4a8>

Podcasts

Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Jan 14, 21] Lockheed Martin's Rambeau on Aegis, HELIOS, unmanned & more
Defense & Aerospace Report

Jon Rambeau, the new vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin's Integrated Warfare Systems and Sensors unit, discusses the outlook for the company's Aegis combat system, SPY-7 radar, HELIOS laser weapon, unmanned systems and cyber role, and growth strategy.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly9kZWZhZXJvcmVwb3J0LmNvbS8yMDIxLzAxLzE0L2RlZmVuc2UtYVYyY3NwYWNILWRhaWx5LXBvZGNhc3QtamFuLTE0LTlxLWxvY2toZWVklW1hcnRpbmMtcMftYmVhdS1vbi1hZWdpcy1oZWxpb3MtdW5tYW5uZWQtbW9yZS8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ea27c40d7>

Defense Industry

Indian government clears \$6.5 billion deal for homemade Tejas fighter jets

Defense News

India on Wednesday cleared the country's largest-ever indigenous defense deal worth \$6.5 billion for the purchase of 83 LCA MK1A Tejas light combat aircraft.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW5ld3MuY29tL2Fpci8yMDIxLzAxLzE0L2luZGhbi1nb3Zlcm5tZW50LWNsZWZfYcy02NS1iaWxsaW9uLWRIYWwtZm9yLWVhbnVWtYWRILXRlamFzLWZpZ2h0ZXItamV0cy8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78E3aa7a7bc>

L3Harris to build prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons

C4ISRNET

The Missile Defense Agency awarded L3Harris Technologies a \$121 million contract to build a prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons, the agency announced Jan. 14.

Caution-

<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22662926.67242/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYzRpc3JuZXQuY29tL2JhdHRsZWZpZWxkLXRIY2gvc3BhY2UvMjAyMS8wMS8xNC9sM2hhcnJpcy10by1idWlsZC1wcm90b3R5cGUtc2F0ZWxsaXRILWNhcGFibGUtb2YtdHJhY2tpbmctaHlwZXJzb25pYy13ZWZvbW5uZWQtbW9yZS8/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78Ee7fde4df>

Thales UK secures Indian partner for selling its Starstreak air-defense missile

Defense News

The Northern Ireland arm of Thales UK has struck a partnering arrangement with Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) as part of its effort to secure a deal with the Indian military to purchase the British-developed Starstreak man-portable, air-defense system.

Caution-

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UK grows national F-35 support with LANCE contract

IHS Jane's 360

The United Kingdom is growing the level of organic sustainment and support it is able to provide for its fleet of Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning combat aircraft.

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US Air Force downselects Northrop Grumman for F-16 electronic warfare suite

IHS Jane's 360

The US Air Force (USAF) has downselected Northrop Grumman as the sole contractor to complete final project efforts to provide the electronic warfare (EW) suite for the service's Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fleet.

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Cyber, Space & Unmanned

Pentagon testing office finds problems — again — with network security system

C4ISRNET

For the fourth year in a row, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester recommended Thursday that components stop migrating to a fraught network security system until the department proves that the system can effectively help defend against cyberattacks.

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JADC2 may be built to fight the wrong war

Breaking Defense

Although it is one of the U.S. military's highest priorities, service and industry leaders remain confused about Joint All-Domain Command and Control, variously describing it as a communication architecture, a data-sharing approach, an operational concept, or a decision-making tool.

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International

NATO leader calls for justice over US Capitol mob siege

The Associated Press

The head of NATO said Thursday that all those responsible for last week's deadly siege at the U.S. Capitol should be held accountable, and he expressed confidence that American institutions are up to the job.

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Romanian government approves Naval Strike Missile buy

Defense News

The Romanian government has approved and sent to the parliament a draft bill that will allow the country to buy Naval Strike Missile coastal defense systems through a foreign military sales (FMS) procedure.

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Commentary & Analysis

Trump's behavior demonstrates that Biden must change US nuclear policy

Defense News

President Donald Trump's role in inciting the shocking events at the Capitol on Jan. 6 and concerns about his state of mind highlight the grave risks posed by the policy that gives presidents the sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons — without the need for consultation or agreement by anyone.

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Pentagon won't throw traditional farewell ceremony for Trump

Defense One

It's a shame, and a missed opportunity — not despite recent events but because of them.

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SR-71 Blackbird: Why the fastest plane ever was grounded

19FortyFive

No other U.S. Air Force aircraft could fly faster or higher than the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbird," and on its final flight, it set a truly impressive record.

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From Trump to Biden: The way forward for US national security

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

America must learn from these last four years.

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The six blind men and the elephant: Differing views on the US defense budget

War On The Rocks

In the Indian parable of “The Blind Men and the Elephant,” six blind men come across an elephant by the side of the road.

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Why overseas military bases continue to make sense for the United States

War On The Rocks

Every president in the post-Cold War period has sought to close U.S. military bases overseas, particularly in Europe.

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The Pentagon must learn to do more with less

Bloomberg

The U.S. military is stronger than it was four years ago, but the country’s defense programs still need a lot of work.

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Overseas Operations

Iran tests missiles under apparent watch of US Navy nuclear sub

The Associated Press

Iran fired cruise missiles Thursday as part of a naval drill in the Gulf of Oman, state media reported, under surveillance of what appeared to be a U.S. nuclear submarine dispatched to the region amid heightened tensions between the countries.

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Army's command team in Europe receives coronavirus vaccine

Stars & Stripes

Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli and Command Sgt. Maj. Robert V. Abernethy, the command team of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, received the Moderna vaccine Thursday at the Wiesbaden Army Health Clinic in Germany.

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Two German lawmakers urge greater control of criminal cases involving US troops

Stars & Stripes

Two German lawmakers are calling for changes in an international treaty that leaves most criminal cases involving U.S. troops in the hands of the military justice system, saying local authorities should have more say in such matters.

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New coronavirus infections hover above 1,500 in Tokyo; US military in Japan reports 13 cases

Stars & Stripes

Japan's capital city counted more than 1,400 new coronavirus cases for a second consecutive day, while the U.S. military listed 13 across the country as of 6 p.m. Thursday.

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Report adds further evidence Iran's Soleimani was killed by new highly precise missile

The Drive

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Pentagon

The military knows it has a problem with domestic extremists, white supremacists

Military Times

In the wake of reports that current and former service members are under investigation for their participation in the Jan. 6 protest and subsequent attack on the Capitol, the Pentagon is making an effort to reinforce its policies on extremism.

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Can the Pentagon prosecute military retirees under the UCMJ? Maybe — it depends.

Military Times

Recent reports of current service members, veterans and some military retirees participating in the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6 have prompted calls for investigations into those connections and using the Uniform Code of Military Justice to prosecute the offenders.

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Acting defense secretary ordered review of Pentagon's extremism policies

Stars & Stripes

Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller quietly ordered a review last month of the Pentagon's policies on extremist activities among service members, a senior defense official said Thursday, acknowledging the growing concern of troops harboring extreme views.

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DoD 'no place' for those espousing extremist views, officials say

UPI

Pentagon officials said Thursday that the Defense Department has "no place" for those espousing extremist views, and is doing everything it can to eliminate extremism in the department.

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Congress & Politics

US military has 'failed' to counter white nationalism in its ranks, lawmakers say

Business Insider

Democratic lawmakers are urging the Defense Department to "immediately" investigate extremist activity within the US military and implement a plan to prevent the ideology from further spreading within its ranks,

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GOP lawmaker and Army veteran who voted for Trump's impeachment says he's buying body armor over death threats

Business Insider

Republican Rep. Peter Meijer of Michigan, an Army veteran, on Thursday said that he and fellow lawmakers are taking precautions such as purchasing body armor in the wake of President Donald Trump's second impeachment over the Capitol siege.

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Lawmakers ask Army to send cots for National Guard in US Capitol

Military.com

If images of sleeping National Guard members wedged between statues and using marble stairs as pillows have tugged at your heartstrings, you're not alone.

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We salute these military veterans who stood up to rioters on Capitol Hill

Task & Purpose

When rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol Building on Jan. 6 after a post-election rally to support President Donald Trump devolved into a riot, the news cycle was flooded with photos and footage most viewers never expected to see.

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National Security

FBI tracking 'extensive' online chatter about armed protests

The Associated Press

Task & Purpose

The Army is offering up to \$25,000 for information leading to the arrest or conviction of the person responsible for the murder of an Army drill sergeant on New Year's Day.

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Fort Benning hunkers down in hopes of avoiding post-holiday COVID-19 surge

Task & Purpose

Soldiers at Fort Benning are nearing the end of a two-week lockdown put in place in hopes to get ahead of a potential post-holiday surge of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).

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Woman found dead at Hawaii base was Army veteran; soldier taken into custody

Stars & Stripes

A soldier has been placed in pre-trial confinement in connection with a homicide investigation into the death of a 25-year-old wife of a soldier Wednesday at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the Army said Thursday.

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Green Beret earns Soldier's Medal for aiding retired Army Ranger

Stars & Stripes

An Army physician assistant earned the Soldier's Medal for his bravery and decisiveness when he strapped a makeshift tourniquet on his own mangled arm and treated his badly wounded mentor after motorcyclists slammed into them at high speed.

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Navy

Hypersonics, unmanned ship teaming ahead for Zumwalt destroyer

Breaking Defense

The Navy plans to install hypersonic missiles on its troublesome Zumwalt destroyers, after Congress gave them the green light to start studying the move in the 2021 budget.

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ZXItaGludHMtmdhZC1jb3VsZC1yZXBsYWNILWYtMzUtd2h5LWxpZmUtY3ljbGUtY29zdHMv/5758863d498edb7fd6780f78F2a4d0e5

Roper makes his pitch to Biden team: 'I want to be part of the China fight'

Defense One

The Air Force acquisition chief says he keeps politics out of his work at the Pentagon — and that the U.S. will lose against China without agility.

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Former Air Force chief Goldfein joins Blackstone

Defense One

The retired general picked the investment firm over opportunities at defense companies.

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Air Force planning hangar construction for future B-21 stealth bombers

Military.com

The U.S. Air Force held a virtual B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber industry day this week to discuss construction projects to house the new stealth bomber, known as the Raider, according to a release.

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Air Force comptroller to step in as acting secretary after inauguration

Air Force Magazine

Air Force comptroller John P. Roth will temporarily take over as acting Air Force secretary before President-elect Joseph R. Biden names his pick to run the department, among a slew of other fiscal officials who will oversee their respective services.

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Marine Corps

Oldest living Marine, who joined after Pearl Harbor attack, dies at age 107

War Is Boring

Army to review more than 3,500 'bad paper' discharges for post-9/11 vets

Military.com

The U.S. Army plans to review all other-than-honorable discharges given between April 17, 2011, and Nov. 17, 2020, to soldiers who were diagnosed or had symptoms of a mental health condition or brain injury.

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Gulf War vet reflects on 30th anniversary of conflict through his photography

Stars & Stripes

Three decades ago, Kirby Lee Vaughn prepared to cross into Iraq as part of Operation Desert Storm.

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Pay & Benefits

Jill Biden names director for military families program Joining Forces

The Associated Press

Days before Joe Biden becomes president, incoming first lady Jill Biden took a step Thursday toward fulfilling a promise to revive a program for military families that she and former first lady Michelle Obama once led.

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Podcasts

Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Jan 14, 21] Lockheed Martin's Rambeau on Aegis, HELIOS, unmanned & more
Defense & Aerospace Report

Jon Rambeau, the new vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin's Integrated Warfare Systems and Sensors unit, discusses the outlook for the company's Aegis combat system, SPY-7 radar, HELIOS laser weapon, unmanned systems and cyber role, and growth strategy.

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Defense Industry

Indian government clears \$6.5 billion deal for homemade Tejas fighter jets

Defense News

India on Wednesday cleared the country's largest-ever indigenous defense deal worth \$6.5 billion for the purchase of 83 LCA MK1A Tejas light combat aircraft.

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L3Harris to build prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons

C4ISRNET

The Missile Defense Agency awarded L3Harris Technologies a \$121 million contract to build a prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons, the agency announced Jan. 14.

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Thales UK secures Indian partner for selling its Starstreak air-defense missile

Defense News

The Northern Ireland arm of Thales UK has struck a partnering arrangement with Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) as part of its effort to secure a deal with the Indian military to purchase the British-developed Starstreak man-portable, air-defense system.

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UK grows national F-35 support with LANCE contract

IHS Jane's 360

The United Kingdom is growing the level of organic sustainment and support it is able to provide for its fleet of Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning combat aircraft.

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US Air Force downselects Northrop Grumman for F-16 electronic warfare suite

IHS Jane's 360

The US Air Force (USAF) has downselected Northrop Grumman as the sole contractor to complete final project efforts to provide the electronic warfare (EW) suite for the service's Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fleet.

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Cyber, Space & Unmanned

Pentagon testing office finds problems — again — with network security system

C4ISRNET

Pentagon won't throw traditional farewell ceremony for Trump

Defense One

It's a shame, and a missed opportunity — not despite recent events but because of them.

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SR-71 Blackbird: Why the fastest plane ever was grounded

19FortyFive

No other U.S. Air Force aircraft could fly faster or higher than the Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbird," and on its final flight, it set a truly impressive record.

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From Trump to Biden: The way forward for US national security

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

America must learn from these last four years.

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The six blind men and the elephant: Differing views on the US defense budget

War On The Rocks

In the Indian parable of "The Blind Men and the Elephant," six blind men come across an elephant by the side of the road.

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Why overseas military bases continue to make sense for the United States

War On The Rocks

Every president in the post-Cold War period has sought to close U.S. military bases overseas, particularly in Europe.

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The Pentagon must learn to do more with less

Bloomberg

The U.S. military is stronger than it was four years ago, but the country's defense programs still need a lot of work.

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration <dea@public.govdelivery.com>
Sent: Friday, January 15, 2021 5:39 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] DEA Announces Expansion of Operation Crystal Shield

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Press Release

DEA Announces Expansion of Operation Crystal Shield

DEA Chicago and San Francisco Field Divisions have been identified as methamphetamine trafficking transportation hubs

of Operation Crystal Shield. This expansion includes the designation of two additional methamphetamine "transportation hubs" in 2021. Through this effort, two new field divisions have been added to this initiative, along with the nine DEA field divisions originally selected to participate. Additionally, operational resources have been increased.

based on the actions of the dangerous drug trafficking cartels, and today we are fulfilling that pledge," said Acting Administrator Shea. "This is an ever-evolving effort to keep our communities safe. This action is an important step to stymie this dangerous drug from flooding our neighborhoods and communities."

methamphetamine transportation hubs throughout the United States to prevent these deadly narcotics from wracking public health and security across the nation. Methamphetamine.

. The Chicago Field Division has been identified as a hub for Sinaloa and CNJG operations that transport methamphetamine to communities across Wisconsin.

accounted for over 75 percent of the methamphetamine seized across the United States in 2019. Including the two new hubs of Chicago and San Francisco, together they

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

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The acting secretary has no public or media events on his schedule. Read More > [Caution-<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Today-in-DoD/Date/2021-01-17?source=GovDelivery>]

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Subject: [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] Belarus Warning Update: Belarus Confirms Plans to Purchase Advanced Air Defense Systems from Russia

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Belarus Warning Update: Belarus Confirms Plans to Purchase Advanced Air Defense Systems from Russia

January 14, 2020, 2:45 EDT: The Kremlin will likely employ Russian S-400 advanced air defense systems in Belarus aircraft missile divisions that currently operate the S-300 system with S-400 and Pantsir-S systems. ISW first warned of systems.

Click here to read the complete assessment by ISW's Russia Team. < Caution-http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?f=001kbAE8_yxoLxib07huE3bEVFfxU9rEfIyqHAyeP1ZgPqyYdIJrtW_hh9ACT8HvvURmCDL1gOayHIV4frfr2E3By1UcFWHBoIkMGXqpiVZqZ2b1Xhr3RPPOofi2LzLu4diVabWCFYD7DC6BB164psL2CTIiK2ZlDBobqIIVJ_ezu3YQtRQdWa3oyLZkv9VKvarbQ==&c=wiOKgN9g7OYYoo_1ztwkEH3Uq39s >

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From: Defense News <news@defensenews.com>
Sent: Friday, January 15, 2021 6:00 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] Discover the secrets of the Tempest

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Radar engineers on the sixth-generation Tempest fighter program say they will break data-processing records by way of m
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
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Russia follows US to withdraw from Open Skies Treaty < Caution-

The treaty was intended to build trust between Russia and the West by allowing the accord's more than three dozen signat
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The Defense Information Systems Agency's Joint Regional Security Stacks still has challenges 2 years after suggestions to
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Footage showed four unmanned, triangle-shaped drones flying in a tight formation. Read More < Caution-
<https://link.defensenews.com/click/22668953.7713/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW5ld3MuY29tL3RyYWluaW5nLXNp>



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Missile Defense is critical to protecting our nation. Our unmatched NCI team combines unmatched experience and innovation. <https://link.defensenews.com/click/22668953.7713/aHR0cHM6Ly9hZC5kb3VibGVjbGljay5uZXQvZGRtL3RyYWNrY2xrL04ZWNOZWRfdHJlYXRtZW50PTt0ZnVhPTtnZHB5PSR7R0RQUm07Z2Rwcl9ib25zZW50PSR7R0RQUi9DT05TRU5UXzc1Nj>

North Korea displayed new submarine-launched ballistic missiles under development and other military hardware in a para

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L3Harris to build prototype satellite capable of tracking hypersonic weapons <
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The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor prototype will culminate in an on-orbit demonstration. Read More < C
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Will improved relations with Qatar lead to more military cooperation? < Caution-
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[VhZC10by1tb3JILW1pbGl0YXJ5LWNvb3BlcmF0aW9uLw/5758863d498edb7fd678](https://link.defensenews.com/click/22668953.7713/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW5ld3MuY29tL2dsb2JhbC9taWRIY)

With signs that diplomatic relations are improving between Qatar and its neighbors, regional analysts are wondering if joint
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The drones are meant to be used by soldiers as eyes in the sky, with no special training required to fly them. [Read More < https://link.defensenews.com/click/22668953.7713/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW5ld3MuY29tL2dsb2JhbC9ldXJvcG](https://link.defensenews.com/click/22668953.7713/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW5ld3MuY29tL2dsb2JhbC9ldXJvcG)

Aerovironment picks up Arcturus UAV, a company whose capability has caught the Army's eye in its Future Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (FTUAV) program. <https://link.defensenews.com/click/22668953.7713/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZGVmZW5zZW5ld3MuY29tL2xhbmQvMjAyMS8w>

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Trump's Mideast military policy capstone. Read More < Caution-
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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: The Jamestown Foundation <pubs@jamestown.org>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 8:59 AM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: [EEMSG: Marketing][Non-DoD Source] Jamestown Strategic Digest Vol. 7, Issue 1

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Strategic Indicator

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Donohue, John K. <John.Donohue@uscp.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 4:13 PM
To: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET); Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); §2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K.; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; stephebj@nctc.gov; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Michael_Libby@nps.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; Farnam, Julie E.; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; McCamley, Ryan P.; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO); Cardella, Alex; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Andres, Alyse; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov; Phillips, Steve; Dillon, Joseph; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; Erickson, John M.; ADonald@wmata.com; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; paige.vandenhoeve@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; CookJam (EXTERNAL); Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); Saleem, Usman NMN.; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Chite, Mark; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Lauren Eagan (EXTERNAL); MICHAEL EBEEY (PID); Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; Guzman, Marilyn C.; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Lay, Amy L.; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Edward W. Wojocichowski (EXTERNAL); Nugent, John T.; Millard, David M.; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil; Deegan, John R.; Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); Waller, Markiest; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA)
Cc: Gallagher, Sean P.; Farnam, Julie E.
Subject: USCP SAR Digest 1/18
Attachments: 21-A-0700 Suspicious Activity Reports January 7-18 2021.pdf
Categories: Green


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
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
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
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
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
























Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 3:53 PM
To: INAUG-PICC-INFO; Glover, Roosevelt; External-§2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Fata, Lillian - GOV; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); Phillips, Steve; MICHAEL EBey (PID); RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO); CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO); MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Cook, James A.; Chite, Mark; DAMON.C.EDWARDS@cbp.dhs.gov; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Jackson, Keishea (FEMS); Mccray, Jonice; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; External-Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; External-Benjamin.goldberg@dot.gov; gerrityd@state.gov; zurburkinghm@state.gov; herrerama@state.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; Andres, Alyse; Tu, Raymond H. (BA) (FBI); Wightman, Michael C. (BA) (FBI); Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; George.Adams@oig.hhs.gov; James.Lehman@oig.hhs.gov; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; External-william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; jonathan.m.morgenstein.mil@mail.mil; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Cardella, Alex; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); External-ADonald@wmata.com; MASalata@wmata.com; EMoscouLewis@wmata.com; Ferraro, Alexandra (HSEMA); Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA); Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; stephebj@nctc.gov; PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K.; Grice, William R; Carlson, Kristoffer B. - GOV; Bahe, Kenneth - GOV; Waller, Markiest; Van Den Heever, Paige - GOV; Cooper, Isaiah - GOV; Suszan, Nicholas - CIV; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Lay, Amy L.; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA); douglas.m.trippamy.mil@mail.mil; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; External-john.erickson@uscg.gov; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; Deegan, John; External-david.millard@uscg.gov; External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; john.donohue@uscg.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; Dillon, Joseph; CGINTELPLLOT@uscg.mil; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil; External-Jeffrey.W.Kuck@whmo.mil; External-Gary.Halton@whmo.mil; 'Hessling, Paul E COL USARMY NG NGB (USA)'
Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); Morris, Tiffany (WF) (FBI); ntic@dc.gov; Keeney, Jessica L MIL USAF AFOSI (USA)
Subject: Social media monitoring report, 18 JAN 2021
Attachments: Daily_Ethnographic_Monitoring_Brief_-_18.01.2021.pdf
Categories: Green

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From: INAUG-PICC-INFO <INAUG-PICC-INFO@usss.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 3:03 PM

To: Glover, Roosevelt <Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; External- 2-534(a)(2) dc.gov <2-534(a)(2) dc.gov>; Fata, Lillian - GOV <lillian.fata@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>; MICHAEL EBey (PID) <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov>; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO) <richard.rogers@usss.dhs.gov>; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO) <christina.fabac@usss.dhs.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@usss.dhs.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@usss.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; DAMON.C.EDWARDS@cbp.dhs.gov <DAMON.C.EDWARDS@cbp.dhs.gov>; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Jackson, Keishea (FEMS) <keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; Mccray, Jonice <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; External-Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil <Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; External-Benjamin.goldberg@dot.gov <Benjamin.goldberg@dot.gov>; gerrityd@state.gov <gerrityd@state.gov>; zurburgkinghm@state.gov <zurburgkinghm@state.gov>; herreraama@state.gov <herreraama@state.gov>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; Tu, Raymond H. (BA) (FBI) <rhtu@fbi.gov>; Wightman, Michael C. (BA) (FBI) <mcwightman@fbi.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov <Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov <Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov>; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; George.Adams@oig.hhs.gov <George.Adams@oig.hhs.gov>; James.Lehman@oig.hhs.gov <James.Lehman@oig.hhs.gov>; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil <wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil <marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil>; External-william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; jonathan.m.morgenstein.mil@mail.mil <jonathan.m.morgenstein.mil@mail.mil>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov <jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov <michael.barbieri@dc.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; External-ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; MASalata@wmata.com <MASalata@wmata.com>; EMoscouLewis@wmata.com <EMoscouLewis@wmata.com>; Ferraro, Alexandra (HSEMA) <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA) <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; Grice, William R <william.grice@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Carlson, Kristoffer B. - GOV <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Bahe, Kenneth - GOV <KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; Van Den Heever, Paige - GOV <paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Cooper, Isaiah - GOV <isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Suszan, Nicholas - CIV <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>;

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Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>; Morris, Tiffany (WF) (FBI) <tmorris@fbi.gov>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - USSS Open Source Intelligence Branch Inauguration Week Demonstrations Update for January 18

Please see the attached USSS Open Source Intelligence Branch Inauguration Week Demonstrations Update for January 18.

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

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Cc: External-htstapleton@fbi.gov; tmorris@fbi.gov
Subject: USSS Open Source Intelligence Branch Inauguration Week Demonstrations Update for January 18
Attachments: (FOUO--LES) USSS PID Open Source Intelligence Branch_ Inauguration Week Demonstrations Update January 18.pdf
Categories: Green

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

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Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 11:45 AM
To: christopher.coles@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; hphillips@uss.s.dhs.gov; kim.detwiler@uss.s.dhs.gov; erik.meidlinger@uss.s.dhs.gov; Osu-onduty@uss.s.dhs.gov; david.leavell@hq.dhs.gov; alexandra.felt@hq.dhs.gov; luis.rovira@hq.dhs.gov; 'jennifer.m.lofland@usdoj.gov'; Mccray, Jonice; Mason, Amanda S Maj USAF NG DCANG (USA); Taylor, Amanda L SFC USARMY NG DCARNG (USA); Andrew.D.Hasser.mil@mail.mil; james.t.miller.civ@mail.mil; lorenzo.godette@ncis.navy.mil; emily.schmid@ncis.navy.mil; Kennedy.D.Cantu@uscg.mil; Joseph.moore141.mil@mail.mil; Cushman, James J.; christopher.coles@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; steve.ghezzi@ncis.navy.mil; Loftus, Ashlea (WF) (FBI); kestenger@fbi.gov; patricia.ripley@nctc.gov; htstapleton@fbi.gov; wjnewman@fbi.gov; miguel.hologuin@njsp.org; jeffrey.lebron-melendez@njsp.org; john.bardunias@njsp.org; jennifer.williams@njsp.org; meredith.lauber@njsp.org; kathryn.ingram@njsp.org; eric.petrevich@njsp.org; Khan, Sabrina; Heesemann, Dan; amcadam@nynjhidta.org; zsnyder@nynjhidta.org; rmarcus@nynjhidta.org; dmorgan@nynjhidta.org; ttrocki@nynjhidta.org; jconlon@nynjhidta.org; marrow@nynjhidta.org; trhein@nynjhidta.org; sgoldfein@nynjhidta.org; kfoyl@nynjhidta.org; ttesler@nynjhidta.org; hgerkman@nynjhidta.org; credner@nynjhidta.org; jgordon@nynjhidta.org; kjohnson@nynjhidta.org; kadwyer@pa.gov; leacampbel@pa.gov; Lohr, Nathan; mmeldrum@pa.gov; merooney@pa.gov; aschoonmaker@ncsbi.gov; mstanley@ncsbi.gov; vgallimore@ncsbi.gov; leichel@ncsbi.gov; ishackelford@ncsbi.gov; ekieser@ncsbi.gov; kmyatt@ncsbi.gov; bsykes@ncsbi.gov; apratt@ncsbi.gov; jldavis@dps.ohio.gov; aimiller@dps.ohio.gov; jmphillips@dps.ohio.gov; Satkalmi, Ravi; steve.ghezzi@ncis.navy.mil; Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov; david.engel@maryland.gov
Cc: Harvin, Donell (HSEMA); Mein, John (EOM); Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA); Bovia, Darrin (HSEMA); Drown, Megan (HSEMA)-Contractor; Ehlman, Sarah (HSEMA); Ferraro, Alexandra (HSEMA); Hoodjer, Steven (HSEMA); Knight, Trevor (HSEMA); Lambert, Jordan (HSEMA); Peacock, Carley (HSEMA)-Contractor; Ross, Aaron (HSEMA); Smart, Sam (HSEMA)-Contractor; Randolph, Sedley (HSEMA); Peri, David (HSEMA); Spalding, Jordan (HSEMA); Schulenberg, Alyssa (HSEMA)
Subject: (U//FOUO//LES) Fw: USCP Information Paper
Attachments: Outlook-54v551zp.jpg; 21-A-0696 Bomb Threats FINAL.pdf
Categories: Green

§ 2-534(e)

Best regards,

Sam

National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC)

Mainline: (202) 481-3075 | ntic@dc.gov

DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency

2720 Martin Luther King, Jr. Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20032



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Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 11:34 AM
To: NTIC (HSEMA) <NTIC@dc.gov>
Cc: Donohue, John K. <John.Donohue@uscp.gov>
Subject: USCP Information Paper


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As mentioned on this morning's call, 2-534(a)(3)

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Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 11:19 AM
To: 'Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI)'; Phillips, Steve; michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov; richard.rogers@usss.dhs.gov; christina.fabac@usss.dhs.gov; matthew.n.phillips@usss.dhs.gov; adam.kirkwood@usss.dhs.gov; Rosanna.donaghey@usss.dhs.gov; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Cook, James A.; Chite, Mark; DAMON.C.EDWARDS@cbp.dhs.gov; derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; benjamin.goldberg@dot.gov; gerrityd@state.gov; zurburgkinghm@state.gov; herrera@state.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; Andres, Alyse; Tu, Raymond H. (BA) (FBI); Wightman, Michael C. (BA) (FBI); Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; George.Adams@oig.hhs.gov; James.Lehman@oig.hhs.gov; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; jonathan.m.morgenstein.mil@mail.mil; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Cardella, Alex; §2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); ADonald@wmata.com; MASalata@wmata.com; EMoscouLewis@wmata.com; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET); Stephen B Johnson; Gilliard, Darrell K.; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Waller, Markiest; paige.vandenneever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Lay, Amy L.; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA); douglas.m.trippamy.mil@mail.mil; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; John.Erickson@uscg.gov; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; Delegan, John; David.Millard@uscg.gov; Usman.Saleem@uscg.gov; john.nugent@uscg.gov; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; john.donohue@uscg.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; Dillon, Joseph; cgintelplot; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); michael.rose2; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); mark_varanelli@nps.gov; Michael.Libby@nps.gov; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil; Jeffrey.W.Kuck@whmo.mil; Gary.Halton@whmo.mil; 'Hessling, Paul E COL USARMY NG NGB (USA)'; RUSSET; Joanna P Angelides; Travis R Hollis
Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); Morris, Tiffany (WF) (FBI)
Subject: INAUG: (U//FOUO) RMVEs Using Variety of Online Platforms for Extremist Activity
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Thank you,

John

John P. Markey
Special Events Intelligence Coordinator
National Counterterrorism Center
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markejo@dni.ic.gov, patrjom@nctc.gov

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
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
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Thank you,
Jimmy


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
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
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Chinese Navy's Third Aircraft Carrier Likely to be Launched This Year

Our Bureau 05:57 AM, January 18, 2021 702



Aerial view of Jiangnan Shipyard @Chinapower.CSIS.org

The Chinese Navy's large aircraft carrier, Type 003, is expected to be launched in 2021 and enter naval service around 2025.

General outline of the warship is already identifiable in recent openly available photographs. Blocks of the Type 003 aircraft carrier are currently being assembled in Shanghai-based Jiangnan Shipyard.

After all the blocks are put together, the upper structures will be installed. Since the blocks are built in advance, the assembly and the outfitting work will take much less time compared with China's second aircraft carrier, *Ordinance Industry Science Technology*, a Chinese defense industry magazine, said in a report published in its WeChat account on Saturday.

The current status indicates that the Type 003 could be only a few months away from its launch before the end of 2021. After this the carrier will undertake outfitting work, be installed with equipment including radar and sensor devices, conduct tests and embark on sea trials, which could take about two years, meaning the warship could join naval service in 2024 or 2025, the magazine predicted.

The Chinese media had speculated earlier that [the warship could be launched in 2020](#).

Chinese state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) also expects the country's third aircraft carrier to make its public debut in 2021.

"2021 is a year full of expectations, including the Type 003 aircraft carrier and also the H-20 bomber. It is time for our technological development to bear fruit," Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and TV commentator, told the [Global Times](#) on Sunday.

Type 003 carrier is expected to be as big as U.S. Navy's Kitty Hawk-class, displacing more than 80,000 tons. The magazine said that the ship is likely to be equipped with electromagnetic catapults to launch aircraft, replacing the ski jump method used on current Chinese carriers.



January 2021

Whither the IRGC of the 2020s?

Is Iran's Proxy Warfare Strategy of Forward Defense Sustainable?

Alex Vatanka

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I. Executive Summary

On January 2, 2020, the United States assassinated the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force, General Qassem Soleimani, in Iraq and accused him of playing a role in an alleged attack on American troops by Iran-backed Shia militias. The assassination signaled a major escalation in the conflict between Iran and the United States. For a moment, the conflict ceased to be a proxy war characterized by efforts to keep tensions deniable and indirect and instead became a direct exchange of violence, with Iran responding to the assassination with a direct missile strike on U.S. forces.

The fallout of the assassination reflects the contradictions and uncertainty at the heart of Iranian proxy warfare strategy and its approach known as “forward defense,”¹ in which Iran seeks to use proxies in other countries to prevent conflict from coming within Iran's borders. Iran's strategy was developed over decades through its confrontations with the United States and regional rivals and historically has emphasized its willingness to eschew revisionist religious and ideological aims in order to pursue national interests.

The 2011 Arab Spring, with its threat to Iran's key partner in Syria while opening opportunities in other areas, inaugurated a more uncertain era for Iran's proxy strategy. This uncertainty has been heightened by an increasingly aggressive U.S. stance towards Iran. As a result, Iran has played up appeals to religious and ideological aims alongside more traditional forms of proxy mobilization in its forward defense strategy.

Though Iran continues to view and portray itself as pursuing defensive ends vis-à-vis the United States and other rivals, the means it uses tend to signal more revisionist aims, an issue Iranian policymakers recognize as a challenge but embraced anyways. In turn, this has encouraged the United States, and some of its partners, to pursue their own more direct policies of maximum pressure with regard to Iran.

It is far from clear whether Iran can sustainably pursue this strategy. Iran has a history of agile use of proxies and relatively successful navigation between the mobilization of religious and ideological appeals and the pursuit of national interest. However, Iranian society is showing signs of concern regarding the limits of forward defense. Iran's rivals appear to have assessed that those strains are sufficient and that Iran will fold when confronted.

What is clear, however, is that this uncertainty brings with it the risk of repeated crises with the potential for escalation. Understanding whether and how stability in the relationship can be reasserted will require detailed examinations of the specific balances of national interest, ideological appeals, and Iranian control in the varied national contexts where the conflict is now playing out.

Key Findings:

- **The 2011 Arab Spring and 2014 war against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) inaugurated a period of greater Iranian aggressiveness in its use of proxy warfare as it confronted a number of crises that increased Iranian threat perceptions.**
- **Iranian proxy warfare strategy is shaped by a desire to minimize costs to Iran and its people. As a result, it historically sought to maintain plausible deniability.** Iran limited its direct contribution to the defense of the Assad regime in Syria, and has staffed its involvement in proxy wars generally from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) volunteers and by mobilizing local or foreign proxies, not by mobilizing the nation's more general armed forces. Iranian strategists tout the limitations on direct intervention as a success of the strategy.
- **While Iran has embraced more aggressive means in the form of a Forward Defense doctrine that seeks to give Iran strategic depth, it still views its objectives as largely defensive.** Iran views itself as facing an American threat to its homeland—escalated by the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign—as well as an American threat to a key partner in Assad's Syria, and an ISIS threat to Iranian partners and interests in Iraq.
- **However, using proxy forces to wage war on the cheap and as a public deterrent has led Iran to rely upon ideological and religious appeals in order to mobilize fighters and signal its capabilities.** In recent years, Iran has grown increasingly bold in making public statements that link together the movements it supports and its influence over their activities.
- **Iran's strategy contains a tension between its proclaimed defensive ends and its offensive means that have signaled a more revisionist intent to Iranian rivals. This tension holds the potential to escalate conflicts and thus make Iran's strategy unsustainable given its desire to minimize costs.** Iranian strategists are aware of the tension but supporters of the forward defense strategy view it as a manageable tension given its history of proxy warfare.
- **Iran's proxy strategy faces real political limits to its sustainability rooted in both domestic anger at the use of funds abroad, economic constraints, and backlash against perceived Iranian domination in countries where Iran seeks to build partners.**

- **The United States, for its part, has embraced a strategy of maximum pressure that views Iran's strategy as unsustainable and prone to failure when conflict takes on a more direct character.** Through sanctions and direct assassinations of key IRGC personnel, the United States hopes to force Iran to back down.
- **It is not clear if Iran's strategy is actually built to last, but the current moment is likely to be characterized by repeated crises with the potential to escalate into more direct confrontations because Iranian strategists view forward defense as an effective approach agile enough to manage tensions and the United States views it as an unsustainable policy that will fall apart when confronted.**
- **Policymakers should be aware of the ways in which Iran's methods of ensuring cost-effective mobilization when pressed shape threat perceptions across the region, the IRGC's own structure, and Iranian domestic politics.** The effects of particular policies are likely to be complex and often unpredictable given the way transnational mobilization and signals interlink conflicts.
- **An effective approach to this moment of crisis instability will require analysis of the sustainability of specific Iranian interventions.** In some cases, like Iran's support for Hezbollah, ideological and material ties make it unlikely that pressure can disrupt an established proxy relationship. In others, like Yemen, Iran's commitment to the Houthis is more vulnerable to pressure. Other cases, like the Shi'a militias in Iraq, are less clear.

II. Introduction

The U.S. assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani on January 2, 2020 in Baghdad was so unprecedented that many feared that any move afterward might lead to all-out war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. After four decades of tense rivalry in the Middle East, the American use of an armed drone to target a military official widely viewed as one of the most powerful men in Iran signaled a precipitous climb up the escalation ladder between Washington and Tehran. Iran in turn retaliated on January 8 with direct missile strikes on American forces in Iraq, although the strikes did not kill anyone.² By one account, the Iranians had given the U.S. military an eight-hour notice to clear the bases before the missiles hit. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the Revolutionary Guards' Aerospace Force, claimed that the warning had been given to the Americans because Tehran "did not intend to kill [persons]."³ Tehran wanted both to show a capacity to strike at the United States but also to demonstrate that it had no intentions to see the military standoff escalate further.

For now, despite the missile strike, Iran appears prepared to double down on the proxy war strategy that was Soleimani's most significant contribution to Tehran's anti-access, area denial approach to deterring American attempts to expand U.S. regional influence that could seed regime change in Tehran.

Over the course of the last decade, this Iranian approach to regional military operations began to be described by its proponents in Tehran as "forward defense." Put simply, forward defense holds that militarily confronting enemies outside of Iran's borders is preferable to having to face them inside of Iran's borders. At its core, forward defense is the embodiment of Iran's military lessons gained over the four decades since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It reflects a fusion of the tools available to Iranian military leaders combined with the need to address a fast-changing security environment.

While Soleimani was one of the principal creators of the concept, his death will not be the end of the strategy. That has been the message sent by Iran's Supreme Leader and Commander-in-Chief, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei swiftly appointed Soleimani's successor, Esmail Ghaani, as head of the Qods Force, the branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) that operates outside of Iran's borders. Khamenei has also been categorical that the mission of the Qods Force as intended by Soleimani will continue. As he put it, "The strategy of the Qods Force will be identical to that during the time of Martyr General Soleimani."⁴

In a speech on May 22, 2020 set to coincide with Al Qods Day, which is an event to express opposition to the State of Israel, Khamenei was unusually polemical and signaled his determination to stay the course. In urging the expansion of "jihad inside Palestinian territories [Israel]," he not only praised groups such as

Lebanon's Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas but vowed that Iran would stand by them on the path of "holy struggle."⁵ Iranian officials even set aside the usual application of deniability. In a rare move, state-run media publicized the fact that Soleimani had spearheaded the transfer of Iranian weaponry to Palestinian militants.⁶ Such statements from Tehran are a rebuff of American and Israeli demands that Tehran roll back its support for militant Islamist groups in various theaters in the Middle East.

In pursuing this strategy in the post-Arab Spring era, Iran has increasingly come to embrace aggressive means that involve transnational mobilization and the interlinking of proxy forces, which has in turn encouraged the United States and other Iranian rivals to perceive Iran's strategy as an offensive and revisionist one.

Soleimani's assassination, increased tensions vis-à-vis the United States, and the fluidity of the geopolitics of the Middle East, have brought into the open questions in Iran about the long-term costs, benefits, and risks of a forward defense strategy that relies on Tehran's ability to continue to defy the growing pressures on its economy from U.S. sanctions and fund proxy groups. In the same week as hardliners around Khamenei were touting Tehran's commitment to militant revolutionary foreign policy, a prominent parliamentarian launched a rare public criticism of Tehran's regional agenda.

Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh,⁷ who until recently had been head of the Iranian parliament's committee on national security and foreign policy, asked for Iran to reassess its commitment to the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria. "[Iran] has probably given 20 to 30 billion dollars to Syria and must recover it. The money belonging to this nation [Iran] has been spent there," he said.⁸ The reference to funds invested in backing Syria's Assad was a clear attack on Tehran's foreign policy priorities or that was at least how Khamenei loyalists viewed it. Hossein Shariatmadari, the Khamenei-appointed editor of Kayhan, the Islamic Republic's equivalent to the Soviet Pravda, denounced Falahatpisheh as doing Trump's bidding by turning Iranian public opinion against Tehran's foreign policy.⁹ The incident was a peek into the opaque policy-making process in Tehran and evidence of competing viewpoints in Tehran in regard to the cost of Iran's regional efforts and whether it is sustainable.

The question now for the Biden administration and Congress as well as for their counterparts in Iran is whether Iranian proxy war strategy is truly built to last. The Trump administration turned the calculus of indirect confrontation with Iran on its head, evidently deciding that the United States either no longer needs or can no longer afford the risks that come with fighting Iran's proxies in the shadows. Despite the Trump administration's repeated public pronouncements that it wanted to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East and discontinue its perceived role as regional policeman, the White House opted to put on display American hard power as a way of forcing the Iranians capitulate to a campaign of "maximum pressure" aimed at forcing Iran to recalibrate its approach to Iraq,

Syria, and Israel. This new U.S. approach essentially destroyed the crisis stability that was part and parcel of a covert action strategy anchored in plausible deniability. The high-profile assassination of Soleimani was the most overt expression of this new policy. At the same time, Iran has increasingly adopted public, aggressive means in pursuit of its forward defense strategy.

In the short term, this fresh American resolve will have to contend with one simple reality: Iran's ongoing determination and ability to mobilize, guide, and launch a host of militant groups across the Middle East that Tehran has painstakingly cultivated for decades. In fact, Soleimani and other architects of Iran's forward defense, proxy war strategy would argue that this turn in American policy has been long awaited, and that Iran and its allies are ready for the challenge.

Yet, while Tehran's ability to mobilize an array of foreign militias under its flag is no small feat, the contention that Iran can stay the course regardless of American counter-actions is an untested theory as is the hope of some U.S. policymakers that U.S. pressure can effectively rollback Iranian footprint across the region. Evaluating where, when, and why Iran's forward defense strategy has worked and where it is built on a sustainable foundation and understanding where it has failed and lacks a sustainable foundation, will be central to determining the effectiveness of both U.S. and Iranian crisis management. In the meantime, the uncertainty will likely bring with it periodic crises that at least appear to hold the potential for further escalation to more direct confrontations.

The rest of this report is divided into three sections. The first section examines the historical development of Iran's proxy warfare strategy under Soleimani. The second section examines the sustainability of the strategy today, and the third and concluding section draws lessons from the clash between Iranian proxy strategy and America's new hard power approach.

III. Soleimani Ascendant: The Origins of Iran’s “Forward Defense” Strategy

The geopolitical feud between Iran and the United States dates to 1979 when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his militant Islamist supporters overthrew the Shah of Iran and soon after took control of the U.S. embassy. Though many historians have assessed that the CIA-backed coup that led to the ouster of Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 planted the initial seeds of mistrust between the United States and the Iranian people, it was Khomeini’s rise to power that earned the United States its most-hated-nation status in Iran among anti-Shah forces. Following the hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979, Washington responded in kind, casting the Khomeinists as the source of nearly all wrongdoing in the Middle East.¹⁰

For nearly half a century, the U.S.-Iran conflict was largely characterized by mutual restraint. Neither Washington nor Tehran judged an open military conflict to be in their interests. Instead, a kind of crisis stability anchored in a proxy war paradigm of covert action shaped the normative bounds of American and Iranian strategy. Hit and run attacks on American targets by Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s and later by proxy elements currently allied with the Popular Mobilization Forces or the PMF in Iraq punctuated by American-backed counterattacks in the form of cyber-strikes and targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists on the streets of Tehran have long been part of the backdrop. Each element of this tit-for-tat proxy war between Washington and Tehran always rested on one simple element: plausible deniability.¹¹

The Iran-Iraq War, Soleimani, and Iran’s Geopolitical Approach to Proxy Warfare

Iran’s proxy warfare strategy of using regional non-state militant groups paralleled Qassem Soleimani’s rise as a military commander during the 1990s on the heels of the Iran-Iraq war. Born in 1957, Soleimani came from a poor family in the central province of Kerman. As a teenager he became an anti-Shah Islamist activist before the revolution of 1979 but he did not stand out at that time.¹² The revolution began and prevailed in Tehran but droves of young men—mostly from impoverished rural backgrounds—jumped on the bandwagon. Soleimani was one of them. While he had no formal military training, his chance in life came at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). He enlisted as a volunteer with the Guards and quickly moved up through the ranks of the IRGC, the group of ragtag, armed young men that were empowered and mandated by Ayatollah Khomeini to defend the Islamic Republic against all domestic and foreign enemies.

In late 1980, a few months after the war with Iraq had begun, the 23-year Soleimani was given the command of a volunteer force from his home province of Kerman in what became the 41st Sarallah Division.¹³ This newly formed division was deployed to Iran's Kurdistan province, an area both known for heavy ethnic Kurdish separatist militancy but also as a staging ground into Iraq. On the other side of the border was Iraqi Kurdistan where Tehran, from the days of the Shah, had cultivated anti-Saddam Iraqi Kurds as allies against Baghdad.¹⁴ It is here that Soleimani experienced first-hand the utility of co-opting and deploying foreign militants as part of military strategizing.¹⁵

Ideological or religious reasons were, at best, secondary drivers at this point. The ideological and religious-based reasoning that later came to dominate the narrative to justify forward defense had yet to be born. Nonetheless, it is during the first years of the Iran-Iraq War, which began in September 1980, that the Qods Force, the expeditionary branch of the IRGC, was born, although its mission would evolve over time.¹⁶ Its actions were centered on cross-border operations along the Iran-Iraq battle lines and on recruiting Iraqis.¹⁷ Mostafa Chamran, an Iranian Islamist revolutionary who had seen military training with Shia militants in Lebanon in the 1970s, was a key driver behind the adoption of asymmetric warfare tactics and became the Islamic Republic's first defense minister.¹⁸ While Soleimani was not a key player in the formation of this new outfit, he would be a key participant in the application of the new approach, which mirrored the missions of special operations forces in countries like the United States, including covert action and reconnaissance behind enemy lines.¹⁹ In time, what would make the Qods Force stand out was its use of Shia Islamist rallying cries and its recruitment among Shias outside of Iran.

The Qods Force's mission was not centered on exploiting religious or sectarian fervor at first. The Iraqi Kurds that Iranian commanders like Soleimani collaborated with were not Shia but secular Sunnis. Iranian support for them was an early signal of the Islamic Republic's willingness to collaborate with an assortment of non-Shia or non-Islamist actors as long as the partnership advanced Iran's perceived geopolitical interests. In a decade's time, Iran would be militarily supporting a range of Sunni groups deemed as important to Islamic Republic national interests including the Sunni Afghan Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to the Sunni Bosnians²⁰ in the Yugoslav civil war to the Sunni Hamas in Gaza.²¹ As Zalmay Khalilzad put it in regards to Iran's *modus operandi* in Afghanistan during the 1990s, being Shia "was not sufficient to gain Iranian support."²² This was also evident in Iran's support for Christian Armenia against Shia Muslim Azerbaijan in the war between the two countries over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s.²³

In all of its efforts involving military partners and operations outside of Iran, certain characteristics stand out. Tehran always performed a careful cost-benefit analysis and, as David Menashri argues, it "diligently sought out opportunities in

areas, or in movements, that seemed ripe to respond” to its ideological overtures.

²⁴ The Shia Islamist Iraqis, many of whom moved to Iran to fight Saddam Hussain’s regime under Ayatollah Khomeini’s spiritual and political leadership during the Iran-Iraq war, were one such group. It was during the early 1980s that some of the most prominent present-day Iraqi militia leaders—men such as Hadi Ameri and Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, who was killed alongside Soleimani in January—launched their collaboration with their sponsors in the IRGC.²⁵

The Badr Corps, composed of Shia Iraqi Islamists who looked to Iran, began as a brigade and remained under tight IRGC control. This oversight angered Mohammad Baqir Al-Hakim, the Iraqi Shia cleric who headed the political wing of the Badr movement.²⁶ He complained to the then President Ali Khamenei and Speaker of the Majlis, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Still, the senior IRGC commanders backed by the political leadership in Tehran were determined to maintain strict Iranian control of the foreign forces they were arming and funding. The dispute over command-and-control was somehow resolved and the relationship continued.²⁷ Since the dispute, however, Iran has continued to have lingering doubts about its ability to effectively organize and control its foreign proxies as it sees fit.

Soleimani held the post of commander of the 41st Sarallah Division throughout the Iran-Iraq War. He was one of the youngest military commanders but never a specially celebrated one during the war and his fame would only come years later in the 2000s as he began to cultivate a public image.²⁸ The one factor that appears to have counted in his favor is that he developed a personal bond with the then President Ali Khamenei who frequently visited the war front. The future supreme leader, who took over after Khomeini’s death in June 1989, never forgot that Soleimani had kept him in the highest esteem when many other IRGC commanders viewed Khamenei suspiciously throughout his presidency (1981-1989).²⁹

It was precisely this close personal bond between Khamenei and Soleimani that many analysts have considered as pivotal to the rise and relative independence of the Qods Force during Soleimani’s command from 1998 until his death in 2020. Soleimani’s death thus raised questions about whether the organization would maintain its stature within the power structures of the Islamic Republic without Soleimani at the helm.

Lessons from a Neighbor Under Siege: Soleimani’s First Forays in Afghanistan

After the Iran-Iraq War, Soleimani was given the mission of dealing with rampant organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking coming out of Afghanistan, a country ravaged by civil war where a new breed of extremist movement under the banner of the Taliban was on the rise. Tehran viewed the movement not only

as anti-Iran and anti-Shia but as a creation of its regional rivals, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.³⁰

In early 1998, as Iran was still recovering from the devastation wrought by the eight-year war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Soleimani was named head of the Qods Force.³¹ At the time, Soleimani was barely known to the Iranian public, but he was a known figure among warring factions in neighboring Afghanistan where he had served as Iran's key military liaison to anti-Taliban forces in the Northern Alliance.³² Little analysis has been conducted in the English language about Soleimani's efforts to aid and guide Northern Alliance forces then under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Sunni and ethnic Tajik leader who was among the top opponents of the Taliban.³³ What is known is that Soleimani had been in his new role less than a year when Taliban forces in August of 1998 captured the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i Sharif and promptly arrested nine diplomats at the Iranian consulate.

The Taliban forces, after they had by one account received instructions from Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence), killed all the Iranians except one who managed to escape.³⁴ Tehran made a show out of its response, mobilizing tens of thousands of troops on the border ready to go into Afghanistan. Still, after lengthy deliberation, Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) opted against a conventional military retaliation against the Taliban, in part fearing being drawn into a quagmire.³⁵ Instead, under the auspices of the Qods Force, Tehran increased its financial and military support for its anti-Taliban partners like Ahmad Shah Massoud.³⁶ Tehran not only welcomed but actively sought to assist the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban in 2001 following the terrorist attacks of September 11.³⁷

Soleimani's close links with the Northern Alliance would prove enduring and critical for bolstering his assertions about the value of proxy relations for maintaining a forward defense and deterrent against potential aggression or overreach by adversaries. This kind of patronage also gave Iran leverage not just in the military theater but also on the political and diplomatic stages. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has claimed that the December 2001 Bonn conference that led to Afghanistan's first post-Taliban government could not have succeeded without Soleimani's mediation and ability to pressure the various Afghan political groups that he had cultivated ties with throughout the 1990s.³⁸

During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, the Qods Force and its top commanders, including Soleimani but also Esmail Ghaani, proved to the political leadership in Tehran that the supply of arms and funds to Afghan militants had not only given Iran a say in the battlefield but also had given Tehran a role as a principal powerbroker in that country. This gave Soleimani much personal confidence, which he soon put on public display. By 2008, Soleimani famously sent a message to the top U.S. military official in Iraq: "General Petraeus, you

should know that I, Qassem Soleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan.”³⁹

The War on Terror and the Arab Spring Years: Iran’s Efforts to Consolidate Forward Defense in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003 prompted a period of reorganization and consolidation of Iran’s military expeditionary forces under the Qods Force. Not only did Soleimani have direct access to Khamenei, which meant he could bypass the rest of the IRGC bosses, but the leadership in Tehran had never had more reason to invest in forward defense. In early 2002, the Bush administration named Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of an “Axis of Evil.” It was not unreasonable for the Iranians to think they might be next in a broader U.S. military campaign in the Middle East following 9/11. Keeping the Americans bogged down elsewhere in the region presented an attractive strategy for Tehran. Despite the risk it took in angering Washington, the strategy was worthwhile if it meant preventing or stalling a possible American attack on the Iranian homeland.

The newly reenergized Qods Force reflected hard lessons learned from several different phases of strategic realignment. From support for Hezbollah in Lebanon beginning in the 1980s to backing for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in the 1990s and various groups in Iraq and Yemen in the 2000s, Soleimani’s way of war led to mixed results. Yet, each case allowed Qods Force commanders to adapt and refine their proxy war strategy, and modulate the response to increasing American pressure in the form of covert counter attacks and sanctions. Meanwhile, Soleimani significantly elevated the degree of freedom of operation provided to Qods Force commanders.

As part of the Qods Force organizational structure, each region of operation is given to an individual commander. This “One Country, One File, One Commander” was Soleimani’s brainchild and gives individual Qods Force commanders extraordinary freedom to design and implement policy; but it also makes them responsible for the outcome, according to Morad Veisi, a journalist with *Radio Farda*, the Iranian branch of the United States’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and an expert on the IRGC.⁴⁰ In those most delicate theaters where the Qods Force required maximum policy control, its officers have often been the ones Tehran has dispatched as its top diplomatic envoys. In the case of Iraq, all three of Iran’s ambassadors to Baghdad since 2003 have come from the Qods Force.⁴¹

To the Qods Force leaders in Tehran, Iran’s support to a long list of militant groups across the Middle East translates into leverage. These groups are seen as a vindication of the mobilization and financing of the so-called forward defense. The militant groups help to project Iranian military reach and, at times,

ideological influence. While Iran's consolidation of a forward defense strategy was driven by overarching regional dynamics including a growing perception of a U.S. threat and the rise of new opportunities and challenges with the Arab Spring, its character varied across different national contexts. This was so despite growing public references to transnational mobilization and connections between groups.

Hezbollah in Lebanon: An Enduring, Ideologically Close Relationship with Geopolitical Value

Hezbollah in Lebanon is the best example of Iran's forward defense concept.⁴² This should not be surprising. Iran's own IRGC began as a militia in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and, 41 years later, it is the most formidable political-military-economic actor in the country. This IRGC has diligently worked to replicate its success domestically and turn its foreign proxies into powerbrokers in their respective home countries.

In the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the IRGC and its Qods Force foreign branch did not only ideologically indoctrinate and arm the group, but selected and groomed its leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, its present leader, and Imad Mughniyeh, the group's top military planner who was assassinated in a joint American-Israeli operation in 2008.⁴³

Hezbollah's nearly four-decade alliance with the Islamic Republic is the ultimate successful embodiment of the application of forward defense. Unlike many of the other groups that Tehran has backed since 1979, Hezbollah not only shares the Shia Islamist ideological model adopted in Tehran but provides Iran with a platform from which to militarily exert pressure on its top regional nemesis, Israel. From Tehran's perspective, Hezbollah represents the best the forward defense model can offer: an effective tool of national interest combined with a close and enduring relationship strengthened by both material and ideological ties.

Iran in Syria and Iraq: Key Geopolitical Partner, Contested Ties, and the Role of Ideological and Transnational Mobilization as Stopgap

Yet Iran's military interventions in Syria since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 demonstrate that ideological conformity is not a prerequisite for Tehran's support. Hezbollah may be a particularly successful case of forward defense, but it is far from the only model for the strategy, which often relies on proxies whose ideological ties to Iran are often far weaker than those of Hezbollah. The Syrian case also illustrates the limits and risks of Iran's pursuit of proxy warfare reliant upon relationships of a less enduring and ideologically bound character.

The Islamic Republic has nothing in common in terms of creed with the secular Baathist regime of Bashar Al Assad.⁴⁴ Despite this, Iran intervened militarily on behalf of Assad in close partnership with its ideological offspring, Hezbollah.

Iran's Syrian intervention demonstrated its versatility. It also showed Iran's ability to compartmentalize its regional ambitions and work with foreign partners while awkwardly attempting to publicly cast the mission in Islamist clothing. Iran's key objective was to save a geopolitical ally with a secular system while minimizing costs to Iran itself.⁴⁵ Notably, Iran's primary foreign cohort in the mission in Syria has been Vladimir Putin's Russian Federation, hardly a vanguard of Islamism.⁴⁶

The biggest departure in Syria, when compared to the situation in Iraq, was the need for Iran to bring in droves of non-locals—such as Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis—to fight under Iranian leadership to keep the Assad regime from collapse.⁴⁷ Unlike in Shia-majority Iraq, where the indoctrination of a generation of pro-Islamic Republic sympathizers had been under way before Saddam's fall, Syria's sectarian realities meant that the manpower shortage was a problem for Tehran. This also differentiated Syria from Lebanon, where Iran could rely upon a close ideological ally in Hezbollah. The Qods Force proved agile in circumventing this impediment. In doing so, it sharpened the essence of what forward defense means in practical terms in the post-Arab Spring Middle East by drawing upon transnational networks to resolve the challenges of proxy warfare in a particular context.

The manifestation of forward defense in Iraq and in Syria, since 2003 and 2012 respectively, highlights two basic facts. First, Iran has demonstrated agility in defining and implementing security policy in the region. Second, Iran's activities in Iraq and Syria reveal a consensus among Iranian policy-makers that the appetite of the Iranian public for forward defense is finite.

Tehran did not engage in large-scale recruitment of Iranians to be dispatched to Syria. The few thousand Iranians sent to Syria, ostensibly as military advisors, were overwhelmingly drawn from volunteers in the ranks of the IRGC and not the conscripted Iranian army.⁴⁸ Iran thus depended upon its ability to appeal to and recruit among non-Iranian Shia in the region in order to mobilize the transnational networks.⁴⁹ While national interest was the primary motivator for Iran's defense of Syria, the limits imposed by Iranian society required an emphasis upon sectarian and religious appeals in the means of accomplishing those goals.

The mobilization of non-Iranian forces was a double-edged sword. It helped resolve Iran's manpower problems. But in strengthening appeals to transnational ideological claims, Iran provided its regional rivals with a convincing argument that Tehran was indoctrinating, funding, and arming a new generation of Shia militants and hence, fueling a regional Shia-Sunni sectarian divide. Iran, a non-

Arab and Shia majority country with aspirations to lead the Islamic world, has always been highly sensitive to the charge of acting as a Shia sectarian power and it has invested heavily in countering this complaint levelled against it. However, the priority of keeping Assad in power superseded Tehran's wish to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the Sunni street.⁵⁰ As a result, Iran's approach helped mobilize opposition to Iranian policy and stoked fears that Iran was seeking more revisionist aims.

The IRGC bosses were undeterred and unapologetic. In August 2012, as Tehran's military intervention in Syria became increasingly public, then-IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Hossein Salami said "our doctrines are defensive at the level of (grand) strategy, but our strategies and tactics are offensive."⁵¹ IRGC commanders proudly defended the ability to practice "deep-attack doctrine."⁵² In April 2019, Khamenei appointed Salami to become the head of the IRGC, and Soleimani's nominal boss, even as Soleimani retained his direct and much publicized access to the Supreme Leader.⁵³ Meanwhile, Khamenei's support for forward defense became increasingly overt. "We mustn't be satisfied with our region. By remaining within our borders, we shouldn't neglect the threats over our borders. A broad overseas vision, which is the IRGC's responsibility, is our strategic depth and it is of the utmost importance," he told the IRGC bosses.⁵⁴

Support for the Houthis in Yemen: Loose Ties and a Low Level of Interest

Iran's role in the Yemeni civil war starting in 2014 demonstrates both the limitations of forward defense war and how Tehran has been selective and careful in applying the strategy. It is commonplace to read that Tehran is the sponsor of the Yemeni Houthi rebels fighting the UN-recognized Yemeni government. In reality, when the last round of conflict began in Yemen in 2014, few Iranians were familiar with the term "Houthis" or "Ansar-Allah," the official name of the group. The lack of historic ties between Tehran and the Houthi movement and an exaggerated sense of the importance of sectarian bonds between the two only underscore that their relationship has mostly been a marriage of convenience.⁵⁵

Neither Soleimani nor any other senior IRGC commander ever made a public appearance in Yemen. This stands in contrast to prominent public visits to Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.⁵⁶ Tehran has not made extensive efforts to spread its religious ideology among the Houthis, who are mostly followers of the Zaidi sect in Islam.⁵⁷ The export of Khomeinism to the Houthis of Yemen has happened, but only in small doses as compared to Iraq or Lebanon. Yemen is, from Tehran's perspective, too far-flung, too fractured, and unripe to be a good host for Iran's forward defense doctrine.⁵⁸

Iran has compared the Houthis to Hezbollah in Lebanon.⁵⁹ If the latter could be a spear aimed at Israel, the Houthis could be Tehran's pawn against the Saudis. Ali Shirazi, Supreme Leader Khamenei's representative to the Qods force, expressed such a view to the Iranian press in January 2015 and on other occasions.⁶⁰ But Yemen was never a core priority for Tehran and the Houthis were never as submissive to Tehran as Hezbollah or the pro-Iran Shia Iraqi groups. Instead, the dynamic in the Iran-Houthi partnership has depended overwhelmingly on the policy decisions of third-party actors, most notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.⁶¹ For example, since late 2019, when the Houthis began the latest round of peace talks with the Saudis and the Americans in Oman, the Iranians were effectively sidelined. The Houthi-Saudi peace talks began shortly after Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei received a senior Houthi delegation in August.⁶² Either Tehran was urging the Houthis to sue for peace or it had little influence over their strategic decisions (or both). Even in Washington a new message began to be disseminated that downplayed the closeness of Tehran and the Houthis.⁶³

Nevertheless, the Houthis continue to provide Iran with a possible staging-ground from Yemen should Tehran opt to pursue a more militant posture against Riyadh, including via the use of Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory as a launchpad for Iranian-supplied missile strikes. The case of Iran's relations with the Houthis shows that when examining the extent and appeal of the Iranian proxy model of forward defense, it is critical to look for the depth in relations, which is an indicator of Tehran's ability to consolidate its regional alliance against the United States and its allies under the banner of the "Axis of Resistance."

IV. Conclusion: Is “Forward Defense” A Sustainable Military Doctrine?

Iran’s forward defense doctrine draws on a long history, including a critical period of consolidation over the 2000s and 2010s. However, as the United States increasingly perceives direct challenges to Iranian proxy actions as a workable strategy, it is far from clear if the doctrine will prove sustainable over the 2020s.

Kayhan Barzegar, a prominent analyst in Tehran on Iranian regional policies, describes Tehran’s logic behind forward defense as “preempting the penetration of symmetric and asymmetric threats inside Iran’s borders.”⁶⁴ According to this line of thinking, Iran not only has to secure its national borders but in certain circumstances it has to go outside of its borders as part of a preemptive national security strategy.

Barzegar calls this the concept of “wider security zone,” which he argues is part of the “the strategic calculus employed by Iranian political-security elites.”⁶⁵ The mastermind behind the concept was Soleimani and, at its core, the logic holds that socio-political turmoil in the region, including the emergence of new security threats such as ISIS, requires an increased and active Iranian response, according to Barzegar.⁶⁶ Others are less certain about the soundness of such logic. Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues the notion of “Soleimani the savior” is highly ironic. According to him, “the Islamic State’s victories in Iraq [after 2014] were largely due to the ultra-sectarian policies he pressed on authorities in Baghdad.” As Clawson puts it, Iran and Soleimani have been both the “fireman and the arsonist,” in regard to conflicts in Iraq and Syria.⁶⁷

What Barzegar calls the application of power in Iran’s wider security zone is merely the latest reincarnation of forward defense. As described above, this concept has evolved over the last 40 years since Iran’s practical military needs during the Iran-Iraq War. It was then that young IRGC commanders like Soleimani looked for ways to overcome Iran’s limitations given Tehran’s isolation and lack of access to conventional military platforms.⁶⁸ Today, the proxy model still reflects Iran’s military weak points but it has also proven its utility.

Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings in 2011, the generals in the IRGC have argued that the shifting regional security environment requires Iran’s military strategy to adapt and reinvent itself. When ISIS carried out its first attacks in Tehran in June 2017, the proponents of forward defense wasted no time in arguing that had Iran not militarily intervened in Syria and Iraq, Iran would have had to confront a far greater ISIS threat inside its borders.⁶⁹ By implication, since the Iranians officially maintain that the United States has been an enabler for the rise of ISIS, Tehran’s rhetorical stance was that fighting ISIS is tantamount to

aborting American plans aimed at Iran. As Khamenei put it a few months before the ISIS attacks in Tehran, “there are well-documented news of American aid to ISIS and some other terrorist groups, and now that they [the Americans] have formed an anti-ISIS coalition, some U.S. agencies are still assisting ISIS in other ways.”⁷⁰ With the United States at the heart of Iran’s security calculations, this sort of logic is pervasive in Tehran. Put simply, the fight against ISIS as leverage against the United States is a common theme in the messaging of Iran’s leaders. The Revolutionary Guards Commander, Hossein Salami, explained in September 2019: “In war, the victor is the one that can shape the power equation. No power in the world today, including the United States, has the capacity to wage war against the Iranian people.”⁷¹ Nonetheless, Iranian academics, including those linked to the Foreign Ministry in Tehran, openly publish works admitting that Iran’s rivals do not see Tehran’s military posture as defensive.⁷² By implication, this is an admission that, in the Middle East at least, the concept of forward defense on a large scale is viewed as part of a grand strategy to expand its influence.

