


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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FOI/PA# 20-cv-2553

Total Deleted Page(s) = 8  
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## (U//LES) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

29 JUNE 2020 – 1700

(U//LES) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 29 June. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DHS, DoJ, DoD, MPD and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) Under FBI policy and federal law, an investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will "exercise no control over or interference with the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Privacy Act of 1974, section (e)(7).

(U//LES) DNOG Appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity; the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not unreasonably interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Responses are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "User" on First Amendment protected speech and "Following" and "Retweeting" on social media may be sensitive to the First Amendment freedom of expression. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine if it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

(U//LES) Within this legal and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SAC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue suspicion into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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### (U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) As of 29 June, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

(U//LES) On 28 June, [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI

b7C -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) As of 29 June, 615 (decrease of 96) National Guard (NG) personnel are deployed across six states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection mission. NG troops are mostly deployed to Texas (295) (decrease of 56), DC (146), and Wisconsin (120). USMS deployed 67 personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel were deployed around

the NCR, Portland, Oregon, and the USMS's Special Operations Group Tactical Center in Pineville, Louisiana.

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4,5 per FBI


b7E -4 per FBI

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 29 June, there are no known threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.
- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, 30 of 56 (54%), field offices reported 60 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 29 June.



*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division Bomb Squad responded to the South Carolina State House after an incendiary device detonated at the base of the Benjamin Tillman monument. There was minimal damage to the monument. [REDACTED]

b7E -2,4 per FBI

[REDACTED] Benjamin Tillman was a former South

Carolina governor and U.S. Senator purported to be affiliated with white supremacists. Current state legislators have called for the removal of Tillman's statue. *The South Carolina State House is located [REDACTED] and 0.9 miles from the Strom Thurmond Federal Building/US Courthouse.*

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) On 28 June, approximately 500 protesters converged on St. Louis Mayor Lyda Krewson's residence demanding her resignation. The St. Louis Metro Police Department in Missouri observed protesters wearing gas masks, armed with sling shots, and destroying St. Louis cameras. Mayor Krewson became the target of threatening texts and protests after identifying the names and addresses of individuals supportive of defunding the police department. With the exception of painting "RESIGN" on the street in front of the residence, the crowd dispersed at approximately 2300 without incident.

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

- (U//FOUO) On 28 June, [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI  
b7C -4 per FBI  
b7E -4,14 per FBI

- (U//LES) Since 8 June, several hundred individuals remain in the Capitol Hill Occupied/Organized Protest (CHOP) zone in downtown Seattle, Washington despite attempts by city officials to dismantle barriers and clear the area. The Seattle Mayor's office continues to negotiate with the CHOP leaders to dismantle the area and disperse; however, the attempted barrier removal on 26 June prompted a swell in the number of protesters from a couple dozen to more than 100. SE maintains continuing contact with Seattle Police Department for any situational updates.

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 48-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 28 June, there is a consistent presence of demonstrators and other non-violent protest activity - comprising several hundred people daily - near the White House and Lafayette Square, Washington, DC.


### *(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, around 2130, protesters surrounded a marked Detroit police SUV in Michigan, reportedly smashed out the rear window, and climbed onto the hood of the vehicle. According to reports, the officer inside the vehicle turned on the overhead lights and accelerated through the crowd, causing two protesters who had climbed onto the hood to be thrown to the ground.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The Washoe County District Attorney is anticipated to release a video on 29 or 30 June of a Sparks Police Department officer-involved shooting in Nevada that could be controversial. Casino partners plan to increase security in anticipation of violence.

### *(U) Scheduled Protests*

- (U)  b7E -4 per FBI
- (U) As of 27 June, hundreds of protesters remain camped out near NY City Hall are advocating for a \$1 billion dollar cut to the NYPD's budget. NY has no information indicating any threat to federal property stemming from this demonstration at this time; however, protest location is less than 0.5 miles away from the Jacob K. Javits Federal Building (26 Federal Plaza) and US Court of International Trade.



## (U//~~L~~) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

1 JULY 2020 – 1700

(U//~~L~~) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 1 July. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DHS, DoJ, DoD, MPD and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//~~L~~) Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will "assess on record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual, about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Privacy Act of 1974, Section (c)(7).

(U//~~L~~) EO 13526, Appendix I, section (c)(7) states: the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not substantially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" are First Amendment protected speech and "gathering" and "intending" associated media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires internal review to determine it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

(U//~~L~~) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices is the communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violence and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigation or highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification of physical assets of human sources, or create undue exploitation into the FBI's system of extended target.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 1 July, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 1 July, 824 (+151) National Guard (NG) personnel are deployed across six states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection mission. NG troops are mostly deployed to Texas (548) (+160), DC (146), and Wisconsin (112) (-7). USMS deployed 65 personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel were deployed around the NCR, Portland, Oregon, and the USMS's Special Operations Group Tactical Center in Pineville, Louisiana.

(U//FOUO)

b7E -4,5 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

<sup>1</sup> (U//FOUO)

<sup>2</sup> (U//FOUO)




## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 1 July, there are no known threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.
- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, 31 of 56 (55%), field offices reported 63 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 1 July.



*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Overnight on 29 June, individuals repeatedly attempted to breach the Multnomah County Justice Center (MCJC) in downtown Portland, Oregon. On the night of 30 June, Portland Police reported protest activity targeting the Police Association and North Precinct, with protestors throwing objects at police, starting fires, and blocking traffic. Although not near

federal facilities, the activity diverted resources from the MCJC, which was still a target of activity.

- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since 8 June, several hundred individuals in the CHOP zone in downtown Seattle resisted attempts by city officials to dismantle barriers and clear the area. An attempt to remove barriers on 26 June prompted a swell in the number of protesters from a couple dozen to more than 100. There were been five shootings and two deaths in the vicinity of CHOP since 7 June.

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) [REDACTED]

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 24-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) An identified local group advocating for removing monuments and symbols honoring white supremacy gave New Orleans a 1 July deadline to take detailed actions towards their goals, specifically removal of the Andrew Jackson statue in Jackson Square.

- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

b6 -3 per FBI  
b7C -3 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI

### *(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U) On 30 June, a Fulton County (Georgia) judge [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI  
b7C -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 1 July [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI

b7C -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, at around 2130, protesters surrounded a marked Detroit police SUV, reportedly smashed out the rear window, and climbed onto the hood of the vehicle. According to reports, the officer inside the vehicle turned on the overhead lights and accelerated through the crowd, causing two protesters who had climbed onto the hood to be thrown to the ground. According to media reports, protestors marched near the Southwest Police Precinct on 29 and 30 June, demanding the resignation of the Chief of Police or the firing of the officer driving the SUV. The protestors have vowed to continue protesting, including at the PGA Tour Rocket Mortgage Classic scheduled to commence on 2 July.
- (U) On 29 June, protests and counter-protests at the Provo (Utah) Police Department escalated into violence when the driver of an SUV was shot by protestors while driving past the protest; the driver was not affiliated with the protests or counter-protests and reportedly drove through a crowd to escape after being shot twice. On 30 June, the Provo Police Department announced the arrest of two individuals in connection to the shooting.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 29 June, photographs emerged of three Aurora (Colorado) Police Department officers reportedly reenacting the "carotid restraint" at the memorial site of Elijah McClain. McClain died of cardiac arrest in August 2019 after Aurora Police Officers restrained McClain with the carotid chokehold. The three officers in the photographs are under investigation by Aurora Police and the Aurora Police Chief vowed to release the findings on the internal investigation, including all documents reviewed during the investigation.


*(U) Scheduled Protests*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Criminal actors may exploit lawful protests to perpetuate acts of violence.

- (U) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]



# (U//LES) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity 2020 National Election Period

30 OCTOBER 2020

(U//LES) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 0900 EST on 30 October. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: DHS, DOI, DOJ, DoD, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) EO 12958, Appendix I, further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is directly related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not adversely interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive technique that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Precautions are required that information including notes, Facebook posts, and "likes" are First Amendment protected speech and "following" and "friending" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The relevance of such information therefore requires instant review to determine if it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) REPORTED VIOLENCE OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI

b7C -4 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

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## II. (U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

*(U) Potential Flashpoints*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) The Pennsylvania National Guard will mobilize into the city.
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI


(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

*(U) Scheduled Protests*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI



# (U//~~LES~~) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity 2020 National Election Period

29 OCTOBER 2020

(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 0900 EST on 28 October. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: DHS, DOI, DOJ, DoD, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//~~LES~~) DEOS Appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Precedents are restricted that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" on First Amendment protected speech and "friendship" and "following" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine if is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) REPORTED VIOLENCE OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) **FBI Philadelphia:** Some police officers were injured during reported protests and looting throughout Philadelphia. Additionally, FBI Philadelphia reported explosions at ATMs and attempted ATM thefts [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

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- (U//~~FOUO~~) **FBI Springfield:** Reported a threat to blow up church property which also serves as a polling place. The threat referenced a Black Lives Matter sign displayed on the church's property.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **FBI Portland:** On 28 October, a protest march on the Portland ICE building attended by approximately 75 people resulted in three arrests by Federal Protective Services for failure to comply. The protest was related to the Portland City Council's new limits on federally-deputized city police officers. Consistent with the ongoing environment, FBI Portland reported continued use of Molotov cocktails and fireworks.

