

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
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(U//LES) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4th Holiday Period

29 JUNE 2020 - 1700

(U//LES) Information provided in this update is based on responses provided to the Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity (PVCA) During the July 4th Holiday Period Joint Inter-Agency Command Post in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center as of the information cut-off time of 1000 EST on 29 June. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DHS, DoJ, DoD, MPD and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) LOI 64-9600, further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity; the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" are First Amendment protected speech and "following" and "friending" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

(U//LES) Within this legal and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigation highlights and RPT as a representative review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is RPT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written documents for further dissemination without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or result in law enforcement into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI
b7C -4 per FBI
b7E -4 per FBI

(U//LES) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) As of 29 June, 615 (decrease of 96) National Guard (NG) personnel are deployed across six states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection mission. NG troops are mostly deployed to Texas (295) (decrease of 56), DC (146), and Wisconsin (120). USMS deployed [REDACTED] personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel were deployed around

b7E per USMS

the NCR, Portland, Oregon, and the USMS's
Louisiana.

[REDACTED]

b7E per USMS

(U//FOUO)

[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U) Executive Update


I. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against FBI facilities, employees, and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~LES~~) Since 25 May, 30 of 56 (54%), field offices reported 60 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 29 June.



(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) On 28 June, approximately 500 protesters converged on St. Louis Mayor Lyda Krewson's residence demanding her resignation. The St. Louis Metro Police Department in Missouri observed protesters wearing gas masks, armed with sling shots, and destroying St. Louis cameras. Mayor Krewson became the target of threatening texts and protests after identifying the names and addresses of individuals supportive of defunding the police department. With the exception of painting "RESIGN" on the street in front of the residence, the crowd dispersed at approximately 2300 without incident.

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]

b6 -4 per FBI
b7C -4 per FBI
b7E -4 per FBI

- ~~(U//LES)~~ Since 8 June, several hundred individuals remain in the Capitol Hill Occupied/Organized Protest (CHOP) zone in downtown Seattle, Washington despite attempts by city officials to dismantle barriers and clear the area. The Seattle Mayor's office continues to negotiate with the CHOP leaders to dismantle the area and disperse; however, the attempted barrier removal on 26 June prompted a swell in the number of protesters from a couple dozen to more than 100. SE maintains continuing contact with Seattle Police Department for any situational updates.

II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.

(U) Landmarks

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4 per FBI

Most sites are readily accessible and relatively soft targets.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 28 June, there is a consistent presence of demonstrators and other non-violent protest activity - comprising several hundred people daily - near the White House and Lafayette Square, Washington, DC.

(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, around 2130, protesters surrounded a marked Detroit police SUV in Michigan, reportedly smashed out the rear window, and climbed onto the hood of the vehicle. According to reports, the officer inside the vehicle turned on the overhead lights and accelerated through the crowd, causing two protesters who had climbed onto the hood to be thrown to the ground.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The Washoe County District Attorney is anticipated to release a video on 29 or 30 June of a Sparks Police Department officer-involved shooting in Nevada that could be controversial. Casino partners plan to increase security in anticipation of violence.

(U) Scheduled Protests

- (U) As of 29 June,

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U) As of 27 June, hundreds of protesters remain camped out near NY City Hall are advocating for a \$1 billion dollar cut to the NYPD's budget. protest location is less than 0.5 miles away from the Jacob K. Javits Federal Building (26 Federal Plaza) and US Court of International Trade.

(U) Positive Mitigation Factors/trends - appearing to have a positive impact on tamping down the violence in an AOR including local curfews, National Guard presence, and enhanced police presence.

- * (U) New Legislation.
- * (U//~~FOUO~~) Community Leader Engagement.
- * (U//~~FOUO~~) Protective materials applied on federal statues and monuments.
- * (U//~~FOUO~~) Preemptive removal of Statues or Monuments.
- * (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- * (U//~~FOUO~~) Coordination with Local, State, and Federal Partners.
- * (U//~~FOUO~~) Increased Law Enforcement Presence.

b7E -2,4,8 per FBI

STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER (SIOC)

BEFORE YOU LEAVE

- Dress code: Business casual b7E -2,8,14,34 per FBI
- Road Closures: Check Google Maps, Waze etc. for Road closures. Also check WTOP for traffic updates.
- Internet: Bring Power Cord for Computer. [REDACTED]
- Food and Drink: Food is NOT provided. [REDACTED]
During the week it is open for hot food and there is a self-pay after hours (credit card only). NOTE: You do not need an escort to go to the cafeteria.
- Bring extra work/book, etc.