For Iran’s regional rivals, the Islamic Republic’s forward defense is considered a case of an ideological commitment rather than an Iranian national security imperative. That Tehran’s reliance on forward defense and depending on foreign militias is mostly by choice, driven by Tehran geopolitical choices and principally its rivalry with the United States and her regional allies. In turn, states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and, to a lesser extent, Turkey, are determined to stop Iran in its tracks even as they each are pursuing their own versions of geopolitical forward defense from Yemen to Syria to Libya. As part of this cycle, many billions of dollars are invested in competition for influence in the region.⁷³

The resultant proxy warfare arms races pose a challenge to Iranian strategy, which has sought to minimize costs to the Iranian people. So far, Iran’s forward defense appears largely to have been implemented on a tight budget. Iran is not the biggest military spender in the Middle East today.⁷⁴ But Tehran also has far less cash on hand due to American sanctions. President Hassan Rouhani has claimed that American sanctions have cost Iran \$200 billion.⁷⁵ The issue of Iran’s ability to fund its proxy allies, and the reliance of its approach in cases like Syria on stopgap measures that can encourage escalation on the part of its rivals, poses a threat to the sustainability of the forward defense model. However, it is not an imminent risk to Iran’s ability to pursue the strategy.

As Tehran has demonstrated over the years, it is able to prioritize. Not every Arab proxy group has the same value to Iran. Hezbollah of Lebanon is, to a significant extent, politically and religiously indistinguishable from the Islamic Republic. There is, however, much daylight between the Houthis of Yemen and the Iranians. Aside from an ability to prioritize if needed and redefine forward defense depending on circumstances, the Iranian regime as a whole, including the IRGC and its foreign branch the Qods Force, have demonstrated that they are

rational actors that engage in a systematic cost-benefit analysis when contemplating military action. Acting rationally does not equate to flawless execution, however. The Iranian military strategy bears the hallmark of trial and error and has proven to be open to mishaps. The Islamic Republic likes to portray itself as a martyrdom-seeking state, but in reality, Iran's military strategy remains cautious.

Moreover, while the Islamist message has helped Tehran mobilize support in certain pockets in the Arab World, and provided it with a vehicle to expand its regional influence and with Iraq as the best example, excessive attachment to a sectarian agenda can create its own problems for Tehran. The Islamist ruling elite in Tehran is aware of the perils of Iran becoming an entrenched Shia power in an Islamic World where the Shia are a minority and Iran's Islamist credentials are dwindling. Tehran does not want to feed the narrative that Iran is a Shia sectarian power bent on expanding its influence in Sunni-majority Arab countries.

Meanwhile, as the Islamic Republic faces a deep crisis of legitimacy at home, it is difficult to see how Tehran can stay the course without risking political blowback from an Iranian public that yearns for nation-building at home and an end to costly foreign projects. This anger is nothing new but Soleimani's assassination, and Washington's determination to push back against Iranian regional efforts, might give enough reason for the political and military elite in Tehran to rethink the concept and the sustainability of the forward defense doctrine.

In Western analysis, Soleimani is often depicted as a brilliant strategist who exploited chaos in Iraq and Syria to project Iranian power. There is no doubt that he managed before his death to cultivate a warrior image for himself. But Soleimani, and his brothers-in-arms in the IRGC, have come to a critical juncture. Washington has openly warned Soleimani's successor, Esmail Ghaani, that he too will be assassinated if he opts to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor.⁷⁶

This ultimatum presents the biggest challenge for the Islamists in Tehran and test of the proxy warfare strategy. Forward defense and the use of foreign proxies, such as Hezbollah or the Iraqi militant Shia groups, are today seen by the average public inside Iran and in the broader Middle East as a projection of the ideological zeal of the Islamic Republic and a trend that is depleting Iranian national resources while fueling a costly competition for regional influence with regional rivals. The United States has settled upon a strategy that views this as a sufficient leverage point to enable coercion of Iranian policymakers by moving the conflict towards more direct confrontation.

However, the IRGC appears to view its proxy network, built over four decades, as a sustainable counterweight that can survive such pressure. As a result, the current uncertainty regarding whose assessment of the sustainability of Iran's proxy strategy is correct is likely to prompt a series of crises in which the U.S.-Iran

conflict moves towards direct confrontation as the two sides play a game of chicken. Important to watch across these crises, however, is the extent to which Iran increasingly plays up ideological rhetoric to sustain both transnational and domestic mobilization amid the repeated crises.

Whether or not the mobilization methods are successful in prolonging the sustainability of Iran's strategy, they will likely play a critical role in shaping the IRGC of the 2020s, just as previous actions shaped today's IRGC. Those changes bear close monitoring by policymakers and consideration as the United States continues to pursue its strategy of amping up the pressure on Iran as a way to force the leadership in Tehran to reconsider their priorities.

Notes

1 In Persian, it is also referred to as “offensive defense” (دفاع تهاجمی).

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6 “Palestinian Militant Leader Says Soleimani Sent Weapons To Gaza,” *Radio Farda*, May 22, 2020, <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/palestinian-militant-leader-says-soleimani-sent-weapons-to-gaza/30629288.html>.

7 Falahatpisheh is hardly a dove in the context of the Iranian Islamist system. He began his career advocating for hardline policies but shifted toward a critical stance of Tehran’s foreign policy agenda over the course of the 2010s.

8 “Iran Lawmaker Says \$30 Billion Spent On Syria Must Be Returned,” *Radio Farda*, May 20, 2020, [https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-lawmaker-says-30-](https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-lawmaker-says-30-billion-paid-to-syria-must-be-paid-back/30623998.html)

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9 “حمله تند شریعتمداری به فلاحیت پیشه | در دروغگویی علیه وطنان روی دست آمریکا بلند شده‌اید؟! | امیدواریم Hamshari Online, May 21, 2020, <https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/513846/حمله-تند-شریعتمداری-به-فلاحیت-پیشه-در-دروغگویی-علیه-وطنان-روی>.

10 For an overview of the history of U.S.-Iran relations see for example: Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations* (New York: The New Press, 2013); Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America*, Paperback ed. (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005); Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, 2017; James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988); Ali M. Ansari, *Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the next Great Crisis in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2006).

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13 This division was also comprised of volunteers from Baluchistan and Hormozgan provinces, located in the far south and far south east of Iran.

14 The Iranians worked both with the forces loyal to the Barzani and Talibani families in Iraqi Kurdistan. See: Arash Reisinezhad, *The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia*, Middle East Today

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East Asia Pacific

China Using 'Cognitive Warfare' Against Taiwan, Observers Say

By Joyce Huang

January 17, 2021 04:44 AM



TAIPEI - A Taipei think tank and observers in Taiwan say China is trying to influence residents with “cognitive warfare,” hoping to reverse opposition to Beijing’s desired takeover of Taiwan so it can be accomplished without having to go to war.

Taiwanese attitudes have been drifting away from the mainland, especially among the younger generation, whose members see themselves “born independent” with no ties to China.

China’s effort, these analysts say, includes tactics ranging from military intimidation and propaganda to misinformation spread by its army of online trolls in a bid to manipulate public opinion. They say the complexity and frequency of the effort puts Taiwan on a constant defensive.

“Its ultimate goal is to control what’s between the ears. That is, your brain or how you think, which [Beijing] hopes leads to a change of behavior,” Tzeng Yi-suo, director of the cybersecurity division at the government-funded Institute of National Defense and Security Research in Taipei, told VOA.

Campaign intensifies amid COVID

Cognitive warfare is a fairly new term, but the concept has been around for decades. China has never stopped trying to deter the island's separatists, according to Tzeng, who wrote about the Chinese efforts last month in [the institute's annual report on China's political and military development](#).

Liberal democracies such as Taiwan, that ensure the free flow of information, are vulnerable to cognitive attacks by China, while China's tightly controlled media and internet environment makes it difficult for democracies to counterattack, according to Tzeng.

China's campaign has intensified since the outbreak of COVID-19, using official means such as flying military jets over Taiwan, and unofficial channels such as news outlets, social media and hackers to spread misinformation. The effort is aimed at dissuading Taiwan from pursuing actions contrary to Beijing's interests, the report said.

China has used these tactics to attack Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's administration, undermine support for democracy and fuel Taiwan's social tensions and political divide, it said.

The South China Situation Probing Initiative, for example, a project run by Nanjing University in China, has disseminated information about Chinese military activities in the region through its Twitter account, but some of the posts have been found to be false, apparently aimed at intimidating Taiwan's public and weakening Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party government's resolve, according to the report.

Tzeng said China's efforts didn't work in Taiwan's presidential election last January, when Tsai won a landslide victory. The island's growing anti-China sentiments – seem further strengthened by disapproval of China's brutal suppression of pro-democracy Hong Kong protests.

China “set out to [actively] promote the island’s reunification with the mainland, its identity as ethnic Chinese or favorable views toward the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]. But now all it can hope for is to curb Taiwan’s [growing] pro-independence sentiments” – a trend Beijing has found it difficult to contain, he said.

Tzeng added that he believes China is biding its time and experimenting with new tactics, which it hopes will succeed in influencing the island’s future elections.

For example, the report said that China’s Communist Party is believed to have played a role in hacking Tsai’s office in May to discredit her. Reporters covering her office at the time claimed to have received minutes of internal meetings from an anonymous email account, which accused the president of corruption. Tsai’s administration responded by saying that the documents had been doctored and contained fabricated content.

Taiwan should, Tzeng said, stay alert and establish a comprehensive fact-checking system to prevent fake news and misinformation from subverting public opinion.

Taiwan should also “work with regional and global liberal democracies to establish a common defense mechanism” as China’s influencing attacks have a global outreach and aren’t limited to Taiwan. They constitute the most serious challenge facing democratic societies today, Tung Li-wen, former head of the ruling DPP’s China affairs department, [wrote in a 2019 essay](#).

Chinese citizen journalist and blogger Zhou Shuguang, who now lives in Taiwan, said many Chinese have taken to the internet to spread China’s narrative. Two groups of such online promoters of China’s narrative are known as “Little Pink” and “50 Cent Party,” The groups, he said, have formed China’s sizable army of online trolls to spread fake news, for example, rumors about Tsai’s academic background. Despite repeated clarifications, many kept circling rumors that the

president's 1984 doctorate degree from the London School of Economics was fake.

A 2016 study, led by Harvard University data scientist Gary King, found that 50 Cent Party produced 488 million “fake” social media posts a year to distract other internet users from news and online discussions painting the Communist Party in a negative light.

Global propaganda campaign

China has also been aggressive in expanding its global propaganda campaign to “tell China’s story well” and disrupt democracy, said Huang Jaw-nian, an assistant professor of National Chengchi University in Taipei, who specializes in media politics.


“[China] is running its global propaganda campaign by expanding its state media abroad and deploying a strategy called ‘borrowing a boat out to sea,’ that is, buying up foreign news outlets [with better credibility]... The media buyouts are, in some cases, made by pro-Beijing businesspeople,” who will likely spin coverage to curry favor with China, Huang told VOA.

However, Li Zhenguang, deputy director of Beijing Union University's Institute of Taiwan Studies, flatly denied that China has launched any efforts against Taiwan or Tsai’s administration.

“She [Tsai] is putting a feather in her own cap. She is a nobody to China. I find the accusations nonsense. Why on earth does China want to attack her?” he told VOA over the phone, refusing to elaborate.

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TODAY'S OPSUM COVERS THE FOLLOWING NOC PRIORITIES

- **NOC Priority Items with New Information**
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NOC 0051-20: COVID-19 – U.S.

United States

- As of 1:21 a.m. ET Monday, the United States has confirmed a total of 23,936,773 coronavirus cases and 397,600 deaths, according to Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins University (COVID-19 Map) < Caution-
[##### **Nevada**](https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Frnjqnnh&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830158838%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoIMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTil6lk1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=zaqnsy8UnczwnMgUecaHSJhEW9I1Fp2%2Fb8uGr0FGRnw%3D&reserved=0 ></div><div data-bbox=)

- Nevada reported a record 63 COVID-19 deaths in the past 24 hours, according to data released Saturday KLAS < Caution-

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- Data reported in the past 24 hours shows 57 of Nevada's 63 deaths were reported in Clark County
- Nevada reported 2,040 new COVID-19 cases, with 1,608 from Clark County

Utah

- A record number of patients with COVID-19 were hospitalized in the ICU Saturday in Utah as the state reported 2,150 more cases and 13 deaths The Salt Lake Tribune < Caution-
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 - There were 210 ICU patients Friday and 194 on Thursday

Virginia

- For the second Saturday in a row, Virginia has set a single-day record with 6,757 newly reported casesRichmond Times-Dispatch < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy3z86cqr&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830178832%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6I1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Oa%2FuHaYeUqaAOKkHyZghnqOnoqJFuKGNtZl6AqYKRtY%3D&reserved=0> >
 - That is nearly 1,000 more than last week's record of 5,798
 - In the first two weeks of 2021, Virginia has recorded nearly 80,000 cases

Austria(Social Media)

- *Austria on Sunday extended its third COVID-19 lockdown into February, hoping to drive down infection rates despite an influx of variants that spread the coronavirus more easily* Twitter [Reuters Health] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4nevujb&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830188825%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6I1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=dhfh5ortgbqxqot6E8aGtBS7YNyipMyVV1rWo4G4ipo%3D&reserved=0> >
 - *The goal is to let shops, museums, and personal services like hairdressers reopen from February 8, while the catering and tourism sectors will stay shuttered until at least March*
- *The country has reported nearly 390,000 coronavirus cases and almost 7,000 COVID-19-linked deaths*

Brazil

- Brazil's health regulator gave emergency approval Sunday for two coronavirus vaccines, kicking off a mass inoculation campaign amid a devastating second wave that is killing over 1,000 people daily Yahoo! News (AFP) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy2cvjtof&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830188825%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6I1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=rkIOavQ7uWMQCiLndU21ah8DxfDjxwgvvy5NTomKQHYE%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The health ministry announced the government would start distributing vaccines to all 27 states on Monday for a national inoculation campaign to start Wednesday

Mexico(Social Media)

- *Mexico has registered its worst week yet of the pandemic, with a record number of infections from the new coronavirus and more than 7,000 COVID-19 deaths, government data showed on Saturday Twitter [Reuters] < Caution-*
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyxc4ety8&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830198816%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoIMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=lfZ5c%2BwZHn5qUjr9LiJUYM7mWFtCcc%2BL3mOEy%2B0gi4o%3D&reserved=0> >
 - *For the week ending Saturday, Mexico recorded more than 7,000 deaths for the first time, while posting over 106,200 new cases*
 - *There were 20,523 new coronavirus cases and 1,219 more fatalities on Saturday, pushing total confirmed infections to 1,630,258 and deaths to 140,241, the health ministry said*

Oman(Social Media)

- *Oman will close land ports starting Monday due to COVID-19, media reported SundayTwitter [Al Arabiya English] < Caution-*
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy4pal3en&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830198816%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoIMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=chtrEE5VMC7n0zGIKag6hwkXP945oukemXo1UVfL33w%3D&reserved=0> >

Portugal

- Portugal's public health system is on the verge of collapsing as hospitals in the areas worst-affected by a surge in coronavirus cases are quickly running out of intensive care beds to treat COVID-19 patients, media reported on SundayReuters < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5djeuul&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830208811%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoIMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=IXFZEz1UICpMIMCBf%2BWv51RJFh0IUsEz2pOa35zKu20%3D&reserved=0> >
 - The health system can accommodate a maximum of 672 COVID-19 patients in ICUs, according to health ministry data
 - The number of people in ICUs with COVID-19 reached 647 on Sunday, according to the health authority
- Three days into a nationwide lockdown, the country reported 10,385 new cases and 152 fatalities on Sunday, bringing the total number of infections to 549,801, with the death toll increasing to 8,861
 - According to Oxford University data, Portugal had the highest number of coronavirus cases in Europe per capita over the last seven days

Worldwide

- As of 1:21 a.m. ET Monday, there were 95,045,802 coronavirus cases and 2,030,842 related deaths worldwide, according to Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins University (COVID-19 Map) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Frnjqnqh&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830208811%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljoIMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=I%2B6ZpuqxQpBYQr2H0MRewdb8wNzPdZ%2BqGRSe9hnmvls%3D&reserved=0> >

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NOC 1060-20: Presidential Inauguration – Washington, DC

- *U.S. defense officials say they are worried about an insider attack or other threat from service members involved in securing the Presidential Inauguration, prompting the FBI to vet all of the 25,000 National*

Guard troops coming into Washington, D.C., for the event (Social Media)Twitter [AP] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy6boelwo&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830218810%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=JosiA%2FWrz%2BLmQcIlnw6Z3ZGBeze7aJuzzZWBsvAoDYA%3D&reserved=0> >

- *A U.S. Army senior official told media on Sunday that officials are conscious of the potential threat, and he warned commanders to be on the lookout for any problems within their ranks as the inauguration approaches (Social Media)*
 - *So far, however, he and other leaders say they have seen no evidence of any threats, and officials said the vetting had not flagged any issues (Social Media)*
- *While the military routinely reviews service members for extremist connections, the FBI screening is in addition to any previous monitoring (Social Media)*
- The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) will temporarily shut down post offices in Washington, D.C., in preparation of next week's Inauguration Day, media reported Sunday WTOP (CNN) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5wjhpyy&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830228798%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=MB9UYqKuoqKMY2tE7MeBHIqQ0VMYw9Qd1U%2FD9uKbPdY%3D&reserved=0> >
 - Collection boxes were moved or locked, suspending mail locations from certain areas in the DistrictKRIV (Fox News) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy5k8qqc3&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830228798%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=y5SLp9Lz0hHnbgf6gBO5F1oGe0EBgbHidLfLubXgOAM%3D&reserved=0> >
 - More than 15 different USPS locations have been disrupted in D.C., with varying days of reopening due to the security measures
 - In addition to the District, mailboxes will also be temporarily removed in at least 17 states as a security measure to protect postal property, employees, and the public
- Troops with the Louisiana National Guard have been sent to assist with safety at the United States Capitol Building in Washington, D.C, media reported Saturday KPLC (KSLA) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyyl9ttbw&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830238792%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=Y6Zy6upwZ9zh%2Feba54XqiMMrV2mZN4G7y1X44EZ9kFQ%3D&reserved=0> >
 - Around 174 soldiers and airmen made their way to the Capitol in preparation for Inauguration Day on January 20

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NOC 0602-18: Southwest Border Operations – U.S. Southwest Border

- Guatemalan police fired tear gas Sunday to disperse thousands of migrants headed for the United States on foot, and soldiers beat back a group that tried to push through barriers, according to AFP journalistsYahoo! News (AFP) < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy6gmm3s3&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830238792%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=AlkKLyZh58y9zZLexh9xCeGsj63RolvHkwMDBiOtVPc%3D&reserved=0> >

- Security forces surrounded the migrant caravan on a road in the town of Vado Hondo, near the border with Honduras where they came from, and fired tear gas
- Police say at least 6,000 people had arrived in the town, out of some 9,000 who left Honduras in recent days in the hopes of making it to the United States
- The deafening explosions of gas and smoke canisters caused thousands of the migrants to turn back, while others fled into nearby mountains
 - Some who tried to break through a fence were beaten back by uniformed personnel equipped with clubs and plastic shields
 - A health official from the region said several of the migrants were injured after being struck

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Other Significant Events

NOC 0378-20-2: Security Incident U.S. Capitol – Washington, DC(Social Media)

- *The FBI is investigating whether foreign governments, organizations, or individuals provided financial support to U.S. individuals who may have helped plan and execute the January 6 incident at the Capitol, one current and one former FBI official told NBC News, according to media reports Saturday* [NBC News - Reporter] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyyulj5ss&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830248787%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=LDMlIByisAHaz4MSE1tc5HhyWl6itU1v78VfkANjs9w%3D&reserved=0> >
 - *As part of the investigation, the bureau is examining payments of \$500,000 in bitcoin, apparently by a French national, to key figures and groups in the alt-right before the riot, the sources said*
 - *A joint threat assessment issued this week by the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and various other federal and D.C.-area police agencies noted that since the January 6 riot, "Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence actors have seized the opportunity to amplify narratives in furtherance of their policy interest amid the presidential transition"*
- *A New Jersey man who is a U.S. Navy contractor and U.S. Army reservist with a "secret" security clearance has been charged with taking part in the U.S. Capitol riot, media reported Sunday* [nypost] < Caution-
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fyxv2mk3m&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830248787%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTiI6IklhaWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=3PwR%2FHq9nCFBu%2BLtse5RWsR1L4C3cl2NThm7%2FPYgVc%3D&reserved=0> >
 - *The 30-year-old from Colts Neck - described as an "avowed white supremacist and Nazi sympathizer" in court papers - allegedly told other rioters to "advance" during the deadly January 6 incident*
 - *He was charged Friday with five federal counts, including: knowingly entering or remaining in a restricted building without lawful authority; disorderly conduct on Capitol grounds; disrupting the orderly conduct of government business; [gathering] in a Capitol building; and obstructing a law enforcement officer*
 - *The man works at the Naval Weapons Station Earle in Colts Neck, where he has access to "a variety of munitions," according to an affidavit filed in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C.*
 - *The Naval Criminal Investigative Service began looking into him after receiving a tip from an informant who said the Colts Neck man had confessed to breaking into the Capitol*
 - *He admitted to encouraging other members of the mob to "advance - giving directions via both voice and hand signals," the court papers allege*

- *The informant described the man as a white supremacist and Nazi sympathizer known for "proffering extreme political opinions and viewpoints," on a YouTube channel and on other online forums*
- *According to an Associated Press review, at least 22 current or former members of the U.S. military or law enforcement have been identified as being at or near the riot*

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NOC 0378-20: Civil Disturbances – U.S.

Washington, D.C.

- *A woman was arrested Saturday at a U.S. Capitol checkpoint in Washington, D.C., for allegedly impersonating a law enforcement officer and fleeing from police, media reported Sunday (Social Media)Twitter [nbcwashington] < Caution-
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy2b8n33z&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830258780%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTil6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=cBKY8WpmWglmvB2Yzyja5xe5A5Adjh5WnBci69aSS9M%3D&reserved=0 >*
 - *The woman was arrested near Union Station after she said she was an officer and "a part of the presidential cabinet," and presented a military police challenge coin, a D.C. police report said (Social Media)*
 - *She was charged with impersonation of a law enforcement officer, failure to obey, and fleeing a law enforcement officer (Social Media)*
- *A Virginia man has been arrested near the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., for carrying a pistol without a license and the possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding device, and unregistered ammunition, media reported SundayWJLA < Caution-
https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fy63s3sck&data=04%7C01%7Cjindermuehle%40techopsolutions.net%7C889452c53f224c684f8e08d8bb86c798%7C5771c6630b964c5f86745091dcd378bd%7C1%7C0%7C637465534830258780%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWljojMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzliLCJBTil6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=qMmjuwP97CRc16N0duzcr6LEqRo3ZDxzSKUWjzs1oFM%3D&reserved=0 >*
 - *Police say the 22-year-old from Gordonsville was walking in the 200 block of Massachusetts Avenue NE around 2:30 a.m. Sunday "with the listed firearm clearly visible in a holster"*
 - *When stopped, officers determined he was also carrying three high-capacity magazines, and 37 rounds of unregistered ammo, according to the incident report*

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PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE BORDER SECURITY ALERT

09 January 2021 - 16 January 2021

Volume: 19, Issue: 15


The Border Security Alert (BSA) is a weekly collection of abstracted unclassified news items relating to national security issues on and around the US northern and southern borders, seaports, and airports. Produced by Patrick Henry College's Intelligence Analysis Center, the BSA highlights incidents involving security breaches, weapons and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and Mexican cartel activity in an attempt to identify developing trends and locate vulnerable areas. Feel free to forward this report. Please acknowledge Patrick Henry College Border Security Alert if you do forward this report to other contacts. If you are routinely forwarding this report, please send an e-mail to the Project Manager so that we can keep track of our distribution. For additional information or to be added to the BSA distribution list, please contact Josh Grantham at projectmanager.bsa@phc.edu.

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

Border Security Alert - Volume 19, Issue 15

Breakout of Incidents Reported between January 10 and January 16


Drug Seizure (Lbs/State)




Drug Seizure (Lbs/Drug)




Number of Incidents/Category



Arrests/State



Arrests/Category



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Mexican Cartels Summarized Articles

National Security Incidents

1. Seizure : Mexican Authorities Seize Six Armored Gulf Cartel Vehicles In Becerros, Tamaulipas, MX

On 10 January 2021, Mexican authorities seized six armored vehicles in Becerros, Tamaulipas, MX. Members of a special forces group within the Tamaulipas Police, GOPES, were patrolling rural roads when they spotted two Gulf Cartel gunmen who fired a couple of shots before fleeing. The authorities were unable to locate the gunmen but did discover the heavily armored vehicles. (Cartel Chronicles, [Six Armored Cartel Vehicles Found In Mexican Border City](#), Breitbart Texas, 1/13/2021)

2. Law Enforcement : Cartel Gunmen Clash With Law Enforcement Near Santa Rosa de Lima, Guanajuato, MX

On 11 January 2021, cartel gunmen clashed with State police and other law enforcement personnel near Santa Rosa de Lima, Guanajuato, MX. The shootouts resulted in the deaths of at least nine suspected cartel members and one State police officer. (Adry Torres, [Gun Battles Leave Nine 'Drug Cartel Members' And One Police Officer Dead In Guanajuato, Mexico's Deadliest State](#), Daily Mail, 1/12/2021)

3. Law Enforcement : Cartel Gunmen Attack Soldiers Of Secretariat Of The National Defense In Nuevo Laredo, MX

On 11 January 2021, cartel gunmen attacked soldiers of the Secretariat of the National Defense In Nuevo Laredo, MX. The attack resulted in the death of four gunmen, the injuring of three bystanders, and the seizure of two vehicles. The gunmen wore camouflage and tactical equipment. Alleged cartel members blocked a highway to obstruct the path of military reinforcements. (César Rodriguez, [Four Suspected Cartel Gunmen Killed In Nuevo Laredo Gun Battle](#), LMTonline, 1/13/2021)

4. Law Enforcement : Mexico Clears Former Defense Chief Of Cartel Ties In Mexico City, MX

On 15 January 2021, Mexico's Attorney General's Office cleared a former defense chief of cartel ties in Mexico City, MX. The United States claimed the Mexican National--arrested in October 2020--worked with a drug cartel. Mexico claimed there is no evidence of involvement. (Carlos Jasso, [Mexico Clears Former Defense Chief U.S. Had Accused Of Cartel Ties](#), NBC News, 1/15/2021)

5. Law Enforcement : State Law Enforcement Officers Allegedly Kidnap Teenagers And Release Them To Cartel Members In Ciudad Mier And Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas, MX

On 14 January 2021, state law enforcement officers allegedly kidnapped teenagers and released them to Gulf Cartel members in Ciudad Mier and Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas, MX. The officers detained the teenagers for a traffic violation. Tamaulipas investigators theorize that the teenagers worked for the Cartel Del Noreste faction of Los Zetas and that the officers were linked to the Gulf Cartel. (Gerald Tony Aranda, [EXCLUSIVE: Mexican Border State Cops Kidnapped Teens For Cartel, Say Investigators](#), Breitbart Texas, 1/14/2021)

6. Law Enforcement : Cartel Gunmen Storm Funeral And Kill Nine In Celaya, Guanajuato, MX

As reported on 09 January 2021, on 05 January 2021, cartel gunmen stormed a home and killed nine victims in Celaya, Guanajuato, MX. The gunmen stormed a home holding a wake and fired over 100 shots. Nine individuals were killed while another was severely injured. (Gerald Tony Aranda, [GRAPHIC: Cartel Gunmen Kill 9 During Wake In Central Mexico](#), Breitbart Texas, 1/9/2021)

Northern Border Summarized Articles

Immigration and Trade Incidents

7. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest Mexican National, A Previously Convicted Sex Offender, For Illegal Entry In Romeo, MI

On 10 January 2021, USBP agents arrested a Mexican national for illegal entry in Romeo, MI. During a records check, the agents found that the national had a prior conviction for Lewd or Lascivious Acts with a Child Under 14 in California and had been previously deported. (CBP Public Affairs, [Convicted Sex Offender Previously Deported Arrested In Romeo](#), CBP, 1/10/2021)

8. Seizure : CBP Officers Seize 173 Counterfeit Designer Handbags And Wallets In Minneapolis, MN

On 12 January 2021, CBP officers seized more than 173 counterfeit designer handbags and wallets in Minneapolis, MN. The handbags/wallets were found in a shipment disguised as articles of clothing during an inspection to determine the admissibility of the goods. (CBP Public Affairs, [\\$405K Of Counterfeit Designer Handbags & Wallets Seized By CBP Officers](#), CBP, 1/12/2021)

9. Seizure : RETROACTIVE: Pittsburgh CBP Seizes Steelers' Fake Super Bowl Rings Ahead Of Wild Card Weekend

RETROACTIVE: As reported on 08 January 2021, on 07 January 2021, CBP officers seized Chinese counterfeit Super Bowl rings in Pittsburgh, PA. Upon arrival from China, CBP import control marked the packages containing the counterfeit memorabilia as suspicious and confirmed that the rings violated applicable trademarks. (CBP Public Affairs, [CBP Officers Seize Chinese Counterfeit Super Bowl Rings In Pittsburgh, PA](#), CBP, 1/8/2021)

Ports Summarized Articles

Immigration and Trade Incidents

10. Seizure : CBP Seizes 5,789 Counterfeit Face Masks At The Port Of Louisville

As reported on 11 January 2021, CBP seized 5,789 counterfeit masks at the Port of Louisville, KY. The shipment originated from Vietnam and was addressed to be sent to a private residence in North Carolina. (, [Thousands Of Counterfeit Face Masks Worth \\$1.4M Found In Louisville](#), WAVE News, 1/11/2021)

11. Seizure : CBP Seizes \$405,975 Worth Of Counterfeit Clothing Accessories At The Port Of St. Paul

On 12 January 2021, CBP seized \$405,975 worth of counterfeit clothing accessories at the Port of St. Paul, MN. The shipment originated from Laos and was addressed to be sent to a private residence in St. Paul. (Katrina Pross, [\\$405K Of Counterfeit Designer Accessories Headed To St. Paul Seized By Customs Officers](#), Twin Cities Pioneer Press, 1/14/2021)

12. Seizure : CBP Seizes 10,080 Counterfeit Face Masks At The Port Of Cincinnati

On 08 January 2021, CBP seized 10,080 counterfeit masks at the Port of Cincinnati, OH. Customs officers discovered the masks after they noted suspicions with the shipment, prompting closer inspection. (, [Thousands Of Counterfeit Face Masks Worth \\$1.4M Found In Louisville](#), WAVE News, 1/11/2021)

International Airport Security

13. Seizure/Arrest: TSA Officers Seize Handgun At Newark Liberty International Airport

On 13 January 2021, TSA officers seized a handgun and arrested a passenger at Newark Liberty International Airport. The gun was discovered at a security checkpoint x-ray machine. The passenger was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a weapon. (Jeff Goldman, [Newark Airport Passenger Tried To Bring Handgun Through Security Checkpoint, Feds Say](#), nj.com, 1/13/2021)

14. Seizure : TSA Officers Seize Handgun At Pittsburgh International Airport

On 15 January 2021, TSA officers seized a handgun at Pittsburgh International Airport, which officers discovered using an x-ray scanner at a security checkpoint. They notified the police and the gun was confiscated. Police cited the passenger on federal civil charges. (Megan Guza, [1st Gun Of 2021 Caught At Pittsburgh International Airport Checkpoint](#), Trib Live, 1/15/2021)

15. Seizure : TSA Officers Seize Loaded Handgun At Norfolk International Airport

On 11 January 2021, TSA officers seized a loaded handgun at Norfolk International Airport. Officers discovered the weapon using an x-ray machine at a security checkpoint. They notified airport police who confiscated the weapon and cited the passenger on a weapons charge. (WAVY Staff, [Chesapeake Man Caught With Loaded Gun At Norfolk International Airport](#), WAVY, 1/11/2021)

Southern Border Summarized Articles

Drug Incidents

16. Seizure/Arrest: USBP Agents Arrest Subject And Seize 350 Pounds Of Marijuana In El Refugio, TX

On 14 January 2021, USBP agents arrested one subject and seized 350 pounds of marijuana in El Refugio, TX. After agents observed subjects carrying suspected bundles of narcotics, all but one of the subjects successfully fled to Mexico. (Roderick Kise, [Border Patrol Agents Seize Over 350 Pounds Of Marijuana In The Rio Grande Valley](#), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1/15/2021)

17. Seizure : USBP Agents Seize 609.5 Pounds Of Marijuana In Laredo, TX

On 12 January 2021, USBP agents seized 609.5 pounds of marijuana in near Riverside Drive in Laredo, TX. Agents responded to observations of several subjects loading the bundles of suspected narcotics into a truck, but the subjects fled the scene before the agents' arrival. (Sara Melendez, [Border Patrol Stops Narcotics Smuggling Attempt](#), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1/13/2021)

18. Seizure : USBP Agents Seize 108 Pounds Of Marijuana Near Garciville, TX

On 12 January 2021, USBP agents seized 108 pounds of marijuana near Garciville, TX. After responding to a call regarding suspected criminal activity, agents saw an ATV leave the scene. Later, agents found the vehicle and narcotics abandoned by the subject. (Roderick Kise, [RGV Border Patrol Agents Seize Over \\$307K Worth of Marijuana](#), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1/13/2021)

19. Seizure : USBP Agents Seize 276 Pounds Of Marijuana Near La Grulla, TX

On 12 January 2021, USBP agents seized 276 pounds of marijuana near La Grulla, TX. After agents observed subjects loading the narcotics into a vehicle, the subjects fled to Mexico. Agents apprehended one subject and the abandoned marijuana. (Roderick Kise, [RGV Border Patrol Agents Seize Over \\$307K Worth Of Marijuana](#), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1/13/2021)

Immigration and Trade Incidents

20. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest Mexican National In Yuma, AZ

On 11 January 2021, USBP agents arrested a Mexican national near the Andrade Port of Entry in Yuma, AZ. After watching the national climb the fence with a machete, USBP agents apprehended the national. (Jamie Landers, [Border Patrol Apprehends Man Who Climbed Yuma Border Fence With A Machete](#), AZ Central, 1/12/2021)

21. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrested A US Citizen Wanted For Sexual Assault Of A Child In Laredo, TX

On 12 January 2021, USBP agents arrested a US citizen wanted for sexual assault of a child. A USBP agent referred the suspect to a secondary inspection, where biometrics revealed the suspect had an outstanding warrant. ([Laredo CBP Officers Apprehend Fugitive Sought For Sexual Assault Of A Child](#), U.S. Customs And Border Protection, 1/14/2021)

22. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest 5 Subjects Including A Sex Offender Near Mission, TX

On 15 January 2021, USBP agent arrested five subjects including a sex offender near Mission, TX. USBP agents apprehended five subjects, including a Honduran national previously arrested for second degree rape, for attempting to enter the country illegally. (Roderick Kise, [RGV Border Patrol Agents Arrest Sex Offender](#), U.S. Customs And Border Protection, 1/15/2021)

23. Arrest : USBP Agents Seize Loaded Handgun And Arrest 119 Subjects Involved In A Human Smuggling Operation In Freer, TX

On 14 January 2021, USBP agents seized a loaded handgun and arrested 119 subjects involved in a human smuggling operation in Freer, TX. After performing a traffic stop, agents discovered 119 Mexican, Salvadoran, Honduran, Ecuadorian, and Guatemalan nationals being smuggled in the back of a commercial truck. Agents found the loaded handgun in a backpack and identified two nationals as child sex offenders. (Haley Williams, [Border Patrol Agents Thwart Human Smuggling Attempt, Arrest Two Child Sex Offenders In Traffic Stop Near Freer](#), Kiiiiv.com, 1/14/2021)

24. Arrest : USBP Agents Apprehend 20 Nationals And Arrest A Mara Salvatrucha Gang Member In Hebbroville, TX

On 13 January 2021, USBP agents apprehended 20 nationals and arrested a Mara Salvatrucha gang member in Hebbroville, TX. A vehicle failed to yield during a traffic stop and was stopped later, where USBP agents discovered the vehicle was smuggling 20 Mexican, Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan nationals, including a member of the MS-13 gang. (César Rodriguez, [MS-13 Gang Member, Convicted Felon Discovered During Human Smuggling Attempt](#), LMT Online, 1/13/2021)

25. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest Mexican National With An Active Warrant In Marfa, TX

On 11 January 2021, USBP agents arrested a Mexican national with an active warrant. USBP agents arrested around 60 nationals in the Big Bend Sector including a Mexican national wanted for a parole violation. (Greg Davis, [Illegal Immigrant With Active Warrant Arrested In Big Bend Sector](#), U.S. Customs And Border Protection, 1/11/2021)

26. Arrest : USBP Agents And Local Deputies Arrest Three Suspects For Attempting To Smuggle 40 Nationals Across The Border In Laredo, TX

On 12 January 2021, USBP agents and local deputies arrested three suspects for attempting to smuggle 40 nationals across the border in Laredo, TX. After placing a known stash house under surveillance, agents later apprehended the nationals in the stash house and arrested the three drivers. (César Rodriguez, [Federal, County Authorities Shut Down Stash House, Detain 40-Plus Immigrants](#), Laredo Morning Times, 1/12/2021)

27. Arrest : USBP Agents Seize Loaded Shotgun And Apprehend 5 Mexican And Guatemalan Nationals In Freer, TX

On 13 January 2021, USBP agents apprehended five Mexican and Guatemalan nationals on a ranch in Freer, TX. Using helicopters for aerial surveillance, agents apprehended the five nationals while they were walking on a trail through a ranch. (Bob Price, [Three Armed Human Smugglers Arrested In 24 Hours Near Border In Texas](#), Breitbart, 1/13/2021)

28. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest US Citizen For Smuggling 12 Nationals In Laredo, TX

On 13 January 2021, USBP agents seized a loaded handgun and arrested a US citizen for smuggling 12 nationals at the Interstate 35 checkpoint in Laredo, TX. After a canine alert, agents searched a tractor-trailer and discovered 12 Guatemalan and Mexican nationals and the weapon. (Bob Price, [Three Armed Human Smugglers Arrested In 24 Hours Near Border In Texas](#), Breitbart, 1/13/2021)

29. Arrest : USBP Agents Raid A Human Smuggling Stash House And Apprehend 9 Nationals In Laredo, TX

On 11 January 2021, USBP agents raided a human smuggling stash house and apprehended nine nationals in a stash house in Laredo, TX. After performing a "knock and talk," agents discovered nine Mexican and Ecuadorian nationals in the house and arrested a US citizen. (Bob Price, [Three Armed Human Smugglers Arrested In 24 Hours Near Border In Texas](#), Breitbart, 1/13/2021)

30. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest El Salvador National In Del Rio, TX

On 10 January 2021, USBP agents arrested a Salvadoran national in Del Rio, TX. Processing revealed that the subject had been arrested before for first degree murder. (, [Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Agents Make Significant](#)

[Arrests Over Weekend](#), U.S. Customs And Border Protection, 1/13/2021)

31. Arrest : USBP Agents Arrest Mexican National Attempting To Enter The Country Illegally In Del Rio, TX

On 10 January 2021, USBP agents arrested a Mexican national attempting to enter the country illegally in Del Rio, TX. The subject had previously received a conviction for indecent liberties with a child. (, [Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Agents Make Significant Arrests Over Weekend](#), U.S. Customs And Border Protection, 1/13/2021)

32. Law Enforcement : USBP Agent Fires His Weapon At A Human Smuggler In An SUV In Laredo, TX

On 13 January 2021, a USBP agent fired his weapon at a human smuggler in an SUV in Laredo, TX. After witnessing the suspect potentially attempt to smuggle nationals into the country, a USBP agent fired at the fleeing suspect as the suspect headed towards the agent. (Border Report staff, [Border Agent Opens Fire When Suspected Smuggler Attacks With Vehicle, CBP Says](#), KGET.com, 1/14/2021)

Index of Articles

1. Seizure :Six Armored Cartel Vehicles Found In Mexican Border City

Cartel Chronicles

Breitbart Texas

2021-1-13

Mexican authorities seized six armored vehicles that members of the Gulf Cartel stashed in a brushy rural area near the Texas border. The criminal organization uses armored vehicles and heavy weaponry in turf wars with rivals.

The seizure took place late Sunday when members of a special operations group with Tamaulipas Police, known as GOPES, were patrolling rural roads used by the Gulf Cartel. According to Tamaulipas authorities, the officers were moving around a community known as Becerro, just south of Reynosa, when they spotted two gunmen guarding the road. The gunmen fired several times at the officers as they ran into nearby brush and managed to escape.

The officers set a manhunt but were unable to find the gunmen. The police did find six large vehicles with makeshift armor. After documenting the scene, authorities were able to move the trucks to their headquarters by Monday morning.

The seizure comes as the border city of Reynosa is caught in the middle of a fierce turf war as the Gulf Cartel fights to keep lucrative drug and human smuggling corridors into Texas. The heavy fighting puts innocent civilians at risk of crossfire, stolen vehicles, and hitting makeshift road spikes.

2. Law Enforcement :Gun Battles Leave Nine 'Drug Cartel Members' And One Police Officer Dead In Guanajuato, Mexico's Deadliest State

Adry Torres

Daily Mail

2021-1-12

At least nine suspected cartel members were killed and a state police officer was shot dead during a series of gun battles Monday.

Authorities said the shootouts in the north-central state of Guanajuato started before dawn near the hamlet of Santa Rosa de Lima, the stronghold of a cartel of the same name.

State police, soldiers and National Guard agents rushed to respond to reports of armed men in the area, and all three forces came under fire from heavily armed assailants in vans, SUVs and pickup trucks, officials said.

A state police officer was hit and later died at a hospital following the first clash between security forces and alleged members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. Five assailants were also reported killed.

As reinforcements arrived, they also came under attack and returned fire.

Guanajuato governor Diego Sinhue Rodríguez said a National Guard soldier was also shot in the leg. The injury was non-life threatening.

Officials said the combined law enforcement forces found a total of four other bodies, many of them bullet-ridden, in a variety of vehicles in the area around Santa Rosa de Lima, which is an agricultural area with many dirt roads.

They reported seizing 10 assault rifles, 14 grenades and 30 gasoline bombs from various vehicles.

A Guanajuato-based security analyst, David Saucedo, said the shootouts initially erupted when Jalisco New Generation Cartel gunmen, known by its Spanish initials CJNG [Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación], attacked rivals from Santa Rosa de Lima. Both groups of gunmen then apparently fired on responding law enforcement officers.

'For some reason, the CJNG decided to start an offensive in this zone,' Saucedo said.

Authorities said hand-lettered drug gang signs were found in some of the vehicles, though they did not release the messages.

But a photo from the scene showed that one of the signs read 'People of Santa Rosa de Lima, the CJNG has arrived in your town, we arrived to clean up this bunch of extortionists and killers of innocent people.'

Saucedo said the home-grown Santa Rosa Gang has taken to extorting protection payments from local people, but the Jalisco cartel has also staged its offensive with cruelty, forcing some in areas controlled by the rival gang to flee their homes and properties.

Thousands have been killed in Guanajuato since Santa Rosa de Lima began a turf war to fight off a takeover by the Jalisco cartel in 2017.

Now the state is at the center of a proxy war between drug cartels, after the Sinaloa cartel entered the conflict backing Santa Rosa de Lima with guns, money and hired killers, said Sophia Huett, the Guanajuato security commissioner.

That same kind of proxy war made the border city of Ciudad Juarez, across from El Paso, Texas, a killing ground in the years around 2010.

The Santa Rosa Cartel grew up in the farming hamlet of the same name by stealing fuel from government pipelines and refineries and robbing freight from trains. After authorities stepped up security around trains and pipelines over the last two years, the gang turned to extortion and kidnapping.

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel has been Mexico's most violent cartel in recent years, aggressively expanding its reach across the country through bold attacks on rival gangs and government forces.

Its leader, Nemesio 'El Mencho' Oseguera, is wanted by the United State Department of Justice. The DEA is offering a \$10 million reward for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction. Oseguera's two oldest American-born children are in custody of U.S. authorities on drug and money laundering charges,

The conflict has made Guanajuato - home to charming San Miguel Allende, a popular retirement spot for Americans - Mexico's deadliest state, where at least 82 people were killed during the first week of 2021.

Nemesio 'El Mencho' Oseguera (pictured), the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, one of Mexico's most powerful criminal groups. The DEA is offering a \$10 million reward for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction

Nemesio 'El Mencho' Oseguera (pictured), the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, one of Mexico's most powerful criminal groups. The DEA is offering a \$10 million reward for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction

At least 4,190 murders were registered from January to November 2020. The homicide tally for December has not been released yet.

Government showed 3,290 homicides were reported in 2018 and slightly increased the following year to 3,540.

In September, gunmen killed 11 people in a bar in Jaral del Progreso near the border with Michoacán state. More than two dozen people were killed in an unregistered drug rehabilitation center in Irapuato in July.

Late last week, nine people were killed and one wounded when gunmen opened fire at a wake in the city of Celaya, near Santa Rosa de Lima. Officials said gunmen arrived late Thursday and opened fire on a group of people.

The victims were standing outside a home in a low-income neighborhood where a wake was being held for a young man who himself had been gunned down nearby a couple of days before.

3. Law Enforcement :Four Suspected Cartel Gunmen Killed In Nuevo Laredo Gun Battle

César Rodríguez

LMTonline

2021-1-13

Four suspected cartel gunmen died in an armed confrontation reported Monday in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, authorities said.

The shooting occurred when the gunmen allegedly shot at soldiers from the Secretariat of the National Defense. Authorities said a chase ensued with several vehicles.

The shootout left four gunmen dead and two vehicles seized. Three civilians were also injured due to bullet

fragments.

To prevent backup military forces from arriving, suspected cartel members used vehicles to block the highway to Anáhuac and another location in Colonia Buenavista.

Authorities said the gunmen wore camouflage and other tactical equipment. An investigation is underway.

4. Law Enforcement :Mexico Clears Former Defense Chief U.S. Had Accused Of Cartel Ties

Carlos Jasso

NBC News

2021-1-15

Mexico will not pursue criminal charges against former defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos, the attorney general's office said on Thursday, a decision that raised criticism and comes despite U.S. prosecutors' accusations he collaborated with drug lords.

Cienfuegos, a member of former President Enrique Peña Nieto's government, was arrested in October at Los Angeles international airport and accused by U.S. prosecutors of collaborating with one of Mexico's most powerful drug cartels.

In November, a federal judge granted a U.S. government request to drop drug charges against Cienfuegos and return him to Mexico, which the United States hoped would restore trust in the neighbors' severely strained security ties.

The Mexican attorney general's office said in a statement an analysis of the evidence showed Cienfuegos "never had any encounters with members of the criminal organization investigated by U.S. authorities, nor did he maintain any communication with them, or carry out acts tending to protect or help said individuals."

Mike Vigil, a former U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration chief of international operations, expressed his dismay at the decision.

"This is a very big stain on the Mexican justice system," Vigil said in a television interview with Mexican broadcaster Milenio.

Vigil said Cienfuegos' case would be a model for corruption and impunity in the future.

Reuters was not able to contact Cienfuegos.

His arrest in the United States followed a multi-year investigation that used wire taps to track a military figure who traffickers called "El Padrino," or The Godfather.

Investigators concluded "El Padrino" was Cienfuegos and had helped drug traffickers move tonnes of narcotics.

However, the attorney general's office said there was no evidence Cienfuegos had "used any equipment or electronic means, or that he had issued any order to favor the criminal group identified in this case."

Video shows aftermath of Mexico gunfight between cartel, police

DEC. 1, 201900:51

Scrutiny of Cienfuegos' wealth and tax obligations uncovered no evidence that he had received illegal income, it said.

These were among the reasons authorities had decided not to pursue criminal charges against Cienfuegos, a former general, the attorney general's office added.

Some Mexicans saw the decision as another example of long-standing impunity for the military.

"Unfortunately, we see that the army is still untouchable," said Nadin Reyes, whose father went missing in 2007 after last being seen at a military base

5. Law Enforcement :EXCLUSIVE: Mexican Border State Cops Kidnapped Teens For Cartel, Say Investigators

Gerald Tony Aranda

Breitbart Texas

2021-1-14

Several border state police officers are under investigation in Tamaulipas for the alleged kidnapping of two underage teens who were turned over to members of a cartel and are still missing. The case sparked protests as relatives and locals demand the return of the teens.

Last week, Tamaulipas state police officers detained two minors for a traffic violation in Ciudad Mier and took them to the nearby border city Miguel Aleman, where they were allegedly released to the Gulf Cartel. Relatives and locals in Ciudad Mier held protests demanding the safe return of the two teens believed to be 14 and 13 years of age.

According to U.S. law enforcement sources in Mexico, the case sparked an investigation at the highest levels within the Tamaulipas government. The source revealed there is particular significance regarding the location of the arrests and where the victims were transferred. Ciudad Mier is an area under the control of the Cartel Del Noreste faction of Los Zetas, while Miguel Aleman belongs to the Gulf Cartel. The current theory of Tamaulipas investigators suggests the teenagers were working with the CDN-Los Zetas in some capacity, leading to their false arrest by Gulf

Cartel-aligned cops, the U.S. law enforcement source revealed.

That case of the missing teens is not the only one dealing with corrupt police and cartels. In late October 2020, gunmen from CDN-Los Zetas killed the state police delegate in Reynosa, Tomas Charles Ortiz. Initially, authorities believed the murder could be tied to Ortiz's crackdown of cartel operations in Reynosa. However, after subsequent arrest of CDN-Los Zetas commander Francisco "P-90" Velasquez Torres, authorities learned the murder was ordered out of CDN headquarters in Nuevo Laredo after Ortiz stopped working with the CDN-Los Zetas for the Gulf Cartel. Soon after P-90's arrest, Gulf Cartel gunmen killed him in a Reynosa prison attack and then stole his body. Authorities collected the cartel commander's dismembered body days after next to a narco-message warning about the ongoing war for control of the region.

6. Law Enforcement :GRAPHIC: Cartel Gunmen Kill 9 During Wake In Central Mexico

Gerald Tony Aranda

Breitbart Texas

2021-1-09

A group of cartel gunmen killed nine victims and injured another during a brazen attack at a home. People in the home gathered for a funerary wake in the central Mexico state of Guanajuato.

The mass shooting took place on Thursday night when a group of gunmen stormed a home in the Arboledas de San Andres neighborhood in the city of Celaya, Guanajuato. The state Public Security Secretariat confirmed nine victims had died in the attack. A tenth person sustained a critical injury.

According to the local news outlet Periodico Correo, neighbors claimed they heard more than 100 shots, some sounding like automatic fire. The gunman managed to escape before authorities arrived at the scene.

Responding paramedics found the victims inside and outside the home in pools of blood while searching for survivors. Details of who the wake was for and their cause of death remain unclear. However, the mass shooting comes at a time when an ongoing turf war between rival drug cartels turned the once peaceful state into the most violent region in Mexico.

Since the start of the year, the turf war between the remnants of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel and Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion led to approximately 60 murders.

7. Arrest :Convicted Sex Offender Previously Deported Arrested In Romeo

CBP Public Affairs

CBP

2021-1-10

Border Patrol agents assigned to the Marysville Station have arrested a felony convicted sex offender with numerous illegal entries.

At approximately 12:10 a.m. on January 10, the United States Border Patrol was contacted by Michigan State Police to assist in identifying a subject in Romeo, Michigan as part of an active investigation. After questioning by U.S. Border Patrol agents, the subject stated he had entered the United States illegally by wading across the Rio Grande River near Laredo, Texas.

The subject, a citizen of Mexico later identified as Jesus Trejo-Garcia, was transported to the Marysville Border Patrol Station for processing.

During processing, it was discovered that Trejo-Garcia was arrested and convicted in 2005 in California for Lewd or Lascivious Acts with a Child Under 14 and sentenced to 365 days incarceration. He was also convicted of 8 USC 1325 Improper Entry by Alien in April 2016 and sentenced to 30 days incarceration. Further records checks revealed that Trejo-Garcia has also been formally removed from the United States four times.

“This is another great example of law enforcement partners working together to protect the communities that we serve,” said Chief Patrol Agent Douglas Harrison.

Jesus Trejo-Garcia has been processed for reinstatement of his prior removal by an immigration judge and will be presented to the U.S. Attorney office for possible federal prosecution.

8. Seizure :\$405K Of Counterfeit Designer Handbags & Wallets Seized By CBP Officers

CBP Public Affairs

CBP

2021-1-12

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers in Minneapolis intercepted a shipment containing more than 170 designer handbags and wallets worth more than \$400,000.

On January 12, CBP officers in Minneapolis seized a shipment manifested as clothes. The parcel was inspected to determine if the goods were admissible in accordance with CBP regulations. Officers found 173 various handbags and wallets with logos from designers like Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Chanel and others.

Due to various inconsistencies, poor quality, and the incorrect packaging, further inspection by CBP import specialists determined the items were counterfeit. If they were authentic, the retail value would have been \$405,975. The items came from Laos and were addressed to a residence in St. Paul.

“Our officers and import specialists have done an excellent job targeting shipments and identifying counterfeit items,” said Augustine Moore, Area Port Director-Minneapolis. “These types of violations negatively impact

trademark holders and is dangerous to consumers, as well.”

Counterfeit merchandise is often made of inferior materials, manufactured under uncontrolled and unsanitary conditions and labeled with false information, potentially threatening the health and safety of buyers and users.

Every year, CBP seizes millions of counterfeit goods from countries around the world as part of its mission to protect U.S. businesses and consumers. These goods include fake versions of popular products, such as smartphones and related accessories, electronics, apparel, shoes, cosmetics, and high-end luxury goods, as well as goods posing significant health and safety concerns, such as counterfeit pharmaceuticals, bicycle and motorcycle helmets, medical devices, supplements and other consumables. Sold online and in stores, counterfeit goods hurt the U.S. economy, cost Americans their jobs, threaten consumer health and safety, and fund criminal activity. Visit the National IPR Coordination Center for more information about IPR including counterfeiting and piracy.

Nationwide in Fiscal Year 2020, CBP seized 26,503 shipments containing goods that violated intellectual property rights. The total estimated value of the seized goods, had they been genuine, was nearly \$1.3 billion.

9. Seizure :CBP Officers Seize Chinese Counterfeit Super Bowl Rings In Pittsburgh, PA

CBP Public Affairs

CBP

2021-1-08

Steelers fans are expectedly excited that the playoffs start Sunday and are hopeful for a long run to the Super Bowl. They’re out buying playoff swag and new jerseys, but some are also basking in former glory and purchasing championship rings from Super Bowls past. But just like a jilted lover, they’ll never see those rings, because the Super Bowl rings they purchased online are counterfeit.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers in Pittsburgh seized a combined 60 Pittsburgh Steelers Super Bowl rings in eight different parcels that arrived from China and were destined to addresses in Allegheny County. The rings arrived as six-ring sets and represented each of the Steelers six Super Bowl championships.

The parcels arrived between December 9 and December 23. CBP officers suspected the rings to be counterfeit and detained them. CBP import specialist confirmed that the rings violated NFL and Steelers intellectual property rights trademarks, and officers completed the seizures on the rings through Thursday.

If authentic, the Steelers Super Bowl rings would have had a manufacturer’s suggested retail price of \$90,000.

“Steelers’ fans are some of the best fans in the country and I certainly can appreciate them wanting to own collector sets representing their team’s past glories, but upon further review, these rings are counterfeit and the call to seize them stands,” said Keith Fleming, CBP’s Acting Director of Field Operations in Baltimore. “Consumer goods like these are illegal, steal revenues from our nation’s economy, and are often constructed with potentially harmful

materials that could threaten consumers' health. Customs and Border Protection urges consumers to protect themselves and their families by always purchasing safe, authentic goods from reputable vendors."

10. Seizure :Thousands Of Counterfeit Face Masks Worth \$1.4M Found In Louisville

WAVE News

2021-1-11

A shipment with thousands of counterfeit designer face masks was detained in Louisville.

The shipment from Vietnam contained 5,789 masks and was stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers this week before it continued to its destination to a home in North Carolina.

The masks were made to look like masks from designers such as Coach, Tory Burch and Chanel.

"On a daily basis, criminals try to send fake designer products in hopes of disrupting our economy," Thomas Mahn, Port Director-Louisville, said. "These masks were inspected and found to be counterfeit. Our officers are highly trained by industry experts and will continue to seize these items to protect consumers and other industries."

Officials said if the masks were real, they would have been worth \$1.4 million.

CBP also announced it seized 10,080 counterfeit surgical masks in Cincinnati on Friday. Officials there said the interception prevents potentially dangerous and faulty masks from being distributed to frontline medical personnel.

11. Seizure :\$405K Of Counterfeit Designer Accessories Headed To St. Paul Seized By Customs Officers

Katrina Pross

Twin Cities Pioneer Press

2021-1-14

Authorities seized a shipment this week headed to St. Paul containing more than 170 counterfeit designer handbags and wallets worth about \$405,000.

The shipment, which was sent from Laos, was seized Tuesday by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers in Minneapolis. The parcel was inspected to determine if the goods were compliant with customs regulations, but officers found 173 various handbags and wallets with logos from designers including Gucci, Louis Vuitton and Chanel. If the items were authentic, they would total \$405,975 at retail value, according to authorities.

Due to inconsistencies and poor quality, authorities determined that the items, which were addressed to a St. Paul residence, were counterfeit.

"Our officers and import specialists have done an excellent job targeting shipments and identifying counterfeit

items,” said Augustine Moore, U.S. Customs and Border Control area port director of Minneapolis, in a statement. “These types of violations negatively impact trademark holders and is dangerous to consumers, as well.”

Counterfeit merchandise is potentially threatening to the health and safety of buyers as they are often made of lower-quality materials, manufactured under unsanitary conditions and labeled with incorrect information, authorities said.

Each year, customs officers seize millions of counterfeit goods from countries around the world, including smartphones, cosmetics, electronics and luxury-goods. Some counterfeit goods pose significant public health concerns, such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices.

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13. Seizure/Arrest:Newark Airport Passenger Tried To Bring Handgun Through Security Checkpoint, Feds Say

Jeff Goldman

nj.com

2021-1-13

A 33-year-old New Jersey man was arrested Tuesday at Newark Liberty International Airport after being found with a handgun at a security checkpoint, authorities said.

The Florham Park resident's firearm was found as it went through an X-ray machine in Terminal A, the Transportation Security Administration said in a statement.

He told TSA officers that he forgot that he had his handgun with him.

Michael J. McGovern was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, according to a Port Authority police spokeswoman.

McGovern faces a fine that can range from \$4,100 to \$13,669 in addition to criminal penalties.

The TSA noted the inconvenience to other travelers.

"When an individual shows up at a checkpoint with a firearm, the checkpoint lane comes to a standstill until the police resolve the incident," the statement said. "Guns at checkpoints can delay travelers from getting to their gates."

The gun was the first confiscated at Newark Liberty International Airport this year.

14. Seizure :1st Gun Of 2021 Caught At Pittsburgh International Airport Checkpoint

Megan Guza

Trib Live

2021-1-15

Another year, another traveler forgetting to remove a gun from a carry-on bag at Pittsburgh International Airport.

Transportation Security Administration officers at the airport stopped a Beaver County woman Thursday morning with a small, foldout .22-caliber handgun in her bag, according to Allegheny County Police and TSA officials.

Security officials in Pittsburgh last year caught 21 travelers with firearms in their carry-on bags, an expected dip in numbers that had been slowly ticking upward in the years prior.

The woman, who was not charged criminally, had a concealed carry permit and had "inadvertently left the firearm in her bag," county police wrote in a statement.

Police confiscated the gun, and the woman was permitted to fly.

TSA officers spotted the gun as the woman's bag went through the X-ray machine at the airport's checkpoint, spokeswoman Lisa Farbstein said.

While she does not face criminal charges, the woman faces federal civil penalties, which can top \$4,000 for a first

offense, Farbstein said.

It is the first firearm caught at Pittsburgh International's checkpoint this year. Nationwide, TSA officers caught their first gun of the year on the first day of the year. A Georgia man traveling through Washington, D.C., on New Year's Day was caught by TSA officers at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

The man, according to the TSA, had a 9mm handgun and magazine in his carry-on bag. He was cited for a weapons violation.

In Pittsburgh, the number of guns stopped at airport checkpoints had been trending slightly upward for years: 32 in 2017, 34 in 2018 and 35 in 2019.

15. Seizure :Chesapeake Man Caught With Loaded Gun At Norfolk International Airport

WAVY Staff

WAVY

2021-1-11

A Chesapeake man was caught with a loaded gun at Norfolk International Airport over the weekend.

TSA officers say they detected the gun in the checkpoint X-ray machine on Sunday, Jan. 10. The 9mm handgun was loaded with eight bullets.

TSA officers alerted the Norfolk Airport Authority Police and confiscated the weapon. The passenger from Chesapeake was cited on a weapons charge and faces a stiff financial penalty for carrying a gun to the checkpoint.

A typical first offense for carrying a loaded handgun into a checkpoint is \$4,100 and can go as high as \$13,669 depending on any mitigating circumstances. This applies to travelers with or without concealed gun carry permits because even though an individual may have a concealed carry permit, it does not allow for a firearm to be carried onto an airplane.

The complete list of civil penalties is posted online.

Two weeks before this incident, TSA officers caught a Virginia Beach man with 9mm handgun loaded with 14 bullets at similar checkpoint.

16. Seizure/Arrest:Border Patrol Agents Seize Over 350 Pounds Of Marijuana In The Rio Grande Valley

Roderick Kise

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

2021-1-15

Agents from the Rio Grande City Border Patrol Station seized \$280K in marijuana.

Yesterday evening, agents assigned to the Rio Grande City Border Patrol Station responded to suspected illegal activity near El Refugio, Texas. As agents arrived to the area, they observed multiple subjects carrying large bundles of suspected narcotics. Upon detection, the subjects abandoned the bundles and ran towards the Rio Grande. A search of the immediate area led to the discovery of one subject and six bundles weighing more than 350 pounds of marijuana valued at over \$280K. The marijuana was turned over to the Starr County Sheriff's Office and the subject will be processed accordingly by Border Patrol.

Please visit www.cbp.gov to view additional news releases and other information pertaining to Customs and Border Protection. Follow us on Twitter @CBPRGV, @USBPChiefRGV and @USBPDepChiefRGV.

17. Seizure :Border Patrol Stops Narcotics Smuggling Attempt

Sara Melendez

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

2021-1-13

U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the Laredo North Station stopped a narcotics smuggling attempt and seized several bundles of marijuana in west Laredo.

The incident occurred during the evening of January 12, when agents responded to several subjects who were loading large bundles of suspected narcotics into a white SUV near Riverside Drive in the west side of town. When the agents arrived on scene, the individuals absconded and were seen wading across the Rio Grande River to Mexico.

Six bundles were seized that had an approximate weight of 609.5 Lb. with an estimated value of \$487,664. The contraband was subsequently turned over to the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Chief Patrol Agent Matthew J. Hudak commented, "The diligence of our agents, coupled with technology, resulted in the seizure of this drug load before it was able to move into our city and to areas beyond the border."

Even with the presence of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. Border Patrol agents of the Laredo Sector continue to secure the Nation's borders and prevent the smuggling of drugs. Their mission is to target and investigate potential violators of the law by utilizing state-of-the-art intelligence data, equipment, collection, and analytics.

To report suspicious activity such as alien and/or drug smuggling, download the "USBP Laredo Sector" App or contact the Laredo Sector Border Patrol toll free at 1-800-343-1994. You can also follow us on our social media platforms on Twitter and Instagram @usbpchieflrt and @usbpdepchieflrt and on Facebook at US Border Patrol Laredo Sector.

18. Seizure :RGV Border Patrol Agents Seize Over \$307K Worth of Marijuana

Roderick Kise

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

2021-1-13

On Tuesday, agents from the Rio Grande City Border Patrol Station seized nearly 400 pounds of marijuana in Starr County.

Yesterday afternoon, Rio Grande City Border Patrol (RGC) agents responded to suspected criminal activity near Garciville, Texas. As agents arrived, they observed an All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) departing the area. Agents attempted to make contact with the ATV operator, however the subject quickly abandoned the ATV and absconded into Mexico. A search of the immediate area led to the discovery of one bundle of marijuana. The marijuana weighed approximately 108 pounds and has a value of \$86K.

Hours later, RGC agents working near La Grulla, Texas, observed multiple subjects attempting to load bundles of suspected narcotics into a vehicle. As agents responded to the area, the subjects abandoned the narcotics and fled back to Mexico. Agents were able to apprehend one suspect and five bundles of marijuana weighing more than 276 pounds and valued at over \$221K. The suspect and marijuana were turned over to the Starr County HIDTA Task Force.

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20. Arrest :Border Patrol Apprehends Man Who Climbed Yuma Border Fence With A Machete

Jamie Landers

AZ Central

2021-1-12

Border Patrol agents in Yuma arrested a man after he climbed over the border fence with a machete in hand on Monday morning, officials say.