## II. (U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Potential Flashpoints*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) **FBI Minneapolis:** Reported a low probability of violent and/or criminal activity on 30 October in relation to a court appearance by [REDACTED] b6 -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED] b7C -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **FBI Philadelphia:** On 30 October, the Pennsylvania National Guard will mobilize into the city.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **FBI Washington Field:** Reported protests continued during the evening hours of 28 October regarding the death of Karon Hylton [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Protesters continue to use fireworks and other projectiles. b7E -4 per FBI

### *(U) Scheduled Protests*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
  - (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

○ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



b7E -4 per FBI

## VI. (U) OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION

*Minor Criminal Activity*

- (U//FOUO) FBI New York reported 15 personal vehicles were vandalized within the confines of the NYPD 115 precinct. Vehicles were spray painted on the door panels with the phrase "BLM" and "AOC"; no arrests were made.
- (U//FOUO) FBI Seattle continues to experience demonstrations of 50-150 people. As of 28 October a small gathering around the Seattle Police Department East Precinct resulted in four arrests for vandalism and other low-level charges.





## (U//LES) Executive Overnight Summary Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail

26 AUGUST 2020 - 0300 PDT

(U//LES) Information provided in this executive memo is based on Inter-Agency responses provided to the OPERATION DILIGENT VALOR and OPERATION OREGON TRAIL<sup>®</sup> Command Posts as of information cut-off time of 0200 PDT on 26 August.

(U//LES) The information in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

### (U) Executive Summary

(U) Over the last 24 hours, the following occurred:

- (U//FOUO) In the evening of 25 August, a crowd of approximately 150-200 people gathered outside Portland City Hall. The Portland Police Bureau (PPB) declared a riot after individuals entered the building through an unlocked door. As of 0200 PDT, PPB arrested 24 individuals. The arrests included two felony charges - assault of a public safety officer and riot.

- (U//LES) [REDACTED] HSI and two FBI ground surveillance teams deployed in the vicinity of the riot activity. Additional FBI surveillance, tactical, and aerial assets supported the two FBI ground teams. b7E per ICE

○ [REDACTED] b7E per DHS

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E per CBP

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## (U) Significant Updates

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI and ATF submitted affidavits for complaints on three arsons approved for federal prosecution (Multnomah County Justice Center and PPB North Precinct). FBI anticipates the complaints and arrest warrants to be signed on 26 August. Arrest planning is underway.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) USMS is investigating over 20 assault cases, starting the discovery process, and is coordinating with USAO.
- (U//~~LES~~) FBI SAs were embedded at command posts with FPS, USMS, and PPB. An FBI SA was also located at PPB Central Precinct to identify felony arrests. FBI SAs at Central Precinct and Edith Green were prepared to conduct interviews of individuals for potential federal charges.
- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] b7E per ICE  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4,9,29 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 26 August, there have been **100** federal arrests in connection with Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail.

- **39** have been charged with 18 U.S.C. 111 - Assaulting federal officer
- **17** have been charged with 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385 - Failure to comply
- **23** have been declined for prosecution
- **21** remaining arrests on a variety of charges

## (U) Deployment Posture




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(U) As of 26 August, the following Federal personnel remain deployed to Portland AOR:

- [REDACTED] FPS personnel
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] USMS personnel
- [REDACTED] ERO personnel
- [REDACTED] CBP personnel
- [REDACTED] HSI personnel
- [REDACTED] FBI personnel

b7E per ICE, CBP, DHS

b7E -4 per FBI



## (U//LES) Executive Overnight Summary Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail

24 AUGUST 2020 - 0300 PDT

(U//LES) Information provided in this executive memo is based on Inter-Agency responses provided to the OPERATION DILIGENT VALOR and OPERATION OREGON TRAIL<sup>®</sup> Command Posts as of information cut-off time of 0200 PDT on 24 August.

(U//LES) The information in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

### (U) Executive Summary

(U) Over the last 24 hours, the following occurred:

- (U//FOUO) On the evening of 23 August, approximately 250 individuals arrived at the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) North Precinct and blocked traffic in the surrounding area. PPB responded by closing the surrounding streets. Individuals in the crowd targeted PPB officers with green lasers, rocks, and glass bottles. Individuals also barricaded the entrance to the North Precinct with burning dumpsters. PPB declared a riot at the North Precinct and made multiple arrests. An individual marked with a "press" insignia launched a firework at PPB officers. As of 0200 PDT, the number of arrests is unknown.

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E per ICE

- (U//LES) [REDACTED]

b7E per CBP

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## (U) Significant Updates

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(U//~~LES~~) FBI and ATF will meet with USAO on 24 August to conduct a prosecutive review of three arsons being considered for federal prosecution. These include the 26 June arson of PPB North Precinct and arsons at Multnomah County Justice Center on 28 and 30 June.

(U//~~LES~~) FBI completed the investigation of a 22 August PPB arrest. The subject was determined to have thrown rocks, but there was no officer injury or damage to property. The USAO advised the case did not meet the requirements for 18 USC 231 (Civil Disorder).

(U//~~FOUO~~)

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4 per FBI

b7E per ICE, DHS

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 24 August, there have been 100 federal arrests.

- 39 have been charged with 18 U.S.C. 111 - Assaulting federal officer
- 17 have been charged with 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385 - Failure to comply
- 23 have been declined for prosecution
- 21 arrests on a variety of other charges

## (U) Deployment Posture



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(U) As of 23 August, the following Federal personnel remain deployed to Portland AOR:

- [REDACTED] FPS personnel
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] USMS personnel
- [REDACTED] ICE personnel
- [REDACTED] CBP personnel
- [REDACTED] HSI personnel
- [REDACTED] FBI personnel

b7E per ICE, CBP, DHS

b7E -4 per FBI



## (U//~~LES~~) Executive Overnight Summary Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail

23 AUGUST 2020 - 0300 PDT

(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this executive memo is based on Inter-Agency responses provided to the OPERATION DILIGENT VALOR and OPERATION OREGON TRAIL<sup>a</sup> Command Posts as of information cut-off time of 0200 PDT on 23 August.

(U//~~LES~~) The information in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

### (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since May 2020, there has been sustained violent criminal activity during lawful protests in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. Federal Law Enforcement from DHS and DOJ are working with federal, state, and Portland local law enforcement partners to investigate and identify federal criminal violations that may have been ideologically motivated and federal criminal violations involving explosive devices, including those used to damage federal property and assault federal officers.

### (U) Significant Updates

(U//~~LES~~) Beginning at 1200 PDT on 22 August 2020, approximately 300 members of the alt-right groups Proud Boys, Oregon Patriot Movement, and COPS Northwest held rallies outside the Multnomah County Justice Center (MCJC) in downtown Portland. Counter-protestors attempted to disrupt the events with bullhorns, throwing water bottles, and forming a shield wall. Activities were predominately in front of MCJC but later spread to adjacent Terry Schrunk Plaza. The two groups frequently engaged in physical altercations and deployed bear mace. Federal Law Enforcement declared an unlawful assembly at the plaza, and a line of FPS officers proceeded across the plaza to clear the area of violent actors. At approximately 1645 PDT, violent actors had dispersed with only approximately 30 individuals remaining.

- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

b7E per CBP

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(U//LES) FBI assesses that [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) [REDACTED]

### (U) Deployment Posture

(U) As of 23 August, the following Federal personnel remain deployed to Portland AOR:

- [REDACTED] FPS personnel
- (b) (7)(E) USMS personnel
- [REDACTED] ICE personnel
- [REDACTED] CBP personnel
- [REDACTED] HSI personnel
- [REDACTED] FBI personnel

b7E per ICE, CBP, DHS

b7E -4 per FBI

(U) FPS and HSI command posts are located at the Edith Green -Wendell Wyatt Federal Building. USMS command post is located at the Hatfield Courthouse.

- [REDACTED]

### (U) Investigative Updates

(U//LES) As of 22 August, HSI Portland identified Sarah Hamer as a person of interest in the damage of the ICE facility on 19 August. The case was referred to FPS Investigations Branch for case opening and presentation to the US Attorney's Office.

(U//LES) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) As of 22 August, there have been 99 federal arrests from 1 June to 17 August.

- 38 have been charged with 18 U.S.C. 111 - Assaulting federal officer
- 17 have been charged with 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385 - Failure to comply
- 23 have been declined for prosecution
- 21 remaining arrests on a variety of charges

Agency	Arrests
ATF	2
DHS	1
FPS	35
HSI	3
HSI/FPS	1
USMS	22
Other	35
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>99</b>

### (U) Reported Damage to Federal Property

---

(U//~~LES~~) As of 0200 PDT 23 August, there has been no new information indicating a threat to federal property, and no reports of damage over the past 24 hours.

### (U) Law Enforcement Officers Injured

---

(U) As of 0200 PDT 23 August, FPS reported one officer injury.

(U//~~LES~~) Cumulative as of 23 August

Type of Injury	FPS	CPB	ICE
Hearing Injury	41	60	1
Eye Injury	59	60	3
Head	1		
Contact w/ Object/Chemical	89	1	3
Knee	7	2	
Foot Fracture	1		
Sprain/Strain Muscle	7		
Thumb Injury	1		
Back Injury	2	1	
Toe Injury	2	1	
Laceration		2	
Shoulder		1	
Groin		1	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>7</b>




## (U) Addendum

## (U) Addendum A

(U//~~LES~~) The below graphic on tactics and techniques observed in the course of damage to federal properties was provided by DHS on 19 August 2020.