GETTING TO THE SIOC: [REDACTED] b7E -2,3,8,30,34 per FBI

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

MISSION

- Situational Awareness / Information Sharing / Officer Safety / Notifications to Executive Management
- [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- [REDACTED]
- See Note A below for more details on collection requirements

SIOC CHECK IN

- Upon SIOC entry, provide identification, email address and receive temperature check.
- You will receive and sign for a badge. Make sure to sign it back in when you leave.
- PPE strongly encouraged and should be available
- [REDACTED] b7E -8,14 per FBI
- On the watch floor, check in with ADMIN to make sure your email address is on the distro for the SITRP.
Also, make sure you write your name and agency on the window just behind ADMIN.

GENERAL SIOC INFORMATION

- [REDACTED] b7E -8,14,30,34 per FBI
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Computers and Phones [REDACTED] computers and phones allowed (no personal phones...must be turned off and left in lock box outside SIOC). [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- Briefings: There are no regular briefings at this time except at shift change and it is more administrative in nature. However, if there is time sensitive information it will be distributed as needed.
- Information Sharing: If you receive pertinent information, talk to someone in person at the FBI CIU and/or email it to: [REDACTED] Pertinent information includes intelligence from the field on suspect actions [REDACTED] b7E -3,30 per FBI
- SITREPS will be disseminated to all partner agencies by sometime after 1900. Please forward SITREP to Intel-civilunrest@atf.gov and JSOC-Actions@atf.gov.

RESOURCES

- ATF / FBI (numerous divisions/sections and majority Intelligence Specialists and Analysts) / DEA / DHS / DOD / DOJ / Metro PD / NATL GUARD / USMS / HSI/others

SIOC POCS

- SIOC [REDACTED]
- SIOC [REDACTED]
- SIOC Admin (scheduling and parking) [REDACTED]
- SIOC Intelligence leads [REDACTED]
- FBI SIOC POC [REDACTED]
- FBI SIOC POC: SSA Jeff Downey, Section Chief [REDACTED]
- FBI SIOC POC: [REDACTED] Unit Chief [REDACTED]

b6 -1 per FBI
b7C -1 per FBI
b7E -3,14 per FBI

NOTE A: COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS BASED ON SITREP CATEGORIES

DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

- Threat of criminal offense of violence directed against FBI facilities, employees and equipment at or near FBI facilities for situational awareness
- Threats of criminal offense or violence directed against federal building at or near federal facilities for situational awareness
- Tactics observed in the course of damage to federal properties

b7E -4,8 per FBI

CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

-

INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

-

-

b7E -4,7,8 per FBI

FBI/FEDERAL DEPLOYMENT POSTURE

- FBI deployment of assets (i.e. self-deployment or in response to State, local, and tribal law enforcement requests for FBI assistance to combat violence and protect property)



(U//LES) Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity During the July 4th Holiday Period

2 JULY 2020 -- 1700

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(U//LES) Under Appellate 1, further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity; the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. Respondents are reminded that information including tweets, Facebook posts, and "likes" are First Amendment protected speech and "following" and "friending" on social media may be an exercise of the First Amendment freedom of association. The collection of such information therefore requires human review to determine if it is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

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(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Overnight between 1 and 2 July, protesters removed protective plywood from the Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse. [REDACTED]

b7E per DHS

(U) On 1 July, a statue of General Stonewall Jackson was removed in Richmond, Virginia by Mayor Levar Stoney through emergency powers granted to him by Governor Northam in the interest of public safety. Additional confederate memorials are planned to be removed in the coming days.

(U//FOUO) As of 2 July, 573 (~251) National Guard (NG) personnel are deployed across six states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection missions. NG troops are mostly deployed to

Texas (275) (-273), DC (164) (+18), and Wisconsin (116) (+4). USMS deployed [redacted] personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel continue to be deployed to the NCR, to Portland, Oregon, and to the USMS's [redacted] b7E per USMS [redacted] Louisiana.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on updated DOJ guidance analyzing 18 U.S.C. 1369 (Destruction of Veteran's Memorial), monuments or structures commemorating the Confederacy or a person's service in the armed forces of the Confederacy are not monuments or structures commemorating "the armed forces of the United States." [redacted]

b7E -4 per FBI

(U) Executive Update

1. (U) DAMAGE TO FEDERAL PROPERTY

b7E -4 per FBI

^a (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]


^b (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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b7E -4 per FBI

• (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

- (U//LES) Since 25 May, 31 of 56 (55%), field offices reported 64 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 2 July.