Around 5:20 a.m., the man was captured on the Yuma Sector's video surveillance system lingering near the Andrade Port of Entry, according to a statement from U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

The man continued to be monitored as he climbed the fence into the United States, all while holding a machete in his hand, the statement said.

Port security officers made contact with the man and ordered him to drop the machete, which he did. The officers took him into custody and turned him over to Border Patrol agents who responded to the location.

The agents identified the man, determined he was from Mexico and discovered he had an active warrant from t

21. Arrest :Laredo CBP Officers Apprehend Fugitive Sought For Sexual Assault Of A Child

U.S. Customs And Border Protection

2021-1-14

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at the Laredo Port of Entry detained a wanted man with an outstanding warrant for sexual assault of a child out of Dallas, Texas.

“CBP plays an essential role in combatting this reprehensible crime by expanding our efforts to protect our nation's children and holding alleged perpetrators accountable for their actions,” said Port Director Eugene Crawford, Laredo Port of Entry.

The fugitive apprehension occurred on Tuesday, January 12th, 2021 at the Colombia-Solidarity Bridge. A CBP officer processing vehicle traffic arriving from Mexico, referred Arturo Vasquez Tovar, a 22 year-old male United States citizen, for a secondary inspection. After escorting the passenger to secondary, subsequent biometric verification through law enforcement databases confirmed that the subject had an outstanding warrant for sexual

assault of a child, a 1st degree felony, pursued by the Dallas County Sheriff's Office in Dallas, Texas. The warrant was confirmed to be active. CBP officers transported the wanted fugitive to Webb County Jail in Laredo, Texas to await criminal proceedings. Criminal charges are merely allegations. Defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law.

22. Arrest :RGV Border Patrol Agents Arrest Sex Offender

Roderick Kise

U.S. Customs And Border Protection

2021-1-15

Border Patrol agents from the McAllen Border Patrol Station arrest a previously convicted rapist attempting to illegally enter the country.

This morning, McAllen Border Patrol Agents working near Mission, Texas apprehended a group of five subjects who illegally entered the United States. Criminal record checks revealed one of the subjects was an Honduran national who was arrested in 2019 for 2nd degree rape by the Suffolk County Police Department in the State of New York. The subject was subsequently convicted for the crime and then removed from the country by immigration officials last year.

Border Patrol processed the subject accordingly.

The public is encouraged to take a stand against crime in their communities and report suspicious activity at 800-863-9382.

Even with the spread of the COVID-19 virus, human smugglers continue to try these brazen attempts with zero regard for the lives they endanger nor to the health of the citizens of our great nation. The U.S. Border Patrol agents of the Rio Grande Valley Sector will continue to safeguard the nation and community against these criminal elements.

23. Arrest :Border Patrol Agents Thwart Human Smuggling Attempt, Arrest Two Child Sex Offenders In Traffic Stop Near Freer

Haley Williams

Kiiitv.com

2021-1-14

Laredo Sector Border Patrol agents from the Freer station recently stopped a human smuggling attempt and arrested two child sex offenders in the same traffic stop, a press release from US Customs and Border Protection.

Agents pulled over a commercial truck that was going down Highway 59 near Freer and found 119 people being smuggled in the back, officials said.

All individuals were illegally in the United State and were from the countries of Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, and Guatemala.

While searching the vehicle, agents located and seized an unregistered loaded handgun that was found inside a backpack belonging to the driver.

When checking the records of the people, two came back to be child sex offenders, officials said.

Placido Mercado-Campos, a 63-year old Mexican national, had been arrested in 1987 and convicted for Sexual Offense Against a Child Fondling in San Antonio, Texas, and was sentenced to three years confinement. His records further revealed an arrest for Indecent Exposure and a felony conviction for a Felon in Possession of a Weapon.

Record checks on Ruben Ruiz-Jimenez, a 45-year-old Mexican citizen, revealed that he had been arrested in 2000 and convicted of Felony Child Sexual Contact in Houston, Texas, and sentenced to five years probation.

Both Mercado-Campos and Ruiz-Jimenez are being held by the U.S. Border Patrol pending prosecution of their immigration violations.

They will be remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshal Service.

“Alien smugglers continue to underestimate the diligence of our agents and attempt to avoid detection by using ranch roads and more remote checkpoints,” Laredo Sector Chief Patrol Agent Matthew Hudak said. “Their arrests are a clear indication that this strategy is not working for them. Our agents remain vigilant and alert, regardless of the area they are patrolling.”

24. Arrest :MS-13 Gang Member, Convicted Felon Discovered During Human Smuggling Attempt

César Rodriguez

LMT Online

2021-1-13

U.S. Border Patrol agents arrested a Mara Salvatrucha gang member and a convicted felon southwest of Hebbronville, authorities said.

Agents attempted a vehicle stop early Tuesday on Texas 16. The driver failed to yield before stopping north of a ranch off the highway. Border Patrol then detained a group of 20 immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua who were in the country illegally.

One individual was identified as Kevin Ramirez-Escobar, a 19-year-old Guatemalan citizen. A record check

revealed that Ramirez-Escobar is a self-admitted active member of the notorious MS-13 gang. Further processing revealed Ramirez-Escobar had a prior order of removal.

A second immigrant was identified as William Gomez-Zeldon, a 37-year-old Nicaraguan citizen. A record check on Gomez-Zeldon revealed extensive criminal history out of Miami Dade County, Florida.

Border Patrol said Gomez-Zeldon had multiple felony convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, grand theft of a motor vehicle, armed robbery with a firearm and aggravated kidnapping with a weapon. Agents said he also had multiple prior deportations.

Both were charged for their immigration violations and will be turned over to the U.S. Marshals.

25. Arrest :Illegal Immigrant With Active Warrant Arrested In Big Bend Sector

Greg Davis

U.S. Customs And Border Protection

2021-1-11

An illegal immigrant with an active warrant was one of many arrests across Big Bend Sector in the last day.

Almost 60 arrests were made across the sector and over 200 pounds of marijuana was seized as Big Bend Sector continues to disrupt human and narcotic smuggling attempts.

Of particular significance was the arrest of Arturo Palma-Vera, a Mexican national, who was wanted in Springfield, Illinois, for a parole violation. A search for previous criminal history revealed the active warrant for Palma-Vera. He was subsequently turned over to the Hudspeth County Sheriff for further prosecution.

All other subjects were processed according to Big Bend Sector protocols for immediate removal or further criminal prosecution.

26. Arrest :Federal, County Authorities Shut Down Stash House, Detain 40-Plus Immigrants

César Rodriguez

Laredo Morning Times

2021-1-12

Federal agents and Webb County constable deputies arrested three people in connection with the smuggling attempt of more than 40 immigrants who had crossed the border illegally.

On Jan. 8, Homeland Security Investigations special agents received information about a trailer home in the 3000 block of North Tapeyste Avenue that was being used to harbor immigrants. U.S. Border Patrol agents set up surveillance at about 8 p.m.

Authorities then observed a GMC Yukon, a Ford Flex and a Ford Expedition arrive at the residence. Agents observed several individuals enter one of the vehicles through the back cargo area. Then, the three vehicles departed the area. Agents followed the vehicles in unmarked vehicles.

Webb County Precinct 2 Constable's Office deputies assisted with conducting traffic stops.

At about 8:25 p.m., a deputy tried to pull over the Ford Flex when the driver stopped near the intersection of East Saunders Street and North Louisiana Avenue. Agents and deputies caught up to the driver after a brief foot pursuit, according to court documents.

He was identified as Heriberto Francisco Granados, 17. Five people were found inside the Ford Flex. Deputies arrested Granados and charged him with one count of evading arrest and five counts of smuggling of persons. Deputies took over that case because Granados is 17 years old.

At about 8:30 p.m., another deputy attempted to pull over the Yukon for a traffic violation, but the driver refused to stop. A vehicle pursuit ensued and ended when the Yukon crashed with a parked vehicle in the intersection of North Texas Avenue and Reynolds Street.

Deputies then observed several people running from the crash scene. Deputies caught up to six people. Laredo Fire Department crews responded to take three people to a Doctors Hospital South with minor injuries. Authorities identified the driver of the Yukon as Leonardo Rivera-Rosales, 18.

At approximately 8:35 p.m., agents in unmarked vehicles observed the Ford Expedition entering the parking lot of a local motel in the 2500 block of East Saunders Street. Agents approached the Expedition and discovered nine people. The driver was identified as Michael Villarreal, 23. He was found hiding in one of the motel rooms found with the front door open.

At approximately 8:50 p.m., agents returned to the stash house on North Tapeyste to conduct a knock and talk and search for additional immigrants. A man answered the door and multiple people were seen inside, according to court documents. Agents detained 23 immigrants.

Villarreal and Rivera-Rosales allegedly agreed to talk to HSI special agents.

"Both individuals agreed to provide statements and stated they made arrangements with other human smugglers to pick up the (immigrants) from the stash house and transport them to another undisclosed location for monetary gain. Both knew it was illegal to transport (immigrants) but agreed to transport them for the money," states the affidavit.

27. Arrest :Three Armed Human Smugglers Arrested In 24 Hours Near Border In Texas

Bob Price

Breitbart

2021-1-13

Freer Station agents received an alert on January 11 about a group of migrants marching through a ranch just east of Highway 16, according to information obtained from Laredo Sector Border Patrol officials. Human smugglers frequently march migrants through ranches to circumvent interior Border Patrol immigration checkpoints.

Agents responded and, with the help of a CBP Air and Marine Operations helicopter aircrew, located a group of five migrants walking a trail in the brush.

The agents conducted a search of the migrants and found a backpack that contained a loaded shotgun.

An immigration interview identified all five of the migrants as Mexican and Guatemalan nationals — all illegally present in the United States, officials stated.

Later that day, Laredo Station agents teamed up with ICE Homeland Security Investigations agents and Webb County Constables Precinct 2 deputies to investigate a residence reported to be a human smuggling stash house, the report continues.

The team conducted a “knock and talk” at the residence and discovered a group of nine people being warehoused in the house located on Zapata Highway in south Laredo. Agents conducted an immigration interview and identified the nine people as illegal immigrants from Mexico and Ecuador. They also arrested a U.S. citizen in the home who is suspected of being involved in the human smuggling incident.

During a search of the residence, agents recovered a stolen shotgun and rounds of ammunition.

The following day, Laredo North Station agents assigned to the Interstate 35 immigration checkpoint observed a tractor-trailer approaching for inspection. During the initial inspection, a Border Patrol K-9 alerted to a scent it is trained to detect. The agents referred the driver to a secondary inspection station.

A search of the tractor led to the discovery of 12 people hiding in the cab. Agents identified all 12 as illegal immigrants, officials said. An immigration interview concluded that the migrants came to the U.S. from Guatemala and Mexico.

The agents conducted a background check on the driver, a U.S. citizen, and discovered an active warrant for Contempt of Court from a court in Loving, New Mexico. A search of the tractor led to the discovery of a loaded handgun.

“Human smugglers are willing to use illegal weapons to conduct human smuggling events of individuals in groups without PPE that not only endangers the people being smuggled but the safety of our Nation,” Laredo Sector officials said in a written statement.

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30. Arrest :Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Agents Make Significant Arrests Over Weekend

U.S. Customs And Border Protection

2021-1-13

U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the Del Rio Sector arrested a convicted murderer and a sex offender on the same day, Jan. 10.

“We continue to encounter dangerous criminals attempting to avoid apprehension through illegal entry,” said Del Rio Sector Chief Patrol Agent Austin L. Skero II. “With the safety of our communities a top priority, our agents work around the clock to detect, arrest, and prosecute anyone attempting to illegally enter the United States.”

Border Patrol Agents assigned to the Uvalde Station arrested Edgardo Aparicio-Cortez, 55, a citizen of El Salvador, shortly after he entered the United States illegally. During processing, agents discovered that Aparicio-Cortez was convicted of first degree murder in 1990 in Los Angeles. He was sentenced to 17 years to life incarceration and most recently removed from the United States in 2020.

On the same day, Border Patrol agents assigned to the Del Rio Station arrested Pedro Sanchez-Valladares, a citizen of Mexico, shortly after he entered the United States illegally. During processing, agents discovered Sanchez-Valladares was convicted of indecent liberties with a child in North Carolina in 2007 and sentenced to 36 months probation. He was most recently removed from the United States in 2016.

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32. Law Enforcement :Border Agent Opens Fire When Suspected Smuggler Attacks With Vehicle, CBP Says

Border Report staff

KGET.com

2021-1-14

A U.S. Border Patrol agent opened fire when a suspected human smuggler attempted to strike the agent with a vehicle on Wednesday in Laredo, Texas.

The agent was patrolling near a park along the U.S.-Mexico border when he spotted an SUV believed to be picking up undocumented immigrants, according to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

The agent approached the group to apprehend the individuals when the driver allegedly drove toward the agent, prompting the agent to fire his weapon.

CBP said the SUV took off but was found later south of town.

There were no injuries.

CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility and the U.S. Border Patrol are investigating the matter.

Project Manager

Josh Grantham; Amelia Mainetti (DPM)

Northern Border Team Leader

Jack Singer

Northern Border Senior Analyst

John Schatz

Southern Border Team Leader

Noah Johnson

Noelle Ross (Cartels)

Southern Border Senior Analysts

Abigail Macaro

Bethany Harris

Kyle Phillips

Ethan Wang

Morgan Nash

Southern Border Junior Analysts

Garrin Rose

Lydia Heykamp

Port Security Team Leader

Calvin Heiple

Port Security Senior Analysts

Zachary Schultz

Andrew Black

Second Phase Team Leader

Kaleb Windsor

January 15, 2021

Aviation Security Measures and Domestic Terrorism Threats

After the January 6, 2021, security breach of the United States Capitol, some Members of Congress have advocated restricting the air travel of individuals who may seek to incite or carry out further violence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is reportedly considering placing individuals who illegally entered the Capitol on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) No-Fly List. This In Focus discusses the circumstances under which air carriers, TSA, and other federal authorities may restrict domestic airline travel in response to security threats.

The No-Fly List and Airline Passenger Prescreening

The No-Fly List is one of several lists maintained by TSA to identify passengers based on their risk to aviation safety and national security (See 49 U.S.C. §44903). As the name implies, individuals on the No-Fly List are to be denied boarding and referred to law enforcement authorities when they arrive at an airport to check in for a commercial airline flight. In addition to the No-Fly List, TSA maintains lists of individuals who are to receive special scrutiny during pre-flight security screening and whose carry-on bags and checked baggage are to be examined more thoroughly. The primary list of such individuals is referred to as the Selectee List or Automatic Selectee List to indicate that these individuals are to be automatically selected for enhanced screening. Enhanced screening may include measures such as pat-downs and chemical trace detection swabs to test for explosives residue. Passengers not on these lists may be randomly selected for enhanced screening, and passengers or baggage that trigger alarms during initial screening may also undergo these additional measures.

Both the No-Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the broader consolidated terrorist watchlist, formally known as the Terrorist Screening Database or TSDB. The TSDB is maintained by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, which is responsible for consolidating and disseminating terrorism data to federal, state, and local law enforcement, and international partners. TSA's Secure Flight system checks passenger names against these lists multiple times between ticket purchase and the flight's departure, as the lists are routinely updated. TSA may expand these Secure Flight checks to include the larger number of identities in the complete TSDB when warranted by security conditions. This can be done when specific threat intelligence suggests, for example, heightened security concerns regarding a specific flight, flights along a specific route, flights from a certain region, or flights to a specific destination. TSA sometimes refers to this broader use of the complete TSDB as the Expanded Selectee List, suggesting that, under such heightened security conditions, additional individuals may be selected for enhanced security screening. However, the No-Fly list might not be expanded unless specific information warrants inclusion of additional individuals on that list.

In addition to the Selectee list, TSA relies on sets of rules to temporarily assign certain passengers to two other lists it maintains, the Silent Partner and Quiet Skies lists. Individuals may be placed on these lists based on their recent international travel patterns, and are subject to enhanced screening measures, including additional baggage screening, for a period of time.

Historically, the TSA lists and the broader TSDB have focused mainly on international terrorist threats. The FBI most recently released data about its security lists in September 2011. At that time, about 98% of the roughly 420,000 identities contained in the TSDB referred to persons who were not U.S. citizens or legal U.S. residents. The No-Fly list then consisted of about 16,000 identities, of which fewer than 500 referred to U.S. persons. The Selectee list was said to also contain about 16,000 identities, although the FBI did not specify how many of those were U.S. persons. The TSDB apparently has grown considerably since then. According to press reports, about 1.2 million people were on the watchlist in 2017, including about 4,600 American citizens. Official updates regarding the size and scope of the No-Fly and Selectee lists, however, have not been made public.

TSA was required to establish a procedural mechanism enabling people to challenge their inclusion on the No-Fly list or other lists that effectively barred them from traveling by air. The Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) maintains a website through which individuals who claim to have been misidentified may seek redress, but such individuals may be barred from air travel or subject to enhanced screening until their cases are adjudicated.

Airline Blacklists

Airlines' contracts of carriage, to which passengers agree when they purchase tickets, oblige passengers to obey airline rules and policies and comply with crewmembers performing their duties. Airlines may refuse to provide service to individuals who refuse to wear masks or facial coverings for the duration of the flight, as airlines have uniformly required in response to federal recommendations to limit the spread of COVID-19. Airlines may also remove disruptive or uncooperative individuals from an airplane, and may ban them from future flights. Airlines are not obligated to notify the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), TSA, other federal agencies, or other airlines of individuals who have been banned from future flights. If incidents are brought to their attention, however, FAA or TSA may investigate to determine whether individuals may have violated federal aviation safety or security regulations.

Enforcement of Federal Aviation Regulations

Airlines may notify FAA of passengers who are disruptive, disobey instructions from airline crewmembers, or interfere with airline crew. If FAA determines that an individual violated 14 C.F.R. § 121.580, which prohibits anyone from assaulting, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with a crewmember performing their duties, it may impose civil penalties and, in certain cases may refer cases to the Department of Justice to assess whether federal criminal statutes may have been violated.

Federal Jurisdiction of Crimes Committed Aboard Aircraft

In addition to FAA and TSA, federal law enforcement authorities have jurisdiction over criminal acts that occur on board aircraft. From the time the external doors of an aircraft are closed in preparation for flight until they are reopened, any domestic flight, a U.S.-bound flight, or a U.S.-registered aircraft operating anywhere in the world is said to be within the “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States” (see 49 U.S.C. Chapter 465). Alleged federal crimes occurring in that jurisdiction are investigated by federal law enforcement and prosecuted by the Department of Justice. These include air piracy, interference with air crew, destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities, carrying a weapon or explosive device, and a host of serious crimes incorporated by reference including assaults; maiming; murder; manslaughter; attempted murder or manslaughter; theft or attempted theft by force, violence, or deception; and sexual abuse.

Federal statutes require TSA to deploy Federal Air Marshal Service teams on all flights assessed to pose a high security risk based on threat and vulnerability assessments. Air marshal duties are focused on detecting and preventing terrorist attacks against an aircraft in flight, but in some instances they may respond to violent criminal behavior onboard an aircraft. Sworn federal, state, and local law enforcement officers that receive training and TSA approval may also carry firearms on board commercial flights under limited circumstances and could assist in responding to criminal conduct. Additionally, under the Federal Flight Deck Officers program, TSA deputizes airline pilots who volunteer to travel armed to protect the flight deck from terrorist attacks. However, armed pilots would not typically intervene in incidents inside the aircraft cabin, but would instead focus on diverting to an airport where law enforcement resources on the ground could respond.

Charter and General Aviation Flight Security

Actions to restrict the travel of certain individuals aboard scheduled airline flights may result in those individuals instead seeking to travel on charter aircraft. Domestic charter flights are not routinely screened against the TSA lists, and only passengers and their baggage traveling on charters aircraft weighing more than roughly 100,000 pounds (somewhat larger than a typical Boeing 737) are required to undergo physical screening. For smaller jets, passengers are not routinely screened, but flight crew must undergo security background checks. However, all charter and private general aviation flights inbound to Washington Reagan National Airport, regardless of size, are subject to more extensive security measures, including screening of

all passengers and a requirement for TSA-approved armed security personnel on board all flights.

The airspace surrounding Washington, DC is off limits to private aircraft, with certain exceptions. Flights operating in a 30-mile outer ring beyond the Flight Restricted Zone above Washington, DC, a circle with a 15-nautical-mile radius extending from the surface to 18,000 feet, must file a flight plan and maintain constant radio communication with air traffic controllers. Such flights are closely monitored. Defensive measures have been put in place to intercept and interdict unauthorized non-commercial aircraft that stray into the restricted zone.

Potential Limitations and Concerns

While the No-Fly List might prevent some individuals intent on carrying out violence from traveling on a commercial airline flight, it would generally not restrict travel by other modes. Identities contained within the TSDB, however, could be shared with law enforcement on an as-needed basis to restrict access to certain facilities and events.

The various TSA lists may be of limited usefulness outside of the aviation security context. They would not, for example, be capable of stopping individuals from lawfully transporting firearms to sites where armed protests are planned. In general, airline passengers, including individuals that may be on the TSA Selectee or Enhanced Selectee lists, are not prohibited from transporting firearms aboard aircraft so long as the firearms are transported unloaded and locked as checked baggage. On January 17, 2017, a mass shooting in a baggage claim area of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport in Florida was perpetrated by an arriving passenger who had properly declared the handgun and two magazines used in the attack and had transported them in a locked box as required by federal regulations. In mid-January 2021, some airlines temporarily prohibited passengers from checking firearms on flights to the Washington, DC area. Somewhat relatedly, proposals to impose a waiting period on the purchase of firearms by individuals on the No-Fly List or whose identities are included in the broader TSDB have been introduced in recent Congresses, but have not been enacted.

Significantly expanding the No-Fly List could increase the number of misidentifications, potentially resulting in delayed or denied boarding of more passengers. Further complicating matters is that some individuals who might be targeted for inclusion on the No-Fly or Selectee lists based on suspected participation in the January 6, 2021, breach of the U.S. Capitol or other domestic incidents may have been previously cleared to participate in trusted traveler programs, such as TSA’s PreCheck or Customs and Border Protection’s Global Entry. Individuals who participate in these programs are eligible for expedited screening at TSA airport checkpoints. While placement on the No-Fly or Selectee lists would presumably terminate an individual’s participation in these programs, it may raise questions regarding the effectiveness of threat assessments conducted under these programs.

Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy

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January 15, 2021

U.S. Secret Service: Threats to and Assaults on Presidents and Vice Presidents

Overview

On January 6, 2021, Vice President Mike Pence was presiding over a joint session of Congress to certify the November 2020 presidential election electoral votes when a crowd breached the U.S. Capitol's security. Due to these events, some Members of Congress have expressed a renewed interest in U.S. Secret Service (USSS) protective detail operations.

USSS has two mandated missions: (1) criminal investigations, and (2) protection of persons and facilities. Criminal investigations focus primarily on financial crimes, whereas protection focuses on the safety and security of specific government officials and specifically identified government facilities. The criminal investigation mission is the USSS's oldest mission; however, the protection mission is the one that often receives the most public and media attention. USSS protects the President, Vice President, their families, former Presidents, and major candidates for those offices, along with the White House and the Vice President's official residence. Protective activities also extend to foreign missions in the District of Columbia (embassies, consulates, residences, and other buildings used by foreign governments) and to designated individuals, such as the Secretary of Homeland Security and visiting dignitaries. Separate from protecting these specific mandated individuals and facilities, USSS is responsible for coordinating security activities for National Special Security Events (NSSE), including inauguration ceremonies, major party quadrennial national conventions, and certain international conferences and events held in the United States.

History of USSS Protection

In March 2003, USSS was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With this transfer, DHS generally, and USSS specifically, became the federal department responsible for protecting significant and specified persons and property. Prior to the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Treasury Department had been responsible for this protection (through USSS) for over 100 years.

USSS has been protecting presidents from President Grover Cleveland in 1894 on a part-time basis to the continuous, round-the-clock protection of the President today. Over the years, the USSS protection mission has been determined by unofficial decisions (such as the one to protect President Cleveland) and congressional mandates (such as the one to protect major presidential candidates). USSS protection activities have generally expanded with an increase in the number of protected individuals; there has been one instance of a specified type of protectee being removed

from the authorized list of protectees—presidentially designated federal officials temporarily representing the United States abroad.

Over the past century, congressional action has focused primarily on the USSS's protection mission. The most recent changes were enacted by the Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011, which amended 18 U.S.C. 1752 and made it a crime for an unauthorized person to enter a building secured by USSS.

Protected Individuals and Facilities

The following individuals are currently authorized USSS protection under 18 U.S.C. Section 3056(a):

- President, Vice President, President- and Vice President-elect;
- immediate families of those listed above;
- former Presidents, their spouses, and their children under the age of 16;
- former Vice Presidents, their spouses, and their children under the age 16;
- visiting heads of foreign states or governments;
- distinguished foreign visitors and official United States representatives on special missions abroad; and
- major presidential and vice presidential candidates within 120 days of the general presidential elections, and their spouses.

The USSS is also required to secure the White House complex, the Vice President's official residence at the Naval Observatory, the Treasury Building, foreign diplomatic missions in Washington, DC, and during their presidential administration, the personal residences of the President and Vice President. The USSS's Uniformed Division primarily secures these facilities.

Specific Protection Activities

As the pool of protectees has evolved over time, so has the manner in which they are protected. Originally, USSS protection primarily involved agents acting as "body guards" and providing personal security to protectees. Today, protection operations include not only the presence of agents in close proximity to the protectee, but also advance security surveys of locations to be visited; coordination with foreign, state, and local law enforcement entities; and intelligence analysis of present and future

threats. The USSS protection mission comprises human resources, physical barriers, technology, and reviews of critical infrastructure and their vulnerabilities. 18 U.S.C. 3056(e)-(f) also authorizes the USSS to conduct other activities, such as planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at NSSEs; and providing forensic and investigative assistance involving missing and exploited children.

Threats to Protectees

Presidential safety is and has been a concern throughout the nation's history. For example, fears of kidnapping and assassination threats towards Abraham Lincoln began with his journey to Washington, DC, for the 1861 inauguration. The number of attempted and successful assaults against Presidents legitimizes concern for presidential safety. Ten presidents have been victims of direct assaults by assassins, with four resulting in death (Presidents Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy). President Woodrow Wilson's Vice President, Thomas R. Marshall, is the only known Vice President to have been targeted for assassination. In 1915, a German-American opposed to the United States selling weapons and material to the Allies bombed the U.S. Senate Chamber's reception room, which was next to the Vice President's office. Vice President Marshall had been receiving death threats from opponents to American policy in World War I, in letters, for weeks. There was potentially a threat to Vice President Pence on January 6, 2021, but the events of that day are still being investigated.

Since USSS started officially protecting Presidents in 1906—in 1917, Congress enacted legislation (39 Stat. 919) that made it a crime to threaten the President—seven assaults have occurred, with one, President Kennedy, resulting in death. The USSS does not provide information on any threats to protectees or investigations related to threats made against protectees. Thus, the extent to which protectees have been threatened or targeted remains a matter of conjecture.

The following table provides information on assaults against Presidents who were protected by USSS; it does not include information on assaults against Presidents prior to the USSS assuming the responsibility of presidential safety.

Table 1. Direct Assaults on Presidents Protected by the U.S. Secret Service

Date	President	Location	Assailants and Reasons
11/01/1950	Harry S. Truman	Washington, DC	Oscar Collazo and Griseilio Torressola, advocates for Puerto Rican independence

Date	President	Location	Assailants and Reasons
11/22/1963	John F. Kennedy	Dallas, TX	Lee Harvey Oswald, motive unknown
09/05/1975	Gerald R. Ford	Sacramento, CA	Lynette Alice Fromme, member of extremist "Manson Family" and mentally unstable
09/22/1975	Gerald R. Ford	San Francisco, CA	Sara Jane Moore, revolutionary
03/30/1981	Ronald W. Reagan	Washington, DC	John W. Hinckley, Jr., mentally unstable
10/29/1994	William J. Clinton	Washington, DC	Francisco M. Duran, motive unknown
05/10/2005	George W. Bush	Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia	Vladimir Arutyunian, motive unknown

In recent years, for the USSS mission of "protection of persons and facilities," Congress has appropriated:

FY2016 (P.L. 114-113)—\$509.8 million;

FY2017 (P.L. 115-31 and P.L. 115-56)—\$627.9 million;

FY2018 (P.L. 115-72 and P.L. 115-141)—\$711.2 million;

FY2019 (P.L. 116-6)—\$740.9 million;

FY2020 (P.L. 116-93)—\$754.5 million; and

FY2021 (P.L. 116-260)—\$818.8 million.

Shawn Reese, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy

IFI 1732

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
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
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2-534(a)(10), 2-534(a)(3)

2-534(a)(10), 2-534(a)(3)

2-534(a)(10), 2-534(a)(3)





Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)

Subject: FW: OSAC Morning Newsletter

From: OSAC Admin

Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 9:01 AM

Subject: OSAC Morning Newsletter



Overseas Security Advisory Council
Research and Information Support
Center
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
U.S. Department of State

Morning Newsletter

Dear David Graves,

Your Morning Newsletter is ready!

01-18-2021

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[Travel Security Resources for Female Travelers in India](#)

Upcoming OSAC Events

Europe

Hungary

[VIRTUAL Country Chapter Meeting: Budapest, Hungary \(January 26\)](#)

Global

[Women in Security Webinar: Learning the Language of Business \(January 27\)](#)

[Europe Regional Committee Winter Webinar \(January 28\)](#)

[Private Sector Security Overseas Seminar \(PSOS\): VIRTUAL Arlington, VA \(April 14-16, 2021\)](#)

[International Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations Security Overseas Seminar \(IO/NGO SOS\):VIRTUAL \(May 13-14\)](#)

Western Hemisphere

Venezuela

[VIRTUAL Country Chapter Meeting: Caracas, Venezuela \(January 21\)](#)

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LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS

- [Heavily fortified statehouses around US see small protests](#) – 39 minutes ago
Small groups, some armed, gathered at state capitols on Sunday but remained peaceful
- [FBI vetting Guard troops in DC amid fears of insider attack](#) – 43 minutes ago
Officials say the vetting hasn't flagged any issues or evidence of threats so far
- [Ban on tear gas, neck restraints, unleashed K-9s among changes proposed in Wash. reform bill](#)
– Yesterday at 2:18 PM
Language in the bill creates "unacceptable consequences" and puts the public and officers in "unnecessary danger," said one LE official
- [Man arrested with invalid credentials, handgun, ammo at DC checkpoint](#) – Yesterday at 10:56 AM
The man was arrested for possession of an unregistered firearm and possession of unregistered ammunition
- [Atlanta sees deadliest year in decades](#) – Yesterday at 10:49 AM
Atlanta Police investigated 157 homicides in 2020, up from 99 in 2019
- [Police, National Guard scramble to secure DC, state capitols](#) – Yesterday at 10:42 AM
Airlines have tracked a recent increase in passengers checking firearms to D.C. as National Guard troops descend on the city
- [Prioritizing your personnel in 2021](#) – Yesterday at 12:00 AM
LE leaders share advice and top tips for improving officer wellness, safety and morale in 2021
- [Digital Edition: What cops want in 2021](#) – Jan 16, 2021
4,000 officers speak up about police reform, recruitment and more in Police1's State of the Industry survey

- [Converting officers with 5-10 years of experience into career employees](#) – Jan 16, 2021

Let's decode the data from Police1's State of the Industry survey to address this critical issue

- [NYPD outlines plan to keep city safe in wake of Capitol siege](#) – Jan 16, 2021

There haven't been any specific threats, but NYPD officials say security will be heightened as a precautionary measure

- [Feds make drug bust right out of 'Miami Vice'](#) – Jan 16, 2021

Authorities found 294 bricks of cocaine during a routine baggage inspection

- [Fla. cop recalls horrific Jet Ski crash rescue](#) – Jan 16, 2021

Officer Darin Hederian said he was certain the crash had killed the two victims -- but they both survived

- [Videos: Officers recount facing mob at Capitol](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Police officers who responded to the Jan. 6 siege at the Capitol have shared harrowing details of their experiences

- [Official: No 'direct evidence' of plot to kill at Capitol](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Federal prosecutors said there was “strong evidence” the mob aimed to “capture and assassinate elected officials,” but the head of the investigation cautioned Friday that the probe is still in its early stages

- [Critical planning for high-profile events](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Avoiding planning failures at large events with dignitaries present

- [Adam Kinakin on the narrowing of police use of force options](#) – Jan 15, 2021

From banning specific restraints to redefining what is “objectively reasonable,” police use of force is under a nationwide spotlight

- [Ready, set, go! Preparing for 2021 grant opportunities](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Advice on getting your team together for success every step of the way

- [Police: Suspect in slaying of 3 Puerto Rico officers is dead](#) – Jan 15, 2021

The man's body was found with a cardboard sign that read, 'I am responsible for the killing of the policemen'

- [Federal watchdogs open probe of response to Capitol attack](#) – Jan 15, 2021

The reviews will cover everything from whether the FBI adequately shared information with other agencies to how the Pentagon mobilized for the Jan. 6 crisis

- [Ind. county public safety agencies seek new dispatch system to speed emergency responses](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Fire, EMS, police and 911 departments in Porter County are collaborating to apply for funding for the more efficient alerting system

- [Houston officer resigns after being linked to Capitol attack](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Chief Art Acevedo says the officer entered the Capitol and will likely face charges

- [Suspect seen beating officer with US flagpole arrested](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Cellphone video showed an angry mob dragging the officer down the steps of the Capitol

- [Union: 17 Chicago cops 'lounging' in burgled office suspended](#) – Jan 15, 2021

Security video showed officers resting in an empty campaign office amid unrest over the summer

- [FBI tracking 'extensive' online chatter about armed protests](#) – Jan 15, 2021

During the inauguration the FBI will operate a round-the-clock command post at headquarters and at its 56 field offices

- [Photo of the Week: Desert patrol](#) – Jan 15, 2021

The Yuma Police Department assists with a multi-agency security program near the Mexican border

- [Md. LEO dies after being struck by vehicle](#) – Jan 14, 2021

Officer Christine Peters, 49, was on foot assisting in a crash when she was struck by a passing vehicle on Jan. 2

- [Every cop needs a checkup from the neck up](#) – Jan 14, 2021

If you find yourself blaming every one of your character flaws on the job something needs to change

- [Why our brains fixate on the bad \(and what to do about it\)](#) – Jan 14, 2021

Negativity effect — also known as negativity bias — is both a blessing and a curse for those in law enforcement

- [More than 100 arrested in Belgium after in-custody death](#) – Jan 14, 2021

An in-custody death over the weekend has set off violent clashes between demonstrators and police

- [Video: Woman stabs NYPD cop in neck](#) – Jan 14, 2021

Police officials said the officer is expected to fully recover

- [COVID-19: Law enforcement deaths](#) – Jan 14, 2021

Tracking the coronavirus-related deaths of U.S. police officers and other LE personnel

- [The Firearm Blog TV's top 5 new guns of 2020](#) – Jan 14, 2021

The team looks back at some of the hottest new releases of 2020

- [NY Attorney General to sue NYPD over response to Floyd protests](#) – Jan 14, 2021

The lawsuit is expected to demand a federal monitor oversee changes on how the NYPD handles protests in the future

- [DC officer crushed in doorway receives 'get well' card from 10-year-old](#) – Jan 14, 2021

"Dear Officer, I'm Emma and I'm 10 years old," the letter begins. "When I saw the video about people crushing you with a door I almost cried"

- [Good Samaritans save officer trapped in burning car](#) – Jan 14, 2021

Two motel workers saw the crash and raced to help, getting the officer out just in time

- [Police leaders, lawmakers call for '9/11-type' commission on Capitol attack](#) – Jan 14, 2021

A former NYPD commissioner and Houston's Chief of Police joined calls to investigate why law enforcement was unprepared for the events of Jan. 6

- [Ret. Pa. FF arrested for allegedly throwing fire extinguisher at Capitol police](#) – Jan 14, 2021

Robert Sanford is accused of being the man seen on video throwing an extinguisher that hit three officers at the Capitol riot

- [Spotlight: Rapid Force by Alien Gear Holsters focused on improving safety by designing comfortable, safe and easy-to-use holsters](#) – Jan 14, 2021


The company set out to make a duty holster that could stand up to the abuse in the field and facilitate a faster draw with a more intuitive retention system


- [Spotlight: VirTra, the leader in innovative police training solutions](#) – Jan 14, 2021

VirTra offers a full line of the very best judgmental use-of-force training simulators

- [Police contract talks with city of Portland begin](#) – Jan 14, 2021

City negotiators opened talks by seeking new educational requirements for officers pursuing promotions and greater ability for city officials to speak publicly about alleged police misconduct



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Department of Justice

Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, January 15, 2021

Former Government Contractor Sentenced for Role in Bribery and Kickback Scheme

A former government contractor was sentenced today for his role in a bribery and kickback scheme where he paid bribes to secure U.S. Army contracts.

David P. Burns, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department's Criminal Division; Kenji M. Price, U.S. Attorney of the District of Hawaii; Ray Park, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command's (Army-CID) Pacific Fraud Field Office; Bryan Denny, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS); and Eli "Sam" Miranda, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Honolulu Field Office made the announcement.

John Winslett, 66, of Bristol, Rhode Island, was sentenced to 70 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release before Chief Judge J. Michael Seabright in the District of Hawaii.

According to court documents and information presented in court, Winslett admitted that from 2011 to 2018, he paid over \$100,000 worth of bribes to two U.S. Army contracting officials who worked at the Range at Schofield Barracks, in order to steer federal contracts worth at least \$19 million to his employer, a government contractor. The bribes included cash, automobiles, and firearms. In return, the contracting officials used their positions to benefit Winslett's employer in securing U.S. Army contracts.

Winslett further admitted that he accepted \$723,333.33 in kickbacks from a local subcontractor in exchange for Winslett assigning those contracts to that local subcontractor.

Army-CID, DCIS and the FBI investigated this case.

Trial Attorney Laura Connelly and Principal Assistant Chief Justin Weitz of the Criminal Division's Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Marc Wallenstein of the District of Hawaii are prosecuting the case.

Topic(s):

Financial Fraud

Component(s):

Criminal Division

Criminal - Criminal Fraud Section

USAO - Hawaii

Press Release Number:

21-65

Updated January 15, 2021



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THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JUSTICE NEWS

Department of Justice

Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, January 15, 2021

Two Maui Men Charged With Hate Crimes For Racially Motivated Attack

A federal grand jury in Honolulu, Hawaii, returned an indictment charging Kaulana Alo Kaonohi and Levi Aki, Jr. with a hate crime for their racially motivated attack on a Caucasian man who was attempting to move into the defendants' Native Hawaiian neighborhood of Kahakuloa on Maui.

The indictment was announced today by Acting Assistant Attorney General John B. Daukas for the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, U.S. Attorney Kenji M. Price for the District of Hawaii, and FBI Honolulu Special Agent in Charge Eli S. Miranda.

The indictment alleges that, on Feb. 13, 2014, Kaonohi and Aki willfully caused bodily injury to C.K., and attempted to cause bodily injury to C.K. through the use of a dangerous weapon (a shovel), because of C.K.'s actual and perceived race and color.

The maximum penalty for the charged crime is 10 years of imprisonment. An indictment is merely an accusation, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

The FBI conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Chris Thomas of the District of Hawaii is prosecuting the case in partnership with Special Litigation Counsel Christopher J. Perras and Trial Attorney Tara Allison of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division.

Topic(s):

Civil Rights

Hate Crimes

Component(s):

[Civil Rights Division](#)

[Civil Rights - Criminal Section](#)

[Civil Rights - Special Litigation Section](#)

[USAO - Hawaii](#)

Press Release Number:

21-63

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Harvin, Donell (HSEMA) </O=DC GOVERNMENT/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=BC2531BBAE494BE8BDBC43B4E9C46D3A-DONELL.HAR>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 9:55 AM
To: Donohue, John K.; david.engel@maryland.gov; amy.lay@vsp.virginia.gov; ALOFTUS@fbi.gov; Donohue, John K.; Nelms, Jordan; cookjam@amtrak.com; Taylor, Michael S; Cullen, Joseph (MPD); Felt, Alexandra; Farnam, Julie E.; sean.morris@maryland.gov; Leavell, David; Knight, Trevor (HSEMA); Manzo, Ronald; Ross, Aaron (HSEMA); Larubbio, Joseph (WF) (FBI); Krista Brown; MoscouLewis, Evan; Cunningham, Laura I.; Salata, Melinda A.; Bovia, Darrin (HSEMA); Mclean, Ralph (MPD); Brown, Joseph (DGS); Godwin, Gregory (DGS); Bauer, Shawn; Mein, John (EOM); Varanelli, Mark; Gallagher, Sean P.; §2-534(a)(2) (MPD); Montagna, Carolyn (MPD)
Cc: Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA); Ross, Aaron (HSEMA); Bovia, Darrin (HSEMA); Mein, John (EOM)
Subject: FW: Call to use and obtain Amateur Radio
Attachments: image001.png; image004.png; OATH KEEPERS WARNING ORDER PART I.pdf
Categories: Green

Please distribute as needed.



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From: Guddemi, Charles (HSEMA) <Charles.Guddemi@dc.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 9:27 AM
Subject: Call to use and obtain Amateur Radio

FYI...Please see attached work product produced by our colleagues at the FCC.

§ 2-534(a)(2)

§ 2-534(a)(2)

§ 2-534(a)(2)



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RED ALERT! OATH KEEPERS WARNING ORDER PART I

👤 Posted by [edurfee](#) 🕒 [January 15, 2021](#) 🗨 [Leave a comment on RED ALERT! OATH KEEPERS WARNING ORDER PART I](#)

As always, Oath Keepers stands in defense of the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. What is now being installed is not a constitutional government. It's an illegitimate regime that has unjustly taken power through massive vote fraud, to install a ChiCom puppet who will do the bidding of a mortal enemy of this nation, as well as the bidding of international elites who are in allegiance and alliance with the CCP as they pursue a common goal of destroying our Republic and enslaving the American people.

Executive Summary:

President Trump still can and should use the Insurrection Act, but it's unlikely. Regardless, patriots should:

1. Prepare for a comms down/blackout environment. Obtain CB and HAM radios, fuel, food, etc
2. Muster NOW in their county seat. Meet face to face and sort out grid down comms and who will be "Home Guard" and part of a "Family Safe" program to stay back and protect families, while also determining who can project out to protect and assist others. Do it now before comms go down.
3. Muster ASAP at state level, but NOT at state Capitol. The newly formed county units must Muster in a friendly "red" county to establish comms and leadership connections for future. Establish protocols in case of lights out/comms down.
4. Beware of false flags and traps that are now being set. Be careful who you listen to and what events you attend. Expect attempts to lure you onto enemy controlled ground where they have time to set up false flags.
5. Prepare to walk the same path as the Founding Fathers of condemnation of an illegitimate regime, nullification/mass non-compliance, defiance, mutual defense, and resistance. See Part II for more.

FOR PRESIDENT TRUMP:

President Trump, though you have waited far too long, it's still not too late to act decisively as Commander-in-Chief. Honor your oath. Have courage. Do what we recommended you do (use the Insurrection Act and conduct a mass data declassification and public data dump to expose the compromised/corrupt traitors, and bring them to justice).

See our two previous open letters to you:

<https://oathkeepers.org/2021/01/13/2020-12-open-letter-to-president-trump-you-must-use-insurrection-act-to-stop-the-steal-and-defeat-the-coup/>

<https://oathkeepers.org/2021/01/13/2020-12-open-letter-to-president-trump-part-ii-act-now-do-not-wait-for-jan-6/>

At the very least, do the mass declassification and data dump. You still have absolute authority as President and Commander-in-Chief to declassify any files held by the CIA, FBI, NSA, etc. Use trusted elite units you know are still loyal to the Constitution to get it done (to seize the servers and dump the data on 4Chan, 8Chan, etc).

President Trump, it's your duty and the only way to actually keep your family safe. It's also your only possible way that YOU can still act to save our Republic from the communists and deep state traitors. Do NOT have faith in the corrupted legal system. Even if you attempt pardons for your family or yourself, that will not save you or them. Look at what the communists did to the Romanov family of Czar Nicholas II, his wife, and his children:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Execution_of_the_Romanov_family.

Also, it's not just about you and your family. The domestic enemy wolves will be at the door of all your supporters as well. Liberty loving American constitutionalists will have no choice but to honor their oaths and defend both the Constitution and their families when the

communists and obedient Deep State minions come for them (as they are already planning on doing). A fight is coming no matter what we do, because the domestic enemies won't stop until stopped. It's infinitely better for it to come while you are Commander-in-Chief, than for it to come with Biden the Chicom puppet imposter illegitimately installed in the White House.

Embrace destiny.

As Thomas Paine said: **‘If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace.’** Amen.

Act. Now. Be the Commander in Chief we all know you can be and keep your word when you said America will never be a socialist country. If you fail to act now, you will go down in history as an American version of Neville Chamberlain (the British Prime Minister who attempted to appease Hitler) rather than as an American Churchill.

FOR PATRIOTS:

Patriots, keep your powder dry, your head on a swivel, and your gear ready to roll at moments notice.

BE PREPARED TO MOVE. TO ROLL. But, also keep your cool. It can be a tough balance, but you can do it. Get right with the Lord, get your mind right, stay cool, but be ready.

Realize that there is a swirling storm of intentional disinformation, rumor-mill crap, and cooked up false-flags running at this time. Be careful about who you trust for information, and remember, information is not the same thing as “intel.” Even if someone is sincere and trustworthy (in the sense of not intending to mislead) they can still be passing on false info.

Also be careful about just jumping in on any advertised or organised “patriot” event – be it a protest or an armed march of any kind. Expect false-flags and enemy orchestrated pied piper events and traps. Do not rush head-long into such a “Buffalo Jump” as Navy SEAL veteran Matt Bracken calls them.

See below for my recommended course of action that is intended to make you stronger and better organized right now and for the future, without falling into false-flag traps that further the enemy's goals.

PREPARE FOR COMMS DOWN/LIGHTS OUT

Within the short term, we face a very high possibility of an intentional “comms down” scenario where black hats take down/shut down all communications in the US – No cell service, no internet, no land lines. A comms blackout.

This could also include a take down of electrical power. An intentional power blackout. Worst case scenario would be an EMP strike. That is the Chicom/globalist final option to stop us. Be as prepared as you can be for it.

The purpose of such a comms down/blackout will be to minimize our ability to communicate and to pin people in their homes as the black hats and their terrorist allies conduct a “night of the long knives” decapitation strike to arrest or otherwise take out patriot leaders, potential leaders, and highly skilled personnel.

Alternatively, even if there is no overt comms-down or blackout event, there can still be simultaneous raids across the country in the middle of the night to take out leadership and hardcore patriots before they can warn each other. Expect it.

Whether a comms/power blackout happens as the result of actions taken by white hats or black hats – whether the black hats react to something President Trump or his supporters have done, or if it is done after more false flag events, to shut us down to prevent us from taking action, you need to do the following:

PERSONAL ACTIONS

1. Leadership needs to get “off the X” NOW. Do NOT be home. Be somewhere else. If you ignore this warning and stay home, at the very least, when the lights go out, get out. Be ready to leave your home on a moment's notice at the first sign of any raids.

All patriots need to have a “Plan B, Plan C, Plan D” for you and your loved ones. A place for them to go that is NOT tied directly to you and several places for you to go that are not tied to you via digital footprint or records.

Be prepared to go “comms dark” by choice. Low tech or no-tech beats high tech. Grab a couple of burner phones. But also be ready to go completely radio/phone silent.

2. Grab all the CB and HAM radios you can NOW. You can find CB radios at truck stops. FRS radios from sporting good stores or Walmart are also useful for close range (inside Neighborhood) comms. HAM radios will likely have to be ordered over the internet, so order them now!

Get a shortwave radio so you can monitor for news and info.

Even if you don't know how to run a HAM or CB radio, buy it. Someone else will know how.

Buy extras for friends, family, neighbors. You WILL need those radios to communicate when the domestic enemies shut down comms (which they will at some point). Sort out your comms now. Don't wait.

3. Get all the fuel you can – gas, diesel, NOW. Get the fuel out of the underground storage tanks and into portable containers. Get all you can. You will need it. Borrow money or charge it if you have to. You can't roll out to help save your country or even to protect your county unless you have fuel. When you think you have enough, double it. Then double it again. Do NOT presume you will be able to buy fuel during an emergency. A power blackout alone will make it hard to get the fuel out of underground storage tanks, let alone suffering a run on gas stations as everyone scrambles to get it.

4. Buy as much food as you can NOW. Double and triple whatever you have. Buy more for friends, family, neighbors. Borrow money if you have to, or charge it. Take out savings. Buy bulk non-perishables that can be cooked with just hot water (rice, beans, oatmeal. etc.), or canned goods. If you can afford it, buy freeze-dried "Mountainhouse" type camping foods (just add hot water). They can still be found in camping supply sections of big box stores. Get food, medicines, vitamins and minerals, and personal hygiene items (baby wipes, for example). Follow the Mormon advice of a three months supply of what you normally eat/use anyway, and then a year's worth of bulk long term storage foods.

PATRIOT COMMUNITY ACTIONS

1. Muster NOW in your County seat. Call together all Trump supporters, all patriots, all constitutionalists, all libertarians, etc. – all committed to liberty and limited constitutional government. Invite your constitutionalist LEOs and other current serving first responders. Call all patriots together in physical space, in a public muster. Come together and look each other in the eye and get to know each other and also begin the necessary process of vetting each other. You WILL get attempted infiltration by leftist moles, paid confidential informants, spies, etc. It's going to happen. Expect it. But you still must come together to become stronger, together, now.

You must sort out your grid-down emergency comms NOW. Sort out how you will communicate when there is no phone, no internet, no cell service. Use HAM radios, CBs, FRS, whatever you have, and whatever you can get. Again, CB radios can still be bought at truck stops. Do NOT wait till lights go out to sort out your comms. Get it done now.

At the muster, divide your man-power into two groups:

A. The Home Guard/Family Safe Unit. Those who are too old, injured, or otherwise unable to project out as first line defenders/responders. This Home Guard is CRITICAL. They will protect your homes and families, neighborhoods and towns, while the more physically capable project out. Even if you prefer to call these men militia (considering them part of the County militia), sort out how to differentiate the different purpose.

Within Oath Keepers we have a "Family Safe" program that is dedicated to watching over patriotic police, fire, EMS, and other first responder homes and families to keep them safe so the first responders can project out to do their jobs, even in the middle of an emergency. Feel free to use that term and form such a program in your neighborhood and town, with the Home Guard taking primary responsibility for your "Family Safe" program.

We have already seen Antifa and BLM targeting police and military homes, doxing them, and preparing to attack them. A Biden/Harris White House will only embolden these domestic Marxist terrorists, so expect it, and prepare to defend against them.

B. The County Militia (or call it a "County Guard" or "County Watch" or "County Defense Unit" or whatever if you are still too squeamish to call it a militia). These are the more fit and mobile who can serve as a QRF to respond to emergencies anywhere in the county. They will also be those who can project out to assist patriots in nearby counties, or at the state level. Some of them may even be willing to travel outside your state if needed. Form special expeditionary teams/units for that. Sort that out now. Perhaps you will call them "Minutemen" as the Founders called their more high-speed units).

Who will stay home and guard your homes while you roll out? Who will roll out? Decide now. Then form them into teams and units.

To be clear: EVERYONE (when home) is in the armed neighborhood watch and the armed town watch. Everyone assists with the "Family Safe" program, watching over the homes and families of local LEOs, EMS, Fire, etc. to protect them from leftist terrorists. The more fit serve as the QRF at the neighborhood and town level. They run to the sound of the guns. But when the more fit project out beyond the town, or beyond the county, the Home Guard has to take up the slack and take responsibility for the home front. Once you determine who is fit enough to project out as the county militia (or county guard, county watch, Minutemen, etc), have the men elect their officers. Yes, this can get messy, with ego clashes and cliques, but it is necessary. The men of a county elect the officers who will command that county militia. Period.

Sort out a standing order that if lights go out, or comms go down, you will respond by doing a stand-to at the neighborhood, town, and county level, with the Home Guard watching over the neighborhoods and towns while the "project out" militia or minute-men roll out, ready to go anywhere needed. If you STILL have not worked out emergency comms, one option is a default muster at the county seat if lights go out. But it's better to have emergency comms worked out so you don't have to be at a predictable known location just to link up.

2. Immediately Muster at the state level. Once you have formed your county units (or begun that process), call a muster at a central location within your state that you determine is the best place for all county militia to come to for a state muster.

No offense to currently existing militia groups, but I am talking about true COUNTY units made up of all the willing patriots in a county, who are from that county, under leadership who are also from that county, elected by the men of that county. Other existing groups? Your responsibility is to help make this happen. It's not about our groups, whether we are Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, or self-organized local or state level militia groups. It's about our communities. Form your community up and let the men elect their officers.

I recommend that this muster be near your state capitol but NOT in your state capitol. The domestic enemies of the Constitution are doing all they can to set up false flag events right now, across the nation. They WANT you to come armed to the state capitol where their paid provocateurs can rope innocent patriots into a staged false flag event. **Don't give them what they want.**

DO come together, but do it just outside the capitol in a friendly "red" county where you have a patriotic constitutional sheriff, county commissioners, county judge, etc. You know your own state. Sort out what makes sense based on your conditions, terrain, and culture.

In nearly every state, the state capitol is a "blue" zone, dominated by the left. With obvious false flag ops running right now, it's a bad idea to put yourself at the mercy of a leftist county attorney and mayor, or a hostile police chief, on ground they control in advance of your arrival, where black hats have plenty of time to set up their false flag traps. Yes, you have a right to free speech and assembly, and I myself have taken part in many armed marches and rallies by patriots in leftist dominated state capitols (we peaceably assembled, but we were also very well armed while doing so). There is a time and a place for that. But at this moment, I think it ill-advised because it's exactly what they want you to do. Take action based on what you want to accomplish, not what your enemy wants.

And remember, the goal of a state-wide muster is for all those newly formed county militia and Home Guard to come together, as units, under their own chosen leadership, so they all get to know each other, and so the leadership in particular gets to know each other, and so they can work up their methods for emergency comms and sort out what they will do in the event of a comms-down, lights out scenario. Will you have a default of coming together at a pre-designated rally point? The downside to that is obvious – you will be in a known place at a known time or window of time. But you would at least be together, which is better than being alone, isolated, and vulnerable to a raid or attack by bad guys.

Again, it is far better for you to work out legit, functional grid down comms (HAM, CB, runners, relays, scouts, etc) now so you DON'T have to muster in a predetermined, known rally point just to link up. But if you are still not squared away on comms when lights go out, you may have no choice (you can send scouts/representatives to make contact instead of sending entire units).

Regardless of where you do it, when you go to a state muster as a unified county unit, you go there with men you know (or are getting to know) under established leadership (even if new). You go as a unit, and it cuts down on the ability of provocateurs and confidential informants to infiltrate and rope you into a false flag.

Main goals of these musters are to organize for the future, to sort out comms and begin to organize at the state level for your mutual defense, mutual aid, and to prepare to defend the Constitution and our natural rights from the pending assault by enemies foreign and domestic. Get organized into units now, and get it all sorted out BEFORE the balloon goes up. And then let THEM come to you, on ground of your choosing, where you are strong and they are weak, just like the Founding Fathers did (more to come on that).

As always, we are not calling for the initiation of violence. We focus on defense of life, liberty, and property. But, we are also committed to defending each other, our neighborhoods, towns, counties, states, and our nation, and above all, defending the Constitution as we swore to do, against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and right now, that means against the communists and deep state traitors who have stolen the White House and stole a false majority in the US Senate, along with their street level terrorist allies, all of whom have already expressed their intent to trample on our rights (more to come on that in the next installment).

Now that it is regrettably becoming clear that President Trump will not be taking the decisive action we urged him to take, using the Insurrection Act and a declass/data dump, let's follow the Founders' game plan, using their strategies and methods, which focused first on declarations of illegitimacy, nullification (declaring unconstitutional acts to be null and void from inception, and refusing to obey them), unified mass non-compliance with unconstitutional and oppressive actions and then on self defense, mutual defense, and resistance when the domestic enemies of the Constitution come for us. That's how the Founders did it, and it worked. There is nothing new under the sun. Let us adapt their game plan to our current situation.

See Part II for more on that.

For the Republic,

Stewart Rhodes

Founder of Oath Keepers

👤 Posted by [edurfee](#) 🕒 [January 15, 2021](#) 📌 Posted in [Uncategorized](#)

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Subject: JOIG Daily Coordination Note - 18 JAN 2021 - (CUI)

Attachments: (U) NCR Weather CAO 20210118.pdf; (U--FOUO) IIB - Nation-State Cyber Actors Likely to Target US Administration Transition Officials 01152021.pdf; (U--FOUO) IIF - Heightened Threat Environment Surrounding Presidential Transition May Increase Potential for 01172021.pdf; (U--FOUO) DHS - Source shares TTPs to circumvent the security fencing around the Capitol OSIR-04001-0208-21.pdf; (U) Foreign Policy - Russia's Security Agencies Are Both Terrifying and Incompetent.pdf; (U) Royal United Services Institute - Underwater Drone Incidents Point to China's Expanding Intelligence Gathering.pdf; (U) New America - Whither the IRGC of the 2020s.pdf; (U) Defense World - Chinese Navy's Third Aircraft Carrier Likely to be Launched This Year.pdf; (U) CRS - The New START Treaty Central Limits and Key Provisions Update 1-14-2021.pdf; (U) JCAT Toolbox PDF.pdf; (U) 38 North - North Korea Plans to Further Develop its Nuclear Strike Capabilities Despite Economic Constraints.pdf; (U) Voice of America - China Using 'Cognitive Warfare' Against Taiwan, Observers Say.pdf; (U) 38 North - Key Results of The Eighth Party Congress in North Korea (Part 1 of 2).pdf

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Key Results of The Eighth Party Congress in North Korea (Part 1 of 2)

BY: RUEDIGER FRANK

JANUARY 15, 2021

The Eighth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP, or simply the party) was held in the DPRK from January 5 to January 12, 2021. Such events are rare occasions during which the work of the past is officially analyzed, and strategic goals are set for the immediate and mid-term future. The last such Congress occurred in 2016, after a hiatus of 36 years since the Sixth Party Congress of 1980.

The Congress highlighted the current position of North Korea's leadership on a number of key issues. The strategy for economic development is inward-oriented, the role of the state is to be strengthened, no new reforms are planned, and no major political purge took place. There were a few interesting parallels to South Korea's development strategy under Park Chung-hee. Improved relations with China since 2016 were acknowledged, while the tone on relations with the US and South Korea was far less positive. North Korea will stick to its policy of military deterrence, based on the development and further modernization of its nuclear arsenal. A trend towards burden-sharing in the operative leadership of the country could be observed, and there were some implied adjustments to the official ideology.

This first of two installments summarize several key takeaways from the Party Congress. The first half featured here are more economically oriented. Whereas the remaining set, covered in the next report, will address broader political, ideological and structural changes, as well as external relations.

1) The Congress took place at an unusual time, lasted longer and had more attendants than before.

The eight days of the Eighth Congress are a substantial extension compared to the five days of the Seventh Party Congress of 2016. Back then, there were 3,467 delegates and 1,545 observers.^[1] This time, 5,000 delegates and 2,000 observers participated.^[2]

The timing of the event was somewhat unusual. For logistical reasons, it is easier to conduct such huge events during spring or autumn, when transportation and heating are less of an issue. Furthermore, since no vaccine is so far available in North Korea, the risk of a mass infection with the coronavirus has been high.

There has been speculation that a sense of urgency, due to negative economic developments in 2020, prompted the decision to hold the Congress in January. This seems unlikely, however, since the Congress had been announced in August 2020, only six months into the COVID crisis. Another possible explanation was the need to adjust the country's strategy due to the outcome of the US presidential elections, but the timing of the announcement does not support that hypothesis either, and the published records of the Congress do not point at the US as a major topic. In any case, holding the Eighth Party Congress in 2021 roughly corresponds with the announcement back in 2016 that the next Congress would be held in five years.

It seems that Kim Jong Un's remarks this time were far more extensive than in 2016. Then, his report in Korean was published in full, totaling about 60,000 words; this time, only a summary was published, amounting to 25,000 words. The full text [reportedly](#)



📷 Kim Jong Un at the closing of the 8th Party Congress. (Source: KCNA)

(<https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610261416-871234007/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-style-socialist-construction-to-fresh-victory-on-report-made-by-supreme-leader-kim-jong-un-at-eighth-congress-of-wpk/?t=1610746090535>) took him nine hours to read.^[3] (Even the Stakhanovite “work hard campaign” that preceded the Eighth Party Congress lasted 10 days longer than the 70-day campaign leading up to the Seventh Party Congress.)

2) Self-critical remarks were scaled back.

While the Seventh Party Congress in 2016 was touted as a “congress of victors,” Kim Jong Un characterized the Eighth Party Congress as a Congress of “work, of struggle, and advancement” (일하는 대회, 투쟁하는 대회, 전진하는 대회). In his opening speech, the leader admitted that the five-year economic development plan had “fallen short in almost every category” and bitter lessons“ were learned. But compared to previous public statements, including some of his new year addresses and his report at the Seventh Party Congress, the tone was relatively mild, and the critical and self-critical remarks were not as extensive.

The dominant narrative was more like “true, we made a few mistakes, but the main problems were external and we are on the way to a solution.” In Kim’s [own words \(https://twitter.com/GTDRP/status/1347935387969327107\)](https://twitter.com/GTDRP/status/1347935387969327107),

The Party turned the enemy’s fierce sanctions into a golden opportunity to increase self-reliance and internal power...Although the strategic goals in the field of economic construction were not reached, a valuable foundation for sustainable economic development on its own was laid.

3) State over market, politics over economy: no signs of economic reform.

According to Kim Jong Un, “the most brilliant achievement achieved in the last five years...is the extraordinarily expanded and strengthened political and ideological power” of the country (정치사상적힘). While the North Korean leader identified economic development as “the most important task,” in his concluding speech, he explicitly called upon the party to approach economic management from a strictly political perspective and not only focus on economic aspects. This signals a strategic decision and the dominance of ideology and politics over the economy. North Korea finds itself in a difficult economic situation, but there are no indications that pragmatism and market-oriented reform have been chosen as solutions.

Central guidance by the Cabinet and the State Planning Commission was emphasized several times. The Cabinet was called the “country’s economic headquarters” (나라의 경제사령부), and the “Cabinet responsibility system” (내각책임제) for the economy and the “centrality of the Cabinet” (내각중심제) were stressed. Such an emphasis by North Korean leaders on the economic technocrats in the Cabinet is typically seen by analysts as a sign of a pragmatic economic policy.

However, considering the remarks cited above, it seems that the North Korean leader currently sees the Cabinet and economic policies merely as tools of state-led development. Kim Jong Un explicitly highlighted self-reliance (자력갱생) and self-sufficiency (자급자족) as “still” being (여전히) the key pillars of the new five-year plan. Self-reliance in particular is supposed to become “nationwide” (국가적), “planned” (계획적) and “scientific” (과학적).

When talking about the “improvement of socialist economic management” (사회주의 경제관리개선), Kim Jong Un defined the North Korean economy as “independent, planned, and people-oriented” (자립경제이고 계획경제이며 인민을 위하여 복무하는 경제), which again is not a sign of market orientation. Terms like “the state’s unified guidance” (국가의 통일적지도) further underscore a focus on centralized and state management of the economy, rather than a policy that allows for decentralization and market forces to play a bigger role. Market indicators like prices, etc., are to be used to that effect.

Very notable in this context of “state versus market” is Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on commercial service (상업봉사활동전반) and the need to preserve the “socialist service culture” (사회주의봉사문화) and “restore the state’s leadership and control” (국가의 주도적역할, 조절통제력을 회복) in this sector. The wording is much more dramatic and urgent in the Korean version compared to the official English translation. Kim calls this an “important task that must be resolved by all means” (반드시 해결하여야 할 중요한 과제).

What might at first glance seem to be a minor issue could have major implications for the overall direction of economic policy. If we understand Kim Jong Un correctly in his intention to reduce the influence of private and semi-private economic activities, and reintroduce the dominance of the state in the economy, then it indeed makes sense to focus on one area that has witnessed the most dynamic development of marketization and emergence of private businesses in North Korea in the past two decades.

Hundreds of restaurants and small shops, transportation businesses and other services have emerged in North Korea. They are officially operated by state entities, but, de facto, these are privately owned businesses. Eventually, the owners who turned into “masters of money” (돈주) accumulated enough capital to expand their businesses and to increase concentration levels of their market shares, thus gaining

substantial economic power that could be transformed into political influence. This not only refers to corruption but also becoming major employers and important payers of taxes and quasi-taxes.

These businesses are not yet “too big to fail,” as it has often been said about South Korean business conglomerates (*chaebol*), but the emergence of North Korean *chaebol* is only a matter of time. In fact, it has already begun with such big state-owned players as the airline Air Koryo expanding into the taxi, beverages and fuel-supply businesses. Now it seems that Kim Jong Un is trying to rein in this dangerous trend by encouraging the state to reassert control over the services and commerce sectors.

It remains to be seen how this will be implemented in practice, and what the response of the affected business owners will be. In 2009, a currency reform aimed at expropriating the newly emerged entrepreneurial class failed and was silently rolled back, presenting officials like Pak Nam Gi as scapegoats who were misled by hostile outside forces.

4) The focus is internal. Trade and tourism play only a minor role.

No external visitors were present at this Congress. Before the collapse of the socialist system in the late 1980s, it was customary to invite representatives of friendly communist parties. This was not done in 2016 when relations with China were at a low point. Foreign journalists were admitted into the country, although they could not enter the Congress venue. This time, neither official guests nor journalists were admitted.