Device	Tactic, Technique & Procedure
Projectiles, Improvised Weapons	
Laser pointers	
Paint-filled balloons	
Vehicles	
Leaf Blowers	
Radio Jamming	
Pyrotechnics	
Incendiary Material	
Wrenches	
Plywood	
Fishing line	
Power Tools	

b7E per DHS



## (U//~~LES~~) Executive Overnight Summary Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail

22 AUGUST 2020 - 0300 PDT

(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this executive memo is based on Inter-Agency responses provided to the OPERATION DILIGENT VALOR and OPERATION OREGON TRAIL<sup>a</sup> Command Posts as of information cut-off time of 0200 PDT on 22 August.

(U//~~LES~~) The information in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

### (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since May 2020, there has been sustained violent criminal activity during lawful protests in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. Federal Law Enforcement from DHS and DOJ are working with federal, state, and Portland local law enforcement partners to investigate and identify federal criminal violations that may have been ideologically motivated and federal criminal violations involving explosive devices, including those used to damage federal property and assault federal officers.

### (U) Significant Updates

(U//~~LES~~) According to PPB, on 21 August 2020 a crowd of approximately 250 individuals gathered at the Portland Police Bureau North Precinct, located at 1111 SW 2nd Ave, Portland, Oregon. PPB reported the crowd throwing rocks and projectiles at the building and police vehicles.

- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) The black clad individuals threw projectiles, chanted and screamed obscenities at PPB. Some projectiles caused damage to the vehicles. PPB did not engage the individuals over the damage to the vehicles. b7E -4 per FBI
- (U//~~LES~~) At approximately 0115 PDT 22 August, PPB declared the gathering a riot.

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

b7E per CBP

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- (U) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- (U) [REDACTED]

### (U) Deployment Posture

(U) As of 22 August, the following Federal personnel remain deployed to Portland AOR:

- [REDACTED] personnel b7E per ICE, CBP, DHS
- (b)(7)(E) USMS personnel
- [REDACTED] ICE personnel
- [REDACTED] CBP personnel
- [REDACTED] FBI personnel b7E -4 per FBI

(U) As of 22 August, FPS and HSI command posts are located at the Edith Green -Wendell Wyatt Federal Building. USMS command post is located at the Hatfield Courthouse.

### (U) Investigative Updates

(U//LES) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) As of 22 August, there have been **99** federal arrests from 1 June to 17 August.

- **38** have been charged with 18 U.S.C. 111 - Assaulting federal officer
- **17** have been charged with 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385 - Failure to comply
- **23** have been declined for prosecution
- **21** remaining arrests on a variety of charges

Agency	Arrests
ATF	2
DHS	1
FPS	35
HSI	3
HSI/FPS	1
USMS	22
Other	35
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>99</b>

(U) Reported Damage to Federal Property

(U//~~LES~~) As of 0200 PDT 22 August, PPB reported damage to PPD vehicles at the Portland Police Bureau North Precinct, located at 1111 SW 2nd Ave, Portland, Oregon.

(U) Law Enforcement Officers Injured


(U//~~LES~~) As of 22 August, FPS reported 2 injuries over the last 24-hour period.

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~LES~~) One PPB Office was reported to have sustained an injury after being struck by a rock [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] As of 0240AM PDT, injuries or damage cannot be confirmed.

(U//~~LES~~) Cumulative as of 22 August

Type of Injury	FPS	CPE	ICE
Hearing Injury	41	60	1
Eye Injury	59	60	3
Head	1		
Contact w/ Object/Chemical	89	1	3
Knee	7	2	
Foot Fracture	1		
Sprain/Strain Muscle	6		
Thumb Injury	1		
Back Injury	2	1	
Toe Injury	2	1	
Laceration		2	
Shoulder		1	
Groin		1	
<b>TOTAL</b>	209	130	7



## (U//~~LES~~) Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail

21 AUGUST 2020 -- 1700

*(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this update is based on Inter-Agency responses provided to the OPERATION DILIGENT VALOR and OPERATION OREGON TRAIL Command Posts during the previous 24 hour Period. The information cut-off time of 0200 PDT on 21 August. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP, DHS, DOJ, FPS, HSI, USMS, and FBI. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.*

(U) The information marked (U//~~LES~~) in this document is the property of the FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the ~~LES~~ caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked ~~LES~~ on a website or an unclassified network.

(U//~~LES~~) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SI/OC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or cause undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigation activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

## (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since May 2020, there has been sustained violent criminal activity during lawful protests in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. Federal Law Enforcement from DHS and DOJ are working with federal, state, and Portland local law enforcement partners to investigate and identify federal criminal violations that may have been ideologically motivated and federal criminal violations involving explosive devices, including those used to damage federal property and assault federal officers. More than 650 arrest have been made by Portland Police Bureau (PPB), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) over the course of the preceding 82 days are demonstrative of the collaborative effort to identify those responsible for instigating, inciting, and facilitating violent criminal activity. Further, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's Office convened an investigative working group comprised of FPS, HSI, USMS and ATF to coordinate investigations stemming from arrests made of violent opportunists during the Portland civil unrest.

b7E per ICE, CBP

*(U) Overnight Activity: Raw Reporting from Law Enforcement Partners*~~(U//LES)~~

b7E per ICE, DHS

~~(U//LES)~~

b7E per ICE

~~(U//LES)~~ UPDATE:

b7E -4 per FBI

\* ~~(U//LES)~~\* ~~(U//LES)~~\* ~~(U//LES)~~

b7E -4 per FBI

\* ~~(U//LES)~~\* ~~(U//LES)~~(U) Executive Update(U) FBI/FEDERAL DEPLOYMENT POSTURE

b7E -4 per FBI

*(U) Deployment of Federal assets*(U) Element(U) Number of  
Deployments(U) Purpose of Each Deployment*(U) FPS:*

b7E per DHS

(U) USMS:

HQ/DISTRICT [REDACTED]

(U) ICE:

b7E per ICE, CBP, DHS

(U) CBP:

MRT/SRI (b) (7)(E) BORSTAR [REDACTED]

(U) FBI:

b7E -4 per FBI

Reporting as of 19 August 2020

## (U) Investigative Information

(U//~~FOUO~~) Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will maintain no record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. Privacy Act of 1974, section (e)(7).

### (U) Arrest Data

(U) Element	(U) Arrest
(U) FPS:	33
(U) USMS:	27
(U) CBP:	16
(U) FBI:	3
(U) HSI:	3
(U) ATF:	2
(U) Joint or Unattributed	19

\*Reporting as of 19 August 2020

b7E -4,5 per FBI

(U//FOUO)

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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- 

b5 -2 per FBI

(U//FOUO)

b5 -2 per FBI

b7E -4,5 per FBI

## (U) Flashpoints and Catalysts

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
*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*





b7E -4,5 per FBI

Command Post Locations:




## I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against Federal facilities, employees, and equipment at or near Federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

*(U) Reported injuries to federal officers*


(U) UPDATE:



b7E per ICE

*(U) Tactics and techniques observed in the course of damage to federal properties*

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to FPS, DHS, and FBI, federal agencies are working with state and local partners to target and investigate individuals responsible for inciting, inspiring, or facilitating violent crimes over the last approximately 82 days. Some of the specific tactics noted are thrown projectiles, use of wrist rocket sling shots, using saws and other items to breach protective fencing, use of commercial fireworks, and use of paint; using spray paint and paint balls to disable surveillance cameras. Conflicts between peaceful protesters engaged in First Amendment-protected activity and individuals involved in vandalism or other crimes have been observed, according to DHS.



*(U) Positive Mitigation Factors/trends - appearing to have a positive impact on tamping down the violence in an AOR including.*

- (U) U.S. Marshals indicate a strategy of low visibility may have had a deescalating effect in the immediate vicinity of the Hatfield Courthouse.
- (U) Shrinking crowd size may have resulted in fewer criminal and violent incidents.
- (U) Shrinking crowd size likely has resulted in fewer injuries to LE personnel.

## (U) Social Media Exploitation



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*(U//~~LES~~) DIOG Appendix J, further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" are First Amendment protected speech and "following" and "friending" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.*

(U)

b7E -4 per FBI

(U)



## (U//LES) Operation Diligent Valor/Oregon Trail

20 AUGUST 2020 - 1700

*(U//LES) Information provided in this update is based on Inter-Agency responses provided to the OPERATION DILIGENT VALOR and OPERATION OREGON TRAIL Command Posts during the previous 24 hour Period. The information cut-off time of 0200 PST on 20 August. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP, CBP, DHS, DOJ, FPS, HSI, USMS, and FBI. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.*

(U) The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Recipients should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the (U//LES) caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked (U//LES) on a website or an unclassified network.

(U//LES) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SMC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) Since May 2020, there has been sustained violent criminal activity during lawful protests in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. Federal Law Enforcement from DHS and DOJ are working with federal, state, and Portland local law enforcement partners to investigate and identify federal criminal violations that may have been ideologically motivated and federal criminal violations involving explosive devices, including those used to damage federal property and assault federal officers. More than 650 arrest have been made by Portland Police Bureau (PPB), the US Marshals Service (USMS) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) over the course of the preceding 81 days are demonstrative of the collaborative effort to identify those responsible for instigating, inciting, and facilitating violent criminal activity. Further, the Oregon U.S. Attorney's office convened an investigative working group comprised of FPS, HSI, USMS and ATF to coordinate investigations stemming from arrests made of violent opportunists during the Portland civil unrest.

b7E per ICE, CBP

*(U) Overnight Activity: Raw Reporting from Law Enforcement Partners*(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

b7E per ICE, DHS

(U//~~LES~~) According to PPB, in the morning hours of Wednesday August 19, 2020, the PPB, assisted by the Clackamas County Sheriff's Office, arrested 27-year-old [REDACTED] in connection with a shooting incident that occurred in Downtown Portland over the weekend [REDACTED] will be booked into the Multnomah County Jail on charges of Unlawful Use of a Weapon (two counts), Menacing, Recklessly Endangering Another Person (with a weapon), and Discharging a Firearm in the City. [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI  
b7C -4 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

(U//~~LES~~) According to FPS information, uniformed FPS Officers observed an individual positioned outside of the Edith Green Federal Building engaging uniformed officers entering the building in conversation and taking actions consistent with photographing officers.