(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).

- (U//FOUO) Overnight between 1 and 2 July, protestors removed protective plywood from the Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse. [REDACTED]

b7E per DHS

- (U//LES) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.

(U) Landmarks

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 1 July the Boston Art Commission voted unanimously to remove "The Emancipation Group" sculpture from its pedestal in Park Square Boston. The sculpture, also known as the "Freedman's Memorial" depicts a freed slave kneeling at President Abraham Lincoln's feet. The sculpture of the slave is based on Archer Alexander, a Black man who assisted the Union Army, escaped slavery, and was the last man recaptured under the Fugitive Slave Act.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- (U) On 1 July, a statue of General Stonewall Jackson was removed in Richmond, Virginia by Mayor Levar Stoney through emergency powers granted to him by Governor Northam in the interest of public safety. Additional confederate memorials are planned to be removed in the coming days.
- (U//~~LES~~) On 2 July, Donald Trump Jr is expected to arrive in Rapid City, South Dakota. On 3 July, President Trump, other family members, and other dignitaries arrive at Mount Rushmore National Memorial for a 4th of July fireworks celebration. Several Native American groups reportedly plan to protest in the Keystone, South Dakota area. Additionally, an "anti-Trump" rally is scheduled at 1500 hours on 3 July in Keystone.

(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 28 June, at around 2130, protesters surrounded a marked Detroit police SUV, reportedly smashed out the rear window, and climbed onto the hood of the vehicle. According to reports, the officer inside the vehicle turned on the overhead lights and accelerated through the crowd, causing two protesters who had climbed onto the hood to be thrown to the ground. According to media reports, protestors marched near the Southwest Police Precinct on 29 and 30

June, demanding the resignation of the Chief of Police or the firing of the officer driving the SUV. The protestors have vowed to continue protesting, including at the PGA Tour Rocket Mortgage Classic scheduled to commence on 2 July. A US Social Security Administration building is located 2.7 miles from the Detroit Golf Course.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b6 -4 per FBI
[REDACTED] b7C -4 per FBI
[REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Scheduled Protests

(U//~~FOUO~~) Criminal actors may exploit lawful protests to perpetuate acts of violence.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) There is a planned protest gathering at Iowa State Capitol Building in Des Moines, IA, on 4 July from 1300-1500. The gathering could be exacerbated by an incident that took place on 1 July, in which a planned peaceful protest resulted in 17 arrests due to alleged damage to police vehicles and conduct toward law enforcement officers. The federal Iowa Central District courthouse is located approximately 0.6 miles away. Coordination with local law enforcement is ongoing.

(U) Positive Mitigation Factors/trends - appearing to have a positive impact on tamping down the violence in an AOR including local curfews, National Guard presence, and enhanced police presence.

- (U) New Legislation
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Community Leader Engagement
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Protective materials applied on federal statues and monuments
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Preemptive removal of Statues or Monuments
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Coordination with Local, State, and Federal Partners
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Increased Law Enforcement Presence

b7E -2,4,8 per FBI



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(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] in the last 24 hours there was criminal activity directed against federal property in Portland, Oregon.

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) On 3 July, Portland, Oregon police declared a riot in the vicinity of the U.S. Federal Courthouse due to violent criminal activity. According to Portland Police and Federal Protective Service (FPS), protesters began throwing fireworks, sling-shooting rocks at FPS officers, and starting fires. United States Marshals (USMS) extinguished a fire that was started after protesters threw incendiary devices (NFI) at the building. Subjects broke the glass doors of the Courthouse and attempted a breach of the building but were stopped by USMS and FPS. USMS arrested two individuals; one who attempted to breach the courthouse and another individual who had firework smoke bombs. One subject was released without being charged.

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~)(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4 per FBI

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 3 July, National Guard (NG) deployments have increased. Currently, 1,265 (+692) NG personnel are deployed across 11 (+5) states and the District of Columbia in support of their regional protection missions. NG troops are mostly deployed to Texas (430) (+155), Minnesota (218), Arizona (200), and DC (138) (-28). USMS deployed 64 personnel in support of local and federal law enforcement efforts. The majority of these personnel are currently deployed to St. Louis, Missouri and Portland, Oregon.

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b7E -4 per FBI

b7E -4 per FBI

^a (U//~~FOUO~~)^b (U//~~FOUO~~)

(U) Executive Update


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• (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//FOUO) On 30 June in Fargo, North Dakota, an unknown subject left what appeared to be a pipe bomb at the door of a business located across the street from the Federal Building United States Post Office [REDACTED]. The device appeared to be a pipe bomb with wires, a circuit board and what appeared to be a clock. The police cordoned off the area and local bomb squad confirmed the device was a hoax. The investigation is ongoing.
- (U//LES) Since 25 May, 31 of 56 (55%), field offices reported 64 incidents of damage to federal property or landmarks, including damage to eight FBI facilities. The bar chart below depicts updated instances of damage to federal property reported between 0600 25 May and 1000 3 July.



(U) Threats of criminal offenses or violence directed against federal buildings at or near federal facilities for situational awareness - past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours).

- * ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
 [REDACTED]
- * (U) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] b7E -4 per FBI
- * ~~(U//FOUO)~~ [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

II. (U) CURRENT AND UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(U) Possible catalysts in AOR to help understand possible flashpoints for upcoming violence, including anniversaries of past events, ongoing legal cases of past incidents where milestones in process could result in community reaction, recent events during criminal activity associated with protests (injuries, etc.) that could spark local responses.

(U) Landmarks

- (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
- * (U//LES) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
- * (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] b7E -2,4 per FBI
 [REDACTED]

-
- (U) On 1 July, a statue of General Stonewall Jackson was removed in Richmond, Virginia by Mayor Levar Stoney through emergency powers granted to him by Governor Northam in the interest of public safety. Additional confederate memorials are planned to be removed in the coming days.

(U) Law Enforcement Activity and Judicial Decisions

(U//~~FOUO~~) Pending judicial decisions, as well as law enforcement arrests of individuals engaged in violent protests, will likely remain a flashpoint for violent and criminal activity.

b7E -4 per FBI

- (U//~~FOUO~~)
- (U//~~LES~~) On 3 July, Aurora Police Department in Colorado is expected to release results of an internal investigation that may result in discipline to three Aurora Police officers photographed while reenacting the August 2019 death of Elijah McClain who died of cardiac arrest during an arrest. The release of the investigative results and the photos taken by the officers may be a flash point for violence associated with planned demonstrations and protests in Aurora this weekend.

(U) Scheduled Protests

(U//~~FOUO~~) Criminal actors may exploit lawful protests over the next 24-72 hours to perpetuate acts of violence. From 30 June to 3 July, 12 field offices reported scheduled lawful protests in their AOR (BF, DN, JN, ME, NK, NY, OC, PD, RH, SE, SU, and WF):

- (U//~~LES~~) There are numerous planned lawful demonstrations for 3 and 4 July at or in the vicinity of federal properties and monuments in Washington, D.C. which could impact the level of violent/criminal activity over the next 72 hours. According to law enforcement partners in the Washington, D.C. area, some planned protests are anticipated to draw large crowds in proximity to national monuments.
- (U) As of 2 July 2020, Brandon, Mississippi Police Department informed federal authorities of a unity rally/protests in support of removing Confederate monuments on 3 July near the Brandon courthouse.
- (U)
- (U//~~FOUO~~) There is a planned protest gathering at Iowa State Capitol Building in Des Moines, Iowa, on 4 July from 1300-1500 (local time). The gathering could be exacerbated by an incident that took place on 1 July, in which a planned peaceful protest resulted in 17 arrests due to alleged damage to police vehicles and conduct toward law enforcement officers. The federal Iowa Central District

b7E -4 per FBI

courthouse is located approximately 0.6 miles away. Coordination with local law enforcement is ongoing.

(U) Positive Mitigation Factors/trends - appearing to have a positive impact on tamping down the violence in an AOR including local curfews, National Guard presence, and enhanced police presence.

- (U) New Legislation
- (U) Community Leader Engagement
- (U) Protective materials applied on federal statues and monuments
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Preemptive removal of Statues or Monuments
- (U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Coordination with Local, State, and Federal Partners
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Increased Law Enforcement Presence

b7E -2,4,8 per FBI