North Korea is facing a number of challenges due to tightened sanctions since 2016 and the pandemic of 2020. Kim Jong Un has decided to search for solutions domestically. He emphasized slogans like “Our style of Socialism,” “People-Centeredness,” and “Our Country First-ism” in his opening speech, and in his closing speech a week later, he even suggested changing the motto of the Eighth Party Congress to reflect the three key slogans “The people are God” (이민위천), Single-Hearted Unity (일심단결), and “Self-Reliance” (자력갱생).[4]

Considering the key role of foreign trade in all standard models of economic development, and the prevalent role played by foreign trade in the success stories of Japan, South Korea and China, it is worth paying particular attention to what the North

Korean leader has to say on that subject. However, Kim Jong Un's report included very little on it. The main strategy for the upcoming five-year plan seems to be "domestic production of inputs" (원자재의 국산화)—in other words, import substitution.

Tourism is to be promoted with two objectives in mind: First, to "make our people enjoy a more civilized life" (우리 인민들이 보다 문명한 생활을 누리게 하고), which could either mean the development of domestic tourism or the generation of revenue for local hospitality industries through foreign visitors; and second, to "spread the changing image of our country to the world" (나날이 변모되는 우리 국가의 모습을 세상에 널리 떨치기). In other words, for propaganda purposes.

The Mt. Kumgang resort in the southeast is mentioned specifically, which is somewhat delicate as it was developed two decades ago with the help of South Korea's Hyundai Asan but has been more or less dormant since the killing of a South Korean tourist in 2008. After a visit by Kim Jong Un and, more recently, his report at the Party Congress, it seems North Korea indeed intends to rebuild these tourism facilities—but for whom? This will raise questions in South Korea about the possibility of continued cooperation, and the ownership of South Korean assets.

5) Metal and chemical industries identified as the key elements of economic development: a North Korean version of Park Chung-hee's Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive?

No further details, such as production targets, were provided. However, as a strategy, the focus on metal and chemical industries are both reminders of classical socialist approaches of giving preference to the "commanding heights" of the economy, and of South Korea's Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive in the 1970s.

Under the current situation of economic isolation, import substitution in this field does have its merits, as the products of these industries are key inputs for many other sectors, including military production. North Korea is in the fortunate position of having most mineral resources needed for operating its own metal and chemical industries. Plans to substitute crude oil, which is so far unavailable in North Korea, with alternative inputs like coal have been promoted for many years in official publications.

However, such industries require major investments of capital and technology, and they need export markets to operate profitably. It remains to be seen how North Korea can pursue such a policy under the current conditions of isolation.

6) Agriculture: renewed emphasis on state distribution?

For agriculture, Kim Jong Un stressed that state procurement levels must reach the 2019 level within the next two to three years. This can be interpreted both as a call to increase grain production, but also as a desire to reduce the share of grain traded freely on the market, and return to the dominance of state distribution through a rationing system or through state-subsidized shops.

7) Afforestation got an extraordinarily high level of attention.

It is noteworthy that among the few specific points of self-criticism, “deviations in afforestation” were mentioned. Furthermore, perhaps because Kim’s report was only published as a summary, very few detailed numbers were announced. It is thus particularly conspicuous that among them, we find that “about 1 million hectares of land” were reforested. It should also be noted that forestry was mentioned before agriculture in Kim Jong Un’s report, indicating a relatively higher priority.

8) Cement production is at lower levels than in 1970.

Construction seems to enjoy particular attention, too. Among the few details provided, Kim mentioned 50,000 new flats to be constructed in Pyongyang and 25,000 new houses in the Komdok mining area (which is also the location of an infamous labor camp).

In this context, Kim announced the target of producing eight million tons of cement during the next five-year plan. To put this in perspective, the average annual target of 1.6 million tons is merely 40 percent of the officially produced 4 million tons of cement 50 years ago in 1970, as reported by the East German (GDR) Embassy in Pyongyang back then.

This can be interpreted in two ways: Either North Korea significantly overstated its cement production in the past and is now providing more honest figures, or this part of the economy has far from recovered from the massive hits it has taken since the 1990s.

9) Focus on rural areas and the local level: a North Korean version of the New Village Movement?

Economic and social development often do not happen evenly in a country. Again, parallels to South Korean development come to mind, especially an initiative in the early 1970s under the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, called the “New Village Movement” (새마을 운동). It aimed at reducing the gap between the quality of life in urban and rural areas by such measures as improving infrastructure like roads and bridges, replacing thatched roofs with more durable materials, and promoting health care, education and culture. Specific economic policy measures in this regard included the supply of cement to localities, which in the South Korean context of the 1970s was also a Keynesian measure to boost domestic demand for the newly emerging cement industry.

Against this background, it is striking how many parallels with the “New Village Movement” we find in Kim Jong Un’s remarks at the Eighth Party Congress, including his promise to provide 10,000 tons of cement to every local city and county annually. Kim announced the development of “advanced regions with their own characteristics” (자기 고유의 특색을 가진 발전된 지역), and called upon cities and counties to establish development strategies for local economies (지방경제) based on their specific conditions (특성) and the available resources (원료와 자재).

Local authorities of party and government are encouraged to become “powerful drivers of their own region’s development (자기 지역의 발전을 이끌어나가는 강력한 견인기가 되고). In a more programmatic sense, Kim demanded to “eliminate the differences between workers and farmers, industry and agriculture, and urban and rural areas” (로동계급과 농민간의 차이, 공업과 농업간의 차이, 도시와 농촌간의 차이를 없애다), and to “turn farmers into members of the working class” (농업근로자들을... 로동계급화하기).

The latter is not only the reflection of the well-known difficulties of applying Marxist-Leninist ideology and a working-class centered theory to the realities of rural production; it also parallels South Korea’s New Village Movement of the early 1970s, which also aimed at breaking down established and hierarchical social structures. Scholars of economic development like Clarence Ayres identified “ceremonialism” as one major obstacle to growth.

10) Development of mobile communications, cable broadcasting and commercial service.

Among the specifically mentioned economic development projects is Kim Jong Un's demand to introduce "next-generation mobile communications" (다음세대통신). Cable broadcasting (유선방송) is promoted as a way to supply better entertainment to the people, but it is also a convenient way for the state to control the media consumption of its citizens. In this context, it should be noted that Kim repeated his earlier calls for the eradication of non-socialist and anti-socialist practices (비사회주의, 반사회주의적 현상).

11) Plans to create a nuclear power industry.

This is a relatively logical step, considering that North Korea has chronic problems with the production of energy, is cut off from external supplies of key fossil fuels by sanctions, has its own domestic uranium reserves, and has made substantial progress in nuclear technology over the past few decades. Plans to provide nuclear power have existed at least since the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Kim Jong Un's remarks on a "nuclear power industry" (핵동력공업) will nevertheless raise eyebrows in the West due to its potential for enhancing the country's nuclear weapons program.

His call to "create" (창설) such an industry is also noteworthy, as it implies that the currently existing facilities at Yongbyon are not considered to be substantial enough to count as an existing industry that only needs to be upgraded.

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- [1] "Kim Jong Un Makes Opening Address at Seventh Congress of WPK," *KCNA*, May 6, 2016.
 - [2] "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Opening Speech at 8th WPK Congress," *KCNA*, January 1, 2021.
 - [3] "Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK," *Rodong Sinmun*, January 10, 2021.
 - [4] "Chairman Kim Jong Un delivers opening speech at Eighth WPK Congress," *Pyongyang Times*, January 6, 2021; and "WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un Makes Concluding Speech at Eighth Congress of WPK," *KCNA*, January 13, 2021.



North Korea Plans to Further Develop its Nuclear Strike Capabilities Despite Economic Constraints

BY: OLLI HEINONEN

JANUARY 15, 2021

At the recent Eighth Party Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), North Korean leadership announced plans and programs to expand its nuclear deterrent—specifically, the development of miniaturized nuclear warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), solid-fuel ballistic missiles of varying ranges, nuclear propulsion systems for submarines, and hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. There are already indications at Yongbyon and defense-related institutes that activity in support of these plans is underway.

This is an ambitious program for a small country, which is suffering from economic mismanagement, severe United Nations (UN) sanctions, and the effects of the pandemic and natural disasters. Some of these projects have been under development in recent years, but it will take more than a decade to field advanced systems such as MIRVs fitted with nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines with missiles and hypersonic glide weapons.^[1] Furthermore, all this will require boosting production of fissile material—plutonium and enriched uranium—and testing of nuclear warheads, which would violate the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions.

To meet the near-term requirements for the production of plutonium and uranium, North Korea would need to construct an additional nuclear reactor to produce plutonium; expand its current spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment capabilities; increase uranium mining, milling, conversion, and nuclear fuel fabrication both for the 5 MWe reactor and the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) at Yongbyon; and possibly establish another nuclear test site to conduct higher-yield nuclear weapon tests.^[2] Ideally, new infrastructure would need to be built to

implement the North's stated nuclear plans. However, given its economic constraints, the North will instead likely take as much advantage as possible of the existing nuclear infrastructure in Yongbyon—activities which would be visible in satellite imagery.

In his closing speech, Kim Jong Un also indicated that the North may have failed in munition production. Public reports of the Party Congress did not provide details on these failures, but it may suggest that North Korea did not achieve all its targets in developing the nuclear deterrent. One indication of this is the slow commissioning of the ELWR in Yongbyon, which is well behind the target operating dates disclosed in 2010. Whether these delays relate to the design and construction of the reactor, fuel fabrication, or requirements for uranium enrichment remains unknown. It could also be the case that the enriched uranium needs of the nuclear weapons program were given a higher priority than those of the ELWR.

Kim also emphasized in his speeches further building the national defense capacity in quality and quantity, which includes strengthening “[the nuclear war deterrent \(https://www.38northref.org/wpk-general-secretary-kim-jong-un-makes-concluding-speech-at-eighth-congress-of-wpk/\)](https://www.38northref.org/wpk-general-secretary-kim-jong-un-makes-concluding-speech-at-eighth-congress-of-wpk/).” An important part of these efforts is defense-related research and development programs highlighted in the reports of the Congress.

Kim's statements will certainly raise concerns, particularly in the US, China, South Korea and Japan. Miniaturization of nuclear warheads is essential in building tactical nuclear warheads for shorter-range missiles threatening the ROK, Japan and US forces based in the area.

Over the longer-term, the strengthening of the North's nuclear deterrent will also boost South Korea's aspirations to acquire submarines with nuclear propulsion in response to North Korean threats and Japanese ambitions to go ahead with its plans to develop, *inter alia*, hypersonic glide missiles with conventional warheads to counter current and future North Korean (and Chinese) missile capabilities.

North Korea's nuclear plans, while they may be constrained by limited resources, are likely aimed at establishing a *fait accompli* in advance of possible denuclearization talks with the Biden administration and increasing the North's leverage in these negotiations. The debate in Pyongyang over its nuclear program will continue on Sunday, January 19, with the meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly, which traditionally blesses the decisions of the WPK Congress.

The new DPRK five-year economic plan should help to inform the new Biden administration's review of North Korea policy. Although the continued growth of the North's nuclear capabilities is a major concern, the slower-than-anticipated progress of their nuclear programs suggests there may be time to conduct a comprehensive review and to engage with regional parties on developing a common approach to the North Korean nuclear problem.

Figure 1. A new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Pukguksong-5, which is under development and yet to be tested, was presented on January 14 in a military parade.



(https://www.38north.org/2021-0115-rodong-sinmun-parade-24668_pukguksong-5/)

📷 (Source: Rodong Sinmun)

- [1] Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are delivered atop of a medium- or long-range missile. They do not follow a ballistic missile trajectory, but their ability to maneuver after they have been released from their rocket boosters makes it difficult to detect, trace and shoot them

down. Russia and China have developed and deployed such weapons. The US hypersonic glide vehicle is in development. Brazil, India and Japan are known to develop such missiles. Read more in: Kelly M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf, *Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons*, CRS IF11459 (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2020), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11459.pdf> (<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF11459.pdf>).

- [2] There are concerns that the Punggye-ri site in particular has deteriorated as a result of the high-yield test in September 2017.

The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions

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Summary

The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament—the Duma and Federation Council—approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty’s requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years.

New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber.

New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.

The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side’s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.

New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads.

The Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty would serve U.S. national security interests because, they argued in 2010, Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021. The Trump Administration raised questions about the value of the treaty and suggested that the United States might allow it to lapse while negotiating a new treaty that would include Russia and China, and capture all types of Russian nuclear weapons. It eventually sought, but failed, to negotiate a short-term extension in the latter half of 2020. The incoming Biden Administration has indicated it would seek an extension, but has not specified whether this would be for the full five years or a shorter period of time.

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Introduction

The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty—known as New START—on April 8, 2010.¹ This treaty replaced the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009.² The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of New START on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. The Russian parliament, with both the Duma and Federation Council voting, did so on January 25 and January 26, 2011. The treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. New START superseded the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty), which then lapsed in 2012.³ New START provided the parties with seven years to reduce their forces. Both parties completed their required reductions by February 5, 2018.⁴

New START will expire on February 5, 2021, 10 years after it entered into force, unless the United States and Russia agree to extend it for no more than 5 years. This extension is included in Article XIV, paragraph 2 of the treaty, which states

If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

Because this provision is included in the text of the treaty, the President could extend New START without asking the Senate for its approval. Some Russian experts have asserted that the Russian parliament would have to approve legislation before President Putin could extend the treaty, but most believe Putin could win this approval with little delay or difficulty.

Prospects for Extension

The Obama Administration briefly considered pursuing an extension before it left office in 2016, but did not raise the issue with Russia. Press reports indicate that the President Trump rejected a proposal from Russian President Putin to extend the treaty during their first phone call in February 2017.⁵ Presidents Putin and Trump reportedly discussed the treaty during their summit in Helsinki in July 2018, with President Putin presenting President Trump with a document suggesting that they extend the treaty after resolving “existing problems related to the Treaty implementation,” but the two reportedly did not reach an agreement on the issue.⁶ The Trump

¹ The treaty is officially titled the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The text of the Treaty, its Protocol, annexes, and article-by-article analysis can be found at <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm>.

² For a brief summary of the original START Treaty, as well as a review of the U.S.-Russian negotiations on the new START Treaty see CRS Report R40084, *Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options*, by Amy F. Woolf.

³ The Moscow Treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 2012, unless replaced by a subsequent treaty. For details on this agreement see CRS Report RL31448, *Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty*, by Amy F. Woolf.

⁴ Heather Nauert, *New START Treaty Central Limits Take Effect*, U.S. Department of State, press statement, Washington, DC, February 5, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277888.htm>. See also “Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry,” *TASS Russian News Agency*, February 5, 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/988458>.

⁵ Jonathan Landay and David Rohde, “Exclusive: In Call with Putin, Trump Denounced Obama-Era Nuclear Arms Treaty—Sources,” *Reuters*, February 9, 2017.

⁶ Bryan Bender, “Leaked Document: Putin Lobbied Trump on Arms Control,” *Politico*, August 7, 2018.

Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), completed in February 2018, confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021, but was silent on the prospects for extension through 2026.

In 2018 and 2019, Trump Administration officials indicated that they were reviewing the treaty and assessing whether it continued to serve U.S. national security interests before deciding whether the United States would propose or accept a five-year extension.⁷ In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2019, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg noted that an interagency review was continuing, but they refused to elaborate on the substance of that review or speculate on the implications of a decision to allow New START to lapse in 2021.⁸ They also noted that Russia was developing new kinds of strategic offensive arms that would not count under the treaty and that it is modernizing and expanding its stockpile of shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are also outside the scope of the treaty. They also noted that China was modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal, although it remained much smaller than the U.S. and Soviet arsenals; China is not a party to the treaty.⁹

Trump Administration concerns about Russian and Chinese nuclear forces outside the New START limits came to dominate discussions about the future of New START. In February 2019, General John Hyten, then the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), testified that New START continued to serve U.S. national security interests because its monitoring regime provided transparency and visibility into Russian nuclear forces and because its limits provide predictability about the future size and structure of those forces. But he argued that new kinds of Russian nuclear forces could eventually pose a threat to the United States. He indicated that the United States and Russia might expand New START so that these weapons could be brought under the treaty limits.¹⁰ In addition, in April 2019, President Trump directed his staff to develop proposals for expanded arms control efforts that would include China as a party, noting that the United States should "persuade China to join an arms-control pact limiting or verifying its capabilities for the first time."¹¹

The public debate about the possible extension of New START has incorporated views about how to address these concerns. For example, some experts believe the United States and Russia should extend the treaty then use the time during the extension to discuss how to include Russia's new types of systems within the treaty limits. They note most of the systems will not enter the Russian force until late in the 2020s, so see no need to condition extension now on their eventual inclusion. They also note that this approach would allow the United States to retain the benefits of

⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts*, Hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018. See the prepared statement of Honorable David Trachtenberg, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091818_Trachtenberg_Testimony.pdf.

⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Future of Nuclear Arms Control*, Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019.

⁹ See, for example, the testimony of Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Future of Nuclear Arms Control*, Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019.

¹⁰ Joe Gould, "US nuclear general worries over Russia's weapons outside New START," *Defense News*, February 26, 2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/02/26/us-nuclear-general-worries-over-russias-weapons-outside-new-start/>.

¹¹ Paul Sonne and John Hudson, "Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China," *Washington Post*, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?utm_term=.3e294ce0a8e9.

New START while seeking to negotiate a trilateral treaty with Russia and China.¹² Some have also suggested that the United States and Russia extend the treaty for shorter than the full five years, to retain the limits and transparency in the treaty, while pressing Russia, and possibly China, to negotiate a follow-on agreement that would address U.S. concerns.¹³

Other analysts, however, suggested the opposite, arguing that the United States should *not* agree to extend New START unless Russia agreed to count its new systems under the treaty limits. Some also argued that the United States and Russia should allow New START to lapse, both to relieve the United States of its obligations and because they believed that Russia's interest in retaining limits on U.S. forces would provide the United States with leverage when negotiating a treaty to replace New START.¹⁴ Some also argue that the treaty better serves Russian than U.S. interests because, as was noted above, Russia is pursuing the development of weapons that may not count under the treaty limits.¹⁵ President Trump and others in his Administration suggested that the United States replace New START with a trilateral "next generation" arms control agreement that would capture all U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear weapons.¹⁶

Russian officials have also questioned whether they should extend New START. At a conference in Washington, DC, in March 2019, Anatoly Antonov, Russia's ambassador to the United States, noted that Russia was not interested in expanding New START to include Russia's new kinds of strategic systems. He also said that Russia would be unwilling to discuss an extension until the United States addressed Russia's concerns with U.S. implementation of the treaty's conversion and elimination procedures.¹⁷

Russian officials, however, altered their position in 2020. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov have both noted that Russia believes the treaty's extension would serve U.S. and Russian national security interests. They asserted that most of Russia's new types of weapons systems should not count under New START limits, but have stated that Russia would participate in strategic stability talks to address these weapons after the parties extend New START.¹⁸ Moreover, Russia set aside its insistence that the parties resolve its

¹² Stephen Pifer, *Want to Improve Relations with Russia? Here's a START*, Brookings, Washington, DC, September 6, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/06/want-to-improve-relations-with-russia-heres-a-start/>. See also Thomas M. Countryman, *Can Trump and Putin Head Off a New Nuclear Arms Race?* Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, August 8, 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2018-08/trump-putin-head-new-nuclear-arms-race>.

¹³ Franklin C. Miller and Eric Edelman, "Russia Is Beefing Up Its Nuclear Arsenal. Here's What the U.S. Needs to Do.," *Politico*, December 30, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/31/russia-nuclear-arsenal-new-start-091487>.

¹⁴ Michaela Dodge, *A Nuclear Guide to the Helsinki Summit*, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, July 18, 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/nuclear-guide-the-helsinki-summit>.

¹⁵ Matthew Costlow, "Don't Give Russia the Gift of Extending New START," *Defense One*, July 10, 2018, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/dont-give-russia-gift-extending-new-start/149605/>.

¹⁶ See, for example, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, on the Future of Nuclear Arms Control. Transcript, Hudson Institute, May 21, 2020, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Transcript_Marshall%20Billingslea%20on%20the%20Future%20of%20Nuclear%20Arms%20Control.pdf.

¹⁷ Russia has objected to the U.S. procedures that remove submarine launch tubes and heavy bombers from the treaty limits because they are not irreversible.

¹⁸ See, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's interview with Interfax news agency, December 26, 2019, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3983633, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to questions during Government Hour at the Federation Council, Moscow, December 23, 2019 https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3977671.

concerns with U.S. conversion and elimination procedures. In December 2019, President Putin stated that “Russia is ready to extend the New START treaty immediately, before the year’s end and without any preconditions.”¹⁹

Recent Developments

Officials from the United States and Russia met in Vienna on June 22, 2020, for discussions on arms control. Marshall Billingslea, who served as the Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, noted, in a press conference after the talks, that the two sides had agreed to establish a number of working groups on strategic stability issues. One such group, according to U.S. sources, would discuss “nuclear warheads and doctrine,” while the Russian readout indicated the working group would just discuss doctrine.²⁰ The two sides, however, did not reach an agreement on whether to extend New START. At the time, Billingslea stated the United States would only “contemplate an extension of that agreement but only under select circumstances” that included Russia’s willingness to include its nonstrategic nuclear weapons and new types of strategic nuclear weapons in an agreement and China’s willingness to participate in the talks.²¹ Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, noted that Russia was ready to extend the treaty, but would not do so “at all costs, especially at the price they want from us.”²²

Before the June talks began, Billingslea noted that the United States invited China to the meeting; China did not accept that invitation. He also noted that the United States would seek to convince Russia to pressure China to join the talks.²³ Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov rejected this approach, noting that “it is a sovereign right of any nation to join any talks.”²⁴ He indicated that he believes the June talks in Vienna should remain bilateral, and that they should focus on an extension of New START.²⁵

U.S. and Russian teams met in Vienna on August 17-18, 2020, where they again discussed the possible extension of New START. According to Marshall Billingslea, who led the U.S. delegation, the Trump Administration believed the New START Treaty was “deeply flawed and that it is not particularly in the U.S. interest to simply extend that treaty.” But he noted that the United States might be willing to extend the treaty for a period of time if Russia agreed to sign “a

¹⁹ Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin offers US to extend key nuclear pact right now,” *Associated Press*, December 5, 2019, <https://apnews.com/7b031de50f534ba181446080117f728f>.

²⁰ Michael R. Gordon, “Trump Administration Weighs Extending New START Nuclear Treaty,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 23, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-weighs-extending-new-start-nuclear-treaty-11592952274>.

²¹ Online Press Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, And Lieutenant General Thomas A. Bussiere, Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command, June 24, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/online+press+briefing+with+ambassador-marshall-billingslea-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lieutenant-general-thomas-a-bussiere-deputy-commander-united-states-strategic-command/>.

²² Maxim Blinov, “Moscow is ready for non-renewal of the START, Ryabkov said,” *Ria Novosti*, June 25, 2020, <https://ria.ru/20200625/1573461669.html>.

²³ Nick Wadhams, “U.S. and Russia to Meet June 22 on Curbing Nuclear Stockpiles,” *Bloomberg News*, June 8, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-08/u-s-and-russia-to-meet-in-vienna-june-22-for-nuclear-arms-talks?sref=IGIy6Jfd>

²⁴ Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. Comments. The Gorchakov Fund. Moscow, May 22, 2020, <https://gorchakovfund.ru/en/news/view/deputy-foreign-minister-of-russian-sergey-ryabkov-took-part-in-the-online-discussion-about-russia-u-/>.

²⁵ Michael R. Gordon, “Russian Negotiator Doubts China Will Join 3-Way Arms Accord Sought by Trump,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 9, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-negotiator-doubts-china-will-join-3-way-arms-accord-sought-by-trump-11591735208>.

politically binding agreement” that provided a framework for a new treaty. According to Billingslea, the United States presented Russia with “a very detailed set of proposals relating to our steadfast view that the next agreement must cover all warheads, all nuclear warheads,” and that it would “need to have a better set of verification and transparency measures.”²⁶ In subsequent interviews, he indicated that the parties might verify limits on nuclear warheads by installing perimeter monitoring systems outside warhead production facilities to count warheads as they entered and left the force. This type of system was used outside under the INF and original START treaties to monitor the production of rocket motors for missiles, items that are much larger and more obvious than the warheads that would be counted in this new concept.

Billingslea did not offer any insights into whether, or how, the framework proposed by the United States would accommodate Russia’s concerns about U.S. weapons programs, instead, he indicated that the United States would only agree to extend New START if Russia agreed to the U.S. proposals for the new framework. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov noted that Russia had taken “American ideas into consideration,” and he stated that “Russia stands for an extension of the START Treaty, but is not ready to pay any price for that.”²⁷

In his statement following the August meeting, Billingslea reiterated the U.S. goal of including China in the arms control negotiations, but indicated that the United States was “not suggesting ... that we would amend the New START Treaty to include China.” He did, however, indicate that the new U.S.-Russian framework would have to include a path for China to join because “the next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include China.”²⁸

In mid-September 2020, Billingslea sought to increase the pressure on Russia to accept the U.S. proposals. In an interview with CNN, he indicated that the “cost” of extending New START could increase if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals from the August meeting. Specifically, he said that the United States could include “a lot of the other bad behavior that the Russians are engaged in around the world” in the nuclear negotiations.²⁹ In addition, in an interview with the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* in mid-September, he mentioned that if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals, the United States would not only allow New START to lapse but would also promptly increase the numbers of warheads on its strategic forces by restoring warheads and missiles that had been removed under New START.³⁰

Press reports indicated that the United States believed Russia would accept the U.S. proposals for a new agreement in exchange for New START extension because it believed that Russia was “desperate” to extend New START.³¹ But Russian officials disputed this conclusion. Russia’s

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control and Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/>.

²⁷ Michael R. Gordon, “Trump Administration Shifts Course on Russian Arms Talks, Easing Insistence China Join Now,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 18, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-shifts-course-on-russian-arms-control-talks-easing-insistence-china-join-11597781025?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1>.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control and Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/>.

²⁹ Kylie Atwood, “US seeks to pressure Russia into nuclear weapons treaty concessions before election,” *CNN*, September 18, 2020, <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/us-russia-nuclear-treaty/index.html>.

³⁰ Elena Chernenko, “If Russia does not accept our offer before the elections, the entry price will go up,” *Kommersant*, September 21, 2020, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4499882>.

³¹ Kylie Atwood, “US seeks to pressure Russia into nuclear weapons treaty concessions before election,” *CNN*,

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov responded to Billingslea's interview in *Kommersant* by noting that "there are no grounds for any kind of deal, in the form proposed by our colleagues in Washington." He stated that Russia preferred a full five-year extension of New START but would be willing to extend the treaty for a shorter period. He concluded that "we will not pay the American asking price for an extension even for five years, let alone for a shorter period."³² Ryabkov again disputed the U.S. view of Russia's interest in New START when he stressed that "the extension of the START Treaty in itself is not critical, from our point of view."³³

Billingslea and Ryabkov met again, in Helsinki, on October 5, 2020. This meeting occurred on short notice, reportedly after phone calls between President Trump and President Putin and a meeting between the U.S. national security adviser, Robert O'Brien and a key Russian national security advisor, Nikolai Patrushev, brought the two sides closer to an agreement.³⁴ Billingslea told the press that the talks had "yielded important progress" in developing a framework for a politically binding agreement that would both impose a freeze on each side's nuclear arsenal and outline the parameters for a future treaty.³⁵ The parties did not agree on the precise definitions needed to implement the warhead freeze or the necessary verification procedures needed to monitor it.³⁶ U.S. officials also acknowledged that, while they had reached agreement on the broad principles of a future treaty, they had deferred some of the more complicated issues to future discussions. According to U.S. officials, the parties agreed that they would pair the warhead freeze with an extension of New START, with both lasting the same amount of time. The parties had not agreed on the precise length of time for this extension, although reports indicated it would likely be in the range of one to two years.³⁷

The Trump Administration reportedly pressed Russia to conclude this agreement quickly so that the Presidents could meet to sign it before the U.S. election in November.³⁸ A U.S. official indicated that he believed President Putin supported the deal and that the two sides could complete it in a week or two, particularly if Putin's support "percolates down through their system so that my counterpart hopefully will be authorized to negotiate."³⁹ Russian officials,

September 18, 2020, <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/us-russia-nuclear-treaty/index.html>.

³² Elena Chernenko, "There is no good deal in sight on the basis the Americans are proposing," *Kommersant*, September 22, 2020, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4501227>.

³³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's interview with the *Kommersant* newspaper, October 22, 2020. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4402033.

³⁴ Vivian Salama and Mary Ilyushina, "Trump administration renews push for nuclear arms agreement with Russia before election," *CNN*, October 12, 2020. <https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/politics/us-russia-nuclear-agreement-push/index.html>.

³⁵ Michael R. Gordon, "U.S., Russia Move Toward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says," *Wall Street Journal*, October 5, 2020. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-russia-move-toward-outline-of-nuclear-deal-administration-official-says-11601933654>.

³⁶ David Lawler, "Trump aiming for nuclear arms deal with Russia before Election Day," *Axios*, October 9, 2020. <https://www.axios.com/trump-russia-nuclear-arms-agreement-new-start-4fe42c37-83e0-4088-aa26-b37f8a07bf7f.html>.

³⁷ Paul Sonne, "Threat from nuclear weapons and missiles has grown since Trump entered office," *Washington Post*, October 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/nuclear-weapons-trump-arms-race/2020/10/12/1f32e026-041b-11eb-8879-7663b816bfa5_story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2010.13.20.

³⁸ Michael R. Gordon, "Trump Administration Pushes Russia for Arms Control Deal by Election," *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 2020. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-pushes-russia-for-arms-control-deal-by-election-11602275351?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2>.

³⁹ David Lawler, "Trump aiming for nuclear arms deal with Russia before Election Day," *Axios*, October 9, 2020. <https://www.axios.com/trump-russia-nuclear-arms-agreement-new-start-4fe42c37-83e0-4088-aa26-b37f8a07bf7f.html>.

however, disputed this assessment. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the U.S. conditions for the treaty's extension are "absolutely unilateral and don't take into account our interests, or the experience of many decades when arms control has existed to mutual satisfaction."⁴⁰ Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov called the U.S. reports of a quick agreement "an illusion," and noted that significant differences remained between the U.S. and Russian positions. Responding to comments made by Billingslea in mid-October, Ryabkov stated that the US proposal for a freeze on nuclear arsenals "is unacceptable" because it does not address Russian concerns about other issues affecting strategic stability. He noted that these include weapons in space, U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and new U.S. long-range conventional weapons.⁴¹ He also noted that Russia was unwilling to sign a formal agreement limiting shorter-range nuclear weapons until the United States took steps to remove its nuclear weapons and their infrastructure from Europe. Ryabkov also critiqued the U.S. insistence that the freeze include a monitoring regime that relied on perimeter monitoring at warhead production facilities. He noted that perimeter control "is all from the already distant foggy past. This is from a completely different era. There is no reason to restore anything like that."⁴² Ryabkov did note, however, that he parties could reach an agreement quickly if the United States simply accepted the Russian proposals for the agreement.⁴³

On October 16, President Putin proposed that the two sides extend New START "unconditionally for at least a year" while they continue talks on other arms control issues. Then-U.S. National Security Advisor, Robert O'Brien, dismissed this as a "non-starter" without the freeze on nuclear arsenals, and suggested that Russia's position could lead to "a costly arms race." On October 20, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia *would* accept a one-year freeze on nuclear arsenals if the United States did not add any conditions to the freeze. Russia also indicated the countries could "hold comprehensive bilateral talks" on "all factors that can influence strategic stability" during the extension. The U.S. State Department responded by welcoming the Russian statement and noting that the "United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement." Russia, however, considers the requirement for verification to be an unacceptable condition added to the freeze.⁴⁴

On October 22, President Putin repeated his call to extend the treaty and freeze weapons for a year, without preconditions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and NSA O'Brien both

See, also, Julian Borger, "Nuclear arms talks spiral into confusion as Russia rejects US 'delusion,'" *The Guardian*, October 13, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/13/us-russia-arms-control-talks-new-start-treaty>.

⁴⁰ "US sees 'important progress' in Helsinki nuclear arms talks," *Associated Press*, October 7, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/10/06/us-sees-important-progress-in-helsinki-nuclear-arms-talks/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2010.07.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief.

⁴¹ "Russia Sees 'No Prospects' For Extending Nuclear Pact With U.S.," *RFE/RL*, October 14, 2020, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sees-no-prospects-for-extending-nuclear-pact-with-u-s-/30892261.html>.

⁴² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's interview with the Kommersant newspaper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4402033.

⁴³ Vivian Salama and Mary Ilyushina, "Trump administration renews push for nuclear arms agreement with Russia before election," CNN, October 12, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/politics/us-russia-nuclear-agreement-push/index.html>.

⁴⁴ John Hudson and Paul Sonne, "Trump administration rejects Putin's offer on nuclear arms deal extension," *Washington Post*, October 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-rejects-putins-offer-on-nuclear-arms-deal-extension/2020/10/16/48d01db8-0fe2-11eb-bfcf-b1893e2c51b4_story.html.

acknowledged that the two sides remained at odds over whether to codify verification measures before extending New START or to work them out in discussions following the extension.⁴⁵

The United States and Russia did not resolve these differences before the end of the Trump Administration. During the transition following the November 2020 election, representatives from the incoming Biden Administration indicated that the United States would seek to extend New START before it expired on February 5, 2021. In November 2020, Anthony Blinken, designated at the incoming Secretary of State, suggested that President Biden would extend New START for five years and then would seek to expand the arms control process to include other types of weapons and additional countries.⁴⁶ Jake Sullivan, the incoming National Security Advisor, also noted that President Biden would move quickly to extend New START, although he did not offer a timeframe for the extension.⁴⁷ Reports indicate that some incoming Administration officials believe that an extension for less than five years would provide the United States with leverage in affecting the shape of a future agreement, while others believe that the full five-year extension will provide more time to address complex issues.⁴⁸

Background

President Obama and Russia's President Medvedev outlined their goals for the negotiations on a new START Treaty in early April 2009. In a joint statement issued after they met in London, they indicated that the subject of the new agreement "will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms."⁴⁹ This statement indicated that the new treaty would not address missile defenses, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, or nondeployed stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The Presidents also agreed that they would seek to reduce their forces to levels below those in the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and that the new agreement would "mutually enhance the security of the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces, and will include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing the START Treaty."

The Presidents further refined their goals for New START, and gave the first indications of the range they were considering for the limits in the treaty, in a Joint Understanding signed at their summit meeting in Moscow in July 2009. They agreed that the new treaty would restrict each party to between 500 and 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and between 1,500 and 1,675 associated warheads. They also agreed that the new treaty would contain "provisions on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures,

⁴⁵ Lara Seligman and Bryan Bender, "Hopes dim for nuclear agreement with Russia before Election Day," *Politico*, October 23, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/23/nuclear-agreement-russia-election-day-431369>.

⁴⁶ David Sanger, "The End of 'America First': How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the World," *New York Times*, November 30, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/biden-foreign-policy.html>.

⁴⁷ David Sanger, "Biden Plans Renewed Nuclear Talks With Russia While Punishing Kremlin, Adviser Says," *New York Times*, January 4, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/us/politics/biden-russia-iran.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage>.

⁴⁸ Jonathan Landay and Arshad Mohammed, "Biden urged to extend U.S.-Russia arms treaty for full 5 years without conditions," *Reuters*, November 25, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-biden-armscontrol/biden-urged-to-extend-u-s-russia-arms-treaty-for-full-5-years-without-conditions-idUSKBN2852Y0>.

⁴⁹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Joint Statement by President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America*, April 1, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-president-dmitriy-medvedev-russian-federation-and-president-barack->.

as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.”⁵⁰

The New START Treaty follows many of the same conventions as the 1991 START Treaty. It contains detailed definitions and counting rules that the parties use to identify the forces limited by the treaty. It also mandates that the parties maintain an extensive database that describes the locations, numbers, and technical characteristics of weapons limited by the treaty. It allows the parties to use several types of exhibitions and on-site inspections to confirm information in the database and to monitor forces and activities limited by the treaty.

But the new treaty is not simply an extension of START. The United States and Soviet Union negotiated the original START Treaty during the 1980s, during the latter years of the Cold War, when the two nations were still adversaries and each was still wary of the capabilities and intentions of the other. Many of the provisions in the original treaty reflect the uncertainty and suspicion that were evident at that time. The New START Treaty is a product of a different era and a different relationship between the United States and Russia.⁵¹ In some ways, its goals remain the same—the parties still sought provisions that would allow for predictability and transparency in their current forces and future intentions. But, the United States and Russia have streamlined and simplified the central limits and the monitoring and verification provisions. The new treaty does not contain layers of limits and sublimits; each side can determine its own mix of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Moreover, in the current environment, the parties were far less concerned with choking off avenues for potential evasion schemes than they were with fostering continued cooperation and openness between the two sides.

Central Limits and Key Provisions

Central Limits

Limits on Delivery Vehicles

The New START Treaty contains three central limits on U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear forces; these are displayed in **Table 1**, below. First, it limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Second, within that total, it limits each side to no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Third, the treaty limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. Deployed warheads include the actual number of warheads carried by deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. **Table 1** compares these limits to those in the 1991 START Treaty and the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

⁵⁰ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Understanding by Obama, Medvedev on Weapon Negotiations,” July 8, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-understanding-start-follow-treaty>.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, *Comparison of START Treaty, Moscow Treaty, and New START Treaty*, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139901.htm>.

According to New START's Protocol⁵² a deployed ICBM launcher is "an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility." A deployed SLBM launcher is a launcher installed on an operational submarine that contains an SLBM and is not intended for testing or training. A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs is one that contains an ICBM and is not a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility. These deployed launchers can be based only at ICBM bases. A deployed ICBM or SLBM is one that is contained in a deployed launcher. Nondeployed launchers are, therefore, those that are used for testing or training, those that are located at space launch facilities, or those that are located at deployment areas or on submarines but do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM.

Table 1. Limits in START, Moscow Treaty, and New START

Treaty	START (1991)	Moscow Treaty (2002)	New START (2010)
Limits on Delivery Vehicles	1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles	No limits	800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons Within the 800 limit, 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear weapons
Limits on Warheads	6,000 warheads attributed to ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers 4,900 warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs 1,100 warheads attributed to mobile ICBMs 1,540 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs	1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads No sublimits	1,550 deployed warheads No sublimits
Limits on Throwweight	3,600 metric tons	No limit	No limit

Source: State Department fact sheets.

The New START Treaty does not limit the number of nondeployed ICBMs or nondeployed SLBMs. It does, however, state that these missiles must be located at facilities that are known to be within the infrastructure that supports and maintains ICBMs and SLBMs. These include "submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities." Nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs may also be in transit between these facilities, although Article IV of the treaty indicates that this time in transit should be "no more than 30 days."

The parties share information on the locations of these missiles in the database they maintain under the treaty and notify each other when they move these systems. These provisions are

⁵² New START is a three-part document. It includes the Treaty, a Protocol, and technical annexes. All three parts will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.

designed to allow each side to keep track of the numbers and locations of nondeployed missiles and to deter efforts to stockpile hidden, uncounted missiles. A party would be in violation of the treaty if one of its nondeployed missiles were spotted at a facility not included on the list, or if one were found at a location different from the one listed for that missile in the database.⁵³

According to the Protocol to New START, a deployed heavy bomber is one that is equipped for nuclear armaments but is not a “test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a repair facility or at a production facility.” Moreover, a heavy bomber is equipped for nuclear armaments if it is “equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.” All deployed heavy bombers must be located at air bases, which are defined as facilities “at which deployed heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.” If an air base cannot support the operations of heavy bombers, then the treaty does not consider it to be available for the basing of heavy bombers, even though they may land at such bases under some circumstances. Test heavy bombers can be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and nondeployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers can be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers. Each party may have no more than 10 test heavy bombers.

Heavy bombers that are not equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs will not count under the treaty limits. However, the treaty does specify that, “within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.” Moreover, if a party does convert some bombers within a given type so that they are no longer equipped to carry nuclear weapons, it cannot base the nuclear and nonnuclear bombers at the same air base, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

Hence, the United States could reduce the number of bombers that count under the treaty limits by altering some of its B-52 bombers so that they no longer carry nuclear weapons and by basing them at a separate base from those that still carry nuclear weapons. In addition, if the United States converted all of the bombers of a given type, so that none of them could carry nuclear armaments, then none of the bombers of that type would count under the New START treaty. This provision allows the United States to remove its B-1 bombers from treaty accountability. They no longer carry nuclear weapons, but they still counted under the old START Treaty and were never altered so that they could not carry nuclear weapons. The conversion rules that would affect the B-1 bombers are described below.

Limits on Warheads

Table 1 summarizes the warheads limits in START, the Moscow Treaty, and the New START Treaty. Two factors stand out in this comparison. First, the original START Treaty contained several sublimits on warheads attributed to different types of strategic weapons, in part because the United States wanted the treaty to impose specific limits on elements of the Soviet force that were deemed to be “destabilizing.” Therefore, START sought to limit the Soviet force of heavy ICBMs by cutting in half the number of warheads deployed on these missiles, and to limit future Soviet deployments of mobile ICBMs. The Moscow Treaty and New START, in contrast, contain only a single limit on the aggregate number of deployed warheads. They provide each nation with the freedom to mix their forces as they see fit. This change reflects, in part, a lesser concern with Cold War models of strategic and crisis stability. It also derives from the U.S. desire to maintain flexibility in determining the structure of its own nuclear forces.

⁵³ Each individual missile will be identified in the database by a “unique identifier,” which will, in most cases, be the serial number affixed to the missile during production.

Table 1 also highlights how the planned numbers of warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic forces have declined in the years since the end of the Cold War. Before START entered into force in 1991, each side had more than 10,000 warheads on its strategic offensive delivery vehicles. If the parties implement the New START Treaty, that number will have declined by more than 80%. However, although all three treaties limit warheads, each uses different definitions and counting rules to determine how many warheads each side has deployed on its strategic forces.

Under START, the United States and Russia did not actually count deployed warheads. Instead, each party counted the launchers—ICBM silos, SLBM launch tubes, and heavy bombers—deployed by the other side. Under the terms of the treaty, they then assumed that each operational launcher contained an operational missile, and each operational missile carried an “attributed” number of warheads. The number of warheads attributed to each missile or bomber was the same for all missiles and bombers of that type. It did not recognize different loadings on individual delivery vehicles. This number was listed in an agreed database that the parties maintained during the life of the treaty. The parties then multiplied these warhead numbers by the number of deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to determine the number of warheads that counted under the treaty’s limits.

In most cases, the number of warheads attributed to each type of ICBM and SLBM was equal to the maximum number that missile had been tested with. START did, however, permit the parties to reduce the number of warheads attributed to some of their ballistic missiles through a process known as “downloading.” When downloading missiles, a nation could remove a specified number of reentry vehicles from all the ICBMs at an ICBM base or from all the SLBMs in submarines at bases adjacent to a specified ocean.⁵⁴ They could then reduce the number of warheads attributed to those missiles in the database, and therefore, the number that counted under the treaty limits.

Unlike ballistic missiles, bombers counted as far fewer than the number of warheads they could carry. Bombers that were not equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles counted as one warhead, even though they could carry 16 or more bombs and short-range missiles. U.S. bombers that were equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles counted as 10 warheads, even though they could carry up to 20 cruise missiles. Soviet bombers that were equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles counted as 8 warheads, even though they could carry up to 16 cruise missiles. These numbers were then multiplied by the numbers of deployed heavy bombers in each category to determine the number of warheads that would count under the treaty limits.

In contrast with START, the Moscow Treaty did not contain any definitions or counting rules to calculate the number of warheads that counted under the treaty limit. Its text indicated that it limited deployed strategic warheads, but the United States and Russia could each determine its own definition of this term. The United States counted “operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads and included both warheads on deployed ballistic missiles and bomber weapons stored near deployed bombers at their bases. Russia, in contrast, did not count any bomber weapons under its total, as these weapons were not actually deployed on any bombers. Moreover, because the Moscow Treaty did not contain any sublimits on warheads deployed on different categories of delivery vehicles, the two parties only had to calculate an aggregate total for their deployed warheads. In addition, while they exchanged data under START on the numbers of accountable launchers and warheads every six months, they only had to report the number of warheads they counted under the Moscow Treaty once, on December 31, 2012, at the end of the treaty’s implementation period.

⁵⁴ A reentry vehicle is a cone-shaped container that holds a warhead to protect it from heat and other stresses when it reenters the Earth’s atmosphere.

Like START, the New START Treaty contains definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. For ballistic missiles, these rules follow the precedent set in the Moscow Treaty and count only the actual number of warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. For bombers, however, these rules follow the precedent set in START and attribute a fixed number of warheads to each heavy bomber.

Article III of the New START Treaty states that “for ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs.” Missiles will not count as if they carried the maximum number of warheads tested on that type of missile. Each missile will have its own warhead number and that number can change during the life of the treaty. The parties will not, however, visit each missile to count and calculate the total number of warheads in the force. The New START database will list total number of warheads deployed on all deployed launchers. The parties will then have the opportunity, 10 times each year, to inspect one missile or three bombers selected at random. At the start of these inspections, before the inspecting party chooses a missile or bomber to view, the inspected party will provide a list of the number of warheads on each missile or bomber at the inspected base. The inspecting party will then choose a missile at random, and confirm that the number listed in the database is accurate. This is designed to deter the deployment of extra warheads by creating the possibility that a missile with extra warheads might be chosen for an inspection.

As was the case under START, this inspection process does not provide the parties with the means to visually inspect and count all the deployed warheads carried on deployed missiles. Under START, this number was calculated by counting launchers and multiplying by an attributed number of warheads. Under New START, as was the case in the Moscow Treaty, each side simply declares its number of total deployed warheads and includes that number in the treaty database. Unlike the Moscow Treaty, however, the parties will provide and update these numbers every six months during the life of the treaty, rather than just once at the end of the treaty.

Under the New START Treaty, each deployed heavy bomber equipped with nuclear armaments counts as one nuclear warhead. This is true whether the bomber is equipped to carry cruise missiles or gravity bombs. Neither the United States nor Russia deploys nuclear weapons on their bombers on a day-to-day basis. Because the treaty is supposed to count, and reduce, actual warheads carried by deployed delivery vehicles, the bomber weapons that are not deployed on a day-to-day basis are excluded. In addition, because the parties will use on-site inspections to confirm the actual number of deployed warheads on deployed delivery vehicles, and the bombers will have no warheads on them during inspections, the parties needed to come up with an arbitrary number to assign to the bombers. That number is one.

Conversion and Elimination

According to New START, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall continue to count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.

ICBM Launchers

Under START, ICBM launchers were “destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters.” If missiles were removed from

silos, and the silos were not eliminated in this fashion, then the silos still counted as if they held a deployed missile and as if the deployed missile carried the attributed number of warheads.

New START lists three ways in which the parties may eliminate ICBM silo launchers. It states that silo launchers “shall be destroyed by excavating them to a depth of no less than eight meters or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters.” It also indicates that the silos can be “completely filled with debris resulting from demolition of infrastructure, and with earth or gravel.” Finally, it indicates the party carrying out the elimination can develop other procedures to eliminate its silos. It may have to demonstrate this elimination alternative to the other party, but that party cannot dispute or deny the use of that method.

Hence, instead of blowing up the silos or digging them out of the ground, the parties to the treaty might choose to disable the silo using measures it identifies itself, so that it can no longer launch a missile. This could be far less costly and destructive than the procedures mandated under START, and would help both nations eliminate some silos that have stood empty for years while continuing to count under the old START Treaty. For the United States, this would include the 50 silos that held Peacekeeper missiles until 2005 and the 50 silos that held Minuteman III missiles until 2008. The United States has never destroyed these silos, so they continued to count under START. It can now disable these silos and remove them from its tally of launchers under the New START Treaty. According to the recent reports, the Air Force Global Strike Command began preparations to eliminate these silos in March 2011, and plans to fill them with gravel. It expects to complete this process by 2017.

Mobile ICBM launchers

Under START, the elimination process for launchers for road-mobile ICBMs required that “the erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports shall be removed from the launcher chassis” and that “the framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.” It also required that the missile launch support equipment be removed from the launcher chassis, and that the “mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and of the launcher leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher chassis” and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size. START also required that 0.78 meters of the launcher chassis be cut off and cut into two parts, so that the chassis would be too short to support mobile ICBMs.

Under New START, the elimination process for launchers for road mobile ICBMs is far more simple and far less destructive. As was the case under START, the elimination “shall be carried out by cutting the erector-launcher mechanism, leveling supports, and mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism from the launcher chassis and by removing the missile launch support equipment ... from the launcher chassis.” But neither the framework nor the chassis itself have to be cut into pieces. If the chassis is going to be used “at a declared facility for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty” the surfaces of the vehicle that will be visible to national technical means of verification must be painted a different color or pattern than those surfaces on a deployed mobile ICBM launcher.

SLBM Launchers

Under START, the SLBM launch tubes were considered to be eliminated when the entire missile section was removed from the submarine; or when “the missile launch tubes, and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes

pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube penetrations” were removed from the submarine. The missile launch tubes then had to “be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.”

Under New START, SLBM launch tubes can be eliminated “by removing all missile launch tube hatches, their associated superstructure fairings, and, if applicable, gas generators.” In other words, the missile section of the submarine and the individual launch tubes can remain in place in the submarine, and cease to count under the treaty limits, if they are altered so that they can no longer launch ballistic missiles. Moreover, according to the Ninth Agreed Statement in the New START Protocol, SLBM launch tubes that have been converted in accordance with this procedure and are “incapable of launching SLBMs may simultaneously be located on a ballistic missile submarine” with launch tubes that are still capable of launching SLBMs. After a party completes this type of conversion, it “shall conduct a one-time exhibition of a converted launcher and an SLBM launcher that has not been converted” to demonstrate, to the other party, “the distinguishing features of a converted launcher and an SLBM launcher that has not been converted.” The United States plans to use this procedure to reduce the number of launch tubes on each SSBN from 24 to 20. According to recent reports, it will begin this process in 2015, so that it will have no more than 240 operational launchers for SLBMs by the treaty deadline of February 2018.⁵⁵

Under START, the United States had to essentially destroy an entire submarine to remove its launch tubes from accountability under the treaty limits. With these provisions in New START, the United States cannot only convert ballistic missile submarines to other uses without destroying their missile tubes and missile compartments; it can also reduce the number of accountable deployed SLBM launchers on ballistic missile submarines that continue to carry nuclear-armed SLBMs. These provisions will provide the United States a great deal of flexibility when it determines the structure of its nuclear forces under New START.

During the past decade, the United States converted four of its Trident ballistic missile submarines so that they no longer carry ballistic missiles but now carry conventional cruise missiles and other types of weapons. These are now known as SSGNs. Because the United States did not remove the missile compartment from these submarines, they continued to count as if they carried 24 Trident missiles, with 8 warheads per missile, under the old START Treaty. These submarines will not count under the New START Treaty.

In the Second Agreed Statement in the New START Protocol, the United States has agreed that, “no later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time exhibition of each of these four SSGNs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such submarines are incapable of launching SLBMs.” Moreover, if an SSGN is located at an SSBN base when a Russian inspection team visits that base, the inspection team will have the right to inspect the SSGN again to confirm that the launchers have not been converted back to carry SLBMs. Russia can conduct six of these re-inspections during the life of the treaty, but no more than two inspections of any one of the SSGNs.

Heavy Bombers

Under START, heavy bombers were eliminated by having the tail section cut off of the fuselage at a location that obviously was not an assembly joint; having the wings separated from the fuselage at any location by any method; and having the remainder of the fuselage cut into two pieces, with

⁵⁵ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 2013, <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/1/85.full.pdf+html>.

the cut occurring in the area where the wings were attached to the fuselage, but at a location obviously not an assembly joint.

START also allowed the parties to remove heavy bombers from treaty accountability by converting them to heavy bombers that were not equipped to carry nuclear armaments. According to the elimination and conversion Protocol in START, this could be done by modifying all weapons bays and by removing or modifying the external attachment joints for either long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments that the bombers were equipped to carry.

The elimination procedure for heavy bombers has also been simplified under New START. To eliminate bombers, the parties must cut “a wing or tail section from the fuselage at locations obviously not assembly joints,” *or* cut “the fuselage into two parts at a location obviously not an assembly joint.” It no longer has to remove the wings from the fuselage. In addition, to convert a bomber counted under the treaty to a heavy bomber no longer equipped to carry nuclear armaments, the parties can either modify the weapons bays and external attachments for pylons so that they cannot carry nuclear armaments, or modify all internal and external launcher assemblies so that they cannot carry nuclear armaments, or develop any other procedure to carry out the conversion. As was the case with the conversion and elimination of missile launchers, the party may have to demonstrate its conversion procedure, but the other party does not have the right to object or reject the procedure.

The United States no longer equips its B-1 bombers with nuclear weapons, and has no plans to do so in the future. It has not, however, converted these bombers to nonnuclear heavy bombers using the procedures outlined in START. As a result, they continued to count as one delivery vehicle and one warhead under the counting rules in START. The United States does not, however, want to count these bombers under the New START Treaty. As a result, in the First Agreed Statement, the United States and Russia agreed, during the first year that the treaty is in force, the United States will conduct a “one-time exhibition” to demonstrate to Russia that these bombers are no longer equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The bombers that no longer carry nuclear weapons will have a “distinguishing feature” that will be recorded in the treaty database and will be evident on all B-1 bombers that are no longer equipped to carry nuclear weapons. After all the B-1 bombers have been converted in this manner, they will no longer count against the limits in the New START Treaty.

Mobile ICBMs

Mobile ICBMs in START

Mobile ICBMs became an issue in the original START negotiations in the mid-1980s, as the Soviet Union began to deploy a single-warhead road-mobile ICBM, the SS-25, and a 10-warhead rail-mobile ICBM, the SS-24.⁵⁶ The United States initially proposed that START ban mobile ICBMs because the United States would not be able to locate or target these systems during a conflict. Some also questioned whether the United States would be able to monitor Soviet mobile ICBM deployments well enough to count the missiles and verify Soviet compliance with the limits in START. Some also argued that the Soviet Union might be able to stockpile hidden missiles and launchers, and to reload mobile ICBM launchers during a conflict because the United States could not target and destroy them.

⁵⁶ In 1987, the United States began to develop its own mobile ICBM, the 10-warhead MX (Peacekeeper) missile, and it continued to explore mobile basing for the new single-warhead small ICBM. Although it eventually deployed the Peacekeeper missile in fixed silos, the parties considered it to be a mobile ICBM under the terms of START.

The Soviet Union refused to ban mobile ICBMs. As a result, START limited the United States and Soviet Union to 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. The treaty also limited the numbers of nondeployed missiles and nondeployed launchers for mobile ICBMs. Each side could retain 250 missiles and 110 launchers for mobile ICBMs, with no more than 125 missiles and 18 launchers for rail mobile ICBMs. This did not eliminate the risk of “breakout,” which refers to the rapid addition of stored missiles to the deployed force, but it did limit the magnitude of the breakout potential and the number of missiles that the Soviet Union could “reload” on deployed launchers during a conflict.

START also contained a number of complementary, and sometimes overlapping, monitoring mechanisms that were designed to help the parties keep track of the numbers and locations of permitted missiles.⁵⁷ Each side could monitor the final assembly facility for the missiles to count them as they entered the force.⁵⁸ The parties also agreed to record the serial numbers, referred to in the treaty as “unique identifiers,” for the mobile ICBMs, and to list these numbers in the treaty’s database. These numbers were used to help track and identify permitted missiles because the parties could check the serial numbers during on-site inspections to confirm that the missiles they encountered were those that they expected to see at the facility during the inspection. The parties also had to provide notifications when mobile ICBMs moved between permitted facilities and when mobile ICBMs moved out of their main operating bases for an exercise. These notifications were designed to complicate efforts to move extra, hidden missiles into the deployed force. Finally, missiles and launchers removed from the force had to be eliminated according to specific procedures outlined in the treaty. This not only helped the parties keep an accurate count of the deployed missiles, but served as a further deterrent to efforts to hide extra missiles outside the treaty regime.

Mobile ICBMs in New START

The New START Treaty contains many limits and restrictions that will affect Russia’s force of mobile ICBMs, but it does not single them out with many of the additional constraints that were contained in START. Russia pressed for an easing of the restrictions on mobile ICBMs in New START, in part because these restrictions were one sided and only affected Russian forces. But Russian officials also noted, and the United States agreed, that mobile ICBMs could enhance the survivability of Russia’s nuclear forces, and therefore strengthen strategic stability under the new treaty.

The United States was also willing to relax the restrictions on mobile ICBMs because it is far less concerned about Russia’s ability to break out of the treaty limits than it was in the 1980s. After 15 years of START implementation, the United States has far more confidence in its knowledge of the number of deployed and nondeployed Russian mobile ICBMs, as it kept count of these missiles as they entered and left the Russian force during START. There is also far less concern about Russia stockpiling extra missiles while New START is in force. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union produced dozens of new missiles each year; Russia now adds fewer than 10 missiles to its force each year.⁵⁹ Some estimates indicate that, with this level of production,

⁵⁷ For more information on the monitoring regime in START, see CRS Report R41201, *Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control*, by Amy F. Woolf.

⁵⁸ The perimeter/portal continuous monitoring systems (PPCMS) consisted of fences surrounding the entire perimeter of the facility and one restricted portal through which all vehicles large enough to carry items limited by the treaty (such as the first stage of a mobile ICBM) had to pass. The portal contained scales and other measuring devices that the countries could use to determine whether the vehicle carried an item limited by the treaty.

⁵⁹ According to one U.S. inspector, monitoring at Votkinsk “was very monotonous. We could have months go by

Russia will find it difficult to retain the 700 deployed missiles permitted by the treaty. In such a circumstance, it would have neither the need nor the ability to stockpile and hide extra missiles. Moreover, where the United States was once concerned about Russia's ability to reload its mobile launchers with spare missiles, after launching the first missiles during a conflict, this scenario no longer seems credible. It would mean that Russia maintained the ability to send extra missiles and the equipment needed to load them on launchers out on patrol with its deployed systems and that it could load these missiles quickly, in the field, in the midst of a nuclear war, with U.S. weapons falling all around. Yet, Russia has not practiced or exercised this capability and it is hard to imagine that it would try it, for the first time, in the midst of a nuclear war.

The New START Treaty does not contain a sublimit on mobile ICBMs or their warheads. It also does not contain any limits on the number of nondeployed mobile ICBMs or the number of nondeployed mobile ICBM launchers. These launchers and warheads will, however, count under the aggregate limits set by the treaty, including the limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers. As a result, the United States will still need to count the number of mobile ICBMs in Russia's force.

New START will not permit perimeter and portal monitoring at missile assembly facilities. The parties must, however, provide notification at least 48 hours before the time when solid-fuel ICBMs and solid-fuel SLBMs leave the production facilities. Moreover, the parties will continue to list the serial numbers, or unique identifiers, for mobile ICBMs in the shared database.⁶⁰

New START limits the locations of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, both to help the United States keep track of the missiles covered by the treaty and to deter Russian efforts to hide extra missiles away from the deployed force. Deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers must be located only at ICBM bases. All nondeployed launchers for mobile ICBMs must be located at "production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities." The locations of nondeployed mobile ICBMs are also limited to loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. Some of these facilities may be at bases for operational mobile ICBMs, but, in that case, the nondeployed missiles must remain in the designated facility and cannot be located in deployment areas.

Moreover, when deployed or nondeployed missiles or launchers move from one facility to another, the parties will have to update the database so each facility contains a complete list of each item located at that facility, and of the unique identifier associated with each item. Then, according to the Protocol to the Treaty, "inspectors shall have the right to read the unique identifiers on all designated deployed ICBMs or designated deployed SLBMs, non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and designated heavy bombers that are located at the inspection site."⁶¹ Hence, the parties will have the opportunity to confirm that items located at the facilities are supposed to be there.

This is designed not only to increase transparency and understanding while the treaty is in force, but also to discourage efforts to hide extra missiles and break out of the treaty limits. The treaty does not limit the number of nondeployed missiles, but it does provide the United States with continuous information about their locations and the opportunity, during on-site inspections, to

without inspecting a missile." See Elaine M. Grossman, "U.S. Treaty-Monitoring Presence at Russian Missile Plant Winding Down," *Global Security Newswire*, November 20, 2009.

⁶⁰ In START, the parties recorded unique identifiers only for mobile ICBMs. In New START, the parties will record these numbers for all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers covered by the limits in Treaty.

⁶¹ <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf>.

confirm that these missiles are not mixed into the deployed force. Moreover, the number of nondeployed launchers for these missiles is limited, under the 800 limit on deployed and nondeployed launchers. So, even if Russia did accumulate a stock of nondeployed missiles, the number that it could add to its force in a relatively short amount of time would be limited.

Some have questioned whether Russia might use these stored mobile ICBMs to break out of the treaty by deploying them on mobile launchers that are not limited by the treaty. Specifically, they have questioned whether the New START Treaty would count rail-mobile ICBMs, and, if not, whether Russia could develop and deploy enough of these launchers to gain a military advantage over the United States.⁶² This concern derives from the definition of mobile launcher in the paragraph 45 of the Protocol to the Treaty, which indicates that a mobile launcher is “an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the *self-propelled* device on which it is mounted [emphasis added].” This definition clearly captures road-mobile launchers, such as those that Russia uses for its SS-25 and SS-27 missiles, because the transporters for these missiles are self-propelled. But a rail car that carried an erector-launcher for an ICBM would not be self-propelled; it would be propelled by the train’s locomotive.

Others, however, point to several provisions in the treaty that indicate that rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs would count under the treaty limits. First, they note that the treaty limits all deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers. It defines ICBM launcher, in paragraph 28 of the Protocol to the Treaty, as “a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.” Any erector-launcher for ICBMs would be covered by this definition, regardless of whether it was deployed on a fixed site, on a road-mobile transporter, or on a railcar.

Moreover, the article-by-article analysis of the treaty specifically states that “all of the defined terms are used in at least one place elsewhere in the Treaty documents.” Article III, paragraph 8 of the treaty lists the current types of weapons deployed by each side and notes that these all count against the limits. It does not list any missiles deployed on rail-mobile launchers, and, therefore, the Protocol does not define rail-mobile launchers, because Russia no longer deploys any missiles on rail-mobile launchers. It had deployed SS-24 missiles on such launchers during the 1980s and 1990s, but these were all retired in the past decade, and the last operating base for these missiles and railcars was closed in 2007.⁶³

The treaty would not prohibit Russia from deploying these types of systems again in the future. Article V specifically states that “modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.” However, the second paragraph of this article indicates that, “when a party believes a new kind of strategic offensive arms is emerging, that party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.” Section 6 of the Protocol to the Treaty, which describes the Bilateral Consultative Commission, states that this body should “resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm.” In addition, Article XV of the treaty states that “if it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol ... that do not affect the substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty,” the parties can use the BCC to reach agreement on these changes without amending the treaty. Hence, if Russia were to deploy ICBMs on rail-mobile launchers, the parties could modify the definition to “mobile launcher” to confirm that these weapons count under the treaty limits.

⁶² See, for example, Christopher Ford, “Does New START Fumble Reloads and Rail-Mobile ICBMs?” New Paradigms Forum, April 26, 2010, http://02e18f7.netsolhost.com/New_Paradigms_Forum/Nuclear_Weapons/Entries/2010/4/26_New_START_Fumbles_Missile_REloads_and_Rail-Mobile_ICBMs.html.

⁶³ Pavel Podvig, *New START on Rail-Mobile ICBMs and Reloads*, April 29, 2010, http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/04/new_start_on_rail-mobile_icbms.shtml.

New START does not define rail-mobile launchers for ICBMs because neither the United States nor Russia currently deploys these systems and the treaty does not specifically prohibit their deployment in the future. If, however, either party installs an erector-launcher for an ICBM on a rail car, that launcher would count under the treaty limits, and the new type of strategic arm, represented by the launcher on a railcar, would be covered by the limits in the treaty. The parties would then use the BCC to determine which of the monitoring provisions and elimination and conversion rules applied to that type of weapons system.

Monitoring and Verification⁶⁴

The original START Treaty included a comprehensive and overlapping set of provisions that was designed to allow the United States and Soviet Union to collect a wide range of data on their forces and activities and to determine whether the forces and activities were consistent with the limits in the treaty. While each party would collect most of this information with its own satellites and remote sensing equipment—known as national technical means of verification (NTM)—the treaty also called for the extensive exchange of data detailing the numbers and locations of affected weapons, numerous types of on-site inspections, notifications, exhibitions, and continuous monitoring at assembly facilities for mobile ICBMs. Further, in START, the parties agreed that they would not encrypt or otherwise deny access to the telemetry generated during missile flight tests, so that the other side could record these data and use them in evaluating the capabilities of missile systems.

The New START Treaty contains a monitoring and verification regime that resembles the regime in START, in that its text contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty, provisions governing the use of NTM to gather data on each side's forces and activities, an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty, provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty, and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges. At the same time, the verification regime has been streamlined to make it less costly and complex than the regime in START. It also has been adjusted to reflect the limits in New START and the current circumstances in the relationship between the United States and Russia. In particular, it focuses on maintaining transparency, cooperation, and openness, as well as on deterring and detecting potential violations.