(U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~LES~~) According to FPS and FBI information, on 18 August, vandals introduced fire to the Multnomah County Building (MCB), Portland, Oregon. A crowd of approximately 150-200 went to MCB, which PPB and Multnomah County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) had previously jointly determined MCB to be a potential target. Fire damage was minimal. According to DHS reporting, a Molotov cocktail was used. However this has yet to be confirmed. The fire may have been fueled by cardboard and paper shoved in through the broken window. Arson investigators continue to process the scene. [REDACTED]

b7E per DHS

(U//~~LES~~) According to USMS, on 17 August, the USMS detained 1 individual related to a felony assault on a Deputy US Marshal. (The individual was being sought pursuant to a prior attack using a baseball bat attack on a Deputy US Marshal.) The USAO has since charged the individual with Assaulting a Federal Officer, 18 U.S.C. 111.

## (U) Executive Update

## (U) FEDERAL LE DEPLOYMENT POSTURE

(U) Deployment of Federal assets

b7E -4 per FBI

(U) Element	(U) Number of Deployments	(U) Purpose of Each Deployment
(U) FPS:	[REDACTED]	
(U) USMS:	[REDACTED]	HQ/DISTRICT [REDACTED]
(U) ICE:	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] b7E per ICE, CBP, DHS
(U) CBP:	[REDACTED]	MRT/SRT/BORTAC/BORSTAR [REDACTED]
(U) FBI:	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI

## (U) Investigative Information

(U//~~LES~~) Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will "maintain no record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Privacy Act of 1974, section (e)(7)

*(U) Arrest Data*

<b>(U)Agency</b>	<b>(U)Arrest</b>
<i>(U) FPS:</i>	33
<i>(U) USMS:</i>	27
<i>(U) CBP:</i>	16
<i>(U) FBI:</i>	3
<i>(U) HSI:</i>	3
<i>(U) ATF:</i>	2
<i>(U) Joint:</i>	19

**(U//LES)**

b7E -4,5 per FBI

**(U//LES)**

b7E -4,5 per FBI

**(U//FOUO)**

b5 -2 per FBI

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b5 -2 per FBI

b5 -2 per FBI

b7E -4,5 per FBI

## (U) Flashpoints and Catalysts

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*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

(U//FOUO)

b7E -4 per FBI



Command Post Locations:

b7E -4,5 per FBI

## I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against Federal facilities, employees, and equipment at or near Federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

(U//LES)

b7E per ICE

*(U) Tactics and techniques observed in the course of damage to federal properties*

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to FPS, DHS, and FBI, federal agencies are working with state and local partners to target and investigate individuals responsible for inciting, inspiring, or facilitating violent crimes over the last approximately 81 days. Some of the specific tactics noted are thrown projectiles, use of wrist rocket sling shots, using saws and other items to breach protective fencing, use of commercial fireworks, and use of paint; using spray paint and paint balls to disable surveillance cameras. Conflicts between peaceful protesters engaged in First Amendment-protected activity and individuals involved in vandalism or other crimes have been observed, according to DHS.



*(U) Reported injuries to federal officers*

- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Federal agencies have conducted additional investigations into individuals shining laser pointers at PPB aircraft and have actioned multiple arrests for shining a laser into the eyes of FPS Officers. One arrest also resulted in the discovery of pipe bomb components, fireworks, and several knives. (Joint investigative and federal prosecutorial efforts continue on the subject.
- (U) Fireworks have been observed being used as explosive devices and have been thrown at the MCJC and injured at least three Deputies and a USMS Deputy.

b7E per ICE

*(U) Positive Mitigation Factors/trends - appearing to have a positive impact on tamping down the violence in an AOR including.*

- (U) US Marshals indicate a strategy of low visibility may have had a deescalating effect in the immediate vicinity of the Hatfield Courthouse.
- (U) Shrinking crowd size may have resulted in fewer criminal and violent incidents.
- (U) Shrinking crowd size likely has resulted in fewer injuries to LE personnel.

## (U) Social Media Exploitation

(U//~~FOUO~~) Appendix 1, further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity; the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" are First Amendment protected speech and "following" and "friending" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

(U) SOMEX: [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to FPS [REDACTED]

b7E per DHS

(U) According to FPS reporting [REDACTED]



## (U//~~LES~~) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

5 JULY 2020 -- 1700

(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 5 July. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: DHS, DoI, DoJ, DoD, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//~~LES~~) DNOG Appendix I further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity; the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not unreasonably interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" on First Amendment protected speech and "following" and "friending" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires heightened review to determine it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

(U//~~LES~~) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is issued as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue confusion into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 5 July, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Violent protest activity that began on 3 July continued in the vicinity of the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Portland, Oregon. As of 5 July, the courthouse was subject to vandalism and had its windows breached along with fireworks shot into the building. According to open source reporting, on 4 July at 2230 PST, police ordered protestors to stop directing fireworks toward the Justice Center and to not engage with the federal courthouse. Individuals fired fireworks, threw bricks, and shined lasers at police officers. At 2310 PST, police declared a riot and ordered protestors to leave.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 5 July, 834 (-2) NG personnel are deployed across nine states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection missions. NG troops have the highest concentrated deployments to Texas (430), DC (138), Indiana (120), and South Dakota (79). USMS has 64 personnel deployed in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel are currently deployed to: St. Louis, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; and the National Capital Region.

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4,5 per FBI

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY


*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 5 July, there has been no reported threat of criminal offenses or violence directed against a federal building that also houses FBI personnel, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.

b7E -4 per FBI

\* (U//~~FOUO~~)\* (U//~~FOUO~~)

- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, FBI field offices reported 64 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 5 July.



*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Violent protest activity that began on 3 July continued in the vicinity of the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Portland, Oregon. As of 5 July, the Federal Courthouse was subject to vandalism and had its windows breached along with fireworks shot into the building. According to open source reporting, on 4 July at 2230 PST, police ordered protestors to stop directing fireworks toward the Justice Center and to not engage with the federal courthouse. Individuals fired fireworks, threw bricks, and shined lasers at police officers. At 2310 PST, police declared a riot and ordered protestors to leave.

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 24-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

*(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U//~~LES~~) On 3 July, Aurora Police Department in Colorado released results of an internal investigation that resulted in the firing of three Aurora Police officers photographed while reenacting the August 2019 death of Elijah McClain who died of cardiac arrest during an arrest. The release of the investigative results and the photos taken by the officers has become a flash point for violence associated with planned demonstrations and protests in Aurora this weekend. Demonstration and protests regarding this matter have been peaceful to date.

*(U) Scheduled Protests*

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4 per FBI

(U)

b7E -4 per FBI



## (U//LES) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

4 JULY 2020 -- 1700

(U//LES) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 4 July. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: DHS, DoI, DoJ, DoD, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) As of 4 July, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

[REDACTED]

b7E per CBP

(U//LES) Minneapolis Field Office: On 3 July, several Native American groups gathered to protest President Trump's event at Mount Rushmore in nearby Keystone, South Dakota and attempted to block roadways. National Guard cleared the crowd with smoke shells, and a Pennington County Sheriff's Office deputy



deployed tear gas on the crowd. As of 4 July, local sheriffs of the Black Hills region of South Dakota police department arrested 18 protestors for disorderly conduct near Mount Rushmore. Of the 18, 11 were from outside South Dakota: Minnesota (2), Nebraska (2), Arizona (1), Colorado (1), Montana (1), New Mexico (1), New York (1), Wisconsin (1), and Wyoming (1).

(U//~~FOUO~~) Seattle Field Office: Unrest continued in Seattle overnight from 3-4 July when two protestors were injured when a vehicle drove at high speed into a group of protestors blocking southbound Interstate 5. Law enforcement officers later arrested the driver. Open source media reports one protester sustained life threatening injuries and Washington State Patrol continues to investigate the driver's motivation and how he gained access to that area of the interstate.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 4 July, National Guard (NG) deployments have decreased by 49% in the past 24 hours. Currently, 836 (-429) NG personnel are deployed across nine (-2) states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection missions. NG troops have the highest concentrated deployments to Texas (430), DC (138), Indiana (120), and South Dakota (79). USMS continues to have 64 personnel deployed in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel are currently deployed to: St. Louis, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; and the National Capital Region.

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4,5 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

<sup>a</sup> (U//~~FOUO~~)


<sup>b</sup> (U//~~FOUO~~)

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 4 July, there has been no reported threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against a federal building which also houses FBI personnel, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.
- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, FBI field offices reported 64 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 4 July.



*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

•



b7E per CBP

b7E per CBP

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 24-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

- (U//~~LES~~) Minneapolis Field Office: Several Native American groups gathered to protest President Trump's event at Mount Rushmore in nearby Keystone, South Dakota and attempted to block roadways. National Guard cleared the crowd with smoke shells, and a Pennington County Sheriff's Office deputy deployed tear gas on the crowd. As of 4 July, local sheriffs of the Black Hills region of South Dakota police department arrested 18 protestors for disorderly conduct near Mount Rushmore. Of the 18, 11 were from outside South Dakota: Minnesota (2), Nebraska (2), Arizona (1), Colorado (1), Montana (1), New Mexico (1), New York (1), Wisconsin (1), and Wyoming (1).