Under New START, the United States and Russia continue to rely on their NTM to collect information about the numbers and locations of their strategic forces. They may also broadcast and exchange telemetry—the data generated during missile flight tests—up to five times each year, although, in practice, they have done so only once each year. They do not need these data to monitor compliance with any particular limits in New START, but the telemetry exchange provides some transparency into the capabilities of their systems.⁶⁵ The parties also exchange a vast amount of data about their forces, specifying not only their distinguishing characteristics, but also their precise locations. They will notify each other, and update the database, whenever they move forces between declared facilities. The treaty also requires the parties to display their forces, and allows each side to participate in exhibitions, to confirm information listed in the database.

New START permits the parties to conduct up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections each year. These inspections began in early April 2011, 60 days after the treaty entered into force. These

⁶⁴ For more information on the monitoring and verification regime in New START, see CRS Report R41201, *Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control*, by Amy F. Woolf.

⁶⁵ U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, *Telemetry*, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139904.htm>.

inspections can occur at facilities that house both deployed and nondeployed launchers and missiles. The treaty divides these into Type One inspections and Type Two inspections. Each side can conduct up to 10 Type One inspections and up to 8 Type Two inspections. Moreover, during each Type One inspection, the parties will be able to perform two different types of inspection activities—these are essentially equivalent to the data update inspections and reentry vehicle inspections in the original START Treaty. As a result, the 18 short-notice inspections permitted under New START are essentially equivalent to the 28 short-notice inspections permitted under START.

Type One Inspections

Type One inspections are those that occur at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases that house deployed or nondeployed launchers, missiles, and bombers. The parties use these inspections “to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this treaty. During Type One inspections, the parties may also confirm that the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers” are consistent with the numbers declared deployed on those specific launchers.

The inspections used to confirm the number of deployed warheads in New START will be distinctly different from the inspections in START because the counting rules for ballistic missiles have changed. Under START, the treaty database listed the number of warheads *attributed* to a type of missile, and each missile of that type counted as the same number of warheads. The parties then inspected the missiles to confirm that the number of warheads on a particular missile did not exceed the number attributed to that type of missile. The database in New START will list the aggregate number of warheads deployed on all the missiles at a given base, but before beginning a Type One inspection, the team will receive a briefing on the actual number of warheads deployed *on each missile* at the base. During the inspections, the parties will have the right to designate one ICBM or one SLBM for inspection, and, when inspecting that missile, the parties will be able to count the actual number of reentry vehicles deployed on the missile to confirm that it equals the number provided for that particular missile prior to the inspection. The inspected party can cover the reentry vehicles to protect information not related to the number of warheads, but the party must use covers that allow the inspectors to identify the actual number of warheads on the missile.

Because these inspections are random, and occur on short notice, they provide the parties with a chance to detect an effort by the other party to deploy a missile with more than its listed number of warheads. As a result, the inspections may deter efforts to conceal extra warheads on the deployed force. These inspections, by allowing the parties to count the actual number of deployed warheads, provide added transparency.

Type Two Inspections

Type Two inspections occur at facilities that house nondeployed or converted launchers and missiles. These include “ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; and training facilities.” The parties will perform these inspections “to confirm the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and declared data, specified for such facilities, on the number and types of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, and nondeployed launchers of ICBMs.” In addition, they can conduct these inspections at formerly declared facilities, “to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.” They can also use Type II

inspections to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated according to treaty procedures.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Presidents Obama and Medvedev had agreed, when they met in April 2009, that the two nations would address Russia's concerns with U.S. missile defense programs in a separate forum from the negotiations on a New START Treaty.⁶⁶ However, during their meeting in Moscow in July 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that the treaty would contain a "provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms."⁶⁷ This statement, which appears in the preamble to New START, states that the parties recognize "the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties."

Russia and the United States each issued unilateral statements when they signed New START that clarified their positions on the relationship between New START and missile defenses. Russia stated that

the Treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. Consequently, the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 14 of the Treaty include increasing the capabilities of the United States of America's missile defense system in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.⁶⁸

In its statement, the United States stated that its

missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.⁶⁹

These statements do not impose any obligations on either the United States or Russia. As Senator Lugar indicated before New START was signed, these statements are, "in essence editorial opinions." Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher also stated that "Russia's unilateral statement on missile defenses is not an integral part of the New START Treaty. It's not legally-binding. It won't constrain U.S. missile defense programs."⁷⁰ These statements also do not provide Russia with "veto power" over U.S. missile defense systems. Although Russia has said it may withdraw

⁶⁶ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America," April 1, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-president-dmitriy-medvedev-russian-federation-and-president-barack->.

⁶⁷ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Understanding by Obama, Medvedev on Weapon Negotiations," July 8, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-understanding-start-follow-treaty>.

⁶⁸ Article 14 indicates that each party shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme national interests. For the full Russian statement, see <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/140187.htm>.

⁶⁹ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/140406.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, *The Case for New START Ratification*, Atlantic Council Panel Discussion, April 21, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/140633.htm>.

from the treaty if the U.S. missile defenses threaten “the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation,” the United States has no obligation to consult with Russia to confirm that its planned defenses do not cross this threshold. It may develop and deploy whatever defenses it chooses; Russia can then determine, for itself, whether those defenses affect its strategic nuclear forces and whether it thinks the threat to those forces justifies withdrawal from the treaty.

Article V, paragraph 3 of New START also mentions ballistic missile defense interceptors. It states that the parties cannot convert ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors and that they cannot convert launchers of missile defense interceptors to launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs. At the same time, the treaty makes it clear that the five ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base that have already been converted to carry missile defense interceptors are not affected by this prohibition. It states that “this provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.”

This provision is designed to address Russian concerns about the U.S. ability to “break out” of the treaty by placing ICBMs in silos that had held missile defense interceptors or by converting ICBM silos to missile interceptor silos then quickly reversing that conversion to add offensive missiles to its forces with little warning. Russia began to express this concern after the United States converted the five ICBM silos at Vandenberg for missile defense interceptors. It initially sought to reverse this conversion, or at least to count the silos under the New START limits. The United States refused, but, in exchange for Russia accepting that the five converted silos would not count under New START, the United States agreed that it would not convert additional silos.

The provision will also protect U.S. missile defense interceptors from the START inspection regime. If the parties were permitted to convert missile defense silos to ICBM silos, they would also have been able to visit and inspect those silos to confirm that they did not hold missiles limited by the treaty. The ban on such conversions means that this type of inspection is not only unnecessary, but also not permitted.

The Obama Administration has stated on many occasions that the New START Treaty does not contain any provisions that limit the numbers or capabilities of current or planned U.S. ballistic missile defense systems.⁷¹ The ban on launcher conversion does not alter this conclusion because the United States has no plans to use any additional ICBM launchers or any SLBM launchers to hold missile defense interceptors. It is constructing new launchers for its missile defense systems. Some have questioned, however, whether the ban on silo conversion may limit missile defenses in the future, particularly if the United States wanted to respond to an emerging missile threat by quickly expanding its numbers of missile defense interceptors.⁷²

General Jim Jones, President Obama’s National Security Adviser during the negotiations, stated that this provision is a “limit in theory, but not in reality.”⁷³ It is not just that the United States has no plans to convert ICBM silos to missile defense interceptor silos, it is that it would be quicker and less expensive for the United States to build new silos for missile defense interceptors than to remove the ICBMs and all their equipment, reconfigure the silo, and install all the equipment for the missile defense interceptors. Moreover, given that the missile defense interceptor launched

⁷¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, *Key Facts About the New START Treaty*, Washington, DC, March 26, 2010, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty>. See also the remarks of Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher at Atlantic Council Panel Discussion on April 21, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/140633.htm>.

⁷² “Stopping Missile Defense?,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 17, 2010, p. A12.

⁷³ James L. Jones, “New START Treaty Won’t Limit Missile Defenses,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 20, 2010.

from the central United States, where U.S. ICBM silos are located, would drop debris on U.S. territory, the United States might prefer to locate its missile defense interceptors in new launchers near the U.S. coast.

General Patrick O'Reilly, then the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, also stated that his agency "never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg and intends to hedge against increased BMDS [ballistic missile defense system] requirements by completing construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely. Moreover, we determined that if more interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI [ground-based interceptor] missile field (which is not prohibited by the treaty)."⁷⁴ He went on to note that "some time ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive option." Putting missile defense interceptors in SLBM launchers would undermine the primary mission of the submarine, which is designed to patrol deeply and quietly to remain invulnerable to attack, by requiring it to remain in one place near the surface while it sought to track and engage attacking missiles.

Conventional Long-Range Strike

During their summit meeting in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that the New START Treaty would contain "a provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability." This statement, which is in the preamble to the treaty, simply states that the parties are "mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability."

During the negotiations on New START, Russia voiced concerns about U.S. plans to deploy conventional warheads on ballistic missiles that now carry nuclear warheads.⁷⁵ Russian officials have argued that these weapons could upset stability for several reasons. First, even if Russia were not the target of an attack with these missiles, it might not know whether the missile carried a nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead, or whether it was headed toward a target in Russia. Moreover, ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could destroy significant targets in Russia and, therefore, they might provide the United States with the ability to attack such targets, with little warning, without resorting to nuclear weapons. Finally, some argued that the United States might replace the conventional warheads with nuclear warheads to exceed the limits in a treaty.

Russia initially sought to include a provision in New START that would ban the deployment of conventional warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. The United States rejected this proposal. It was considering this capability as a way to attack targets around the world promptly, and did not envision using these weapons against Russia. As a result, as the White House noted in its Fact Sheet on New START, "the Treaty does not contain any constraints on ... current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities."⁷⁶ However, if the United States deployed conventional warheads on missiles that are covered by the limits in START, the

⁷⁴ U.S. Congress, House Armed Services, Strategic Forces, *President Obama's Fiscal 2011 Budget Request for the Missile Defense and Ballistic Missile Review Programs*, Hearing, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 14, 2010.

⁷⁵ For information about the issues associated with the potential deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles see CRS Report R41464, *Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues*, by Amy F. Woolf. See also David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Faces Choice of New Weapons for Fast Strikes," *New York Times*, April 23, 2010.

⁷⁶ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Key Facts About the New START Treaty," Washington, DC, March 26, 2010, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty>.

warheads on these missiles would count under the treaty limit on deployed warheads. Because the United States expected to deploy very small numbers of these systems, this trade-off would not have a significant effect on U.S. nuclear capabilities.⁷⁷

Moreover, if the United States deployed conventional warheads on new types of long-range strike systems, these systems would not necessarily count under or be affected by the limits in New START. The United States would likely consider these to be a “new type of strategic offensive arms.” Under Article V, paragraph 2, Russia would have the right to raise its concerns about these weapons within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), but the United States would not have to accept Russia’s interpretation or accede to any requests to count the systems under the treaty.⁷⁸ The same procedures would apply if Russia were to develop new types of strategic offensive arms—with either nuclear or conventional warheads. The United States could raise its concerns with these weapons in the BCC, but Russia would not have to accept a U.S. request to count these weapons under the treaty.

U.S. and Russian Forces Under New START

U.S. Forces

According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released by DOD on April 6, 2010,⁷⁹ the United States planned to maintain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers under New START.⁸⁰ The 2010 NPR did not specify how many ICBMs would remain in the force, but indicated that each would be deployed with only one warhead. It also indicated that the United States would, initially at least, retain 14 Trident submarines. It might, however, reduce its fleet to 12 submarines after 2015. The NPR did not indicate whether the Trident submarines would continue to be deployed with 24 missiles on each submarine, or if the Navy would eliminate some of the launchers on operational submarines in accordance with the treaty’s Ninth Agreed Statement. Finally, the NPR indicated that the United States would convert some of its 76 dual-capable B-52 bombers to a conventional-only role.

The Obama Administration clarified its plans for U.S. forces under New START in the 1251 plan that it submitted to the Senate with the treaty documents on May 13, 2010.⁸¹ This plan indicated that the United States would eliminate at least 30 deployed ICBMs, retaining a force of up to 420 deployed launchers under the treaty limits. It would also retain 14 Trident submarines, but each submarine would contain only 20 launchers, and two of the submarines would be in overhaul at any time, so only 240 launchers would count under the limit on deployed launchers. In addition, the report indicated that the United States would retain up to 60 deployed bombers equipped for nuclear weapons, including all 18 B-2 bombers in the current force.

⁷⁷ U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, *Conventional Prompt Global Strike*, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139913.htm>.

⁷⁸ Article V, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that “when a party believes a new kind of strategic offensive arms is emerging, that party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.”

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, pp. 19-25.

⁸⁰ The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms this commitment to retaining the triad. U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, report, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.

⁸¹ Congress mandated that the President submit a report on this plan in Section 1251 of the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 111-84.

This force would have included up to 720 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, a number that exceeds the 700 deployed missiles and bombers permitted by the treaty. In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that the United States would have to make a small number of further reductions, or convert a small number of additional systems to nondeployed status, to meet the treaty limits. However, they noted that because the United States would have seven years to reduce its forces to these limits, they saw no reason to identify a final force structure at that point. Secretary Gates noted that DOD was considering a number of options for the final force structure, and would make a decision on this force structure after considering the international security environment and Russia's force structure in the treaty's later years.

The Obama Pentagon released its plans for the New START force structure in April 8, 2014. As was indicated in May 2010, this force will include 14 submarines with 20 launchers on each submarine. Because two submarines will be in overhaul at any time, these submarines will count as carrying 240 deployed launchers within a total of 280 deployed and nondeployed launchers. The force also calls for a reduction in the number of deployed ICBMs from 450 to 400, with the retention of all 50 empty launchers, for a total force of 450 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers. The Air Force will also count 4 ICBM test launchers as nondeployed launchers within the total. Finally, New START force will include 60 deployed bombers and 6 nondeployed bombers.

Even before it determined the final force structure, the Pentagon had requested funding to pursue activities that would enable these reductions, regardless of the specific force structure decisions. For example, in the FY2014 budget, the Pentagon requested funding for an environmental assessment (EA) that would be needed before it could eliminate ICBM silos. Several Members of Congress objected to this study, arguing that it would allow the Administration to eliminate an ICBM squadron regardless of whether this turned out to be the preferred option for force reductions. Several Members strongly supported the retention of all 450 ICBM silos, even if a portion of them were nondeployed, with the missiles removed to meet the New START limit of 700 deployed launchers.⁸²

The Pentagon responded to this criticism by noting that the EA would not predetermine the outcome of the force structure decision. However, if it were not initiated by the end of 2013, it would not be completed in time to support reductions by 2018, if the Pentagon chose to pursue those reductions. In other words, even if the study were completed, the ICBM silos could remain in the force, but if the study was not begun in time, the ICBM silos could not be eliminated, even if that proved to be the preferred force structure option. In response to these concerns, Congress included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 (H.R. 3304, §1056) that limited the Pentagon's ability to reduce U.S. forces under New START. Specifically, the legislation states that "the Secretary of Defense may only use funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 to carry out activities to prepare for such reductions." Further, the legislation states that only 50% of the funds authorized for the EA can be obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense submits the required plan that describes preferred force structure option under New START. The Pentagon has now submitted the plan, but it is unclear whether the EA will proceed.

Table 2, below, contains an estimated force structure of the United States prior to New START's entry into force; the force structure as of February 5, 2018 (when the reductions were required to

⁸² Jeremy Herb, "Senators Tell Hagel Not to Study ICBM Cuts," *The Hill*, September 27, 2013, <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/325137-senators-tell-hagel-not-to-study-icbm-cuts>.

meet the treaty limits); and the New START force outlined by the Administration in April 2014. As these data demonstrate, the United States reached the reduced force level required by the treaty. Within these limits, the United States retains a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. It has reduced the number of deployed nuclear-armed B-52 bombers by converting many to conventional missions. It has reduced the number of launchers on its Trident submarines and retains 400 Minuteman III missiles. An additional 54 Minuteman III launchers do not hold ICBMs and therefore do not count under the 700 limit for deployed launchers. As noted below, when two additional Trident submarines return to the fleet, the United States will have the treaty-permitted 700 deployed launchers and it will adjust the number of warheads on deployed SLBMs to meet the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.

The United States did not have to destroy many ICBM or SLBM launchers to reach the limits in New START. The treaty includes provisions that allowed the United States to exempt many of its existing nondeployed launchers, including 94 B-1 bombers, and 4 ballistic missile submarines that have been converted to carry cruise missiles, from treaty limits. Moreover, as it reduced its deployed forces, the United States did not have to destroy either ICBM or SLBM launchers; it could deactivate them so that they could no longer launch ballistic missiles. Instead of eliminating missiles and launchers, the United States reached the limits in New START by deploying its missiles with far fewer than the maximum number of warheads that each could be equipped to carry. The Air Force has completed the deactivation of 50 Minuteman III missiles that will be removed from the force under New START, and the Navy has completed the elimination of four launch tubes on all 14 of its Trident submarines.

Table 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START

(Estimated current forces and potential New START forces)

	Estimated U.S. Forces, 2010		U.S. Forces, February 5, 2018 ^a			Permitted Forces Under New START ^b		
	Deployed Launchers	Warheads	Total Launchers	Deployed Launchers	Warheads	Total Launchers	Deployed Launchers	Warheads
Minuteman III	450	500	454	400		454	400	400
Peacekeeper	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Trident	336	1,152	280	203		280	240	1,090
B-52	76	300	46	36		47	41	41
B-2	18	200	20	13		19	19	19
Total	880	2,152	800	652	1,350	800	700	1,550

Sources: CRS estimates, Air Force estimates.

- a. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, *New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Forces*, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, July 6, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284376.pdf>. The fact sheet does not display warhead subtotals for each delivery system; it includes only an aggregate across the force.
- b. This force assumes that the United States retains 14 Trident submarines, with 2 submarines in overhaul, but that each has only 20 deployed launchers. It also assumes that the Air Force maintains all 450 Minuteman III silos, but places 50 in “warm” status. This appears to be the Air Force preferred option at this time, although the final force structure decision is still pending.

Russian Forces

On February 5, 2018, when the treaty reductions were complete, Russia announced that it had reduced its forces to 1,444 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, within a total of 779 deployed and nondeployed launchers.⁸³

During the implementation of New START, the number of warheads deployed on Russian missiles and bombers climbed above the New START limits, leading some to express concerns about Russia's intention to comply with the treaty. Others noted that this was a reflection of Russia's modernization program, as it deployed new multiple-warhead ballistic missiles in place of older single-warhead missiles, and waited until late in the implementation process to eliminate older multiple-warhead land-based missile. Russia also retired many of its older ballistic missile submarines, replacing them with several new Borey-class submarines; three of these have entered the force, and three more are under construction. This submarine is deployed with the new Bulava missile. The missile failed many of its early flight tests, and continues to experience some failed tests, although it has had more several successful tests since late 2010.

Table 3. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START

(Estimated current forces and potential New START forces)

	Estimated Forces 2010		Potential Forces under New START		
	Launchers	Warheads	Total Launchers	Deployed Launchers	Deployed Warheads
SS-18 ICBM	68	680	46	46	460
SS-19 ICBM	72	432	20	10	60
SS-25 (mobile)	180	180	63	50	50
SS-27 (mobile)	13	13	18	18	18
SS-27 (silo)	50	50	60	60	60
SS-27 mod 2 (mobile)	0	0	99	99	99
SS-27 mod 2 (silo)			12	12	12
SS-N-18 (Delta III SSBN)	64 (4 SSBNs)	192	16 (one SSBN)	16	48
SS-N-23 (Delta IV SSBN)	96 (6 SSBNs)	384	96 (6 SSBNs)	80 (5 SSBNs)	320
Bulava (Borey SSBN)	0	0	48 (3 SSBNs)	48	288
Blackjack Bomber	14	168	13	13	13
Bear Bomber	63	688	63	63	63
Total	620	2,787	554	515	1,491

Sources: United States Department of State, Fact Sheet, START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, November 30, 2012; Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2010; Russian Nuclear Forces <http://russianforces.org/>.

Table 3, above, presents estimates of Russia's force structure in 2010, before New START entered into force, and potential forces that it might deploy under the New START Treaty. It does not contain an estimate of the current force structure, as the New START data only include aggregate totals across the force and provides no information about the current structure of this

⁸³ "Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry," *TASS Russian News Agency*, February 5, 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/988458>.

force. This table assumes that, under New START, Russia's new RS-24 missile would carry four warheads. However, according to accounts in the Russian press this missile will carry "no fewer than 4" warheads. If each of these missiles were to carry 6-7 warheads, Russia could retain the 1,550 warheads permitted by the treaty. Russia has announced plans to deploy a new heavy, liquid-fueled multiple-warhead missile to replace the SS-18, although this missile is not likely to enter the force until at least 2020.

Ratification

U.S. Ratification Process

The Obama Administration submitted the New START Treaty to the Senate on May 13, 2010. The treaty package included the treaty text, the Protocol, the Annexes, the Article-by-Article analysis prepared by the Administration, and the 1251 report on future plans and budgets for U.S. nuclear weapons required by Congress. It also included the text of the unilateral statements made by the United States and Russia when they signed the treaty. The Senate offered its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty by voting on a Resolution of Ratification. The treaty's approval requires a vote of two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 Senators.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 12 hearings on the treaty. These began in April 2009, with testimony from former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger. In total, the committee received testimony from more than 20 witnesses from both inside and outside the Obama Administration. It received testimony from current senior officials from the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Department of Energy, and from several former officials from past Administrations. The committee completed its hearing process in mid-July, after receiving a National Intelligence Estimate on the future of Russian forces and a report on the verifiability of the treaty.

The Senate Armed Services Committee held a total of eight hearings and briefings on the treaty. The Armed Services Committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of Energy Chu, and Admiral Mullen on June 17, 2010. It also received testimony and briefings from other Administration officials and from experts from outside the government. The Intelligence Committee also held a closed hearing to discuss U.S. monitoring capabilities and the verifiability of the treaty.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a business meeting to mark up the Resolution of Ratification for New START on September 16, 2010.⁸⁴ The committee began its consideration with a draft proposed by Senator Lugar, then addressed a number of amendments proposed by members of the committee. Both the Lugar draft and many of the proposed amendments addressed the members' concerns with U.S. missile defense programs, U.S. conventional prompt global strike capabilities, monitoring and verification, and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Most of these amendments were defeated, although the committee did modify and incorporate some into the resolution.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty)*, Executive Report, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., October 1, 2010, Ex. Rept 111-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010).

⁸⁵ Josh Rogin, "Kerry and DeMint Spar over Missile Defense," *Foreign Policy, The Cable*, September 16, 2010, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/16/kerry_and_demint_spar_over_missile_defense. See also John Isaacs, Analysis of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Passage of the new START Treaty, *The Chain Reaction*,

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Resolution of Ratification by a vote of 14-4, and sent the resolution to the full Senate. The Senate did not address the treaty before the November elections. The Administration pressed the Senate to debate the treaty during the lame-duck session of Congress in December 2010. Many Senators supported this goal. Some, however, suggested that the Senate would not have time to debate the treaty during the lame-duck session, and indicated that they preferred the Senate wait until 2011 to debate the treaty.

The Senate began the debate on New START on December 16, 2010. During the debate, some Senators proposed amendments to the treaty, both to strike language related to ballistic missile defenses and to add language related to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The treaty's supporters argued that these amendments would "kill" the treaty because they would require Russian approval and could lead to the reopening of negotiations on a wide range of issues addressed in the treaty. The Senate rejected these amendments, but it did accept amendments to the Resolution of Ratification that underlined the U.S. commitment to modernizing its nuclear weapons infrastructure and its commitment to deploying ballistic missile defenses. In addition, President Obama sent a letter to the Senators confirming his view that the New START Treaty places "no limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs," highlighting his commitment to proceed with the deployment of all four phases of the missile defense system planned for Europe, and noting that the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses would not threaten the strategic balance with Russia and would not "constitute the basis for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty."⁸⁶

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of New START on December 22, 2010, approving the Resolution of Ratification by a vote of 71-26. President Obama signed the instruments of ratification in early February 2011.

Russian Ratification Process

Russia's President Medvedev submitted the New START Treaty to the Russian Parliament on May 28, 2010. Both houses of the Russian Parliament, the Duma and the Federation Council, will vote on the treaty, with a majority vote required to approve the law on ratification. Russia's president said he hoped that the two sides could "synchronize" their ratification, voting on the treaty at about the same time. This would avoid the circumstances that existed on the second START Treaty in the late 1990s, when the U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification of START II in January 1996, but by the time the Russian Parliament voted in 2000, the parties had negotiated a Protocol to the Treaty that also required ratification. The Senate never voted on the new version of the treaty, and START II never entered into force. Most experts agreed that President Medvedev should be able to win approval for the treaty in the Russian Parliament with little difficulty.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma had initially supported the treaty. However, in early November 2010, Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the committee, indicated that the committee would reconsider the treaty. He indicated that this was in response to both the delay in the U.S. Senate's consideration of the treaty and the conditions and understandings that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included in the U.S. Resolution of Ratification. Nevertheless, after the Senate voted on the treaty on December 22, members of the Duma called for the prompt ratification of New START. Reports indicated they received the documents from the Senate on December 23, and they held their first vote on the Draft Law on Ratification by

September, 16, 2010, <https://livableworld.org/analysis-of-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-passage-of-the-new-start-treaty/>.

⁸⁶ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-understanding-start-follow-treaty>.

Friday, December 24. The Duma then crafted amendments and declarations to the Federal Law on Ratification, and, after two more votes, approved the treaty by a vote of 350-96 (with one abstention) on January 25, 2011.

The upper chamber of Russia's parliament, the Federation Council, also voted on the ratification of the treaty. Sergei Mironov, the Speaker of the Federation Council, indicated that the vote would take place after the vote in the Duma.⁸⁷ This occurred on January 26, 2011, when the Federation Council unanimously approved the ratification of the treaty.⁸⁸ President Medvedev signed the instruments of ratification on January 28, 2011. Russia's Federal Law on Ratification contains a number of declarations and understandings that highlight the Duma and Federation Council's concerns with the New START Treaty. These do not alter the text of the treaty and, therefore, did not require U.S. consent or agreement. Many of the provisions in the law call on Russia's leadership to pursue funding for the modernization and sustainment of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. They also reiterate Russia's view that the preamble to the treaty, and its reference to the relationship between offensive and defense forces, is an integral part of the treaty. The law does not indicate that this language imposes any restrictions on the United States. It does, however, reiterate that Russia has a right to withdraw from the treaty, and could do so if the United States deploys defenses that undermine Russia's strategic deterrent. In addition, the law indicates that new kinds of strategic offensive weapons, such as the potential U.S. conventional prompt global strike weapons, should count under the treaty limits. The law indicates that the parties should meet in the BCC and agree on how to count these systems before either party deploys the system. This differs from the U.S. interpretation because the United States has indicated that it could deploy such systems before completing the discussions in the BCC. These differing interpretations did not delay the entry into force of the treaty, but could raise questions in the future, if the United States deploys a PGS system that it does not consider to count under the treaty limits.

Entry into Force and Implementation

Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification for the New START Treaty on February 5, 2011. This act brought the treaty into force and started the clock on early activities outlined in the treaty. For example, the United States and Russia conducted their initial data exchange, 45 days after the treaty entered into force, on March 22, 2011, within 45 days of entry into force. They also had the right to begin on-site inspection activities in early April, 60 days after the treaty entered into force. Reports indicate that this process began in the United States with the display of a B-1 bomber and in Russia with the display of Russia's new RS-24 missile.

Consultations

The United States and Russia also met in Geneva, from March 28 through April 8, 2011, in the first meeting of the treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission. The representatives issued two joint statements at the conclusion of the meeting that addressed procedures that would be used during the on-site inspection process. The parties met for the second session of the BCC from October 19 to November 2, 2011.

The third meeting of the BCC occurred in late January 2012. During that meeting, the parties signed several statements on the sharing telemetry on missile test launches. They agreed that they

⁸⁷ "Federation Council Ready to Ratify New START on Same Day as Duma—Mironov," *Interfax*, December 23, 2010.

⁸⁸ "Russian Parliament Approves START Nuclear Arms Treaty," *BBC News*, January 26, 2011.

would exchange telemetric data on one ICBM or SLBM launch that had occurred between February 5, 2011, when the treaty entered into force, and the end of 2011. They also agreed on when they would begin and end the sharing of telemetric data during the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. They also agreed on the procedures they would use when demonstrating the recording media and playback equipment used when providing telemetric information.⁸⁹

The BCC met for a fourth time in September 2012. During this meeting, the two sides agreed on the use of tamper detection equipment during on-site inspections. The BCC met again in February 2013. At this meeting, the two sides signed an agreement indicating that they would exchange telemetry on the launch of ICBM or one SLBM during the time between January 1 and December 31, 2012.⁹⁰ The BCC met again in January 2014, with the two sides, again, agreeing that they would exchange telemetric information on the launch of one ICBM or SLBM from 2013. They also agreed to use an additional measuring device during reentry vehicle inspections at SSBN bases. In October 2016, the parties met in the 12th session of the BCC; the State Department did not provide any public details about the substance of the meeting. The 13th session of the BCC met from late March to mid-April 2017; the State Department, again, did not offer any details about the substance of the meeting.

According to a State Department Fact Sheet released at the conclusion of the reduction period, on February 5, 2018, the two sides conducted a total of “14 meetings of the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission (twice each Treaty year) to discuss issues related to implementation, with no interruption to the Parties’ work during global crises causing friction elsewhere in the bilateral relationship.”⁹¹ Two sessions also occurred in 2018 and 2019. The United States and Russia agreed, however, to delay the March 2020 meeting in response to the coronavirus outbreak until later in the fall 2020. If the treaty expires in February 2021, this will be the last meeting of the BCC.⁹²

Reductions

In a data exchange released in February 2011, with numbers drawn from the treaty’s initial data exchange, the U.S. State Department noted that the United States had 1,800 warheads on 882 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.⁹³ These deployed forces were within a total of 1,124 deployed and nondeployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and deployed in nondeployed heavy bombers. By September 2011, the United States had reduced these numbers to 1,790 warheads on 882 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.⁹⁴ The total number of deployed and nondeployed launchers had declined to 1,043. The reduction in 81 nondeployed launchers likely reflects the conversion or elimination of some of the “phantom” launchers that remained in the U.S. force but no longer carried nuclear warheads. In

⁸⁹ For the text of these three statements, see, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183540.htm>, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183541.htm>, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183539.htm>.

⁹⁰ United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, *Verification and Compliance, Bilateral Consultative Commission: Decision on the Number of Launches of ICBMs and SLBMs Conducted in 2012, on Which an Exchange of Telemetric Information Will Be Carried Out in 2013*, Geneva, Switzerland, February 19, 2013, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/204959.htm>.

⁹¹ U.S. State Department, *Key Facts About New START Treaty Implementation*, fact sheet, Washington, DC, February 5, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277889.htm>.

⁹² “Decision on halting inspections under New START made upon mutual agreement—diplomat,” *Tass*, March 29, 2020.

⁹³ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164722.htm>.

⁹⁴ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/175945.htm>.

the most recent exchange, with data current as of April 1, 2014, the United States indicated that it had 778 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 952 deployed and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carry a total of 1,585 warheads.

In data released on January 1, 2015, from the exchange that occurred on September 1, 2014, the United States had 794 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 912 deployed and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carry a total of 1,642 warheads. The increase in deployed forces reported in this exchange likely reflected the return to service of one SSBN, after it completed its overhaul process. The numbers declined again, by the time of the October 2015 exchange, both because another SSBN has begun its overhaul and because the U.S. Air Force has completed the “de-MIRVing” of the ICBM force. Each Minuteman III missile now carries a single warhead.

In addition, in September 2015, the Air Force announced that it had begun to convert a portion of the B-52H bomber force from nuclear to conventional-only capability, thus removing 30 operational bombers from accountability under New START.⁹⁵ While the Air Force has not provided any public statements about the changes made to the B-52 bombers, these changes are likely consistent with the objective of rendering the bombers unable to carry or launch nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

According to the State Department, as of September 1, 2016,⁹⁶ the United States had a force of 1,367 warheads on 681 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 848 deployed and nondeployed launchers. This included 416 deployed ICBM launchers, with a total of 454 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers; 209 deployed SLBM launchers within a total of 320 deployed and nondeployed launchers; 10 deployed B-2 bombers, within a total of 20 deployed and nondeployed B-2 bombers; and 46 deployed B-52 bombers, within a total of 54 deployed and nondeployed B-52 bombers. These data show that the United States has continued to convert B-52 bombers from nuclear to conventional-only capability; to remove ICBMs from operational launchers, on the path to 400 deployed ICBM launchers; and to reduce the number of launchers from 24 to 20 on each ballistic missile submarine. The data released in April 2017, from the March 1, 2017, data exchange, show that the United States counted 1,411 warheads on 673 deployed launchers, within a total of 820 deployed and nondeployed launchers. The increase in warheads possibly reflects the return to service of ballistic missile submarines, following the elimination of the four excess launchers.

The data exchange from September 2017, which shows the U.S. aggregate numbers of warheads and launchers, indicates that United States had met the New START limits. At that time it had 1,393 warheads on 660 deployed launchers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers.

Some analysts questioned whether the U.S. reductions through September 2016, which placed the United States below the New START limits of 1,550 warheads on 700 deployed launchers, indicated that the Obama Administration had decided to reduce U.S. nuclear forces, unilaterally, to levels below the New START limits.⁹⁷ However, these reductions were temporary, and the

⁹⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force Global Strike Command, *AFGSC Completes First New START Bomber Conversion*, September 17, 2015.

⁹⁶ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/262624.htm>.

⁹⁷ Bill Gertz, “Russia Adds Hundreds of Warheads Under Nuclear Treaty,” *Washington Free Beacon*, October 5, 2016. In a speech in Berlin, in June 2013, President Obama announced that the Pentagon had concluded that the United States could maintain a robust deterrent with one-third fewer warheads than the 1,550 permitted by New START. He did,

number of deployed launchers and warheads has now risen and should reach the levels permitted by the treaty when implementation is complete in 2018. For example, while the United States was reducing the number of launch tubes on deployed submarines, it removed them from deployment and removed the missiles from the launchers. These launchers and warheads did not count in the deployed force. Because each submarine now counts as 20 launchers, the September 2017 total of 660 deployed launchers can be read to indicate that two submarines, with 40 launchers, were still in nondeployed status at the time.

The data exchanges from 2018, 2019, and 2020 show that the United States continues to have fewer than the permitted number of deployed missiles and warheads, as it continues to remove systems from deployment for short periods of time. In September 2018, it reported that it had 1,398 warheads deployed on 659 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On March 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,365 warheads deployed on 656 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On September 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,376 warheads deployed on 668 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On March 1, 2020, it reported that it had 1,373 warheads deployed on 655 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.

On September 1, 2020, the State Department reported that the United States had 1,457 warheads deployed on 675 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.⁹⁸ This increase of 20 deployed strategic launchers and 84 deployed strategic warheads over the March 2020 data likely represents the move from maintenance to deployment of an additional ballistic missile submarine, which would carry 20 SLBM launchers.

The State Department fact sheets also include the summary of Russia's force data. In February 2011, Russia reported that it had 1,537 warheads on 521 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Russia also reported a total of 865 deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles. At the time of this report, analysts expressed surprise that Russian forces were already below the treaty limits in New START when the treaty entered into force. Some argued that this indicated the United States did not have to sign the treaty to bring about reductions in Russian forces, and that the treaty represented unilateral concessions by the United States. Others noted that the number of deployed warheads possibly reflected the ongoing retirement of older Russian missiles and could change in the future as Russia deployed new, multiple-warhead land-based missiles. In September 2011, in the second treaty data exchange, Russia reported that it had 1,566 deployed warheads on 516 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Hence, although the number of deployed delivery vehicles declined, the number of warheads increased by a small amount, and then exceeded the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads. Because the data provide no details of the force composition, this increase could have been due either to the deployment of the new MIRVed RS-24 missiles, which carry more warheads than the single-warhead SS-25 missile they replace, or to variations in the numbers of warheads carried on deployed SLBMs. The number of deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles had increased

however, indicate that the United States would only reduce to that level in cooperation with Russia. See <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany>.

⁹⁸ <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/10-01-2020-October-NST-FACTSHEET.pdf>

slightly, to 871. This could reflect the retirement of some of Russia's older missiles, which would move their delivery vehicles from the deployed to nondeployed column in the data.

In the data exchange from April 1, 2014, Russia reported that it had 498 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 906 deployed and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carry a total of 1,512 warheads. In the data exchanged in September 2014, and released in January 2015, Russia reported a force of 528 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 911 deployed and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carried a total of 1,643 warheads. Within these totals, Russia continued to deploy some new ICBMs and SLBMs while retiring older systems. However, as all categories had increased since the last data exchange, new deployments seemed to be outpacing retirements. This continued over the past year, as, in March 2016—when Russia reported that it had 1,735 warheads on 521 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 856 deployed and nondeployed launchers. The pattern shifted a little in September 2016—when Russia reported that it had 1,796 warheads on 508 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 847 deployed and nondeployed launchers—as the number of warheads continues to rise while the number of deployed and nondeployed launchers has declined.

The data exchanged in March 2017 show that Russia had begun to reduce the number of deployed warheads while increasing the number of deployed launchers—at that point it counted 1,765 warheads on 523 deployed launchers, within a total of 816 deployed and nondeployed launchers. The September 2017 data reinforce this trend. Russia reported a force 1,561 warheads, only 11 over the limit of 1,550 deployed warheads, on 503 deployed launchers. Hence, Russia appeared to be reducing older systems with larger numbers of warheads, while still deploying new missiles with fewer warheads, as it headed toward the New START limits by February 2018. On February 5, 2018, Russia reported that it had met the New START limits, with 1,444 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, within a total of 779 deployed and nondeployed launchers.⁹⁹

The data exchanges from 2018, 2019, and 2020 show that the Russia continues to comply with the New START limits. In September 2018, it reported that it had 1,420 warheads deployed on 517 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 775 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On March 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,461 warheads deployed on 524 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 760 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On September 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,426 warheads deployed on 513 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 757 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.

On March 1, 2020, Russia reported that it had 1,326 warheads deployed on 485 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 754 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. Although the State Department does not provide details on the underlying force structure, one analyst attributed the decline in the number of deployed launchers and deployed warheads to the possible deactivation of a regiment of SS-18 ICBMs and the possible withdrawal of some Topol ICBMs.¹⁰⁰ On September 1, 2020, Russia reported that it

⁹⁹ "Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry," *TASS Russian News Agency*, February 5, 2018. <http://tass.com/politics/988458>.

¹⁰⁰ Pavel Podvig, "New START Data as of March 1, 2020," *Russian Forces*, April 2, 2020, http://russianforces.org/blog/2020/04/new_start_data_as_of_1_march_2_1.shtml

had 1,447 warheads deployed on 510 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 764 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. According to one analyst, increase of 25 deployed launchers and 121 deployed strategic warheads likely “reflects fluctuations caused by launcher maintenance and upgrade work to new systems.”¹⁰¹

Some analysts questioned whether the increase in Russian warheads reported in March 2016 and September 2016 indicated that Russia would eventually withdraw from New START without reducing to its limit of 1,550 deployed warheads.¹⁰² Others, however, noted that Russia did not need to meet the limits until February 2018, so the warhead levels in 2016 should not be of concern. They also noted that Russia continues to deploy new systems, like a third new submarine and new multiple-warhead land-based missiles, at a faster pace than it has retired older systems.¹⁰³ Hence, as Russia retired older multiple-warhead missiles before the deadline, it succeeded in reducing its forces below the limit of 1,550 warheads.

Some have also suggested that Russia’s continuing deployment of new missiles systems, and its plans for modernization through the next 5-10 years, indicate that Russia may be prepared to exceed the limits under New START, either before or shortly after the treaty’s 2021 expiration.¹⁰⁴ They have suggested that the United States respond to Russia’s plans with its own plans to modernize and expand its nuclear forces. Others, however, while agreeing with assessments of Russia’s ability to expand its nuclear forces, argue that the United States should respond by pressing Russia to extend New START through 2026 so that limits on Russian forces remain in place.

Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance

The United States has not raised any questions, in public, about Russia’s compliance with the New START Treaty. In the January 2016 version of the Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty, the State Department reported that “the United States certifies the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty.” The report indicated that the United States “has raised implementation-related questions with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels and in the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).”¹⁰⁵

Russia has also raised questions about U.S. implementation during BCC sessions. In its statement released on February 5, 2018, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that it had concerns with the conversion procedures the United States had used to eliminate some missile launchers and B-52 bombers from its force structure. It noted that Russia could not verify that the conversions had been done in a way that permanently “rules out the use of Trident II submarine-

¹⁰¹ Hans M. Kristensen, “At 11th Hour, New START Data Reaffirms Importance of Extending Treaty,” *Federation of American Scientists*, October 1, 2020, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/10/new-start-2020_aggregate-data/.

¹⁰² Bill Gertz, “Russia Deployed over 150 New Warheads in Past Year,” *Washington Free Beacon*, April 6, 2016, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-deployed-150-new-warheads-past-year/>. See, also, Bill Gertz, “Russia Adds Hundreds of Warheads Under Nuclear Treaty,” *Washington Free Beacon*, October 5, 2016.

¹⁰³ Greg Thielmann, “Russia Relies on ‘Satan’ to Keep New START Data Exchange Numbers Up,” *Arms Control Today*, April 5, 2016, <http://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-04-06/Russia-Relies-on-Satan-to-Keep-New-START-Data-Exchange-Numbers-Up>.

¹⁰⁴ Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Posture Review, New START, and the Russian Nuclear Buildup,” *Real Clear Defense*, June 5, 2017.

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Annual Report on Implementation of the New Start Treaty*, Washington, DC, January 2016, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255558.htm>.

launched ballistic submarines and nuclear weapons of heavy bombers.”¹⁰⁶ The Protocol to New START states the parties must demonstrate their elimination procedures if there is a question about whether the method meets the treaty terms, but it does not allow for the other party to object and require changes in the procedures. As a result, although the United States has insisted that its procedures are sufficient, Russia continues to question this conclusion. Russian officials have indicated that the United States should address Russia’s concerns with these procedures before the two parties agree to extend New START before it expires in 2021.

In a joint briefing provided by the United States and Russia in October 2011, the parties that, in the first six months of treaty implementation, they had exchanged almost 1,500 notifications and had conducted demonstrations of telemetric information playback equipment. By the end of the first year of implementation, on February 5, 2012, the parties had exchanged over 1,800 notifications. They had also conducted three required exhibitions, with Russia exhibiting the RS-24 missile and its launcher, and the United States exhibiting the B-1 and B-2 bombers. During the year, both parties had also conducted all 18 of the permitted inspections at facilities in the other nation. These inspections occurred at ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases; storage facilities; conversion and elimination facilities; and test ranges.¹⁰⁷ In late November 2012, the State Department reported that the United States and Russia had each, as of November 26, conducted 15 of the 18 permitted inspections under the treaty. Both nations also completed their full complement of 18 inspections before the end of the second year of implementation, in February 2013.

According to the State Department, the United States and Russia both completed all 18 of their permitted Type 1 and Type 2 inspections during the first nine years of treaty implementation. They continued to conduct these inspections in spite of growing tensions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine in early 2014. They have each conducted two inspections in the current treaty year, which began on February 5, but have suspended inspections through May 1, in response to the coronavirus outbreak. According to the State Department, the two sides also exchanged 19,852 notifications by late April 1, 2020. These notifications report on the location, movement, and disposition of strategic offensive arms. They have also completed at least 15 exhibitions to demonstrate distinguishing features and technical characteristics of new types of strategic offensive arms or demonstrate the results of a conversion of a strategic offensive arm subject to New START through early 2018.¹⁰⁸ This includes the November 2018 exhibition of Russia’s new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. These monitoring activities will continue through 2021, or 2026 if New START is extended.

Issues for Congress

New START and Strategic Stability

When the Obama Administration released the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, it indicated that the United States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers under the New START

¹⁰⁶ “Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, February 5, 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/988458>.

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, *New START Treaty Implementation Update*, Washington, DC, May 17, 2012, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183335.htm>.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Key Facts About New START Treaty Implementation*, fact sheet, Washington, DC, February 5, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277889.htm>.

Treaty. The NPR indicates that this force structure supports strategic stability because it allows the United States to maintain an “assured second-strike capability” with warheads on survivable ballistic missile submarines and allows the United States to retain “sufficient force structure in each leg to ... hedge effectively ... if necessary due to unexpected technological problems or operational vulnerabilities.”¹⁰⁹ The Trump Administration, in the 2018 NPR, also reaffirmed the support for the nuclear triad. Although it offered a more detailed rationale for the maintenance of a triad, the underlying themes of strengthening deterrence and supporting stability were part of the discussion.

Obama Administration officials also indicated that New START promoted strategic stability by “discounting” the weapons on heavy bombers. As President Reagan argued during his commencement address at Eureka College in 1982, ballistic missiles are the “most destabilizing nuclear systems.”¹¹⁰ As a result, in his START proposals, President Reagan sought deep reductions in ballistic missile warheads, but lesser reductions in the weapons on heavy bombers. The counting rules in New START reflect this logic. Because bomber weapons would take hours or days to reach their targets, and because they could be recalled after they were launched, they pose less of a threat to strategic stability than do ballistic missiles. As a result, some argue that, even if the United States and Russia retain hundreds of bomber weapons that do not count against the treaty limits, the reductions required in ballistic missile warheads will enhance strategic stability.

Some have also noted that New START may strengthen strategic stability from the Russian perspective by removing the specific limits and restrictions on mobile ICBMs. Russia does not deploy many submarines at sea, and, therefore, lacks an assured second-strike capability on that leg of its triad. Instead, it has sought to improve the survivability of its forces by deploying ICBMs on mobile launchers. Under START, the United States sought to restrict these systems because it feared it would not be able to count them in peacetime and target them in wartime. In the current environment, concerns about wartime targeting played less of a role in the negotiations. Consequently, instead of limiting their numbers and restricting their operations, New START seeks to provide transparency and openness, so the United States can be confident in its ability to count these weapons in peacetime even though it might not be able to attack them during a conflict.

Critics of the New START Treaty have questioned whether it serves U.S. security interests even if it did promote strategic stability. Some argued, during the negotiations, that the United States did not need to negotiate a new treaty to maintain its own triad, as this was possible with or without arms control. They also argued that the United States did not need to reduce its forces to bring about reductions in Russia’s forces, as Russia would reduce its forces over the next decade as it retired aging systems, even in the absence of a new arms control agreement.¹¹¹ Moreover, they questioned whether arms control should even be a part of the U.S.-Russian relationship, as arms control is a symbol of a Cold War, antagonistic relationship between the two nations. They believe that the United States and Russia should not measure their relationship with each other using Cold War-era measures like strategic stability and survivable warheads.

This last argument has faded as the U.S.-Russian relationship has changed over the past decade. Few now argue that arms control is irrelevant in the absence of an antagonistic relationship.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 20, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.

¹¹⁰ Ronald Reagan, Commencement Address at Eureka College, May 9, 1982, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42501>.

¹¹¹ Keith B. Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Deal,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 8, 2010, p. A21.

Instead, they dispute the value of arms control precisely because the major-power rivalry has returned and the United States and Russia now have a more antagonistic relationship. They note that this change has occurred in spite of the presence of New START, and, therefore, is evidence of the failure of arms control to either support or strengthen strategic stability. Moreover, they note that New START did not include any limits on Russian shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and, therefore, failed to capture the full scope of threats that Russia presents to the United States and its allies.

Monitoring and Verification in New START

Monitoring and verification were among the central concerns addressed in the Senate committees during their review of the New START Treaty. The cooperative monitoring measures in the treaty received special scrutiny, as many observers of the arms control process specifically measured the value of the monitoring and verification regime in the original START Treaty by its widespread use of notifications, on-site inspections, and other cooperative measures.

Some critics of New START questioned whether the monitoring provisions in the new treaty were sufficient to provide the United States with enough information to either confirm Russian compliance with the treaty or to detect efforts to violate its terms. They pointed to differences between the verification regime in the original START Treaty and those in New START to argue that the new verification regime is less robust than the old regime. They noted that the United States would no longer maintain a monitoring presence outside the Votkinsk facility where Russia assembles its mobile ICBMs, which, they argued, could weaken the U.S. ability to count these missiles as they entered Russia's forces. They also noted that the United States and Russia would no longer exchange telemetry data on all their ballistic missile flight tests, which, over time, could lessen the U.S. ability to understand and evaluate the capabilities of Russian ballistic missiles.

Marshall Billingslea, who served in the Trump Administration as the State Department's Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, raised similar concerns, arguing that the monitoring provisions in New START were insufficient because they were different from those in the original START Treaty. He stated that, during the negotiations in late 2020, the United States would insist that Russia accept more robust provisions governing on-site inspections and telemetry exchanges.¹¹²

The Obama Administration and others who supported the new treaty argued that the verification regime in New START would be more than sufficient to provide the United States with confidence in Russia's compliance with the treaty. They acknowledged that the regime is different from the regime in the original START Treaty, but noted that this was, in part, due to improvements in the relationship between Russia and the United States and differences between the limits and restrictions in the two treaties. They argued that the monitoring regime in New START was streamlined, both to reduce its costs and to ease the disruptions caused by monitoring for U.S. and Russian military forces. They also noted that it relied on as much or more cooperation between the two parties, which would continue to build confidence and reduce suspicions.

Moreover, many in the Obama Administration noted that the United States had not had any opportunity to monitor Russian forces on Russian territory since the original treaty expired in December 2009. They argued that continuing delays in Senate consideration of New START

¹¹² *U.S. Department of State*, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control and Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/>.

could further reduce U.S. and Russian confidence in their knowledge of each other's forces, leading to worst-case assessments and possible instabilities. They further reminded those who contend that the verification regime in New START is less robust than the regime in old START that the absence of a treaty would have meant the absence of any monitoring and verification regime. The United States did not have the option of returning the regime of the original START Treaty; nor should it have wanted to do so since the new treaty has different limits and restrictions than the old treaty. Many U.S. officials, including Admiral Mullen and General Chilton, included their concerns about the absence of monitoring in their appeals for the prompt ratification of the New START Treaty.

Questions about the monitoring and verification regime in New START go beyond concerns about the specific monitoring mechanisms and the U.S. ability to confirm Russian compliance with individual limits in the treaty. Most experts agree that neither party can be absolutely certain that the other is in perfect compliance with all the limits and restrictions in the treaty. This is due, in some cases, to ambiguities in the treaty language and varying interpretations of the treaty requirements. It is also due to the fact that both sides may have gaps in their knowledge about the details of the other side's forces and activities. These uncertainties do not, by themselves, indicate that the parties should not ratify and implement the treaty. The broader question often asked by experts on treaty monitoring and verification is whether the parties, in general, and the United States, in particular, will have high confidence in Russia's compliance with the treaty, and, in those cases when compliance concerns may come up, whether the United States will be able to detect evidence of potential violations that might undermine U.S. security with enough warning to respond and adjust U.S. forces to offset those security concerns.

The Obama Administration indicated, in documents submitted to the Senate in July 2010, that the New START Treaty met this standard. The Administration concluded that the benefits to Russia of cheating would be minimal, as the United States, by maintaining a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, would be able to respond to any attempt to shift the strategic balance by adding significant numbers of warheads to its own forces. Moreover, if Russia were to cheat to any significant degree, it would undermine its relationship with the United States and interfere with any possible future arms control agreements. Therefore, in a letter sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates concluded that Russia would not be able to achieve "militarily significant cheating" under the New START Treaty.¹¹³

A review of the verification regime in New START, and summary of some of the differences between the verification regime in the original START Treaty and the regime in New START can be found in CRS Report R41201, *Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control*.

New START and Ballistic Missile Defenses

As was noted above, during the debate over New START the Obama Administration testified repeatedly that the New START Treaty imposes no limits on current or planned ballistic missile defense programs in the United States. Some critics have claimed, however, that the United States might impose those limits itself, to ensure that Russia does not withdraw from New START, as it said it might do in the unilateral statement it released when it signed the treaty.

Officials from the Obama Administration argued that this concern was unfounded. They noted that the Soviet Union issued a similar statement when it signed the original START Treaty, threatening to withdraw if the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM Treaty). Yet, when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia not only did

¹¹³ Robert Burns, "Gates: Any Russian Arms Cheating Would Backfire," *Associated Press*, September 9, 2010.

not withdraw from START, it continued to participate in negotiations on the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Moreover, in the 1990s, when the United States might have altered its missile defense plans in response to the Soviet letter, the United States actually expanded its missile defense activities and increased spending on missile defense programs. As a result, there is little reason, based on historical data, to expect the United States to restrain its missile defense programs. Moreover, officials from the Obama Administration have highlighted that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the 2011 budget all offer strong support for continuing U.S. missile defense programs.¹¹⁴

Some critics have also claimed that Russia might seek, and the United States might agree to, new limits on U.S. missile defense capabilities in the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by the treaty. According to the Protocol to New START, this commission is designed “to promote the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.” The Protocol indicates that the United States and Russia will meet in the commission to “resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties,” agree on “additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty,” and “discuss other issues raised by either Party.” Some have claimed that because this agenda is somewhat open-ended, Russia may raise its concerns about U.S. missile defenses in the commission and propose limits on those systems.

The Obama Administration insisted that the parties could not, and would not use the BCC to negotiate new limits on ballistic missile defenses or any other elements of the U.S. strategic arsenal. In a fact sheet that accompanies the treaty, the State Department has indicated that the parties would use the BCC “to reach agreement on changes in the Protocol to the Treaty, including its Annexes, that do not affect substantive rights or obligations. The BCC may in no way make changes that would affect the substantive rights and obligations contained in the New START Treaty.”¹¹⁵ The parties may use the BCC to “agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty” but these measures would address concerns that came up while implementing the existing limits and restrictions in the treaty. They would not be able to impose new limits or restrictions without amending the treaty, and any amendment to the treaty would be subject to the same ratification process as the treaty itself. The Senate would have to offer its advice and consent.

Although the Obama Administration pursued discussions with Russia on missile defense issues for several years, it never accepted any limitations on U.S. missile defense programs and insisted, repeatedly, that U.S. missile defense programs were not designed or capable of undermining Russia’s ballistic missile defenses. Russia, however, continued to question U.S. intentions and press for limits on ballistic missile defenses. It has insisted that any negotiations on further reductions in nuclear weapons include discussions about limits on ballistic missile defenses.

Congress remains concerned about the possibility that the United States might accept limits on missile defenses in exchange for limits on offensive nuclear forces. Senator Barrasso raised this issue in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18, 2018. He asked officials from the State Department and Defense Department to assure him that “in any arms control discussions with Russia for which you’re responsible that the United States will not agree to limiting our own missile defense programs.” Both Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg provided those assurances.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the New START Treaty*, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/140624.htm>.

¹¹⁵ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/145830.htm>.

¹¹⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts*, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018.

Modernization

The New START Treaty does not limit or restrict the ability of the United States or Russia to modernize strategic offensive nuclear forces. It specifically states, in Article V, paragraph 1, that, “Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.” Both nations are currently modernizing their forces and replacing aging missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Moreover, while some Members of the Senate insisted that the Obama Administration commit to modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal before voting in support of the treaty, many have also indicated that their continuing support for the modernization programs is linked to ongoing implementation of New START. Several Senators emphasized this linkage during a hearing in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2018. Senator Menendez noted that “bipartisan support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an arms-control process that controls and seeks to reduce Russian nuclear forces.” Senator Corker pointed out that, when the Senate gave its consent to the ratification of New START, “there was no doubt” about the “tie between the two.” He stated that “the essence of this is that the modernization piece, and the reduction in warheads piece go hand in hand.”¹¹⁷

U.S. Modernization

The United States is currently recapitalizing all three legs of its nuclear triad, with replacements planned for its bombers, air-delivered cruise missiles, land-based ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines over the next 20 years.¹¹⁸ It is also pursuing life extension programs for many of the warheads in the U.S. stockpile, to ensure that the weapons remain safe, secure, and effective. The Obama Administration outlined much of this modernization program in a report, known as the 1251 Report, mandated by Congress in the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84, §1251). This provision required the Administration to submit a report to Congress when it submitted the New START Treaty to the Senate that described how it planned to “enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; modernize the nuclear weapons complex; and maintain the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.” In this 1251 report, the Obama Administration stated that the United States planned to spend \$180 billion over the next 10 years to meet these objectives, with \$80 billion allocated to the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and nuclear warheads and \$100 billion allocated to the Navy and Air Force for the maintenance and modernization of their delivery systems. The program has expanded over the years, and, although cost estimates vary, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the United States is likely to spend around \$350 billion over 10 years and \$1.2 trillion over 30 years to modernize its nuclear arsenal. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump Administration reaffirmed its support for the continuing modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad, advocating for the completion of all the programs initiated under the Obama Administration, while adding two new systems to the plan.¹¹⁹

During the debate over New START’s ratification, some Members of Congress and analysts outside government questioned whether the Obama Administration was sufficiently committed to

¹¹⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts*, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018.

¹¹⁸ For details see CRS Report RL33640, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues*, by Amy F. Wolff.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Report, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.

modernizing and maintaining its strategic nuclear forces, nuclear weapons complex, and nuclear warheads. Some also questioned whether the funding in the program would be sufficient to maintain and sustain the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some argued that the totals did not add enough above the previously planned program to go far in expanding the U.S. capability to maintain and modernize its forces. Others questioned whether the Administration would sustain its commitment for more than a year or two, particularly in an era of tight defense budgets. These concerns grew as the fiscal constraints imposed through the Budget Control Act in 2011 reduced the resources available for modernization in the nuclear enterprise and have led to delays in some programs.

Others, however, argued that the Obama Administration's budget for the nuclear weapons complex in FY2011 and the added funding outlined in the 1251 report demonstrated a strong commitment to recapitalizing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, maintaining nuclear warheads, and maintaining and modernizing the delivery vehicles. The Administration added nearly 10%, or over \$700 million, to the DOE budget for nuclear weapons in FY2011. Ambassador Linton Brooks, who had served as the Director of the National Nuclear Security Administration during the Bush Administration, indicated that he would have "killed" for a budget of that magnitude when he was managing the nuclear weapons complex for DOE.¹²⁰ While the 2011 Budget Control Act required some delays in planned spending on nuclear weapons modernization, the Obama and Trump Administrations' budget proposals continued to show increases above the levels expected before the ratification of New START.

Russian Modernization

Russia is also deploying new missiles, submarines, and bombers to replace aging systems within the limits of New START. At the same time, it may be developing new types of strategic offensive arms that might not be captured by the limits in the treaty. In his annual address on March 1, 2018, Russian President Putin announced that Russia was developing several new nuclear delivery vehicles that could evade or penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses.¹²¹ One of the new weapons mentioned in the speech, the large, multiple-warhead ICBM known as the Sarmat, would by most estimates clearly count under the New START Treaty.

However, other systems—including a long-range nuclear-powered cruise missile, a long-range nuclear-armed underwater drone, and an air-delivered hypersonic cruise missile—may not be covered by the treaty's definitions of existing types of strategic offensive systems. As was noted above, the treaty addresses the possible emergence of new types of strategic offensive arms in paragraph 2 of Article V, where it states that the parties should raise their concerns about such weapons in the BCC. It does not, however, indicate how the parties will resolve such questions or whether they must agree before a weapon is included or excluded from the treaty limits. According to Under Secretary of State Thompson, in September 2018, the United States had not yet questioned Russia about these systems. However, these weapons would only raise concerns under New START if they were deployed before the treaty expired. Many analysts doubt that this

¹²⁰ <https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2010-12/nuclear-weapons-budget-more-enough-maintain-arsenal-modernize-complex>.

¹²¹ Anton Troianovski, "Putin Claims Russia Is Developing Nuclear Arms Capable of Avoiding Missile Defenses," *Washington Post*, March 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-claims-russia-has-nuclear-arsenal-capable-of-avoiding-missile-defenses/2018/03/01/d2dcf522-1d3b-11e8-b2d9-08e748f892c0_story.html.

will happen since most of the weapons mentioned in the speech seem to be in the early stages of development.¹²²

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed, in April 2009, when they initiated the negotiations on the New START Treaty, that this agreement would address only strategic nuclear forces, the long-range weapons that each side could use to reach the territory of the other side. It would not seek to limit or restrict the shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons in either side's arsenal. This agreement derived not only from the fact that the existing START Treaty, and nearly all past bilateral arms control treaties, had addressed only strategic nuclear weapons, but also from the fact that many of the issues that would need to be addressed in a treaty that limited nonstrategic nuclear weapons would likely prove too complex to resolve in the near term, when both sides sought to replace the existing START Treaty.

There was widespread agreement in Congress, in the Obama Administration, and within the arms control community, that the United States and Russia should seek to negotiate a treaty that increases transparency and possibly imposes limits on nonstrategic strategic nuclear weapons. However, there is also widespread agreement that negotiating such a treaty would prove extremely difficult, as Russia maintains a far larger stock of these weapons than the United States, in part to compensate for perceived weaknesses in its conventional forces, and because U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons are a part of the U.S. commitment to NATO, and the United States believes that any changes in their deployment should be addressed by the alliance before they are addressed in an arms control negotiation.

Some analysts and Senators questioned whether the United States should agree to further reductions in its strategic nuclear weapons in the absence of any limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. They noted that Russia retains more than 2,000 operational nonstrategic nuclear weapons while the United States has around 200 in Europe, and that the value of these weapons could grow as the numbers of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons decline. They also noted that these weapons could seem particularly threatening to some of the new NATO states that are located near the periphery of Russia. Others however, argued that Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons do not pose a threat to the United States or NATO, as Russia has indicated that these weapons would only be used in response to an attack on Russian territory. So, these analysts noted, as long as NATO does not initiate such an attack, NATO members would not be threatened by these weapons. Moreover, as Senator Lugar noted in his response to former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney's critique of New START, most of Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons do not pose a missile threat to Europe. Senator Lugar stated that "most of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons either have very short ranges, are used for homeland air defense, are devoted to the Chinese border, or are in storage."¹²³

Many of the experts who testified in support of the New START Treaty agreed that the United States and Russia should pursue negotiations on a treaty on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, most agreed that Russia would be unwilling to participate in such discussions, and the United States and Russia would be unlikely to find common ground on such an agreement, unless

¹²² James Cameron, "Putin Just Bragged About Russia's Nuclear Weapons. Here's the Real Story." *Washington Post*, March 5, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/05/putin-claims-russia-has-invincible-nuclear-weapons-heres-the-story-behind-this/>.

¹²³ Press Release of Senator Richard Lugar. "Lugar: Romney Misinformed on New START Treaty." July 8, 2010, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-romney-misinformed-on-new-start-treaty>.

both sides ratified and implemented the New START Treaty first. For example, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and William Perry both indicated that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be an issue for the next treaty, and that the United States should ratify New START as a step on the path to get to reduction in nonstrategic nuclear weapons.¹²⁴

The Trump Administration, in the Nuclear Posture Review released on February 2, 2018, also expressed concerns about Russia's stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. While it did not advocate for the negotiation of a treaty specifically limiting these weapons, it did indicate that Russia would have to address these concerns before the United States would be willing to negotiate further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, when it began discussions with Russia on New START extension in 2020, it insisted that Russia agree to link an extension to an agreement to freeze the number of warheads in its nuclear stockpile.

New START and the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Agenda

The Obama Administration argued that U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control, in general, and the New START Treaty, specifically, could help move forward the U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation agenda. No one has argued that the treaty will convince nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapon that they should follow the U.S. and Russian lead and reduce those weapons or roll back those programs. However, some have argued that U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control could strengthen the U.S.-Russian cooperation on a broader array of issues and that, "cooperation is a prerequisite for moving forward with tough, internationally binding sanctions on Iran."¹²⁵

Moreover, some have noted that U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control would also demonstrate that these nations are living up to their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).¹²⁶ Most nations that are parties to the NPT believe that reductions in the number of deployed nuclear weapons are a clear indicator of U.S. and Russian compliance with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.¹²⁷ During the preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs) leading up to the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, many of the participants called on the United States and Russia to complete negotiations on a New START Treaty. While the completion of this treaty may not assure the United States of widespread agreement on U.S. goals and priorities at the NPT review conference, many argue that the absence of an agreement would have certainly complicated U.S. efforts and reduced the chances for a successful conference.

In contrast, some have argued that the New START Treaty will do little to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals. They noted that the parties at the NPT review conference may express their approval of the New START, but their positions on substantive issues would reflect their own national security interests and goals. Moreover, some critics argue that New START might

¹²⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on U.S.-Russia Arms Control Cooperation*, Hearing, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 29, 2010.

¹²⁵ Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, *The Case for New START Ratification*, Atlantic Council Panel Discussion, April 21, 2010, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/140633.htm>.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Article VI states that the parties to the treaty will "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm>.

undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals by calling into question U.S. security commitments and the continuing salience of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The State Department, in its press releasing announcing that the United States had met its obligation to reduce to the New START limits, noted that “the United States continues to demonstrate its commitment to fulfilling its arms control obligations, including under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” through its adherence to the New START limits.¹²⁸

U.S.-Russian Arms Control After New START

Prospects for Further Reductions

In 2010, when it signed the New START Treaty, the Obama Administration indicated that it hoped this would be the first step in a renewed arms control process with Russia. In his statement on April 8, 2010, President Obama indicated that “this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including nondeployed weapons.”¹²⁹ In his State of the Union Address on February 12, 2013, the President stated that, as a part of the “effort to prevent the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons,” the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.”¹³⁰ Then, on June 19, 2013, in a speech in Berlin, President Obama stated that, after a comprehensive review, he had “determined that we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third.” He stated that he intended “to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures.”¹³¹

Many analysts outside government supported the idea of further reductions beyond New START. They had hoped New START would cut more deeply into U.S. and Russian forces, reducing them to perhaps 1,000 warheads on each side. Others focused their concern on the absence of limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear warheads. They expected a second treaty to address some of these concerns. Some suggested that the two sides pursue a single, comprehensive treaty that would limit strategic, nonstrategic, and nondeployed warheads. This was similar to the approach that the Obama Administration appeared willing to pursue in 2013. Others suggested that the United States and Russia accelerate their reductions under New START, amend the treaty to reduce the numbers of permitted weapons, or agree informally to reduce their forces below New START levels. They argued that these steps, if the nations took them together, could enhance stability and reduce nuclear dangers, without waiting for the completion a new, lengthy treaty negotiation process.¹³² Some also suggested that the United States and Russia could

¹²⁸ Heather Nauert, *New START Treaty Central Limits Take Effect*, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Washington, DC, February 5, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277888.htm>.