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

### *(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*


(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U//~~LES~~) Denver Field Office: On 3 July, Aurora Police Department in Colorado released results of an internal investigation that may result in discipline to three Aurora Police officers photographed while reenacting the August 2019 death of Elijah McClain who died of cardiac arrest during an arrest. The release of the investigative results and the photos taken by the officers has become a flash point for violence associated with planned demonstrations and protests in Aurora this weekend. A protest took place 3 July until the early morning hours of 4 July and was peaceful, with no incident. As of early 4 July, less than ten people remained at the police precinct. [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

### *(U) Scheduled Protests*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Criminal actors may exploit lawful protests over the next 24-72 hours to perpetuate acts of violence.



## (U//LES) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

3 JULY 2020 -- 1700

(U//LES) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 3 July. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: DHS, DoJ, DoD, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) Under FBI policy and federal law, an investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will "maintain no record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Privacy Act of 1974, section (e)(7).

(U//LES) DNOG Appendix I further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose; (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights; and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" on First Amendment protected speech and "liking" and "friending" on social media may be insensitive to the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine if it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

(U//LES) Within this legal and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOG. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue confusion into the FBI's intent of intended targets.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) As of 3 July, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

(U//FOUO) On 3 July, Portland, Oregon police declared a riot in the vicinity of the U.S. Federal Courthouse due to violent criminal activity. According to Portland Police and Federal Protective Service (FPS), protesters began throwing fireworks, sling-shooting rocks at FPS officers, and starting fires. United States Marshals (USMS) extinguished a fire that was started after protesters threw incendiary devices (NFI) at the building. Subjects broke the glass doors of the Courthouse and attempted a breach of the building but were stopped by USMS and FPS. USMS arrested two individuals; one who attempted to breach the courthouse and another individual who had firework smoke bombs. [REDACTED]

b7E per DHS

(U//LES)

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO)

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 3 July, National Guard (NG) deployments have increased. Currently, 1,265 (+692) NG personnel are deployed across 11 (+5) states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection missions. NG troops are mostly deployed to Texas (430) (+155), Minnesota (218), Arizona (200), and DC (138) (-28). USMS deployed 64 personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel are currently deployed to St. Louis, Missouri and Portland, Oregon.

(U//FOUO)

b7E -4,5 per FBI

<sup>a</sup> (U//FOUO)

b7E -4 per FBI

<sup>b</sup> (U//FOUO)

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*


- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 3 July, there has been one reported threat of criminal offenses or violence directed against a federal building which also houses FBI personnel, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.

- (U//~~FOUO~~)

b7A -1 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, 31 of 56 (55%), field offices reported 64 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 3 July.



*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 3 July, Portland, Oregon police declared a riot in the vicinity of the U.S. Federal Courthouse due to violent criminal activity. According to Portland Police and Federal Protective Service (FPS), protesters began throwing fireworks, sling-shooting rocks at FPS officers, and starting fires. United States Marshals (USMS) put out a fire that was started after protesters threw incendiary devices (NFI) at the building. Subjects broke the glass doors of the Courthouse and attempted a breach of the building but were stopped by USMS and FPS. USMS arrested two individuals; one who attempted to breach the courthouse and another individual who had firework smoke bombs [REDACTED]

b7E per DHS

- (U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 24-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) On 1 July, a statue of General Stonewall Jackson was removed in Richmond, Virginia by Mayor Levar Stoney through emergency powers granted to him by Governor Northam in the interest of public safety. Additional confederate memorials are planned to be removed in the coming days.

*(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*


(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) On 3 July, Aurora Police Department in Colorado is expected to release results of an internal investigation that may result in discipline to three Aurora Police officers photographed while reenacting the August 2019 death of Elijah McClain who died of cardiac arrest during an arrest. The release of the investigative results and the photos taken by the officers may be a flash point for violence associated with planned demonstrations and protests in Aurora this weekend.

*(U) Scheduled Protests*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]





## (U//~~LES~~) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

2 JULY 2020 -- 1700

(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 2 July. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: DHS, DoJ, DoD, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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## (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 2 July, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Overnight between 1 and 2 July, protestors removed protective plywood from the Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse. Federal Protective Services (FPS) units responded and deployed [REDACTED] to repel protestors who threw fireworks and other projectiles at FPS units and attempted further vandalism of the facility. This activity is a continuation of the unrest in Portland, Oregon over 20-30 June involving the Multnomah County Justice Center (MCJC) and police precinct in downtown Portland.

b7E per DHS

(U) On 1 July, a statue of General Stonewall Jackson was removed in Richmond, Virginia by Mayor Levar Stoney through emergency powers granted to him by Governor Northam in the interest of public safety. Additional confederate memorials are planned to be removed in the coming days.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 2 July, 573 (-251) National Guard (NG) personnel are deployed across six states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection missions. NG troops are mostly deployed to

Texas (275) (-273), DC (164) (+18), and Wisconsin (116) (+4). USMS deployed 64 (-1) personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel continue to be deployed to the NCR, to Portland, Oregon, and to the USMS's Special Operations Group Tactical Center in Pineville, Louisiana.

(U//FOUO)

b7E -4 per FBI

b7E -4,5 per FBI

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY


<sup>a</sup> (U//FOUO)

b7E -4 per FBI

<sup>b</sup> (U//FOUO)

(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 2 July, there are no known threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.
- (U//LES) Since 25 May, 31 of 56 (55%), field offices reported 64 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 2 July.



(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Overnight between 1 and 2 July, protestors removed protective plywood from the Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse. Federal Protective Services (FPS) units responded and deployed [redacted] to repel protestors who threw fireworks and other projectiles at FPS units and attempted further vandalism of the facility. This activity is a continuation of the unrest in Portland over 20-30 June involving the Multnomah County Justice Center (MCJC) and police precinct in downtown Portland.

b7E per DHS

- (U//LES) [redacted]

b7E -4 per FBI

[redacted] AS of late on 1 July, Seattle Police reported 44 arrests and encountered no violent or organized resistance. There was no impact to federal facilities. Since 8 June, several

hundred individuals in the CHOP zone in downtown Seattle have resisted attempts by city officials to dismantle barriers and clear the area.

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 24-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 1 July the Boston Art Commission voted unanimously to remove "The Emancipation Group" sculpture from its pedestal in Park Square Boston. The sculpture, also known as the "Freedman's Memorial" depicts a freed slave kneeling at President Abraham Lincoln's feet. The sculpture of the slave is based on Archer Alexander, a Black man who assisted the Union Army, escaped slavery, and was the last man recaptured under the Fugitive Slave Act.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]
- (U) On 1 July, a statue of General Stonewall Jackson was removed in Richmond, Virginia by Mayor Levar Stoney through emergency powers granted to him by Governor Northam in the interest of public safety. Additional confederate memorials are planned to be removed in the coming days.
- (U//~~LES~~) [REDACTED] b6 -3 per FBI  
b7C -3 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI  
[REDACTED]

### *(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, at around 2130, protesters surrounded a marked Detroit police SUV, reportedly smashed out the rear window, and climbed onto the hood of the vehicle. According to reports, the officer inside the vehicle turned on the overhead lights and accelerated through the crowd, causing two protesters who had climbed onto the hood to be thrown to the ground. According to media reports, protestors marched near the Southwest Police Precinct on 29 and 30

June, demanding the resignation of the Chief of Police or the firing of the officer driving the SUV. The protestors have vowed to continue protesting, including at the PGA Tour Rocket Mortgage Classic scheduled to commence on 2 July. A US Social Security Administration building is located [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Civil trial of multiple Logan, WV Police Department officers accused of use of excessive force against [REDACTED] begins on 7 July 2020 in Charleston, WV. [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI  
b7C -4 per FBI

- (U) According to open source reporting, as of 1 July, Virginia will allow cities and counties to remove confederate memorials based on legislation passed by the general assembly in April 2020.

*(U) Scheduled Protests*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Criminal actors may exploit lawful protests to perpetuate acts of violence.

- (U) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI


- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

- (U) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]



## (U//~~LES~~) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4<sup>th</sup> Holiday Period

28 JUNE 2020 - 1700

(U//~~LES~~) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED] as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 28 June. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DHS, DoJ, DoD, MPD and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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### (U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 28 June, there are no indications of direct threats, criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours.

(U//~~LES~~) On 27 June, Louisville ATF Agents responded with the Louisville Metro Police Department to a shooting inside Jefferson Square Park in downtown Louisville. One death and multiple injuries were reported. One suspect is in custody. A preliminary investigation indicated multiple firearms were discharged.

(U//~~FOUO~~) All four terminated police officers in the George Floyd incident are scheduled for their second court appearance on 29 June at the Hennepin County Courthouse in downtown Minneapolis. Two of the former officers were released on bond, while two remain in custody.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 28 June, 711 (-33) National Guard (NG) personnel are deployed across seven states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection mission. NG troops are mostly deployed to Texas (329) (-84), DC (146) (+7), and Wisconsin (120) (-12). USMS deployed 67 personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel were deployed around the NCR, Portland, Oregon, and the USMS's Special Operations Group Tactical Center in Pineville, Louisiana.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]


b7E -4 per FBI

## (U) Executive Update

### I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 28 June, there are no known threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, or equipment within the past 24 hours based on 56 field office responses.
- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, 30 of 56 (54%), field offices reported 60 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 30 May and 1000 28 June.