¹²⁹ “Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at New START Signing Ceremony and Press Conference,” April 8, 2010, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-medvedev-russia-new-start-treaty-signing-cere>.

¹³⁰ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address,” February 12, 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address>.

¹³¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate—Berlin, Germany,” June 19, 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany>.

¹³² See, for example, U.S. Department of State, International Security Advisory Board, *Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Force Reductions*, Washington, DC, November 27, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/201403.pdf>.

increase transparency on their nonstrategic nuclear weapons, even if they were not yet ready to agree to limits or reductions in these systems.

Some have also suggested that the United States and Russia revisit proposals from prior treaties—such a ban or limits on multiple-warhead (MIRVed) missiles—as a way to not only deepen the reductions in deployed warheads but also to bolster stability in the strategic balance.¹³³ The United States and Russia agreed to ban land-based MIRVed missiles in the 1993 START II Treaty, as a way to reduce the vulnerability of land-based weapons and to ease the pressure to launch these weapons early in a crisis. They never implemented this ban, as the START II Treaty never entered into force, but concerns about crisis stability remain as Russia’s modernization program includes the development of a new large, MIRVed land-based missile. On the other hand, Russia considers MIRVed land-based missiles to be a part of its response to U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and is unlikely to accept such a proposal.

Others, however, disputed the notion that the United States and Russia should follow New START with further reductions in nuclear weapons. While some were willing to support the modest reductions of New START, they would not have supported a treaty that imposed deeper reductions. They also objected to the broader arms control agenda that President Obama had outlined in his speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, including his call for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Hence, some who concluded that the New START Treaty would not harm U.S. security by itself objected to its ratification because they believed its defeat would close the door on the rest of the President’s arms control agenda.

Russia has also questioned whether New START was the first step towards deeper reductions. Shortly after the treaty entered into force, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia would not want to pursue further negotiations until New START had been implemented. Russian officials have stated, repeatedly, that a treaty mandating further reductions would not only have to include limits on U.S. ballistic missile defenses and nonnuclear strategic strike systems, but would also have to limit the forces of the other major nuclear powers.

Most experts agree that a new treaty that addressed each of these issues raised by both parties would likely be extremely difficult to complete. Russia has been unwilling to negotiate reductions in its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and neither side may be willing to adopt the amount of transparency necessary to negotiate verifiable limits on nondeployed warheads in storage. The United States has firmly rejected Russia’s proposals for limits on ballistic missile defense and is unwilling to include conventional-armed cruise missiles or other long-range missiles in nuclear arms control negotiations. Moreover, Britain, France, and China—the other declared nuclear weapons states under the NPT—have not shown any willingness to participate in the U.S.-Russian arms control process.

Prospects for the negotiation of a follow-on treaty dimmed further in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursion into Ukraine. In addition, in July 2014, the Obama Administration—in its Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments—stated that the United States “has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987] Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or

¹³³ Dakota S. Rudesill, “MIRVs Matter: Banning Hydra-Headed Missiles in a New START II Treaty,” *Stanford Journal of International Law*, vol. 54, no. 1 (Winter 2018), pp. 83-115.

produce launchers of such missiles.”¹³⁴ While Russia appeared to be complying with New START, most agreed that further negotiations would be unwise; some also suggested that the United States suspend its implementation of New START until Russia returned to compliance with the INF Treaty. Others, however, have argued that the United States should continue to implement New START, as the limits on the size of Russia’s strategic forces and the transparency provided by its verification regime continue to serve U.S. national security interests.

Extending New START

Absent an agreement between the United States and Russia to extend New START for a period of no more than five years, the treaty will lapse in 2021. As was noted above, President Trump and President Putin reportedly discussed the treaty during their summit in Helsinki in July 2018, with President Putin presenting President Trump with a document suggesting that they extend the treaty after resolving “existing problems related to the Treaty implementation,” but the two did not reach an agreement on the issue.¹³⁵ In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump Administration noted that the United States had met the treaty’s central limits, and that it would “continue to implement the New START Treaty and verify Russian compliance.” It did not, however, indicate whether it might seek an extension of the treaty and made it clear that it was unlikely to negotiate a new treaty before New START’s expiration in 2021. It noted that the United States is committed to “arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations.” But it also noted that Russian actions, including its noncompliance with the INF Treaty and other arms control agreements, and its actions in Crimea and Ukraine made further progress difficult.¹³⁶

The Trump Administration conducted an interagency review of New START to determine whether it continues to serve U.S. national security interests, has indicated that this review would inform the U.S. approach to the treaty’s extension.¹³⁷ Administration officials addressed this review during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18, 2018.¹³⁸ Both Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg emphasized how Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and its more general approach to arms control undermined U.S. confidence in the arms control process. Under Secretary Thomson noted that “the value of any arms control agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for miscalculation.” She also said that Russia’s noncompliance “has created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question Russia’s commitment to arms

¹³⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments*, Washington, DC, July 2014, p. 8, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/230047.htm>.

¹³⁵ Bryan Bender, “Leaked Document: Putin Lobbied Trump on Arms Control,” *Politico*, August 7, 2018.

¹³⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, Report, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.

¹³⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts*, hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018. See the prepared statement of Honorable David Trachtenberg, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091818_Trachtenberg_Testimony.pdf.

¹³⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts,” hearing, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018.

control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability.”

Several Senators questioned whether the Administration’s review would include a broader assessment of whether the provisions in New START contributed to U.S. national security. They focused on both the benefits of the limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and the value of the transparency provided by the monitoring and verification regime. Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg acknowledged that “the verification and monitoring and on-site inspection provisions provide a level of openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial not just to the United States but to our allies as well.” But he reiterated that “any decision on extending the treaty will, and should be, based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START treaty remains in our national security interests in light of overall Russian arms control behavior.”¹³⁹

Senators held a similar conversation with Under Secretary Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg during a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 15, 2019. In this hearing, the two witnesses addressed concerns about Russia’s development of new kinds of strategic offensive arms that would fall outside the New START limits, Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are not covered by the Treaty, and China’s nuclear modernization programs. At the same time, Under Secretary Thompson refused to speculate about possible changes in Russian forces if the treaty were to expire, and Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg declined to offer insights into how the United States might alter its nuclear forces or how it might recover the data and information provided by New START’s verification regime if the treaty were to expire.¹⁴⁰

During this hearing, Undersecretary of State Andrea Thompson stated that the United States had begun to hold discussions with Russia about its new kinds of strategic weapons at the technical expert level. Russian officials have stated that some of its new strategic systems should not count under New START because they do not meet the treaty’s definition of deployed missile launchers or heavy bombers. At the same time, they have recognized that the new 10-warhead land-based ballistic missile and the new Avangard missile-based hypersonic glide vehicle will count under New START. Russia conducted its static exhibition of the Avangard for U.S. treaty inspectors in November 2019 and, according to press reports, began to deploy the system in late December 2019.

Russia did not reject U.S. proposals to address its new kinds of long-range delivery systems, but it has refused to count them under New START. Instead, it has suggested that the two sides discuss these weapons in a separate forum, that addresses concerns about strategic stability. It has indicated that this forum could meet in the years after the parties extend New START. Russia has not yet produced any of these weapons, and may produce only a small number between 2021 and 2026. So even if these weapons were not captured by New START, such discussions could occur before the weapons posed a significant threat to the United States or its allies.

As noted above, U.S. and Russian officials met in August 2020 and October 2020 to discuss the possible extension of New START. In August, Ambassador Billingslea made it clear that the United States would be willing to let New START lapse, but might agree to extend it for a short period of time if Russia agreed to sign a “politically binding statement” that included an outline for a follow-on treaty. The United States insisted that Russia agree, in this statement, to limit all its nuclear weapons under the next treaty, that it accept expanded monitoring and verification provisions in the framework for a subsequent treaty, and that it agree that China must participate

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Future of Nuclear Arms Control, Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019.

in the negotiations when the parties converted the statement into a legally binding treaty. At the same time, the United States rejected Russia's proposals for limits on U.S. shorter-range nuclear weapons and for the United Kingdom and France to participate in future negotiations. Russian officials also indicated that they supported the extension of New START, but would not "pay any price" to reach that goal.¹⁴¹

In October, the United States narrowed its position by seeking to pair a short-term extension of New START with a short-term freeze on both sides' nuclear arsenals. The freeze would accommodate U.S. demands for limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons without addressing other issues in the August proposal. He also stated that Presidents Trump and Putin had reached an "agreement in principle" on this deal and that he and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov could complete an agreement quickly. He seemed to imply that Ryabkov was either unaware of this agreement or had not yet received his instructions to complete the deal.¹⁴²

Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov called the U.S. reports of a quick agreement "an illusion." He stated that the proposed freeze "is unacceptable" because it would not address Russian concerns about U.S. weapons. Ryabkov also disputed the U.S. assertion that the two sides could conclude the agreement before the election.

On October 16, President Putin proposed that the two sides extend New START "unconditionally for at least a year" while they continue talks on other arms control issues. President Trump's National Security Advisor, Robert O'Brien, dismissed this as a "non-starter" without the freeze on nuclear arsenals, and suggested that Russia's position could lead to "a costly arms race." On October 20, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia *would* accept a one-year freeze on nuclear arsenals if the United States did not add any conditions to the freeze. Russia also indicated the countries could "hold comprehensive bilateral talks" on "all factors that can influence strategic stability" during the extension. The U.S. State Department responded by welcoming the Russian statement and noting that the "United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement." Russia, however, considers the requirement for verification to be an unacceptable condition added to the freeze.¹⁴³

On October 22, President Putin repeated his call to extend the treaty and freeze weapons for a year, without preconditions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and NSA O'Brien both acknowledged that the two sides remain at odds over whether to codify verification measures before extending New START or to work them out in discussions following the extension.¹⁴⁴ The United States and Russia did not resolve these differences before the end of the Trump Administration.

Reports indicate that the Biden Administration is likely to seek the prompt extension of New START. In November 2020, Anthony Blinken, designated at the incoming Secretary of State, suggested that President Biden would extend New START for five years and then would seek to

¹⁴¹ Elena Chernenko, "'If Russia does not accept our offer before the elections, the entry price will go up,'" *Kommersant*, September 21, 2020, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4499882>; Elena Chernenko, "'There is no good deal in sight on the basis the Americans are proposing,'" *Kommersant*, September 22, 2020, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4501227>.

¹⁴² Julian Borger, "Nuclear arms talks spiral into confusion as Russia rejects US 'delusion,'" *The Guardian*, October 13, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/13/us-russia-arms-control-talks-new-start-treaty>.

¹⁴³ John Hudson and Paul Sonne, "Trump administration rejects Putin's offer on nuclear arms deal extension," *Washington Post*, October 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-rejects-putins-offer-on-nuclear-arms-deal-extension/2020/10/16/48d01db8-0fe2-11eb-bfcf-b1893e2c51b4_story.html.

¹⁴⁴ Lara Seligman and Bryan Bender, "Hopes dim for nuclear agreement with Russia before Election Day," *Politico*, October 23, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/23/nuclear-agreement-russia-election-day-431369>.

expand the arms control process to include other types of weapons and additional countries.¹⁴⁵ Reports indicate, however, that some incoming Administration officials believe that an extension for less than five years would provide the United States with leverage in affecting the shape of a future agreement.¹⁴⁶ Officials from the outgoing Trump Administration have suggested that the Biden Administration continue to pursue the framework from late 2020 to lock in Russia's commitment to impose a cap on the size of its stockpile.¹⁴⁷ Others, however, note that this framework should not be binding on the Biden Administration because the two nations had not actually reached an agreement on what would be limited or how to count the limited items.

Those who favor renegotiating, rather than extending, New START believe it would provide the United States with the opportunity to press Russia to include limits on its new types of long-range nuclear delivery systems and to accept limits on shorter-range, nonstrategic delivery vehicles. But this approach envisions a more complicated treaty and could take years to complete the negotiations. Therefore, it may not provide a capable or timely response to the impending expiration of New START. As noted above, Russia has been unwilling to accept limits on its nonstrategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the past, and any attempt to convince Russia to do so in the future may require the United States to agree to the elimination of its nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov reiterated this point during an interview in October 2020.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, while limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons have long been a U.S. priority for the next arms control agreement, Russia has stated that the next agreement should include limits on U.S. ballistic missile defense programs, limits on nonnuclear strategic-range delivery systems (specifically, U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles), and limits on other nations' (specifically British and French) nuclear forces. These demands would likely impede an effort to renegotiate or replace New START before its 2021 expiration, but could be included in a framework for a new agreement to be negotiated after an extension of New START.

Some have also questioned whether the United States should extend New START because they believe it might eventually constrain the ongoing U.S. nuclear modernization program.¹⁴⁹ While the United States plans to recapitalize all three legs of its nuclear triad, each program is sized to fit within the limits of New START. But, with growing concerns about the challenges the United States might face from Russia and China, along with growing concerns about the scope of their nuclear modernization programs, the United States might eventually seek to expand its forces beyond the limits in New START. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review hints at this possibility by noting that the plan for rebuilding the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad will include *at least* 12 Columbia-class submarines, thus leaving open the possibility of a larger program.

Nevertheless, based on the pace of modernization, New START may not interfere with the U.S. modernization program, even if the treaty were extended for five years. Most of the new U.S. systems are not scheduled to enter the force until the late 2020s, after New START's 2026

¹⁴⁵ David Sanger, "The End of 'America First': How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the World," *New York Times*, November 30, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/biden-foreign-policy.html>.

¹⁴⁶ Jonathan Landay and Arshad Mohammed, "Biden urged to extend U.S.-Russia arms treaty for full 5 years without conditions," *Reuters*, November 25, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-biden-armscontrol/biden-urged-to-extend-u-s-russia-arms-treaty-for-full-5-years-without-conditions-idUSKBN2852Y0>.

¹⁴⁷ Jon Kyl and Tim Morrison, "Biden faces big decisions on nuclear arms control—here's what he should do," *Fox News*, December 19, 2020, <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/nuclear-arms-control-biden-jon-kyl-tim-morrison>.

¹⁴⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's interview with the *Kommersant* newspaper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4402033.

¹⁴⁹ For details, see CRS Report RL33640, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues*, by Amy F. Woolf.

expiration. Moreover, the new systems are to replace existing, older systems, which would keep the U.S. force within the New START limits for many years. Any expansion beyond those limits would not occur until later in the 2030s. On the other hand, if New START were to expire in 2021, the United States might feel compelled to both accelerate and expand its modernization programs if Russia were to expand its nuclear programs when released from the constraints of the treaty.

Prospects for Trilateral Arms Control

U.S. Views

In April 2019, President Trump directed his staff to develop proposals for expanded arms control efforts that include China as a party, noting that the United States should “persuade China to join an arms-control pact limiting or verifying its capabilities for the first time.”¹⁵⁰ The Administration has labeled this approach as “21st century arms control” and has argued that it would better serve U.S. national security interests than would the extension of New START.¹⁵¹ Administration officials did not offer many details about the U.S. goals for these discussions beyond calling for an agreement that would limit all the nuclear weapons deployed by all three nations.¹⁵² Nevertheless, a senior State Department official maintained that it is critical to bring China into the arms control process because “China has enjoyed having both Moscow and Washington constrained by strategic arms control, and it is on track to at least double the size of its arsenal over the next few years.”¹⁵³ Trump Administration officials have also suggested that China should want to join in the U.S.-Russian arms control process to solidify its status as a great power. As Marshall Billingslea recently argued, “Great power status requires behaving with great power responsibility.”¹⁵⁴ A State Department official also recently suggested that the United States would “mobilize world opinion against [China] if they don’t negotiate with us.”¹⁵⁵

When the United States and Russia began discussions on strategic stability and the arms control in July 2020, the United States insisted that the China participate in the negotiations. However, as noted below, China has refused to join the talks and Russia has rejected the U.S. suggestion that it pressure China to do so. When the United States and Russia met again in August 2020, the United States seemed willing to begin discussions on a follow-on agreement to New START without China at the table. In his statement following the meeting, Billingslea reiterated the U.S. goal of

¹⁵⁰ Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,” *Washington Post*, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?utm_term=.3e294ce0a8e9.

¹⁵¹ Christopher A. Ford, *U.S. Priorities for “Next-Generation Arms Control,”* U.S. Department of State, Arms Control and International Security Papers, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/T-paper-series-1-Arms-Control-2.pdf>.

¹⁵² Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,” *Washington Post*, April 25, 2019.

¹⁵³ U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Senior State Department Official on the New START, March 9, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-the-new-start/>.

¹⁵⁴ Michael R. Gordon, “Russian Negotiator Doubts China Will Join 3-Way Arms Accord Sought by Trump,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 9, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-negotiator-doubts-china-will-join-3-way-arms-accord-sought-by-trump-11591735208>.

¹⁵⁵ Paul Sonne and Robyn Dixon, “Trump envoy to begin nuclear talks with Russia as key treaty hangs in the balance,” *Washington Post*, June 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-envoy-to-begin-nuclear-talks-with-russia-as-key-treaty-hangs-in-the-balance/2020/06/09/ed38c196-a1df-11ea-9d96-c3f7c755fd6e_story.html.

including China in the arms control negotiations, but indicated that the United States was “not suggesting ... that we would amend the New START Treaty to include China.” He did, however, indicate that the new U.S.-Russian framework would have to include a path for China to join because “the next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include China.”¹⁵⁶

Some analysts familiar with China’s views and the U.S.-Russian arms control process contend that the United States would have difficulty negotiating an agreement with China with limits similar to those mandated by the U.S.-Russian New START Treaty. As noted above, this treaty permits the United States and Russia to deploy 1,550 warheads on their long-range nuclear delivery systems; unclassified estimates contend that China deploys fewer than 150 warheads on systems of a similar range.¹⁵⁷ China might reject a treaty that codified this imbalance; the United States and Russia would likely object to an agreement that either invited China to increase its forces to U.S. and Russian levels or required the U.S. and Russia to reduce their forces to China’s level. Consequently, some analysts have suggested that the United States seek a political commitment from China with a pledge to refrain from increasing its nuclear forces while the United States and Russia remain bound by the limits of New START.¹⁵⁸ Alternatively, the United States and China could also pursue bilateral talks where they could share information and concerns about their respective nuclear forces. Such talks could open communications and build confidence between the two governments, while also possibly identifying areas for further cooperation.

Current and former State Department officials have also noted the difficulties with bringing China into the arms control negotiations. Andrea Thompson, the former Under Secretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, recently noted that she raised the issue repeatedly with Chinese officials, and “they were not interested in having a discussion.”¹⁵⁹ In December 2019, then-Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford sent China an invitation to begin a two-way “strategic security dialogue.” China has not responded to this invitation, but the White House apparently believes these talks could serve as a “first step toward an agreement that will cover all U.S., Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons.”¹⁶⁰

Nevertheless, in May 2020 Marshall Billingslea suggested that the United States would be unlikely to extend New START unless China joins the arms control process.¹⁶¹ He modified this approach in August 2020, when he acknowledged that the United States would not seek to amend New START to include China and that the United States would likely work with Russia to negotiate a “politically binding” framework agreement on a successor agreement. But he also

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/>.

¹⁵⁷ Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 75, no. 4 (2019), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511>.

¹⁵⁸ Frank Rose, *Bringing China into the fold on arms control and strategic stability issues*, The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, September 25, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/09/25/bringing-china-into-the-fold-on-arms-control-and-strategic-stability-issues/>.

¹⁵⁹ Julian Borger, “Trump to pull US out of third arms control deal,” *The Guardian*, May 24, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/24/nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-arms-control-chaos>.

¹⁶⁰ Christopher A. Ford, *U.S. Priorities for “Next-Generation Arms Control,”* U.S. Department of State, Arms Control and International Security Papers, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020, p. 5, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/T-paper-series-1-Arms-Control-2.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ William Gertz, “EXCLUSIVE: Envoy says China is key to new arms deal with Russia,” *The Washington Times*, May 7, 2020, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/may/7/marshall-billingslea-says-new-start-fate-hangs-chi/>.

argued that this framework should include a pathway for China to join the discussions and continued to insist that a future treaty would have to include China.¹⁶² Billingslea has noted that China is modernizing its nuclear forces, and that it plans to transform its military into a “first tier force by 2050.” Therefore, he stated, a “three-way arms control agreement would provide the best way to avoid an unpredictable three-way arms race.” He also argued that Russia should take the initiative to bring China to the negotiating table.¹⁶³ In response to questions about why China should participate and what incentives the United States would offer, he noted that China wants to “be afforded great power status” and that the United States is “certainly willing to afford them that respect.” He also pointed out that, if China and Russia did not agree to pursue arms control agreements that met the U.S. goals, they could face an arms race with the United States. He said “we know how to spend the adversary into oblivion. If we have to, we will, but we sure would like to avoid it.”¹⁶⁴ Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford made a similar point in the paper he published in April 2020, when he stated that “we are giving Moscow and Beijing incentives to negotiate seriously with us by being prepared to compete ruthlessly and effectively with them—and to win that competition—if they will not talk.”¹⁶⁵

Russian Views

In his remarks at the Hudson Institute, Special Presidential Envoy Billingslea noted that Russia has agreed with the U.S. suggestion that future arms control agreements include other nuclear-armed nations. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted this point in comments he made shortly before New START entered into force in 2011. At the time, he suggested that further steps in arms control could not occur until the United States and Russia fulfilled their obligations under New START and that, when they did occur, they would have to include other nuclear armed nations.¹⁶⁶ While most observers believed this was a reference to China, Russia, and the Soviet Union before it, have long believed that arms control treaties should also limit British and French nuclear forces because these can reach targets in Russia. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov confirmed this view in June 2019, when he noted that Russia “sees the need to include all countries” recognized as nuclear weapons states “in such a format.” This would mean including “the UK and France, the closest allies of the United States, whose nuclear potentials are an integral element in the overall military planning system, including within the framework of NATO.”¹⁶⁷

Neither France, with around 300 nuclear warheads, nor the United Kingdom, with a force of around 200 warheads, has shown any interest in participating in the U.S.-Russian arms control

¹⁶² U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/>.

¹⁶³ Hudson Institute, *Special Presidential Envoy Marshall Billingslea on the Future of Nuclear Arms Control*, Transcript, Washington, DC, May 21, 2020, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Transcript_Marshall%20Billingslea%20on%20the%20Future%20of%20Nuclear%20Arms%20Control.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Christopher A. Ford, *U.S. Priorities for “Next-Generation Arms Control,”* U.S. Department of State, Arms Control and International Security Papers, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020, p. 5, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/T-paper-series-1-Arms-Control-2.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ Richard Boudreaux, “Russia Says Next U.S. Arms Talks Must Include Others,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704307404576079953654840710>.

¹⁶⁷ “Ryabkov: meeting with Thompson gave a start to contacts of the Russian Federation and the United States on strategic stability,” *Tass*, June 12, 2019, <https://tass.ru/politika/6543135>.

process. Hence, if the United States believes that a 21st century arms control treaty must include China, and Russia believes it must also include the United Kingdom and France, the prospects of negotiating such a treaty before New START expires, or even as a replacement after New START is extended, seem extremely low.

At the same time, Russian officials have rejected the U.S. view that Russia must work to bring China into the arms control process. In a statement issued in May 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated Russia is “ready to support any multilateral initiatives that can enhance international security and stability. However, this must be based on the free will of their potential participants. No country may be coerced into them.”¹⁶⁸ Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov also rejected the suggestion that Russia bring China to the table, noting that “it is a sovereign right of any nation to join any talks.”¹⁶⁹

Chinese Views

China has long been opposed to participation in formal negotiations to limit or reduce nuclear weapons. The PRC generally argues that the United States and Russia, as the nuclear powers with by far the largest arsenals and the greatest capabilities, should take the first steps toward meaningful arms control.¹⁷⁰ Consistent with this past approach, China rejected the Trump Administration’s April 2019 invitation to participate in arms control negotiations with Russia and the United States. At the time, Geng Shuang, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that China’s “nuclear force is always kept at the minimum level required by national security, with an order-of-magnitude difference from that of the US and Russia.”¹⁷¹ PRC officials reiterated this point on multiple occasions in 2019 and 2020.¹⁷² China has also rejected calls by the United States and others in the international community for it to offer more transparency into the size and structure of its nuclear forces, noting that these measures would only aid its adversaries in planning attacks against those forces.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, May 14, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4122532#6.

¹⁶⁹ Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. Comments. The Gorchakov Fund. Moscow, May 22, 2020.

¹⁷⁰ Pan Zhengqiang, “China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” in *Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking*, eds. Li Bin and Tong Zhao, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, p. 65.

¹⁷¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on May 6, 2019*, Beijing, China, May 6, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1661163.shtml.

¹⁷² PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on January 22, 2020,” January 22, 2020, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1735126.shtml.

¹⁷³ China has not rejected all forms of arms control, as it has participated in discussions in international arms control fora, including the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It has signed (although it has not yet ratified) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It also participates in the P-5 process (a reference to the Permanent five members of the UN Security Council), where the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom discuss measures to reduce nuclear risks within the context of the NPT. Maximilian Hoell, *The P5 Process: Ten Years On*, European Leadership Network, Global Security Policy Brief, London, August 2019, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190925-P5-Process-Max-Hoell-1.pdf>.

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
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Chinese Navy's Third Aircraft Carrier Likely to be Launched This Year

Our Bureau 05:57 AM, January 18, 2021 702



Aerial view of Jiangnan Shipyard @Chinapower.CSIS.org

The Chinese Navy's large aircraft carrier, Type 003, is expected to be launched in 2021 and enter naval service around 2025.

General outline of the warship is already identifiable in recent openly available photographs. Blocks of the Type 003 aircraft carrier are currently being assembled in Shanghai-based Jiangnan Shipyard.

After all the blocks are put together, the upper structures will be installed. Since the blocks are built in advance, the assembly and the outfitting work will take much less time compared with China's second aircraft carrier, *Ordinance Industry Science Technology*, a Chinese defense industry magazine, said in a report published in its WeChat account on Saturday.

The current status indicates that the Type 003 could be only a few months away from its launch before the end of 2021. After this the carrier will undertake outfitting work, be installed with equipment including radar and sensor devices, conduct tests and embark on sea trials, which could take about two years, meaning the warship could join naval service in 2024 or 2025, the magazine predicted.

The Chinese media had speculated earlier that [the warship could be launched in 2020](#).

Chinese state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) also expects the country's third aircraft carrier to make its public debut in 2021.

"2021 is a year full of expectations, including the Type 003 aircraft carrier and also the H-20 bomber. It is time for our technological development to bear fruit," Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and TV commentator, told the [Global Times](#) on Sunday.

Type 003 carrier is expected to be as big as U.S. Navy's Kitty Hawk-class, displacing more than 80,000 tons. The magazine said that the ship is likely to be equipped with electromagnetic catapults to launch aircraft, replacing the ski jump method used on current Chinese carriers.

ARGUMENT

Russia's Security Agencies Are Both Terrifying and Incompetent

The ineptitude of the FSB sends a message about how powerful it is.

BY NATALIA ANTONOVA | JANUARY 15, 2021, 12:37 PM

In 2007, the popular Russian rock group DDT released a **provocative album** that featured, among other things, a song called “At the general’s house.” The song, written mostly from the point of view of a drunken general at the FSB (the Russian Federal Security Service) surrounded by his stolen wealth, mocked the corruption and cynicism of Russia’s security forces. You might think this caused the band problems. But they remain as popular as ever.

That’s because everyone in Russia knows that the FSB, and other security agencies, are insanely corrupt—and also often massively incompetent. It’s a fact of life under President Vladimir Putin, as mundane as the weather. Russian state media may not like to dwell on it in order to protect its budgets, but Russians don’t need the newspapers to tell them something that’s already being rubbed in their faces every day.

Western media has written that the FSB’s incompetence and inefficiency were **“exposed” by the botched poisoning of opposition figure Alexei Navalny**. But that incompetence, to Russians, is exactly what they expect from the security state. This isn’t to take away from the gravity of the situation around Navalny—what happened was a travesty, even if it did involve **poisoned underwear, and a clueless hitman discussing the assassination with Navalny himself on an unsecured line**.

The FSB is not unique when it comes to botched assassinations. Take another security agency, the GRU, which attempted to poison another dissident in the UK—and the **“chain of stupidity” that resulted in them being exposed**.

In Putin’s Russia, the security services don’t actually need to be professional in order to be considered fearsome. In fact, no officials in Russia need to be professional in order to be feared. Instead, their terrifying reputation comes from a total lack of accountability.

In 2010, I had come to Russia to work as deputy editor of *The Moscow News*, an English language newspaper that was once a propaganda organ which traced its roots back to the Stalin era. Under my then boss, Tim Wall, the newspaper, while owned by state media agency RIA Novosti, was an editorially independent entity. RIA Novosti itself in those days was also very different from the **propagandist cesspool** it is today, with actual professionals in key roles, working to make it more like the Russian version of the BBC.

Even so, I was constantly warned about not running my mouth in front of some of the RIA people we worked with. When I became acting editor-in-chief of *The Moscow News*, I was even pulled aside and told to “watch myself” with some people rumored to be in constant contact with the FSB, reporting to them on all of my activities. The situation didn’t so much scare me as irritate me.

I once shared a cigarette with one of the very people I had been warned about, listening to him bitterly complain about how he’d been late for a flight out of Moscow because the border patrol, which is run by the FSB, was slow that day (Russians stamp your passport when you enter and exit the country, and they do that for everybody—it’s both an extra layer of security and surveillance).

“It was an outrage! Lines everywhere! But you can’t complain, can you? Who do you complain about the FSB to?” ranted the man many of us thought to be an FSB asset himself.

For me, this was an important lesson in how power works in modern Russia. The powerful are powerful precisely because they are allowed to be incompetent. Whether it’s a line at the airport, or an official motorcade blocking all of Moscow traffic, or an assassination gone wrong, the message is: “We’re going to do what we want, and we don’t care. Now watch us.”

The powerful are powerful precisely because they are allowed to be incompetent.

In some ways, the incompetence of the armed and powerful in Russia can be even more terrifying than their flashes of competence. **Just consider the botched Beslan siege**, when Russian special forces stormed a school being held hostage and accidentally killed dozens of people.

In the Navalny case, even an assassination gone wrong can be exploited by the Kremlin for shock value. Yes, **it will result in memes and plenty of people making fun of the situation**. Yet at the same time, it's not as if the Russian government is going to be brought down by memes, and the leaders know that. As a Russian official told me off the record once, the memefication of the security services' screw-ups can actually be convenient, as it humanizes the participants.

In the UK case, when the men calling themselves "Petrov" and "Boshirov" sat down for a television interview in which they argued that they were **innocent tourists** and not GRU assassins, viewers couldn't help but cringe on their behalf.

The horror of what happened—**and the fact that a woman died as the direct result of their actions**—was lost in the carnival atmosphere that dominated the media coverage. "Petrov" and "Boshirov" came off as so fake and pathetic during the interview that plenty of Russians wound up feeling sorry for them.

A similar situation occurred with the FSB's Navalny poisoners. One of my favorite Russian writers, the playwright and satirist Valery Pechevkin, summed this up well in a **Facebook post** where he talked about the depressing states of the stairwells in buildings where both FSB hitmen and Russian dissidents live, with walls "green like ennui, like a phone call at 7 a.m., but also green like the spring." Pechevkin's posts capture both the absurdity and glacial stagnation of late Putinism—the government and its minions are a joke, the joke has been told over and over again, the joke is old, the joke is stale, and that too is part of its power.

Just like in DDT's song about the FSB general, there is a heart of darkness buried underneath the absurdity. By their actions, incompetent Russian assassins demonstrate that the government doesn't need to try. It just needs to exist.

When the narrator of the song asks the general how he wound up owning a palace, the general is first angry, then resigned. "Oh, son..." he says.

The weary paternalism of the general's words doesn't stop him from trying to mock-execute the narrator by dawn, after a night of drinking. If that's not a metaphor for the Russian security state as a whole, I don't know what is.

Natalia Antonova is a writer, journalist, and online safety expert based in Washington D.C.

TAGS: ARGUMENT, RUSSIA


[VIEW
COMMENTS](#)







Office of PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement has compiled some useful UNCLASSIFIED products from the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) that may prove helpful to agencies in preparing for potential threats in the coming week.














The following products are useful for first responders in addressing threats and in meeting plots of illegal activity. This can include destruction of property and violence targeted at official of all level of government, law enforcement, journalists, and infrastructure sties, as well as sporadic violence that may occur during lawful protests, rallies, demonstrations, and other gatherings.

Click on the  for the link to the document.

FIRST RESPONDER'S TOOLBOX Documents – Special Events:

Violent Extremists and Terrorists Exploit Civil Unrest and Public Assemblies in the United States 	Operating in Complex Environments – Special and Other Significant Events 	Special Events Working Aid 	Planning and Preparedness Can Promote an Effective Response to a Terrorist Attack at Open-Access Events 
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FIRST RESPONDER'S TOOLBOX Documents – Weapons / Methods:

Persistent Threat of Terrorist Ambush Attacks on First Responders 	ACID ATTACKS: Potential Opportunistic Threat and Rapid Treatment Awareness 	Vehicle-Borne Attacks: Tactics and Mitigations 	Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED): Preparedness, Recognition, and Response 
Best Practices for Vehicle Screening Against Terrorist Tactics 	Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP): Indicators of Acquisition and Manufacture, and Considerations for Response 	Urea Hydrogen Peroxide (UHP): Indicators of Acquisition and Manufacture, and Considerations for Response 	Plant-Derived Toxins: Indicators of Acquisition and Manufacture, and Considerations for Response 
Terrorist Insider Threat 	Knockdown Gases: Dangers, Indicators, and Response 	Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): Recognizing Malicious Modification 	Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine: Indicators of Acquisition and Manufacture, and Considerations for Response 
IED Manufacture Indicators 			

For a full listing of all JCAT products, please see our catalog:

[First Responder's Toolbox–A Catalog From December 2013 To December 2020](#)



NCR Forecast Overview (18JAN2021-24JAN2021)

Hazardous Weather: None

Caution: None

Detailed Forecast

M.L.King Day	Partly sunny, with a high near 46. West wind 6 to 16 mph, with gusts as high as 28 mph.
Tonight	Partly cloudy, with a low around 32. West wind 8 to 13 mph.
Tuesday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 49. Southwest wind 8 to 11 mph, with gusts as high as 24 mph.
Tuesday Night	Partly cloudy, with a low around 33. West wind around 9 mph.
Wednesday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 41. Northwest wind 9 to 18 mph, with gusts as high as 34 mph.
Wednesday Night	Partly cloudy, with a low around 28.
Thursday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 47.
Thursday Night	Partly cloudy, with a low around 34.
Friday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 47.
Friday Night	Mostly clear, with a low around 29.
Saturday	Sunny, with a high near 41.
Saturday Night	Mostly clear, with a low around 27.
Sunday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 41.



UNCLASSIFIED

NCR 5-DAY FORECAST

AS OF 0300 HRS LOCAL 18 JAN 21

FORECAST	Mon 18 Jan 21		Tue 19 Jan 21		Wed 20 Jan 21		Thu 21 Jan 21		Fri 22 Jan 21		
	Trace		0.00 in		0.00 in		0.00 in		0.00 in		
	LO: 33F/1C HI: 43F/6C		LO: 29F/-2C HI: 43F/6C		LO: 30F/-1C HI: 37F/3C		LO: 26F/-3C HI: 44F/7C		LO: 30F/-1C HI: 48F/9C		
	DP: 29F/-1C RH: 85%		DP: 23F/-5C RH: 78%		DP: 14F/-10C RH: 50%		DP: 19F/-7C RH: 74%		DP: 28F/-2C RH: 93%		
	WIND CHILL 27F/-3C HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 24F/-4C HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 17F/-9C HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 20F/-7C HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL N/A HEAT INDEX N/A		
	13G24 KTS		13G24 KTS		13G29 KTS		8 KTS		9 KTS		
	00/18 L&R: 24 KTS		00/18 L&R: 24 KTS		00/18 L&R: 26 KTS		00/18 L&R: 3 KTS		00/18 L&R: 6 KTS		
	7 SM / 5000FT		7 SM / 5000FT		7 SM / 700FT		7 SM / 700FT		7 SM / 700FT		
	MOSTLY CLOUDY		MOSTLY CLOUDY		CLOUDY		MOSTLY CLOUDY		PARTLY CLOUDY		
MAX DA: -920FT		MAX PA: +133FT		MAX DA: -1235FT		MAX PA: -94FT		MAX DA: -1563FT		MAX PA: -90FT	
MAX DA: -733FT		MAX PA: +142FT		MAX DA: -489FT		MAX PA: +138FT					
BMNT: 06:22 EENT: 18:16		BMNT: 06:22 EENT: 18:17		BMNT: 06:21 EENT: 18:18		BMNT: 06:21 EENT: 18:19		BMNT: 06:20 EENT: 18:20			
SR: 07:24 SS: 17:14		SR: 07:23 SS: 17:15		SR: 07:23 SS: 17:16		SR: 07:22 SS: 17:17		SR: 07:22 SS: 17:18			
MR: 10:49 MS: 22:58		MR: 11:13 MS: 23:56		MR: 11:37 MS: **		MR: 12:02 MS: 00:54		MR: 12:30 MS: 01:53			
ILLUM DATA		34%		44%		58%		67%		63%	
ROTARY WING											
FIXED WING											
GROUND OPS											
IAA											
NBC OPS											
TIME (LOCAL)		00 06 12 18		00 06 12 18		00 06 12 18		00 06 12 18		00 06 12 18	
TIME (ZULU)		05 11 17 23		05 11 17 23		05 11 17 23		05 11 17 23		05 11 17 23	

C - Ceiling W - Wind T - Temperature S - Atmos. Stability 1 - S W

FORECASTER: JFHQ-NCR

UNCLASSIFIED



National Weather Service Baltimore/Washington
Weather Impact Matrix: Inauguration - US Capitol Next 24 Hours
Valid: 01/18/2021 04 AM - 01/19/2021 04 AM EST



	Mon 01/18 4 AM	Mon 01/18 5 AM	Mon 01/18 6 AM	Mon 01/18 7 AM	Mon 01/18 8 AM	Mon 01/18 9 AM	Mon 01/18 10 AM	Mon 01/18 11 AM	Mon 01/18 12 PM	Mon 01/18 1 PM	Mon 01/18 2 PM	Mon 01/18 3 PM	Mon 01/18 4 PM	Mon 01/18 5 PM	Mon 01/18 6 PM	Mon 01/18 7 PM	Mon 01/18 8 PM	Mon 01/18 9 PM	Mon 01/18 10 PM	Mon 01/18 11 PM	Tue 01/19 12 AM	Tue 01/19 1 AM	Tue 01/19 2 AM	Tue 01/19 3 AM	Tue 01/19 4 AM
Temperature	34°F	33°F	36°F	35°F	36°F	37°F	39°F	41°F	42°F	43°F	44°F	44°F	43°F	42°F	40°F	39°F	38°F	37°F	36°F	36°F	35°F	35°F	35°F	34°F	34°F
Wind Chill	29°F	28°F	31°F	30°F	30°F	30°F	32°F	34°F	35°F	36°F	37°F	37°F	36°F	36°F	33°F	33°F	32°F	31°F	30°F	30°F	29°F	30°F	30°F	29°F	29°F
Wind Speed	5 mph	5 mph	5 mph	5 mph	6 mph	9 mph	10 mph	11 mph	12 mph	13 mph	13 mph	13 mph	12 mph	11 mph	10 mph	9 mph	9 mph	8 mph	8 mph	6 mph	6 mph	5 mph	5 mph	5 mph	5 mph
Wind Direction	SW	SW	SW	SW	SW	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	SW
Wind Gust	6 mph	6 mph	6 mph	6 mph	8 mph	10 mph	11 mph	19 mph	21 mph	23 mph	23 mph	23 mph	21 mph	14 mph	11 mph	10 mph	10 mph	9 mph	9 mph	8 mph	8 mph	6 mph	6 mph	6 mph	6 mph
Chance of Precipitation	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Weather	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Sky Cover	Partly Cloudy	Partly Cloudy	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Sunny	Partly Cloudy	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear	Mostly Clear
Rainfall	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in
Snow Accumulation	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in
Ice Accumulation	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in	0.0 in
Ceiling	None	None	None	None	9300 ft	9300 ft	8400 ft	6800 ft	5200 ft	5200 ft	5200 ft	5200 ft	5300 ft	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Visibility	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM	10.0 SM
Mixing Height	172 ft	0 ft	0 ft	166 ft	1167 ft	2541 ft	3957 ft	5270 ft	6390 ft	7085 ft	7323 ft	7013 ft	6076 ft	4195 ft	1980 ft	222 ft	0 ft	0 ft	162 ft	169 ft	184 ft	196 ft	194 ft	186 ft	178 ft
Ventilation Rate	1032 kt*ft	0 kt*ft	0 kt*ft	1162 kt*ft	12837 kt*ft	43197 kt*ft	83097 kt*ft	115940 kt*ft	140580 kt*ft	148365 kt*ft	161106 kt*ft	161299 kt*ft	133672 kt*ft	79705 kt*ft	27720 kt*ft	2220 kt*ft	0 kt*ft	0 kt*ft	1134 kt*ft	1014 kt*ft	1104 kt*ft	1176 kt*ft	1164 kt*ft	1116 kt*ft	1068 kt*ft
Winter Threat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Issued: Monday January 18, 2021, 04:01 AM
018



U.S. ARMY




TODAY

January 18 Monday)

January 19 (Tuesday)

January 20 (Wednesday)






U.S. ARMY



January 20 (Wednesday)

January 21 (Thursday)

January 22 (Friday)






U.S. ARMY



January 22 (Friday)

January 23 (Saturday)

January 24 (Sunday)





Washington Channel Flood Gauge

Washington Channel Flood gauge is Forecasted to be below minor levels today.


Notes:

At 3.70ft: Water begins to overflow the lowest Spots along the seawall adjacent to Ohio Drive And the Hains Point Loop Road.

At 4.2ft: Lowland is occurring along sporadic Portions of seawall adjacent to Ohio Drive and Hains Point Loop Road.

At 5.3ft: The unprotected area on the Southwest Waterfront at the DC seafood market begins to flood. Water approaches parts of the Hains Point Loop Road, but the road will likely be closed.

Forecasts for the Washington Channel at SW Waterfront are issued routinely year-round.



Flood Categories (in feet)	
Major Flood Stage:	7
Moderate Flood Stage:	5.3
Flood Stage:	4.2
Action Stage:	3.7



January 2021

Whither the IRGC of the 2020s?

Is Iran's Proxy Warfare Strategy of Forward Defense Sustainable?

Alex Vatanka

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Candace Rondeaux and Daniel Rothenberg for their support and instructive feedback that made this paper possible. And thanks to New America/ Arizona State University Future of War project for their support for this important series of studies.

About the Author(s)

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The International Security program aims to provide evidence-based analysis of some of the thorniest questions facing American policymakers and the public. We are focused on South Asia and the Middle East, extremist groups such as ISIS, al Qaeda and allied groups, the proliferation of drones, homeland security, and the activities of U.S. Special Forces and the CIA.

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I. Executive Summary

On January 2, 2020, the United States assassinated the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force, General Qassem Soleimani, in Iraq and accused him of playing a role in an alleged attack on American troops by Iran-backed Shia militias. The assassination signaled a major escalation in the conflict between Iran and the United States. For a moment, the conflict ceased to be a proxy war characterized by efforts to keep tensions deniable and indirect and instead became a direct exchange of violence, with Iran responding to the assassination with a direct missile strike on U.S. forces.

The fallout of the assassination reflects the contradictions and uncertainty at the heart of Iranian proxy warfare strategy and its approach known as “forward defense,”¹ in which Iran seeks to use proxies in other countries to prevent conflict from coming within Iran's borders. Iran's strategy was developed over decades through its confrontations with the United States and regional rivals and historically has emphasized its willingness to eschew revisionist religious and ideological aims in order to pursue national interests.

The 2011 Arab Spring, with its threat to Iran's key partner in Syria while opening opportunities in other areas, inaugurated a more uncertain era for Iran's proxy strategy. This uncertainty has been heightened by an increasingly aggressive U.S. stance towards Iran. As a result, Iran has played up appeals to religious and ideological aims alongside more traditional forms of proxy mobilization in its forward defense strategy.

Though Iran continues to view and portray itself as pursuing defensive ends vis-à-vis the United States and other rivals, the means it uses tend to signal more revisionist aims, an issue Iranian policymakers recognize as a challenge but embraced anyways. In turn, this has encouraged the United States, and some of its partners, to pursue their own more direct policies of maximum pressure with regard to Iran.

It is far from clear whether Iran can sustainably pursue this strategy. Iran has a history of agile use of proxies and relatively successful navigation between the mobilization of religious and ideological appeals and the pursuit of national interest. However, Iranian society is showing signs of concern regarding the limits of forward defense. Iran's rivals appear to have assessed that those strains are sufficient and that Iran will fold when confronted.

What is clear, however, is that this uncertainty brings with it the risk of repeated crises with the potential for escalation. Understanding whether and how stability in the relationship can be reasserted will require detailed examinations of the specific balances of national interest, ideological appeals, and Iranian control in the varied national contexts where the conflict is now playing out.

Key Findings:

- **The 2011 Arab Spring and 2014 war against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) inaugurated a period of greater Iranian aggressiveness in its use of proxy warfare as it confronted a number of crises that increased Iranian threat perceptions.**
- **Iranian proxy warfare strategy is shaped by a desire to minimize costs to Iran and its people. As a result, it historically sought to maintain plausible deniability.** Iran limited its direct contribution to the defense of the Assad regime in Syria, and has staffed its involvement in proxy wars generally from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) volunteers and by mobilizing local or foreign proxies, not by mobilizing the nation's more general armed forces. Iranian strategists tout the limitations on direct intervention as a success of the strategy.
- **While Iran has embraced more aggressive means in the form of a Forward Defense doctrine that seeks to give Iran strategic depth, it still views its objectives as largely defensive.** Iran views itself as facing an American threat to its homeland—escalated by the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign—as well as an American threat to a key partner in Assad's Syria, and an ISIS threat to Iranian partners and interests in Iraq.
- **However, using proxy forces to wage war on the cheap and as a public deterrent has led Iran to rely upon ideological and religious appeals in order to mobilize fighters and signal its capabilities.** In recent years, Iran has grown increasingly bold in making public statements that link together the movements it supports and its influence over their activities.
- **Iran's strategy contains a tension between its proclaimed defensive ends and its offensive means that have signaled a more revisionist intent to Iranian rivals. This tension holds the potential to escalate conflicts and thus make Iran's strategy unsustainable given its desire to minimize costs.** Iranian strategists are aware of the tension but supporters of the forward defense strategy view it as a manageable tension given its history of proxy warfare.
- **Iran's proxy strategy faces real political limits to its sustainability rooted in both domestic anger at the use of funds abroad, economic constraints, and backlash against perceived Iranian domination in countries where Iran seeks to build partners.**

- **The United States, for its part, has embraced a strategy of maximum pressure that views Iran's strategy as unsustainable and prone to failure when conflict takes on a more direct character.** Through sanctions and direct assassinations of key IRGC personnel, the United States hopes to force Iran to back down.
- **It is not clear if Iran's strategy is actually built to last, but the current moment is likely to be characterized by repeated crises with the potential to escalate into more direct confrontations because Iranian strategists view forward defense as an effective approach agile enough to manage tensions and the United States views it as an unsustainable policy that will fall apart when confronted.**
- **Policymakers should be aware of the ways in which Iran's methods of ensuring cost-effective mobilization when pressed shape threat perceptions across the region, the IRGC's own structure, and Iranian domestic politics.** The effects of particular policies are likely to be complex and often unpredictable given the way transnational mobilization and signals interlink conflicts.
- **An effective approach to this moment of crisis instability will require analysis of the sustainability of specific Iranian interventions.** In some cases, like Iran's support for Hezbollah, ideological and material ties make it unlikely that pressure can disrupt an established proxy relationship. In others, like Yemen, Iran's commitment to the Houthis is more vulnerable to pressure. Other cases, like the Shi'a militias in Iraq, are less clear.

II. Introduction

The U.S. assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani on January 2, 2020 in Baghdad was so unprecedented that many feared that any move afterward might lead to all-out war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. After four decades of tense rivalry in the Middle East, the American use of an armed drone to target a military official widely viewed as one of the most powerful men in Iran signaled a precipitous climb up the escalation ladder between Washington and Tehran. Iran in turn retaliated on January 8 with direct missile strikes on American forces in Iraq, although the strikes did not kill anyone.² By one account, the Iranians had given the U.S. military an eight-hour notice to clear the bases before the missiles hit. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the Revolutionary Guards' Aerospace Force, claimed that the warning had been given to the Americans because Tehran "did not intend to kill [persons]."³ Tehran wanted both to show a capacity to strike at the United States but also to demonstrate that it had no intentions to see the military standoff escalate further.

For now, despite the missile strike, Iran appears prepared to double down on the proxy war strategy that was Soleimani's most significant contribution to Tehran's anti-access, area denial approach to deterring American attempts to expand U.S. regional influence that could seed regime change in Tehran.

Over the course of the last decade, this Iranian approach to regional military operations began to be described by its proponents in Tehran as "forward defense." Put simply, forward defense holds that militarily confronting enemies outside of Iran's borders is preferable to having to face them inside of Iran's borders. At its core, forward defense is the embodiment of Iran's military lessons gained over the four decades since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It reflects a fusion of the tools available to Iranian military leaders combined with the need to address a fast-changing security environment.

While Soleimani was one of the principal creators of the concept, his death will not be the end of the strategy. That has been the message sent by Iran's Supreme Leader and Commander-in-Chief, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei swiftly appointed Soleimani's successor, Esmail Ghaani, as head of the Qods Force, the branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) that operates outside of Iran's borders. Khamenei has also been categorical that the mission of the Qods Force as intended by Soleimani will continue. As he put it, "The strategy of the Qods Force will be identical to that during the time of Martyr General Soleimani."⁴

In a speech on May 22, 2020 set to coincide with Al Qods Day, which is an event to express opposition to the State of Israel, Khamenei was unusually polemical and signaled his determination to stay the course. In urging the expansion of "jihad inside Palestinian territories [Israel]," he not only praised groups such as

Lebanon's Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas but vowed that Iran would stand by them on the path of "holy struggle."⁵ Iranian officials even set aside the usual application of deniability. In a rare move, state-run media publicized the fact that Soleimani had spearheaded the transfer of Iranian weaponry to Palestinian militants.⁶ Such statements from Tehran are a rebuff of American and Israeli demands that Tehran roll back its support for militant Islamist groups in various theaters in the Middle East.

In pursuing this strategy in the post-Arab Spring era, Iran has increasingly come to embrace aggressive means that involve transnational mobilization and the interlinking of proxy forces, which has in turn encouraged the United States and other Iranian rivals to perceive Iran's strategy as an offensive and revisionist one.

Soleimani's assassination, increased tensions vis-à-vis the United States, and the fluidity of the geopolitics of the Middle East, have brought into the open questions in Iran about the long-term costs, benefits, and risks of a forward defense strategy that relies on Tehran's ability to continue to defy the growing pressures on its economy from U.S. sanctions and fund proxy groups. In the same week as hardliners around Khamenei were touting Tehran's commitment to militant revolutionary foreign policy, a prominent parliamentarian launched a rare public criticism of Tehran's regional agenda.

Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh,⁷ who until recently had been head of the Iranian parliament's committee on national security and foreign policy, asked for Iran to reassess its commitment to the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria. "[Iran] has probably given 20 to 30 billion dollars to Syria and must recover it. The money belonging to this nation [Iran] has been spent there," he said.⁸ The reference to funds invested in backing Syria's Assad was a clear attack on Tehran's foreign policy priorities or that was at least how Khamenei loyalists viewed it. Hossein Shariatmadari, the Khamenei-appointed editor of Kayhan, the Islamic Republic's equivalent to the Soviet Pravda, denounced Falahatpisheh as doing Trump's bidding by turning Iranian public opinion against Tehran's foreign policy.⁹ The incident was a peek into the opaque policy-making process in Tehran and evidence of competing viewpoints in Tehran in regard to the cost of Iran's regional efforts and whether it is sustainable.

The question now for the Biden administration and Congress as well as for their counterparts in Iran is whether Iranian proxy war strategy is truly built to last. The Trump administration turned the calculus of indirect confrontation with Iran on its head, evidently deciding that the United States either no longer needs or can no longer afford the risks that come with fighting Iran's proxies in the shadows. Despite the Trump administration's repeated public pronouncements that it wanted to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East and discontinue its perceived role as regional policeman, the White House opted to put on display American hard power as a way of forcing the Iranians capitulate to a campaign of "maximum pressure" aimed at forcing Iran to recalibrate its approach to Iraq,

Syria, and Israel. This new U.S. approach essentially destroyed the crisis stability that was part and parcel of a covert action strategy anchored in plausible deniability. The high-profile assassination of Soleimani was the most overt expression of this new policy. At the same time, Iran has increasingly adopted public, aggressive means in pursuit of its forward defense strategy.

In the short term, this fresh American resolve will have to contend with one simple reality: Iran's ongoing determination and ability to mobilize, guide, and launch a host of militant groups across the Middle East that Tehran has painstakingly cultivated for decades. In fact, Soleimani and other architects of Iran's forward defense, proxy war strategy would argue that this turn in American policy has been long awaited, and that Iran and its allies are ready for the challenge.

Yet, while Tehran's ability to mobilize an array of foreign militias under its flag is no small feat, the contention that Iran can stay the course regardless of American counter-actions is an untested theory as is the hope of some U.S. policymakers that U.S. pressure can effectively rollback Iranian footprint across the region. Evaluating where, when, and why Iran's forward defense strategy has worked and where it is built on a sustainable foundation and understanding where it has failed and lacks a sustainable foundation, will be central to determining the effectiveness of both U.S. and Iranian crisis management. In the meantime, the uncertainty will likely bring with it periodic crises that at least appear to hold the potential for further escalation to more direct confrontations.

The rest of this report is divided into three sections. The first section examines the historical development of Iran's proxy warfare strategy under Soleimani. The second section examines the sustainability of the strategy today, and the third and concluding section draws lessons from the clash between Iranian proxy strategy and America's new hard power approach.

III. Soleimani Ascendant: The Origins of Iran’s “Forward Defense” Strategy

The geopolitical feud between Iran and the United States dates to 1979 when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his militant Islamist supporters overthrew the Shah of Iran and soon after took control of the U.S. embassy. Though many historians have assessed that the CIA-backed coup that led to the ouster of Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 planted the initial seeds of mistrust between the United States and the Iranian people, it was Khomeini’s rise to power that earned the United States its most-hated-nation status in Iran among anti-Shah forces. Following the hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979, Washington responded in kind, casting the Khomeinists as the source of nearly all wrongdoing in the Middle East.¹⁰

For nearly half a century, the U.S.-Iran conflict was largely characterized by mutual restraint. Neither Washington nor Tehran judged an open military conflict to be in their interests. Instead, a kind of crisis stability anchored in a proxy war paradigm of covert action shaped the normative bounds of American and Iranian strategy. Hit and run attacks on American targets by Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s and later by proxy elements currently allied with the Popular Mobilization Forces or the PMF in Iraq punctuated by American-backed counterattacks in the form of cyber-strikes and targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists on the streets of Tehran have long been part of the backdrop. Each element of this tit-for-tat proxy war between Washington and Tehran always rested on one simple element: plausible deniability.¹¹

The Iran-Iraq War, Soleimani, and Iran’s Geopolitical Approach to Proxy Warfare

Iran’s proxy warfare strategy of using regional non-state militant groups paralleled Qassem Soleimani’s rise as a military commander during the 1990s on the heels of the Iran-Iraq war. Born in 1957, Soleimani came from a poor family in the central province of Kerman. As a teenager he became an anti-Shah Islamist activist before the revolution of 1979 but he did not stand out at that time.¹² The revolution began and prevailed in Tehran but droves of young men—mostly from impoverished rural backgrounds—jumped on the bandwagon. Soleimani was one of them. While he had no formal military training, his chance in life came at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). He enlisted as a volunteer with the Guards and quickly moved up through the ranks of the IRGC, the group of ragtag, armed young men that were empowered and mandated by Ayatollah Khomeini to defend the Islamic Republic against all domestic and foreign enemies.

In late 1980, a few months after the war with Iraq had begun, the 23-year Soleimani was given the command of a volunteer force from his home province of Kerman in what became the 41st Sarallah Division.¹³ This newly formed division was deployed to Iran's Kurdistan province, an area both known for heavy ethnic Kurdish separatist militancy but also as a staging ground into Iraq. On the other side of the border was Iraqi Kurdistan where Tehran, from the days of the Shah, had cultivated anti-Saddam Iraqi Kurds as allies against Baghdad.¹⁴ It is here that Soleimani experienced first-hand the utility of co-opting and deploying foreign militants as part of military strategizing.¹⁵

Ideological or religious reasons were, at best, secondary drivers at this point. The ideological and religious-based reasoning that later came to dominate the narrative to justify forward defense had yet to be born. Nonetheless, it is during the first years of the Iran-Iraq War, which began in September 1980, that the Qods Force, the expeditionary branch of the IRGC, was born, although its mission would evolve over time.¹⁶ Its actions were centered on cross-border operations along the Iran-Iraq battle lines and on recruiting Iraqis.¹⁷ Mostafa Chamran, an Iranian Islamist revolutionary who had seen military training with Shia militants in Lebanon in the 1970s, was a key driver behind the adoption of asymmetric warfare tactics and became the Islamic Republic's first defense minister.¹⁸ While Soleimani was not a key player in the formation of this new outfit, he would be a key participant in the application of the new approach, which mirrored the missions of special operations forces in countries like the United States, including covert action and reconnaissance behind enemy lines.¹⁹ In time, what would make the Qods Force stand out was its use of Shia Islamist rallying cries and its recruitment among Shias outside of Iran.

The Qods Force's mission was not centered on exploiting religious or sectarian fervor at first. The Iraqi Kurds that Iranian commanders like Soleimani collaborated with were not Shia but secular Sunnis. Iranian support for them was an early signal of the Islamic Republic's willingness to collaborate with an assortment of non-Shia or non-Islamist actors as long as the partnership advanced Iran's perceived geopolitical interests. In a decade's time, Iran would be militarily supporting a range of Sunni groups deemed as important to Islamic Republic national interests including the Sunni Afghan Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to the Sunni Bosnians²⁰ in the Yugoslav civil war to the Sunni Hamas in Gaza.²¹ As Zalmay Khalilzad put it in regards to Iran's *modus operandi* in Afghanistan during the 1990s, being Shia "was not sufficient to gain Iranian support."²² This was also evident in Iran's support for Christian Armenia against Shia Muslim Azerbaijan in the war between the two countries over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s.²³

In all of its efforts involving military partners and operations outside of Iran, certain characteristics stand out. Tehran always performed a careful cost-benefit analysis and, as David Menashri argues, it "diligently sought out opportunities in

areas, or in movements, that seemed ripe to respond” to its ideological overtures.

²⁴ The Shia Islamist Iraqis, many of whom moved to Iran to fight Saddam Hussain’s regime under Ayatollah Khomeini’s spiritual and political leadership during the Iran-Iraq war, were one such group. It was during the early 1980s that some of the most prominent present-day Iraqi militia leaders—men such as Hadi Ameri and Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, who was killed alongside Soleimani in January—launched their collaboration with their sponsors in the IRGC.²⁵

The Badr Corps, composed of Shia Iraqi Islamists who looked to Iran, began as a brigade and remained under tight IRGC control. This oversight angered Mohammad Baqir Al-Hakim, the Iraqi Shia cleric who headed the political wing of the Badr movement.²⁶ He complained to the then President Ali Khamenei and Speaker of the Majlis, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Still, the senior IRGC commanders backed by the political leadership in Tehran were determined to maintain strict Iranian control of the foreign forces they were arming and funding. The dispute over command-and-control was somehow resolved and the relationship continued.²⁷ Since the dispute, however, Iran has continued to have lingering doubts about its ability to effectively organize and control its foreign proxies as it sees fit.

Soleimani held the post of commander of the 41st Sarallah Division throughout the Iran-Iraq War. He was one of the youngest military commanders but never a specially celebrated one during the war and his fame would only come years later in the 2000s as he began to cultivate a public image.²⁸ The one factor that appears to have counted in his favor is that he developed a personal bond with the then President Ali Khamenei who frequently visited the war front. The future supreme leader, who took over after Khomeini’s death in June 1989, never forgot that Soleimani had kept him in the highest esteem when many other IRGC commanders viewed Khamenei suspiciously throughout his presidency (1981-1989).²⁹

It was precisely this close personal bond between Khamenei and Soleimani that many analysts have considered as pivotal to the rise and relative independence of the Qods Force during Soleimani’s command from 1998 until his death in 2020. Soleimani’s death thus raised questions about whether the organization would maintain its stature within the power structures of the Islamic Republic without Soleimani at the helm.

Lessons from a Neighbor Under Siege: Soleimani’s First Forays in Afghanistan

After the Iran-Iraq War, Soleimani was given the mission of dealing with rampant organized crime, including arms and drug trafficking coming out of Afghanistan, a country ravaged by civil war where a new breed of extremist movement under the banner of the Taliban was on the rise. Tehran viewed the movement not only

as anti-Iran and anti-Shia but as a creation of its regional rivals, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.³⁰

In early 1998, as Iran was still recovering from the devastation wrought by the eight-year war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Soleimani was named head of the Qods Force.³¹ At the time, Soleimani was barely known to the Iranian public, but he was a known figure among warring factions in neighboring Afghanistan where he had served as Iran's key military liaison to anti-Taliban forces in the Northern Alliance.³² Little analysis has been conducted in the English language about Soleimani's efforts to aid and guide Northern Alliance forces then under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Sunni and ethnic Tajik leader who was among the top opponents of the Taliban.³³ What is known is that Soleimani had been in his new role less than a year when Taliban forces in August of 1998 captured the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i Sharif and promptly arrested nine diplomats at the Iranian consulate.

The Taliban forces, after they had by one account received instructions from Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence), killed all the Iranians except one who managed to escape.³⁴ Tehran made a show out of its response, mobilizing tens of thousands of troops on the border ready to go into Afghanistan. Still, after lengthy deliberation, Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) opted against a conventional military retaliation against the Taliban, in part fearing being drawn into a quagmire.³⁵ Instead, under the auspices of the Qods Force, Tehran increased its financial and military support for its anti-Taliban partners like Ahmad Shah Massoud.³⁶ Tehran not only welcomed but actively sought to assist the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban in 2001 following the terrorist attacks of September 11.³⁷

Soleimani's close links with the Northern Alliance would prove enduring and critical for bolstering his assertions about the value of proxy relations for maintaining a forward defense and deterrent against potential aggression or overreach by adversaries. This kind of patronage also gave Iran leverage not just in the military theater but also on the political and diplomatic stages. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has claimed that the December 2001 Bonn conference that led to Afghanistan's first post-Taliban government could not have succeeded without Soleimani's mediation and ability to pressure the various Afghan political groups that he had cultivated ties with throughout the 1990s.³⁸

During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, the Qods Force and its top commanders, including Soleimani but also Esmail Ghaani, proved to the political leadership in Tehran that the supply of arms and funds to Afghan militants had not only given Iran a say in the battlefield but also had given Tehran a role as a principal powerbroker in that country. This gave Soleimani much personal confidence, which he soon put on public display. By 2008, Soleimani famously sent a message to the top U.S. military official in Iraq: "General Petraeus, you

should know that I, Qassem Soleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan.”³⁹

The War on Terror and the Arab Spring Years: Iran’s Efforts to Consolidate Forward Defense in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003 prompted a period of reorganization and consolidation of Iran’s military expeditionary forces under the Qods Force. Not only did Soleimani have direct access to Khamenei, which meant he could bypass the rest of the IRGC bosses, but the leadership in Tehran had never had more reason to invest in forward defense. In early 2002, the Bush administration named Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of an “Axis of Evil.” It was not unreasonable for the Iranians to think they might be next in a broader U.S. military campaign in the Middle East following 9/11. Keeping the Americans bogged down elsewhere in the region presented an attractive strategy for Tehran. Despite the risk it took in angering Washington, the strategy was worthwhile if it meant preventing or stalling a possible American attack on the Iranian homeland.

The newly reenergized Qods Force reflected hard lessons learned from several different phases of strategic realignment. From support for Hezbollah in Lebanon beginning in the 1980s to backing for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in the 1990s and various groups in Iraq and Yemen in the 2000s, Soleimani’s way of war led to mixed results. Yet, each case allowed Qods Force commanders to adapt and refine their proxy war strategy, and modulate the response to increasing American pressure in the form of covert counter attacks and sanctions. Meanwhile, Soleimani significantly elevated the degree of freedom of operation provided to Qods Force commanders.

As part of the Qods Force organizational structure, each region of operation is given to an individual commander. This “One Country, One File, One Commander” was Soleimani’s brainchild and gives individual Qods Force commanders extraordinary freedom to design and implement policy; but it also makes them responsible for the outcome, according to Morad Veisi, a journalist with *Radio Farda*, the Iranian branch of the United States’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and an expert on the IRGC.⁴⁰ In those most delicate theaters where the Qods Force required maximum policy control, its officers have often been the ones Tehran has dispatched as its top diplomatic envoys. In the case of Iraq, all three of Iran’s ambassadors to Baghdad since 2003 have come from the Qods Force.⁴¹

To the Qods Force leaders in Tehran, Iran’s support to a long list of militant groups across the Middle East translates into leverage. These groups are seen as a vindication of the mobilization and financing of the so-called forward defense. The militant groups help to project Iranian military reach and, at times,

ideological influence. While Iran's consolidation of a forward defense strategy was driven by overarching regional dynamics including a growing perception of a U.S. threat and the rise of new opportunities and challenges with the Arab Spring, its character varied across different national contexts. This was so despite growing public references to transnational mobilization and connections between groups.

Hezbollah in Lebanon: An Enduring, Ideologically Close Relationship with Geopolitical Value

Hezbollah in Lebanon is the best example of Iran's forward defense concept.⁴² This should not be surprising. Iran's own IRGC began as a militia in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and, 41 years later, it is the most formidable political-military-economic actor in the country. This IRGC has diligently worked to replicate its success domestically and turn its foreign proxies into powerbrokers in their respective home countries.

In the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the IRGC and its Qods Force foreign branch did not only ideologically indoctrinate and arm the group, but selected and groomed its leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, its present leader, and Imad Mughniyeh, the group's top military planner who was assassinated in a joint American-Israeli operation in 2008.⁴³

Hezbollah's nearly four-decade alliance with the Islamic Republic is the ultimate successful embodiment of the application of forward defense. Unlike many of the other groups that Tehran has backed since 1979, Hezbollah not only shares the Shia Islamist ideological model adopted in Tehran but provides Iran with a platform from which to militarily exert pressure on its top regional nemesis, Israel. From Tehran's perspective, Hezbollah represents the best the forward defense model can offer: an effective tool of national interest combined with a close and enduring relationship strengthened by both material and ideological ties.

Iran in Syria and Iraq: Key Geopolitical Partner, Contested Ties, and the Role of Ideological and Transnational Mobilization as Stopgap

Yet Iran's military interventions in Syria since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 demonstrate that ideological conformity is not a prerequisite for Tehran's support. Hezbollah may be a particularly successful case of forward defense, but it is far from the only model for the strategy, which often relies on proxies whose ideological ties to Iran are often far weaker than those of Hezbollah. The Syrian case also illustrates the limits and risks of Iran's pursuit of proxy warfare reliant upon relationships of a less enduring and ideologically bound character.

The Islamic Republic has nothing in common in terms of creed with the secular Baathist regime of Bashar Al Assad.⁴⁴ Despite this, Iran intervened militarily on behalf of Assad in close partnership with its ideological offspring, Hezbollah.

Iran's Syrian intervention demonstrated its versatility. It also showed Iran's ability to compartmentalize its regional ambitions and work with foreign partners while awkwardly attempting to publicly cast the mission in Islamist clothing. Iran's key objective was to save a geopolitical ally with a secular system while minimizing costs to Iran itself.⁴⁵ Notably, Iran's primary foreign cohort in the mission in Syria has been Vladimir Putin's Russian Federation, hardly a vanguard of Islamism.⁴⁶

The biggest departure in Syria, when compared to the situation in Iraq, was the need for Iran to bring in droves of non-locals—such as Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis—to fight under Iranian leadership to keep the Assad regime from collapse.⁴⁷ Unlike in Shia-majority Iraq, where the indoctrination of a generation of pro-Islamic Republic sympathizers had been under way before Saddam's fall, Syria's sectarian realities meant that the manpower shortage was a problem for Tehran. This also differentiated Syria from Lebanon, where Iran could rely upon a close ideological ally in Hezbollah. The Qods Force proved agile in circumventing this impediment. In doing so, it sharpened the essence of what forward defense means in practical terms in the post-Arab Spring Middle East by drawing upon transnational networks to resolve the challenges of proxy warfare in a particular context.

The manifestation of forward defense in Iraq and in Syria, since 2003 and 2012 respectively, highlights two basic facts. First, Iran has demonstrated agility in defining and implementing security policy in the region. Second, Iran's activities in Iraq and Syria reveal a consensus among Iranian policy-makers that the appetite of the Iranian public for forward defense is finite.

Tehran did not engage in large-scale recruitment of Iranians to be dispatched to Syria. The few thousand Iranians sent to Syria, ostensibly as military advisors, were overwhelmingly drawn from volunteers in the ranks of the IRGC and not the conscripted Iranian army.⁴⁸ Iran thus depended upon its ability to appeal to and recruit among non-Iranian Shia in the region in order to mobilize the transnational networks.⁴⁹ While national interest was the primary motivator for Iran's defense of Syria, the limits imposed by Iranian society required an emphasis upon sectarian and religious appeals in the means of accomplishing those goals.

The mobilization of non-Iranian forces was a double-edged sword. It helped resolve Iran's manpower problems. But in strengthening appeals to transnational ideological claims, Iran provided its regional rivals with a convincing argument that Tehran was indoctrinating, funding, and arming a new generation of Shia militants and hence, fueling a regional Shia-Sunni sectarian divide. Iran, a non-

Arab and Shia majority country with aspirations to lead the Islamic world, has always been highly sensitive to the charge of acting as a Shia sectarian power and it has invested heavily in countering this complaint levelled against it. However, the priority of keeping Assad in power superseded Tehran's wish to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the Sunni street.⁵⁰ As a result, Iran's approach helped mobilize opposition to Iranian policy and stoked fears that Iran was seeking more revisionist aims.

The IRGC bosses were undeterred and unapologetic. In August 2012, as Tehran's military intervention in Syria became increasingly public, then-IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Hossein Salami said "our doctrines are defensive at the level of (grand) strategy, but our strategies and tactics are offensive."⁵¹ IRGC commanders proudly defended the ability to practice "deep-attack doctrine."⁵² In April 2019, Khamenei appointed Salami to become the head of the IRGC, and Soleimani's nominal boss, even as Soleimani retained his direct and much publicized access to the Supreme Leader.⁵³ Meanwhile, Khamenei's support for forward defense became increasingly overt. "We mustn't be satisfied with our region. By remaining within our borders, we shouldn't neglect the threats over our borders. A broad overseas vision, which is the IRGC's responsibility, is our strategic depth and it is of the utmost importance," he told the IRGC bosses.⁵⁴

Support for the Houthis in Yemen: Loose Ties and a Low Level of Interest

Iran's role in the Yemeni civil war starting in 2014 demonstrates both the limitations of forward defense war and how Tehran has been selective and careful in applying the strategy. It is commonplace to read that Tehran is the sponsor of the Yemeni Houthi rebels fighting the UN-recognized Yemeni government. In reality, when the last round of conflict began in Yemen in 2014, few Iranians were familiar with the term "Houthis" or "Ansar-Allah," the official name of the group. The lack of historic ties between Tehran and the Houthi movement and an exaggerated sense of the importance of sectarian bonds between the two only underscore that their relationship has mostly been a marriage of convenience.⁵⁵

Neither Soleimani nor any other senior IRGC commander ever made a public appearance in Yemen. This stands in contrast to prominent public visits to Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.⁵⁶ Tehran has not made extensive efforts to spread its religious ideology among the Houthis, who are mostly followers of the Zaidi sect in Islam.⁵⁷ The export of Khomeinism to the Houthis of Yemen has happened, but only in small doses as compared to Iraq or Lebanon. Yemen is, from Tehran's perspective, too far-flung, too fractured, and unripe to be a good host for Iran's forward defense doctrine.⁵⁸

Iran has compared the Houthis to Hezbollah in Lebanon.⁵⁹ If the latter could be a spear aimed at Israel, the Houthis could be Tehran's pawn against the Saudis. Ali Shirazi, Supreme Leader Khamenei's representative to the Qods force, expressed such a view to the Iranian press in January 2015 and on other occasions.⁶⁰ But Yemen was never a core priority for Tehran and the Houthis were never as submissive to Tehran as Hezbollah or the pro-Iran Shia Iraqi groups. Instead, the dynamic in the Iran-Houthi partnership has depended overwhelmingly on the policy decisions of third-party actors, most notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.⁶¹ For example, since late 2019, when the Houthis began the latest round of peace talks with the Saudis and the Americans in Oman, the Iranians were effectively sidelined. The Houthi-Saudi peace talks began shortly after Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei received a senior Houthi delegation in August.⁶² Either Tehran was urging the Houthis to sue for peace or it had little influence over their strategic decisions (or both). Even in Washington a new message began to be disseminated that downplayed the closeness of Tehran and the Houthis.⁶³

Nevertheless, the Houthis continue to provide Iran with a possible staging-ground from Yemen should Tehran opt to pursue a more militant posture against Riyadh, including via the use of Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory as a launchpad for Iranian-supplied missile strikes. The case of Iran's relations with the Houthis shows that when examining the extent and appeal of the Iranian proxy model of forward defense, it is critical to look for the depth in relations, which is an indicator of Tehran's ability to consolidate its regional alliance against the United States and its allies under the banner of the "Axis of Resistance."

IV. Conclusion: Is “Forward Defense” A Sustainable Military Doctrine?

Iran’s forward defense doctrine draws on a long history, including a critical period of consolidation over the 2000s and 2010s. However, as the United States increasingly perceives direct challenges to Iranian proxy actions as a workable strategy, it is far from clear if the doctrine will prove sustainable over the 2020s.

Kayhan Barzegar, a prominent analyst in Tehran on Iranian regional policies, describes Tehran’s logic behind forward defense as “preempting the penetration of symmetric and asymmetric threats inside Iran’s borders.”⁶⁴ According to this line of thinking, Iran not only has to secure its national borders but in certain circumstances it has to go outside of its borders as part of a preemptive national security strategy.

Barzegar calls this the concept of “wider security zone,” which he argues is part of the “the strategic calculus employed by Iranian political-security elites.”⁶⁵ The mastermind behind the concept was Soleimani and, at its core, the logic holds that socio-political turmoil in the region, including the emergence of new security threats such as ISIS, requires an increased and active Iranian response, according to Barzegar.⁶⁶ Others are less certain about the soundness of such logic. Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues the notion of “Soleimani the savior” is highly ironic. According to him, “the Islamic State’s victories in Iraq [after 2014] were largely due to the ultra-sectarian policies he pressed on authorities in Baghdad.” As Clawson puts it, Iran and Soleimani have been both the “fireman and the arsonist,” in regard to conflicts in Iraq and Syria.⁶⁷

What Barzegar calls the application of power in Iran’s wider security zone is merely the latest reincarnation of forward defense. As described above, this concept has evolved over the last 40 years since Iran’s practical military needs during the Iran-Iraq War. It was then that young IRGC commanders like Soleimani looked for ways to overcome Iran’s limitations given Tehran’s isolation and lack of access to conventional military platforms.⁶⁸ Today, the proxy model still reflects Iran’s military weak points but it has also proven its utility.

Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings in 2011, the generals in the IRGC have argued that the shifting regional security environment requires Iran’s military strategy to adapt and reinvent itself. When ISIS carried out its first attacks in Tehran in June 2017, the proponents of forward defense wasted no time in arguing that had Iran not militarily intervened in Syria and Iraq, Iran would have had to confront a far greater ISIS threat inside its borders.⁶⁹ By implication, since the Iranians officially maintain that the United States has been an enabler for the rise of ISIS, Tehran’s rhetorical stance was that fighting ISIS is tantamount to

aborting American plans aimed at Iran. As Khamenei put it a few months before the ISIS attacks in Tehran, “there are well-documented news of American aid to ISIS and some other terrorist groups, and now that they [the Americans] have formed an anti-ISIS coalition, some U.S. agencies are still assisting ISIS in other ways.”⁷⁰ With the United States at the heart of Iran’s security calculations, this sort of logic is pervasive in Tehran. Put simply, the fight against ISIS as leverage against the United States is a common theme in the messaging of Iran’s leaders. The Revolutionary Guards Commander, Hossein Salami, explained in September 2019: “In war, the victor is the one that can shape the power equation. No power in the world today, including the United States, has the capacity to wage war against the Iranian people.”⁷¹ Nonetheless, Iranian academics, including those linked to the Foreign Ministry in Tehran, openly publish works admitting that Iran’s rivals do not see Tehran’s military posture as defensive.⁷² By implication, this is an admission that, in the Middle East at least, the concept of forward defense on a large scale is viewed as part of a grand strategy to expand its influence.

For Iran’s regional rivals, the Islamic Republic’s forward defense is considered a case of an ideological commitment rather than an Iranian national security imperative. That Tehran’s reliance on forward defense and depending on foreign militias is mostly by choice, driven by Tehran geopolitical choices and principally its rivalry with the United States and her regional allies. In turn, states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and, to a lesser extent, Turkey, are determined to stop Iran in its tracks even as they each are pursuing their own versions of geopolitical forward defense from Yemen to Syria to Libya. As part of this cycle, many billions of dollars are invested in competition for influence in the region.⁷³

The resultant proxy warfare arms races pose a challenge to Iranian strategy, which has sought to minimize costs to the Iranian people. So far, Iran’s forward defense appears largely to have been implemented on a tight budget. Iran is not the biggest military spender in the Middle East today.⁷⁴ But Tehran also has far less cash on hand due to American sanctions. President Hassan Rouhani has claimed that American sanctions have cost Iran \$200 billion.⁷⁵ The issue of Iran’s ability to fund its proxy allies, and the reliance of its approach in cases like Syria on stopgap measures that can encourage escalation on the part of its rivals, poses a threat to the sustainability of the forward defense model. However, it is not an imminent risk to Iran’s ability to pursue the strategy.

As Tehran has demonstrated over the years, it is able to prioritize. Not every Arab proxy group has the same value to Iran. Hezbollah of Lebanon is, to a significant extent, politically and religiously indistinguishable from the Islamic Republic. There is, however, much daylight between the Houthis of Yemen and the Iranians. Aside from an ability to prioritize if needed and redefine forward defense depending on circumstances, the Iranian regime as a whole, including the IRGC and its foreign branch the Qods Force, have demonstrated that they are

rational actors that engage in a systematic cost-benefit analysis when contemplating military action. Acting rationally does not equate to flawless execution, however. The Iranian military strategy bears the hallmark of trial and error and has proven to be open to mishaps. The Islamic Republic likes to portray itself as a martyrdom-seeking state, but in reality, Iran's military strategy remains cautious.

Moreover, while the Islamist message has helped Tehran mobilize support in certain pockets in the Arab World, and provided it with a vehicle to expand its regional influence and with Iraq as the best example, excessive attachment to a sectarian agenda can create its own problems for Tehran. The Islamist ruling elite in Tehran is aware of the perils of Iran becoming an entrenched Shia power in an Islamic World where the Shia are a minority and Iran's Islamist credentials are dwindling. Tehran does not want to feed the narrative that Iran is a Shia sectarian power bent on expanding its influence in Sunni-majority Arab countries.

Meanwhile, as the Islamic Republic faces a deep crisis of legitimacy at home, it is difficult to see how Tehran can stay the course without risking political blowback from an Iranian public that yearns for nation-building at home and an end to costly foreign projects. This anger is nothing new but Soleimani's assassination, and Washington's determination to push back against Iranian regional efforts, might give enough reason for the political and military elite in Tehran to rethink the concept and the sustainability of the forward defense doctrine.

In Western analysis, Soleimani is often depicted as a brilliant strategist who exploited chaos in Iraq and Syria to project Iranian power. There is no doubt that he managed before his death to cultivate a warrior image for himself. But Soleimani, and his brothers-in-arms in the IRGC, have come to a critical juncture. Washington has openly warned Soleimani's successor, Esmail Ghaani, that he too will be assassinated if he opts to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor.⁷⁶

This ultimatum presents the biggest challenge for the Islamists in Tehran and test of the proxy warfare strategy. Forward defense and the use of foreign proxies, such as Hezbollah or the Iraqi militant Shia groups, are today seen by the average public inside Iran and in the broader Middle East as a projection of the ideological zeal of the Islamic Republic and a trend that is depleting Iranian national resources while fueling a costly competition for regional influence with regional rivals. The United States has settled upon a strategy that views this as a sufficient leverage point to enable coercion of Iranian policymakers by moving the conflict towards more direct confrontation.

However, the IRGC appears to view its proxy network, built over four decades, as a sustainable counterweight that can survive such pressure. As a result, the current uncertainty regarding whose assessment of the sustainability of Iran's proxy strategy is correct is likely to prompt a series of crises in which the U.S.-Iran

conflict moves towards direct confrontation as the two sides play a game of chicken. Important to watch across these crises, however, is the extent to which Iran increasingly plays up ideological rhetoric to sustain both transnational and domestic mobilization amid the repeated crises.

Whether or not the mobilization methods are successful in prolonging the sustainability of Iran's strategy, they will likely play a critical role in shaping the IRGC of the 2020s, just as previous actions shaped today's IRGC. Those changes bear close monitoring by policymakers and consideration as the United States continues to pursue its strategy of amping up the pressure on Iran as a way to force the leadership in Tehran to reconsider their priorities.

Notes

1 In Persian, it is also referred to as “offensive defense” (دفاع تهاجمی).

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Underwater Drone Incidents Point to China's Expanding Intelligence Gathering



Underwater Drone Incidents Point to China's Expanding Intelligence Gathering

H I Sutton

Commentary, 15 January 2021

China's apparent efforts to survey within other country's territorial waters may go unchallenged.

The proliferation of small uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) poses new challenges to governments. Even seemingly innocent civilian drones, used to gather hydrographic data, can pose a long-term security risk. The data is defence-civilian agnostic and can be used as readily for submarine warfare as for environmental research. There is no real way to be sure which, so even 'research' types that have been painted bright yellow are often viewed with suspicion. This has been highlighted by a UUV which recently turned up in Indonesia. It is just one among several, and they can be tied back to China.

China does not like other country's UUVs in their waters. When Chinese fishing vessels find a foreign one, they can [receive a life-changing reward](#) from the government. In December 2016, a Chinese boat intentionally plucked a [US Navy UUV out of international waters](#). It was only returned after a diplomatic exchange. It was a glider, a low-power type of UUV which travels with the current, collecting data.

Four years after the US Navy glider incident, in December 2020, a broadly similar glider was [found by Indonesian fishermen](#). There is one significant difference: this glider is Chinese. In fact, many of the gliders and other underwater vehicles washing up on beaches or found by fishing vessels are, too.

China's gliders are as ambiguous as any other state's. Despite their high-visibility yellow paint and clear (and likely genuine) connection with civilian research, they are also associated with naval aims. In 2017,

the *South China Morning Post* [reported](#) that China was speeding up the deployment of gliders in the South China Sea. Tellingly, the reason given was that this 'could help reveal and track the location of foreign submarines'.

The glider found in Indonesia was a [Sea Wing](#) ('Haiyi'). This is the most commonly seen Chinese model and is roughly equivalent to Western types such as the popular Slocum G3 glider. Despite similarities, the Sea Wing has a unique appearance, so it can be confidently identified. It was discovered on 20 December near Selayar Island in the South Sulawes, which is on the eastern side of the Makassar Strait; one of several strategically important sea lines of communication (SLOC) which pass through Indonesia. It connects to the Lombok Strait, a narrow choke point connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Together with the Sunda Strait and the Malacca Strait, which are also in Indonesia's back yard, this may be a critical transit route for the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in wartime.

As well as data for submarine detection, or route planning, the gliders may be gathering other strategically relevant data. This could include, for example, information on natural resources which might be plundered in the future, or information on industry, gathered by sampling chemicals entering the sea from rivers.

There were four earlier known instances of Sea Wings being found. On 16 November 2016, one was found near Quang Ngai in Vietnam. Then, on 12 February 2019, one was found near the northern tip of Bangka Island in Indonesia. This was quickly followed on 23 March 2019 by another in the Riau Islands. This one was helpfully labelled with the Chinese characters for 'Sea Wing' and 'China Shenyang Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Science'. Given the short time interval, these two occurrences may have originated from the same mother ship.

On 22 January 2020, one was found near the Masalembu Islands at the eastern end of the Java Sea, which is located on the eastern side of the Makassar Strait. This fourth example was likely still relatively newly deployed, complete with most of its yellow paint. This was followed in December by the Selayar Island example described above.

These may have been placed in the water by China's large fleet of survey ships. They range far and wide, even to the east coast of the US and to Antarctica. Analysis of their deployments with assistance from The Intel Lab, using data from MarineTraffic.com, shows a number of transits through Indonesian waters in the past two years. These included several surveys of the Indian Ocean. The ships transited all three strategic waterways through Indonesia: the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait.

In December 2019, China deployed 12 Sea Wings in the Indian Ocean. The survey ship Xiangyanghong 06 was used, and is one of those analysed by The Intel Lab. But the mother ships do not have to be dedicated survey ships. These gliders are small and autonomous enough that they can be launched from almost any vessel, right down to a rubber dingy. Analysis of China's survey ships is a strong indicator of where they are looking to deploy, but these gliders could also be launched covertly by other means.

The Sea Wing is similar to other gliders. The basic principle that it uses is called 'buoyancy propulsion'. Instead of using battery power to turn a screw to propel itself along, it uses forward momentum from first sinking and then rising. It has an oil bladder which is inflated to cause it to rise after it has sunk to the desired depth. The glider-like wings extend the distances travelled, and a small rudder gives it a limited capability to control its direction, although it is still largely at the mercy of the currents. When it reaches the surface, a long antenna is used to send data to base. All of this still requires a battery, as do its sensors, but its endurance is extremely long.

All of the gliders found have carried a distinctive sensor on the outside of their fuselage. By analysing the available photographic evidence, these can be identified as measuring conductivity, temperature and

depth (CTD). They are visually identical to a model made by a leading US glider manufacturer. These craft likely carry a range of other sensors too, many of which have both civilian and naval uses.

But why are so many Sea Wing gliders turning up? There must be even more that are undiscovered, or found but not reported on. Generally, gliders are semi-reliable and users expect to lose some from time to time. They have a limited battery life, and some may sink or get washed up before they can be recovered. Normally, when a glider is found, the owning organisation is keen to get it back (or, at the very least, retrieve any data from the onboard memory).

Perhaps the relatively high number of reported incidents is because the Sea Wing model is less reliable. But this doesn't ring true for people familiar with the Chinese programme, as Chinese gliders are now typically on par with Western types.

Another possibility is that China is deploying such a large number that more are bound to get lost. This is possible, but a third reason seems to fit the circumstances. China may be using them in a way where a higher loss rate is expected and tolerated.

All four of the Sea Wings found in Indonesia were in territorial waters. This means that permission would have been required, whether for military or civilian purposes. Generally, a government representative would be aboard the survey ship to ensure that the activities are in line with the permissions given. The data would also, in many cases, be shared with the host country. Sometimes, extra stipulations are given, such as not allowing data sharing with third countries. Indonesia has in the past been reluctant to grant these permissions to foreign research vessels.

When the most recent glider was found, the Indonesian military held a press conference where they displayed the vehicle. It was reported that they did not know its origin. This is despite it clearly being a Sea Wing, and essentially identical to three others previously found in Indonesian waters. So, this explanation seems unlikely. But it also suggests that it has not been claimed, meaning it likely does not relate to an authorised survey.

It seems plausible, therefore, that China has deployed the gliders to gather strategic data in Indonesian territorial waters. The last two – which were found east of the Makassar Strait – bolster this theory, as does the fact that this has been done without the permission of the Indonesian government. That said, it can be difficult to link an individual glider to a specific operation. Their innocent-looking yellow paint and tendency to drift in the currents is the embodiment of plausible deniability.

These easily deniable assets are now an emerging threat to states' sovereignty, and one which is hard to stop. We may, therefore, expect to see an increasing number of Chinese UUVs turning up in unexpected places.

H I Sutton is an open source author, focusing on the maritime domain and particularly underwater warfare. He currently contributes to US Naval Institute News and NavalNews.com, as well as his own Covert Shores website.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution. A minor amendment was made on 18 January 2021.

BANNER IMAGE: South China Sea. Courtesy of Danil Rogulin/Adobe Stock.



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East Asia Pacific

China Using 'Cognitive Warfare' Against Taiwan, Observers Say

By Joyce Huang

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TAIPEI - A Taipei think tank and observers in Taiwan say China is trying to influence residents with “cognitive warfare,” hoping to reverse opposition to Beijing’s desired takeover of Taiwan so it can be accomplished without having to go to war.

Taiwanese attitudes have been drifting away from the mainland, especially among the younger generation, whose members see themselves “born independent” with no ties to China.

China’s effort, these analysts say, includes tactics ranging from military intimidation and propaganda to misinformation spread by its army of online trolls in a bid to manipulate public opinion. They say the complexity and frequency of the effort puts Taiwan on a constant defensive.

“Its ultimate goal is to control what’s between the ears. That is, your brain or how you think, which [Beijing] hopes leads to a change of behavior,” Tzeng Yi-suo, director of the cybersecurity division at the government-funded Institute of National Defense and Security Research in Taipei, told VOA.

Campaign intensifies amid COVID

Cognitive warfare is a fairly new term, but the concept has been around for decades. China has never stopped trying to deter the island's separatists, according to Tzeng, who wrote about the Chinese efforts last month in [the institute's annual report on China's political and military development](#).

Liberal democracies such as Taiwan, that ensure the free flow of information, are vulnerable to cognitive attacks by China, while China's tightly controlled media and internet environment makes it difficult for democracies to counterattack, according to Tzeng.

China's campaign has intensified since the outbreak of COVID-19, using official means such as flying military jets over Taiwan, and unofficial channels such as news outlets, social media and hackers to spread misinformation. The effort is aimed at dissuading Taiwan from pursuing actions contrary to Beijing's interests, the report said.

China has used these tactics to attack Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's administration, undermine support for democracy and fuel Taiwan's social tensions and political divide, it said.

The South China Situation Probing Initiative, for example, a project run by Nanjing University in China, has disseminated information about Chinese military activities in the region through its Twitter account, but some of the posts have been found to be false, apparently aimed at intimidating Taiwan's public and weakening Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party government's resolve, according to the report.

Tzeng said China's efforts didn't work in Taiwan's presidential election last January, when Tsai won a landslide victory. The island's growing anti-China sentiments – seem further strengthened by disapproval of China's brutal suppression of pro-democracy Hong Kong protests.

China “set out to [actively] promote the island’s reunification with the mainland, its identity as ethnic Chinese or favorable views toward the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]. But now all it can hope for is to curb Taiwan’s [growing] pro-independence sentiments” – a trend Beijing has found it difficult to contain, he said.

Tzeng added that he believes China is biding its time and experimenting with new tactics, which it hopes will succeed in influencing the island’s future elections.

For example, the report said that China’s Communist Party is believed to have played a role in hacking Tsai’s office in May to discredit her. Reporters covering her office at the time claimed to have received minutes of internal meetings from an anonymous email account, which accused the president of corruption. Tsai’s administration responded by saying that the documents had been doctored and contained fabricated content.

Taiwan should, Tzeng said, stay alert and establish a comprehensive fact-checking system to prevent fake news and misinformation from subverting public opinion.

Taiwan should also “work with regional and global liberal democracies to establish a common defense mechanism” as China’s influencing attacks have a global outreach and aren’t limited to Taiwan. They constitute the most serious challenge facing democratic societies today, Tung Li-wen, former head of the ruling DPP’s China affairs department, [wrote in a 2019 essay](#).

Chinese citizen journalist and blogger Zhou Shuguang, who now lives in Taiwan, said many Chinese have taken to the internet to spread China’s narrative. Two groups of such online promoters of China’s narrative are known as “Little Pink” and “50 Cent Party,” The groups, he said, have formed China’s sizable army of online trolls to spread fake news, for example, rumors about Tsai’s academic background. Despite repeated clarifications, many kept circling rumors that the

president's 1984 doctorate degree from the London School of Economics was fake.

A 2016 study, led by Harvard University data scientist Gary King, found that 50 Cent Party produced 488 million “fake” social media posts a year to distract other internet users from news and online discussions painting the Communist Party in a negative light.

Global propaganda campaign

China has also been aggressive in expanding its global propaganda campaign to “tell China’s story well” and disrupt democracy, said Huang Jaw-nian, an assistant professor of National Chengchi University in Taipei, who specializes in media politics.

“[China] is running its global propaganda campaign by expanding its state media abroad and deploying a strategy called ‘borrowing a boat out to sea,’ that is, buying up foreign news outlets [with better credibility]... The media buyouts are, in some cases, made by pro-Beijing businesspeople,” who will likely spin coverage to curry favor with China, Huang told VOA.

However, Li Zhenguang, deputy director of Beijing Union University's Institute of Taiwan Studies, flatly denied that China has launched any efforts against Taiwan or Tsai’s administration.

“She [Tsai] is putting a feather in her own cap. She is a nobody to China. I find the accusations nonsense. Why on earth does China want to attack her?” he told VOA over the phone, refusing to elaborate.

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JOIG Daily Coordination Note - 14 JAN 2021 (CUI)

Attachments:

(U) NCR Weather CAO 20210114.pdf; (U--FOUO) NCTC CT Weekly.pdf; (U--FOUO) JIB -
 Domestic Violent Extremists Emboldened in Aftermath of Capitol Breach 01132021.pdf;
 (CUI) China-Based APT27 Cyber Actors Expand Operations to Conduct Financially-
 Motivated Attacks.pdf; (U-TLP-GRN) FBI LIR - Increasing Trend of Foreign Vendors Using
 Bait-and-Switch Scams.pdf; (U) The Aviationist - The Russian S-70 Okhotnik UCAV
 Struck Ground Targets With Unguided Bombs During Weapons Testing.pdf; (U)
 Jamestown Foundation - Year 2020 in Review_ Results of Russia's Nuclear Weapons
 Modernization.pdf; (U) Jamestown Foundation - The Second Karabakh War_ Lessons
 and Implications for Russia (Part Two).pdf; (U) Wall Street Journal - Iran Is Assembling
 Gear Able to Produce Key Nuclear-Weapons Material.pdf; (U) CyberNews - How
 phishing attacks are evolving and why you should care.pdf; (U) Naval News - Russian
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How phishing attacks are evolving and why you should care



by Pierluigi Paganini — 14 January 2021 in Security 0



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Cybercriminal gangs and nation-state threat actors continue to evolve their phishing attack techniques, experimenting with different lures, adopting new social engineering tricks, and devising new ways to avoid detection in 2021.

According to the annual Microsoft Digital Defense Report, threat actors, focused on malware attacks to harvest people's credentials in the past, have recently shifted their focus to phishing attacks (~70%). Experts observed threat actors sending out emails imitating top brands like Microsoft, UPS, Amazon, Apple, and Zoom.

The ENISA Threat Landscape 2020 report states that cyberattacks are becoming more sophisticated, targeted, widespread, and undetected.

While malware stands strong as the #1 cyber threat in the EU, experts observed a significant increase in phishing, [identity theft](#), and [ransomware](#) attacks in 2020.



Image by ENISA: Cyberattacks becoming more sophisticated, targeted, widespread and undetected

Here are some interesting findings from the ENISA report related to phishing campaigns monitored in the last twelve months:

- Losses of €26.2 billion in 2019 with Business E-mail Compromise (BEC) attacks
- 42.8% of all malicious attachments were Microsoft Office documents
- 667% increase in phishing scams in just 1 month during the COVID-19 pandemic
- 30% of phishing messages were delivered on Mondays
- 32.5% of all e-mails used the keyword 'payment' in the e-mail subject

A constantly evolving threat

Security firms warn that attackers are rapidly evolving to evade detection.

The majority of phishing attempts today are “polymorphic” in nature.

This means that attackers make slight and often random changes to an email’s artefacts (i.e. template, content, subject, sender name, domains). The morphing allows them to make phishing attacks difficult to detect for signature-based email defence solutions.

Polymorphic phishing attacks are not new, however. Experts began observing them since at least 2016. The first attacks only changed the embedded URLs pointing to their landing pages that were only deployed for a few hours. These URLs were difficult to label as malicious by automated scanning and blacklisting software due to their short lifespan. Making continuous changes to the URLs allowed attackers to avoid detection.

While phishing detection tools were becoming more effective in implementing new detection capabilities, attackers started varying an increasing number of components in the message to avoid them. Threat actors also changed their tactics by sending only a small number of messages to avoid creating “noise” that could be easily detected by email filters.

Today, phishing attacks are becoming much more targeted.

Once a bad actor has obtained the credentials of an employee within an organization, they will use them to target colleagues in surgical and polymorphic operations.

Another trick employed by threat actors behind phishing campaigns is the use of HTTPS sites. According to ENISA, more than two-thirds (74%) of phishing sites adopted HTTPS in Q4 2020. The experts at ENISA pointed out that the presence of a lock icon at the browser’s address bar may trick victims into thinking that the messages are sent from a trusted website. In some cases, threat actors also use legitimate sites that have been hacked to host phishing pages, making it hard to detect malicious activity.

“Other factors contributing to the steep rise in HTTPS usage are the plethora of free certificate services such as Let’s Encrypt and the fact that modern browsers mark every HTTPS site as secure, without any further checks.”

— states the ENISA report.

Phishing-as-a-service on the rise

Security experts also warn of the rise of Phishing-as-a-Service (PaaS) in the cybercrime underground.

Crooks can pay for phishing kits that can be accessed by subscribing to such services. A security researcher [identified](#) over 5,334 unique phishing kits by June 2019 that were offered for a price ranging from \$50 to \$80 for a monthly subscription. Most of the kits (87%) included evasion mechanisms such as HTML character encoding and content encryption. Some of these services were hosted on legitimate cloud services with proper domain name system (DNS) names and certificates.

During the past months, security firms spotted multiple creative phishing techniques to avoid detection.


In November 2020, researchers at WMC Global have spotted a new creative Office 365 phishing campaign that has been inverting images used as backgrounds for landing pages to avoid getting flagged as malicious by security solutions that scan the web for phishing sites.

The bot avoidance mechanism has been deployed on multiple phishing websites designed to steal Office 365 credentials.

WMC Global researchers observed this technique implemented in a phishing kit developed by a threat actor that was selling it to multiple users.

“Because image recognition software is improving and becoming more accurate, this new technique aims to deceive scanning engines by inverting the colours of the image, causing the image hash to differ from the original. This technique can hinder the software’s ability to flag this image altogether.”

— [reads the analysis](#) published by WMC Global.



The phishing kit that uses this trick automatically reverts the backgrounds using Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) to make them look just like the backgrounds of legitimate Office 365 login pages.

While phishing detection web crawlers are served the inverted image, the potential victims are redirected to one of these phishing landing pages that will see the original background instead of the inverted one.

Innovative phishing techniques

Recently, experts also observed other phishing campaigns aimed at Office 365 users that were using innovative techniques, such as leveraging public cloud services to host the phishing landing

pages.

Another innovative technique observed by the researchers targeting Office 365 users leverages both cloud services from Oracle and Amazon for their infrastructure. The threat actors used compromised accounts to send out phishing messages and used Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Oracle Cloud in the redirect chain.

“Once the link was clicked, the user is redirected through several proxies, including AWS load balancers, all the way to a legitimate but compromised website.”

— Ofir Rozmann, threat intelligence at Mitiga [told Bleeping Computer](#)

Before the victims land on the final landing page, they are redirected through several proxies, including AWS load balancers. Most of the fake Office 365 login pages were hosted on the Oracle Cloud computing service, but experts also observed the use of the Amazon Simple Storage Service.

Mitiga researchers discovered more than 40 compromised websites that were used in this Office 365 phishing campaign. The analysis of the HTML code for the fake Office 365 pages suggests that attackers opted for a PaaS kit.

In November 2020, Microsoft tracked an ongoing Office 365 phishing campaign that was targeting enterprises. The threat actors behind the campaign leveraged redirector URLs with the capability to detect incoming connections from sandbox environments.

Upon detecting connections for sandboxes, the redirector would redirect them to legitimate sites to evade detection, while connections from real potential victims were redirected to phishing pages.

In August, researchers from Malwarebytes analyzed a new evasive phishing technique used by attackers in the wild in Magecart attacks. The hackers targeted visitors of several websites by using typo-squatted domain names, and modified favicons to inject software skimmers used to steal payment card information.

The technique is known as [homoglyph attack](#), it was involved in phishing scams with IDN homograph attacks. “The idea is simple and consists of using characters that look the same in order to dupe users,” reads the [analysis](#) published by Malwarebytes researchers.


“Sometimes the characters are from a different language set or simply capitalizing the letter ‘i’ to make it appear like a lowercase ‘l’.”

The internationalized domain name (IDN) [homograph attack](#) technique has been used by the [Magecart group](#) on multiple domains to load the Inter software skimmer inside a [favicon](#) file.

The visual trick leverages the similarities of character scripts to register fraudulent domains that appear similar to legitimate ones, then attackers trick victims into visiting them.

While analyzing homoglyph attacks, experts also found legitimate websites (e.g., “cigarpage.com”) that were compromised and injected with an innocuous loader for an icon file that loaded a copycat version of the favicon from the typo-squatted domain (“cigarpage[.]com”).

This favicon loaded from the homoglyph domain allowed the attackers to inject the Inter JavaScript skimmer.



Experts noticed that one of the fraudulent domains (“zoplm.com”) involved in this type of attack has been previously tied to Magecart Group 8, the crew that was behind the attacks on NutriBullet, and MyPillow.

How to prevent sophisticated phishing attacks?

Here are a few suggestions for organizations looking to mitigate phishing attacks:

- Train employees to identify a malicious email. Simulated phishing campaigns could allow organisations to test the resilience and responsiveness of the staff.
- Use a secure e-mail gateway with regular (possibly automated) maintenance of filters (anti-spam, anti-malware, policy-based filtering).
- Deploy defence solutions that use machine-learning techniques to identify phishing sites in real-time.
- Disable automatic execution of code, macros, rendering of graphics and preloading mailed links at the mail clients and update them frequently.
- Implement SPF (Sender Policy Framework), DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance), and DKIM (Domain Keys Identified Mail) to identify spam.
- Implement anomaly detection at the network level for both inbound and outbound e-mails.
- Check the domain name of the websites you visit for typos, especially for sensitive websites, e.g. bank sites. Relying on the HTTPS connection is not enough.
- Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) whenever applicable to prevent account takeovers.



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Federal Bureau of Investigation

THREAT and INTIMIDATION RESPONSE GUIDE



IN-PERSON THREAT

A physical **IN-PERSON THREAT** is when you are in imminent danger because of the close proximity of the person making the threat. You have three options:

1. **Run:** Identify an escape route. Drop any belongings that may slow you down. If possible, help others escape. Call 911.
2. **Hide:** Hide away from view of the threat. Lock doors or block entries. Silence your cell phone (including vibrate mode) and remain silent until the threat is over.
3. **Fight:** Fighting should be a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger. Attempt to incapacitate the threat. Act with as much physical aggression as possible.

A verbal **IN-PERSON THREAT** one that does not place the recipient in immediate danger or is intended to be carried out later.

- Write down or otherwise record the threat exactly as it was communicated.
- Record as many descriptive details as possible about the person who made the threat: name, appearance, skin color, sex, height, weight, hair and eye color, voice, clothing, or any other distinguishing features.
- Report the threat to law enforcement.



PHONED THREAT

A **PHONED THREAT** is a threat received by telephone. You should try to get as much information on the caller and the threat as possible, unless the threat is nearby or may imminently harm you or others.

- Remain calm and do not hang up.
- Keep the caller on as long as possible and try soliciting information to determine whether the threat is specific, realistic, or poses immediate danger to you or others.
- If possible, signal others nearby to listen and notify law enforcement.
- Copy any information from the phone's electronic display.
- Write the exact wording of the threat.
- Record the call if possible.
- Be available to discuss the details with law enforcement personnel.



ELECTRONIC MESSAGE THREAT

An **ELECTRONIC MESSAGE THREAT** is a threat received through direct messaging, email, or social media. It may include threats of blackmail or adverse consequences if the recipient does not comply.

- Do not open an electronic message or attachment from unknown senders.
- Do not communicate on social media with unknown or unsolicited individuals.
- Make sure your security settings are set to the highest level of protection.

If an electronic threat is received:

- Do not delete the message. Forensic examination may uncover important details.
- Leave the message open on the computer.
- Immediately notify law enforcement.
- Print, photograph, or copy the message, subject line, date, and time.
- Preserve all electronic evidence.



CYBER ATTACKS

A **CYBER ATTACK** can compromise your electronic device and expose personal information.

- Use strong passphrases and do not use the same passphrase for multiple websites.
- Set anti-virus and anti-malware applications to automatically update.
- Apply system and software updates as soon as they become available.
- Apply two-factor authentication.
- Backup data regularly.

If you suspect that you have been a victim of a cyber attack:

- Do not delete or alter your computer systems.
- Immediately contact your financial institutions to protect your accounts from identity theft.
- Change passphrases and monitor accounts for suspicious activity.

If you are in immediate physical danger, call 911.

If you experience a threat, please contact your local FBI field office (listings available at www.fbi.gov) or submit a tip via 1-800-CALLFBI (or 1-800-225-5324) or via www.fbi.gov/tips.

You can also make an anonymous tip to the FBI by phone or online.



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

THREAT and INTIMIDATION RESPONSE GUIDE



Who should I contact if I experience threats or intimidation: local police or the FBI?

- If you or others are in immediate physical danger, call the local police by dialing 911.
- If you experience a threat associated with a federal crime, contact your local FBI field office (listings at www.fbi.gov) by calling 1-800-CALLFBI (or 1-800-225-5324) or via www.fbi.gov/tips. Examples include threats from an agent of a foreign government, organized crime, or a government official. Your report can be anonymous.
- Not all incidents meet the FBI's investigative threshold. If you are the victim of an incident that does not meet the threshold of a federal crime, you may need to report it to your local police department. Local and state jurisdictions have different thresholds for investigating suspected crimes.



What can I expect if I am interviewed by the FBI?

- An FBI agent can meet with you at an FBI field office or at another location.
- The FBI will ask you to provide as much information as possible about the perpetrator and details of the threat you have experienced.
- The FBI will ask for your contact information to follow-up with you if needed.
- The FBI will attempt to protect your identity and confidentiality.
- If appropriate, an FBI Victim Specialist may be present during the interview to provide information and support, or they may contact you after your interview by phone or mail.



What is the threshold for the FBI to investigate a complaint and/or initiate an investigation?

- The FBI is able to investigate threats that violate US federal law and imply harm or danger to the recipient.
- The ability of the US Government to prosecute individuals for threat-related charges is contingent upon several factors, such as: the quality of the evidence, the ability to identify the individuals who perpetrated the action, the identification of a conspiracy, and/or the ability to arrest the offending individuals.



What can I expect if the FBI initiates an investigation?

- If the FBI believes a federal crime may have been committed, one or more FBI special agents will conduct an investigation. As part of the investigation, the special agents will gather evidence, which may include an interview with you and other victims.
- You may also be asked to describe your experience before a federal grand jury.
- A thorough investigation will be completed. The investigation may take a long time to finish, and you will not be updated on day-to-day case developments. Every effort will be made to tell you about major events in an investigation, such as an arrest or indictment. The FBI is committed to providing such information to you before it is released to the public, when possible. However, the FBI must always be careful not to reveal sensitive information that could hurt the investigation or increase danger to law enforcement.
- An FBI Victim Specialist will be available to provide identified victims with support, information, and referrals for any local resources that may be needed.

Even if reporting the details of how you were threatened or intimidated does not result in an investigation, it will likely assist other victims by helping the FBI track threats and identify trends.

FBI FIELD OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION LISTED BY CITY AND STATE IS AVAILABLE AT WWW.FBI.GOV. IF YOU ARE IN IMMINENT DANGER, CALL 911.

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR

The Second Karabakh War: Lessons and Implications for Russia (Part Two)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 7

By: [Sergey Sukhankin](#)

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Captured Armenian 2S1 Gvozdika on parade in Baku, December 10 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

[*To read Part One, please click here.](#)

Russian experts and commentators have sought to draw key military lessons from the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020), which concluded in a decisive victory for the Azerbaijani side, actively supported by Turkey (see [Part One](#) in EDM, January 5, 2021). However, last year's deadly conflict in the South Caucasus also had important informational-ideological, geopolitical and economic implications for Russia.

In the informational-ideological realm, most Russian observers evaluated the outcome of the war as overtly negative for Moscow and exceptionally beneficial for Ankara, whose prestige and “soft power” (pan-Turkism), they predict, are now likely to skyrocket among Turkic-speaking peoples. Importantly, as the main theaters/venues where Turkish influence is bound to grow, many Russian experts mention not only the independent former Soviet republics (mainly Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia) but also many non-ethnic-Russian citizens of the Russian Federation itself ([Vpoanalytics.com](#), November 11, 2020). For instance, Konstantin Makienko, the deputy director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, has argued that since Armenia—Russia's “client and ally”—found itself on the losing side, whereas Azerbaijan and its Turkish ally clearly won, Ankara's influence in the post-Soviet space (especially parts with large Islamic populations) will grow exponentially and supplant Moscow ([Vedomosti](#), November 10, 2020).

In the geopolitical domain, Russian experts have indicated two important troublesome aspects. First are the Karabakh war's implications for the Donbas region. Specifically, some commentators have contended that the results of the conflict in the South Caucasus could (possibly, and probably not immediately) encourage Ukraine to attempt to “solve the issue” of occupied Donbas in a military way. Interestingly, Russian sources expressed visible concerns over recently held military drills in Ukraine. According to the exercise legend, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were practicing liberating parts of Donbas. The most important part of these exercises involved Ukrainian forces actively relying on Turkish-supplied unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAV)—one of the main (if not the key) component that secured Azerbaijan's military success last autumn ([Lenta.ru](#), November 18). Other analysts also noted that Ukraine's mounting activities in areas near the Donbas frontline—for example, boosting the overall number of military formations in the area—may indicate Kyiv's desire (using the example of Azerbaijan) to try to launch a military operation in the future ([Nezavisimaya Gazeta](#), December 6, 2020).

The second oft-repeated set of geopolitical concerns is related to Turkey's growing ambitions in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. According to renowned Russian expert Dr. Andrey Kortunov, this new configuration creates a new reality whereby “the main security threats to Russia no longer stem from the western direction, but rather from the south—the Greater Caucasus region and, ultimately, from Central Asia as well” ([Globalbrief.ca](#), October 4, 2020).

Lastly, in the economic domain, concerns expressed by the Russian expert community mainly revolve around the following question: to what extent will Turkish-backed Azerbaijan's military superiority affect the international reputation of Russian-produced weaponry? One

such analysis argues that the results of the military engagements in Karabakh introduced fresh doubts about the actual capabilities of Russian-produced radio-electronic and Electronic Warfare (EW) battlefield assets. Specifically, the director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science, Fedor Voytlovskii, asserts that the conflict “demonstrated the potential of the Turkish defense-industrial complex very clearly... Turkey will be able to attract many potential buyers on the global weapons market” ([Nezavisimaya Gazeta](#), November 26, 2020). Undoubtedly, such an outcome would negatively affect Russia’s position in this lucrative economic space.

Another important detail on the subject appeared in the Russian media late last year. Namely, as a result of its military defeat and disgruntlement over the performance of the Russian EW/radio-electronic weapons that Armenian forces had been relying on, Yerevan is reportedly now determined to stop purchasing this type of equipment from Moscow, switching instead to German suppliers. According to Russian sources, “[A]bsolutely all means of radio-electronic confrontation, including the Repellent system [designed for collecting signal intelligence on enemy UAVs and suppressing their control systems], turned out to be useless against Turkish drones, whereas a portion of these complexes were simply destroyed.” Other Russian experts, however, claimed that instead of blaming the Russian EW technology, Armenia could have acquired Krasukha complexes, which “have proven their effectiveness in Libya and Syria” ([Avia.pro](#), November 26, 2020). In any event, should Yerevan’s military-political leadership opt for Western suppliers—whether because of real deficiencies of the Russian EW assets, or for internal political reasons—that shift would represent a huge reputational loss for Russia and a large economic blow for its domestic arms manufacturers since other potential buyers (with far more impressive economic capabilities than Armenia) might be discouraged from dealing with Moscow.

Similarly, Russian experts have voiced concerns over the quality of domestically produced armored vehicles and anti-missile/anti-aircraft systems. According to Azerbaijani sources, more than 350 Armenian armored vehicles were destroyed and/or captured during the fighting around Karabakh last fall—a number comparable with some of the world’s largest military operations, including the Battle of Prokhorovka (1943) and the Battle for the Golan Heights (1973). These staggering numbers were so high despite the fact that main battle tanks were not involved in military operations in large quantities in the Second Karabakh War. Crucially, according to President Ilham Aliyev, the Azerbaijani armed forces destroyed an impressive quantity of other Armenian (Russian-produced) weaponry, with the total cost of this lost equipment exceeding \$3 billion. *Inter alia*, this included S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems with radio locators (seven pieces), an Oborona radio-location station (one), Tor missile systems (five), Osa short-range anti-air systems (forty); KUB mobile SAM systems (four), a KRUG medium-range SAM system (one); Zastava UAVs (fourteen), as well as S-125 SAM systems (two). Moreover, all in all, 19 pieces of EW/radio-electronic equipment were destroyed. Taking this into consideration, Russian experts argue that “the Russian side needs to come up with some explanations as to how such large quantities of

weaponry ended up destroyed in a such a short interim,” otherwise, this could be taken negatively by current and potential buyers of Russian arms ([Nezavisimaya Gazeta](#), December 6, 2020).

So despite some cheerful rhetoric coming out of Moscow’s state-sponsored information outlets, reputable Russian experts are, indeed, concerned about the implications of the Second Karabakh War beyond the military realm, to include potential geopolitical, economic and reputational losses for Russia. It remains to be seen to what degree their fears will come to pass over the coming months.

EURASIA DAILY MONITOR

Year 2020 in Review: Results of Russia's Nuclear Weapons Modernization

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By: [Maxim Starchak](#)

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Tu-160M construction (Source: Military Review)

Russia continues to press ahead with its nuclear weapons modernization program; however, domestic production difficulties and the coronavirus pandemic hindered the development of its latest strategic systems during the course of the last year.

In 2020, the Strategic Missile Forces (*Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya*—RVSN) were ordered to deploy for combat duty 20 launchers armed with Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) as well as 2 UR-100N UTTH launchers with the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (RIA Novosti, [December 24, 2019](#) and [October 13, 2020](#)). These tasks were completed. Two regiments of the RVSN's Barnaul Missile Division were re-equipped with mobile-based Yars ICBMs, while a missile regiment of the Kozelsk division was filled out by equipping it with a separate variant of this ICBM complex ([Izvestia](#), December 21, 2020). The Dombrovsky Division, meanwhile, received two missiles with the *Avangard* hypersonic glide vehicle ([Izvestia](#), December 22, 2020). Yet besides these modest accomplishments, Russia's nuclear arms modernization efforts during the past 12 months saw wide-ranging delays affecting its flagship projects.

Last year was supposed to see the first flight design tests of Russia's newest intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat. But those never occurred. The initial stage of testing is to involve two launches of a missile with a mass-dimensional dummy warhead, from the silo at the Plesetsk cosmodrome to the Kura test range in Kamchatka. Ultimately, Russia plans to conduct at least five test launches in total before starting operational production. The phase one tests launches were originally scheduled for the beginning of 2019 ([RIA Novosti](#), December 17, 2018). However, in July 2019, those flight tests were postponed to the end of 2020 ([Interfax](#), July 6, 2019).

In May 2020, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov said that preparations for the Sarmat's flight tests had not been interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic ([RIA Novosti](#), May 21, 2020). And in August, the head of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin, reiterated those claims ([Interfax](#), August 24, 2020). At least two tests of the missile were to be carried out before the end of the year ([Vedomosti](#), October 29, 2019). But in the end, there was not even one such test, having again been deferred until the following year. Moreover, in December, authorities noted that the Sarmat missiles would not begin entering service in 2020, as had heretofore been the plan; instead, the ICBM would only start to appear in 2022 ([Radio Sputnik](#), December 16, 2020).

Intercontinental ballistic missile test launches, by their nature, are quite difficult and expensive to organize. On December 30, Deputy Defense Minister Alexey Krivoruchko said that flight tests of the Sarmat will begin in the near future ([Rossiyskaya Gazeta](#), December 30, 2020). However, to complete the trials, Russia will first need to upgrade the testing site. Indeed, Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu recently admitted that a test range for flight trials of the Sarmat missile system has yet to be built; but plans call for completion of such a launch site, near the village of Severo-Yeniseysky, in Krasnoyarsk region, sometime during 2011 ([TVZvezda](#), December 21, 2020).

Drastic delays and planning setbacks affected other strategic platforms as well. In 2020, Russia's Long-Range Aviation (*Aviatsiya Dalnego Deystviya*—ADD) was to receive six upgraded Tu-95MS strategic missile carrier planes. However, at the end of the year, the Ministry of Defense received only five aircraft ([Mil.ru](#), December 2020). In this case, the problem was related to unsatisfactory management and mounting debts of the production plant ([Bloknot-taganrog.ru](#), November 12, 2020).

Similarly, at the end of 2020, the Tupolev Company was supposed to transfer two new Tu-160M strategic bombers to the Ministry of Defense for state testing ([Interfax](#), August 26, 2019). This did not happen because of the pandemic. First, the Tu-160M test pilots and support crews could not make it to the Kazan Aviation Plant for a long time, thus forcing delays to flight test schedules. Second, representatives of the suppliers of the new aircraft systems were also barred from accessing the production facilities for an extended period. Third, coronavirus-related shutdowns prevented specialists on the implementation of new technological equipment from entering the Kazan plant, creating even more delays to development of the latest Tu-160M model ([Business Gazeta](#), May 8, 2020). Throughout all of 2020, the Ministry of Defense received only two upgraded, but still Soviet-built, Tu-160s ([TASS](#), April 23, 2020). The aircraft received more advanced inertial navigation and engine-control systems as well as weapons devices driven by modern digital technologies.

Finally, COVID-19 derailed development plans for naval nuclear weapons (see [EDM](#), December 2, 2020). In April 2020, sea and state trials of the K-329 *Belgorod* submarine were to begin; and the vessel was supposed to be transferred to the Military-Maritime Fleet (*Voyenno-Morskoi Flot*—VMF) by the end of the year ([TASS](#), June 26, 2019). The *Belgorod* is to carry the Poseidon (a.k.a. Status-6) autonomous nuclear-tipped super-torpedo. Yet as a result of the pandemic-related delays, the defense ministry only announced on July 27 that tests were being conducted ([Sudostroenie.info](#), July 27, 2020). And an unnamed source within the Russian military-industrial complex said last May that the tests of the *Belgorod* would continue for another year and a half ([RIA Novosti](#), May 26, 2020). At the same time, the first test-launch of the Poseidon was supposed to take place in the fall of 2020 ([Flotprom.ru](#), May 26, 2020). That trial has still not been completed. Another vessel designed to carry and launch the Poseidon nuclear super-torpedo—the first submarine of the new Khabarovsk-class, which was supposed to be launched in the spring of 2020 ([Rossiyskaya Gazeta](#), May 14, 2019)—also failed to materialize.

The Borei-A-class submarine *Knyaz Oleg* was ultimately not transferred in 2020 either, despite the defense ministry's previous expectations that this could be accomplished ([Kremlin.ru](#), December 24, 2019). In addition to mooring as well as factory and state trials of all of the submarine's structures and mechanisms, it will still be necessary to conduct a test launch of the Bulava missile from this vessel. This means that it is far from certain that the SevMash company will be able to transfer the *Knyaz Oleg* to the navy even before the end of 2021.

Management and technical issues, compounded by last year's coronavirus restrictions and accompanying delays, had relatively little impact on the overall growth of advanced weapons in the nuclear triad. According to previous planning, the share of advanced weapons in the nuclear triad was supposed to increase from 82 to 87 percent by the end of 2020 ([RIA Novosti](#), March 25, 2020), and according to official data, that share reached 86 percent by last December. On the other hand, the coronavirus had a much greater negative effect on the testing of weapons under development. Because of this, the impact of the pandemic will be quite long lasting. Already, the Ministry of Defense's planning has become more modest: by the end of 2021, it projects a further increase in the share of the latest nuclear weapons by only 2 percent ([Kremlin](#), December 21, 2020).

Russian MoD Ordered Two More Borei-A-class SSBN from Sevmash - Naval News

TASS Russian news agency

“In July, a contract was signed with the Defense Ministry for the construction of another two Borey-A-class nuclear submarines. They are the Dmitry Donskoy and the Knyaz Potemkin,”

Sevmash shipyard CEO Mikhail Budnichenko

Budnichenko recalled that the *Knyaz Vladimir* lead submarine of upgraded project 955A was handed over to the Navy in June 2020. The *Knyaz Oleg* SSBN was rolled out of the slipway in July. The shipyard is building four SSBN — the *Knyaz Oleg*, the *Generalissimo Suворov*, the *Emperor Alexander III* and the *Knyaz Pozharsky*.

Sevmash laid the *Knyaz Vladimir* in July 2012 and floated it in November 2017. It joined the Navy in June 2020 making the construction time last 96 months. The *Knyaz Oleg* was laid in July 2014 and floated in July 2020. It has to join the Navy in 2021.

The *Generalissimo Suворov* was laid in December 2014, the *Emperor Alexander III* in December 2015, and the *Knyaz Pozharsky* in December 2016.

If the fifth and sixth SSBN are laid in 2021, they may join the Navy in 2027-2028. Thus, Russia will have ten project 955 and 955A SSBN (the *Yuri Dolgoruky*, the *Alexander Nevsky* and the *Vladimir Monomakh* of project 955 and seven SSBN of project 955A).



K-535 Yuriy Dolgorukiy is the first Borei-class ballistic missile submarine of the Project 955 in service with the Russian Navy.

The Russian Navy currently operates four SSBN of projects 955 and 955A, one SSBN of project 677BDR (the *Ryazan*), six SSBN of project 677BDRM (the *Verkhoturys*, the *Yekaterinburg*, the *Tula*, the *Bryansk*, the *Karelia* and the *Novomoskovsk*) and one SSBN of project 941 (the *Dmitry Donskoy*). It makes a total of twelve SSBN. All Soviet-built submarines are to be decommissioned and replaced by new SSBN by the end of the decade.

The naming of a new SSBN after *Dmitry Donskoy* means that the last SSBN of project 941 with the same name would be decommissioned. The Navy will also get rid of project 667BDR submarines. It is unclear which project 677BDRM subs will be replaced. The decision will depend on the technical state of each submarine.

If Sevmash signs another contract for two SSBN of project 955A in the coming years, it will fully switch the sea component of the Russian nuclear deterrence to fourth-generation SSBN by early 2030s.



NCR Forecast Overview (14JAN2021-20JAN2021)

Hazardous Weather: None

Caution: None

Detailed Forecast

Today	Mostly cloudy, then gradually becoming sunny, with a high near 53. Calm wind becoming west around 5 mph.
Tonight	Increasing clouds, with a low around 35. Light and variable wind.
Friday	A chance of showers, mainly after 3pm. Partly sunny, with a high near 51. East wind 5 to 9 mph. Chance of precipitation is 30%.
Friday Night	Showers. Low around 38. Southeast wind around 6 mph becoming calm after midnight. Chance of precipitation is 80%. New precipitation amounts between a tenth and quarter of an inch possible.
Saturday	Showers likely, mainly before 7am. Partly sunny, with a high near 47. West wind 5 to 10 mph, with gusts as high as 18 mph. Chance of precipitation is 60%.
Saturday Night	A chance of showers before 8pm. Partly cloudy, with a low around 33. Chance of precipitation is 40%.
Sunday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 46.
Sunday Night	Mostly cloudy, with a low around 33.
M.L.King Day	Mostly sunny, with a high near 45.
Monday Night	Mostly clear, with a low around 30.
Tuesday	Mostly sunny, with a high near 46.
Tuesday Night	Partly cloudy, with a low around 34.
Wednesday	Partly sunny, with a high near 46.



U.S. ARMY



UNCLASSIFIED

NCR 5-DAY FORECAST

AS OF 0300 HRS LOCAL 14 JAN 21

FORECAST	Thu 14 Jan 21				Fri 15 Jan 21				Sat 16 Jan 21				Sun 17 Jan 21				Mon 18 Jan 21																						
	Trace		0.00 in		Trace		0.08 in		Trace		Trace		0.00 in		0.00 in		0.00 in		Trace																				
	LO: 30F/-1C HI: 48F/9C				LO: 33F/1C HI: 45F/7C				LO: 36F/2C HI: 45F/7C				LO: 34F/1C HI: 45F/7C				LO: 32F/0C HI: 39F/4C																						
	DP: 25F/-4C		DP: 34F/1C		DP: 32F/0C		DP: 43F/6C		DP: 25F/-4C		DP: 43F/6C		DP: 25F/-4C		DP: 25F/-4C		DP: 23F/-5C		DP: 27F/-3C																				
	RH: 79%		RH: 58%		RH: 94%		RH: 93%		RH: 64%		RH: 93%		RH: 69%		RH: 45%		RH: 69%		RH: 60%																				
	WIND CHILL N/A		HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 28F/-2C		HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 29F/-2C		HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 26F/-4C		HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL 28F/-2C		HEAT INDEX N/A																				
	4 KTS		4 KTS		7 KTS		9 KTS		7 KTS		9 KTS		9 KTS		12G27 KTS		6 KTS		7 KTS																				
	00/18 L&R: 3 KTS		00/18 L&R: 3 KTS		00/18 L&R: 6 KTS		00/18 L&R: 8 KTS		00/18 L&R: 7 KTS		00/18 L&R: 8 KTS		00/18 L&R: 7 KTS		00/18 L&R: 27 KTS		00/18 L&R: 6 KTS		00/18 L&R: 7 KTS																				
	7 SM / 20000FT		7 SM / 20000FT		7 SM / 200FT		7 SM / 0FT		7 SM / 200FT		7 SM / 700FT		7 SM / 600FT		7 SM / 600FT		7 SM / 600FT		7 SM / 600FT																				
MOSTLY CLOUDY				MOSTLY CLOUDY				FREEZING DRIZZLE				SCATTERED TSTMS				RAIN				MOSTLY CLOUDY				MOSTLY CLOUDY				MOSTLY CLOUDY				CLOUDY				FREEZING DRIZZLE			
MAX DA: -505FT				MAX PA: +107FT				MAX DA: -388FT				MAX PA: +353FT				MAX DA: -363FT				MAX PA: +392FT				MAX DA: -726FT				MAX PA: +303FT				MAX DA: -1200FT				MAX PA: +40FT			
BMNT: 06:23				EENT: 18:12				BMNT: 06:23				EENT: 18:13				BMNT: 06:23				EENT: 18:14				BMNT: 06:22				EENT: 18:15				BMNT: 06:22				EENT: 18:16			
SR: 07:25				SS: 17:10				SR: 07:25				SS: 17:11				SR: 07:25				SS: 17:12				SR: 07:24				SS: 17:13				SR: 07:24				SS: 17:14			
MR: 08:47				MS: 18:47				MR: 09:25				MS: 19:54				MR: 09:56				MS: 20:58				MR: 10:24				MS: 21:59				MR: 10:49				MS: 22:58			
ILLUM DATA				16%				16%				16%				25%				25%				34%				34%											
ROTARY WING				C				C				C				C				C				C				C											
FIXED WING				C				C				C				C				C				C				C											
GROUND OPS				P				P				P				P				P				P				P											
IAA				C				C				C				C				C				C				C											
NBC OPS				W				S				W				W				S				W				W				S				W			
TIME (LOCAL)				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18				00 06 12 18							
TIME (ZULU)				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23				05 11 17 23							



U.S. ARMY



RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATL	38.8500 lat	-77.0400 lon	5 meters elevation																												
½° GEPS JAN 14/00Z 2021	FRI 15				SAT 16				SUN 17				MON 18				TUE 19				WED 20				THR 21						
Surface winds	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18			
Winds GT 25 KT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2			
Winds GT 35 KT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Winds GT 50 KT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Precipitation	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18			
Precip GT 0.10 IN in 6 hr	0	0	0	0	15	37	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	13	17	17	13	8	12			
Precip GT 2.0 IN in 12 hr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
FZRA GT 0.01 IN in 6 hr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0			
SN GT 0.1 IN in 6 hr	0	0	0	0	0	4	8	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	4	5	6	5	5	0	0	0	5	4	4	3	4	7			
SN GT 2.0 IN in 12 hr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4			
SN GT 6.0 IN in 24 hr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Thunderstorms	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18			
Lightning within 20 km	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
0.75 IN hail within 40 km	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Ceiling and Visibility	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18			
Visibility LT 5 miles	1	3	8	1	11	20	10	1	16	0	1	0	0	4	5	6	5	5	4	0	0	2	6	3	5	7	12	13			
Visibility LT 3 miles	0	1	4	0	5	9	5	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	2	3	2	0	0	1	3	1	2	3	7	10			
Visibility LT 1 mile	0	0	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	5			
Ceiling LT 3000 feet	1	3	10	8	26	29	11	2	17	1	1	0	2	6	8	9	6	6	5	1	1	4	8	6	7	10	14	19			
Ceiling LT 1000 feet	0	1	4	0	5	9	5	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	2	3	2	0	0	1	3	2	2	3	8	11			
Ceiling LT 500 feet	0	0	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	5			
Others	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18	0Z	6	12	18			
Mean Temperature (F)	39	33	33	46	44	39	33	42	38	33	33	43	38	33	30	40	36	31	29	40	37	34	34	44	41	36	34	42			
Mean Wind Speed (KT)	2	3	6	9	7	6	6	8	8	9	10	11	6	5	5	9	7	7	5	7	5	6	6	8	7	6	6	8			




TODAY

January 14 (Thursday)

January 15 (Friday)

January 16 (Saturday)






U.S. ARMY



January 16 (Saturday)

January 17 (Sunday)

January 18 (Monday)






January 18 (Monday)

January 19 (Tuesday)

January 20 (Wednesday)





Washington Channel Flood Gauge

Washington Channel Flood gauge is Forecasted to be below minor levels today.


Notes:

At 3.70ft: Water begins to overflow the lowest Spots along the seawall adjacent to Ohio Drive And the Hains Point Loop Road.

At 4.2ft: Lowland is occurring along sporadic Portions of seawall adjacent to Ohio Drive and Hains Point Loop Road.

At 5.3ft: The unprotected area on the Southwest Waterfront at the DC seafood market begins to flood. Water approaches parts of the Hains Point Loop Road, but the road will likely be closed.

Forecasts for the Washington Channel at SW Waterfront are issued routinely year-round.



Flood Categories (in feet)	
Major Flood Stage:	7
Moderate Flood Stage:	5.3
Flood Stage:	4.2
Action Stage:	3.7

The Russian S-70 Okhotnik UCAV Struck Ground Targets With Unguided Bombs During Weapons Testing

January 14, 2021 Drones, Russia, Troubled Areas

STEFANO D'URSO

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The S-70 Okhotnik takes off for a test flight. (Photo: Russian MoD)

In December it was also announced that the S-70 Okhotnik drone was tested in flight with captive air-to-air missiles in the fighter role

The Russian next-generation Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) [Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik](#) (Hunter) struck some ground targets in the Ashuluk range (home of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Combat Training and Combat Application Center) in southern Russia, according to a source in the military-industrial complex cited by the Russian News Agency *RIA Novosti*. The drone hit the target with high accuracy using 500 kg (1100 lb) free-fall unguided bombs, likely the standard FAB-500 M-62 bomb used by Russian aircraft, carried in the weapons bay.

The [source did not disclose when this test happened](#), but mentioned that this was not the first bombing test of the drone. Further details included that the UCAV may have been recently upgraded to add new capabilities, as the source was quoted as saying that "the newest sighting and navigation system installed on the Okhotnik makes it possible to use free-falling ammunition with an accuracy approaching that of a high-precision guided weapon."

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Interestingly he added that the S-70 can autonomously engage "stationary and restrictedly mobile ground targets" with known coordinates, either preplanned or received from another source while in flight. While this could be just speculation, the few details disclosed by the source may suggest that the drone is using a [Continually Computed Release Point](#) (CCRP) method of bombing, normally used when the target's coordinates are known.

This method involves a computer calculating the optimal release point for the bomb to hit the target, taking into account the aircraft flight parameters (speed, altitude, etc), the weapon's parameters (speed, drag, etc), the target position and eventually its movements, as opposed to Constantly Computed Impact Point (CCIP) where the pilot has to put a pipper, which indicates the desired impact point, right on target, usually in a dive.

However, if the target is moving after the bomb release, the new changes in the position will not be taken into account, making a hit possible only if the target is moving very slowly. Obviously, in that case a direct hit would be much less probable than a hit by shrapnel in the immediate vicinity of the target (**unless guided weapons are used**).

The bombing test of the Okhotnik, **which first flew in 2019**, was preceded about a month ago by the announcement of the testing with air-to-air missiles in the fighter role. This test also happened over the Ashuluk range and was reportedly the first weapon testing performed after months of assessments of the flight qualities and on-board systems.



The S-70 Okhotnik accompanied by a Su-57 during a test flight. (Photo: Russian MoD)

After the air-to-air test, a source mentioned by RIA Novosti said that several flights were performed captive training missiles, which are identical to the live missile but missing the rocket engine and the warhead. Both IR-guided and radar-guided missiles were used to assess the UCAV's avionics coupled with the missile guidance systems and the Su-57 "Felon" which was accompanying the drone. This could be a further demonstration that the S-70 could be intended also to act as a **"Loyal Wingman"** for the Su-57 in future.

The **type of the weapons was not specified**, other than saying that they were both IR-guided and radar-guided missiles. This would somewhat restrict the field to the R-73/AA-11A Archer IR-guided short-range missile and its derivate R-74/AA-11B Archer, and the R-77/AA-12 Adder active radar-guided medium range missile.

*The R-73 and R-74 are the standard short-range air-to-air missile of the Russian Aerospace Forces, with the latter being further upgraded to a new K-74M2 variant, designed to be fired **from the Su-57's side weapon bays**. This variant reportedly includes a lock-on after launch (LOAL) capability, meaning that the missile can be launched without guidance and it will acquire its target once in flight.*

If the reports about the R-74M2 variant are correct, it would make sense to use it aboard the Okhotnik, as the IR sensor of the missile can't achieve a lock before launch while it is inside the weapon bays, unless there is a mechanism that extends the missile launcher into the airstream during the targeting process. In that case, the LOAL capability would not be essential and the UCAV could also use the standard R-74 and R-73.

Regarding the R-77, considered to be the Russian counterpart of the AIM-120 AMRAAM, the missile is currently being tested in a specially designed variant for the Su-57, called R-77M. This missile, based on the upgraded R-77-1/AA-12B **currently in service on the Su-27SM, Su-30SM and Su-35S** (and according to some sources also on earlier Su-27s and MiG-29, although there is no photographic evidence of its use in operational role), has been redesigned to fit inside the weapon bays, with the main difference being the replacement of the grid fins on the missile's tail with standard fins.

The missile should include a dual-pulse rocket motor for improved high-altitude maneuvering and extended range (rumored up to 100 miles, doubling the range of previous variants), an enhanced AESA radar sensor, improved **Electronic Counter-Countermeasures** (ECCM), better aerodynamics and reduced radar cross section (the last two mainly due to the new fins). With all these characteristics and the design optimized to fit inside the weapon bays, the R-77M could be the main candidate to be carried by the S-70.

There are also reports about another variant of the Adder, called R-77PD, which is powered by a combined rocket-ramjet engine, much like the European **MBDA Meteor BVRAAM** (Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile). Details about this variant are scarce and it is not known if it will be acquired by the Russian Aerospace Forces.

The commonality of the weapons between the S-70 and the Su-57 could be another hint to the future role of the UCAV. In the past, the Russian government said the drone would extend the radar coverage of the Felon and provide target acquisition, while also being able to attack its own targets autonomously. The Russian Ministry of Defense expects the **first deliveries of the drone to happen in 2024**, so we will likely know more about its role as we get closer to that deadline.

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According to some sources, the Okhotnik could perform live air-to-air missile launches this year, this has not been confirmed. However, it would not be the first time for a drone, as the MQ-9 Reaper already **fired live AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles** in 2017 and 2020 and, even before, the MQ-1 Predator launched the AIM-92 ATAS (Air-to-Air Stinger), including **one fired in 2002 at an Iraqi MiG-25**.

Chinese Covid-19 Vaccine Far Less Effective Than Initially Touted in Brazil

Results of Sinovac's shot were almost 30 percentage points lower than previously announced, as concerns grow over study's transparency



A Butantan Institute researcher in São Paulo held a vial on Tuesday containing CoronaVac, Sinovac's vaccine.

PHOTO: AMANDA PEROBELLI/REUTERS

By [Samantha Pearson](#), [Luciana Magalhaes](#) and [Chao Deng](#)

Updated Jan. 12, 2021 8:10 pm ET



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9 minutes

SÃO PAULO—China's effort to boost its image by providing Covid-19 vaccines to the developing world suffered a setback after one of its leading inoculation candidates turned out to be 50% effective in late-stage trials in Brazil, significantly lower than earlier results showed.

While Sinovac's CoronaVac efficacy rate still meets the 50% threshold the World Health Organization considers good enough for widespread use, scientists said a lack of transparency about the data risks damaging the credibility of a vaccine Brazilians and others world-wide are already reluctant to take.

Brazil's Butantan Institute, a São Paulo-based public institute that is the first to complete late-stage trials of the CoronaVac vaccine, had said last week that it was shown to be 78% effective and offer total protection against severe cases of the disease.

But after rising pressure from Brazilian scientists, some of whom accused the trial's organizers of misleading the public, Butantan said Tuesday those rates only included volunteers who suffered mild to severe cases of Covid-19. When data from all volunteers was considered—including those who contracted “very mild” cases of Covid-19 and required no medical assistance—the total efficacy rate fell to 50.4%, Butantan said.

Sinovac didn't respond to requests for comment.

BATTLE AGAINST COVID-19

[Latest Updates: Live Developments](#)

[Iran, Cuba, Under U.S. Sanctions, Team Up for Vaccine Trials](#)

[U.K. Hospitals Find Pandemic Paradox](#)

[Coronavirus Vaccine Doses That Were Held Back Now Being Released](#)

[China Reimposes Lockdowns as It Battles Worst Outbreak in Months](#)

[Uber, Lyft Push Biden Team for Role in Vaccine Rollout](#)

From Latin America to Africa and Asia, many developing countries have pinned their hopes on CoronaVac and other Chinese vaccine candidates as richer nations snap up inoculations developed in the West. CoronaVac can be stored in an ordinary refrigerator, making it cheaper and easier to transport than others that require subfreezing storage temperatures.

“This will have profound implications domestically [in China] and internationally,” said Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. “From the very beginning, China has raised people’s expectations about the effectiveness of China-made vaccines.”


Beyond mainland China and Hong Kong, Turkey and Ukraine are among nations that have reported orders for CoronaVac, and where regulators would also be closely watching for

efficacy analysis. Brazil has agreed to buy up to 100 million doses, and seven other Latin American countries have been in talks to obtain the vaccine.

Sinovac and Butantan had initially scheduled to reveal the efficacy rate by Dec. 15 but delayed it a week, citing a decision to collect additional data. A week later, the announcement was delayed again, which Brazilian researchers attributed to Sinovac's request for more time to consolidate data from trials in Indonesia and Turkey.

"It's extremely unusual, I've never seen this," said Denise Garrett, an epidemiologist at the Washington-based Sabin Vaccine Institute who worked for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta for more than 20 years. "They had already delayed the results—it seems they found them to be unsatisfactory so they came up with a way to announce the results in a more favorable way," she said.

Vaccine efficacy at recommended doses



Sources: State of Sao Paulo (CoronaVac); the companies (Covid-19 vaccines); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (other vaccines)

The lower success rate could push governments

toward giving priority to purchases from drugmakers whose vaccines have higher efficacy rates, said Iván Darío Vélez, an infectious disease expert at Colombia's University of Antioquia.

"If the vaccine has an efficacy rate around 50%, it's going to be hard to justify including it in the national vaccination program," said Dr. Vélez. "But if we have a society that doesn't

have the means to acquire all of the vaccines it needs, you can see a scenario where authorities would say, 'Fifty percent protection is still better than nothing.'"

In Chile, officials said they would go ahead with plans to import some 10 million doses of the Sinovac vaccine, the first batch of which was expected this month, said Rodrigo Yáñez, a high-ranking official in the Foreign Relations Ministry in charge of importing the shots.

Mr. Yáñez said CoronaVac would still be effective in preventing deaths and overwhelming hospitals with Covid-19 patients. "That is the objective," he said.

Many flu vaccines have an efficacy rate even lower than that of CoronaVac, public-health specialists said.

WHAT'S NEWS



Trump Administration Releases Vaccine Doses That Were Held Back



00:00

1x

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As China brought Covid-19 under control last year, the country's vaccine developers turned to foreign nations to conduct their clinical trials, choosing Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey. The widely differing results from those countries have only raised more questions about how well the vaccine works.

In countries with high numbers of Covid-19 cases, volunteers in vaccine trials face a greater exposure to the virus, allowing researchers to test vaccines faster and produce more accurate results. More than 200,000 people have died from Covid-19 in Brazil so far, second only to the U.S., turning the Latin American country into an ideal testing ground for vaccines.

Researchers in Turkey, which is at an earlier stage of testing CoronaVac, said late last month that initial data from around 1,300 people in late-stage trials showed the vaccine to be just over 91% effective.

Meanwhile, Indonesian authorities reported Monday that preliminary results from their clinical trial of CoronaVac showed an efficacy rate of 65.3%, although it isn't clear how scientists there made their calculations.

Though that rate was based on data from a trial involving just 1,600 volunteers in the city of Bandung, Indonesian authorities this week greenlighted CoronaVac for emergency use. It isn't clear whether Indonesian authorities knew the full extent of the data analysis from Brazil. The country has secured 126 million doses of the vaccine, batches of which have already arrived.

In contrast, more than 12,000 health workers took part in Phase 3 trials in Brazil, the first country to complete tests of Sinovac's vaccine. Of those volunteers, 252 contracted Covid-19—167 of whom took the placebo, and 85 of whom took the vaccine, the Butantan Institute said Tuesday.

Butantan researchers on Tuesday defended their decision to release partial results first, saying that it is more important to know how well the vaccine protects people against more severe cases rather than all cases.

CoronaVac's relatively low efficacy rate means more people will need to take the vaccine to achieve herd immunity, making it even more important for its developers to be transparent and reassure the public about its efficacy and safety, doctors said.

Infectious disease specialists blamed the skewed results on both pressure from São Paulo's government and Sinovac in China.

Political observers here say that São Paulo's Gov. João Doria, who spearheaded Butantan's partnership with Sinovac, has politicized the vaccine's development by championing its use in his increasingly public tussle with President Jair Bolsonaro, who has long disparaged Chinese vaccines. Mr. Doria is considered a likely presidential candidate next year.

STAY INFORMED

Get a coronavirus briefing six days a week, and a weekly Health newsletter once the crisis abates: [Sign up here](#).

In November, Mr. Bolsonaro warned his followers that the CoronaVac vaccine could kill or disable them, without offering any evidence. Mr. Bolsonaro, who last year recovered from a mild case of Covid-19, has dismissed the disease as nothing more than a “little flu” and said he doesn’t plan to get vaccinated himself.

Battling politicians coupled with the mixed signals about the Sinovac vaccine led 50% of respondents in a Datafolha poll conducted last month to say they wouldn’t take any Chinese vaccine. When respondents were asked if they would get vaccinated, knowing vaccines are produced by many countries, only 20% said they would not.

“It’s absurd,” Sonia Nascimento, a 46-year-old caregiver for the elderly, said about the confusion over the vaccine’s efficacy rate. “Is this vaccine going to work? Should I wait for more people to take it in case it has side effects?”

While Butantan has found itself caught in a political battle in Brazil, its Chinese partners imposed strict controls on what information could be publicly shared.

“Butantan found itself squashed between them in the middle of all this mess,” said Eliseu Waldman, an epidemiologist at the University of São Paulo, who like many specialists has defended the 120-year-old institution. Butantan produces the majority of vaccines used in the country and is in talks to distribute CoronaVac throughout South America.

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PREVIEW

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Hours after Butantan announced CoronaVac to be between 78% and 100% effective last Thursday, Brazil’s federal government announced it would buy up to 100 million doses of the vaccine.

Chinese authorities approved CoronaVac for emergency use last July but have yet to approve the vaccine for broad use. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Mr. Huang says the

lower efficacy figure doesn't preclude China from still allowing the vaccine to be used widely.

Iran Is Assembling Gear Able to Produce Key Nuclear-Weapons Material

Tehran has taken a new step toward possible atomic-weapons production



An Oct. 21 satellite photo showed construction at Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment facility.

PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/ASSOCIATED PRESS

By [Laurence Norman](#) and [Michael R. Gordon](#)

Updated Jan. 13, 2021 1:54 pm ET



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Iran has taken a significant new step toward possible atomic-weapons production, starting work on an assembly line to manufacture a key material used at the core of nuclear warheads, the United Nations atomic agency said in a confidential report Wednesday, raising the stakes in Tehran's standoff with Washington ahead of President-elect Joe Biden's inauguration.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, in a report for member states viewed by The Wall Street Journal, said Iran has told the watchdog that it has started manufacturing equipment it will use to produce uranium metal at a site in Isfahan in coming months.

Uranium metal can be used to construct the core of a nuclear weapon.

Iran hasn't made uranium metal so far, senior Western officials said. The IAEA said Tehran had given it no timeline for when it would do so. Still, the development brings Iran closer to crossing the line between nuclear operations with a potential civilian use, such as enriching nuclear fuel for power-generating reactors, and nuclear-weapons work, something Tehran has long denied ever carrying out.

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Kazem Gharib Abadi, said Wednesday on Twitter that Iran would produce uranium metal, saying it would allow the development of a new fuel for the Tehran civilian research reactor. Iran has said it would take four to five months to install the equipment to produce a uranium powder from which uranium metal is made.

The Iranian government has moved methodically over the past 18 months to expand its nuclear activities. Since the Trump administration withdrew from a 2015 international accord limiting Iranian nuclear activities and began imposing sweeping economic sanctions, Iran has begun stockpiling more enriched uranium and taken other steps barred under the nuclear deal.

Making uranium metal is also prohibited by the deal, which also involves the U.K., France, Germany, China and Russia.

Mr. Biden has said he wants to resume diplomacy with Iran and is looking for a way to return to the nuclear agreement, which was reached when he was vice president. But reviving the international pact could be complicated politically and for technical reasons, and could face stiffer opposition if Iran conducts nuclear weapons-related work.

Western diplomats say that by taking the recent steps, Iran is seeking leverage to pressure Mr. Biden to move swiftly to drop sanctions on Iran and return speedily to the nuclear accord without laying down any conditions. By threatening major new steps on uranium metal production and scaling back U.N. inspectors' access to Iran, Tehran could leave Mr. Biden with a difficult choice—a rapid return to the deal or a major confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

[How Close Is Tehran to Developing Nuclear Weapons?](#)

After the killing of leading Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh—in an attack Tehran has blamed on Israel—Iran's parliament in December called on the government to start enriching uranium up to 20% purity and to begin producing uranium metal within five months if the U.S. doesn't drop its economic sanctions. Israel has declined to comment on the killing of Mr. Fakhrizadeh. Iran said last week it was starting to produce 20% enriched uranium.

Under the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran had agreed to a 15-year moratorium on uranium and plutonium metallurgical production. Iran was allowed to work on advanced fuel for research reactors, one of the few civilian uses for uranium metal, but only after 10 years.


When enriched to weapons grade of roughly 90% purity, uranium metal plays a central role in atomic weapons, forming the core of the device which, when triggered, sets off a chain reaction that creates the nuclear explosion.

Making a Nuclear Weapon


Iran has taken early steps that could possibly allow it to build a nuclear weapon.

Creating weapons-grade nuclear fuel


- 1 Low-grade uranium ore is mined and chemically treated to produce a concentrated yellowcake. After a conversion process, it is fed into centrifuges.



- 2 Centrifuges are set up in cascades to enrich the uranium. The sophisticated process can take years to establish. Iran produced around 20,000 basic centrifuges—IR-1s and IR-2ms—but is doing research on more advanced machines.




- 3 Enriching uranium to 5% purity is the most time-consuming part of producing weapons-grade material. Since the Trump administration left the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018, Iran has accrued a stockpile of at least 2,443 kg of uranium, including material enriched to 3.67% and 4.5%. The size of the stockpile is more than 12 times the total permitted under the accord.




- 4 It takes roughly 200 kg to 250 kg of 20% enriched uranium to produce 25 kg of 90% enriched uranium, the amount needed for a bomb. In early January, Iran began enriching uranium at 20% for the first time

since the 2015 nuclear deal. Enriched uranium can be converted into uranium metal for weapon use.



Weaponizing nuclear fuel

Iran has signaled it could begin building a uranium metal plant that would give it the material to make the core of a nuclear weapon. Deploying the nuclear fuel in a weapon presents technical challenges, many of which Iran isn't believed to have mastered. Detonating the weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear payload must be attached to a missile, and the payload must be able to withstand re-entry through Earth's atmosphere as it descends to its target.



Roque Ruiz/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Even with the production of uranium metal, Iran would need to complete many additional steps before it is capable of building a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile. It would need to be able to build a warhead compact enough to be carried on such a missile and manufacture a re-entry vehicle to prevent the weapon from exploding in flight.

Iran may still need years to master those skills, some analysts believe.

Iran has denied ever working on nuclear weapons, but Western officials and the IAEA have said Tehran had a structured weapons program until 2003. And the IAEA has for years pursued leads about the Iranians' work on uranium materials.

Over the past year, the IAEA has sought to locate a natural uranium-metal disc, present in Iran in the early 2000s, which is no longer accounted for. That led to a protracted standoff, which saw IAEA inspectors banned from visiting two Iranian sites for months.



An International Atomic Energy Agency inspector worked at Iran's Natanz nuclear power plant in 2014.


PHOTO: KAZEM GHANE/IRNA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES


The IAEA said in a report in 2013 that Iran had told the agency it intended to build a facility to produce uranium-metal ingots, but it was widely believed a production line was never completed.


According to Western officials, the work on the new Iranian uranium-metal production line is being done by a company called Sureh, a subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which is currently under U.S. sanctions and was previously sanctioned by the European Union for its nuclear-related work.

The work is taking place at an Iranian nuclear facility in Isfahan, near the Uranium Conversion Facility, which is under regular IAEA inspection.

Some Western officials have said Iran has worked for several years on research to pave the way to being able to produce uranium metal.







Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Ferraro, Alexandra (HSEMA) </O=DC GOVERNMENT/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=AA04E9A90A014BE29A48AD566D9D0015-ALEXANDRA>

Sent: Monday, January 18, 2021 7:56 AM

To: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET); Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); §2-534(a)(2) (MPD); Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); Hawkins, Derron (FEMS); Gilliard, Darrell K.; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; stephebj@nctc.gov; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Michael_Libby@nps.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO); Cardella, Alex; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Andres, Alyse; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil; Barbieri, Michael (MPD); Phillips, Steve; Dillon, Joseph; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; John.Erickson@uscg.gov; ADonald@wmata.com; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; paige.vandenneever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; Cook, James A.; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); usman.saleem@uscg.gov; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Chite, Mark; Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA); elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; MICHAEL EBEY (PID); Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Jackson, Keishea (FEMS); Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Lay, Amy L.; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; john.donohue@uscg.gov; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; john.nugent@uscg.gov; david.millard@uscg.gov; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Mccray, Jonice; douglas.m.trippary.mil@mail.mil; Delegan, John; Mein, John (EOM); Harvin, Donell (HSEMA); Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); Waller, Markiest; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA)

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Subject: RE: SITREP from OPE17 Jan and bulletin on DVE Use of Amateur HAM Radios

Attachments: image001.png; image002.png; (U--LES) NTIC 2000 SITREP 17 Jan.pdf

Categories: Green

Attaching NTIC's SITREP from 2000 hours on 01-17.

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Subject: SITREP from OPE17 Jan and bulletin on DVE Use of Amateur HAM Radios


From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>

Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 11:02 AM

To: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>; §2-534(a)(2) <[§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov)>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Michael.Libby@nps.gov <Michael.Libby@nps.gov>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil <William.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO) <richard.rogers@uss.s.dhs.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO) <christina.fabac@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil <Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil>; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov <Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; John.Erickson@uscg.gov <John.Erickson@uscg.gov>; ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; paige.vandenhoeve@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <paige.vandenhoeve@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil <Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov>; Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; MICHAEL EBEL (PID) <michael.ebel@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; Mark.varanelli@nps.gov <Mark.varanelli@nps.gov>; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil <marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov <Keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov <Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; john.donohue@uscg.gov <john.donohue@uscg.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil <Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil>; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov <Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov>; john.nugent@uscg.gov <john.nugent@uscg.gov>; david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@uss.s.dhs.gov>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov <jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov>; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil <douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil>; Deigan, John <john.deigan@uscg.gov>; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil <wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil <lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil>; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>

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Subject: Muriel Bowser Threat and conspiracy theories



From: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>

Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:50 AM

To: §2-534(a)(2) [§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov) <[§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov)>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Michael.Libby@nps.gov <Michael.Libby@nps.gov>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil <William.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO) <richard.rogers@uss.s.dhs.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO) <christina.fabac@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil <Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil>; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov <Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; John.Erickson@uscg.gov <John.Erickson@uscg.gov>; ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil <Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov>; Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; MICHAEL EBAY (PID) <michael.ebay@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; Mark.varanelli@nps.gov <Mark.varanelli@nps.gov>; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil <marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov <Keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov <Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>;

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Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI) <HLEE5@FBI.GOV>; Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI) <psbrown@fbi.gov>; WF-ID-INCIDENT-2 <WF-ID-INCIDENT-2@ic.fbi.gov>
Subject: 1/17 Inauguration Virtual Command Post

Good morning. 2-534(a)(3)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thank you
Hope

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On Jan 13, 2021 1:56 PM, "MICHAEL EBEBY (PID)" <michael.ebey@ussd.dhs.gov> wrote:

>
> All –
>
> Please see the attached USSS Protective Intelligence Assessment for the 59th Presidential Inauguration.
>
> Please do not disseminate this product outside your agency without contacting Steve Phillips or myself.
>
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> Thank you
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>
> Mike Ebey

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> 2-534(a)(2) -

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 9:42 PM
To: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); §2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K.; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; stephebj@nctc.gov; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Michael_Libby@nps.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO); Cardella, Alex; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Andres, Alyse; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov; Phillips, Steve; Dillon, Joseph; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; John.Erickson@uscg.gov; ADonald@wmata.com; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; Cook, James A.; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); usman.saleem@uscg.gov; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Chite, Mark; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; MICHAEL EBEY (PID); Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Lay, Amy L.; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; john.donohue@uscg.gov; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; john.nugent@uscg.gov; david.millard@uscg.gov; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil; Deegan, John; Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); Waller, Markiest; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA)
Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI); Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI); WF-ID-INCIDENT-2
Subject: SITREP from OPE17 Jan and bulletin on DVE Use of Amateur HAM Radios
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2-534(a)(3), 2-534(a)(10)

From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>

Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 11:02 AM

To: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>; §2-534(a)(2) dc.gov <§2-534(a)(2) dc.gov>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Michael_Libby@nps.gov <Michael_Libby@nps.gov>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil <William.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO) <richard.rogers@usss.dhs.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>;

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2-534(a)(3)

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Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI) <HLEE5@FBI.GOV>; Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI) <psbrown@fbi.gov>; WF-ID-INCIDENT-2 <WF-ID-INCIDENT-2@ic.fbi.gov>
Subject: 1/17 Inauguration Virtual Command Post

Good morning. 2-534(a)(3)

Thank you
Hope

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On Jan 13, 2021 1:56 PM, "MICHAEL EBEY (PID)" <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov> wrote:

>

> All –

>

> Please see the attached USSS Protective Intelligence Assessment for the 59th Presidential Inauguration.

>

> Please do not disseminate this product outside your agency without contacting Steve Phillips or myself.

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> Thank you

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> Mike Ebey

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> 2-534(a)(2) -

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[REDACTED]

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA) <david.l.graves6.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 5:17 PM
To: Graves, David L CIV DTRA OI (USA)
Subject: LE-2 [MAY CONTAIN USPER INFO
Attachments: SD-LECC FBI - Potential for Violence in Pacific Beach from Demonstrators and Counter-Protestors.pdf; FBI ECIR - Radio Frequencies Possibly Used During the Violent Breach of the US Capitol.pdf; Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 01142021.pdf; (U) SNHD Weekly Major Recall Summary Report_20210115.pdf; 20200115 Security Awareness Bulletin - Inauguration NSSE.pdf; 01152021PPDHDBIntel.pdf

Categories: Green

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(U//FOUO) This product contains information concerning U.S. person(s) that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided, in accordance with the DoD Manual 5240.01 and Executive Order 12333. It should be handled IAW recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures.

Intelligence Oversight policy applies to the information contained within the summary. Dissemination of this summary to authorized personnel (those responsible for antiterrorism, force protection and/or law enforcement) is permissible.

This document is intended to provide situational awareness of food, medical device, and pharmaceutical recall news occurring around the United States. This Unclassified report is a compilation of extracted open source information and titles and summaries are re-captioned and shortened during editing.

FOOD, PHARMACEUTICAL, AND MEDICAL PRODUCT RECALLS SUMMARY REPORT

Food Recalls

(U) Lavva Voluntarily Recalls a Single Lot of Blueberry Plant-Based Yogurt

Summary: EVR Foods, INC, parent company to Lavva, is issuing a voluntary recall of its 5.3 ounce Blueberry Plant-Based Yogurt with expiration date 2/21/21 due to potential mold contamination. This plant-based yogurt was produced at a manufacturing facility in New York and has only been linked to the single date code. The product comes in a 5.3 ounce, colorful plastic cup with a foil lid, marked with lot #022121 on the bottom of the cup which is also used as the expiration date of the product. The affected product was distributed to retail stores nationwide. Additional information about affected products including lot numbers and images of the product packaging, if available, can be found [HERE](#).

(U) Weis Markets Issues Recall for Possible Foreign Matter Contamination in Weis Ice Cream Products

Summary: Weis Markets today said it has issued a recall for 10,869 containers of Weis Quality Cookies and Cream Ice Cream (48 oz.) and 502 bulk containers of Klein's Vanilla Dairy Ice Cream (3 gallon) because the products may be contaminated with extraneous material, specifically metal filling equipment parts. There has been one report of a customer who discovered an intact piece of metal equipment in the Weis Quality Cookies and Cream Ice Cream (48 oz.). There is concern of an additional piece of equipment present in the ice cream product(s) possibly presenting a choking hazard. The affected product was sold in 197 Weis Markets' stores in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey, New York, Delaware and West Virginia. The Weis Quality Cookies and Cream ice cream is packaged in a scround 48- ounce container with a UPC of 041497-01253 and with a sell by date of 10/28/21. The Klein's Vanilla bulk ice cream is packaged in 3-gallon containers with a code stamp of 0302 and are not for retail sale. This product was sold to one retail establishment in New York and has been removed from sale. Additional information about affected products including lot numbers and images of the product packaging, if available, can be found [HERE](#).

Drug, Supplement, and Cosmetics Recalls

(U) Fresenius Kabi Issues Recall of Ketorolac Tromethamine Injection, USP Due to the Presence of Particulate Matter

Summary: Fresenius Kabi USA is voluntarily recalling a single lot of Ketorolac Tromethamine Injection, USP, 30 mg/mL, 1 mL fill in a 2 mL amber vial to the user level due to the presence of particulate matter. Particulate matter was found in reserve sample vials. Ketorolac Tromethamine, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, is indicated for the short-term (up to 5 days in adults) management of moderately severe acute pain that requires analgesia at the opioid level. The affected product details are as follows: Ketorolac Tromethamine Injection, USP, 30 mg/mL, 1 mL fill in a 2 mL amber vial; NDC Number 63323-162-01; Product Code 160201; Batch Number 6121083; with Expiration Date 02/2021. The recalled lot was distributed nationwide in the U.S. to wholesalers, distributors, hospitals, and pharmacies between March 28, 2019 and September 3, 2019. Additional information about affected products including lot numbers and images of the product packaging, if available, can be found [HERE](#).

Medical Device Recalls

(U) Boston Scientific Announces LOTUS Edge™ Aortic Valve System Voluntary Recall and Product Discontinuation

Summary: Boston Scientific Corporation (NYSE: BSX) has announced it has initiated a global, voluntary recall of all unused inventory of the LOTUS Edge™ Aortic Valve System due to complexities associated with the product delivery system. The voluntary recall is related solely to the delivery system, as the valve continues to achieve positive and clinically effective performance post-implant. There is no safety issue for patients who currently have an implanted LOTUS Edge valve. Given the additional time and investment required to develop and reintroduce an enhanced delivery system, the company has

chosen to retire the entire LOTUS product platform immediately. Additional information about affected products including lot numbers and images of the product packaging, if available, can be found [HERE](#).

Other Recalls

(U) Midwestern Pet Foods Voluntarily Expands Recall of Pet Food for Aflatoxin Health Risk

Summary: Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc., of Evansville, IN is expanding its December 30, 2020 voluntary recall of certain dog and cat food products produced in our Chickasha Operations Facility to include all dog and cat pet food products made with corn products because those products may contain aflatoxin levels which exceed acceptable limits. Products were distributed nationally to online distributors and retail stores nationwide. The products recalled cover all that expire on or before July 9, 2022, depicted as “07/09/22” in the date code on the product. Aflatoxin is a toxin produced by the mold *Aspergillus flavus*. There have been reports of illnesses and deaths in dogs associated with certain lots of products. No human illnesses have been reported. Lot code information may be found on the back of bag and will appear in a three-line code, with the top line in format “EXP 03/03/22/05/L#/B####/HH:MM”. This recall covers only product manufactured at Midwestern Pet Food’s Chickasha, Oklahoma facility, and the unique Chickasha Facility identifier is located in the date code as a “05” and “REG. OK-PFO-0005” at the end of the date code. Multiple products sold under varying brand names and formulations are affected. Additional information about affected products including lot numbers and images of the product packaging, if available, can be found [HERE](#).

Additional Resources

(U) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Summary: The [FDA Recalls, Market Withdrawals, & Safety Alerts portal](#) displays a concise, reverse chronological listing of current recalls, withdrawals, and alerts. Through the [FDA Recall Information Search portal](#), users can search for and view more detailed information including the Weekly Enforcement Reports for the following categories of products regulated by the FDA: Biologics, Cosmetics, Devices, Drugs, Food, Tobacco, and Veterinary.

(U) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food Safety and inspection Service (FSIS)

Summary: Through the [FSIS Recalls and Public Health Alerts portal](#) provides links to view current and historical recalls and alerts as well as current and historical foodborne illness and outbreak investigations. Occasionally for products with overlapping jurisdiction the same recall will be posted by both the USDA and FDA.

(U) U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)

Summary: The [CPSC Recalls portal](#) displays recalls for all other general consumer products not otherwise under the jurisdiction of the other federal regulatory agencies. CPSC also has a new portal for [COVID-19 Home Safety Information](#).

(U) U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)

Summary: The [NHTSA Recalls portal](#) allows users to search vehicle safety recalls by Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) or manufacturer and includes vehicle components, tires, related equipment, and car seats.

(U) State of Nevada Department of Taxation (NV DOT)

Summary: The NV DOT issues [Cannabis Product Advisories](#) for cannabis products sold in the state.



*Land of the free
Home of the brave.*

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Snyder, Marc R. (OPE) (FBI) <MRSnyder@fbi.gov>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 12:50 PM
To: HQ-DIV15-ASSOC-PARTNERS; HQ-DIV15-DoD-eGWG; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-POCs; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DIRECTORS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DEPUTY-DIRECTORS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-PARTNERS; HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-MGMT
Subject: OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep 17 January 2021
Attachments: OPS 2021 Inauguration Daily Sitrep-20210117_TLP-AMBER.pdf
Categories: Green

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Good afternoon,

Please see the attached OPS Inauguration Daily SITREP for Sunday, 01/17/2021.

This report is classified at the **TLP: AMBER** level and should be shared accordingly.

TLP: AMBER documents contain information that may be shared with members of your own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm.

Thank you,

FBI Office of Partner Engagement

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 11:11 AM
To: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); §2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K.; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; stephebj@nctc.gov; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Michael_Libby@nps.gov; CeasarDN@state.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO); Cardella, Alex; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Andres, Alyse; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov; Phillips, Steve; Dillon, Joseph; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; John.Erickson@uscg.gov; ADonald@wmata.com; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; Cook, James A.; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); usman.saleem@uscg.gov; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); Kbahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Chite, Mark; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; MICHAEL EBEY (PID); Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Lay, Amy L.; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; john.donohue@uscg.gov; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; john.nugent@uscg.gov; david.millard@uscg.gov; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil; Deegan, John; Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); Waller, Markiest; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA)
Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI); Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI); WF-ID-INCIDENT-2
Subject: SITREPs- FBI/OPE and NTIC both dated 16 Jan 2021
Attachments: OPE_SITREP_FINAL_Jan 16.pdf; (U--LES) SITREP 16 Jan (1).pdf
Categories: Green

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2-534(a)(10), 2-534(a)(3)

From: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>

Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:50 AM

To: §2-534(a)(2) <§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov> <§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Michael_Libby@nps.gov <Michael_Libby@nps.gov>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil <William.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; RICHARD ROGERS II (WFO) <richard.rogers@usss.dhs.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; CHRISTINA FABAC (WFO) <christina.fabac@usss.dhs.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@usss.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@usss.dhs.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil <Douglas.R.Reedy@whmo.mil>; Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov <Michael.Barbieri@dc.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; John.Erickson@uscg.gov <John.Erickson@uscg.gov>; ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil <Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjcnczyk@fbi.gov>; usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov>; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; MICHAEL EBAY (PID) <michael.ebay@usss.dhs.gov>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; Mark_varanelli@nps.gov <Mark_varanelli@nps.gov>; marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil <marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov <Keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov <Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; john.donohue@uscg.gov <john.donohue@uscg.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil <Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil>; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov <Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov>; john.nugent@uscg.gov <john.nugent@uscg.gov>; david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@usss.dhs.gov>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov <jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov>; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; douglas.m.trippary.mil@mail.mil <douglas.m.trippary.mil@mail.mil>; Deigan, John <john.deigan@uscg.gov>; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil

<wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil <lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil>; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>

Cc: Lee, Hunter (LA) (FBI) <HLEE5@FBI.GOV>; Brown, Pamela S. (WF) (FBI) <psbrown@fbi.gov>; WF-ID-INCIDENT-2 <WF-ID-INCIDENT-2@ic.fbi.gov>

Subject: 1/17 Inauguration Virtual Command Post

Good morning. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Thank you
Hope

-

On Jan 13, 2021 1:56 PM, "MICHAEL EBEEY (PID)" <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov> wrote:

>
> All –
>
> Please see the attached USSS Protective Intelligence Assessment for the 59th Presidential Inauguration.
>
> Please do not disseminate this product outside your agency without contacting Steve Phillips or myself.

>
>
>
> Thank you
>
>
>
> Mike Ebey

> [REDACTED]

>
>
>
>
>
> All e-mail to/from this account is subject to official review and is for official use only. Action may be taken in response to any inappropriate use of the Secret Service's e-mail system. This e-mail may contain information that is privileged, law enforcement sensitive, or subject to other disclosure limitations. Such information is loaned to you and should not be further disseminated without the permission of the Secret Service. If you have received this e-mail in error, do not keep, use, disclose, or copy it; notify the sender immediately and delete it.

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: NTIC (HSEMA) </O=DC GOVERNMENT/OU=EXTERNAL (FYDIBOHF25SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=2B47F489E46846A9BFE3E59817F068FF>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:12 AM
To: Farnam, Julie E.; Hurtig, Matthew N.; HUGH PHILLIPS (PID); Cisneros GySgt Dana K; Lee, Andrew J MAJ USARMY NG DCANG (USA); Polisen, Thomas M.; McCamley, Ryan P.; §2-534(a)(2) (MPD); Varanelli, Mark
Cc: Donohue, John K.
Subject: Re: Domestic Extremist Activities Following Riots
Attachments: Outlook-p4kxgy52.jpg
Categories: Green

Thank you, Julie! We will share with our team here.

Best regards,

Sam

National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC)

Mainline: (202) 481-3075 | ntic@dc.gov

DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency

2720 Martin Luther King, Jr. Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20032



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From: Farnam, Julie E. <Julie.Farnam@uscg.gov>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:06 AM
To: NTIC (HSEMA) <NTIC@dc.gov>; Hurtig, Matthew N. <Matthew.Hurtig@uscg.gov>; HUGH PHILLIPS (PID) <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>; Cisneros GySgt Dana K <dana.cisneros@usmc.mil>; Lee, Andrew J MAJ USARMY NG DCANG (USA) <andrew.j.lee.mil@mail.mil>; Polisen, Thomas M. <Thomas.Polisen@uscg.gov>; McCamley, Ryan P. <Ryan.McCamley@uscg.gov>; §2-534(a)(2) (MPD) <§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov>; Varanelli, Mark <Mark_Varanelli@nps.gov>
Cc: Donohue, John K. <John.Donohue@uscg.gov>
Subject: Domestic Extremist Activities Following Riots

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FYSA.

One piece of text in the attached to highlight:

2-534(a)(3)

Julie E. Farnam
Assistant Director
Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division
Protective Services Bureau
United States Capitol Police

(d) 202-224-6901

(c) 2-534(a)(2) -

Get important updates on the 59th Presidential Inauguration from DC Government. Text INAUG2021 to 888-777 for updates on public safety, street closures, weather alerts, and more.

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Farnam, Julie E. <Julie.Farnam@uscp.gov>
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2021 10:07 AM
To: NTIC (HSEMA); Hurtig, Matthew N.; HUGH PHILLIPS (PID); Cisneros GySgt Dana K; Lee, Andrew J MAJ USARMY NG DCANG (USA); Polisen, Thomas M.; McCamley, Ryan P.; §2-534(a)(2) (MPD); Varanelli, Mark
Cc: Donohue, John K.
Subject: Domestic Extremist Activities Following Riots
Attachments: 2021-01-17_03_10_29_002_Flashpoint_-_1_16_21
_Daily_Update__Domestic_Extremist_Activities_Following_Capitol_Riots__January_16__2021_.pdf

Categories: Green

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FYSA.

One piece of text in the attached to highlight:

§2-534(a)(3)

Julie E. Farnam
Assistant Director
Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division
Protective Services Bureau
United States Capitol Police
(d) 202-224-6901
§ 2-534(a)(2)



~~2-534(a)(10)~~

[illegible]

[illegible]

The image shows a document page where the vast majority of the text has been redacted with solid black bars. The redactions are organized into several distinct blocks:

- Top Left:** A small rectangular redaction box.
- Top Section:** A large block of text at the top of the page is completely obscured by a single, wide black bar.
- Second Section:** Below the first large redaction, there is another block of text that has been fully covered by a black bar.
- Third Section:** A third block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box appearing to the left of the main black bar.
- Fourth Section:** A large block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box positioned to the left of the main black bar.
- Fifth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Sixth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Seventh Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Eighth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Ninth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Tenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Eleventh Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Twelfth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Thirteenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Fourteenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Fifteenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Sixteenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Seventeenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Eighteenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Nineteenth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Twentieth Section:** A block of text is redacted, with a small rectangular redaction box to the left.
- Bottom Left:** A small brown dot is located in the bottom left corner of the page.

2-534(a)(10), 2-534(a)(3)(E)

[illegible][illegible]

2-534(a)(10), 2-534(a)(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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REPORT SOURCES

1. <https://oathkeepers.org/>

TOPICS



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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 7:18 PM
To: Carroll, Jeffery W. (MPD)
Subject: 2-534(a)(3)
Attachments: [REDACTED]

Categories: Green

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I'm going to go on a limb and say that you have already seen these, but USSS BOLOs for this week

From: INAUG-PICC-ONDUTY <INAUG-PICC-ONDUTY@uss.s.dhs.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 6:52 PM
To: External-wjnewman@fbi.gov; MICHAEL EBAY (PID) <michael.ebay@uss.s.dhs.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@uss.s.dhs.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@uss.s.dhs.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; External-cookjam@amtrak.com; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; External-Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; CeasarDN@state.gov; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; External-william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; External-2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov <michael.barbieri@dc.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; External-ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; stephebj@nctc.gov; PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; paige.vandenheever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>; douglas.m.trippamy.mil@mail.mil; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; External-john.erickson@uscg.gov <john.erickson@uscg.gov>; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; External-john.delegan@uscg.gov; External-david.millard@uscg.gov; External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; john.donohue@uscg.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil <douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil>; ANDRE RUTHERFORD (WFO)

<ANDRE.RUTHERFORD@usss.dhs.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov; Sanchez, Minerva (USMS)
<Minerva.Sanchez@usdoj.gov>; External-SochaJM@state.gov; External-HuntJW@state.gov; BRAD MORENKO (CSD)
<Brad.Morenko@usss.dhs.gov>; JOEL DEJESUS (CSD) <joel.dejesus@usss.dhs.gov>; External-htstapleton@fbi.gov;
Pillsbury, Richard <Richard.Pillsbury@usss.dhs.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - NCR Special Interest and Lookout Subjects

Good evening,

Please see the attached [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Inauguration Protective Intelligence and Assessment Coordinating Center
United States Secret Service

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Loftus, Ashlea (WF) (FBI) <ALOFTUS@fbi.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 3:31 PM
To: Marcenelle, Madeline (HSEMA); darrin.bovia@dc.gov; Donell, Harvin
Cc: Randolph, Sedley (HSEMA)
Subject: Fwd: TLP:AMBER - OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep - 14 January 2021
Attachments: OPS 2021 Inauguration Daily Sitrep-20210114_TLP-AMBER.pdf

Categories: Green

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Good afternoon,

Please see below regarding the attached OPS sitrep. Note this is TLP:AMBER and should be handled accordingly.

Sedley, I believe this is the sitrep you had been referring to. I didn't know about it until just now! I should be able to pass them along now.

Vr,

Ashlea Loftus
Intelligence Analyst
FBI Washington
202.287.4897 | 202.403.7116
Liaison Officer to National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Snyder, Marc R. (OPE) (FBI)" <MRSnyder@fbi.gov>

Date: Jan 14, 2021 9:06 AM

Subject: TLP:AMBER - OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep - 14 January 2021

To: HQ-DIV15-ASSOC-PARTNERS <HQ-DIV15-ASSOC-PARTNERS@ic.fbi.gov>,HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-POCs <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-POCs@ic.fbi.gov>,HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DIRECTORS <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DIRECTORS@ic.fbi.gov>,HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DEPUTY-DIRECTORS <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-DEPUTY-DIRECTORS@ic.fbi.gov>,HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-PARTNERS <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-PARTNERS@ic.fbi.gov>,HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-MGMT <HQ-DIV15-FUSION-CENTER-MGMT@ic.fbi.gov>

Cc:

Good morning,

Please see the attached OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep for 14 JAN 2021.

This report is classified at the **TLP: AMBER** level and should be shared accordingly.

TLP: AMBER documents contain information that may be shared with members of your own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm.

Thank you,

FBI Office of Partner Engagement

Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 2:01 PM
To: Hasser, Andrew D MSgt USAF NORAD-USNC JFHQ - NCR (USA); Phillips, Steve; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI); MICHAEL EBEY (PID); MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); Cook, James A.; Chite, Mark; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; Mccray, Jonice T NFG NG DCARNG (USA); Mason, Amanda S Maj USAF NG DCANG (USA); Murphy, Anh-Chi P Maj USAF 113 WG (USA); Ebbert, Jonathan S COL USARMY NG DCARNG (USA); CeasarDN@state.gov; Andres, Alyse; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; Rasmussen, Mark A CIV USARMY MDW (USA); Squirewell, Wanda C CIV USAF (USA); Solomon, Marvin CIV CPMS (USA); Furmanski, William C II CIV NORAD-USNC JFHQ - NCR (USA); jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Cardella, Alex; External-§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); External-ADonald@wmata.com; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; stephebj@nctc.gov; PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K.; Grice, William R CIV USN (USA); Fata, Lillian M CIV USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC (USA); Glover, Roosevelt A Jr CIV (USA); kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Bahe, Kenneth T CIV USN (USA); Waller, Markiest; van den Heever, Paige H CIV USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC (USA); Cooper, Isaiah N CIV (USA); Suszan, Nicholas J CIV USN NCIS (USA); Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); Gross, Samuel G MAJ USARMY NORAD-USNC WO (USA); Lay, Amy L.; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA); Trippany, Douglas M II MAJ USARMY MDW (USA); Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); Taylor, Catherine MIL USAF JS J3 (USA); External-john.erickson@uscg.gov; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; Deegan, John; External-david.millard@uscg.gov; External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; john.donohue@uscg.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; Dillon, Joseph; McGarvey, Ronald C CIV USMC MCB QUANTICO (USA); Smith, Johnnie (USMS); Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil; ANDRE RUTHERFORD (WFO); External-david.millard@uscg.gov; Sanchez, Minerva (USMS); External-SochaJM@state.gov; External-HuntJW@state.gov; BRAD MORENKO (CSD); JOEL DEJESUS (CSD); Systermann, Kyle M. (RH) (FBI); Wright, Robert L. (RH) (FBI); Hunt, Gregory R. (RH) (FBI)
Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI); Pillsbury, Richard
Subject: ISD Report
Attachments: Daily Ethnographic Monitoring Brief - 15.01.2021.pdf
Categories: Green

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From: Hasser, Andrew D MSgt USAF NORAD-USNC JFHQ - NCR (USA) <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>

Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 1:24 PM

To: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; MICHAEL EBey (PID) <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@usss.dhs.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@usss.dhs.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@usss.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov <Keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; Mccray, Jonice T NFG NG DCARNG (USA) <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; Mason, Amanda S Maj USAF NG DCANG (USA) <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; Murphy, Anh-Chi P Maj USAF 113 WG (USA) <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; Ebbert, Jonathan S COL USARMY NG DCARNG (USA) <jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov <Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov <Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov>; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; Rasmussen, Mark A CIV USARMY MDW (USA) <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; Squirewell, Wanda C CIV USAF (USA) <wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; Solomon, Marvin CIV CPMS (USA) <marvin.solomon15.civ@mail.mil>; Furmanski, William C II CIV NORAD-USNC JFHQ - NCR (USA) <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov <jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; §2-534(a)(2) <§2-534(a)(2)@fbi.gov>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov <michael.barbieri@dc.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; External-ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; Grice, William R CIV USN (USA) <william.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; Fata,

Lillian M CIV USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC (USA) <lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil>; Glover, Roosevelt A Jr CIV (USA) <roosevelt.glover@ncis.navy.mil>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Bahe, Kenneth T CIV USN (USA) <kbahe@ncis.navy.mil>; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; van den Heever, Paige H CIV USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC (USA) <paige.vandenheever@ncis.navy.mil>; Cooper, Isaiah N CIV (USA) <isaiah.cooper@ncis.navy.mil>; Suszan, Nicholas J CIV USN NCIS (USA) <nicholas.suszan@ncis.navy.mil>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; Gross, Samuel G MAJ USARMY NORAD-USNC WO (USA) <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>; Trippany, Douglas M II MAJ USARMY MDW (USA) <douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; Taylor, Catherine MIL USAF JS J3 (USA) <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; External-john.erickson@uscg.gov <john.erickson@uscg.gov>; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; Deegan, John <john.deegan@uscg.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov <john.nugent@uscg.gov>; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; john.donohue@uscg.gov <john.donohue@uscg.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; McGarvey, Ronald C CIV USMC MCB QUANTICO (USA) <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov <Mark_varanelli@nps.gov>; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov <Michael_Libby@nps.gov>; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov>; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil <Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil>; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil <douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil>; ANDRE RUTHERFORD (WFO) <ANDRE.RUTHERFORD@usss.dhs.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; Sanchez, Minerva (USMS) <Minerva.Sanchez@usdoj.gov>; External-SochaJM@state.gov <SochaJM@state.gov>; External-HuntJW@state.gov <HuntJW@state.gov>; BRAD MORENKO (CSD) <Brad.Morenko@usss.dhs.gov>; JOEL DEJESUS (CSD) <joe.dejesus@usss.dhs.gov>
Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>; Pillsbury, Richard <Richard.Pillsbury@usss.dhs.gov>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - RE: Untitled attachment 00031.pdf

2-534(a)(3)

V/r,

Andrew Hasser, MSgt, USAF
Superintendent, Intelligence Analysis & Production
J2 Directorate of Intelligence
JTF-NCR | Fort McNair | Washington, DC
NIPR: andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil
SIPR: andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: andrew.d.hasser@coe.ic.gov
J2 NIPR Org Box: usarmy.mcnair.mdw.list.jfhqncr-mdw-j2@mail.mil
J2 SIPR Org Box: usarmy.mcnair.mdw.list.jfhqncr-j2@mail.smil.mil
COMM: 202-902-0305 (temporary: 443-339-8044)
SVOIP: 302-511-9247
NSTS: 980-4166

From: Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 1:22 PM
To: Phillips, Steve <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>; Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; MICHAEL EBey (PID)

<michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@usss.dhs.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@usss.dhs.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@usss.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; Mccray, Jonice T NFG NG DCARNG (USA) <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; Mason, Amanda S Maj USAF NG DCANG (USA) <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; Murphy, Anh-Chi P Maj USAF 113 WG (USA) <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; Ebbert, Jonathan S COL USARMY NG DCARNG (USA) <jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; CeasarDN@state.gov; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; Rasmussen, Mark A CIV USARMY MDW (USA) <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; Hasser, Andrew D MSgt USAF NORAD-USNC JFHQ - NCR (USA) <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; Squirewell, Wanda C CIV USAF (USA) <wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; Solomon, Marvin CIV CPMS (USA) <marvin.solomon15.civ@mail.mil>; Furmanski, William C II CIV NORAD-USNC JFHQ - NCR (USA) <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; External-§2-534(a)(2) dc.gov <§2-534(a)(2) dc.gov>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov <michael.barbieri@dc.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; External-ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; stephebj@nctc.gov; PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K CIV JS J2 (USA) <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; Grice, William R CIV USN (USA) <william.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; Fata, Lillian M CIV USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC (USA) <lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil>; Glover, Roosevelt A Jr CIV (USA) <roosevelt.glover@ncis.navy.mil>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Bahe, Kenneth T CIV USN (USA) <kbahe@ncis.navy.mil>; Waller, Markiest D CIV USN NCIS (USA) <markiest.waller@ncis.navy.mil>; van den Heever, Paige H CIV USN NAVCRIMINVSERV DC (USA) <paige.vandenheever@ncis.navy.mil>; Cooper, Isaiah N CIV (USA) <isaiah.cooper@ncis.navy.mil>; Suszan, Nicholas J CIV USN NCIS (USA) <nicholas.suszan@ncis.navy.mil>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; Gross, Samuel G MAJ USARMY NORAD-USNC WO (USA) <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>; Trippany, Douglas M II MAJ USARMY MDW (USA) <douglas.m.trippany.mil@mail.mil>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; Taylor, Catherine MIL USAF JS J3 (USA) <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; External-john.erickson@uscg.gov <john.erickson@uscg.gov>; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; Deegan, John <john.deegan@uscg.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov <john.nugent@uscg.gov>; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; john.donohue@uscg.gov; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; Dillon, Joseph R LT USCG SEC BALTIMORE (USA) <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; McGarvey, Ronald C CIV USMC MCB QUANTICO (USA) <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov <Mark_varanelli@nps.gov>; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov <Michael_Libby@nps.gov>; External-elizabeth.adams@vdem.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdem.virginia.gov>; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil <douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil>; ANDRE RUTHERFORD (WFO) <ANDRE.RUTHERFORD@usss.dhs.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; Sanchez, Minerva (USMS) <Minerva.Sanchez@usdoj.gov>; External-SochaJM@state.gov <SochaJM@state.gov>; External-HuntJW@state.gov <HuntJW@state.gov>; BRAD MORENKO (CSD) <Brad.Morenko@usss.dhs.gov>; JOEL DEJESUS (CSD) <joel.dejesus@usss.dhs.gov>
Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>; Pillsbury, Richard <Richard.Pillsbury@usss.dhs.gov>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Untitled attachment 00031.pdf

2-534(a)(3)

Best,
Trish

From: HUGH PHILLIPS (PID) <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>

Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 8:45 AM

To: Newman, William J. (WF) (FBI) <wjnewman@fbi.gov>; MICHAEL EBEEY (PID) <michael.ebey@usss.dhs.gov>; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO) <MATTHEW.N.PHILLIPS@usss.dhs.gov>; ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID) <adam.kirkwood@usss.dhs.gov>; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO) <Rosanna.DONAGHEY@usss.dhs.gov>; Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET) <TBARMONDE@fbi.gov>; Cook, James A. <cookjam@amtrak.com>; Chite, Mark <Mark.Chite@amtrak.com>; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov <derron.hawkins@dc.gov>; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov <Keishea.jackson@dc.gov>; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil <jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil>; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil <amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil>; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil <anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil>; External-Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil <Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil>; CeasarDN@state.gov <CeasarDN@state.gov>; Andres, Alyse <andrewsav@state.gov>; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI) <lmellis@fbi.gov>; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI) <jjerlendson@fbi.gov>; Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO) <jblouryk@fbi.gov>; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov <Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov>; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov <Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov>; Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov <Lauren.Eagan@saa.senate.gov>; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil <mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil>; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil <andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil>; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil <wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil>; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil <marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil>; External-william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil <william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil>; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov <jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov>; Cardella, Alex <alex.cardella@mcac.maryland.gov>; [External-§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:External-§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov) <[§2-534\(a\)\(2\)@dc.gov](mailto:§2-534(a)(2)@dc.gov)>; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO) <jpjanczyk@fbi.gov>; External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov <michael.barbieri@dc.gov>; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA) <DALVAREZ2@fbi.gov>; External-ADonald@wmata.com <ADonald@wmata.com>; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov <alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov>; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov <madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov>; Mein, John <john.mein@dc.gov>; Donell, Harvin <donell.harvin@dc.gov>; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET) <PLRIPLEY@fbi.gov>; stephebj@nctc.gov <stephebj@nctc.gov>; PATRJOM@nctc.gov <PATRJOM@nctc.gov>; Gilliard, Darrell K. <darrell.k.gilliard.civ@mail.mil>; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil <William.grice@ncis.navy.mil>; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil <lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil>; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Waller, Markiest <Markiest.Waller@ncis.navy.mil>; paige.vandenneever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <paige.vandenneever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL <nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL>; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI) <ERALEXANDER@FBI.GOV>; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil <samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil>; Lay, Amy L. <Amy.Lay@vsp.virginia.gov>; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov <jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov>; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA) <MTMILLER3@fbi.gov>; douglas.m.trippamy.mil@mail.mil <douglas.m.trippamy.mil@mail.mil>; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET) <BCTHORWARD@fbi.gov>; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil <catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil>; External-john.erickson@uscg.gov <john.erickson@uscg.gov>; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov <marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov>; Deegan, John <john.deegan@uscg.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov <usman.saleem@uscg.gov>; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov <john.nugent@uscg.gov>; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov <ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov>; john.donohue@uscg.gov <john.donohue@uscg.gov>; julie.farnam@uscg.gov <julie.farnam@uscg.gov>; Dillon, Joseph <joseph.r.dillon@uscg.mil>; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil <ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil>; Smith, Johnnie (USMS) <Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov>; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS) <Jonathan.Madagu@usdoj.gov>; Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS) <Michael.Rose2@usdoj.gov>; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET) <BKNUTSON@fbi.gov>; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON) <marossi@fbi.gov>; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET) <JEDINGELDEIN@fbi.gov>; External-Mark.varanelli@nps.gov <Mark.varanelli@nps.gov>; External-Michael.Libby@nps.gov <Michael.Libby@nps.gov>; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov <elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov>; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil <Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil>; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil <douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil>; ANDRE RUTHERFORD (WFO) <ANDRE.RUTHERFORD@usss.dhs.gov>; External-david.millard@uscg.gov <david.millard@uscg.gov>; Sanchez, Minerva (USMS) <Minerva.Sanchez@usdoj.gov>; External-SochaJM@state.gov <SochaJM@state.gov>; [157](mailto:External-</p></div><div data-bbox=)

HuntJW@state.gov <HuntJW@state.gov>; BRAD MORENKO (CSD) <Brad.Morenko@uss.s.dhs.gov>; JOEL DEJESUS (CSD) <joel.dejesus@uss.s.dhs.gov>

Cc: Stapleton, Hope T. (WF) (FBI) <htstapleton@fbi.gov>; Pillsbury, Richard <Richard.Pillsbury@uss.s.dhs.gov>; Phillips, Steve <hphillips@uss.s.dhs.gov>

Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Untitled attachment 00031.pdf

Good morning,

Attachment passed for your situational awareness.

Steve

Respectfully,

SA H. S. Phillips
USSS / PID / PDL
202-757-2570
§ 2-534(a)(2) (cell)

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

From: HUGH PHILLIPS (PID) <hphillips@usss.dhs.gov>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2021 8:50 AM
To: External-wjnewman@fbi.gov; MICHAEL EBEEY (PID); MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); External-cookjam@amtrak.com; Chite, Mark; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; External-Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; CeasarDN@state.gov; Andres, Alyse; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; External-william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; External-Alex.Cardella@mcac.maryland.gov; External-§2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); External-ADonald@wmata.com; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; Mein, John; Donell, Harvin; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET); stephebj@nctc.gov; PATRJOM@nctc.gov; Gilliard, Darrell K.; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Kbahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Waller, Markiest; paige.vandenneever@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; Lay, Amy L.; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA); douglas.m.trippamy.mil@mail.mil; Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; External-john.erickson@uscp.gov; External-marilyn.guzman@uscp.gov; External-john.delegan@uscp.gov; External-david.millard@uscp.gov; External-usman.saleem@uscp.gov; External-john.nugent@uscp.gov; External-ryan.mccamley@uscp.gov; john.donohue@uscp.gov; julie.farnam@uscp.gov; Dillon, Joseph; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; External-Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET); Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil; ANDRE RUTHERFORD (WFO); External-david.millard@uscp.gov; Sanchez, Minerva (USMS); External-SochaJM@state.gov; External-HuntJW@state.gov; BRAD MORENKO (CSD); JOEL DEJESUS (CSD)
Cc: External-htstapleton@fbi.gov; RICHARD PILLSBURY (PID)
Subject: "Probable Indicators of an Escalation of Protest-Related Violence in Washington, DC."
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Steve

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§ 2-534(a)(2) (cell)

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Sacco, Cristina (EOM)

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Sent: Friday, January 15, 2021 8:15 PM
To: DAMON.C.EDWARDS@cbp.dhs.gov; George.Adams@oig.hhs.gov; External-john.nugent@uscg.gov; Miller, Michael T. (WF) (OGA); McClelland, Bradley; jonathan.m.morgenstein.mil@mail.mil; Chite, Mark; External-douglas.r.reedy@whmo.mil; MCINCR MA; wanda.c.squirewell.civ@mail.mil; anh-chi.p.murphy.mil@mail.mil; Madagu, Jonathan (USMS); External-ADonald@wmata.com; Dingeldein, James E. (WF) (DET); paige.vandenhoeve@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; SHAFFER, JEFFERY J; William.grice@ncis.navy.mil; jonice.t.mccray.nfg@mail.mil; julie.farnam@uscg.gov; Salata, Melinda A.; ronald.mcgarvey@usmc.mil; Wightman, Michael C. (BA) (FBI); Zurburg king, Heather M; seic@dni.gov; Ripley, Patricia L. (WF) (DET); External-michael.barbieri@dc.gov; External-ryan.mccamley@uscg.gov; Andres, Alyse; Mein, John; Gilliard, Darrell K; marvin.c.solomon.civ@mail.mil; External-\$2-534(a)(2) dc.gov; Marc.L.Bosley@fps.dhs.gov; Morris, Tiffany (WF) (FBI); External-john.delegan@uscg.gov; PATRJOM@nctc.gov; External-jeffery.carroll@dc.gov; MATTHEW PHILLIPS (WFO); Barmonde, Thomas (WF) (DET); ADAM KIRKWOOD (PID); kristoffer.carlson@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Ellis, Loren M. (CIRG) (FBI); stephebj@nctc.gov; Dillon, Joseph; Lauren_Eagan@saa.senate.gov; External-john.erickson@uscg.gov; James.Lehman@oig.hhs.gov; alexandra.ferraro@dc.gov; Donell, Harvin; jessica.curtis@mcac.maryland.gov; Gene.E.Roddy@whmo.mil; Alexander, Eryn R. (IOD) (FBI); External-william.c.furmanski.civ@mail.mil; mark.a.rasmussen.civ@mail.mil; External-Mark_varanelli@nps.gov; External-marilyn.guzman@uscg.gov; samuel.g.gross.mil@mail.mil; isaiah.cooper@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; External-elizabeth.adams@vdm.virginia.gov; CGINTELPLOT@uscg.mil; Erlewine, Kari A. (CIRG) (FBI); Rose, Michael (HQ-JSD) (USMS); External-Jonathan.s.ebbert.mil@mail.mil; ROSANNA DONAGHEY (OPO); Waller, Markiest; Keishea.jackson@dc.gov; HUGH PHILLIPS (PID); Tu, Raymond H. (BA) (FBI); Thorward, Brent C. (WF) (DET); Roosevelt.Glover@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; External-cookjam@amtrak.com; MoscouLewis, Evan; Janczyk, Jeffrey P. (WF) (TFO); amanda.s.mason4.mil@mail.mil; madeline.marcenelle@dc.gov; External-david.millard@uscg.gov; Lay, Amy L; nicholas.suszan@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; Herrera, Manuela A; catherine.taylor43.mil@mail.mil; CeasarDN@state.gov; External-Benjamin.goldberg@dot.gov; MICHAEL EBEY (PID); douglas.m.trippary.mil@mail.mil; john.donohue@uscg.gov; External-Michael_Libby@nps.gov; Alvarez, Daniel (WF) (OGA); External-Alex.Cardella@mcac.maryland.gov; Erlendson, Jennifer J. (CIRG) (FBI); Lindstrom, Daniel L. (CIRG) (FBI); Ed.Wojciechowski@mail.house.gov; andrew.d.hasser.mil@mail.mil; Vela, Freddy (CD) (FBI); Louryk, John B. (WF) (TFO); External-htstapleton@fbi.gov; Rossi, Michael A. (CTD) (CON); Scott, Jason (BA) (FBI); External-usman.saleem@uscg.gov; lillian.fata@ncis.navy.mil; KBahe@NCIS.NAVY.MIL; jeremy.roush@fairfaxcounty.gov; External-derron.hawkins@dc.gov; Macchiarulo, Michael T. (WF) (FBI); External-Johnnie.Smith@usdoj.gov; Knutson, Brett (WF) (DET)
Cc: External-htstapleton@fbi.gov; RICHARD PILLSBURY (PID); External-wjnewman@fbi.gov; MICHAEL EBEY (PID)
Subject: PID Blue Banner Product
Attachments: (FOUO--LES) USSS PID Open Source Intelligence Branch_ Inauguration Week Demonstrations Update January 15.pdf
Categories: Green

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Thank you all again for your partnership.

Respectfully,

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