*(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).*

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 27 June, one individual was killed and others injured in a shooting at Jefferson Square Park in downtown Louisville. The shooter has been identified and is in local custody.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 27 June, it was reported that there were limited incidents of vandalism in the National Capital Region (NCR) to include vandalism and graffiti to the following locations in Washington, D.C.: USSS building, the Francis Scott Key statue and a plaque at the Francis Griffiths Newlands Memorial Fountain. It is unknown when the damage occurred.

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) On 27 June, Austin police detained one individual for driving a vehicle through a crowd of protestors in front of police headquarters in Austin. There were no reported injuries.
- (U//LES) Since 8 June, several hundred individuals remain in the Capitol Hill Occupied/Organized Protest (CHOP) zone in downtown Seattle despite attempts by city officials to dismantle barriers and clear the area. The Seattle Mayor's office continues to negotiate with the CHOP leaders to dismantle the area and disperse; however, the attempted barrier removal on 26 June prompted a swell in the number of protestors from a couple dozen to more than 100. SE maintains continuing contact with Seattle Police Department for any situational updates.
- (U) On 26 June, vandals were seen smashing a window at the entrance to the Seattle Police Department's (SPD) West Precinct in Seattle. SPD Officers chased the crowd away.
- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U//LES) [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI  
b7C -4 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI

## II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

*(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.*

### *(U) Landmarks*

(U//FOUO) Monuments/statues/memorials will likely remain a potential flashpoint for violence and criminal activity in the next 48-72 hours. Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]



- (U//~~FOUO~~): On 27-28 June, a demonstration called "Rally Against The Freedman's Memorial" at Lincoln Park in Washington, D.C. The flyer does not indicate a date, purpose or participation expected.

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~): [REDACTED]

*(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) All four terminated police officers in the George Floyd incident are scheduled for their second court appearance on 29 June at the Hennepin County Courthouse in downtown Minneapolis. Two of the former officers were released on bond, while two remain in custody.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The Washoe County District Attorney is anticipated to release a video on 29 or 30 June of a Sparks Police Department officer-involved shooting that could be controversial. Casino partners plan to increase security in anticipation of violence.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 29 June, there were reported concerns at the federal courthouse in Madison, Wisconsin surrounding the upcoming sentencing of an individual—currently on federal supervised release.

- (U//~~LES~~): [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI

b7A -1 per FBI

b7C -4 per FBI


- (U//~~FOUO~~): [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

*(U) Scheduled Protests*

(U//~~FOUO~~) Criminal actors may exploit lawful protests to perpetuate acts of violence.

- (U) As of 27 June, hundreds of protesters remain camped out near NY City Hall are advocating for a \$1 billion dollar cut to the NYPD's budget. *NY has no information indicating any threat to federal property stemming from this demonstration at this time.*



## Albany | Civil Unrest June 2020

2 JUNE 2020

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### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - None.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
    - None.
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, i.e. - planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - Ongoing protest in a parking lot near the Syracuse RA at 1500 ET on 01 June 2020
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
    - None.

• [REDACTED]

○ [REDACTED]

▪  
▪

▪

b7E -4 per FBI,DHS

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b7E -4 per FBI

## Intelligence/Investigative

- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities.
  - Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors.

- None.

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- Known criminal group associations or memberships.

b7E -4 per FBI

- None.

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- Interviews of Agitators in Custody

- None.

- Number of Predicated FBI Cases

- Include case files

- None.

- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites

- Local and state LE have arrested approximately 18 individuals.

- Three Burlington Police Department officers have been publicly identified for alleged previous misconduct.

- [REDACTED]

b7A -1 per FBI

- [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)

- None.

- Domain/environmental variables

- Infrastructure that could be impacted by acts of violence include state capitol building, Federal and state court houses, Federal buildings, and Governor's mansions

- Requests for resources have come from the Capital Region Crime Analysis Center due to a shutdown and Schenectady PD requested less-than-lethal pellets and gas.

- [REDACTED]

- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence

b7E -4 per FBI

- None.
- Requests from partners due to lack of resources
  - None.
- Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted)
  - None.

## Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

---

- FBI deployment of assets [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
    - FBI [REDACTED]
  - Other FBI personnel requested to protect federal or state buildings.
    - [REDACTED]
- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:
  - a. [REDACTED]
  - b. [REDACTED]
  - c. [REDACTED]
  - d. [REDACTED]

b7E -2,4 per FBI

## Non-federal Deployment Posture

---

- Requests / deployment of National Guard
  - Size of National Guard elements to address unrest
    - None.
- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance
  - None.

## Damage/Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

---

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities
    - None.
  - Federal property
    - None.
  - State / local municipalities
    - Damage to buildings and assets of local police department and local government buildings.
  - Other – to include local businesses as reportable
    - Looting of malls, liquor stores, and burning of a bank.
- Injuries/Deaths
  - LE
    - Albany PD had at least one injury to an officer.
  - Other (to include local population/protestors)
    - None.



## Buffalo | Civil Unrest May 2020

2 JUNE 2020

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

*Information provided in this update is based on responses provided by FBI field offices as of the information cut-off time of 0600 ET, 2 June 2020. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.*

### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - Peaceful protests in the City of Buffalo, NY, Lockport, NY, and Rochester, NY areas.
    - Buffalo area, protests in progress, thus far nonviolent. Protest is originating near the FBI Buffalo office.
    - [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
    - Rochester RA – No threats to RA or employees – City of Rochester had large protests causing property damage throughout the city.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, i.e. - planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - None.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours) b7E -4 per FBI
    - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
    - [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]

### Intelligence / Investigative

- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities.
  - Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors.
    - None.

- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- Known criminal group associations or memberships. b7E -4 per FBI
  - None.
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]
  - Interviews of Agitators in Custody
    - None.
- Number of Predicated FBI Cases/Subjects
  - None.
  - Include names of subjects / case files
- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites?
  - 1 Buffalo Police Department Officer and 1 New York State Trooper were hit by a vehicle of 3 individuals on Bailey Avenue in the City of Buffalo (E District Area). All 3 individuals in the vehicle were arrested by the Buffalo Police Department. Both officers are in stable condition.
  - Subject who threw a flaming object through a window in Buffalo City Hall on 30 May 2020 was arrested by Buffalo Police, federal charges forthcoming, ATF lead agency.
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED] b7A -1 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI
- Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)
- Demographic information
  - In progress.
- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence
  - Federal Courthouse (largely glass building near site where most protests originate)
- Requests from partners due to lack of resources
  - HHS-OIG Agents requested a threat brief because U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services Secretary Alex M. Azar II is planning to visit the Buffalo AOR on Thursday 4 June 2020. His itinerary includes visits to Buffalo General Hospital, Roswell Park Cancer Institute, and possibly a Wegmans supermarket on Amherst Street in Buffalo, NY.
- Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted facilities
  - None.

## Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

---

- FBI deployment of assets [REDACTED]

•  
•

b7E -4 per FBI

- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.

### Non-federal Deployment Posture

---

- Requests / deployment of National Guard
  - Size of National Guard elements to address unrest
    - None.
- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance

b7E -2,4 per FBI

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▪

### Damage / Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

---

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities
    - Minor damage to the Federal Courthouse in Buffalo (glass break).
  - Federal property
    - None.
  - State / local municipalities
    - Buffalo City Hall – vandalism, graffiti, broken windows and fire (minor)
  - Other – to include local businesses as reportable
    - A local mini mart
    - Damage throughout the cities of Buffalo and Rochester due to violent protests to include banks, liquor stores, convenience stores (7/11), pawn shops (reportedly 15 weapons stolen from a pawn shop in Buffalo to include one AR-15), graffiti on monuments and buildings.
- Injuries/Deaths:
  - LE
    - 1 Buffalo Police Department Officer; 1 New York State Trooper (both in stable condition at ECMC)
    - According to the Buffalo News, officers suffered minor injuries from broken glass and thrown projectiles.
  - Other (to include local population/protestors)

- Driver of vehicle (shot 3 times); passenger of vehicle (grazed); and passenger of vehicle (uninjured)
- Only confirmed injuries of note were, one woman was dragged from her car and beat by protesters during the protest in Buffalo. A Channel 4 news reporter was struck and injured (NFI).





## Boston Civil Unrest Addendum 2 June 2020

2 JUNE 2020

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

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### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours):
    - None.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours):
    - None.
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, ie planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours):
    - None.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours):
    - None.

- [REDACTED] b7D -5 per FBI  
◦ [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
  - (U//LES) [REDACTED]
  - (U//LES) [REDACTED]
  - (U//LES) [REDACTED]

## Intelligence / Investigative

---

- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities.
  - None.
- Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors.
  - None.
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- Known criminal group associations or memberships.
  - None
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
  - An active National Guard member posted on social media he would shoot rioters in Boston. Subject was located, interviewed, and admitted to the posting.
  - [REDACTED]
- Number of Predicated FBI Cases/Subjects
  - Include names of subjects / case files
    - None.
- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites?
  - Boston Police arrest of gang-affiliated individual who admitted to shooting at police during protests on night of 31 May 2020.
- [REDACTED] b7A -1 per FBI  
[REDACTED] b7E -4,7 per FBI
- Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)
  - None.
- Demographic information
  - Boston's territory spans four states and approximately 56,500 square miles and is home to 10.5 million people—the third most populous FBI field office.
- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence

- The Boston AOR is home to the largest collection of Cleared Defense Contractor (CDC) facilities outside of the Washington, DC, metropolitan area.
  - Among the region's hundreds of CDCs are the headquarters of Raytheon and General Electric, and significant operations at MIT Lincoln Labs, BAE Systems, General Dynamics Bath Ironworks, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute.
  - World-class universities such as Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston University, Boston College, Brown University, and Northeastern University.
  - Major military facilities located in Boston's territory include the Naval War College, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Coast Guard District 1.
- Requests from partners due to lack of resources
  - None.
- Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted facilities
  - See Infrastructure bullet

### Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

---

- FBI deployment of assets [REDACTED]
  - FBI [REDACTED]
- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:
  - a. [REDACTED]
  - b. [REDACTED]
  - c. [REDACTED]
  - d. [REDACTED]

b7E -2,4 per FBI

### Non-federal Deployment Posture

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
- Requests / deployment of National Guard:
  - Request made by MA Governor Baker on 5/31 to the MA State House, Boston, MA
    - Size of National Guard elements to address unrest:
      - 100
- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance:
  - None.

### Damage / Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

---

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities
    - None.
  - Federal property
    - None.

- State / local municipalities
  - On Saturday, 30 May 2020, a door to the Rhode Island State House had been vandalized with graffiti, "Time for Change."
  - Massachusetts State House defaced during protests of 31 May 2020
  - Many historic monuments damaged in Boston the night of 31 May 2020.
- Other
  - The night of 1 June 2020, several businesses were damaged and looted in Portland, ME. One (1) occupied police vehicle was damaged. 8-10 arrests were reported.
  - In the early hours of 2 June 2020 the Providence Place Mall (RI) was breached, and at least two (2) local police vehicles were damaged.
  - Multiple business storefronts damaged in the Downtown Crossing and surrounding areas the night of 31 May 2020.
  - 21 non-federal law enforcement vehicles damaged in Boston the night of 31 May 2020.
- Injuries/Deaths:
  - LE
    - 7-9 law enforcement officers injured during protests on 31 May 2020.
  - Other (to include local population/protestors)
    - None reported.



## El Paso | Civil Unrest June 2020

2 JUNE 2020

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### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - None.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
    - None.
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, ie planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - 1 June 2020 – EP HQCITY; Tentative: Justice for George Floyd Protest; El Paso County Coliseum; Unknown time
    - 1 June 2020 – EP HQCITY; Tentative; Latinos for BLM; Memorial Park; 1830 MST
    - 1 June 2020 – EP MRA: Black Lives Matter; Midland Park Mall; 1900 CST
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)

- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

### Intelligence / Investigative

- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities

- Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors.
  - None.

- [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]

b7E -4 per FBI

- Known criminal group associations or memberships.
  - None.

- [Redacted]

- [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]

- Interviews of Agitators in Custody
  - None.

- Number of Predicated FBI Cases/Subjects
  - Include names of subjects/ case files
    - None.

- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites

- [Redacted]

- [Redacted]

b7A -1 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

- [Redacted]

- Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)

- None.

- Domain/environmental variables

- None.

- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence

- None.

- Requests from partners due to lack of resources

- None.

- Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted)

- None

## Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

- FBI deployment of assets [Redacted]

- [Redacted]

b7E -2,4 per FBI

- [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]

- Other FBI personnel requested to protect federal or state buildings
    - None.
- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:

f.  
g.  
h.  
i.

b7E -4 per FBI

## Non-federal Deployment Posture


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- Requests / deployment of National Guard
  - None.
  - Size of National Guard elements to address unrest
    - Not applicable.
- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance
  - None.

## Damage / Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

---

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities:
    - SAC Quesada and ASAC Boyd detained one individual who spray painted the wall of the FBI El Paso Field Office and was believed to be armed per observations of security guards. Subject had a toy pistol and was turned over to FPS. FPS was contacting USAO-WDTX for prosecution. Media was seen taking video of graffiti. No known nexus to organized group.
  - Federal property
    - None.
  - State / local municipalities
    - Graffiti incidents: On 31 May 2020, an individual vandalized the walls of the Federal Justice Center, 660 S. Mesa Hills, El Paso, Texas, where the FBI EP Division, DEA, and West Texas HIDTA/ISC reside. The DHS Federal Protective Service made one arrest. On 30 May 2020, unknown actors vandalized with graffiti the EPPD Regional Command Center. No arrests have been made. On 30 May 2020, unknown actors vandalized the EPPD Headquarters office. No arrests have been made.
  - Other
    - None.
- Injuries/Deaths:
  - LE
    - None.
  - Other (to include local population/protestors)
    - None.



## Jacksonville | Civil Unrest June 2020

2 JUNE 2020 0900

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

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### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - None.
    - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
      - None.
  - Threats of violence against federal buildings, ie planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
    - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
      - None.
    - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
      - None.

- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

### Intelligence / Investigative

- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities
  - Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors
    - None.
    - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - Known criminal group associations or memberships
    - [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI



\* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

o [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

\* [REDACTED]

o Interviews of Agitators in Custody

o

[REDACTED]

o On 31 May 2020, an individual was taken into custody during a protest in Jacksonville with a homemade incendiary device made by filling a liquor bottle with gasoline and Vaseline. The individual did not claim to be affiliated with any group and was evasive during questioning.

• Number of Predicated FBI Cases

o Include case files

\* None.

• Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites

o Jacksonville Sheriff's Office arrested one protester on 1 June 2020 for resisting arrest and assault on a police officer outside the Jacksonville Courthouse.

o Approximately 87 individuals were detained for breach of peace and disorderly conduct in conjunction with protests in Jacksonville between 30 May and 31 May 2020, including an individual who was arrested for felon in possession of a weapon and possession of a destructive device. In his possession was a backpack with a homemade incendiary device made by filling a liquor bottle with gasoline and Vaseline. Additionally, the backpack contained several balloons filled with acrylic paint, extra balloons and paint, a demolition hatchet, first aid kit, black scarf, and a spray bottle with a baking soda solution for decontamination.

o (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI  
b7A -1 per FBI  
b7C -4 per FBI  
b7C -4,7 per FBI

\* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

o  
o  
o  
o

[REDACTED]

• Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)

o None.

- Domain/environmental variables
  - None.
- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence
  - None.
- Requests from partners due to lack of resources

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b7E -4 per FBI

Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted facilities

- None.

### Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

- FBI deployment of assets

- [Redacted]

- [Redacted]
  - [Redacted]

- Other FBI personnel requested to protect federal or state buildings
  - None.

b7E -2,4 per FBI

- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:

- i. [Redacted]
- l. [Redacted]
- m. [Redacted]
- n. [Redacted]

### Non-federal Deployment Posture

- Requests / deployment of National Guard
  - Size of National Guard elements to address unrest:
    - None


[Redacted]

b7E per DEA

### Damage / Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities
    - None.
  - Federal property
    - None.
  - State / local municipalities
    - Three police cars were damaged in Jacksonville on 30 May 2020 and graffiti was sprayed at the Governor's mansion in Tallahassee on 30 May 2020.
  - Other
    - 31 May 2020 - Looting at Walmart in Live Oak, Florida.

- 31 May 2020 - Tallahassee Gun and Pawn, 1435 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, Number of suspect(s): Approximately 6-8, Number of Firearms taken: Approximately 19; Number of Suspect(s) Arrested: 1 juvenile.
  - 1 June 2020 - Spike's Tactical, 2036 Apex Court, Apopka, FL, Number of suspect(s): 4, Method of entry: Brick thrown through glass front door, Number of Firearms taken: Estimated 10-15, Number of Suspect(s) Arrested: None.
- Injuries/Deaths
    - LE
      - None.
    - Other (to include local population/protestors)
      - None.



## Omaha | Civil Unrest June 2020

1 JUNE 2020

(b) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

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### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - None.
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
    - None.
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, ie planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - The Federal courthouse in Des Moines was damaged in last 48 hours (broken windows). The Federal courthouse in Omaha is near protest sites and suffered some minor damage (spray-paint).
  - Planned (next 12-24 hours)
    - None.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

b6 -3 per FBI  
b7C -3 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

## Intelligence / Investigative

---

- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities.

- Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors.

- None.

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- Known criminal group associations or memberships.

- None.

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- Interviews of Agitators in Custody

- Attempted but all subjects refused at this time.

- Number of Predicated FBI Cases/Subjects

- Include case files

- [REDACTED]

- Pending investigation (266H) regarding joint investigation with ATF regarding molotov cocktail.

- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites

- None.

b7A -1 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)

- None.

- Domain/environmental variables

- None.

- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence

- None.

- Requests from partners due to lack of resources

- None.

- Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted facilities

- None.

## Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

---

- FBI deployment of assets

b7E -4 per FBI

- [redacted]
  - [redacted]
- Other FBI personnel requested to protect federal or state buildings.
  - None.
- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:
  - y. [redacted]
  - bbb. [redacted]
  - m. [redacted]
  - n. [redacted]

b7E -2,4 per FBI

## Non-federal Deployment Posture


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- Requests / deployment of National Guard
  - Size of National Guard elements to address unrest
    - Governor Ricketts deployed Nebraska National Guard assets to protect facilities and infrastructure. Size unknown.
- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance
  - None.

## Damage / Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

---

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities
    - None.
  - Federal property
    - Federal courthouse and a parking garage in Lincoln, NE and a federal courthouse in Des Moines, IA all had minor damage.
  - State / local municipalities
    - None.
  - Other
    - Several small businesses with minor vandalism across the Omaha Field Office AOR. Significant looting at Merle Hay Mall in Des Moines, IA. Looting at Sam's Club in Quad Cities/Davenport, Iowa (smashed the jewelry case).
- Injuries/Deaths:
  - LE
    - None.
  - Other (to include local population/protestors)
    - Protestor shot and killed by bar owner in Omaha, NE.



## San Diego | Civil Unrest June 2020

11 JUNE 2020

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

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### Threats

- As of 31MAY20, 1700hrs, 1700hrs there are no known threats of violence against FBI San Diego facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities.
  - Past/ongoing –
    - None.
- Planned (next 12 – 24 hours)
  - None.
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, ie planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - Past protest in La Mesa, CA on 30 May20 focused on La Mesa Police Department HQ.
    - 31 May 2020: Ongoing protest at the San Diego Hall of Justice in downtown San Diego. This facility houses State of California judicial activities and is in near proximity to the San Diego Federal Building. As of 31MAY20, 1034 hrs SDPD reported over 300 protesters and growing. Protester's moved from the area towards Interstate 5. At 1216hrs the protesters breached LE barriers to block portions of Interstate 5. At 1221hrs a vehicle drove into the protest crowd resulting in two individuals with minor injuries. Size of the group is approximately 600 individuals.
    - 31 MAY 2020: Ongoing protest at San Diego Police Department HQ in downtown San Diego. At approx. 1514 SDPD deployed pepper balls and tear gas.
    - Largely peaceful protest at Balboa Park during the afternoon of 1JUN20, confirmed through multiple news articles. Protestors also moved from the East Village, near San Diego PD HQ, toward Balboa Park before dispersing around 2030, confirmed through local news reporting.

\* Largely peaceful protest in El Centro on 1JUN20 had ended as of 2230, per SSRA reporting.

\* [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

o Planned (next 12-24 hours)

\* [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

\* [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

\* [REDACTED]

Intelligence / Investigative



- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities.

- Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors.

- [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]

b6 -3 per FBI  
b7C -3 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI

- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
    - [REDACTED]

b6 -3 per FBI  
b7C -3 per FBI  
b7E -4 per FBI

- Known criminal group associations or memberships

- None.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- An individual with a military background and alleged ties to ANTIFA was contacted by SDPD intelligence indicated individual may be transporting Molotov cocktail bombs. Individual was identified and determined to be transporting solely food and drinks. Individual identity relayed to NCIS for additional follow-up.

- [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- Interviews of Agitators in Custody

- None.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]

b3 -5 per FBI  
b7A -1 per FBI  
b7E -4,7 per FBI

• [REDACTED] b7E -4,7 per FBI

- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites
  - None
- Unique variables in the SD AOR that could lead to violent activities (anniversaries, previous similar cases, etc.)

• [REDACTED]

- Domain/environmental variables

• [REDACTED]

- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence

b7E -4 per FBI

▪ None

- Requests from partners due to lack of resources

▪ None

- Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted facilities

• [REDACTED]

## Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

- FBI deployment of assets

[REDACTED]

○ [REDACTED]

▪ [REDACTED]

- Other FBI personnel requested to protect federal or state buildings.

b7D -5 per FBI

b7E -2,4 per FBI

▪ [REDACTED]

▪ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

▪ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]


b7E -4 per FBI

## Non-federal Deployment Posture

- Requests / deployment of National Guard
  - No request. California National Guard is being deployed to the FBI LA AOR.
- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance
  - Unknown

## Damage / Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

- Buildings
  - FBI facilities - no damage sustained
    - None.
  - Federal property
    - None.
  - State / local municipalities
    - La Mesa Police Department HQ sustained graffiti and minor damage.
    - La Mesa City Hall was briefly set on fire. Fire was extinguished prior to any major damage.
    - Several police vehicles vandalized; tires slashed.
    - A Heartland Fire Department vehicle was set on fire in La Mesa and destroyed.
  - Other
    - 30 May 2020 - Protestors attempted to break into California Coast Credit Union in  
  
La Mesa, CA.
    - 30 May 2020 - Union Bank was set on fire and destroyed in La Mesa, CA.
    - 30 May 2020 - Chase Bank was set on fire and destroyed in La Mesa, CA.
    - 30 May 2020 -- Vons grocery store vandalized and looted in La Mesa, CA.
    - 30 May 2020 -- Walmart vandalized and looted in La Mesa, CA.
    - 30 May 2020 -- Several small businesses vandalized and looted in La Mesa, CA.
    - 31 May 2020 - San Diego Police Department (SDPD) reported vandalism (graffiti and broken windows) and looting in downtown San Diego, California, as well as protesters throwing rocks and bottles at SDPD.
    - 31 May 2020 SDPF reported vandalism and a break-in at CVS store near Broadway Avenue in downtown San Diego.
- Injuries/Deaths:
  - LE -- as of 0230 on 1 June 2020
    - None
  - Other (to include local population/protestors)
    - None



## FBI San Francisco | Civil Unrest June 2020

01 JUNE 2020

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

*Information provided in this update is based on responses provided by FBI field offices as of the information cut-off time of 1900 ET, 31 May 2020. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.*

### Threats

- Threats of violence against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment to include protests at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - As of 31 May 2020 protests occurred at SF Civic Center/UN Plaza, approximately one block from FBI SF headquarters, which were anticipated to continue throughout the evening until curfew at 2000 PST.
    - As of 1 June 2020, a demonstration was planned for approximately 1500 near the FBI San Francisco San Jose RA on Hamilton Avenue in Campbell, according to a contact at Campbell PD and further confirmed by Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office. The demonstration did not take place. FBI San Francisco is operating out of the San Jose RA due to closures of the San Francisco Headquarters Building and the Oakland RA.

b7E -4 per FBI

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b7E -4 per FBI

- Planned (next 12-24 hours)
  - None.
- Threats of violence against federal buildings, ie planned protests at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
  - Past/ongoing (w/in last 12-24 hours)
    - 31 May 2020: Protests migrate throughout San Francisco, none targeted specific federal buildings

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- Planned (next 12-24 hours)

b7E -4 per FBI

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## Intelligence/Investigative

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- Identifiers of individuals traveling (to include over state lines) to engage in violent activities.
  - Methods utilized to incite violence and agitate protestors
    - None.

○

b7E -4 per FBI

§

- Known criminal group associations or memberships
  - None.
- [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- Interviews of Agitators in Custody
  - None.
- Number of Predicated FBI Cases/Subjects
  - Include case files
    - [REDACTED] b7A -1 per FBI  
b7E -1,4,7 per FBI
- Any notable information regarding local LE (non-FBI) arrests at sites?
  - None.
- [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- Requests from partners due to lack of resources
  - None
- Unique variables in your AOR that could lead to violent activities (ex: previous similar cases, anniversaries of past events, etc.)
  - The San Francisco Bay Area has a history of civil unrest associated with police use of force. In 2009, Oscar Grant was shot and killed by a BART police officer in Oakland and in 2015, Mario Woods was killed by police in San Francisco, both sparked protests against police brutality in the AOR. Both instances have been cited by protestors in the AOR.
- Domain/environmental variables
  - None
- Infrastructure that could potentially be impacted by acts of violence
  - As of 1 June 2020, freeways, major roads, and police stations remain most likely to be impacted by acts of violence resulting from civil unrest in the AOR. So far three major freeways in the Bay Area, 880, 680, and 101 have been blocked by protestors so far.
  - As of 1 June 2020, Private Sector Partner Chevron, reported the Governor announced the National Guard will be deployed to Chevron terminals for purposes of "protecting critical infrastructure." There are currently no specific threats to those facilities in our AOR, and FBISF is working to

confirm if in fact the National Guard will be deployed as open source checks do not confirm this reporting.

Other information which could help identify future locations/targeted facilities

## Federal/FBI Deployment Posture

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- FBI deployment of assets

- 

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b7E -2,4 per FBI

- Other FBI personnel requested to protect federal or state buildings.

- 

- Anticipated FBI Field Office resource requests for:

- a.

- b.

- c.

- d.

## Non-federal Deployment Posture

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- Requests / deployment of National Guard

- Size of National Guard elements to address unrest:

- None

- Other deployments in AOR of other non-federal assistance

- None

## Damage/Violence Assessment to AOR to the following:

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- Buildings

- FBI facilities

- None

- Federal property

- None

- State / local municipalities

- None

- Other – to include local businesses as reportable

▪ [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

▪ As of 1 June 2020, vandalism and looting moved into smaller communities in the East Bay, targeting department stores and a high-end shopping area in Walnut Creek. Ongoing threats continue to call for the targeting of more affluent areas of the AOR.

▪ As of 31 May 2020, vandalism and looting moved into smaller communities in the East Bay, targeting department stores and a high-end shopping area in Walnut Creek. Ongoing threats continue to call for the targeting of more affluent areas of the AOR. As of 1 June 2020, peaceful protests in the area continued, except for protestors blocking a freeway onramp.

▪ [REDACTED]

b7A -1 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

▪ On 31 May 2020, at approximately 2218 hours, 30-40 individuals working together broke into a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) in Hayward, CA, and stole 23 firearms (4 long guns and 19 pistols). ATF is the lead on this investigation.

▪ Late 31 May 2020 through early morning 1 June 2020, groups of individuals attempted to break into an FFL in Castro Valley, CA, and an FFL in San Lorenzo, CA. The subjects were unable to gain access to the businesses and no firearms were stolen.

▪ Late 31 May 2020 through early morning 1 June 2020, two individuals attempted to break into an FFL in Fremont, CA. The subjects were unable to gain access to the structure, and one subject was arrested.

- Injuries/Deaths:

- LE

- As of 31 May 2020, one Federal Protective Service officer was killed, one wounded in Oakland on 29 May 2020.

- Other (to include local population/protestors)

- [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI