

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMON CAUSE
805 15th Street NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20005,

COMMON CAUSE EDUCATION FUND
805 15th Street NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20005,

ANTHONY NEL
c/o Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington
P.O. Box 14596
Washington, DC 20044,

HALEY SMITH
c/o Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington
P.O. Box 14596
Washington, DC 20044,

LINDA DUCKWORTH
c/o Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington
P.O. Box 14596
Washington, DC 20044,

RUTH NASRULLAH
c/o Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington
P.O. Box 14596
Washington, DC 20044,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530,

TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
Acting U.S. Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530,

Defendants.


Case No. 1:26-cv-01352

CERTIFICATION

I, Eric V. Neff, Acting Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, hereby certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that the attached table is a true and accurate list of the documents that constitute the administrative record with respect to the above captioned action. The attached table lists all available documents comprising the administrative record in the actions under review in the above captioned actions.

I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 7th day of May 2026, in Washington, D.C.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eric V. Neff", written over a horizontal line.

Eric V. Neff

Acting Chief, Voting Section
Civil Rights Division

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(D.D.C.)

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20250818 State of Maine Final	CRT-0002759
Bellows from DOJ 20270724	CRT-0002762
State of Maine	CRT-0002763
State of Maryland	CRT-0002766
State of Maryland- L4.8.18.25	CRT-0002770
20250722 Galvin from DOJ	CRT-0002773
Commonwealth of Massachussets	CRT-0002774
20250814 Galvin from DOJ	CRT-0002777
State of Massachusetts Final	CRT-0002778
20250828 Galvin from DOJ	CRT-0002781
20250721 Benson from DOJ	CRT-0002782
State of Michigan	CRT-0002783
20250808 Benson from DOJ	CRT-0002787
State of Michigan	CRT-0002788
20250814 Benson from DOJ	CRT-0002790
20250822 Lillie from DOJ	CRT-0002793
20250902_1500 Hines from DOJ	CRT-0002795
20250903_0942 Hines from DOJ	CRT-0002799
20250903_1446 Hines from DOJ	CRT-0002803
20250911_1623 Hines from DOJ	CRT-0002808
2025.08.13 HAVA.CRA Letter to MN re Voter Reg List 8.13.2025	CRT-0002815
20250625 EM CRT to Simon	CRT-0002817
State of Minnesota	CRT-0002818
2026.01.02 MN Demand Letter 010226 (signed)	CRT-0002821
2026.04.17 CRA Letter to MN 4.17.26	CRT-0002823
DOJ-CRT_Registered Voter List Request Form	CRT-0002825

RE_ USA v_ Simon 25-CV-3671	CRT-0002827
VRLData Sharing Agreement to MN 2025.12.01	CRT-0002828
20250725 EM CRT to Watson	CRT-0002837
State of Mississippi	CRT-0002838
20251201 CRT to MS MOU to sign and request for VOT list	CRT-0002841
Full Voter Roll List MOU	CRT-0002842
20250814 State of Mississippi Final	CRT-0002843
20250821 [EXTERNAL] Mississippi Secretary of State response to request for records	CRT-0002846
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-MS	CRT-0002847
RE_ Full Voter Roll List MOU	CRT-0002856
20250908 Hoskins from DOJ	CRT-0002858
20260303 Hoskins from DOJ	CRT-0002861
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-MO 3.9.26	CRT-0002862
20251202 CRT to State_ Full Voter Roll List with MOU	CRT-0002871
20250814 State of Montana Final	CRT-0002872
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-MT	CRT-0002875
20251209 CRT to State_ RE_ Full Voter Roll List with MOU	CRT-0002884
20251210 CRT to State_ RE_ 2 Full Voter Roll List with MOU	CRT-0002886
20251218 CRT to State_ Re_ Follow up 12.18	CRT-0002888
Full Voter Roll List with MOU	CRT-0002890
9.8.2025 Letter to Nebraska Final	CRT-0002891
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-NE	CRT-0002894

RE_ Full Voter Roll List with MOU	CRT-0002903
20250814 Aguilar from DOJ	CRT-0002905
State of New Hampshire	CRT-0002908
20250818 State of New Hampshire Final	CRT-0002911
VRLData Sharing Agreement (FINAL)	CRT-0002913
20250715 EM CRT to Way	CRT-0002922
State of New Jersey	CRT-0002923
Complete Voter Registration List with All Fields	CRT-0002926
State of New Jersey Final	CRT-0002927
Follow Up email	CRT-0002930
RE_ Follow Up email	CRT-0002932
RE_ MOU to protect voter information	CRT-0002934
VRLData Sharing Agreement (FINAL)	CRT-0002936
20250814 Toulouse Oliver from DOJ	CRT-0002945
20250908 Toulouse Oliver from DOJ	CRT-0002948
20250630 CRT to NYSBOE	CRT-0002951
State of New York	CRT-0002952
20250814 State of New York Final	CRT-0002955
12.10.2025 Request for Complete North Carolina's Voter Registration List with All Fields	CRT-0002958
CRA Letter to NC 12.10.25	CRT-0002959
VRLData Sharing Agreement MOU	CRT-0002962
12.19.2025 Voter Roll Request Follow up	CRT-0002971
2.5.2026 Voter records request - FRE 408 Protected Communication	CRT-0002972
VRLData Sharing Agreement (FINAL)	CRT-0002973
20250806 LaRose from DOJ	CRT-0002982

State of Ohio	CRT-0002983
20250814 LaRose from DOJ	CRT-0002986
CRA Letter to OK 12.10.25	CRT-0002989
Request for Oklahoma's Complete Voter Registration List with All Fields	CRT-0002992
CRA Letter to OK 12.10.25	CRT-0002993
VRLData Sharing Agreement MOU	CRT-0002996
Voter Roll Request Follow Up	CRT-0003005
Request for Oklahoma's Complete Voter Registration List with All Fields	CRT-0003006
CRA Letter to OK 12.10.25	CRT-0003007
VRLData Sharing Agreement MOU	CRT-0003010
RE_ Following Up on Voter Roll Request	CRT-0003019
Following Up on Voter Roll Request	CRT-0003021
CRA Letter to OK 12.10.25	CRT-0003022
CRA Letter to OK 12.10.25	CRT-0003025
VRLData Sharing Agreement MOU	CRT-0003028
20250602 Ltr DOJ to Page Orange County emailed copy_	CRT-0003037
20250616 Ltr Page to DOJ_ recvd by mail	CRT-0003039
20250617 DRAFT Letter to Orange County CA signed	CRT-0003045
FW_ Letter from the Department of Justice	CRT-0003047
Orange County emailed copy_	CRT-0003048
20250716 Read from DOJ	CRT-0003050
State of Oregon	CRT-0003051
20250814 Read from DOJ	CRT-0003054
20250623 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania	CRT-0003057
20250623 EM DOJ to Schmidt	CRT-0003060

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania	CRT-0003061
20250814 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Final	CRT-0003064
EM Schmidt from DOJ 20250804	CRT-0003067
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania	CRT-0003068
9.8.2025 Letter to Rhode Island Final	CRT-0003071
20250806 State of South Carolina	CRT-0003074
20250814 State of South Carolina Final	CRT-0003076
Knapp from DOJ 20250806	CRT-0003079
State of South Carolina	CRT-0003080
RE_ USDOJ MOU_ Today's Meeting	CRT-0003082
NY BOE Memorandum Motion to Compel	CRT-0003087
Texas SOS Letter to DOJ Civil Rights Division 12.23.25	CRT-0003125
Ohio Response to DOJ	CRT-0003126
Letter to DOJ (12.17.2025)	CRT-0003129
20250814 State of South Dakota Final	CRT-0003130
20250807 Hargett from DOJ	CRT-0003133
State of Tennessee	CRT-0003134
20250814 Hargett from DOJ	CRT-0003137
20250807 Nelson from DOJ	CRT-0003140
State of Texas	CRT-0003141
20250814 Nelson from DOJ	CRT-0003144
Bitter from DOJ 20251209	CRT-0003147
EXECUTED MOU DOJ-TX 12.9.25	CRT-0003149
20250715 Henderson from DOJ	CRT-0003158
State of Utah	CRT-0003159
20250801 Cowley from DOJ	CRT-0003162
JEFS_ External Users Agreement	CRT-0003164

20251202 Cowley from DOJ	CRT-0003171
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-UT	CRT-0003172
20250829 Owsley to DOJ	CRT-0003181
20250814 Henderson from DOJ	CRT-0003184
9.8.2025 Letter to Vermont Final	CRT-0003187
20250715 Letter to Commonwealth of Virginia	CRT-0003190
20250814 Commonwealth of Virginia Final	CRT-0003193
9.8.2025 Letter to Washington Final	CRT-0003196
Follow Up	CRT-0003199
9.8.2025 Letter to West Virginia Final	CRT-0003200
VRLData Sharing Agreement MOU	CRT-0003203
RE_ Follow Up	CRT-0003212
Request for West Virginia's VRL	CRT-0003213
9.8.2025 Letter to West Virginia Final	CRT-0003214
VRLData Sharing Agreement MOU	CRT-0003217
20250604 CRT to WEC	CRT-0003226
20250617 CRT to WEC	CRT-0003229
20251202 Demand for Full Voter Roll from DOJ CRT	CRT-0003231
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-WI	CRT-0003232
DOJ Seal	CRT-0003241
Demand for Full Voter Roll from DOJ CRT	CRT-0003242
VRLData Sharing Agreement DOJ-WI	CRT-0003243
20250821 New Jersey to DOJ	CRT-0003252



U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. PARTIES & POINTS OF CONTACT.

Requester

Federal Agency Name: Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

VRL/Data User:

Title:

Address:

Phone:

VRL/Data Provider

State Agency Name: Alaska Division of Elections

Custodian: Carol Beecher

Title: Director

Address: PO Box 110017, Juneau AK 99811

Phone: (907) 465-4611

The parties to this Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU" or "Agreement") are the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division ("Justice Department" or "Department"), and the State of Alaska ("Alaska").

II. AUTHORITY.

By this Agreement, Alaska has agreed to, and will, provide an electronic copy of your state's complete statewide Voter Registration List ("VRL" or "VRL/Data") to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (at times referred to as the "Department"). The VRL/Data must include, among other fields of data, the voter registrant's full name, date of birth, residential address, his or her state driver's license number or the last four digits of the registrant's

social security number as required under the HAVA to register individuals for federal elections.
See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5)(A).

The authorities by which this information is requested by the Department of Justice are:

- National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20501, *et seq.*
- Attorney General’s authority under Section 11 of the NVRA to bring enforcement actions. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 20501(a).
- Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*
- Attorney General’s authority to enforce the Help America Vote Act under 53 U.S.C. § 21111.
- Attorney General authority to request records pursuant to Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (“CRA”), codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20701, *et seq.*
- The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended.

III. PURPOSE.

A VRL is a Voter Registration List pursuant to the NVRA and HAVA, commonly referred to as “voter roll,” compiled by a state – often from information submitted by counties – containing a list of all the state’s *eligible* voters. Regardless of the basis for ineligibility, ineligible voters do not appear on a state’s VRL when proper list maintenance is performed by states. The Justice Department is requesting your state’s VRL to test, analyze, and assess states’ VRLs for proper list maintenance and compliance with federal law. In the event the Justice Department’s analysis of a VRL results in list maintenance issues, insufficiency, inadequacy, anomalies, or concerns, the Justice Department will notify your state’s point of contact of the issues to assist your state with curing.

The purpose of this MOU is to establish the parties' understanding as to the security protections for data transfer and data access by the Department of Justice of the electronic copy of the statewide voter registration list, including all fields requested by the Department of Justice.

IV. TIMING OF AGREEMENT – TIME IS OF ESSENCE.

Although the Justice Department is under no such obligation as a matter of law, because this Agreement is proposed, made, and to be entered into at your state's request as part of your state's transmission of its VRL to the Justice Department, this Agreement is to be fully executed within seven (7) days of the Justice Department presenting this Agreement to you. Both parties agree that no part of this Agreement or execution is intended to, or will, cause delay of the transmission of your state's VRL to the Justice Department for analysis.

V. TIMING OF VRL/DATA TRANSFER.

You agree to transfer an electronic copy of your state's complete statewide VRL/Data to the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice as described in Section III of this Agreement no later than five (5) business days from the execution of this Agreement, which is counted from the last day of the last signatory.

VI. METHOD OF VRL/DATA ACCESS OR TRANSFER.

The VRL will be submitted by your state via the Department of Justice's secure file-sharing system, i.e., Justice Enterprise File Sharing (JEFS"). A separate application to use JEFS must be completed and submitted by your state through the Civil Rights Help Desk. JEFS implements strict access controls to ensure that each user can only access their own files. All files and folders are tied to a specific user, and each user has defined permissions that govern how they may interact with those files (e.g., read, write, or read-only).

Whenever a user attempts to access a file or folder, JEFS validates the request against the assigned permissions to confirm that the user is explicitly authorized. This process guarantees that users can only access files and folders only where they have permission. Users are also limited to the authorized type of interaction with each file or folder. Within the Department of Justice, access to JEFS is restricted to specific roles: Litigation Support, IT staff, and Civil Rights Division staff.

VII. LOCATION OF DATA AND CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

The parties mutually agree that the Civil Rights Division (also “Department”) will be designated as “Custodian” of the file(s) and will be responsible for the observance of all conditions for use and for establishment and maintenance of security agreements as specified in this agreement to prevent unauthorized use. The information that the Department is collecting will be maintained consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The full list of routine uses for this collection of information can be found in the Systems of Record Notice (“SORN”) titled, JUSTICE/CRT – 001, “Central Civil Rights Division Index File and Associated Records,” 68 Fed. Reg. 47610-01, 611 (August 11, 2003); 70 Fed. Reg. 43904-01 (July 29, 2005); and 82 Fed. Reg. 24147-01 (May 25, 2017). It should be noted that the statutes cited for routine use include NVRA, HAVA, and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, and the Justice Department is making our request pursuant to those statutes. The records in the system of records are kept under the authority of 44 U.S.C. § 3101 and in the ordinary course of fulfilling the responsibility assigned to the Civil Rights Division under the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.50, 0.51.

VRL/Data storage is similar to the restricted access provided on JEFS and complies with the SORN: Information in computer form is safeguarded and protected in accordance with applicable Department security regulations for systems of records. Only a limited number of staff members who are assigned a specific identification code will be able to use the computer to access

the stored information. However, a section may decide to allow its employees access to the system in order to perform their official duties.

All systems storing the VRL data will comply with all security requirements applicable to Justice Department systems, including but not limited to all Executive Branch system security requirements (e.g., requirements imposed by the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST]), Department of Justice IT Security Standards, and Department of Justice Order 2640.2F.

VIII. NVRA/HAVA COMPLIANT VOTER REGISTRATION LIST.

After analysis and assessment of your state's VRL, the Justice Department will securely notify you or your state of any voter list maintenance issues, insufficiencies, inadequacies, deficiencies, anomalies, or concerns, the Justice Department found when testing, assessing, and analyzing your state's VRL for NVRA and HAVA compliance, i.e., that your state's VRL only includes eligible voters.

You agree therefore that within forty-five (45) days of receiving that notice from the Justice Department of any issues, insufficiencies, inadequacies, deficiencies, anomalies, or concerns, your state will clean its VRL/Data by removing ineligible voters and resubmit the updated VRL/Data to the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department to verify proper list maintenance has occurred by your state pursuant to the NVRA and HAVA.

IX. CONFIDENTIALITY & DEPARTMENT SAFEGUARDS.

Any member of the Justice Department in possession of a VRL/Data will employ reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards designed to protect the security and confidentiality of such data. Compliance with these safeguards will include secure user authentication protocols deploying either: (i) Two-Factor Authentication ("2FA"), which requires users to go through two layers of security before access is granted to the system; or (ii) the

assignment of unique user identifications to each person with computer access plus unique complex passwords, which are not vendor supplied default passwords.

The Department will activate audit logging for the records, files, and data containing the state's VRL/Data in order to identify abnormal use, as well as to track access control, on computers, servers and/or Devices containing the VRL/Data.

For all devices storing records, files, and data containing the VRL/Data: there is (i) up-to-date versions of system security agent software that includes endpoint protection and malware protection and reasonably up-to-date patches and virus definitions, or a version of such software that can still be supported with up-to-date patches and virus definitions, and is set to receive the most current security updates on a regular basis; and (ii) up-to-date operating system security patches designed to maintain the integrity of the personal information.

For all devices storing records, files, and data containing the VRL/Data: there is (i) controlled and locked physical access for the Device; and (ii) the prohibition of the connection of the Device to public or insecure home networks.

There will be no copying of records, files, or data containing the VRL/Data to unencrypted USB drives, CDs, or external storage. In addition, the use of devices outside of moving the records, files, or data to the final stored device location shall be limited.

Any notes, lists, memoranda, indices, compilations prepared or based on an examination of VRL/Data or any other form of information (including electronic forms), that quote from, paraphrase, copy, or disclose the VRL/Data with such specificity that the VRL/Data can be identified, or by reasonable logical extension can be identified will not be shared by the Department. Any summary results, however, may be shared by the Department.

In addition to the Department's enforcement efforts, the Justice Department may use the information you provide for certain routine, or pre-litigation or litigation purposes including:

present VRL/Data to a court, magistrate, or administrative tribunal; a contractor with the Department of Justice who needs access to the VRL/Data information in order to perform duties related to the Department's list maintenance verification procedures. Recipients of information shall be required to comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).

X. LOSS OR BREACH OF DATA.

If a receiving party discovers any loss of VRL/Data, or a breach of security, including any actual or suspected unauthorized access, relating to VRL/Data, the receiving party shall, at its own expense immediately provide written notice to the producing party of such breach; investigate and make reasonable and timely efforts to remediate the effects of the breach, and provide the producing party with assurances reasonably satisfactory to the producing party that such breach shall not recur; and provide sufficient information about the breach that the producing party can reasonably ascertain the size and scope of the breach. The receiving party agrees to cooperate with the producing party or law enforcement in investigating any such security incident. In any event, the receiving party shall promptly take all necessary and appropriate corrective action to terminate unauthorized access.

XI. DESTRUCTION OF DATA.

The Department will destroy all VRL/Data associated with actual records as soon as the purposes of the list maintenance project have been accomplished and the time required for records retention pursuant to applicable law has passed. When the project is complete and such retention requirements by law expires, the Justice Department will:

1. Destroy all hard copies containing confidential data (e.g., shredding);
2. Archive and store electronic data containing confidential information offline in a secure location; and

3. All other data will be erased or maintained in a secured area.

XII. OTHER PROVISIONS.

- A. **Conflicts.** This MOU constitutes the full MOU on this subject between the Department and your state. Any inconsistency or conflict between or among the provisions of this MOU, will be resolved in the following order of precedence: (1) this MOU and (2) other documents incorporated by reference in this MOU (e.g., transaction charges).
- B. **Severability.** Nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with current law or regulation or the directives of Department, or the your state. If a term of this MOU is inconsistent with such authority, then that term shall be invalid but, to the extent allowable, the remaining terms and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect.
- C. **Assignment.** Your state may not assign this MOU, nor may it assign any of its rights or obligations under this MOU. To the extent allowable by law, this MOU shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any successors to the Justice Department and your state without restriction.
- D. **Waiver.** No waiver by either party of any breach of any provision of this MOU shall constitute a waiver of any other breach. Failure of either party to enforce at any time, or from time to time, any provision of this MOU shall not be construed to be a waiver thereof.
- E. **Compliance with Other Laws.** Nothing in this MOU is intended or should be construed to limit or affect the duties, responsibilities, and rights of the User Agency under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 *et seq.*, as amended; the Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20901 *et seq.*, as amended; the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 *et seq.*, as amended; and the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 *et seq.*, as amended.
- F. **Confidentiality of MOU.** To the extent allowed by applicable law, this MOU, its contents, and the drafts and communications leading up to the execution of this MOU are deemed

by the parties as "confidential." Any disclosures therefore could be made, if at all, pursuant to applicable laws or court orders requiring such disclosures.

SIGNATURES

VRL/Data Provider

State Agency Name: Alaska Division of Elections

Signature:  Date of Execution: 12/19/2025

Authorized Signatory Name Printed: Carol Beecher

Title: Director

Requester

Federal Agency Name: Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Signature:  Date of Execution: 12/22/2025

Authorized Signatory Name Printed: Harmeet K. Dhillon

Title: Assistant Attorney General

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

WHEREAS, Plaintiff, the United States of America (“Plaintiff”), filed the Complaint in the action styled *United States of America v. Paul Ziriaux*, No. 5:26-cv-00361 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2026), pursuant to Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20706 (“CRA”), against Defendant, Paul Ziriaux, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board (“Defendant”).

WHEREAS, the CRA provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-two months from the date of [a federal election] all records and papers which come into his possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election....” 52 U.S.C. § 20701.

WHEREAS, pursuant to the CRA, the Attorney General or her representative may “demand in writing” such records from the “person having custody, possession, or control” of those records. 52 U.S.C. § 20703.

WHEREAS, Defendant is the chief election officer for the State of Oklahoma, and retains custody of election records that fall within the scope of the CRA for the State of Oklahoma, including Oklahoma’s computerized statewide voter registration list (“SVRL”).

WHEREAS, a representative of the Attorney General made a demand in writing under the CRA for a current copy of Oklahoma's SVRL with all fields—including identifiers required by the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), such as the last four digits of social security numbers or full driver's license numbers—in order to ascertain Oklahoma's compliance with HAVA and the National Voter Registration Act ("NVRA").

WHEREAS, the requested SVRL was not produced in the form requested, which resulted in the filing of the foregoing styled action pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20705. The Secretary had instead offered to provide the SVRL in redacted form, without the driver's license and social security numbers.

WHEREAS, Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively, the "Parties") desire to resolve this matter without the need for further litigation. Accordingly, they have engaged in good faith negotiations and have agreed to the following terms of this Settlement Agreement, without admitting or denying any wrongdoing, as an appropriate resolution to all claims alleged in this litigation:

1. Defendant shall provide to the Attorney General or her representative the current (as of the date of extraction for uploading) electronic copy of Oklahoma's computerized SVRL, with all fields, including each registrant's full name, date of birth, residential address, and either their full state driver's license number, the last four digits of their Social Security number, or HAVA unique identifier, as well as the

date of extraction of the SVRL, as required by 52 U.S.C. § 21083, as soon as practicable but no later than five (5) business days from the execution of this Settlement Agreement. As Oklahoma's chief election official, Defendant has sole and unencumbered authority to complete performance for this Settlement Agreement. The SVRL shall be limited to data on file in the computerized voter registration system as of the date of extraction. Nothing in this settlement shall be construed as prohibiting Plaintiff from making another demand or a subsequent demand for the SVRL pursuant to CRA election record retention requirements. Nothing in this Settlement Agreement requires the creation or compilation of data beyond what is contained in the extracted SVRL, other than noting the date of extraction for the purposes of the transmittal. Defendant shall transmit the SVRL via the U.S. Department of Justice's secure file-sharing system, Justice Enterprise File Sharing ("JEFS"), or via the Department's secure, encrypted email system. Nothing in this Settlement Agreement shall be construed as prohibiting Defendant or the State of Oklahoma from additionally entering into a memorandum of understanding and user agreement with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to access the Systemic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE") program. Nor shall anything in this Settlement Agreement prohibit Defendant or the State of Oklahoma from additionally uploading the SVRL directly to SAVE.

2. The Civil Rights Division shall use the copy of the SVRL information solely to assess the State's compliance with NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507, the HAVA, 52 U.S.C. § 21083, other purposes outlined in 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.50-.51, and for no other purpose.

3. Upon execution of this Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff shall dismiss the above-referenced legal action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All Parties shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs associated with this action.

4. The Parties represent they have the authority to enter into this Settlement Agreement. The terms of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon the Parties and their successors, and the Parties warrant and represent that the persons signing this Settlement Agreement possess full authority to bind the Parties and their successors to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. This Settlement Agreement may be terminated with the written consent of the Parties. This Agreement shall expire on December 31, 2027, unless otherwise extended by mutual consent or court order.

5. The Civil Rights Division will comply with all laws, including but not limited to the Privacy Act of 1974 in the handling and protection of the SVRL that is produced by Defendant.

6. This Settlement Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and commitments of the Parties. Any modifications to this Settlement Agreement must be mutually agreed upon and memorialized in a writing signed by all Parties.

7. If any provision of this Settlement Agreement is found to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, only the specific provision in question shall be affected and the other provisions shall remain in full force and effect.

8. This Settlement Agreement may be executed in separate counterparts, which may be in original or electronic image copy (facsimile, pdf, etc.).

9. The Parties waive any right to contest the validity of the terms of this Settlement Agreement. Either party may bring an action to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, or move for such enforcement in the action styled *United States of America v. Paul Ziriak*, No. 5:26-cv-00361, to the extent permitted by law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

10. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a waiver of any rights, claims, or remedies available to either party, and failure to enforce any provision shall not constitute a waiver of that or any other provision.

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HARMEET K. DHILLON
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division


ROBERT J. KEENAN
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division



ERIC V. NEFF
Acting Chief, Voting Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice

FOR DEFENDANT PAUL ZIRIAX:

PAUL ZIRIAX
Secretary of Oklahoma State Election Board



GENTNER DRUMMOND
Oklahoma Attorney General



GARRY M. GASKINS, II
Oklahoma Solicitor General

April 28, 2026

The Honorable Harmeet K. Dhillon
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

RE: Memorandum of Understanding Between the S.C. State Election
Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice

Dear Assistant Attorney General Dhillon:

On behalf of the South Carolina State Election Commission (“SEC”), I am hereby transmitting the enclosed countersigned, fully executed copy of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between the SEC and the United States Department of Justice (“Department”) concerning the SEC’s voter registration list and certain associated data (“VRL/Data”). At today’s meeting, the SEC authorized the Executive Director to enter into this agreement and to execute the MOU pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 7-5-186(C), which expressly authorizes the SEC to enter into information- and data-sharing agreements for purposes of voter registration list maintenance.

I want to express the SEC’s sincere appreciation for the professional and constructive dialogue with DOJ throughout this process, and in particular for DOJ’s willingness to incorporate several clarifications or considerations requested by the SEC. By way of example, the SEC particularly appreciates the following refinements reflected in the final MOU:

- Providing for transmission of the voter registration list and associated data through DOJ’s encrypted Justice Enterprise File Sharing system, with the requested last four digits of registrants’ Social Security Numbers transmitted in hashed form using a mutually agreed cryptographic method—an approach consistent with that used by the Electronic Registration Information Center (“ERIC”) and other States. We appreciate DOJ’s recognition that this approach materially reduces the risk associated with transmitting sensitive personal identifying information while preserving DOJ’s ability to perform meaningful list-maintenance review.
- Clarifying, in Section VIII, that the SEC will review the relevant data and remove any ineligible voters “as identified by [DOJ] and confirmed by the SEC.” The SEC appreciates DOJ’s willingness to adopt language that accurately reflects the SEC’s independent role and statutory responsibility in making eligibility determinations.
- Recognizing, also in Section VIII, that the section is not intended to prevent the SEC from complying with any federal or state law that may require notice to be provided to registrants before they are removed from the voter rolls.

COMMISSIONERS

ROBERT BOLCHOZ
Chairman

JOANNE DAY

CLIFFORD J. EDLER

SCOTT MOSELEY

ANGELA STRINGER

Conway Belangia
Executive Director

1122 Lady Street
Suite 500
Columbia, SC 29201

P.O. Box 5987
Columbia, SC 29250

803.734.9060
Fax: 803.734.9366
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To be eligible to register, you must be:
A U.S. Citizen | S.C. Resident | 18 years or older

- Specifying the MOU's effective date, duration, and termination, while also permitting either party to terminate the MOU, with or without cause, upon ninety (90) days' advance written notice.


From the SEC's perspective, the resulting MOU is an apolitical agreement that responsibly balances DOJ's legitimate governmental interests under the National Voter Registration Act ("NVRA") and the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") with the SEC's statutory obligations under South Carolina law and its duty to safeguard, simultaneously, the integrity of South Carolina's elections and the personal information of South Carolina's registered voters.

Consistent with the position the SEC has communicated to DOJ throughout this process, please be advised that, contemporaneously with execution of the MOU, the SEC intends to release publicly a copy of the MOU. The SEC believes that doing so aligns with the revised confidentiality language and serves the public's legitimate interest in transparency regarding intergovernmental agreements concerning voter information. Indeed, the SEC has publicly disclosed similar data-sharing agreements with other States.

The SEC remains committed to maintaining the accuracy, security, and integrity of South Carolina's voter rolls in compliance with applicable South Carolina law. To these ends, the SEC looks forward to working cooperatively with DOJ under the terms of the MOU to ensure every eligible citizen has the opportunity to register to vote and participate in fair and impartial elections with the assurance that every vote will count.

Should you or your team have any questions regarding this letter, the executed MOU, or the SEC's implementation of the same, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully,



Conway Belangia
Executive Director
South Carolina State Election Commission

Enclosures

cc w/ enc: Eric Neff, Esquire
Acting Chief, Voting Section
Civil Rights Division
United States Department of Justice

**RESOLUTION OF THE
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION
Resolution No. 2026-01-A**

**A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR TO EXECUTE A
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PURSUANT TO S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-186(C) AND TO TAKE ALL ACTIONS
NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME**

WHEREAS, the South Carolina State Election Commission (“Commission”) is the state agency responsible for establishing standardized processes for the administration of elections and voter registration, ensuring that the Commission and the county boards of voter registration and elections comply with applicable state and federal election law, maintaining a statewide voter registration database, and conducting, by and through the Commission’s Executive Director, an annual general registration list maintenance program to maintain accurate voter registration records in the statewide voter registration system; and

WHEREAS, S.C. Code Ann. § 7-5-186(C) authorizes the Commission to enter into agreements with other States, groups of States, governmental entities, persons, or organizations, as the Commission considers necessary, related to maintaining the statewide voter registration database or engaging in legitimate governmental purposes related to the maintenance of the statewide voter registration database; and

WHEREAS, the United States Department of Justice (“Department”), through its Civil Rights Division, has requested access to South Carolina’s voter registration list and certain associated data pursuant to the Department’s authority and enforcement responsibilities under the National Voter Registration Act, the Help America Vote Act, Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, and the Privacy Act of 1974; and


WHEREAS, the Commission has received a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) from the Department, dated April 23, 2026, and executed by Acting Chief of the Voting Section of the Department’s Civil Rights Division, setting forth the terms and conditions under which certain voter registration data will be transmitted, used, safeguarded, and returned or destroyed, and incorporating certain provisions and protections the Commission considers necessary and appropriate, to include providing for the secure transmission of data and cryptographic hashing of personal identifying information, acknowledging potentially applicable notice requirements under state or federal law, recognizing the Commission’s authority and responsibility with respect to maintaining the statewide voter registration database, and clarifying terms related to the effective date, duration, and termination of the parties’ obligations; and

WHEREAS, the Commission has reviewed the MOU, a copy of which is attached hereto, and finds that execution of the MOU is consistent with the Commission’s statutory authority under South Carolina law, including S.C. Code Ann. § 7-5-186(C), and is in the public interest.


NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION AS FOLLOWS:

1. The Commission authorizes and directs the Executive Director, on behalf of the Commission, to execute the MOU with the Department in substantially the form reviewed by the Commission, with such non-substantive technical or conforming changes as the Executive Director, in consultation with the Chairman, deems necessary or appropriate.
2. The Executive Director is further authorized to transmit the executed MOU, together with any appropriate correspondence, to the Department.
3. The Executive Director is further authorized to take any and all actions necessary and appropriate to implement the MOU and to perform the Commission's obligations thereunder, in each case consistent with applicable state and federal law.
4. The Commission authorizes the contemporaneous public release of the executed MOU.
5. This Resolution shall take effect immediately upon its adoption by the Commission.

ADOPTED this 28th day of April, 2026, by the South Carolina State Election Commission, at its duly noticed, called, and convened meeting in Columbia, South Carolina.


Robert Bolchoz, Chairman
South Carolina State Election Commission

ATTEST:


Conway Belangia, Executive Director
South Carolina State Election Commission



U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. PARTIES & POINTS OF CONTACT

Requester

Federal Agency Name: Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

VRL/Data User: Chris Hayes

Title: IT Specialist

Address: 150 M St. NE, Ste. 9.926, Washington DC 20002

Phone: 202-532-3879

VRL/Data Provider

State Agency Name: South Carolina State Election Commission

Custodian: Conway Belangia

Title: Executive Director

Address: 1122 Lady St, Suite 500, Columbia, SC 29201

Phone: (803) 734-9060

The parties to this Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU" or "Agreement") are the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division ("Justice Department" or "Department"), and the South Carolina State Election Commission ("SEC" or "the State").

II. AUTHORITY

By this Agreement, the SEC has agreed to, and will, provide an electronic copy of South Carolina's complete statewide Voter Registration List ("VRL" or "VRL/Data") to the Justice Department. The VRL/Data must include, among other fields of data, the voter registrant's full name, date of birth, residential address, his or her state driver's license number or the last four digits of the registrant's Social Security Number, as required by the Help America Vote Act of

2002 (“HAVA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*, for States to register individuals for federal elections. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5)(A).

The Justice Department is requesting this information pursuant to its authority under the following federal laws:

- Attorney General’s authority to request records pursuant to Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (“CRA”), codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20701, *et seq.*;
- National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20501, *et seq.*;
- Attorney General’s authority under Section 11 of the NVRA to bring enforcement actions. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 20510(a);
- Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*;
- Attorney General’s authority to enforce the Help America Vote Act under 53 U.S.C. § 21111; and
- The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended.

III. PURPOSE

A VRL is a statewide Voter Registration List pursuant to the NVRA and HAVA, commonly referred to as “voter roll,” compiled by a State – often from information submitted by counties – containing a list of all the State’s *eligible* voters. Regardless of the basis for ineligibility, ineligible voters should not be on a State’s VRL when proper list maintenance is performed by the State. The Justice Department is requesting South Carolina’s VRL to test, analyze, and assess the State’s VRL/Data for proper list maintenance and compliance with federal law. In the event the Justice Department’s analysis of the State’s VRL/Data identifies list maintenance issues, insufficiency, inadequacy, anomalies, or concerns, the Justice Department will notify the SEC’s point of contact (identified above) of the issues to assist the SEC with curing any identified and confirmed ineligible voters and other list maintenance issues.

The purpose of this MOU is to establish the parties' understanding as to the security protections for data transfer and data access by the Justice Department of the electronic copy of the State's VRL/Data, including all fields requested by the Justice Department.

IV. TIMING OF AGREEMENT – TIME IS OF ESSENCE

The parties agree that time is of the essence. Although the Justice Department is under no such obligation as a matter of law, because this Agreement is proposed, made, and entered into at the SEC's request as part of its transmission of South Carolina's VRL/Data to the Justice Department, this Agreement is to be fully executed by the SEC within seven (7) days of the Justice Department presenting this Agreement to the SEC. Both parties agree that no part of this Agreement or execution is intended to, or will, cause delay of the transmission of the State's VRL/Data to the Justice Department for analysis.

V. TIMING OF VRL/DATA TRANSFER

The SEC agrees to transfer an electronic copy of South Carolina's complete statewide VRL/Data to the Justice Department as described in Section III of this Agreement no later than five (5) business days from the Effective Date of this Agreement., as defined below.

VI. METHOD OF VRL/DATA ACCESS OR TRANSFER

The VRL/Data will be submitted by the SEC via the Justice Department's encrypted secure file-sharing system, i.e., Justice Enterprise File Sharing ("JEFS"), with the requested last four digits of a registrant's Social Security Number hashed using an agreed-upon algorithm or one-way cryptographic hashing software. A separate application to use JEFS must be completed and submitted by SEC staff through the Civil Rights Division's Help Desk. JEFS implements strict access controls to ensure that each user can only access their own files. All files and folders are tied to a specific user, and each user has defined permissions that govern how they may interact with those files (e.g., read, write, or read-only).

Whenever a user attempts to access a file or folder, JEFS validates the request against the assigned permissions to confirm that the user is explicitly authorized. This process guarantees that users can only access files and folders only where they have permission. Users are also limited to the authorized type of interaction with each file or folder. Within the Justice Department, access to JEFS is restricted to specific roles: Litigation Support, IT staff, and Civil Rights Division staff.

VII. LOCATION OF DATA AND CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The parties mutually agree that the Justice Department (specifically, the Civil Rights Division) will be designated as “Custodian” of the file(s) and will be responsible for the observance of all conditions for use and for establishment and maintenance of security agreements as specified in this Agreement to prevent unauthorized use. The information that the Justice Department is collecting will be maintained consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The full list of routine uses for this collection of information can be found in the Systems of Record Notice (“SORN”) titled, JUSTICE/CRT – 001, “Central Civil Rights Division Index File and Associated Records,” 68 Fed. Reg. 47610-01, 611 (August 11, 2003); 70 Fed. Reg. 43904-01 (July 29, 2005); and 82 Fed. Reg. 24147-01 (May 25, 2017). It should be noted that the statutes cited for routine use include NVRA, HAVA, and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, and the Justice Department is making our request pursuant to those statutes. The records in the system of records are kept under the authority of 44 U.S.C. § 3101 and in the ordinary course of fulfilling the responsibility assigned to the Civil Rights Division under the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.50, 0.51.

VRL/Data storage is similar to the restricted access provided on JEFS and complies with the SORN. Information in computer form is safeguarded and protected in accordance with applicable Justice Department security regulations for systems of records. Only a limited number of staff members who are assigned a specific identification code will be able to use the computer

to access the stored information. However, a section may decide to allow its employees access to the system in order to perform their official duties.

All systems storing the VRL/Data will comply with all security requirements applicable to Justice Department systems, including but not limited to all Executive Branch system security requirements (*e.g.*, requirements imposed by the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST]), Department of Justice IT Security Standards, and Department of Justice Order 2640.2F.

VIII. NVRA/HAVA COMPLIANT VOTER REGISTRATION LIST

After analysis and assessment of South Carolina's VRL/Data, the Justice Department will securely notify the SEC of any voter list maintenance issues, insufficiencies, inadequacies, deficiencies, anomalies, or concerns that the Justice Department found when testing, assessing, and analyzing the State's VRL/Data for NVRA and HAVA compliance, *i.e.*, that the State's VRL only includes eligible voters.

The SEC agrees that within forty-five (45) days of receiving notice from the Justice Department of any issues, insufficiencies, inadequacies, deficiencies, anomalies, or concerns with the State's VRL/Data, the SEC will review the State's VRL/Data and remove any ineligible voters, as identified by the Justice Department and confirmed by the SEC, and will resubmit the updated VRL/Data to the Justice Department to verify that the SEC has conducted proper list maintenance and brought South Carolina's VRL into compliance with the NVRA and HAVA. This section is not intended to prevent the SEC from complying with any federal or state law that may require notice to be provided to registrants before they are removed from voter rolls.

IX. CONFIDENTIALITY & DEPARTMENT SAFEGUARDS

Any member of the Justice Department in possession of a VRL/Data will employ reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards designed to protect the security and

confidentiality of such data. Compliance with these safeguards will include secure user authentication protocols deploying either: (i) Two-Factor Authentication (“2FA”), which requires users to go through two layers of security before access is granted to the system; or (ii) the assignment of unique user identifications to each person with computer access plus unique complex passwords, which are not vendor supplied default passwords.

The Justice Department will activate audit logging for the records, files, and data containing the State’s VRL/Data in order to identify abnormal use, as well as to track access control, on computers, servers and/or Devices containing the VRL/Data.

For all devices storing records, files, and data containing the VRL/Data: there is (i) up-to-date versions of system security agent software that includes endpoint protection and malware protection and reasonably up-to-date patches and virus definitions, or a version of such software that can still be supported with up-to-date patches and virus definitions, and is set to receive the most current security updates on a regular basis; and (ii) up-to-date operating system security patches designed to maintain the integrity of the personal information.

For all devices storing records, files, and data containing the VRL/Data: there is (i) controlled and locked physical access for the Device; and (ii) the prohibition of the connection of the Device to public or insecure home networks.

There will be no copying of records, files, or data containing the VRL/Data to unencrypted USB drives, CDs, or external storage. In addition, the use of devices outside of moving the records, files, or data to the final stored device location shall be limited.

Any notes, lists, memoranda, indices, compilations prepared or based on an examination of VRL/Data or any other form of information (including electronic forms), that quote from, paraphrase, copy, or disclose the VRL/Data with such specificity that the VRL/Data can be

identified, or by reasonable logical extension can be identified will not be shared by the Department. Any summary results, however, may be shared by the Department.

In addition to the Department's enforcement efforts, the Justice Department may use the information provided by the SEC for certain routine, or pre-litigation or litigation purposes, including presentation of VRL/Data to a court, magistrate, or administrative tribunal; or to a contractor with the Justice Department who needs access to the VRL/Data in order to perform duties related to the Department's list maintenance verification procedures. Recipients of such VRL/Data shall be required to comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).

X. LOSS OR BREACH OF DATA

If a receiving party discovers any loss of VRL/Data, or a breach of security, including any actual or suspected unauthorized access, relating to VRL/Data, the receiving party shall, at its own expense immediately provide written notice to the producing party of such breach; investigate and make reasonable and timely efforts to remediate the effects of the breach, and provide the producing party with assurances reasonably satisfactory to the producing party that such breach shall not recur; and provide sufficient information about the breach that the producing party can reasonably ascertain the size and scope of the breach. The receiving party agrees to cooperate with the producing party or law enforcement in investigating any such security incident. In any event, the receiving party shall promptly take all necessary and appropriate corrective action to terminate unauthorized access.

XI. DESTRUCTION OF DATA

The Department will destroy all VRL/Data associated with actual records as soon as the purposes of the list maintenance project have been accomplished and the time required for records

retention pursuant to applicable law has passed. When the project is complete and such retention requirements by law expires, the Justice Department will:

1. Destroy all hard copies containing confidential data (e.g., shredding);
2. Archive and store electronic data containing confidential information offline in a secure location; and
3. All other data will be erased or maintained in a secured area.

XII. OTHER PROVISIONS

A. Conflicts. This MOU constitutes the full agreement between the Justice Department and the SEC regarding the subjects addressed herein. Any inconsistency or conflict between or among the provisions of this MOU will be resolved in the following order of precedence: (1) this MOU and (2) other documents incorporated by reference in this MOU (e.g., transaction charges).

B. Severability. Nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with any current law or regulation or the directives of the Justice Department or the SEC. If any part of this MOU is held by a court to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid as contrary to law, the parties agree that, to the extent allowable, the remaining terms and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect.

C. Assignment. The SEC may not assign this MOU, nor may it assign any of its rights or obligations under this MOU. To the extent allowable by law, this MOU shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any successors to the Justice Department and the SEC without restriction.

D. Waiver. No waiver by either party of any breach of any provision of this MOU shall constitute a waiver of any other breach. Failure of either party to enforce at any time, or from time to time, any provision of this MOU shall not be construed to be a waiver thereof.

E. Compliance with Other Laws. Nothing in this MOU is intended or should be construed to limit or affect the duties, responsibilities, and rights of the Justice Department (i.e.,

the User Agency) under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 *et seq.*, as amended; the Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20901 *et seq.*, as amended; the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 *et seq.*, as amended; and the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 *et seq.*, as amended.


F. Confidentiality of MOU. To the extent allowed by applicable law, this MOU, its contents, and the drafts and communications leading up to the execution of this MOU are deemed by the parties as “confidential.” Any disclosures therefore may be made, if at all, pursuant to applicable laws or court orders requiring such disclosures.

G. Effective Date & Period of MOU. This MOU shall be effective immediately upon execution by the last signatory hereto (“Effective Date”), and it shall remain in effect until December 31, 2028, unless otherwise expressly stated herein or modified, amended, or extended by mutual written consent of the parties, or unless earlier terminated by either party upon 90 days advance written notice to the other party.

SIGNATURES

VRL/Data Provider

State Agency Name: South Carolina State Election Commission

Signature:  Date of Execution: 4/28/26

Name Printed: Conway Belangia

Title: Executive Director

Requester

Federal Agency Name: Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice

Signature:  Date of Execution: 4/23/26

Name Printed: Eric V. Neff

Title: Acting Chief, Voting Section



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

**BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
AND
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
REGARDING
PARTICIPATION IN THE SAVE PROGRAM FOR
VOTER REGISTRATION AND LIST MAINTENANCE OVERSIGHT**

I. PARTIES.

The parties to this Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) are the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS-USCIS), and the **U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division** (User Agency).

II. AUTHORITY.

The authorities governing this MOA include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, as amended.
- Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, as amended.
- Section 642 of Div. C, Title VI of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, as amended (8 U.S.C. §1373(a) and (c)).
- The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended.
- The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2014 (Pub. L. 113-283), as amended.
- National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 *et seq.*, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77, as amended.
- Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 303 *et seq.*, 116 Stat. 1666, as amended, including the additional criminal penalties listed under 52 U.S.C. § 21144 (a) & (b).

Additionally, the authorities governing this MOA that are specific to this User Agency's request to use SAVE, include but are not limited to the following:

- 18 U.S.C. §§ 601, 1015
- 52 U.S.C. §§ 10307, 10308, 20510, 20511, 20703, 20704, 21081, 21082, 21083, 21083a, and 21111.
- 28 CFR Ch. 1, Part 0 §§ 0.50 and Appendix to Subpart J of Part 0.

The full list of routine uses for Department of Justice records can be found in the System of Records Notice (“SORN”) titled, JUSTICE/CRT – 001, “Central Civil Rights Division Index File and Associated Records,” 68 Fed. Reg. 47610-01, 611 (Aug. 11, 2003); 70 Fed. Reg. 43904-01 (July 29, 2005); and 82 Fed. Reg. 24147-01 (May 25, 2017). The statutes cited for routine use in the SORN include the NVRA, HAVA, and the CRA. The records in the SORN are kept under the authority of 44 U.S.C. § 3101 and in the ordinary course of fulfilling the responsibility assigned to the Civil Rights Division under the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.50, 0.51.

The Department of Justice SORN provides that:

(1) In the event that a record in this system, either alone or in conjunction with other information, indicates a violation or potential violation of law— criminal, civil, or regulatory in nature— the relevant records may be referred to the appropriate Federal, State, local, foreign, or Tribal law enforcement authority or other appropriate agency charged with the responsibility for investigating or prosecuting such violation or charged with enforcing or implementing such law;

(2) In the course of the administration by CRT of a federally mandated program, or the investigation or litigation of a case or matter, a record may be disseminated to a Federal, State or local agency, or to an individual or organization, if there is reason to believe that such agency, individual or organization possesses information or has the expertise in an official or technical capacity to assist in the administration of such program or to analyze information relating to the investigation, trial or hearing and the dissemination is reasonably necessary to elicit such assistance, information or expert analysis, or to obtain the cooperation of a prospective witness or informant.

Central Civil Rights Division Index File and Associated Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 47610-01, 611 (Aug. 11, 2003).

The full list of routine uses for SAVE records can be found in the System of Records Notice (“SORN”) titled, “Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)-004 Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program (SAVE),” 90 Fed. Reg. 48948 (Oct. 31, 2025).

III. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this MOA is to facilitate information sharing between DHS-USCIS and the User Agency and establish the terms and conditions for the User Agency’s participation in SAVE to

verify the U.S. citizenship and immigration status information of registrants or registered voters on state voting rolls provided to User Agency in order to help ensure that state and local voting administration agencies within the United States are properly conducting **voter registration and voter list maintenance** as required by the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act, and to enforce all Federal laws related to voting to help ensure that only eligible voters remain on state voter registration lists and vote in Federal elections.¹

SAVE verifies User Agency-provided information against DHS-accessed records, including immigration, naturalization, and U.S. citizenship records using an immigration enumerator issued by DHS (immigration enumerator) or other government issued enumerator(s) permitted by SAVE. SAVE does not provide information regarding citizenship or immigration status at points of time other than at the time of the SAVE case response but does provide grant date information for naturalized and derived citizenship determinations and other immigration benefits, including lawful permanent resident status determinations. SAVE may only be able to verify acquired U.S. citizens in certain situations.²

SAVE will provide information to the User Agency by:

- 1) Initial response (initial verification) to an online inquiry by the User Agency; and
- 2) Additional verification procedures, where applicable.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. DHS-USCIS agrees to:

- (1) Provide to the User Agency, in a manner determined by DHS-USCIS, an immigration status and U.S. citizenship information verification process under SAVE;
- (2) Respond to properly submitted verification requests from the User Agency by providing the limited information noted in the **PURPOSE** section above, i.e., a verification case number and U.S. citizenship or immigration status, if any;
- (3) Process and respond to properly submitted additional verification requests³ from the User Agency or from associated state and local voting administrators. Response time to additional

¹ "Participation" in SAVE is as described in the DHS/USCIS/SAVE Privacy Impact Assessment - 006. See [Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements \(SAVE\) Program | Homeland Security \(dhs.gov\)](#).

² "Acquired citizenship" is defined as citizenship conveyed to children through the naturalization of parents or, under certain circumstances, at birth to foreign-born children of U.S. citizens, provided certain conditions are met. SAVE is only able to verify information that relates to information found in the databases accessed by the system. Accordingly, if the User Agency provides an immigration enumerator for an individual with acquired citizenship who has not applied for a Certificate of Citizenship with USCIS, the agency may not have that individual's citizenship information available in the databases accessed, and SAVE may not be able to confirm that individual's acquired citizenship.

³ "Additional verification" is as described in the DHS/USCIS/SAVE Privacy Impact Assessment - 006. See [Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements \(SAVE\) Program | Homeland Security \(dhs.gov\)](#).

verification requests may vary depending upon DHS-USCIS workload, available resources, and the registrant's or registered voter's specific circumstances;

(4) Provide to the User Agency operating instructions necessary for the User Agency to designate users within the purview of the User Agency;

(5) Provide to the User Agency SAVE point of contact information for questions or problems regarding the User Agency's participation in SAVE;

(6) Provide access to training and information regarding the laws, policies, and procedures that govern verifying, safeguarding, using, maintaining, and disclosing certain citizenship and immigration status information;

(7) Provide the User Agency access to additional verification processes, with requirements identified by SAVE;

B. User Agency agrees to:

(1) SAVE System Use.

(a) Provide the necessary information in the manner SAVE requires to respond to User Agency requests for verification of immigration status or U.S. citizenship information. The following information from the registrant or registered voter is required to create and submit a request for initial automated verification:

- First name and last name;
- Date of birth; and
- At least one of the following:
 - A DHS issued citizenship or immigration enumerator (for example, A-Number/USCIS Number, Certificate of Naturalization Number, Certificate of Citizenship Number, I-94 Number, Card Number / I-797 Receipt Number, or SEVIS ID); or
 - Other government issued enumerator permitted by SAVE.

SAVE may modify requirements for SAVE cases and will provide written notification (e.g., by e-mail or update to SAVE website) to User Agency of any changes. Only enumerators accepted in SAVE will be used for verification or additional verification.

Cases submitted for additional verification may require different enumerators than what the User Agency used to create the SAVE case and submit for initial verification. User Agency will only submit requests for additional verification using enumerators permitted by SAVE. Additional information obtained from the applicant's immigration or citizenship documentation may be required for additional verification. Scanned documents and other electronically submitted information may also be required for additional verification.

User Agency must institute additional verification when required by SAVE for any registrant or registered voter that does not verify as a U.S. citizen on initial verification, including in all cases where the User Agency receives any SAVE response other than that of U.S. citizen. If the User Agency does not request and receive an additional verification response or SAVE does not verify the registered voter as a U.S. citizen after conducting additional verification, the User Agency must contact the registrant or registered voter to obtain proof of U.S. citizenship, if necessary under the circumstances to fulfill the purpose of this MOA, and in accordance with the provisions of this MOA and Federal and state law, where applicable.

User Agency consents to electronic-only submission of all verification requests and additional information, including all information submitted for SAVE additional verification. SAVE will reject non-electronic (i.e., paper or fax) verification requests and information submissions.

(b) Ensure and report to DHS-USCIS that, before using SAVE and whenever subsequently required by DHS-USCIS (e.g., for SAVE system enhancements), all users performing verification procedures complete SAVE-required training, including: reviewing the SAVE Program Guide, taking the latest version of SAVE tutorial(s), and maintaining a working knowledge of requirements contained therein and in this MOA, as updated. These instructional materials will address the policies and procedures governing use of the program, including (1) program access, (2) verification procedures, (3) disclosure of information and privacy protections, (4) non-discrimination requirements, and (5) records correction procedures for registrants and registered voters;

(c) Ensure users are provided with, maintain, and use SAVE User IDs and access SAVE only while they need to perform verification procedures and promptly terminate user access when requested by SAVE, or if the user separates from the User Agency or otherwise no longer needs SAVE access;

(d) Ensure all users performing verification procedures only use SAVE with respect to verification of registrant or registered voter U.S. citizenship information or immigration status information for the specified purpose and comply with all other requirements contained in the SAVE Program Guide and other SAVE guidance, the SAVE tutorial, and this MOA, and updates to these requirements;

(e) Ensure that all Users performing verification procedures have contact information for SAVE and DHS-USCIS;

(f) Ensure all users perform any additional verification procedures SAVE requires and/or the registrant or registered voter requests after the User Agency initiates a verification request. User Agency cannot deny or have voter registration or continued voter registration denied based on a SAVE response where additional verification is required by SAVE or requested by the applicant but has not been completed;

(g) Use any information provided by DHS-USCIS under this MOA solely for lawful purposes, namely the purpose above of verifying U.S. citizenship information and immigration status

information of registrants and registered voters to help ensure that state and local voting administration agencies within the United States are properly conducting voter registration and voter roll list maintenance as required by the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act, and to enforce all Federal laws related to voting to help ensure that only eligible voters remain on state and local voter registration lists and vote in Federal elections, and limit use of such information in accordance with this and all other provisions of this MOA;

(h) Comply with the requirements of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (Pub. L. No. 113-283, as amended) and OMB guidance as applicable to access, electronic storage, transport of records between agencies, and the internal processing of records received by either agency under the terms of this MOA;

(i) Maintain physical, administrative, and technical safeguards for SAVE information and access methods to ensure that it is not used for any other purpose than described in this MOA and protect its confidentiality, including ensuring that it is not disclosed to any unauthorized person(s) without the prior written consent of DHS-USCIS;⁴

(j) Comply with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, as amended, and other applicable laws, regulations, and policies, including but not limited to all OMB and DHS privacy guidance, in conducting verification procedures pursuant to this MOA, and in safeguarding, maintaining, and disclosing any data provided or received pursuant to the MOA. Information shared as a result of this MOA shall be considered DHS-USCIS information. Responses to third party requests for such information should be consistent with federal law and DHS policy, including but not limited to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552;

(k) Comply with federal laws prohibiting discrimination against registrants or registered voters and discriminatory use of SAVE based upon the national origin, color, race, sex, religion, age, or disability of the registrant or registered voter, including but not limited to the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq., as amended; the Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20901, as amended; the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq., as amended; and the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., as amended. In accordance with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and related agency implementing regulations, User Agency will provide reasonable modifications for individuals with disabilities to ensure effective communication;

(l) Provide or cause to be provided to all registrants or registered voters who are not verified as U.S. citizens based solely or in part on the SAVE response with the opportunity to use the User Agency's or the state or local agency's existing process to appeal the denial and to contact DHS-USCIS to correct their immigration records prior to a final decision, if necessary. (Information for how to contact DHS to correct immigration records is available in the SAVE Records Fast

⁴ Each registrant or registered voter seeking access to information regarding himself/herself may do so by submitting a written signed request to DHS-USCIS. Instructions for submitting such requests may be found on the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act page of www.uscis.gov.

Facts for Benefit Applicants on the SAVE and USCIS websites.) Registrants and registered voters may need to correct their records with other government agencies depending on the error;

(m) Provide or cause to be provided to all individuals with respect to whom User Agency or another agency intends to deny registration or proceed with any removal from a voter roll or other action removing or limiting the right to vote, or with civil or criminal enforcement action, because or based in whole or in part upon any information received pursuant to this MOA, with any right to notice and hearing or other due process available under applicable law;

(n) Refrain from using SAVE, or assisting any person or entity, to comply with the employment eligibility verification requirements of section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.

(2) Account Compliance.

(a) Provide DHS-USCIS with the current e-mail, U.S. postal service address, physical address, name, and telephone number of the User Agency authorized representative for any notifications, questions or problems that may arise in connection with the User Agency's participation in SAVE and with notification of changes in the use of SAVE by the User Agency;

(b) Notify DHS-USCIS immediately whenever there is reason to believe a violation of this MOA has occurred;

(c) Notify DHS-USCIS immediately whenever there is reason to believe a breach of personally identifiable information has occurred as a result of User Agency action or inaction pursuant to OMB Memorandum M-17-12, "Preparing for and Responding to a Breach of Personally Identifiable Information" or successor guidance;

(d) Allow DHS-USCIS to monitor and review all records and documents related to the use, abuse, misuse, fraudulent use or improper use of SAVE by the User Agency, including, but not limited to original registrant or registered voter consent documents required by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a or other applicable authority;

(e) Allow DHS-USCIS to conduct desk audits and/or site visits to review User Agency's compliance with this MOA and all other SAVE-related policies, procedures, guidance and laws applicable to conducting verification and safeguarding, maintaining, and disclosing any data provided or received pursuant to this MOA;

(f) Allow DHS-USCIS to perform audits of User Agency's user IDs use and access, SAVE Training Records, SAVE financial records, SAVE biographical information, system profiles and usage patterns and other relevant data;

(g) Allow DHS-USCIS to interview any and all User Agency SAVE system users and any and all contact persons or other personnel within the User Agency regarding any and all questions or problems which may arise in connection with the User Agency's participation in SAVE;

(h) Allow DHS-USCIS to monitor system access and usage and to assist SAVE users as necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of this MOA and SAVE requirements by its authorized agents or designees; and

(i) Take corrective measures in a timely manner to address all lawful requirements and recommendations on every written finding including, but not limited to, those of DHS-USCIS regarding waste, fraud, and abuse, and discrimination or any unauthorized use or misuse of the SAVE system or SAVE data, non-compliance with the terms, conditions and safeguards of this MOA, SAVE procedures or other applicable law, regulation or policy.

V. POINTS OF CONTACT.

DHS-USCIS

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Department of Homeland Security
Attn: SAVE Operations
5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Mail Stop 2620
Camp Springs, MD 20588-0009
Phone: (877) 469-2563
E-mail: SAVE.help@uscis.dhs.gov

USER AGENCY

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division
Harmeet K Dhillon
Assistant Attorney General
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Phone:
202-616-3781
E-mail: harmeet.dhillon@usdoj.gov

VI. OTHER PROVISIONS.

A. MOA Responsibilities. Consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, and the availability of User Agency resources, User Agency will commit personnel and resources sufficient to support this MOA. Only authorized employees, agents, or designees of DHS-USCIS and the User Agency will carry out the requirements of this MOA. In carrying out these responsibilities, they will operate within the scope of applicable regulations, specifically delegated authorities, the program authorities and funding limitations and terms and conditions of this MOA. The User Agency will also ensure that all state and local officials responsible for voter registration and voter list maintenance use information obtained from SAVE by User Agency pursuant to this MOA in accordance with the terms and conditions of this MOA.

B. Determining Benefit Eligibility. This MOA is limited to the provision of verification services. DHS-USCIS will verify limited citizenship and immigration status information but will not recommend to the User Agency or other agencies whether to approve or deny registration or maintenance on a voting roll. The DHS-USCIS response is not intended to be, and should not be construed as, an opinion on the part of DHS-USCIS or the United States regarding any right to register to vote, be maintained on a voting roll, or vote.

C. Criminal Penalties.

(1) DHS-USCIS reserves the right to use information from the User Agency for any purpose permitted by law, including, but not limited to, the prosecution of violations of Federal administrative or criminal law.

(2) The User Agency acknowledges that the information it receives from DHS-USCIS may be governed by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a(i)(1), and that any person who obtains this information under false pretenses or uses it for any purpose other than as provided for in this MOA may be subject to criminal penalties.

D. Third Party Liability.

(1) Each party to this MOA shall be solely responsible for its own defense against any claim or action by third parties arising out of or related to the execution and/or performance of this MOA, whether civil or criminal, and retain responsibility for the payment of any corresponding liability.

(2) Nothing in this MOA is intended, or should be construed, to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any third party against the United States, its agencies, officers, or employees or the User Agency.

E. Disputes. Disagreements on the interpretation of the provisions of this MOA that cannot be resolved between SAVE and the User Agency point of contact should be provided in writing to the authorized officials at both agencies for resolution. If settlement cannot be reached at this level, the disagreement will be elevated to the next level in accordance with DHS-USCIS procedures for final resolution.

F. Conflicts. This MOA constitutes the full MOA on this subject between DHS-USCIS and the User Agency. Any inconsistency or conflict between or among the provisions of this MOA, will be resolved in the following order of precedence: (1) this MOA and (2) other documents incorporated by reference in this MOA (e.g., transaction charges).

G. Severability. Nothing in this MOA is intended to conflict with current law or regulation or the directives of DHS, DHS-USCIS, or the User Agency. If a term of this MOA is inconsistent with such authority, then that term shall be invalid but, to the extent allowable, the remaining terms and conditions of this MOA shall remain in full force and effect. In the event of a conflict

that prevents either party from fulfilling its obligations, this MOA may be immediately canceled without providing the 30-day notice period referenced in Section IX.

H. Assignment. The User Agency may not assign this MOA, nor may it assign any of its rights or obligations under this MOA. To the extent allowable by law, this MOA shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any successors to DHS-USCIS and the User Agency without restriction.

I. Waiver. No waiver by either party of any breach of any provision of this MOA shall constitute a waiver of any other breach. Failure of either party to enforce at any time, or from time to time, any provision of this MOA shall not be construed to be a waiver thereof.

J. Compliance with Other Laws. Nothing in this MOA is intended or should be construed to limit or affect the duties, responsibilities, and rights of the User Agency, or state or local voting administrators, under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq., as amended; the Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq., as amended; the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq., as amended; the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., as amended; and all applicable state law.

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This MOA shall be effective when the DHS-USCIS authorized official and User Agency authorized official have both signed the MOA. This MOA shall continue in effect until and unless modified or terminated in accordance with the provisions of this MOA.

VIII. MODIFICATION.

A. This MOA is subject to periodic review by DHS-USCIS, its authorized agents or designees, and, if necessary, periodic modification and/or renewal to assure compliance with current law; policy, and standard operating procedure(s). This MOA constitutes the complete MOA between the parties for its stated purpose, and no modification or addition will be valid unless entered into by mutual consent of both parties evidenced in writing and signed by both parties and appended to this agreement.

B. Either party may accomplish a unilateral administrative modification to change POC information. A written bilateral modification (i.e., agreed to and signed by authorized officials of both parties) is required to change any other term of this MOA.

IX. TERMINATION.

Either party may terminate this MOA at any time by providing 30 days written notice of intent. DHS-USCIS and User Agency, when feasible, will consult with the other party and attempt to reconcile issues before terminating this MOA. Notwithstanding any other provision in the MOA, DHS-USCIS may suspend or terminate this MOA, and thereby the Agency's use of SAVE for voter registration and voter list maintenance purposes, without prior notice if deemed

necessary because of a requirement of law or policy, upon a determination by DHS-USCIS that there has been a breach of system integrity or security by the User Agency or a failure by the User Agency to comply with established procedures or legal requirements, including but not limited to failure to pay.

Written notices shall be sent to the addresses of the POCs listed herein and shall be effective upon receipt. Either party may change its POC by written notice to the other party.

The foregoing, in conjunction with the incorporated references, constitutes the full agreement on this subject between DHS-USCIS and the User Agency. This MOA supersedes all previous agreements governing the provision of verification services related to voter registration and voter list maintenance. Those agreements are explicitly acknowledged to be null and void.


The undersigned represent that they are authorized to enter into this MOA on behalf of DHS-USCIS and the User Agency, respectively.

**BRIAN J
BRODERICK**

Digitally signed by
BRIAN J BRODERICK
Date: 2026.01.23
16:50:35 -05'00'

**Brian J. Broderick
(Acting) Chief, Verification Division
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Department of Homeland Security**

Date



**Eric V. Neff
Acting Chief, Voting Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice**

Date

1/20/26

Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report

A Report from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission
to the 119th Congress



This report by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission is the result of a contract to collect and analyze data for the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey and Election Administration Policy Survey. The contract was carried out by Fors Marsh, an applied research company based in Arlington, VA.

Published June 2025
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001
www.eac.gov

Executive Summary

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election since 2004. The EAVS asks all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories — American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands — to provide data about the ways Americans vote and how elections are administered. Since 2008, this project has included a separate survey, the Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey), that collects information about state election laws, policies, and practices.

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state- and local jurisdiction-level data about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to changing voter preferences, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter experience, and better secure U.S. election infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to examine the details of U.S. election infrastructure and to produce a general understanding of core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by election officials. The survey data provide policymakers and the public with crucial information about how federal elections are conducted every two years and help the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials who use the data to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and informational materials. The EAC also uses EAVS data when creating resources to advance the agency's mission to better support election officials and voters, as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections.

In the past several election cycles, American elections have undergone many changes to the policy landscape, how Americans cast their ballots, how individuals register to vote, and how military and overseas Americans receive and return ballots. As the most comprehensive source of election administration data in the nation, the 2024 EAVS provides a unique insight into how election dynamics have and have not changed. To this end, the EAC is pleased to present to the 119th U.S. Congress its report on the 2024 EAVS.

This report describes in detail how the 2024 federal general election was administered and how voters cast their ballots. Data from the EAVS and the accompanying Policy Survey are used to provide an overview of each of the following aspects of the election process:

- Turnout, voting methods, polling places, ballot drop boxes, ballot curing, poll workers, and election technology are covered in [Chapter 1](#), “Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2024 General Election”;
- Key laws, rules, policies, and procedures that govern U.S. elections are covered in [Chapter 2](#), “Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey”;
- Voter registration and list maintenance are covered in [Chapter 3](#), “Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond”;
- Voting by individuals covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) is described in [Chapter 4](#), “Military and Overseas Voting in the 2024 General Election”; and



- The methodological procedures that the EAC followed to collect the EAVS and Policy Survey data and a description of the survey questions are discussed in [Chapter 5](#), “Survey Methodology.”

Voting and Election Administration Findings

The 2024 EAVS data allow the EAC to meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource of federal election administration information. Data from the 2024 EAVS show that 64.7% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) in the United States voted in the 2024 general election, and over 158 million ballots were cast by voters and were counted. Turnout for this election decreased by 3 percentage points compared to the last presidential election held in November 2020, with six states showing turnout increases between these two elections.

The EAVS also tracks data on how voters cast their ballots — in person on Election Day, in person before Election Day (which is known in many states as early voting), by mail, or by another mode of voting. In-person voting levels dropped during the 2020 general election as many states expanded early and mail voting opportunities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but increased to pre-pandemic levels starting with the 2022 general election. The majority of voters in the 2024 general election cast their ballots in person, with 35.2% voting in person before Election Day and 37.4% voting in person on Election Day. Although levels of Election Day voting decreased from 2022 to 2024, there was a corresponding increase in the percentage of individuals who voted early in person. Mail voting comprised 30.3% of the turnout for the 2024 election, which is down from the high water mark for mail voting seen in 2020 (43%) but still larger than the percentage of the electorate that voted by mail in pre-pandemic elections.

Nearly 15 million mail ballots were returned at ballot drop boxes in the 36 states that allow for drop boxes, which account for just under half of the ballots returned in these states. Among states that made ballot drop boxes available for both the 2022 and 2024 general elections, the percentage of mail ballots returned by voters at these drop boxes increased by nearly 10 percentage points between these two elections. More than 585,000 mail ballots entered the cure process for this election, and more than half of these ballots were successfully cured and included in the vote totals for the 2024 general election.

EAVS data also allow the EAC to identify trends in poll worker characteristics and election jurisdictions' experiences with recruiting poll workers. The age distribution of poll workers was significantly younger in the 2020 EAVS than for previous elections, but skewed older in 2022 and 2024. For the 2024 general election, the majority of poll workers were at least 61 years old. The 2020 election also marked the beginning of a trend of jurisdictions reporting that poll worker recruitment was becoming easier; this continued with the 2024 EAVS data. More than 770,000 individuals served as poll workers for the 2024 general election, with 15.5% being first-time poll workers.

The EAVS also collects data on the equipment that jurisdictions use to assist with registering voters, checking them in at polling places, and casting and counting ballots. Data from the 2022 and 2024 EAVS show that states are continuing to acquire voting systems that use paper ballots or produce auditable paper records. These include direct electronic recording (DRE) devices with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), ballot marking devices (BMD), scanners that tabulate paper

records marked by voters or by BMDs, and hand counting of paper ballots. The use of DRE without VVPAT declined between 2022 and 2024 and nearly every EAVS jurisdiction in the country reported using election equipment that uses paper ballots or generates a VVPAT. The percentage of jurisdictions that reported hand counting paper ballots increased from 17.8% in 2022 to 21% in 2024. The use of electronic poll books increased from 35.1% of jurisdictions in the 2022 general election to nearly 40% in 2024.

Election Administration Policy Survey Findings

The EAC collected data through the 2024 Policy Survey to provide context to the data that states reported in the EAVS and to track changes in election policy over time in areas that include voter registration and list maintenance, voting by mail, UOCAVA voting, in-person voting, voter identification, provisional voting, election technology, recounts, audits, and election certification. This survey supports the EAC's mandate to collect data under federal law.

Some of the notable findings from the 2024 Policy Survey include that a strong majority of states reported having voter registration databases that functioned in a top-down manner. A majority of states permitted one or more forms of automatic or electronic voter registration, with all of these states using the state's motor vehicles agency to process these registrations and some states making the program available at other state agencies. More than 80% of states made online voter registration available to their citizens in some format, just over 50% of states allowed individuals to register to vote on the same day that they cast a ballot, and nearly all states provide a way for individuals to pre-register to vote before they turn 18 years old. Fifty-four states send confirmation notices to voters to assist in maintaining the state's voter registration lists and ensuring they are up-to-date and accurate.

State policies on the availability of mail voting have evolved rapidly over the past few election cycles. About one-fifth of states conduct all-mail elections either statewide or in certain jurisdictions — that is, they automatically mail a ballot to all registered voters or to all active registered voters without the voter having to complete a mail ballot application. For the 2024 election, about two-thirds of states allowed voters to return mail ballots at ballot drop boxes and more than three-quarters of states allowed voters to cure their ballots and correct missing information or errors on their mail ballots in order for them to be counted for this election. For the first time, all states reported offering some form of in-person voting before Election Day. Two-thirds of states allowed the use of vote centers and just over half of states permitted curbside voting.

States also reported information on the auditing and review activities they conduct. Audits are conducted to ensure that voting systems operate accurately, election officials comply with regulations, procedures, or internal policies, and discrepancies are identified and resolved so that the public can be confident in the election administration process. The most commonly reported auditing activities were logic and accuracy testing (used in over 90% of states) and post-election tabulation audits (used in two-thirds of states).

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) Findings

The EAC collected voter registration data to satisfy the agency's data reporting requirements established by the NVRA and HAVA. More than 211 million individuals were active registered voters



for the 2024 general election, representing 86.6% of the CVAP. However, the active voter registration rate was lower in 2024 than in 2020 nationally and for about two-thirds of states.

More than 103 million registration transactions were processed in the period between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election. State motor vehicle offices and automatic voter registration (AVR) combined accounted for almost 60% of all registration transactions processed, with motor vehicle offices representing nearly one-third and AVR representing slightly more than one-quarter of all transactions. Other common sources of registration transactions were online voter registration portals, in-person registrations, and paper registrations received by mail, fax, or email. More than half of all registration transactions involved updates to existing voter registration records, and one-quarter were new and valid registrations.

States also reported data on their efforts to keep voter registration lists current and accurate, known as list maintenance. For the 2024 EAVS, states reported sending nearly 40 million confirmation notices to verify continued eligibility from registered voters. Nearly half of these confirmation notices were sent as part of routine mailings made to all registered voters, and another one-quarter of confirmation notices were sent to individuals who may have moved from the address listed in their voter registration record. Nearly 70% of confirmation notices were not returned by voters. More than 21 million voter registration records were removed from states' voter lists between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election. The most common reasons for removal were failing to return a confirmation notice and not voting in two consecutive federal general elections, and moving out of the voting jurisdiction.

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) Findings

UOCAVA outlines special voting procedures and protections for two categories of voters: members of the uniformed services absent from their voting residence and their eligible family members, and U.S. citizens living overseas. The 2024 EAVS data show that the voting residences of UOCAVA voters tend to be highly concentrated: almost half of these voters held legal voting residence in just four states, whereas nearly half of EAVS jurisdictions reported having just 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters. Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, 2024 data show that overseas citizens made up a larger share of the UOCAVA voting population than did uniformed services voters.

More than 1.3 million ballots were transmitted by election offices to UOCAVA voters for the 2024 general election. Seventy percent of these ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens, marking the largest gap compared to uniformed services voters since the 2014 EAVS. Email was the most common method election offices used to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters, although a majority of uniformed services ballots were transmitted by postal mail. Over two-thirds of transmitted UOCAVA ballots were returned by voters, a rate that decreased since the 2020 general election. Postal mail was the most common method for all categories of UOCAVA voters to return their ballots. Nationwide, more than 96% of returned UOCAVA ballots were counted and less than 4% were rejected, most commonly because the ballot was received after the state's deadline for returning ballots.

UOCAVA voters can use Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) as a backup ballot in case their regular absentee ballot cannot be received and returned in time. States reported that more than 28,000 FWABs were submitted by voters for the 2024 general election. This represents a decrease from the number of FWABs received for the 2020 general election. The FWAB allowed more than 20,000 additional UOCAVA voters to have their ballots counted for the 2024 general election; nearly three-quarters of counted FWABs were received from overseas citizens and less than one-quarter were from uniformed services voters.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Executive Summary Table 1: 2024 EAVS at a Glance

State	Total EAVS Jurisdictions	Total Active Registered Voters	Total CVAP	Total Voter Turnout	Turnout as % of Active Reg.	Turnout as % of CVAP
Alabama	67	3,466,606	3,871,866	2,272,911	65.6%	58.7%
Alaska [1]	1	565,242	540,681	340,981	60.3%	63.1%
American Samoa [2]	1	15,948	--	10,215	64.1%	--
Arizona [3]	15	4,366,786	5,384,019	3,477,975	79.6%	64.6%
Arkansas	75	1,359,659	2,270,663	1,122,278	82.5%	49.4%
California	58	22,836,602	26,042,367	16,164,330	70.8%	62.1%
Colorado	64	4,074,612	4,390,366	3,240,754	79.5%	73.8%
Connecticut [4]	169	2,292,818	2,660,107	1,820,891	79.4%	68.5%
Delaware	3	742,370	770,737	514,367	69.3%	66.7%
District of Columbia	1	469,969	508,689	328,871	70.0%	64.7%
Florida [5]	67	14,028,831	16,313,597	10,999,125	78.4%	67.4%
Georgia	159	7,174,961	7,917,054	5,297,500	73.8%	66.9%
Guam	1	62,098	--	30,283	48.8%	--
Hawaii	5	765,998	1,053,254	522,236	68.2%	49.6%
Idaho [6]	44	1,178,750	1,445,124	917,469	77.8%	63.5%
Illinois [7]	108	8,104,485	9,036,650	5,717,147	70.5%	63.3%
Indiana	92	4,288,091	5,058,179	2,986,839	69.7%	59.0%
Iowa	99	2,016,967	2,387,401	1,674,011	83.0%	70.1%
Kansas	105	1,871,857	2,146,714	1,342,102	71.7%	62.5%
Kentucky	120	3,219,361	3,414,611	2,086,090	64.8%	61.1%
Louisiana [8]	64	2,734,059	3,398,688	2,021,588	73.9%	59.5%
Maine [9]	497	1,041,826	1,126,987	842,447	80.9%	74.8%
Maryland	24	4,231,112	4,411,478	3,028,813	71.6%	68.7%
Massachusetts	351	4,369,280	5,136,750	3,512,930	80.4%	68.4%
Michigan [10]	83	7,267,666	7,646,222	5,706,503	78.5%	74.6%
Minnesota	87	3,853,668	4,258,921	3,271,069	84.9%	76.8%
Mississippi [11]	82	1,965,948	2,222,109	1,225,176	62.3%	55.1%
Missouri	116	4,075,977	4,698,865	3,126,837	76.7%	66.5%
Montana [12]	56	691,534	888,190	612,423	88.6%	69.0%
Nebraska [13]	93	1,190,813	1,420,996	965,145	81.0%	67.9%

State	Total EAVS Jurisdictions	Total Active Registered Voters	Total CVAP	Total Voter Turnout	Turnout as % of Active Reg.	Turnout as % of CVAP
Nevada	17	2,052,976	2,243,354	1,486,297	72.4%	66.3%
New Hampshire [14]	320	1,008,603	1,117,113	829,090	82.2%	74.2%
New Jersey [15]	21	6,066,940	6,397,695	4,321,921	71.2%	67.6%
New Mexico	33	1,254,851	1,552,694	927,923	73.9%	59.8%
New York	62	12,429,981	13,945,400	8,389,626	67.5%	60.2%
North Carolina [16]	100	6,986,365	8,017,902	5,756,106	82.4%	71.8%
North Dakota	53	--	589,860	371,974	--	63.1%
Northern Mariana Islands	1	19,329	--	12,610	65.2%	--
Ohio	88	7,054,966	8,948,378	5,851,625	82.9%	65.4%
Oklahoma	77	2,095,952	2,953,778	1,573,274	75.1%	53.3%
Oregon [17]	36	3,060,374	3,212,722	2,269,608	74.2%	70.6%
Pennsylvania [18]	67	8,407,874	9,930,217	7,074,875	84.1%	71.2%
Puerto Rico [19]	1	1,987,317	2,670,201	1,283,628	64.6%	48.1%
Rhode Island	39	734,885	824,795	522,164	71.1%	63.3%
South Carolina	46	3,417,493	4,065,128	2,566,404	75.1%	63.1%
South Dakota	66	627,248	683,617	435,739	69.5%	63.7%
Tennessee	95	4,458,851	5,329,651	3,090,161	69.3%	58.0%
Texas	254	16,611,078	20,149,798	11,488,820	69.2%	57.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	1	31,171	--	15,952	51.2%	--
Utah	29	1,793,182	2,327,211	1,466,896	81.8%	63.0%
Vermont [20]	247	460,415	523,322	361,604	78.5%	69.1%
Virginia	133	5,898,922	6,397,071	4,511,853	76.5%	70.5%
Washington [21]	39	5,013,112	5,604,117	3,949,810	78.8%	70.5%
West Virginia	55	1,118,468	1,404,377	769,206	68.8%	54.8%
Wisconsin [22]	1,851	3,933,068	4,518,555	3,434,185	87.3%	76.0%
Wyoming [23]	23	296,960	442,989	271,123	91.3%	61.2%
U.S. Total	6,461	211,144,275	244,271,230	158,211,780	74.8%	64.7%



State	Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA)	Total In-Person Early Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Polling Places	Total Poll Workers
Alabama	--	126,055	--	2,010	7,835
Alaska [1]	175,541	48,744	92,281	524	2,979
American Samoa [2]	9,035	189	991	41	300
Arizona [3]	496,753	2,597,974	349,129	781	7,642
Arkansas	294,235	23,843	810,714	1,030	5,720
California	1,836,518	13,062,318	878,489	3,818	41,643
Colorado	141,556	2,957,550	109,209	366	7,587
Connecticut [4]	--	118,362	715,275	739	3,590
Delaware	268,718	33,659	210,295	282	3,797
District of Columbia	82,396	168,111	72,914	75	1,367
Florida [5]	2,596,761	2,945,893	5,364,821	4,162	46,833
Georgia	1,239,125	268,751	3,768,395	2,658	18,580
Guam	24,291	104	5,774	22	360
Hawaii	0	483,078	39,158	13	301
Idaho [6]	508,734	179,777	225,973	856	6,140
Illinois [7]	2,666,185	1,016,208	2,001,203	5,213	41,042
Indiana	1,372,508	1,603,815	1,397,345	1,654	16,957
Iowa	--	--	--	1,663	--
Kansas	604,319	147,276	557,906	1,177	9,468
Kentucky	1,267,653	116,324	687,057	1,580	12,641
Louisiana [8]	1,047,445	119,694	849,784	2,032	16,580
Maine [9]	463,500	215,242	157,116	514	6,253
Maryland	1,145,134	744,244	974,945	1,991	22,986
Massachusetts	1,713,191	1,173,112	600,225	1,634	9,556
Michigan [10]	2,453,252	2,017,704	1,214,409	5,169	45,363
Minnesota	1,960,360	446,576	850,705	2,685	34,886
Mississippi [11]	1,010,752	--	--	1,746	--
Missouri	2,067,247	178,526	867,936	2,240	18,740
Montana [12]	--	--	--	411	4,422
Nebraska [13]	564,660	307,135	80,304	1,083	7,951
Nevada	247,291	656,140	543,461	288	3,904

State	Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA)	Total In-Person Early Ballots Cast and Counted	Total Polling Places	Total Poll Workers
New Hampshire [14]	730,273	92,945	0	307	--
New Jersey [15]	--	828,200	--	4,620	13,242
New Mexico	252,629	111,527	556,395	668	4,221
New York	4,320,467	836,987	2,986,704	5,197	102,259
North Carolina [16]	1,175,905	298,269	4,224,909	3,360	28,374
North Dakota	181,998	89,429	99,007	172	--
Northern Mariana Islands	5,571	915	6,124	13	96
Ohio	3,130,240	1,060,236	1,536,604	3,267	40,084
Oklahoma	1,174,876	98,548	294,037	2,067	7,269
Oregon [17]	--	2,253,114	--	36	--
Pennsylvania [18]	5,043,808	1,933,707	--	7,752	46,172
Puerto Rico [19]	1,071,954	132,157	4,004	1,337	--
Rhode Island	290,699	51,995	173,547	430	3,709
South Carolina	977,341	98,782	1,476,843	2,088	18,122
South Dakota	273,648	159,335	0	493	2,697
Tennessee	856,491	86,904	2,132,535	1,889	16,750
Texas	2,329,171	384,221	8,703,181	6,135	42,324
U.S. Virgin Islands	6,832	613	8,506	11	140
Utah	104,350	1,341,595	36,381	114	1,110
Vermont [20]	122,386	234,038	2,631	262	--
Virginia	2,053,905	474,332	1,840,239	2,673	29,760
Washington [21]	--	3,890,945	171	67	--
West Virginia	431,925	22,377	310,305	1,486	8,602
Wisconsin [22]	1,870,285	570,657	977,648	2,696	--
Wyoming [23]	154,579	38,217	76,943	218	2,079
U.S. Total	52,816,493	46,846,449	48,872,528	95,815	772,433

Executive Summary Table 1 Calculation Notes:

Total EAVS Jurisdictions uses a count of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code by state.

Total Active Registered Voters uses question A1b.



Total CVAP uses the 2023 one-year estimate of the CVAP from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Total Voter Turnout uses question F1a.
Turnout as % of Active Registration uses $F1a/A1b \times 100$.
Turnout as % of CVAP uses $F1a/CVAP \times 100$.
Total In-Person Election Day Ballots Cast and Counted uses question F1b.
Total Mail Ballots Cast and Counted (Excluding UOCAVA) uses the sum of questions F1d and F1g.
Total In-Person Ballots Cast Before Election Day and Counted uses question F1f.
Total Polling Places uses question D2a.
Total Poll Workers uses question D7a.

Executive Summary Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation. For example, since there was no CVAP estimate for most U.S. territories, their turnout data (F1a) were not used for the calculation of "Turnout as % of CVAP" at the national level.
- Items that are displayed as a dash (–) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- The CVAP is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older in the state. This report used the one-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2023 instead of the five-year estimate to ensure the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the year 2024 was unavailable by the time this report was finalized. Some states may have reported more active registered voters than CVAP because the 2023 CVAP is being compared to 2024 data.
- The Total Voter Turnout column includes voters who cast a ballot that was counted.

[1] F1d includes ballots sent by electronic transmission (fax and online delivery).

[2] Some UOCAVA voters are also mail ballot voters.

[3] Mohave County noted that the total number reported in the official election canvass could differ from the voting history reports within the voter registration database because the system was live during the entirety of the voting period. This means voters who cast a ballot in the election and who were eligible to vote in Mohave County at the time the ballot was cast, moved from the county, or became ineligible after the ballot was tabulated. This reflects the discrepancy of ballots tabulated versus voters who received voting credit.

[4] In some jurisdictions, the totals for F1 exceed the totals for A1 because the source in A1 does not account for same day registration.

[5] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.

[6] Idaho does not have inactive voters.

[7] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data might not provide a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.

[8] The total reported in F1 includes voters who were given credit for voting but whose ballots may have been blank or otherwise invalidated after acceptance.

[9] Provisional ballots are not counted separately from other ballots. Provisional ballot totals are reflected in F1b, F1d, or F1f as applicable.

- [10] Voters reported in A1 are eligible to vote. Those defined as "inactive" need only to confirm their address before receiving a ballot. Participation in past elections is not a factor in defining eligibility.
- [11] The number of absentee ballots (in-person and mail-in) is calculated together and cannot be separated.
- [12] The total number of registered/eligible voters consists of active and inactive voters. Montana reports a total registered/eligible voters of 800,573. The difference between this number and what is reported in EAVS is provisional and pending voters. The reported number of ballots counted is from the state canvass report. Data in F1b-F1g cannot be provided because some ballots marked for counting in the system were not actually counted due to issues with the ballot.
- [13] Nebraska does not have "inactive" voters. Nineteen counties in Nebraska are entirely vote by mail and some precincts are also vote by mail.
- [14] The information provided is based on the local officials' entries into the state voter registration system as of March 27, 2025. These numbers may continue to fluctuate as cities and towns add additional entries or make corrections.
- [15] F1a is taken from statewide certified results. These results do not break down the ballots cast by Election Day (F1b) and early voting (F1f) ballots cast.
- [16] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets. UOCAVA ballots are reported with mail ballots.
- [17] Oregon does not track the number of inactive voters. The data reported in F1 include ballots returned and accepted for counting.
- [18] The Pennsylvania Department of State cannot provide a number for F1f because in-person return of mail ballots is not explicitly tracked in the voter registration system.
- [19] In Puerto Rico, voters classified as inactive must first reactivate their voter status before being allowed to cast a ballot. This process requires the voter to verify their address and update their registration information with the Puerto Rico State Election Commission (Comisión Estatal de Elecciones [CEE]). Depending on the circumstances, reactivation may involve completing a specific form or providing a document that confirms their residence. Once their status is updated, the voter is allowed to vote in their assigned precinct without restrictions. This process differs from the classification under the NVRA in the United States, which refers to voters who are still eligible but require address verification before voting. For the 2024 elections in Puerto Rico, the voter registration deadline was September 21, 2024. Any voter who did not update their registration before this date would remain classified under their previous status until the next registration period.
- [20] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [21] Washington remains a vote-by-mail state where voters can register and vote on or before Election Day. The total reported in F1g, which includes voters who cast a mailed ballot in jurisdictions that conduct elections entirely by mail, also accounts for in-person voters who were issued a mailed ballot packet at a voting center and could deposit it in a ballot drop box or return it by mail. Additionally, the total reported in F1f, representing voters who cast a ballot at an in-person early voting location and whose ballots were counted, includes those who used a disability access unit.
- [22] The number of jurisdictions in Wisconsin changed over the two-year period covered by the 2022 EAVS due to incorporations, mergers, and similar mechanisms. Wisconsin is not subject to the NVRA and does not have inactive registered voters. The reported registration totals include military voters, even though they are not required to "register" in Wisconsin because they still have a voter record created. Wisconsin is not a vote-by-mail state but does allow voters to request that an absentee ballot be mailed to them. Poll worker data are no longer tracked by the state. Wisconsin canvass-required data track individual contests, and therefore, the total ballots cast in any election is highly unlikely to match the total votes cast in any one contest. Wisconsin voters are not required to vote in each contest on the ballot and undervotes are the likely cause of data on the total ballots cast being higher than the number of votes in a contest. Some data in Sections A-E will not match with their equivalent in Section F for the following reasons: In cases where two voter records for the same voter are



merged together, the election participation record moves with the merge; however, the absentee ballot record does not, the system does not see them as being associated with the same voter. Or, because in Wisconsin, provisional ballot data have to be recorded into the database on election night, voters who register on Election Day are usually not entered into the database until after Election Day, and these two records cannot be linked in our database, since voter records may be created after Election Day, and are therefore not always connected to their provisional ballot record.

- [23]** In Wyoming, voters designated as "inactive" are not considered registered and eligible voters. They may be eligible upon re-registration or may be inactive due to becoming ineligible (e.g. felony, moved out of state).

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Chapter 1. Overview of Election Administration and Voting in the 2024 General Election

Key Findings

The 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on ballots cast, voter registration, overseas and military voting, voting technology, and other important issues related to voting and election administration. Notable findings from the 2024 EAVS include:


- More than 211 million individuals were active registered voters for the 2024 general election, marking an all-time high. More than 85% of the voting age citizens were registered as active voters.
- Turnout for the 2024 general election was 64.7% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) nationwide, which is the second-highest turnout in the last five presidential elections. More than 158 million voters cast ballots were counted.
- More than two-thirds of voters in the 2024 general election cast their ballots in person, with approximately half of in-person turnout occurring on Election Day and half occurring before Election Day. About three in 10 ballots were cast through mail voting. Most states saw the percentage of ballots cast by mail decrease between the 2020 and 2024 general elections.
- Nearly 15 million ballots were reported as being returned at ballot drop boxes. Among states that made ballot drop boxes available for both the 2022 and 2024 general elections, the percentage of mail ballots returned by voters at drop boxes increased by nearly 10 percentage points between these two elections.
- Among states that allow ballot curing, 1.5% of mail ballots entered the cure process and over half of these ballots were successfully cured.
- The age distribution of poll workers was notably older in 2024 compared to the 2020 general election. For 2024, more than half of poll workers were age 61 or older. States reported that 15.5% of poll workers who assisted with the 2024 general election had not served as poll workers in a previous election. The 2024 EAVS continued a trend that began in 2020 of jurisdictions reporting that recruiting poll workers was becoming easier.
- The use of voting equipment that uses paper ballots or produces a paper record, including direct electronic recording (DRE) devices with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), ballot marking devices (BMD), scanners that tabulate paper records marked by voters or by BMDs, and hand counting of paper ballots, increased compared to 2022. The use of DREs without VVPAT decreased, and nearly 100% of EAVS jurisdictions used voting equipment that uses a paper ballot or produces an auditable paper record of voters' choices.
- Nearly 40% of jurisdictions nationwide reported using electronic poll books, which is the highest percentage recorded in the EAVS.



Election Administration in the United States

The United States holds elections for many different levels of government, including local, state, and federal office. However, responsibility for administering these elections and tabulating, reporting, and certifying election results is largely exercised by local jurisdictions, with oversight from states and in accordance with federal law. The U.S. Constitution and various federal laws govern specific aspects of federal elections, and a small number of federal agencies, such as the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), play a supportive role in election administration. Broad legal and procedural authority rests with the states,¹ territories, the District of Columbia, and local jurisdictions. As a result, wide variation exists in the policies and practices for conducting elections across and sometimes within states, and these policies and practices are constantly changing. Nevertheless, U.S. elections generally follow a standard process. As shown in Figure 1, the election process can be viewed as a cycle.

Figure 1. The U.S. Election Process



¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

1. The legal and procedural framework for elections is generally established in advance of a general election. This legal framework determines which individuals are eligible to vote in an election; how, when, and where voters may cast their ballots for the election; and what technology will be used to support elections. Supported by state election offices, most of these policies and procedures are implemented by election officials at the local level (e.g., county, township, parish, or municipality).
2. To participate in elections, eligible citizens typically must register to vote pursuant to the eligibility rules established by federal law and by their state.² In many states, voters must register in advance of a set registration deadline; in others, eligible individuals may register on the same day they cast their ballot, whether during an early voting period or on Election Day. Depending on state policy, eligible citizens may have multiple avenues for submitting their registration applications, such as by mail, fax, or email; online registration websites; in person at an election office; at a motor vehicle office; at other state government agency offices; at an armed forces recruitment office; or through a registration drive. States are also required to periodically examine their voter list and remove the records of voters who are no longer eligible; for instance, because the voter no longer resides in the state or jurisdiction in which they are registered, the voter has failed to respond to a notice sent to them by mail and has not voted in the two most recent federal general elections, the voter is deceased, or the voter is incarcerated or has received a criminal conviction that disqualifies them from voting. The process of updating voter registration lists and removing ineligible voters is referred to as “list maintenance.”
3. When a federal general election is approaching, voting begins well in advance of Election Day for many voters, including eligible military voters and overseas citizens who are absent from their voting residence, for whom the right to participate in federal elections is protected under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). In addition, all states provide avenues for voters to cast ballots before Election Day. This may include voting using a ballot that is mailed to an eligible voter by an election office, casting a ballot in person at a dedicated voting site before Election Day (often called “early voting”), or receiving and casting a ballot at an election office. Some states allow any eligible voter to cast their ballot before Election Day, whereas others limit it only to certain segments of the population, such as voters who are absent from their home jurisdiction on Election Day, voters with illnesses or disabilities, voters over a certain age, or voters who provide a statutorily valid excuse. The voting options that are available to voters and the timelines for mail voting and in-person voting vary by state and by local jurisdiction.
4. Voters who do not cast ballots beforehand may vote on Election Day at in-person voting sites. In most states, individuals whose eligibility to vote cannot be verified at the time of voting may cast a provisional ballot. Election officials then investigate the eligibility of individuals who cast provisional ballots to determine whether their ballots should be counted, either in full or in part, or rejected.
5. After the polls close on Election Day, the process of counting ballots to determine the final election results begins. This may also be referred to as “tabulation” or “canvassing.” State

² North Dakota is the only state that does not require citizens to register before casting a ballot in an election.



policies vary on when counting may begin — some states may begin pre-processing mail ballots (e.g., verifying the mail voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, opening envelopes, removing the ballots from secrecy envelopes to prepare them for counting) before Election Day, whereas other states require in-person polls to be closed before any mail ballots can be processed. Some states also accept mail ballots, particularly those cast by UOCAVA voters, if they are received after Election Day, so long as they were postmarked on or before Election Day. Depending on state law and on what equipment is used to process the ballots, ballot counting may take several days to weeks to complete.

6. Once the unofficial results of an election are known, state and local election officials review the results for accuracy and certify them as final. Many states conduct audits of their election results and voting equipment to ensure that the established election procedures were followed and that the equipment functioned correctly. Certain election races may also be recounted if the margin of victory is close; if a candidate, party, or other authorized group requests a recount; if a court orders a recount to be conducted; or for other reasons specified by state law.

The election process can be viewed as a cycle in the sense that the experiences from previous elections are used to inform decision-making for the legal and procedural framework for subsequent elections. Often, the successful approaches and innovations implemented in one state or local jurisdiction during an election are adopted by other states or localities in subsequent elections. As this process begins anew with each federal election cycle, policymakers and administrators at every level benefit from the insights available in the state and local election data the EAC publishes in the EAVS.

The 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

Since 2004, the EAC has conducted the EAVS following each federal general election.³ The EAVS collects data from all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories — American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands — on the ways in which Americans vote and how elections are administered. Data are provided at the jurisdiction level.⁴

The EAVS provides the most comprehensive source of state- and local jurisdiction-level data about election administration in the United States. These data play a vital role in helping election officials, policymakers, and other election stakeholders identify trends, anticipate and respond to changing

³ The EAVS does not collect data on primary elections, run-off elections, or special elections. The data provided by states were only for the November 5, 2024, federal general election.

⁴ What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2024 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 cities and townships in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.

voter needs, invest resources to improve election administration and the voter experience, and better secure U.S. elections infrastructure. The EAVS data make it possible to examine the details of the U.S. election infrastructure and to produce a general understanding of the core aspects of the election process and the management challenges faced by election officials at the state and local levels. The survey provides policymakers and the public with crucial information every two years about how federal elections are conducted, and it helps the EAC fulfill its congressionally mandated reporting requirements. The EAVS is also invaluable to election officials themselves. These officials use the EAVS to manage election oversight, conduct issue analysis and strategic planning, and create training and outreach materials.

The EAC also uses the EAVS data to create research and clearinghouse resources to advance the agency's mission to help election officials improve the administration of federal elections and help Americans participate in the voting process, as well as to inform lawmakers and national-level stakeholders about the impact of federal voting laws and the changing landscape of U.S. elections. The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and to review procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections. The EAVS sections related to voter registration and UOCAVA voting allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established, respectively, by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA. The EAVS also helps FVAP fulfill its obligations under UOCAVA to reduce obstacles to ensure military and overseas voting success by collecting data about how UOCAVA voters participate in elections.

The EAVS project consists of two separately administered surveys. The first survey is the Policy Survey, which is administered to each state or territory election office in advance of each federal general election, collects data on the election laws and policies in the states and territories. These data are used to provide context for states' EAVS submissions and to reduce the response burden associated with the EAVS. The second survey is the EAVS itself, which is due after each federal general election is complete and captures data at the jurisdiction level. The data collected include information on voter registration, UOCAVA voters, mail voting, in-person voting operations, provisional ballots, voter participation, and election technology. Although the EAVS gathers data at the jurisdiction level, providing these data is frequently a joint task undertaken by state and local election officials. Twenty-four states were able to provide all EAVS data from the state's centralized election database, whereas 32 states relied on local jurisdictions to provide data for some or all the EAVS questions. The full scope of the data collection procedures for both the Policy Survey and EAVS are detailed in [Chapter 5](#) of this report.

Chapter 1 of this report covers turnout and modes of voting in the 2024 general election, polling places and poll workers, and election technology. This chapter also comprises a non-exhaustive overview of the data provided by states and jurisdictions in the EAVS. State election policies and practices are featured in [Chapter 2](#), "Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey." Voter registration and list maintenance are covered in greater detail in [Chapter 3](#), "Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond." UOCAVA voting is discussed further in [Chapter 4](#), "Military and Overseas Voting in the 2024 General Election."

EAVS Response Rates

The analysis in this report is based on information and data submitted and certified by the 50 U.S. states, five territories, and the District of Columbia. These 56 entities comprise 6,461 jurisdictions.



The state-level response rate for the EAVS was 100% (56 of 56 states, territories, and districts provided data) and the jurisdiction-level response rate was 100% (6,461 of 6,461 jurisdictions provided data).⁵ During the data collection period, efforts were made to maximize the completeness and accuracy of the data reported. These efforts are outlined in the methodology of this report (Chapter 5). Instances when a state's data were not included in a calculation because of missing data or data quality issues are described in the footnotes and source notes that accompany the analysis in this report.

Turnout in the 2024 General Election

According to the EAVS data submitted by states, there were 234,504,358 individuals who were registered to vote in the United States as of November 5, 2024. Of this number, 211,144,275 individuals were classified as active registered voters (meaning they had no additional processing requirements to fulfill before voting), 23,184,185 were considered inactive voters (meaning they required address verification under the provisions of the NVRA before they would be permitted to vote), and 207,400 individuals were categorized as another type of registered and eligible voter aside from active and inactive.⁶ As a percentage of the 2023 citizen voting age population (CVAP) estimate calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau, 86.6% of voting age citizens were registered as active voters for the 2024 general election.⁷ This represents a decrease of 1.5 percentage points compared to the active voter registration rate for the 2020 general election (88.2%).⁸ Further details about voter registration, including how voters registered to vote, the use of same day voter registration (SDR), and list maintenance, can be found in Chapter 3 of this report.

States also reported that 158,211,780 voters cast ballots that were counted for the 2024 general election. This represents a CVAP turnout rate of 64.7% nationwide, which is the second highest turnout in the last five presidential elections.⁹ Turnout for the 2024 general election decreased by

⁵ Appendix A of Chapter 5 of this report contains an analysis of state-level response rates to each section of the EAVS. Although 100% of EAVS jurisdictions provided a response to the survey, there is variance in the completeness of those responses to each section and to specific survey questions.

⁶ The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a of the EAVS. Data on active registered voters were collected in A1b, data on inactive registered voters were collected in A1c, and data on other types of registered and eligible voters were collected in A1d. The sum of active, inactive, and other registered voters did not correspond exactly to the total number of registered voters in all jurisdictions that reported these data. According to Q13 of the 2024 Policy Survey, six states (Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico) did not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their registration records. These states were not required to provide data in items A1c and A1d of the EAVS.

⁷ This report uses the one-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2023 instead of the five-year estimate to ensure the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2024 were not available by the time this report was finalized.

⁸ The active CVAP registration rates for 2020 and 2024 were calculated as $A1b/CVAP \times 100$. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in this calculation because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate a CVAP for these territories. North Dakota was not included in this calculation because this state does not have voter registration. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

⁹ The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted was reported in item F1a of the EAVS. The CVAP turnout rates for 2020 and 2024 were calculated as $F1a/CVAP \times 100$. All calculations use the one-year ACS state CVAP estimate for the year prior to the general election to account for the

Calculating Turnout Rates

There are several valid ways of calculating turnout, or the percentage of a population that voted in an election. The EAVS provides a measure of the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted for a general election in F1a, but there are multiple possible denominators.

- **Number of registered voters or active voters.** States report the number of individuals in their state who are registered and eligible to vote in A1a, and some states separately report the number of active voters (who have no additional processing requirements to fulfill before voting) in A1b. This number is available for states and sub-state EAVS jurisdictions.
- **Citizen voting age population (CVAP).** The U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) estimates the total number of U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older. This number is available for states and most sub-state EAVS jurisdictions but not for U.S. territories, except for Puerto Rico.
- **Voting-eligible population (VEP).** This measure uses the CVAP but excludes those who are ineligible to vote (such as individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and individuals who are in the military or who are citizens living overseas. This number is available for states, but not territories or for sub-state jurisdictions.

Relying on the number of registered or active voters can be problematic for calculating turnout because it is often challenging for states to keep voter registration lists fully up to date (see [Chapter 3](#) of this report for a discussion of list maintenance practices). Using VEP as the denominator in turnout calculations would overrepresent voter turnout — since EAVS data explicitly include individuals covered by UOCAVA — and would restrict the ability to estimate turnout for sub-state jurisdictions. Using the CVAP as a denominator provides greater coverage of sub-state jurisdictions but also includes citizens over the age of 18 who are ineligible to vote due to certain state laws. Although each denominator has its limitations, the EAC uses the CVAP to calculate turnout in this report because of its availability for the majority of jurisdictions that report EAVS data and because it provides a more accurate picture of the population covered by the EAVS. [Appendix D](#) of Chapter 5 of this report includes recommendations on how to calculate additional EAVS rates.

3 percentage points from the 2020 CVAP turnout rate of 67.7%,¹⁰ but increased by 3.7 percentage points from the 2016 CVAP turnout of 61%.¹¹ Nationwide CVAP turnout for the 2006 to 2024 EAVS is shown in Figure 2.


unavailability of the election-year CVAP at the time of reporting the EAVS. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in these calculations because the U.S. Census Bureau does not calculate CVAP for these territories. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations.

¹⁰ Beginning with the 2020 EAVS, the question about voter participation was reworded. In 2018 and earlier, this question collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2020 and later, it collected data on ballots cast and counted.

¹¹ The CVAP turnout rate for 2016 was calculated as item F1a divided by the 2015 CVAP from the one-year ACS and multiplied by 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in this calculation.




Figure 2. 2024 CVAP Turnout Was Second-Highest Since 2006



Source: CVAP turnout was calculated as $F1a/CVAP \times 100$ for all years. All calculations use the one-year ACS state CVAP estimate for the year prior to the general election to account for the unavailability of the election-year CVAP at the time of reporting the EAVS. The CVAP for 2006 to 2014 was obtained by totaling the estimated numbers of native and naturalized citizens over 18 years of age reported by the corresponding one-year ACS. Territories for which CVAP is not available were excluded from the calculations; 2006 does not include data from Maryland, New York, and Wisconsin; 2008 does not include data from Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Rhode Island; 2014 does not include data from Alabama, Illinois, and Mississippi; and 2016 does not include data from Hawaii. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout level.

Figure 3. Turnout Decreased In Most States From 2020 To 2024



Source: CVAP turnout was calculated as F1a/CVAP x 100 for 2020 and 2024. All calculations use the one-year ACS state CVAP estimate for the year prior to the general election to account for the unavailability of the election-year CVAP at the time of reporting the EAVS. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not shown because CVAP is not available for these territories. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout level. Turnout change between 2020 and 2024 is measured in percentage points.




Figure 3 shows the change in CVAP turnout among states between the 2020 and 2024 general elections. Most states saw their turnout decrease between these elections. The largest decreases were in Utah, Hawaii, California, Washington, New Jersey, Oregon, and Idaho; each of these states saw its turnout decrease by 5 or more percentage points between elections. Turnout increased in six states — North Carolina, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin — but only marginally, with the largest turnout increase being only 1 percentage point. In addition, although all states reported at least 50% turnout in the 2020 general election, three states fell below 50% voter turnout in 2024 — Puerto Rico, Arkansas, and Hawaii.

EAVS data also show that the ways American voters cast their general election ballots have changed significantly in the last three election cycles. Figure 4 shows the percentage of voters who cast their ballots in person on Election Day, by mail, in person during early voting, and by other modes of voting (including UOCAVA voting and provisional voting).¹² Prior to the 2020 general election, a majority of voters tended to cast their votes at an in-person polling place on Election Day; 58.2% of voters chose this mode of voting for the 2018 general election. The 2020 general election saw a large increase in mail voting, as many states made mail voting easier to reduce crowding at in-person polling places as a COVID-19 pandemic measure. In-person voting saw a resurgence in 2022 and mail voting saw a corresponding decrease. For the 2024 general election, more than two-thirds of voters cast their ballots in person either before or on Election Day. Approximately three in 10 voters cast their ballots by mail. Although the percentage of voters who cast mail ballots decreased between 2020 and 2024, the level of mail voting in 2024 was still elevated compared to pre-pandemic elections; for both 2016 and 2018, mail voting comprised approximately one-quarter of voter turnout.

¹² For all election years, the percentage of voters who cast their ballots in person on Election Day was calculated as $F1b/F1a \times 100$. The percentage of voters who cast their ballots by mail was calculated as $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$. The percentage of voters who cast their ballots in person before Election Day was calculated as $F1f/F1a \times 100$. The percentage of voters who cast their ballots by other methods was calculated as $(F1c+F1e+F1h)/F1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in these calculations. Montana was unable to report data in F1b-F1h. Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington did not report data in F1b. Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands did not report data in F1c. Iowa and Mississippi did not report data in F1d; California and the District of Columbia also did not report data in F1d because they are all-mail election states. Alabama did not report data in F1e; Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, and North Dakota also did not report data in F1e because they do not use provisional ballots. Alabama, Iowa, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oregon, and Pennsylvania did not report data in F1f. Vermont reported being an all-mail election state but noted that the state was “unable to answer F1g separately from F1d.”

Figure 4. In-Person Voting Was the Most Common Mode of Turnout In 2024



Source: Election Day turnout was calculated as $F1b/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Mail turnout was calculated as $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$ for all years. In-person early turnout was calculated as $F1f/F1a \times 100$ for all years. UOCAVA, provisional, and other turnout was calculated as $(F1c+F1e+F1h)/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national turnout levels for each mode, and because of this, percentages for each year do not equal 100%. Early voting includes all modes of casting a ballot in person at a polling site or election office before Election Day; see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the types of early voting available in states.

In-Person Voting

In-person voting was the most common method of casting a ballot in the 2024 general election, with this proportion approximately evenly split between voting on Election Day and voting before the election. In-person voting takes place at designated polling places on Election Day and at polling places, election offices, or other designated sites before Election Day. All states allowed voters to cast ballots in person before Election Day for the 2024 general election.¹³ For the purposes of EAVS, in-person early voting generally falls into two categories:

¹³ Information on early voting was collected in Q34 of the Policy Survey. Although this report primarily uses the terminology “early voting,” there are a variety of terms that states use to refer to the process of allowing individuals to cast their ballots in person at a polling location, vote center, or election office before Election Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a full discussion of states’ policies on early voting.



- A voter who casts a ballot at a physical polling location, vote center, or an election office before Election Day.
- A voter who cast an in-person absentee ballot in person at an election office or other designated polling site before Election Day.

Some states and territories offer both of these types of voting. Nine states require voters to provide a valid excuse to be permitted to vote early, whereas 47 states have no-excuse early voting that is open to any registered voter.¹⁴ For a complete discussion of state policies on in-person voting, including the length of time in-person early voting was available, the use of vote centers, and the use of poll workers to assist with in-person voting, see [Chapter 2](#) of this report.

States reported that 48,872,528 ballots were cast through in-person early voting and counted for the 2024 general election, an increase of 18% over the 41,415,710 early voting ballots cast for the 2020 general election.¹⁵ The number of ballots cast in person on Election Day in 2024 was 52,816,493, an increase of 12% from the 47,148,389 ballots cast on Election Day for the 2020 general election.¹⁶

On average, states saw a 7.5-percentage point increase of in-person Election Day turnout between 2020 and 2024, with the states of New Hampshire, Maryland, North Dakota, Guam, and Kentucky reporting increases of more than 20 percentage points.¹⁷ On average, states saw an increase in early voting turnout of 3.5 percentage points, with South Carolina and Delaware reporting the largest increases of 22.1 percentage points and 39.9 percentage points, respectively.¹⁸

Voting By Mail

All states and territories and the District of Columbia offer registered voters the opportunity to cast their ballots by mail in federal general elections, although the number of citizens who cast their ballots using this method and the circumstances under which citizens can vote by mail vary widely among states. Some states use the term “absentee voting” instead of “mail voting.”¹⁹ For purposes of this report, mail voting refers to the process by which:

1. An individual receives a ballot in the mail before an election. In some states or jurisdictions, election offices automatically send a mail ballot to all registered voters (often referred to as “all-mail elections”), whereas others automatically send mail ballots only to individuals on a permanent mail voting list. In other states, individuals must complete an application to

¹⁴ Information on whether an excuse was required for early voting was collected in Q34a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹⁵ Data on early voting ballots were collected in item F1f of the 2020 and 2024 EAVS.

¹⁶ Data on ballots cast in person on Election Day were collected in item F1b of the 2020 and 2024 EAVS.

¹⁷ The percentage of voters who cast their ballots in person on Election Day was calculated as $F1b/F1a \times 100$ for all years. This percentage could not be calculated for Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington because they did not provide data for item F1b in 2024.

¹⁸ The percentage of voters who cast their ballots early and in person was calculated as $F1f/F1a \times 100$. This percentage could not be calculated for Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Pennsylvania because they did not provide data for item F1f in 2020 or 2024.

¹⁹ Because many states no longer require a person to be absent from their election jurisdiction in order to be permitted to cast a ballot by mail, the EAVS uses the term “mail voting.”

request a ballot for each election for which they wish to vote using a mail ballot. Some states require an individual to provide a valid excuse to be able to receive a mail ballot.

2. The individual marks the mail ballot with their preferences at home instead of at an election office or polling location.
3. The individual returns the voted ballot to election officials, typically by sending the voted ballot through the mail, by returning the voted ballot to an in-person voting site or election office, or by depositing the voted ballot in a designated ballot drop box. The options that voters have for returning their voted mail ballots are dictated by state policy.

Chapter 2 of this report describes a full analysis of the laws that states had in place regarding mail voting for the 2024 general election. In total, 18 states required an excuse to vote by mail, whereas 38 states did not.²⁰ Twelve states conducted all-mail elections for the 2024 general election — nine of these states did so statewide and three in certain jurisdictions only.²¹ In 25 states, voters could be placed on a permanent absentee voting list.²²

The number of voters in the United States who have participated in federal general elections using mail voting has changed significantly in recent election cycles, with these numbers being higher in presidential election years than in midterm election years and a significant increase corresponding with the COVID-19 pandemic. For the 2016 EAVS, states reported 33,140,081 ballots cast by mail. That number more than doubled for the 2020 election to 69,337,349 ballots, as many states expanded opportunities to vote by mail in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the 2024 EAVS, states reported that 46,846,449 voters cast mail ballots that were counted.²³

Accordingly, mail voting showed the greatest change between the 2020 and 2024 general elections. Figure 5 shows the change in mail voting turnout by state between these two elections. Only four states saw a higher percentage of mail voting in 2024 than in 2020: Washington (0.1 percentage points), Utah (1.6 percentage points), South Dakota (7.9 percentage points), and Indiana (36.4 percentage points).²⁴ On average, states saw their mail turnout decline by 12.7 percentage points between these two elections.²⁵

²⁰ Data on requiring an excuse to vote by mail were collected in item Q24 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

²¹ Data on all-mail elections were collected in items Q25 and Q25a of the 2024 Policy Survey. All-mail elections are defined as elections for which all registered voters, or all active registered voters, are automatically sent a mail ballot without having to file a mail ballot request. Some in-person voting may take place in an all-mail election.

²² Data on permanent absentee voting policies were collected in item Q26 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Voters who received a mail ballot because they resided in a state or jurisdiction that automatically sent mail ballots to all registered voters (or to all active registered voters) were excluded from being considered permanent absentee voters.


²³ The number of ballots cast by mail and counted was the sum of F1d and F1g for all years. For the 2016 EAVS, these items collected data on ballots cast (independent of outcome), whereas in 2020 and 2024 they collected data on ballots cast and counted.

²⁴ Utah and Washington are all-mail election states that automatically send mail ballots to all registered and eligible voters for elections.

²⁵ Mail turnout was calculated as $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$ for the 2020 and 2024 EAVS. Change was measured by subtracting 2020 mail turnout from 2024 mail turnout. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.



Figure 5. Mail Turnout Decreased In All But Four States Between 2020 and 2024



Source: Mail turnout was calculated as $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$ for the 2020 and 2024 EAVS. Turnout change is measured in percentage points (p.p.).

In addition to data on turnout, the EAVS collected data on mail ballots transmitted to voters (excluding military and overseas voters covered by UOCAVA) from election offices that were returned by voters, counted, and rejected. States reported transmitting 66,867,671 mail ballots for the 2024 general election (a decrease of 26.3% over the 90,687,978 mail ballots transmitted for the 2020 general election), of which 47,957,093 were returned by voters, for a rate of 72% of transmitted mail ballots being returned by voters.²⁶ Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 47,629,437 were reported as being counted and 584,463 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 98.8% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.2% of the mail ballots that were

²⁶ Data on the number of mail ballots transmitted were collected in item C1a, and data on mail ballots returned were collected in item C1b of the 2020 and 2024 EAVS. The return rate was calculated as $C1b/C1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. Alabama, Connecticut, Mississippi, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data in C1b for the 2024 EAVS.

Table 1. Most Common Reason For Mail Ballot Rejection Was a Non-Matching Or Incomplete Signature

Reason	Percentage of Rejected Mail Ballots
Ballot envelope had a non-matching or incomplete signature	40.7%
Other reason not listed	18.1%
Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline	17.8%
Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted	11.1%
Ballot envelope did not have a voter signature	10%
Ballot envelope did not have a witness signature	5.6%
Voter did not provide the required documentation (e.g., identification, affidavit, statement) or documentation was incomplete	4.4%
Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope	3.7%
Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction	3.4%
Envelope was not sealed	2%
Voter was deceased	1.5%
Ballot was missing from the envelope	1.1%
Returned ballot envelope did not have required postmark	0.9%
Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope	0.4%
No resident address was on the envelope	0.2%
Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope	0.2%
No ballot application on record	0%

Source: Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature was calculated as $C9e/C9a \times 100$. Other reason not listed was calculated as $(C9r+C9s+C9t)/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was received late was calculated as $C9b/C9a \times 100$. Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted was calculated as $C9n/C9a \times 100$. Ballot did not have a voter signature was calculated as $C9c/C9a \times 100$. Ballot did not have a witness signature was calculated as $C9d/C9a \times 100$. Voter did not provide documentation or provided incomplete documentation was calculated as $C9o/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope was calculated as $C9h/C9a \times 100$. Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction was calculated as $C9p/C9a \times 100$. Envelope was not sealed was calculated as $C9j/C9a \times 100$. Voter was deceased was calculated as $C9m/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was missing from the envelope was calculated as $C9g/C9a \times 100$. Returned ballot did not have required postmark was calculated as $C9k/C9a \times 100$. Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope was calculated as $C9f/C9a \times 100$. No resident address was on the envelope was calculated as $C9l/C9a \times 100$. Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope was calculated as $C9i/C9a \times 100$. No ballot application on record was calculated as $C9q/C9a \times 100$; this percentage is displayed as 0% due to rounding. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

returned.²⁷ The mail ballot return rate for the 2024 EAVS was statistically significantly higher than the rate for 2022 (59.7%), but was similar to the return rate for 2020 (77.8%). The percentage of

²⁷ Data on the number of mail ballots counted were collected in item C8a, and data on mail ballots rejected were collected in item C9a of the 2024 EAVS. The count rate was calculated as $C8a/C1b \times 100$,



returned mail ballots that were counted and rejected was not significantly different across these three elections. For the 2024 general election, the percentage of counted and rejected mail ballots was not significantly different when comparing states that conducted an all-mail election at a state level to those that did not.²⁸

Table 1 shows the most common reasons that states reported for rejecting mail ballots for the 2024 general election. By far the most common reason states reported for rejecting a mail ballot was that the voter's signature did not match what was on file for the voter or was incomplete. About two-fifths of the mail ballots that were rejected for this election were rejected for this reason. About one-fifth of rejected mail ballots were rejected for reasons not listed in the survey question. The states with the largest number of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (36,982 ballots), Arizona (9,289 ballots), Pennsylvania (5,663 ballots), New York (4,873 ballots), New Jersey (3,624 ballots), and Florida (3,557 ballots). The states with the highest percentage of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (96.1%), Idaho (65.1%), Ohio (41.5%), Wisconsin (38.6%), Virginia (37.4%), and Arizona (37.1%). Other common reasons for rejection reported in the data descriptions included "All signature issues," "Neither returned undeliverable nor returned by the voter," multiple issues with a single mail ballot, and the rejection reason not being specified.²⁹

Additional common reasons for rejecting mail ballots were that the ballot was received after the state's deadline for returning mail ballots (17.8%), that the voter had already cast another ballot that was accepted (11.1%), and the ballot envelope lacked a voter signature (10%). Together, the top five reasons for rejecting mail ballots accounted for more than eight out of 10 of the mail ballots that were rejected for the 2024 general election.

Ballot Drop Boxes

In the 2024 Policy Survey, 36 states reported using ballot drop boxes to collect mail ballots from voters.³⁰ Drop boxes are locked containers (located either indoors or outdoors) where voters (or voters' authorized representatives, if allowed under state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. Drop boxes are staffed or unstaffed and are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate from ballot boxes that are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots immediately after voting in person. Some states use alternative terms for ballot drop boxes, such as "place of deposit" or "secure ballot intake station."

Among 36 states that reported using ballot drop boxes, 32 were able to track data on the number of drop boxes used to support the 2024 election. In these 32 states, a total of 14,958 drop boxes were

and the rejection rate was calculated as $C9a/C1b \times 100$ for the 2022 and 2024 EAVS. For the 2020 EAVS, the count rate was calculated as $C3a/C1b \times 100$, and the rejection rate was calculated as $C4a/C1b \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; the count and rejection rate may not total 100% because of the casewise deletion and due to rounding. Mississippi and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data for C8a, and Mississippi did not report data for C9a for the 2024 EAVS. The sum of counted and rejected mail ballots did not match the reported number of mail ballots returned in the 2024 EAVS in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, and Vermont.

²⁸ T tests that were noted as being statistically significant were significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

²⁹ Descriptions of other reasons why mail ballots were rejected were reported in C9r_other, C9s_other, and C9t_other of the 2024 EAVS.

³⁰ Data on whether states allowed the use of drop boxes were collected in item Q27 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

used.³¹ Of the 13,553 drop boxes that were available on Election Day, 20.1% were located at election offices and 80.1% were located at other sites, such as at non-election office polling places, county government buildings, or other locations that are conveniently accessible to voters. Of the 10,648 drop boxes available before Election Day, 27.2% were located at election offices and 73% were located at other sites.³²

Among the 21 states that were able to track data on the number of mail ballots that were returned at ballot drop boxes, 14,933,114 mail ballots were reported as being returned through this method.³³ In these states, this accounted for 44.6% of the mail ballots that were returned by voters and for 20.8% of all ballots that were cast and counted for this election.³⁴ Of the states that reported data on mail ballots returned at drop boxes for both the 2022 and 2024 elections, the percentage of mail ballots returned by voters at drop boxes increased by an average of 9.2 percentage points between these two elections.³⁵ In only two states did this percentage drop from 2022 to 2024: New Mexico (by 3.4 percentage points) and Maryland (by 2.1 percentage points). States that saw double-digit percentage point increases in the percentage of returned mail ballots that were returned at drop boxes were California (11.1 percentage points), Kansas (13.9 percentage points), Nevada (17.3 percentage points), and Utah (23.4 percentage points).

Ballot Curing

Another part of the election administration process that is specific to mail voting is mail ballot curing. When voters return their mail ballots to election offices, election workers verify that the envelope has all the required voter information and that the ballot is eligible to be counted. This process varies by state, but can include comparing the voter's signature with the one on file at the election office and verifying the date the ballot envelope was signed as well as other required information. If any of this information is missing, if it does not match the records on file in the election office, or if it is otherwise incomplete, then each state and territory has laws and procedures on how to treat these ballots. A

³¹ The total number of drop boxes was collected in item C3a of the 2024 EAVS. The number of drop boxes deployed on Election Day was collected in C4a, and the number of drop boxes deployed before Election Day was collected in C5a. Drop boxes that were deployed both before and on Election Day are reported in both C4a and C5a. Indiana, Iowa, New York, and Wisconsin reported using drop boxes but were unable to report data on the number of drop boxes used.

³² For Election Day drop boxes, the percentage located at election offices was calculated as $C4b/C4a \times 100$ and the percentage located at other sites was calculated as $C4c/C4a \times 100$. For early voting drop boxes, the percentage located at election offices was calculated as $C5b/C5a \times 100$ and the percentage located at other sites was calculated as $C5c/C5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; percentages may not sum to 100% because of this casewise deletion or because of rounding.

³³ The number of mail ballots returned at drop boxes was reported in item C6a of the 2024 EAVS. Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin reported using ballot drop boxes but were unable to report data on the number of ballots returned at drop boxes.

³⁴ The percentage of mail ballots returned by voters that were returned at drop boxes was calculated as $C6a/C1b \times 100$ for the 2022 and 2024 EAVS. The percentage of all ballots cast and counted that were returned at drop boxes was calculated as $C6a/F1a \times 100$ for both years. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. Data from Colorado were excluded from these calculations because several counties that had reported these data for 2022 could not do so for 2024.

³⁵ The percentage point change was calculated by subtracting the 2022 drop box return rate from the 2024 drop box return rate. Data from Colorado were excluded from these calculations because several counties that had reported these data for 2022 could not do so for 2024.



certain percentage of those ballots may initially be rejected for counting — for instance, because the voter forgot to sign the ballot envelope so the election office was unable to verify their identity; because the voter’s signature does not match the signature that the election office has on file; or because the voter neglected to include other information such as a required affidavit, statement, or copy of their identification to assist in verifying their identity and ability to cast a mail ballot.

According to the 2024 Policy Survey, 43 states allowed voters to cure their mail ballots for the 2024 general election — that is, making their ballot eligible to be counted for the election by correcting missing information or signature errors.³⁶ The EAVS collected data on the number of mail ballots that entered the curing process, as well as how many of those ballots were successfully cured by the voter and were ultimately counted for the election, and how many ballots were not successfully cured and were rejected. Among states that reported these data, 585,457 ballots were reported to have been set aside for curing, of which 317,191 were successfully cured by voters and 270,753 were ultimately rejected.³⁷ The states with the highest numbers of ballots that were set aside for curing were California (153,097), Colorado (65,629), Washington (65,561), Arizona (55,010), and Utah (35,410); each of these five states had about three-quarters or more of its turnout take place through mail voting.³⁸

At the national level, 1.5% of returned mail ballots entered the curing process, with 54.3% of these ballots being successfully cured by voters.³⁹ Maryland had the highest successful cure rate at 94.8% and the District of Columbia had the lowest rate at 21.4%.

Additional information about mail voting in the 2024 general election, including statistics by state, can be found in [Appendix A](#) of this chapter.

Provisional Voting

HAVA expanded and standardized the use of provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot when their registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some indication that the voter may have already cast another ballot (e.g., by mail), or when the voter’s eligibility to vote in an election is challenged. Provisional ballots are kept separate from other election ballots and are later fully counted, partially counted, or rejected depending on whether the provisional voter’s eligibility can be verified in the days following the election according to the state’s rules for this process. The provisional ballot process helps ensure each qualified voter casts only one ballot that is counted and allows the voter additional time to prove their eligibility to vote if necessary. Five states — Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming — are exempt from HAVA’s provisional ballot requirements because they allowed for SDR (i.e., the ability to register to vote and

³⁶ Information on state ballot curing policy was collected in item Q28 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

³⁷ Not all states that cure ballots were able to report data on the number of ballots that were cured. Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin were unable to report data on the total number of mail ballots that entered the cure process in C7a. New Jersey was able to report data on successfully cured mail ballots in C7b only. Indiana was able to report data in C7a on total mail ballots that entered curing and on mail ballots unsuccessfully cured in C7c. Kansas was able to report data in C7a, but not in C7b and C7c.

³⁸ The percentage of a state’s turnout that took place through mail voting was calculated as $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$.

³⁹ The percentage of returned mail ballots that entered the cure process was calculated as $C7a/C1b \times 100$. The percentage of successfully cured mail ballots was calculated as $C7b/C7a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

cast a ballot on the same day) at the time the law was enacted, although Wisconsin and Wyoming reported using provisional ballots. North Dakota is exempt from this HAVA provision because it does not require citizens to register to vote. In addition, some states that are subject to HAVA use provisional ballots as an SDR method, including California, Nevada, and Virginia.

In the 2024 Policy Survey, most states and territories reported offering provisional ballots to voters. Only four states — Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Dakota — did not.⁴⁰ Chapter 2 of this report includes a detailed analysis of additional policies on provisional voting, including under which circumstances a state may offer a provisional ballot to a voter and how states handle provisional ballots cast by a voter who is in the wrong precinct.

The percentage of ballots cast provisionally has been steadily declining over the past few election cycles; 2018 EAVS data show that 1.3% of voters who cast a ballot did so by provisional ballot, and that percentage declined to 0.8% of the electorate in the 2020 EAVS and 0.5% for the 2022 EAVS. For the 2024 general election, 0.9% of voters who cast a ballot that was counted did so by provisional ballot.⁴¹ This represented a reported 1,736,209 provisional ballots that were cast among states that reported these data.⁴² States reported that 73.8% of the provisional ballots that were cast were counted (either partially or fully), 25.1% were rejected, and 3% reached another outcome.⁴³ Analysis shows that the provisional ballot adjudication percentages for 2024 did not change significantly compared to the 2020 or 2022 EAVS.⁴⁴

EAVS data in Table 2 show that the most common reason states reported for their voters to cast provisional ballots was that the person attempting to cast a ballot did not appear on the list of eligible voters; these accounted for 40.2% of provisional ballots cast nationwide. The next most common reason was that the voter had registered to vote on the same day they cast a ballot in person, otherwise known as SDR. Ten states — Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia — reported in the Policy Survey that provisional ballots are routinely used for SDR voters, and SDR accounted for slightly more than one-quarter of all provisional ballots cast in this election.⁴⁵ Other common reasons included that the voter's registration was not updated with their current name or address and that the voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person; each of these reasons accounted for slightly less than 15% of provisional ballots cast. Other reasons for casting provisional

⁴⁰ Information on states' use of provisional voting was collected in item Q46 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁴¹ The percentage of provisional voters is calculated as $F1e/F1a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage. For the 2018 EAVS, F1 collected data on all ballots cast, regardless of outcome, whereas the 2020, 2022, and 2024 versions of F1 collected data on ballots cast and counted.

⁴² The total number of provisional ballots cast by voters was collected in item E1a of the 2024 EAVS. American Samoa and Hawaii reported using provisional ballots but were unable to report data on these ballots in E1. The number of provisional ballots states and jurisdictions reported in Section E may differ from the number of provisional ballots cast and counted reported in Section F.

⁴³ The percentage of counted provisional ballots was calculated as $(E1b+E1c)/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) \times 100$. The percentage of rejected provisional ballots was calculated as $E1d/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) \times 100$. The percentage of provisional ballots that reached another adjudication was calculated as $E1e/(E1b+E1c+E1d+E1e) \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁴⁴ T tests were statistically insignificant at $p > 0.05$.

⁴⁵ Data on whether states offered provisional ballots to voters who used SDR was collected in item Q46a of the 2024 Policy Survey.



ballots (including other reasons not listed, the voter not being a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote, the voter not having proper identification, an election official challenging the voter's eligibility, another person challenging the voter's eligibility, and a federal or state judge extending polling place hours) were comparatively rare.⁴⁶

Table 2. Most Common Reason For Voters To Cast Provisional Ballots Was Not Being On Eligible Voter List

Reason For Casting Provisional Ballot	Percentage of Provisional Ballots Cast
Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters	40.2%
Voter registered to vote on the same day they cast a ballot in person	26.2%
Voter's registration was not updated with their current name or address	14.3%
Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person	14.3%
Other reasons not listed	6.4%
Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote	6.3%
Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law)	2.7%
Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote	0.6%
Another person (not an election official) challenged the voter's qualifications and poll workers were unable to resolve the challenge	0.1%
A federal or state judge extended the polling place hours for the election	0%

Source: Voter did not appear on the list of eligible voters was calculated as $E2a/E1a \times 100$. Voter registered on the same day as casting a ballot in person was calculated as $E2i/E1a \times 100$. Voter's registration was not updated with their current name or address was calculated as $E2f/E1a \times 100$. Voter was issued a mail ballot but did not surrender the ballot to poll workers when they came to vote in person was calculated as $E2g/E1a \times 100$. Other reasons not listed was calculated as $(E2j+E2k+E2l)/E1a \times 100$. Voter was not a resident of the precinct in which they were attempting to vote was calculated as $E2e/E1a \times 100$. Voter did not have proper identification (as defined by state law) was calculated as $E2b/E1a \times 100$. Election official asserted that the voter was not eligible to vote was calculated as $E2c/E1a \times 100$. Another person (not an election official) challenged the voter's qualifications and poll workers were unable to resolve the challenge was calculated as $E2d/E1a \times 100$. A federal or state judge extended the polling place hours for the election was calculated as $E2h/E1a \times 100$; this percentage is displayed as 0% because of rounding. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

The EAVS also collects data on the reasons why provisional ballots are rejected. By far, the most common reason states reported for rejecting provisional ballots was that the voter who cast the provisional ballot was not registered in the state; this reason alone accounted for 52.2% of the

⁴⁶ Eleven states that used provisional ballots were unable to report data on the number of provisional ballots according to the reason for the ballots being cast. These states were Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Vermont, and Washington.

provisional ballots that were reported as rejected by states. The next most common reason was a reason that was not listed in the survey question. These ballots comprised 16.3% of rejected provisional ballots; the high percentage of ballots being rejected for other reasons may be a reflection of the differing and nuanced ways that states use provisional ballots beyond what is mandated by HAVA. Voters who were registered in the state but attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction accounted for 14.2% of rejections. Other reasons for rejecting provisional ballots that the EAVS collects data on — the voter attempting to vote in the wrong precinct, the voter failing to provide sufficient identification, the envelope and/or ballot being incomplete and/or illegible, the ballot being missing from the envelope, the ballot lacking a signature, the ballot having a non-matching signature, and the voter already having voted — collectively accounted for approximately one-quarter of all provisional ballots that were rejected nationwide.⁴⁷

UOCAVA and Other Methods of Voting

Absentee and mail voting have long been used to facilitate participation in federal elections for individuals in the military, eligible family members of service members, and U.S. citizens who live overseas. The distinct needs of members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens remain an area of focus in election administration, and these individuals are given special voting protections under UOCAVA and its amendments.⁴⁸ UOCAVA voters are provided certain rights to fully participate in federal elections and are given special considerations as to when their ballots are sent, how their blank ballots can be transmitted, and how and when they may return their voted ballots.

The 2024 general election represented the second-highest rate of ballots cast and counted from UOCAVA voters in a presidential election since 2012. The highest rate recorded in EAVS was in 2020, which saw 0.6% of all voter turnout being from UOCAVA voters; in 2024, this percentage fell slightly to 0.5%.⁴⁹ EAVS data for the 2024 general election show that 1,327,324 UOCAVA ballots were transmitted from election offices to UOCAVA voters; 806,743 of these ballots were returned by

⁴⁷ Voter was not registered in the state was calculated as $E3b/E3a \times 100$. Other reasons not listed was calculated as $(E3k+E3l+E3m)/E3a \times 100$. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the wrong jurisdiction was calculated as $E3c/E3a \times 100$. Voter was registered in the state but attempted to vote in the wrong precinct was calculated as $E3d/E3a \times 100$. Voter failed to provide sufficient identification was calculated as $E3e/E3a \times 100$. Envelope and/or ballot was incomplete and/or illegible was calculated as $E3f/E3a \times 100$. Ballot was missing from the envelope was calculated as $E3g/E3a \times 100$. Ballot did not have a signature was calculated as $E3h/E3a \times 100$. Ballot had a non-matching signature was calculated as $E3i/E3a \times 100$. Voter already voted was calculated as $E3j/E3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; percentages may not total 100% for this reason. Five states that use provisional ballots were unable to report data on the reasons why provisional ballots were rejected: Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, Oregon, and Vermont.

⁴⁸ The uniformed services are the armed forces — the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space Force), and Coast Guard — and the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Officer Corps, and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Uniformed services members, their spouses, and their eligible dependents are, together, referred to as uniformed services voters. Overseas citizens are U.S. citizens living outside of the United States who are not uniformed services voters but who are also protected by UOCAVA.

⁴⁹ The percentage of voters who cast UOCAVA ballots was calculated as $F1c/F1a \times 100$ for all years. For 2012 and 2016, this item collected data on ballots cast regardless of outcome; for 2020 and 2024, it collected data on ballots cast and counted. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.



voters, for a UOCAVA ballot return rate of 68.4%.⁵⁰ Of these ballots, states reported that 96.3% were counted and 3.7% were rejected.⁵¹ This is in addition to 28,140 Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) that were sent to election offices by UOCAVA voters, of which 20,065 were counted (71.5%).⁵²

Chapter 4 of this report contains a complete discussion of the EAC's history of collecting data on voters covered by UOCAVA; a full analysis of the data collected about these voters and their ballots in 2024, including ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and the use of the FWAB. Chapter 2 of this report contains a complete discussion of state policies regarding UOCAVA voting.

In addition to ballots that were cast at a physical polling place either on Election Day or during the early voting period, by mail, by provisional voting, and by UOCAVA voters, states reported data on any other modes of voting that were offered in the state in 2024. Only 104,743 of these ballots were cast among 11 states, which accounted for 0.2% of all ballots cast and counted in the 2024 general election. Puerto Rico reported both the highest number (62,134) and highest percentage (4.8%) of these ballots among all EAVS respondents. The territory described these ballots as including absentee votes received from individuals who were not UOCAVA voters but were domiciled in Puerto Rico.⁵³ The state with the next highest percentage of these voters was Kentucky, in which 0.6% of ballots cast were described as "supplemental." In the remaining nine states that reported other types of turnout, other modes of voting accounted for 0.2% or less of the state's total turnout.⁵⁴

Polling Places and Poll Workers

To organize elections, registered voters are typically assigned to precincts according to the residential addresses listed in their voter registration records. These precincts are contiguous, bounded geographic areas that form the basis for determining the contests and issues on which the voters legally residing in that area are eligible to vote.⁵⁵ Precincts are then assigned to polling locations, which are physical locations where in-person voting takes place. One precinct may be

⁵⁰ The number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted was collected in B5a and the number of UOCAVA ballots returned was collected in item B11a. The UOCAVA ballot return rate was calculated as $B11a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁵¹ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots counted was calculated as $B18a/B11a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected was calculated as $B24a/B11a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

⁵² The number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters was collected in item B29a. The number of counted FWABs was collected in item B30a.

⁵³ Puerto Rico provided this comment in its EAVS Section B submission: "As part of absentee voting, Puerto Rico, in addition to the UOCAVA categories — uniformed services members, eligible dependents, U.S. Merchant Marine members, and overseas civilian voters — also provides absentee voting options for voters who are physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day but are not classified as overseas citizens. This includes Puerto Rico residents who are temporarily in the United States for work, study, or other personal reasons but maintain their official residence in Puerto Rico."

⁵⁴ The number of ballots cast by another mode of voting and counted was reported in item F1h of the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of these ballots cast was calculated as $F1h/F1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used in calculating the national percentage. The description of states' other mode of voting was based on what the state submitted in item F1h_Other of the 2024 EAVS. Additional states that reported ballots cast in F1h were Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

⁵⁵ Some states use the terms "ward" or "voting district" to describe their voting precincts.

assigned to a polling place, or multiple precincts may vote together at a single polling place. Some states use a vote center model, which allows people to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction rather than at a specifically assigned polling place. State laws dictate which voting location or locations a voter must go to in order to cast a ballot in person. [Chapter 2](#) of this report reports findings from the 2024 Policy Survey on how states trained the poll workers who assisted with this general election.

For the 2024 general election, states reported having 177,708 precincts in use and operating 95,815 physical polling places.⁵⁶ A total of 87,736 polling places were reported as being operated on Election Day 2024, and 13,163 were reported as being in use during in-person early voting before Election Day.⁵⁷ Among Election Day polling places, 2.8% were reported by states as being located at an election office and 97.5% were reported as being located at another site, such as a library, school, or a mobile voting location. For early voting polling places, 44.2% were located at election offices and 61.4% were located at other sites.⁵⁸

In-person voters who vote at polling places are assisted by poll workers. These poll workers are typically not full-time election workers or employees of election offices; rather, they are recruited and trained to assist temporarily during election periods. Typical activities that poll workers perform include checking in voters, setting up voting equipment, providing ballots to voters, and performing other functions as dictated by the state or local election authority.⁵⁹ States reported that 772,433 poll

⁵⁶ The number of precincts was collected in item D1a, and the total number of polling places was collected in D2a. The instructions for D2a stated that each polling place was to be counted only once, regardless of the number of voting days it was open for.


⁵⁷ The total number of Election Day polling places was collected in D3a, and the total number of early voting polling places was collected in D4a. Hawaii and Washington did not report data in D3a; Alabama, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Pennsylvania did not report data in D4a. Arkansas is excluded from analysis in this section that uses D3 or D4 data because the state reported higher numbers in each of D3a and D4a than total polling places in D2a. The EAC cautions against doing a year-over-year analysis of polling places as reported in the EAVS because these items have been underreported in previous years.

⁵⁸ The percentage of Election Day polling places at election offices was calculated as $D3c/(D3b+D3c) \times 100$. The percentage of Election Day polling places at other sites was calculated as $D3b/(D3b+D3c) \times 100$. The percentage of early voting polling places at election offices was calculated as $D4c/(D4b+D4c) \times 100$. The percentage of early voting polling places at other sites was calculated as $D4b/(D4b+D4c) \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages; the percentages for each election period may not sum to 100% because of this. Alabama, Arkansas, Missouri, and North Carolina did not report data on where Election Day polling sites were located; Hawaii, North Carolina, and the Northern Mariana Islands did not report data on where early voting polling sites were located. "Early voting" refers to any in-person voting that took place before Election Day.

⁵⁹ Some states and jurisdictions use other titles for poll workers, such as election judges, booth workers, wardens, or commissioners. The EAVS instructions stated that observers stationed at polling places, regular office staff who did not fulfill poll worker functions during the election, or temporary election staff who were not hired specifically to serve voters in either early or Election Day voting should not be counted as poll workers for purposes of the EAVS. However, regular office staff who performed poll worker duties during early voting or on Election Day were to be counted as poll workers in these survey items.



Figure 6. Age Distribution of Poll Workers has Skewed Older Since 2020



Source: Percentage of poll workers under age 18 was calculated as $D7b / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for all years. Percentage of poll workers ages 18-25 was calculated as $D7c / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for all years. Percentage of poll workers ages 26-40 was calculated as $D7d / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for all years. Percentage of poll workers ages 41-60 was calculated as $D7e / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for all years. Percentage of poll workers ages 61-70 was calculated as $D7f / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for all years. Percentage of poll workers ages 71 or older was calculated as $D7g / (D7b + D7c + D7d + D7e + D7f + D7g) \times 100$ for all years. Data for Alaska were excluded for 2022 and 2024 and data for South Carolina were excluded for all years because these states only tracked data on poll workers under 18 years of age in the years for which they were excluded. Casewise deletion was used at the state level for calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

workers assisted with in-person voting for the 2024 general election, with 675,434 poll workers assisting with voting on Election Day and 149,321 assisting with early voting.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ The total number of poll workers was collected in item D7a. The total number of Election Day poll workers was collected in item D5a. The total number of early voting poll workers was collected in item D6a. D7a was not intended to match the sum of D5a and D6a because the instructions in D7 were to count each poll worker only once, regardless of the number of days of voting the poll worker assisted with. Iowa, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin were

Thirty-seven states also reported data on the age breakdown of the poll workers who assisted with the 2024 general election.⁶¹ Among these states, a majority of poll workers were reported as being age 61 or older. The age distribution of poll workers in the 2020, 2022, and 2024 general elections is shown in Figure 6. This figure shows a clear increase in older poll workers since the 2020 general election. For that election, the age group that showed the highest percentage of poll workers was age 41 to 60; for 2024, the most common age category reported was 61 to 70, and an outright majority of poll workers were age 61 or older. Although the age distribution of poll workers was not significantly different from 2022 to 2024, the 2020 age distribution was notably younger than the subsequent two elections.⁶² States reported that 94,466 of the poll workers who assisted with the 2024 general election were new poll workers, which made up 15.5% of the poll worker population for this election year. This was similar to the 16.7% of poll workers who were new that was reported for the 2022 general election.⁶³

The data collected by EAVS on how easy or difficult it was for jurisdictions to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers shows a consistent trend toward recruitment becoming easier over the last three general elections, as displayed in Figure 7. Although recruitment is still a challenge for many officials, the number of jurisdictions that reported a “somewhat easy” recruitment experience showed marked improvement between 2022 and 2024 and the number of jurisdictions that reported a “somewhat difficult” experience trended downward. More than half of jurisdictions reported a difficult recruiting experience in the 2020 and 2022 elections, but the comparable number for 2024 was less than half. Analysis confirms that poll worker recruitment was easier in 2024 than it was in 2020.⁶⁴ However, it remains highly correlated with jurisdiction size, with jurisdictions having 10,000 or fewer total registered voters reporting that recruitment was easier compared to jurisdictions with more than 10,000 total registered voters.⁶⁵

unable to report data on poll workers in any of these three items. In addition, New Hampshire was unable to report data in D7a or D6a. Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, and Montana were unable to report data in either D5a or D6a. Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island were unable to report data in D6a.

⁶¹ Data on poll workers' ages were collected in items D7b-D7g of the 2024 EAVS. In addition to the nine states that did not report data in D7a, 10 states that reported data on the total number of poll workers in D7a were unable to provide an age breakdown of poll workers: American Samoa, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, the Northern Mariana Islands, Utah, and Virginia.

⁶² Comparisons for age categories between 2020 and 2024 were significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Comparisons for age categories between 2022 and 2024 were insignificant at $p > 0.05$.


⁶³ Data on new poll workers were collected in item D9a of the 2024 EAVS; the percentage of new poll workers was calculated as $D9a/D7a \times 100$ for 2022 and 2024. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. Twenty-seven states (Alaska, American Samoa, Connecticut, Delaware, Guam, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) were unable to track data on new poll workers for 2024.

⁶⁴ *T* tests comparing D8 for 2024 and 2022 were statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. *T* tests comparing D8 for 2024 and 2020 were statistically insignificant at $p > 0.05$.

⁶⁵ For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as reported in item A1a of the 2024 EAVS. This comparison was statistically significant at $p < 0.001$.



Figure 7. Poll Worker Recruitment Has Trended Easier Since the 2020 Election



Source: Ease of recruiting poll workers was collected in item D8 for all years. Jurisdictions that responded “Not enough information to answer,” “Data Not Available,” “Does Not Apply,” or left this item blank were excluded from this analysis.

Election Technology

The use of technology in polling places and vote tally locations varies widely across and even within states. The 2024 EAVS collected data on the type of voting equipment and other election technology that is used, including the type of voting that the equipment supports, the specific makes and models of the equipment, and how many were deployed for the election. The voting equipment landscape continues to evolve with each election.


Voting Equipment

The 2024 EAVS collected data on five types of voting systems used in the 2024 general election:

- Direct-recording electronic (DRE) devices that are not equipped with a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT);
- DRE voting devices that are equipped with a VVPAT;

- Electronic systems that produce a paper ballot but do not tabulate votes, often referred to as ballot marking devices (BMD);
- Scanners (either optical or digital) that tabulate paper ballots that voters mark by hand or via a BMD; and
- Electronic poll books, which are a type of hardware, software, or a combination of both and are used in place of paper poll books that list all registered voters.

Figure 8. Percentage of EAVS Jurisdictions Using BMDs, Scanners, Hand Counting, and DREs with VVPAT Increased From 2022 To 2024; Use of DREs Without VVPAT Decreased



Source: Data on use of BMDs were collected in item F5a in the 2024 EAVS and in F7a for 2022. Data on use of scanners were collected in item F6a for 2024 and in F8a for 2022. Data on use of hand counting were collected in item F7a for 2024 and in F9a for 2022. Data on use of DRE with VVPAT were collected in item F4a in 2024 and in F6a for 2022. Data on use of DRE without VVPAT were collected in item F3a for 2024 and in F5a for 2022. Percentages were calculated as the number of jurisdictions responding “Yes” to the listed item divided by the total number of EAVS jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions use more than one type of equipment.



The EAVS also collected information on whether jurisdictions counted ballots by hand without the use of any optical or digital scanning system.⁶⁶

Nationally, states reported deploying 367,682 voting systems to assist with the 2024 general election.⁶⁷ Figure 8 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that reported using each type of voting equipment in the 2022 and 2024 EAVS. The most commonly used types of voting equipment in EAVS jurisdictions were BMDs and scanners, which were used in 90.5% and 86.4% of jurisdictions, respectively. The use of both types of equipment increased slightly from the 2022 election. The use of hand counting also increased between these two elections, and in 2024 it was used by just over one-fifth of jurisdictions that reported data.⁶⁸ Use of hand counting to tabulate ballots for the 2024 general election was not correlated with jurisdiction size.⁶⁹ DREs continue to be the least-used type of voting equipment in the United States, with only 8.9% of jurisdictions using DREs with VVPAT and 1.2% using DREs without VVPAT.

DREs without VVPAT are of special concern to some experts because these systems do not use a paper ballot or produce a paper record of the votes that are cast, which raises security concerns and can make it difficult to conduct certain types of post-election audits. The percentage of jurisdictions that reported using these systems decreased significantly since the previous general election. In the 2022 EAVS, 434 jurisdictions in nine states reported using DRE without VVPAT; in the 2024 EAVS, that dropped to 80 jurisdictions in three states. Only Louisiana reported using these systems statewide; other states that reported using this equipment in 2022 or 2024 used it only in select jurisdictions. Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont reported discontinuing use of DREs without VVPAT between the 2022 and 2024 elections. Furthermore, the number of jurisdictions that use DRE without VVPAT *only*, without any other voting systems or counting methods that rely on a paper ballot or produce a VVPAT, continues to decrease. For the 2020 general election, 32 jurisdictions (12 in Indiana, one in Tennessee, and 19 in Texas) used only

⁶⁶ Information on DREs without VVPAT was collected in F3 of the 2024 EAVS. Information on DREs with VVPAT was collected in F4. Information on BMDs was collected in F5. Information on scanners was collected in F6. Information on hand counting was collected in F7. Information on electronic poll books was collected in F8. Alabama did not provide data for any of the election technology questions in F3-F8 for 2024. Kansas did not provide responses on the use of hand counting in F7; one jurisdiction in Texas and two jurisdictions in Wisconsin also did not respond to this question. Most jurisdictions in Mississippi did not provide responses on the use of electronic poll books in F8. Previously, the EAVS also collected information on the use of punch card and lever-voting systems; starting with the 2022 EAVS, these questions were eliminated because no jurisdiction in the United States had reported using either of these types of equipment since the 2016 EAVS, marking three election cycles in which no jurisdiction reported using this equipment. Both VVPAT and paper ballots are considered to be paper records that can assist in conducting post-election audits.

⁶⁷ The number of voting systems deployed was calculated as the sum of F3c_1, F3c_2, F3c_3, F4c_1, F4c_2, F4c_3, F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, and F6c_3 in the 2024 EAVS.

⁶⁸ The EAVS did not collect information on whether jurisdictions used hand counting for all ballots or all ballot contests within a jurisdiction.


⁶⁹ For this comparison, jurisdictions were classified according to the total number of registered voters as reported in item A1a and according to the number of voters who cast ballots that were counted in item F1a of the 2024 EAVS. These comparisons were statistically insignificant at $p > 0.05$. Jurisdictions that did not provide a response in F7a of the 2024 EAVS were excluded from this analysis. No jurisdiction in the 2024 EAVS reported using only hand counting; all jurisdictions used some other form of voting equipment to assist with ballot casting or tabulation. However, the EAVS did not collect information on whether jurisdictions used hand counting for all ballots or all ballot contests within a jurisdiction.

DRE without VVPAT. For the 2022 general election, that number decreased to only four jurisdictions (one in Tennessee and three in Texas). For the 2024 EAVS, one jurisdiction in Arkansas reported that DREs without VVPAT were the only type of voting equipment used. This means that nearly 100% of jurisdictions in the United States use voting equipment that has voters mark a paper ballot (including BMDs, scanners, and hand counting) or produces an auditable paper record of voters' ballot preferences (including DRE with VVPAT).

Electronic Poll Books

When voters go into polling places to cast ballots in person, their identity is checked against voter registration information that is contained in poll books to ensure the voters are registered to vote and did not already cast a ballot (either in person or by mail). These poll books can be paper based and printed before the election, or they can be electronic. The use of electronic poll books has steadily increased in recent elections, from 38 states using them for the 2020 general election to 41 for the

Figure 9. Electronic Poll Books Were Used Statewide In One-Third of States



Source: Data on the use of electronic poll books in jurisdictions were collected in item F8a of the 2024 EAVS. Percentages were calculated as the number of jurisdictions that responded “Yes” to F8a divided by the number of EAVS jurisdictions in the state.



2024 general election.⁷⁰ This includes Massachusetts, which reported using electronic poll books for the first time for this election.

In 2024, 39.9% of jurisdictions used electronic poll books to assist with voting, which represents the highest percentage reported to date in the EAVS and an increase of more than 4 percentage points over 2022 levels.⁷¹ Figure 9 shows the percentage of jurisdictions in each state that reported using electronic poll books in this election. In 19 states, all EAVS jurisdictions used electronic poll books. Top-down states (in which the state's voter registration database is hosted on a single, central platform or mainframe and is generally maintained by the state with information supplied by local jurisdictions) were not more likely to use electronic poll books than were bottom-up or hybrid states (in which the voter registration database generally uploads information retained at the local level and compiles it at regular intervals to form the statewide voter registration list).⁷²

Voter Registration Systems

The 2024 EAVS marks the first time that the EAC collected data on the use of voter registration systems (VRS) deployed to voting sites to assist with elections. VRSs are a combination of hardware, software, or firmware and materials and documentation used to streamline the process of voter registration and to secure voter information in a county, state, or election jurisdiction by election administrators. VRSs are connected to a private network, administered through state or local jurisdictions, and hold the capability of administrative functions to aid in the voting process on Election Day. In some jurisdictions, VRSs may be interoperable with electronic poll books, election night reporting systems, and/or election management systems. VRSs are designed by either private sector manufacturers or in-house jurisdictions and are managed by manufacturers and jurisdictions based on high-level standards of cybersecurity and data infrastructure maintenance. Collecting data on VRSs is vital, as most states' election infrastructures rely heavily on these systems and are deeply integrated with them.

Thirty-four states were able to report data on deployed VRSs.⁷³ Of these states, nearly half (16) reported not deploying VRSs.⁷⁴ Of the 18 that did, eight states (Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) deployed VRSs at the

⁷⁰ Data on the use of electronic poll books were collected in item F8a of the 2024 EAVS and in items F3a, F3b, F3c, and F3d of the 2020 EAVS. For the latter year, a jurisdiction was considered to have used an electronic poll book if it responded "Yes" to at least one of those questions.

⁷¹ Data on the use of electronic poll books were collected in items F3a, F3b, F3c, F3d, F3e, and F3f of the 2022 EAVS. A jurisdiction was considered to have used an electronic poll book if it answered "Yes" to at least one of those questions. Puerto Rico was not included in the calculation of percentage of jurisdictions that used this equipment in 2022 because it was not required to respond to the 2022 EAVS. This territory used electronic poll books in the 2020 and 2024 general elections.

⁷² Data on state voter registration database type was collected in item Q4 of the 2024 Policy Survey. The comparison was statistically insignificant at $p > 0.05$.

⁷³ Data on the number of VRSs deployed was collected in item F11a of the 2024 EAVS. The states that were unable to report these data were Alabama, American Samoa, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, the Northern Mariana Islands, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington.

⁷⁴ States that reported deploying zero VRSs at the polling place in any of their EAVS jurisdictions were Delaware, Georgia, Guam, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

polling place in all of their EAVS jurisdictions. The remaining states (Arkansas, Arizona, California, Illinois, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia) reported deploying VRSs in only some jurisdictions; these percentages ranged from 0.8% of jurisdictions in Virginia to 33.3% of jurisdictions in Arizona. Nationwide, states reported deploying 7,697 VRSs at voting sites for the 2024 general election.⁷⁵

Recommendations from the EAC to Congress

Exempt the EAC From the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

The EAC recommends that Congress exempt it from the PRA. The EAVS collects election information that the EAC must report to Congress by June 30 of the year following a federal election, per HAVA. To collect the required information from state and local election officials, the EAC must undergo the time-consuming and resource-intensive PRA process. The EAC regularly collects information from state and local election officials and receives time-sensitive requests for information from stakeholders, including Congress. For example, election guidance is often unique to a given election cycle, and the EAC needs to respond immediately to emerging threats by distributing alerts or resources. However, compliance with the PRA involves a lengthy process that requires considerable time and resources.

When the PRA was established in 1980, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which handled election administration duties, was exempt from this law. This exemption continued in the PRA of 1995. However, when HAVA transferred election administration duties from the FEC, the exemption was not extended to the EAC.

Authorize and Appropriate Funds to Purchase VVSG 2.0 Voting Systems

The EAC recommends that Congress provide dedicated funding to support the implementation and certification of voting systems that comply with the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0. This funding will ensure that states and jurisdictions can upgrade their voting systems to meet the latest standards for security, accessibility, and reliability.

When HAVA was enacted, it provided approximately \$3.5 billion in federal funds to replace punch card and lever-voting systems with more modern, electronic systems. This initial funding was crucial in modernizing the nation's voting infrastructure and enhancing the integrity of the electoral process.

Since the passage of HAVA, the EAC has continued to develop and update the VVSG to reflect technological advancements and emerging security threats. The latest iteration, VVSG 2.0, represents a comprehensive set of standards to ensure that voting systems are secure, accessible, and reliable. However, the transition to VVSG 2.0-compliant systems requires substantial investment.

⁷⁵ This calculation excludes data from 36 jurisdictions in Arkansas that may have reported erroneous numbers.



Extend the EAVS Reporting Deadline to September 30 of the Year Following a Federal Election

The EAC recommends that Congress extend the EAVS reporting deadline to September 30 of the year following a federal election. This legislative change will align the EAVS deadline with the FVAP reporting requirements and provide election officials with additional time needed to submit accurate and complete data.

Since its inception, EAVS has been a critical tool for collecting data on election administration and voting practices. Given the evolving landscape of election administration and the increasing importance of accurate data for policymaking, it is essential to provide election officials with the necessary time to complete their reporting obligations. The June 30 deadline has often posed challenges for election officials, particularly in years with high voter turnout or significant changes in election procedures. The extension to September 30 will ensure that the EAVS data are as accurate and comprehensive as possible, supporting the EAC's mission to improve election administration and voter experience.

Authorize and Appropriate Funding to Conduct a Study on Election Staffing Challenges and Solutions to Improve Federal Elections

The EAC recommends that Congress authorize and appropriate funds to conduct a study on election staffing challenges and solutions to improve federal elections, pursuant to its mandate under HAVA Section 241.

HAVA mandated the EAC to conduct studies and issue reports to improve the administration of federal elections. Recent elections have indicated challenges in recruiting and retaining an election workforce. Additional funding would provide detailed information on the current state of election staffing and enhance understanding of the necessary support to maintain a resilient and effective election workforce.

Amend HAVA to Allow Greater Operational Efficiency of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee

Amend section 221(c)(1) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. § 20961(c)(1)) as follows:

“The Development Committee shall be composed of the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (who shall serve as its chair), together with a group of 14 other individuals appointed jointly by the Commission and the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, consisting of the following:...”

The statutorily mandated Technical Guidelines Development Committee is charged with helping the Executive Director of the Commission develop the voluntary voting system guidelines. Currently, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee is chaired by the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). All other members are appointed jointly by the Commission and the Director of NIST. As the voluntary voting system guidelines are the core responsibility of the EAC and only a secondary consideration for the Director of NIST, there have been long delays in getting members of the committee appointed. As such, the EAC recommends removing the Director as Chair and allowing the EAC to appoint members. This would create efficiencies in allowing

vacancies to be filled faster, ensuring full membership when the Technical Guidelines Development Committee is required to meet.

Authorize and Appropriate Funding for Poll Worker Recruitment, Training, and Retention

The EAC recommends that Congress allocate dedicated federal funding to support the recruitment, training, and retention of poll workers.

Poll workers are critical in administering elections, performing essential duties such as setting up voting equipment, verifying voter identities, and providing ballots. However, 47.9% of jurisdictions reported facing significant challenges in recruiting and retaining a sufficient number of poll workers for the 2024 general election.

The initial funding provided under HAVA was instrumental in modernizing the nation's voting infrastructure. However, the challenges faced by election officials today require continued investment in the human resources that support election administration. Federal funding will ensure that states and jurisdictions have the necessary resources to maintain a robust and well-prepared workforce of poll workers, which is essential for the smooth and secure administration of federal elections.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Overview Table 1: Mail Voting in the 2024 General Election

State	% Turnout by Mail	Total Mail Ballots Transmitted	Total Mail Ballots Returned	% Mail Ballots Returned	Mail Ballots Counted	
					Total	% of Returned
Alabama	5.5%	140,558	--	--	126,018	--
Alaska [1]	14.3%	60,695	49,616	81.7%	48,744	98.2%
American Samoa [2]	1.9%	207	190	91.8%	189	99.5%
Arizona [3]	74.7%	3,582,082	2,859,348	79.8%	2,816,885	98.5%
Arkansas	2.1%	29,173	25,976	89.0%	24,552	94.5%
California	80.8%	23,003,434	13,185,566	57.3%	13,062,318	99.1%
Colorado [4]	91.3%	4,090,266	3,000,301	73.4%	2,957,550	98.6%
Connecticut	6.5%	129,996	--	--	127,354	--
Delaware	6.5%	40,728	35,475	87.1%	33,659	94.9%
District of Columbia	51.1%	453,858	169,280	37.3%	168,111	99.3%
Florida [5]	26.8%	3,524,965	2,960,238	84.0%	2,947,371	99.6%
Georgia [6]	5.1%	327,241	273,512	83.6%	268,751	98.3%
Guam [7]	0.3%	77	54	70.1%	45	83.3%
Hawaii	92.5%	755,841	487,239	64.5%	483,078	99.1%
Idaho [8]	19.6%	196,032	182,434	93.1%	179,777	98.5%
Illinois [9]	17.8%	1,177,760	1,030,362	87.5%	1,022,256	99.2%
Indiana [10]	53.7%	1,616,735	1,607,247	99.4%	1,603,815	99.8%
Iowa	--	235,170	221,210	94.1%	220,041	99.5%
Kansas	11.0%	165,077	149,591	90.6%	149,350	99.8%
Kentucky	5.6%	131,762	120,400	91.4%	116,324	96.6%
Louisiana [11]	5.9%	167,577	122,627	73.2%	119,706	97.6%
Maine [12]	25.5%	224,646	215,753	96.0%	215,242	99.8%
Maryland	24.6%	878,815	747,040	85.0%	744,244	99.6%
Massachusetts [13]	33.4%	1,349,590	1,186,310	87.9%	1,173,112	98.9%
Michigan	35.4%	2,213,167	2,081,265	94.0%	2,017,704	96.9%
Minnesota	13.7%	576,563	455,698	79.0%	446,576	98.0%
Mississippi [14]	--	28,558	--	--	--	--
Missouri	5.7%	199,327	183,764	92.2%	178,526	97.1%
Montana [15]	--	503,295	432,394	85.9%	430,159	99.5%
Nebraska [16]	31.8%	323,237	308,601	95.5%	307,135	99.5%
Nevada	44.1%	2,069,339	669,445	32.4%	656,140	98.0%
New Hampshire	11.2%	98,762	94,362	95.5%	92,945	98.5%
New Jersey [17]	19.2%	1,100,762	839,944	76.3%	828,200	98.6%

State	% Turnout by Mail	Total Mail Ballots Transmitted	Total Mail Ballots Returned	% Mail Ballots Returned	Mail Ballots Counted	
					Total	% of Returned
New Mexico	12.0%	122,478	112,494	91.8%	111,527	99.1%
New York	10.0%	975,377	862,737	88.5%	836,987	97.0%
North Carolina [18]	5.2%	451,176	307,185	68.1%	298,269	97.1%
North Dakota	24.0%	94,676	89,930	95.0%	89,429	99.4%
Northern Mariana Islands	7.3%	1,168	--	--	--	--
Ohio	18.1%	1,131,278	1,066,229	94.2%	1,058,400	99.3%
Oklahoma	6.3%	124,664	103,025	82.6%	98,548	95.7%
Oregon [19]	99.3%	3,038,435	2,291,579	75.4%	2,253,114	98.3%
Pennsylvania [20]	27.3%	2,204,273	1,952,372	88.6%	1,933,102	99.0%
Puerto Rico [21]	10.3%	149,339	134,396	90.0%	132,157	98.3%
Rhode Island	10.0%	56,663	52,301	92.3%	51,995	99.4%
South Carolina	3.8%	108,922	101,585	93.3%	98,782	97.2%
South Dakota	36.6%	155,015	152,146	98.1%	151,762	99.7%
Tennessee	2.8%	98,452	88,748	90.1%	86,904	97.9%
Texas	3.3%	463,200	398,270	86.0%	384,221	96.5%
U.S. Virgin Islands	3.8%	648	613	94.6%	613	100.0%
Utah	91.5%	1,475,522	1,268,103	85.9%	1,239,070	97.7%
Vermont [22]	64.7%	441,666	237,565	53.8%	240,375	101.2%
Virginia	10.5%	531,154	479,139	90.2%	474,332	99.0%
Washington [23]	98.5%	5,169,231	3,927,132	76.0%	3,890,945	99.1%
West Virginia	2.9%	24,830	22,624	91.1%	22,377	98.9%
Wisconsin [24]	16.6%	614,367	575,257	93.6%	572,434	99.5%
Wyoming	14.1%	39,842	38,421	96.4%	38,217	99.5%
U.S. Total	30.3%	66,867,671	47,957,093	72.0%	47,629,437	98.8%



State	Mail Ballots Not Counted		Total Drop Boxes	Ballots Returned by Drop Box		Mail Ballots That Underwent Curing	
	Total	% of Returned		Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Alabama	1,779	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska [1]	872	1.8%	5	--	--	--	--
American Samoa [2]	1	0.5%	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona [3]	25,071	0.9%	544	411,280	14.4%	55,010	1.9%
Arkansas	2,274	8.8%	--	--	--	209	0.8%
California	123,248	0.9%	2,854	6,200,937	47.0%	153,097	1.2%
Colorado [4]	42,751	1.4%	434	317,337	10.6%	65,629	2.2%
Connecticut	2,642	--	201	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1,816	5.1%	--	--	--	33	0.1%
District of Columbia	1,169	0.7%	55	96,610	57.1%	1,487	0.9%
Florida [5]	21,126	0.7%	542	745,254	25.2%	32,652	1.1%
Georgia [6]	4,761	1.7%	196	--	--	--	--
Guam [7]	9	16.7%	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	4,161	0.9%	62	190,545	39.1%	6,979	1.4%
Idaho [8]	2,657	1.5%	41	--	--	--	--
Illinois [9]	16,559	1.6%	510	156,532	15.2%	9,474	0.9%
Indiana [10]	3,432	0.2%	--	--	--	4,756	0.3%
Iowa	1,169	0.5%	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	561	0.4%	154	59,925	40.1%	2,919	2.0%
Kentucky	4,076	3.4%	186	49,258	40.9%	5,873	4.9%
Louisiana [11]	2,921	2.4%	--	--	--	3,608	2.9%
Maine [12]	511	0.2%	359	--	--	--	--
Maryland	2,796	0.4%	286	363,317	48.6%	1,124	0.2%
Massachusetts [13]	13,198	1.1%	874	--	--	--	--
Michigan	63,561	3.1%	1,711	--	--	16,862	0.8%
Minnesota	9,122	2.0%	53	--	--	--	--
Mississippi [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	5,238	2.9%	--	--	--	--	--
Montana [15]	2,235	0.5%	--	--	--	10,440	2.4%
Nebraska [16]	1,466	0.5%	121	216,022	70.0%	1,322	0.4%
Nevada	13,305	2.0%	342	299,601	44.8%	32,909	4.9%
New Hampshire	1,552	1.6%	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [17]	11,191	1.3%	448	398,300	47.4%	--	--
New Mexico	967	0.9%	62	6,533	5.8%	1,614	1.4%
New York	25,750	3.0%	--	--	--	23,235	2.7%

State	Mail Ballots Not Counted		Total Drop Boxes	Ballots Returned by Drop Box		Mail Ballots That Underwent Curing	
	Total	% of Returned		Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
North Carolina [18]	8,916	2.9%	--	--	--	5,539	1.8%
North Dakota	501	0.6%	63	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	13	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	8,335	0.8%	90	181,688	17.0%	5,326	0.5%
Oklahoma	4,477	4.3%	--	--	--	--	--
Oregon [19]	38,465	1.7%	318	1,484,470	64.8%	--	--
Pennsylvania [20]	19,270	1.0%	175	--	--	--	--
Puerto Rico [21]	2,239	1.7%	--	--	--	7,130	5.3%
Rhode Island	306	0.6%	459	21,374	40.9%	327	0.6%
South Carolina	2,803	2.8%	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	738	0.5%	--	--	--	--	--
Tennessee	1,844	2.1%	--	--	--	483	0.5%
Texas	14,049	3.5%	--	--	--	23,226	5.8%
U.S. Virgin Islands	6	1.0%	--	--	--	--	--
Utah	23,819	1.9%	308	1,018,405	80.3%	35,410	2.8%
Vermont [22]	467	0.2%	158	--	--	1,320	0.6%
Virginia	4,807	1.0%	2,764	94,192	19.7%	11,903	2.5%
Washington [23]	36,187	0.9%	575	2,616,566	66.6%	65,561	1.7%
West Virginia	247	1.1%	--	--	--	--	--
Wisconsin [24]	2,823	0.5%	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	204	0.5%	8	4,968	12.9%	--	--
U.S. Total	584,463	1.2%	14,958	14,933,114	41.8%	585,457	1.5%

Overview Table 1 Calculation Notes:

- % Turnout by Mail uses $(F1d+F1g)/F1a \times 100$.
- Total Mail Ballots Transmitted uses question C1a.
- Total Mail Ballots Returned uses question C1b.
- % Mail Ballots Returned uses $C1b/C1a \times 100$.
- Mail Ballots Counted, Total uses question C8a.
- Mail Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses $C8a/C1b \times 100$.
- Mail Ballots Not Counted, Total uses question C9a.
- Mail Ballots Not Counted, % of Returned uses $C9a/C1b \times 100$.
- Total Drop Boxes uses question C3a.
- Ballots Returned by Drop Box, Total uses question C6a.
- Ballots Returned by Drop Box, % of Returned uses $C6a/C1b \times 100$.
- Mail Ballots That Underwent Curing, Total uses question C7a.
- Mail Ballots That Underwent Curing, % of Returned uses $C7a/C1b \times 100$.



Overview Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of mail ballots counted and rejected may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- The Total Mail Ballots Transmitted column captures the total number of mailed ballots that states reported transmitting, regardless of whether the ballot was returned or not. The number of ballots transmitted typically exceeds the number of ballots returned because some voters who were transmitted a mailed ballot choose to vote by another mode or to not vote at all. Total Mail Ballots Returned typically exceeds Total Mail Voters because some returned mailed ballots are rejected for not meeting state requirements. Mail Ballots Counted may not match Total Mail Voters because states may have different methodologies for calculating these numbers.
- The Total Mail Ballots Returned column includes both counted and rejected ballots that were returned to election offices.

- [1] Data reported in C1a, C8a, C9, and F1d include ballots sent by electronic transmission (fax and online delivery).
- [2] Some UOCAVA voters are also mail ballot voters.
- [3] Some Arizona counties do not track data for C7. Mohave County noted that the total number reported in the official election canvass could differ from the voting history reports within the voter registration database because the system was live during the entirety of the voting period. This means voters who cast a ballot in the election and who were eligible to vote in Mohave County at the time the ballot was cast, moved from the county, or became ineligible after the ballot was tabulated. This reflects the discrepancy of ballots tabulated versus voters who received voting credit.
- [4] Eight counties were unable to report data on ballots returned via drop box in C6.
- [5] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official. Differences may exist between survey data and official data/reports generated and/or filed by a specific date or deadline.
 1. Official voting history including voting methods for the 2024 General Election, is contained in the post-election legislative recap report pursuant to s. 98.0981, FS.
 2. For official election data and voter registration statistics, refer to statistics: dos.fl.gov/elections/data-statistics/.
- [6] Any ballots received after the certification of the election on November 22, 2024, are considered unreturned. Absentee voter reports in Georgia reflect the status of absentee ballots, but they do not reflect how ballots were delivered. Absentee ballot reports in Georgia track the status of absentee ballots as of a particular moment in time. Therefore, our reports show the number of ballots that were still in the cure process at the conclusion of the election, but they do not show the number of ballots that entered the cure process during the entirety of the election.
- [7] Local law allows for ballots to be transmitted via email, but all ballots must be returned by mail.
- [8] Voters are contacted if their ballot is rejected; however, the curing process is not tracked in the system. Voters can have absentee ballots both rejected and accepted but it is unclear whether it is result of curing.

- [9] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority. The number of Total Mail Voters is lower than Total Mail Ballots Transmitted, Returned, etc., likely because Illinois was unable to gather a completely accurate picture of data from all jurisdictions for this section in the survey.
- [10] County election boards set their own policies but drop boxes must be under county election board control based on IC 3-11-10-24. Counties do not track data related to drop boxes in the statewide voter registration system.
- [11] The data reported in C8 include voters who were given credit for voting but whose ballots may have been blank or otherwise invalid for acceptance. This explains the mismatch with data reported in F1d and F1g.
- [12] Provisional ballots are not counted separately from other ballots. Provisional ballot totals are reflected in F1b, F1d, or F1f as applicable.
- [13] Drop box returns are not tracked separately from hand-delivered ballots. Voters can correct errors by completing a new ballot and affidavit, which are not tracked separately.
- [14] Mississippi is unable to provide data in C1 because this series of questions specifically asks for mail-in ballots and not absentee ballots. The state can only provide the total number of absentee ballots returned, which includes in-person and mail-in. The state's election management system does not distinguish between the two.
- [15] Montana does not track data on ballots returned via drop box. Data reported in C8 are the number of ballots returned and accepted. Ballot secrecy laws prevent staff from opening the secrecy envelope before the ballot is separated from the voter information. A ballot secrecy envelope may not contain an actual ballot. Because of this, Montana does not report details in F1 for ballots that were counted.
- [16] Nineteen counties in Nebraska are entirely vote by mail and some precincts are also vote by mail.
- [17] F1a is taken from statewide certified results. These results do not break down the ballots cast by Election Day (F1b) and early voting (F1f) ballots cast. Data are unavailable for ballots not successfully cured because the data are not specifically recorded.
- [18] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets. UOCAVA ballots are reported with mail ballots.
- [19] The data reported in F1 include ballots returned and accepted for counting. C7 data are not tracked.
- [20] Data on ballots collected via drop boxes are not tracked in the system. Whether a ballot undergoes curing and its final status is not recorded.
- [21] Puerto Rico experienced a significant increase in mail ballot requests compared to 2020. This increase is due to an extensive promotion campaign encouraging the use of mail voting, as well as the elimination of early voting at the precinct level, which led more voters to opt for mail ballots.
- [22] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can. Vermont has no way of capturing and tracking the ballots received via a drop box.
- [23] Data reported on cured ballots include only those cured due to non-matching or missing signatures. Reports of in-person voters before Election Day reflect county data on individuals who cast their ballots at voting centers using accessible voting units (AVU). However, ballots cast using AVUs are not tracked separately from mail ballots.
- [24] Due to a recent court ruling, municipal clerks may (but are not required to) choose to use drop boxes in their jurisdictions as a lawful method of absentee ballot return. *Priorities USA v. Wis. Elections Comm'n*, 2024 WI 32, 412 Wis. 2d 594, 8 N.W.3d 429. In the State of Wisconsin, municipalities are not required to report their use of drop boxes with the state. A total of 77 municipalities have reported the use of 113 drop boxes; however, this number is an incomplete reporting. Data in C8a will not match exactly with data in F1d due to how voter record merges happen in our database. When two voter records for the same voter are merged together, the election participation record moves with the merge, but the absentee ballot record does not. The system does not see them as being associated to the same voter. In Section C, we look only at absentee ballot records whereas in Section F, we



look for election participation and an absentee ballot record. Those voters not recorded in F1d are recorded in F1h. Wisconsin does not gather data on whether or how absentee ballots may have been received back by the clerk with missing data or whether these missing data were cured.

Overview Table 2: In-Person Voting and Other Modes of Voting

State	In-Person Election Day Voters		In-Person Early Voters		Provisional Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	175,541	51.5%	92,281	27.1%	14,786	4.3%
American Samoa [1]	9,035	88.4%	991	9.7%	0	0.0%
Arizona [2]	496,753	14.3%	349,129	10.0%	15,699	0.5%
Arkansas	294,235	26.2%	810,714	72.2%	1,389	0.1%
California	1,836,518	11.4%	878,489	5.4%	289,935	1.8%
Colorado	141,556	4.4%	109,209	3.4%	205	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	715,275	39.3%	36	0.0%
Delaware	268,718	52.2%	210,295	40.9%	14	0.0%
District of Columbia	82,396	25.1%	72,914	22.2%	93	0.0%
Florida [3]	2,596,761	23.6%	5,364,821	48.8%	6,168	0.1%
Georgia [4]	1,239,125	23.4%	3,768,395	71.1%	3,718	0.1%
Guam	24,291	80.2%	5,774	19.1%	65	0.2%
Hawaii	0	0.0%	39,158	7.5%	0	0.0%
Idaho	508,734	55.4%	225,973	24.6%	--	--
Illinois [5]	2,666,185	46.6%	2,001,203	35.0%	8,316	0.1%
Indiana	1,372,508	46.0%	1,397,345	46.8%	1,939	0.1%
Iowa	--	--	--	--	749	0.0%
Kansas	604,319	45.0%	557,906	41.6%	27,441	2.0%
Kentucky	1,267,653	60.8%	687,057	32.9%	194	0.0%
Louisiana	1,047,445	51.8%	849,784	42.0%	535	0.0%
Maine [6]	463,500	55.0%	157,116	18.6%	--	--
Maryland	1,145,134	37.8%	974,945	32.2%	145,763	4.8%
Massachusetts	1,713,191	48.8%	600,225	17.1%	1,797	0.1%
Michigan	2,453,252	43.0%	1,214,409	21.3%	10	0.0%
Minnesota	1,960,360	59.9%	850,705	26.0%	--	--
Mississippi [7]	1,010,752	82.5%	--	--	14,685	1.2%
Missouri	2,067,247	66.1%	867,936	27.8%	5,534	0.2%
Montana [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nebraska	564,660	58.5%	80,304	8.3%	10,651	1.1%
Nevada	247,291	16.6%	543,461	36.6%	28,242	1.9%
New Hampshire	730,273	88.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
New Jersey [9]	--	--	--	--	116,528	2.7%
New Mexico	252,629	27.2%	556,395	60.0%	1,597	0.2%
New York	4,320,467	51.5%	2,986,704	35.6%	194,588	2.3%
North Carolina [10]	1,175,905	20.4%	4,224,909	73.4%	24,989	0.4%
North Dakota	181,998	48.9%	99,007	26.6%	--	--



State	In-Person Election Day Voters		In-Person Early Voters		Provisional Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	5,571	44.2%	6,124	48.6%	0	0.0%
Ohio	3,130,240	53.5%	1,536,604	26.3%	104,848	1.8%
Oklahoma	1,174,876	74.7%	294,037	18.7%	1,598	0.1%
Oregon [11]	--	--	--	--	52	0.0%
Pennsylvania [12]	5,043,808	71.3%	--	--	69,506	1.0%
Puerto Rico	1,071,954	83.5%	4,004	0.3%	12,576	1.0%
Rhode Island	290,699	55.7%	173,547	33.2%	2,514	0.5%
South Carolina	977,341	38.1%	1,476,843	57.5%	4,517	0.2%
South Dakota	273,648	62.8%	0	0.0%	201	0.0%
Tennessee	856,491	27.7%	2,132,535	69.0%	3,139	0.1%
Texas	2,329,171	20.3%	8,703,181	75.8%	20,511	0.2%
U.S. Virgin Islands	6,832	42.8%	8,506	53.3%	1	0.0%
Utah	104,350	7.1%	36,381	2.5%	41,114	2.8%
Vermont [13]	122,386	33.8%	2,631	0.7%	0	0.0%
Virginia	2,053,905	45.5%	1,840,239	40.8%	111,390	2.5%
Washington [14]	--	--	171	0.0%	12	0.0%
West Virginia	431,925	56.2%	310,305	40.3%	2,905	0.4%
Wisconsin [15]	1,870,285	54.5%	977,648	28.5%	57	0.0%
Wyoming	154,579	57.0%	76,943	28.4%	63	0.0%
U.S. Total	52,816,493	37.4%	48,872,528	35.2%	1,290,670	0.9%

State	UOCAVA Voters		Other Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--
Alaska	9,629	2.8%	--	--
American Samoa [1]	132	1.3%	--	--
Arizona [2]	18,449	0.5%	--	--
Arkansas	898	0.1%	60	0.0%
California	83,937	0.5%	13,133	0.1%
Colorado	32,234	1.0%	--	--
Connecticut	--	--	--	--
Delaware	1,681	0.3%	--	--
District of Columbia	5,357	1.6%	--	--
Florida [3]	85,692	0.8%	7	0.0%
Georgia [4]	17,511	0.3%	--	--
Guam	49	0.2%	--	--
Hawaii	--	--	--	--
Idaho	2,985	0.3%	--	--
Illinois [5]	18,487	0.3%	12,371	0.2%
Indiana	7,629	0.3%	--	--
Iowa	--	--	--	--
Kansas	5,160	0.4%	--	--
Kentucky	3,078	0.1%	11,784	0.6%
Louisiana	4,130	0.2%	--	--
Maine [6]	6,589	0.8%	--	--
Maryland	18,727	0.6%	--	--
Massachusetts	24,605	0.7%	--	--
Michigan	21,128	0.4%	--	--
Minnesota	13,428	0.4%	--	--
Mississippi [7]	--	--	--	--
Missouri	7,604	0.2%	--	--
Montana [8]	--	--	--	--
Nebraska	2,395	0.2%	--	--
Nevada	11,163	0.8%	--	--
New Hampshire	5,872	0.7%	--	--
New Jersey [9]	22,195	0.5%	--	--
New Mexico	5,775	0.6%	--	--
New York	50,880	0.6%	--	--
North Carolina [10]	32,034	0.6%	--	--
North Dakota	1,540	0.4%	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--
Ohio	17,184	0.3%	2,162	0.0%



State	UOCAVA Voters		Other Voters	
	Total	%	Total	%
Oklahoma	4,215	0.3%	--	--
Oregon [11]	16,442	0.7%	--	--
Pennsylvania [12]	27,854	0.4%	--	--
Puerto Rico	803	0.1%	62,134	4.8%
Rhode Island	3,409	0.7%	--	--
South Carolina	8,921	0.3%	--	--
South Dakota	2,542	0.6%	--	--
Tennessee	11,092	0.4%	--	--
Texas	51,704	0.5%	32	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	--	--
Utah	6,116	0.4%	63	0.0%
Vermont [13]	2,549	0.7%	--	--
Virginia	31,987	0.7%	--	--
Washington [14]	58,682	1.5%	--	--
West Virginia	1,618	0.2%	76	0.0%
Wisconsin [15]	12,617	0.4%	2,921	0.1%
Wyoming	1,321	0.5%	--	--
U.S. Total	780,029	0.5%	104,743	0.2%

Overview Table 2 Calculation Notes:

- In-Person Election Day Voters, Total uses question F1b.
- In-Person Election Day Voters, % uses F1b/F1a x 100.
- In-Person Voters Before Election Day, Total uses question F1f.
- In-Person Voters Before Election Day, % uses F1f/F1a x 100.
- Provisional Voters, Total uses question F1e.
- Provisional Voters, % uses F1e/F1a x 100.
- UOCAVA Voters, Total uses question F1c.
- UOCAVA Voters, % uses F1c/F1a x 100.
- Other Voters, Total uses question F1h.
- Other Voters, % uses F1h/F1a x 100.

Overview Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

- Question F1f includes all voters who participated in the election in person prior to Election Day. This includes in-person early voting, in-person absentee voting, and any other terminology the state used to refer to in-person voting that took place before Election Day (as reported in question Q34 of the 2024 Policy Survey).
 - Question F1h was not mandatory. States only reported data in this item if they offered another mode of voting aside from those listed in questions F1b-F1g or if there were counted ballots that could not be categorized in questions F1b-F1g.
 - Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentages of turnout by mode in this table and the previous table may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
- [1] Some UOCAVA voters are also mail ballot voters.
 - [2] Mohave County noted that the total number reported in the official election canvass could differ from the voting history reports within the voter registration database due to the system being live during the entirety of the voting period. This means voters who cast a ballot in the election and who were eligible to vote in Mohave County at the time the ballot was cast, moved from the county, or became ineligible after the ballot was tabulated. This reflects the discrepancy of ballots tabulated versus voters who received voting credit.
 - [3] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official. Differences may exist between survey data and official data/reports generated and/or filed by a specific date or deadline. Official voting history including voting methods for the 2024 General Election, is contained in the post-election legislative recap report pursuant to s. 98.0981, FS.
 - [4] The total number of provisional ballots counted in E1b may not exactly match the total in F1e. Data in E1b were collected via survey of county election officials, and data in F1e report the official reported results. Additionally, some provisional ballots were reported in the results category in which they were cast. For example, if a provisional absentee by mail ballot is cast and counted, then the county election official may choose to report the results in the absentee category rather than provisional.
 - [5] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [6] Provisional ballots are not counted separately from other ballots. Provisional ballot totals are reflected in F1b, F1d, or F1f, as applicable.
 - [7] The number of absentee ballots (in-person and mail-in) is calculated together and cannot be separated.
 - [8] The reported number of ballots counted is from the state canvass report. Data in F1b-F1g cannot be provided because some ballots marked for counting in the system were not actually counted because of issues with the ballot.
 - [9] F1a is taken from statewide certified results. These results do not break down the ballots cast by Election Day (F1b) and early voting (F1f) ballots cast.
 - [10] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets. UOCAVA ballots are reported with mail ballots.
 - [11] The data reported in F1 include ballots returned and accepted for counting.
 - [12] The Pennsylvania Department of State cannot provide a number for F1f because in-person return of mail ballots is not explicitly tracked in the voter registration system.
 - [13] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
 - [14] Washington is a vote-by-mail state where voters can register and vote on or before Election Day. The total reported in F1f, which represents voters who cast a ballot at an in-person early voting location and whose ballots were counted, includes individuals who used a disability access unit. The number of in-person voters is based on county reports of those who voted at voting centers using accessible voting units (AVU), but ballots cast via AVUs are not tracked separately from mail ballots.



[15] In Wisconsin, if a UOCAVA voter is in the local area on Election Day or during in-person absentee voting, they may choose to vote through one of those methods instead of an absentee ballot by mail. In those cases, the voter is not recorded in the UOCAVA section of the EAVS but instead under the sections that apply to voting at the polls or in-person absentee. In Wisconsin, provisional ballot data has to be recorded into the database on election night, any voters who register to vote in person at their polling places on Election Day are recorded after Election Day as state law permits local clerks 45 days to enter election data after a general election. Wis. Stat. § 6.33(5)(a)3. These two records then cannot be linked in the state's voter registration database. Therefore, data in the section about provisional ballots specifically will show more provisional ballots counted than the section that shows participations received by having a provisional counted. Other modes of voting included voters who voted absentee with incomplete data.

Overview Table 3: Polling Places and Poll Workers

State	Total Precincts	Total Polling Places		Total Poll Workers	
		Election Day	Early Voting	Election Day	Early Voting
Alabama	2,283	2,010	--	--	--
Alaska [1]	402	412	100	2,751	233
American Samoa	17	41	1	295	5
Arizona [2]	1,735	730	241	7,551	1,834
Arkansas	2,910	7,200	17,339	5,366	2,684
California [3]	25,127	3,777	1,807	39,482	21,901
Colorado	3,243	366	325	7,307	6,629
Connecticut	718	739	171	--	--
Delaware	537	282	19	3,312	485
District of Columbia	144	75	25	1,071	1,367
Florida [4]	5,798	4,024	467	42,664	13,484
Georgia [5]	2,699	2,292	366	13,736	4,844
Guam [6]	72	22	1	360	22
Hawaii	248	--	13	198	129
Idaho [7]	976	814	50	--	--
Illinois [8]	8,498	5,040	394	37,994	3,730
Indiana [9]	4,982	1,642	304	14,425	2,532
Iowa [10]	1,653	1,663	99	--	--
Kansas	4,141	1,042	108	8,507	1,879
Kentucky	3,117	1,475	252	11,988	2,376
Louisiana [11]	3,805	1,955	111	16,580	--
Maine	533	514	483	6,251	--
Maryland	1,991	1,458	97	22,735	7,750
Massachusetts [12]	2,389	1,222	469	9,556	--
Michigan	4,340	3,135	2,034	33,858	11,505
Minnesota	4,103	2,578	247	33,012	1,874
Mississippi	1,746	1,746	92	--	--
Missouri [13]	3,974	2,240	--	18,739	--
Montana	727	390	77	--	--
Nebraska	1,326	997	93	7,646	238
Nevada	1,667	248	94	3,510	1,951
New Hampshire [14]	333	307	--	3,564	--
New Jersey [15]	6,402	4,518	160	13,200	852
New Mexico [16]	2,169	548	142	3,982	1,119
New York	13,324	4,758	439	67,010	20,001



State	Total Precincts	Total Polling Places		Total Poll Workers	
		Election Day	Early Voting	Election Day	Early Voting
North Carolina [17]	2,659	2,748	612	31,194	11,693
North Dakota	385	172	14	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	7	13	3	96	23
Ohio	8,868	3,231	85	40,531	1,285
Oklahoma	1,986	1,980	87	6,504	765
Oregon [18]	1,304	36	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [19]	9,153	7,752	--	46,246	--
Puerto Rico [20]	114	1,241	96	--	--
Rhode Island	453	430	39	3,709	--
South Carolina [21]	2,308	2,005	137	16,085	1,903
South Dakota	710	490	12	2,629	68
Tennessee	1,996	1,759	228	16,216	3,067
Texas	9,704	5,620	1,355	37,811	16,544
U.S. Virgin Islands	22	11	3	140	30
Utah	2,979	103	44	1,047	361
Vermont [22]	262	262	247	--	--
Virginia	2,865	2,472	201	26,090	3,670
Washington [23]	8,111	--	67	--	--
West Virginia	1,652	1,437	95	8,418	477
Wisconsin [24]	3,603	2,696	533	--	--
Wyoming [25]	438	218	24	2,068	11
U.S. Total	177,708	94,936	30,502	675,434	149,321

State	Poll Workers' Ages						% of New Poll Workers
	% Age <18	% Age 18-25	% Age 26-40	% Age 41-60	% Age 61-70	% Age 71+	
Alabama	0.2%	1.6%	4.4%	22.5%	33.3%	38.0%	1.0%
Alaska [1]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona [2]	1.1%	2.3%	6.7%	23.0%	34.1%	32.7%	20.0%
Arkansas	2.0%	1.8%	4.0%	17.1%	36.9%	38.1%	12.9%
California [3]	13.7%	6.5%	12.6%	23.8%	22.5%	20.9%	22.9%
Colorado	2.9%	1.9%	4.5%	16.7%	38.4%	35.7%	30.7%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	0.0%	3.1%	6.2%	24.1%	35.8%	30.8%	--
District of Columbia	5.0%	10.8%	26.1%	35.9%	14.7%	7.5%	72.3%
Florida [4]	0.4%	2.7%	6.3%	23.2%	33.5%	33.8%	14.8%
Georgia [5]	0.0%	2.3%	4.2%	26.3%	41.8%	25.4%	6.7%
Guam [6]	0.0%	20.0%	30.8%	33.1%	12.8%	3.3%	--
Hawaii	0.0%	2.1%	3.2%	24.5%	34.0%	36.2%	6.0%
Idaho [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois [8]	10.7%	5.9%	9.0%	23.9%	27.9%	22.6%	22.6%
Indiana [9]	5.4%	4.2%	10.1%	21.3%	33.1%	25.9%	--
Iowa [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	2.8%	2.5%	5.5%	18.9%	34.1%	36.3%	21.2%
Kentucky	0.3%	3.6%	10.2%	31.1%	31.1%	23.7%	8.9%
Louisiana [11]	--	--	--	--	--	--	13.3%
Maine	0.6%	2.0%	7.4%	26.2%	33.4%	30.4%	--
Maryland	3.6%	4.1%	8.2%	28.4%	32.1%	23.7%	--
Massachusetts [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan	1.2%	3.0%	7.3%	22.5%	34.2%	31.9%	16.2%
Minnesota	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.7%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [13]	3.5%	2.3%	6.5%	20.3%	35.0%	32.5%	--
Montana	0.1%	1.4%	4.3%	17.4%	36.8%	40.1%	--
Nebraska	0.2%	1.5%	9.4%	27.1%	31.9%	29.9%	17.2%
Nevada	2.2%	3.6%	8.4%	24.3%	32.0%	29.6%	40.2%
New Hampshire [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico [16]	4.2%	9.1%	10.8%	21.7%	27.0%	27.1%	10.2%
New York	0.4%	7.2%	14.3%	27.7%	27.4%	23.0%	19.5%



State	Poll Workers' Ages						% of New Poll Workers
	% Age <18	% Age 18-25	% Age 26-40	% Age 41-60	% Age 61-70	% Age 71+	
North Carolina [17]	1.7%	2.4%	5.8%	22.3%	35.0%	32.9%	19.2%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	2.9%	3.8%	7.6%	23.2%	33.9%	28.5%	16.1%
Oklahoma	0.0%	0.5%	3.3%	13.9%	33.8%	48.5%	5.5%
Oregon [18]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [19]	2.6%	5.6%	11.5%	25.7%	30.7%	23.9%	0.0%
Puerto Rico [20]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	3.3%	4.1%	7.2%	21.3%	29.5%	34.6%	--
South Carolina [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	0.1%	0.6%	4.3%	19.7%	40.7%	34.6%	7.7%
Tennessee	2.9%	2.6%	5.9%	19.2%	33.6%	35.8%	17.3%
Texas	6.5%	7.8%	7.9%	22.9%	29.6%	25.3%	21.3%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	7.1%	17.9%	28.6%	35.7%	10.7%	17.9%
Utah	--	--	--	--	--	--	40.3%
Vermont [22]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Washington [23]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
West Virginia	0.3%	5.7%	12.5%	28.3%	31.1%	22.1%	8.2%
Wisconsin [24]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming [25]	0.7%	1.2%	5.1%	22.9%	36.1%	34.0%	--
U.S. Total	3.3%	4.5%	9.1%	24.0%	31.1%	28.1%	15.5%

Overview Table 3 Calculation Notes:

- Total Precincts uses question D1a.
- Total Polling Places, Election Day uses question D3a.
- Total Polling Places, Early Voting uses question D4a.
- Total Poll Workers, Election Day uses question D5a.
- Total Poll Workers, Early Voting uses question D6a.
- Poll Workers' Ages, % Age <18 uses $D7b / (\text{sum of } D7b-D7g) \times 100$.
- Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 18-25 uses $D7c / (\text{sum of } D7b-D7g) \times 100$.
- Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 26-40 uses $D7d / (\text{sum of } D7b-D7g) \times 100$.
- Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 41-60 uses $D7e / (\text{sum of } D7b-D7g) \times 100$.
- Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 61-70 uses $D7f / (\text{sum of } D7b-D7g) \times 100$.
- Poll Workers' Ages, % Age 71+ uses $D7g / (\text{sum of } D7b-D7g) \times 100$.
- % of New Poll Workers uses $D9a / D7a \times 100$.

Overview Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - The sum of the number of Election Day poll workers (D5a) and the number of early voting poll workers (D6a) may not equal the total number of poll workers reported (D7a) because the instructions for D7a instructed respondents to count poll workers in D7a only once regardless of how many days of voting the poll worker assisted with.
 - Because percentages for each age category were calculated independently, the percentages for each age category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
 - In calculating percentages for poll worker age categories, the sum of questions D7b-D7g was used instead of D7a because some states did not report data in all age categories.
 - States that only track data for poll workers who are under age 18 do not have data on poll worker ages displayed in this table.
-
- [1] Alaska only tracks data on the ages of poll workers under the age of 18.
 - [2] Some Arizona counties do not gather data on poll worker ages or all age categories. Maricopa County has 935 precincts, which includes 29 without any residents or voters.
 - [3] Some California jurisdictions were unable to report data on poll worker ages.
 - [4] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
 - [5] Information in D7 was collected through a survey distributed by the Georgia Secretary of State's elections division. The data in D7a represent the sum of the number of poll workers that worked in early voting and on Election Day. It is possible that a single individual could have been counted twice.
 - [6] Early voting is staffed with full-time employees.
 - [7] Data on ages of poll workers were not tracked.
 - [8] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [9] There are instances of calculation errors by the counties who did not report all of their poll worker's ages, but the state chose to report exactly what the county responded with in their CEB-9 Section ii.
 - [10] Satellite polling locations before Election Day are allowed in Iowa by petition, but data are not readily available for the state from each county on if or how many satellites were operated.
 - [11] The Department of State cannot distinguish between poll workers who worked on Election Day and those who worked during early voting. The total in D5 includes both Election Day and early voting poll workers. The Department of State does not track the ages of poll workers.
 - [12] Early voting staff varied each day of early voting and was not reported by jurisdictions. Poll workers are not reported by age.
 - [13] At least one polling place is a central office. Information is not available for D4 but each county at least maintained its own office. The number of absentee poll workers was not available, but most counties used office staff.
 - [14] In-person absentee voting is permissible in the town or city clerk's office over the counter. The town or city clerk's office is not a polling place. Information on poll workers provided in D5 and D6 is the minimum required. Totals vary by location.



- [15]** Some counties do not use the poll worker module of the voter registration system. Age is not tracked for reporting.
- [16]** Some New Mexico counties do not track poll worker age data.
- [17]** The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets. Ages of some poll workers are unknown.
- [18]** Oregon is a wholly vote-by-mail state and has no polling places or traditional poll workers. Counties may hire temporary staff as necessary to conduct an election. The number of temporary staff is not tracked.
- [19]** County election boards can maintain two or more precincts at the same polling location. County election boards are responsible for staffing polling places based on statutory requirements. The Department of State collects the number of poll workers via a survey and the total number of poll workers represented in this section would be impacted by counties not answering the survey by the data submission deadlines.
- [20]** Currently, there are no available data on poll workers. This information will not be known until the list deputation process is complete, which is expected to be finalized by June 2025. Poll workers are officials selected by political parties.
- [21]** South Carolina only tracks data on the ages of poll workers under the age of 18.
- [22]** Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [23]** Washington does not have traditional polling places, as it conducts elections primarily by mail. Instead, voting centers are available throughout the entire voting period rather than on a single designated day. Each county is required to have at least two certified election administrators and may hire election workers to assist with processing returned ballots.
- [24]** Physical Election Day polling places cannot be located in election offices. Municipalities may provide information about in-person absentee voting locations with the state, but they are not required to. Therefore, data cannot be provided for all municipalities. Where these data were provided, the data cannot distinguish whether the in-person absentee voting locations are an election office or another location. Wisconsin no longer tracks data on poll workers.
- [25]** Data are not available for how many poll workers worked during both early voting and Election Day.

Overview Table 4: Election Technology and Ballot Counting

State	Total Number of Voting Systems Deployed	DRE Without VVPAT		DRE With VVPAT		Ballot Marking Devices	
		Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	718	--	--	145	20.2%	275	38.3%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona [1]	1,806	--	--	18	1.0%	1,181	65.4%
Arkansas	6,312	77	1.2%	691	10.9%	4,344	68.8%
California	23,670	--	--	--	--	22,157	93.6%
Colorado	1,727	--	--	--	--	1,545	89.5%
Connecticut	2,154	--	--	--	--	718	33.3%
Delaware	1,363	--	--	1,353	99.3%	--	--
District of Columbia	440	--	--	--	--	337	76.6%
Florida [2]	13,882	--	--	--	--	5,177	37.3%
Georgia	22,214	--	--	--	--	19,441	87.5%
Guam	10	--	--	--	--	6	60.0%
Hawaii	108	--	--	--	--	62	57.4%
Idaho [3]	1,962	--	--	--	--	1,238	63.1%
Illinois [4]	18,911	--	--	46	0.2%	10,881	57.5%
Indiana	14,494	--	--	7,854	54.2%	5,266	36.3%
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	8,419	--	--	--	--	5,182	61.6%
Kentucky	5,903	--	--	--	--	2,808	47.6%
Louisiana	9,612	9,535	99.2%	--	--	--	--
Maine	1,116	--	--	--	--	516	46.2%
Maryland	6,104	--	--	--	--	6,104	100.0%
Massachusetts [5]	4,637	--	--	--	--	1,671	36.0%
Michigan	4,340	--	--	--	--	4,340	100.0%
Minnesota	5,939	--	--	--	--	2,963	49.9%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	4,930	--	--	--	--	2,289	46.4%
Montana [6]	508	--	--	--	--	367	72.2%
Nebraska	1,443	--	--	--	--	1,284	89.0%
Nevada	6,597	--	--	6,428	97.4%	121	1.8%
New Hampshire	596	--	--	--	--	307	51.5%



State	Total Number of Voting Systems Deployed	DRE Without VVPAT		DRE With VVPAT		Ballot Marking Devices	
		Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed
New Jersey	11,226	--	--	--	--	11,161	99.4%
New Mexico	1,575	--	--	--	--	--	--
New York	16,175	--	--	--	--	5,382	33.3%
North Carolina [7]	9,775	--	--	--	--	6,192	63.3%
North Dakota	939	--	--	--	--	429	45.7%
Northern Mariana Islands	6	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	24,764	--	--	5,865	23.7%	13,440	54.3%
Oklahoma	2,071	--	--	--	--	--	--
Oregon	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [8]	24,079	--	--	--	--	13,044	54.2%
Puerto Rico	4,785	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	1,202	--	--	--	--	495	41.2%
South Carolina	18,805	--	--	--	--	15,659	83.3%
South Dakota	508	--	--	--	--	437	86.0%
Tennessee	9,259	--	--	2,930	31.6%	4,632	50.0%
Texas	55,522	1,030	1.9%	--	--	46,027	82.9%
U.S. Virgin Islands	130	--	--	--	--	100	76.9%
Utah	933	--	--	667	71.5%	169	18.1%
Vermont [9]	522	--	--	260	49.8%	262	50.2%
Virginia	6,857	--	--	--	--	3,066	44.7%
Washington	179	--	--	--	--	94	52.5%
West Virginia	7,551	--	--	--	--	5,872	77.8%
Wisconsin [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	904	--	--	--	--	510	56.4%
U.S. Total	367,682	10,642	2.9%	26,257	7.1%	227,551	61.9%

State	Scanners		Hand Counting		Electronic Poll Books	
	Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	Total Jurisdictions	% of Jurisdictions	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	% of Jurisdictions
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	298	41.5%	1	100.0%	--	--
American Samoa	--	--	1	100.0%	--	--
Arizona [1]	607	33.6%	0	--	3,765	100.0%
Arkansas	1,200	19.0%	3	4.0%	3,072	97.3%
California	1,513	6.4%	0	--	12,360	60.3%
Colorado	182	10.5%	1	1.6%	--	100.0%
Connecticut	1,436	66.7%	0	--	--	--
Delaware	10	0.7%	0	--	840	100.0%
District of Columbia	103	23.4%	0	--	153	100.0%
Florida [2]	8,705	62.7%	0	--	18,038	100.0%
Georgia	2,773	12.5%	0	--	6,137	100.0%
Guam	4	40.0%	0	--	--	--
Hawaii	46	42.6%	0	--	--	80.0%
Idaho [3]	724	36.9%	8	18.2%	--	81.8%
Illinois [4]	7,984	42.2%	0	--	10,064	23.1%
Indiana	1,374	9.5%	0	--	5,297	100.0%
Iowa	--	--	0	--	--	100.0%
Kansas	3,237	38.4%	--	--	2,709	81.9%
Kentucky	3,095	52.4%	120	100.0%	5,527	100.0%
Louisiana	77	0.8%	64	100.0%	--	--
Maine	600	53.8%	162	32.6%	--	--
Maryland	--	--	0	--	6,104	100.0%
Massachusetts [5]	2,966	64.0%	351	100.0%	2,502	65.5%
Michigan	--	--	0	--	4,825	100.0%
Minnesota	2,976	50.1%	5	5.7%	6,792	71.3%
Mississippi	--	--	0	--	--	12.2%
Missouri	2,641	53.6%	53	45.7%	6,599	74.1%
Montana [6]	141	27.8%	16	28.6%	--	--
Nebraska	159	11.0%	0	--	--	--
Nevada	48	0.7%	0	--	3,033	100.0%
New Hampshire	289	48.5%	122	38.1%	--	--
New Jersey	65	0.6%	0	--	14,228	100.0%
New Mexico	1,575	100.0%	33	100.0%	1,834	100.0%



State	Scanners		Hand Counting		Electronic Poll Books	
	Total Systems Deployed	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	Total Jurisdictions	% of Jurisdictions	% of Total Voting Systems Deployed	% of Jurisdictions
New York	10,793	66.7%	62	100.0%	17,629	98.4%
North Carolina [7]	3,583	36.7%	0	--	--	78.0%
North Dakota	510	54.3%	0	--	987	100.0%
Northern Mariana Islands	6	100.0%	0	--	--	--
Ohio	5,459	22.0%	3	3.4%	10,759	96.6%
Oklahoma	2,071	100.0%	0	--	--	--
Oregon	--	--	0	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [8]	11,035	45.8%	0	--	6,557	37.3%
Puerto Rico	4,785	100.0%	1	100.0%	8,584	100.0%
Rhode Island	707	58.8%	0	--	1,621	100.0%
South Carolina	3,146	16.7%	46	100.0%	5,378	100.0%
South Dakota	71	14.0%	3	4.5%	168	18.2%
Tennessee	1,697	18.3%	38	40.0%	3,124	44.2%
Texas	8,465	15.2%	9	3.5%	15,751	87.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	30	23.1%	0	--	40	100.0%
Utah	97	10.4%	1	3.4%	637	69.0%
Vermont [9]	--	--	73	29.6%	--	--
Virginia	3,791	55.3%	31	23.3%	7,998	95.5%
Washington	85	47.5%	0	--	--	--
West Virginia	1,679	22.2%	0	--	884	54.5%
Wisconsin [10]	--	--	149	8.0%	--	15.5%
Wyoming	394	43.6%	1	4.3%	130	30.4%
U.S. Total	103,232	28.1%	1,357	21.0%	194,126	39.9%

Overview Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Total Number of Voting Systems Deployed uses the sum of questions F3c_1, F3c_2, F3c_3, F4c_1, F4c_2, F4c_3, F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, and F6c_3.

DRE without VVPAT, Total Systems Deployed uses F3c_1+F3c_2+F3c_3.

DRE without VVPAT, % of Total Voting Systems Deployed uses (F3c_1+F3c_2+F3c_3) / total voting systems from first column x 100.

DRE with VVPAT, Total Systems Deployed uses F4c_1+F4c_2+F4c_3.

DRE with VVPAT, % of Total Voting Systems Deployed uses (F4c_1+F4c_2+F4c_3) / total voting systems from first column x 100.

Ballot Marking Devices, Total Systems Deployed uses F5c_1+F5c_2+F5c_3.

Ballot Marking Devices, % of Total Voting Systems Deployed uses $(F5c_1+F5c_2+F5c_3) / \text{total voting systems from first column} \times 100$.

Scanners, Total Systems Deployed uses $F6c_1+F6c_2+F6c_3$.

Scanners, % of Total Voting Systems Deployed uses $(F6c_1+F6c_2+F6c_3) / \text{total voting systems from first column} \times 100$.

Hand Counting, Total Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F7a.

Hand Counting, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F7a / number of FIPS by state x 100.

Electronic Poll Books, Total Systems Deployed uses $F8c_1+F8c_2+F8c_3$.

Electronic Poll Books, % of Jurisdictions uses the count of the number of jurisdictions that responded "Yes" to F8a / number of FIPS by state x 100.

Overview Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Although other descriptive tables in this chapter use casewise deletion at the state level in calculating percentages, this table does not. When a state reported not using a type of equipment, the number of devices of that type was filled with zero to better capture at the national level the prevalence of each type of election technology or counting method in the 2024 general election.
- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

[1] Some counties used different election equipment for early voting versus Election Day voting.

[2] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.

[3] Use of voting technology not tracked in Idaho's election management system. Data reported are only data provided by counties.

[4] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.

[5] Ballot marking devices are used for voters with disabilities. Jurisdictions that used scanners hand counted provisional ballots.

[6] Ten of 56 counties perform a complete hand count of all ballots. Six additional counties hand count certain types of ballots.

[7] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.

[8] County election boards work with the manufacturer to determine the number of voting machines deployed after reviewing the Secretary's certification report. The department collects the number of machines deployed via a survey and the total number of machines represented in this section would be impacted by counties not answering the survey by the data submission deadlines.

[9] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.

[10] Wisconsin does not track the number of pieces of voting equipment each municipality has, just what type they use. Wisconsin does not allow for direct-recording electronic (DRE) without a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) for any municipalities.



Chapter 2. Election Law and Procedure: The Policy Survey

Key Findings

The 2024 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) provides information about the policy context in which states and territories conducted the 2024 general election.¹ This survey asked states to identify the election laws and procedures that govern voter registration, election technology, voter eligibility, modes of voting, and election audits in their state. Notable findings from this survey include:

- Top-down voter registration databases continue to be the most common type of database system reported, used by nearly three-quarters of states.
- A majority of states reported making automatic and electronic voter registration programs available. Each of these states permits automatic or electronic registration at their state's motor vehicle agency, and some states make it available through at least one other government agency.
- For the 2024 general election, just over half of states allowed a form of same day voter registration, in which individuals can register on the same day that they cast a ballot in person.
- Fifty-four states reported sending confirmation notices to voters to assist in maintaining accurate and up-to-date voter lists. The most common reasons reported for sending confirmation notices included the voter's election mail being returned as undeliverable, the voter changing addresses, and the voter not voting in a certain number of consecutive general elections.
- All states allow mail voting for at least some voters. About one-fifth of states offer all-mail elections, two-thirds of states allow voters to return mail ballots at ballot drop boxes, and more than three-quarters of states allow voters to cure errors on their returned mail ballot envelopes.
- Fifty-two states offered provisional ballots during the 2024 general election, most commonly to voters whose names did not appear on the voter list and voters who were not residents of the precinct in which they attempted to vote.
- All states offer some form of in-person voting before Election Day. Two-thirds of states allow vote centers, and just over half of states offer curbside voting.
- States reported conducting a variety of auditing activities to validate the accuracy of voting equipment and election procedures. Over ninety percent of states conduct logic and accuracy testing, nearly two-thirds conduct post-election tabulation audits, and more than half conduct ballot reconciliation audits.

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term "state" can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.



Introduction

Although quantitative data from state and local election officials provide an important window into how the 2024 general election was conducted, these data must be understood in the context of state laws and policies. In 2008, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) introduced a component of the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) that collects information on state election laws. Since 2018, these data have been collected through the Policy Survey,² which uses closed-ended questions to capture states' broad policies. This chapter summarizes the Policy Survey's findings, with further information about state responses available in [Appendix A](#) of this chapter.

The 2024 Policy Survey collected data on states' election laws, policies, and practices that would be in place for the 2024 general election. Most states submitted this information before the election. The Policy Survey was also used to validate 2024 EAVS data before states certified their data as final. The goal of the 2024 Policy Survey was to create comparisons between states across broad policy categories and to provide context to understand the EAVS data submitted by states. Due to the nature of the closed-ended survey questions, some of the complexities in state election policies could not be accounted for. It is important to remember that state election laws are nuanced, and this report simplifies them to provide an overview of election policies and contextualize the EAVS data. States were encouraged to forward additional information and context for their Policy Survey responses to the EAC to allow their data to be interpreted as accurately as possible.

The information that states and territories submitted for the 2024 Policy Survey explained the election laws and practices that applied to the federal general election conducted on November 5, 2024. Some states may have changed some of their policies since that election was conducted; the Policy Survey does not collect information about when an election policy change occurs or why. In addition, states may have different policies for midterm and presidential elections, for primary elections and general elections, or for elections for local, state, or federal office.

For further information about how the Policy Survey data were collected and used to validate EAVS data, see [Chapter 5](#) of this report.

Responding to the 2024 EAVS

The 2024 Policy Survey asked states to describe who provides the data for questions in each section of the EAVS: the state election office, local election offices, or both the state and local offices. Twenty-four states provided data for all six sections of the EAVS solely at the state level, whereas 32 states relied on local jurisdictions to provide some or all of a state's EAVS data.³ Table 1 shows the number of states that provided section data at the state level between 2020 and 2024. At the section level, the most common section to be reported entirely at the state level was Section A, and the least common section reported at the state level was Section D. Except for Section F, the

² Before 2018, the Policy Survey was known as the Statutory Overview and required states to submit text descriptions of their election laws and policies. When possible, certain Statutory Overview items were recoded to align with Policy Survey items to allow state policies to be tracked over a longer period.

³ Information on how states answered each section of the EAVS was collected in items Q1_1 (Section A), Q1_2 (Section B), Q1_3 (Section C), Q1_4 (Section D), Q1_5 (Section E), and Q1_6 (Section F) of the 2024 Policy Survey.

number of states providing each section's data at the state level has decreased only slightly since the 2020 Policy Survey.

The findings from this question illustrate the complexities that state and local election officials encounter when completing the EAVS. Many states with a large number of jurisdictions reported providing EAVS data entirely at the local level. Furthermore, some states reported providing EAVS data for some sections at the state level and relying on local officials for other sections. States that require some or all EAVS data to be provided directly by local jurisdictions often face additional hurdles in compiling their EAVS submissions.

Table 1. The Number of States Providing EAVS Data At the State Level Remains Consistent

EAVS Section	Number of States Providing EAVS Responses At the State Level		
	2020	2022	2024
Section A: Voter Registration	34	33	33
Section B: Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)	28	28	26
Section C: Mail Voting	29	29	26
Section D: In-Person Polling Operations	26	26	25
Section E: Provisional Voting	28	29	27
Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies	33	28	26

Source: Information on answering the EAVS was collected in item Q1 of the 2022 and 2024 Policy Surveys and Q3 of the 2020 Policy Survey.

Voter Registration

For most Americans, registering to vote is the first step in participating in elections, and election offices across the country invest significant effort to maintain and update voter lists. The primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States is the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which became effective after the 1994 general election. The NVRA expands voter registration opportunities by creating more standardized registration processes and designating more places as voter registration agencies. It also requires that states conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove the records of individuals from their voter list who are no longer eligible to vote; this program is often referred to as “voter registration list maintenance.”

Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, which requires each state to adopt a computerized statewide voter list. States use these voter lists to determine who is eligible to



participate in elections. However, keeping these lists up to date can be challenging, as voters may move to different jurisdictions or states, die, or become otherwise ineligible to vote.⁴

Database Systems

States structure their voter registration databases and process updates differently. Some states have a single, central platform at the state level that connects to terminals in local jurisdictions. This is typically referred to as a “top-down” voter registration system. Other states use a state voter registration database that gathers and aggregates information from their local jurisdictions’ voter registration databases. This is typically referred to as a “bottom-up” voter registration system.⁵ If a system has a mix of top-down and bottom-up characteristics, then it is referred to as a “hybrid” system. The specific characteristics of hybrid systems vary by state.

As Figure 1 demonstrates, most states reported using a top-down system in the 2024 Policy Survey. Historical Policy Survey data shows that since 2008, top-down systems have consistently comprised between 64% and 75% of state databases.


States that reported using either a bottom-up or hybrid system were asked to report how often their jurisdictions transmit voter registration information to the statewide database. For the 14 states that used one of these two systems for the 2024 general election, real-time data transmissions were most common (reported by about 86% of the states), whereas just over one-third of the states reported that voter registration information is transmitted daily.⁶

⁴ North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration. According to the North Dakota Office of the Secretary of State, “Precincts in North Dakota maintain a list of voters who have voted in previous elections. When a voter approaches a polling place they are asked to provide an acceptable form of identification. Then the election board will attempt to locate the voter’s name on the voting list. If the voter’s name is on the list, the voter’s name and address are verified and the voter is then allowed to vote.” (vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/votereg.pdf). Individuals who wish to vote in North Dakota must meet federal and state eligibility requirements. All calculated percentages related to voter registration omit North Dakota from the calculations.

⁵ For a bottom-up voter registration system to be considered a statewide system, the state database, the data, and the data flow must be defined, maintained, and administered by the state. *Voluntary Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists*. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, July 2005. eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/Implementing%20Statewide%20Voter%20Registration%20Lists.pdf.

⁶ Texas noted that counties that use the state system have information transmitted in real time, but counties that use a third-party vendor have information transmitted daily.

Figure 1. Top-Down Registration Systems Remain the Most Common Among States



Source: Information on voter registration database system types was collected in item Q4 of the 2024 Policy Survey, item Q3 of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q4 of the 2020 Policy Survey, item Q2 of the 2018 Policy Survey, and item B1 of the 2008-2016 Statutory Overviews. The Statutory Overview question was open-ended, and the resulting data were content coded. North Dakota was excluded from these calculations because North Dakota does not require voter registration.

Voter Registration Data Linkages

State election officials must accomplish two primary activities related to voter registration: adding individuals to the database who are eligible to vote and maintaining the accuracy of the database.⁷ They accomplish these goals by accessing or “linking” to other databases and using the information to verify the voter registration information in their state’s database. The NVRA and HAVA outline steps that states are required to take to keep voter registration information current and to remove ineligible voters and duplicate registrations from the voter lists. This task requires comparing voter

⁷ National Research Council. *Improving State Voter Registration Databases: Final Report*, The National Academies Press, 2010, doi.org/10.17226/12788.



lists to records in other databases to prevent duplicate registration records and to avoid adding individuals who are ineligible to register.⁸

HAVA requires the chief election official in each state to attempt to verify the information in first-time voter registration applications against driver's license numbers in the state's motor vehicle licensing agency's database or against the Social Security Administration's database of social security numbers. If no match is found, election officials in most states attempt to contact the applicant for additional information, but they manage this process in various ways. HAVA requires that applicants who cannot be matched against one of these databases be allowed to vote on Election Day, provided they present appropriate identification.⁹

The Policy Survey asks state election offices how they share information electronically with other state and federal government entities. Most states reported that they link their voter registration data with motor vehicle agencies (91%) and with entities that maintain death records (78.2%). The other most commonly reported linkages were with entities that maintain felony or prison records, such as state courts and parole agencies (63.6%). Less commonly reported linkages included those with entities that maintain records of individuals who are declared mentally incompetent, state public assistance agencies, agencies for people with disabilities, other state agencies that are not required by the NVRA, federal agencies, and military recruiting offices.

States that reported linking with motor vehicle agencies most often reported transferring voter registration data daily (70%), followed by in real time (18%) and by some other measure of time that is neither weekly nor monthly (6%). Of the states that reported linking with entities that maintain death records, the most common cadence of data transfer was monthly (48.8%), followed by weekly (25.6%) and daily (14%). States that reported linking registration data with entities that maintain felony records most often reported transferring data monthly (45.7%).¹⁰

State Election Office Websites

Because election practices vary widely between states, many voters rely on their state's election office website to find information on elections and voting. In the 2024 Policy Survey, most states indicated that voters could check their registration status (92.7%) and check their polling site location (94.6%) on the state election office website. Most states also reported offering tools to track ballot status, including UOCAVA ballots (81.8%), mail ballots (85.4%), and provisional ballots (60%), and tools that check voter-specific ballot information (80%). Additionally, most states reported that their website allows voters to request a mail ballot (60%).¹¹

Voter Registration Methods

Although the NVRA established some consistency in the ways voters can register to vote and update their voter registration information, states have wide latitude to offer additional registration modes. All states that require voter registration reported that individuals may register to vote or

⁸ National Research Council, 2010.

⁹ 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

¹⁰ Information on which entities states link their voter registration databases to and how often data transfers occur was collected in item Q5 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹¹ Information on state election office website lookup tools was collected in item Q10 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

submit an update to their voter registration in person at the election or registrar's office. A strong majority also reported that individuals may register to vote or submit an update to their voter registration via mail, fax, or email (85.4%); or by using a public-facing online registration system maintained by the state or jurisdiction election office (85.4%). Other common methods included registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties (81.8%), public assistance offices mandated as registration sites under the NVRA (80%), motor vehicle agencies or other offices that issue driver's licenses (78.2%), and state-funded agencies primarily serving people with disabilities (76.4%). The least common methods for voter registration and registration updates were an automatic registration program (52.7%) and other modes (29.1%).¹²

The Policy Survey collects additional data on four areas of interest in voter registration: automatic registration and electronic programs, online voter registration, same day registration, and pre-registration of individuals under 18 years of age.

Automatic and Electronic Registration Programs

The NVRA requires states to offer the opportunity to register to vote when voters interact with certain government agencies. However, under the NVRA, individuals must affirmatively choose to register. When the NVRA modernized voter registration, it was largely built around paper-based systems. Since then, many states have implemented automatic and electronic voter registration programs, which allow individuals to submit or update their voter registration electronically during agency transactions. There are several ways these programs can be implemented.

In 2024, 18 states reported that when interacting with some state government agencies, the option to register to vote is preselected and a person needs to deselect it during the transaction to opt out of registering to vote.¹³ Eight states reported that individuals are automatically registered during an interaction with the state government agency unless they opt out in response to a mailer that is sent to the individual after the interaction has concluded. And in 14 states, individuals cannot complete the interaction with the state government agency without selecting whether or not they wish to register to vote. Although some states use more than one of these processes, all states that use automatic and electronic registration programs reported that their state's motor vehicle agency participated in the program. Less common program participants included public assistance agencies, agencies for people with disabilities, agencies specifically designated by the state's chief election official or governor, and others.^{14, 15}

Online Voter Registration

Arizona became the first state to adopt online voter registration in 2002, and by 2024, the number of states that offered online voter registration had increased to 47. In the 2024 Policy Survey, 81.8% of

¹² Information on sources for voter registration and registration updates was collected in item Q17 of the 2024 Policy Survey.


¹³ Information on automatic and automated voter registration was collected in item Q8 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹⁴ Information on which state agencies participate in automatic voter registration was collected in item Q8a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹⁵ States specified other agencies: the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and the Illinois Department of Natural Resources, Office of the Secretary of State, Department of Human Services, and Department of Financial and Professional Regulation.



Figure 2. The Ability of Voters To Register To Vote and Update Their Registration Online Has Increased Dramatically Over Time



Source: Information on whether states have public-facing online systems that interact with the state voter registration system was collected in item Q9 of the 2024 Policy Survey, item Q6 of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q7 of the 2020 Policy Survey, item Q6 of the 2018 Policy Survey, and item B7 of the 2008-2016 Statutory Overviews. The Statutory Overview question was open-ended, and the resulting data were content coded. The 2018 survey question did not include an answer option for whether individuals could update registrations online. North Dakota was excluded from these calculations because North Dakota does not require voter registration.

states reported that voters can both register to vote and update their registration online, whereas 3.6% of states reported that individuals can only update their registration online (see Figure 2). In 89% of states that offer online registration, a person needs to have a driver’s license or other state-issued form of identification to register to vote or update their voting registration online.¹⁶ As of the 2024 general election, eight states do not offer online voter registration. Figure 2 shows that starting with the 2016 Policy Survey, states that allowed voters to both register to vote and update their registrations online overtook the number of states that did not allow online voter registration. States


¹⁶ Information on states’ online voter registration policies was collected in item Q9 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on whether a driver’s license or other state-issued form of identification is needed to register to vote online was collected in item Q9a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

that allow voters to register and update their registration online continue to comprise a strong majority.

Same Day Registration

Instead of requiring voters to register before an election, some states allow individuals to register to vote and to cast a ballot on the same day. For the 2024 general election, a slight majority (52.7%) of states reported allowing individuals to register on the same day that they cast a ballot in person or request a mail ballot (see Figure 3). This process is known as same day registration (SDR).¹⁷

Figure 3. More Than Half of States Offer Some Form of SDR



Source: Information on SDR policy was collected in items Q11 and Q11a of the 2024 Policy Survey. “ED” stands for “Election Day.” “Other Cases” includes instances in which states may allow for SDR during in-person early voting only, during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, and in other unique cases.

¹⁷ The timeline does not include an overlap between the mail balloting period and the close of voter registration.



Among states that offer SDR, about 72% reported having SDR on Election Day and during in-person early voting.¹⁸ Ten states reported having SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration. Five states reported specific cases in which a voter may register on the same day that they cast a ballot. For example, in North Carolina, an individual who has become eligible to vote between the close of books¹⁹ and Election Day — either by being naturalized as a citizen or having citizenship rights restored after conviction of a felony — may be a same day registrant. In Wisconsin, individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day from the Tuesday prior to Election Day through 5:00 p.m. on Election Day. Missouri clarified that SDR is only available for military voters or new residents who moved into Missouri after the voter registration deadline. Lastly, Alaska reported that SDR is only available for presidential races.

Eighteen states reported that SDR was offered at election offices. Sixteen states reported that any polling place within their state offered SDR. Four states reported that SDR was offered at only some polling places. Lastly, 10 states reported other locations at which SDR was offered. For example, Alaska, Massachusetts, and North Carolina clarified that SDR was offered at early voting sites.²⁰

Pre-Registration

In the 2024 Policy Survey, most states (96.4%) reported allowing individuals under age 18 to pre-register to vote and become automatically registered once they turn 18 years old.²¹ Among states that allow pre-registration, 39.6% reported that they allow individuals to pre-register at age 17, whereas 49% of states reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 16. Four states reported allowing individuals to pre-register at age 17 and a half. Some states and territories have additional rules that apply to pre-registrations; for example, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, the Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming allow a person to register to vote before age 18 as long as they will be 18 years old at the time of the next general election. Some states allow pre-registered voters to vote in a primary election before the general election for which they are eligible to be fully registered.

List Maintenance

The NVRA establishes a process for states to keep their voter lists accurate by adding newly registered voters, updating voter records, and removing ineligible voters. Under this law, a registrant can be removed from a state's voter list under the following circumstances:

¹⁸ Twenty-one states reported offering SDR on Election Day and during in-person early voting. New Hampshire reported having SDR only on Election Day. Information on state SDR policies was collected in item Q11 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances of SDR was collected in item Q11a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹⁹ North Carolina did not provide clarification on what was meant by "close of books."

²⁰ Information on locations where SDR was offered was collected in item Q11 of the 2024 Policy Survey. This item allowed states to select more than one response.

²¹ Information on whether states allow individuals to pre-register before they are 18 years old and become automatically registered to vote once they turn 18 years old was collected in item Q12 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

- Upon the death of the registrant;
- Upon the registrant's written confirmation that their address has changed to a location outside of the registrar's jurisdiction;
- At the request of the registrant;
- Due to mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
- Due to criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
- Upon the registrant's failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings along with failure to appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections after the mailing.²²

Under the process established by the NVRA, when a registrant appears to have moved outside of their jurisdiction, the state must follow a specific process to verify that the individual is no longer eligible to vote. An address confirmation procedure must be followed before removing the voter from the voter list. [Chapter 3](#) of this report includes more details about the list maintenance process outlined in the NVRA.

Data from the 2024 Policy Survey show that in 16.4% of states, only state officials are responsible for modifying or removing voter registration records within the state. In 58.2% of states, responsibility lies solely with local officials, and in 25.4% of states, it is shared between state and local officials.²³ Fifty-four states reported sending confirmation notices to voters to help identify individuals who may be ineligible to vote in that jurisdiction, but the reasons for sending confirmation notices differ by state. Of the states that send confirmation notices, 83.3% reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to sections 8(d)(1)(B) and 8(d)(2) of the NVRA, 64.8% reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a state statute, and 14.8% reported sending confirmation notices pursuant to a formal administrative rule or guidance. Three states reported that they do not send confirmation notices.²⁴

States most commonly reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose mail from an election office was returned as undeliverable (87%), to voters whose addresses may have changed (81.5%), to voters who have not voted in a specified number of consecutive general elections (51.9%),²⁵ and to voters who have received a disqualifying criminal conviction (33.3%). Less than one-third of states reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have surrendered their driver's license to obtain a new license in a different state, who have not contacted the state election division for a specified number of years, who have requested removal from the voter list, and who have been incarcerated. Seven states reported that all registered voters routinely receive a non-forwardable notice during a specified increment of time; this time frame ranges from one to two years. Fourteen states reported sending confirmation notices for some other reason,²⁶

²² 52 U.S.C. § 20507.

²³ Information on responsibility for modifying or removing voter registration records was collected in item Q14 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

²⁴ Information on whether and how states send confirmation notices to help identify ineligible voters was collected in item Q18 of the 2024 Policy Survey. This item allowed states to select more than one response.

²⁵ Most states specified either one or two consecutive federal general elections.

²⁶ Information on which voters to whom states send confirmation notices was collected in item Q18a of the 2024 Policy Survey.



Table 2 illustrates the data sources states reported using to identify potentially ineligible voters. Across states, the most common data sources were the state vital statistics office, requests from voters to be removed from the voter list, reports or notices from other states that a former resident

Table 2. States That Send Out Confirmation Notices Most Often Use the State Vital Statistics Office and Reports From Other States To Identify Ineligible Voters

Source of Data On Potentially Ineligible Voters	Percentage of States That Report Using Data From the Data Source
State vital statistics office death records	98.1%
Requests from voters for removal from the voter list	96.3%
Reports or notices from other states that a former resident has registered to vote	94.4%
Entities that maintain felony or prison records (e.g., state courts, state police, federal courts, pardons or parole agencies)	83.3%
Other mail from the election office (not ballots) that is returned as undeliverable	81.5%
Newspaper death notices or obituaries	72.2%
National Change of Address (NCOA) reports	70.4%
Motor vehicle agencies (e.g., DMV)	68.5%
Mail ballots that are returned as undeliverable	64.8%
Social Security Administration death records	63%
Data from an interstate data-sharing compact (e.g., the Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC])	48.1%
Entities that maintain records of individuals declared mentally incompetent	46.3%
Local or county office records	33.3%
Jury questionnaires	31.5%
Applications for mail ballots	22.2%
Returned jury summons	18.5%
Other (e.g., military recruitment offices)	14.8%
State agencies that serve people with disabilities	13%
State agencies that are not specified in the NVRA	11.1%
Canvassing (door-to-door verification)	5.6%
State tax filings	1.9%

Source: Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q19 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

has registered to vote, entities that maintain felony or prison records, and other mail from the election office (not ballots) that is returned as undeliverable.²⁷

Mail Voting

All states offer at least some residents the opportunity to vote by mail in federal general elections.²⁸ Some states use the term “absentee voting” to refer to mail voting. Data from the 2024 Policy Survey show that there was wide variation among states regarding which voters are eligible to vote by mail, what documentation voters must provide to receive a mail ballot and have it counted, how mail ballots may be returned to election officials, and the deadlines for mail ballots to be postmarked and received by election offices in order to be counted for the 2024 general election.

In 2024, 68% of states reported that they do not require voters to provide a reason for requesting a mail ballot, whereas about one-third of states reported requiring voters to provide a reason.²⁹ Less than half of states (44.6%) reported that voters can request to be on a permanent absentee list and automatically receive mail ballots for all future elections. States with a permanent absentee list were split between those that allow any registrant to request to be added (44%) and those that restrict access to registrants who meet specific criteria (56%).³⁰ The most common criterion was that the requester must have a disability (57.1%); New York and Wisconsin reported that they will also grant permanent absentee status to those who are infirm, have a chronic illness, or have a letter from a physician stating that they are unable to vote in person. Louisiana and Maine indicated they require individuals to be over a specified age. Despite conducting all-mail elections, Oregon reports using the term “absentee voter” for individuals who may be away from their residences when ballots are transmitted.

States were also asked to report whether they, or any jurisdiction within their state, automatically send a mail ballot to every registered (or every active registered) voter. This process is often referred to as an “all-mail election” or an “all-vote-by-mail election,” though in-person voting may still take place in these elections. For the 2024 general election, about 21% of states reported that they conduct all-mail elections. As Figure 4 demonstrates, this signals a slight decline from the two most recent general elections. States reporting all-mail elections understandably peaked in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with 14 states adopting the practice for the 2020 election. However, this number decreased to 12 states in 2024. Three of these states conducted all-mail elections only in certain jurisdictions, and nine had statewide vote-by-mail systems.

²⁷ Information on the data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters was collected in item Q19 of the 2024 Policy Survey.


²⁸ Some states use the term “in-person absentee voting” to refer to the process by which a voter visits an election office to request a mail ballot, completes the ballot, and returns the ballot in one trip. However, the EAVS considers this a form of in-person early voting and asks states to report their data as such.

²⁹ Information on whether states require an excuse for mail voting was collected in item Q24 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

³⁰ Information on whether states have permanent absentee voting was collected in item Q26 of the 2024 Policy Survey.



Figure 4. All-Mail Elections Peaked In 2020 and Have Declined Since




Source: Information on whether states conduct all-mail elections was collected in item Q25 of the 2024 Policy Survey, item Q17 of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q18 of the 2020 Policy Survey, item Q9 of the 2018 Policy Survey, and item C4 of the 2008-2016 Statutory Overviews. The Statutory Overview question was open-ended, and the resulting data were content coded.

Ballot Drop Boxes

The 2024 Policy Survey asked states to report their usage of ballot drop boxes. For the purposes of the Policy Survey, a ballot drop box was defined as a locked container where voters or their authorized representatives may deliver their completed mail ballots for collection. They are different from ballot boxes at in-person voting locations, where voters place their ballots immediately after voting. Ballot drop boxes may be located indoors or outdoors.

Almost two-thirds (64.3%) of states reported allowing ballot drop boxes for the 2024 general election (see Figure 5). For these states, the most commonly reported location for ballot drop boxes was election offices (64%), followed by early voting polling places (41.7%) and Election Day polling places (36.1%). Other sites reported by states included libraries, recreation centers, satellite county offices, Tribal reservations, and college student centers. Additionally, 72.2% of states with ballot

Figure 5. Almost Two-Thirds of States Used Ballot Drop Boxes In the 2024 General Election



Source: Information on whether states used ballot drop boxes was collected in item Q27 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

drop boxes indicated that locations varied by locality, with several noting that ballot drop boxes can be placed at any site at the discretion of the local jurisdiction.³¹

There was wide variation among states regarding the dates that ballot drop boxes were made available to voters. Seventeen states made ballot drop boxes available to voters starting in September 2024, and 19 states made them available starting in October 2024. Michigan reported making ballot drop boxes available to voters as early as September 1, 2024, and New York opened their ballot drop boxes to voters latest, on October 26, 2024. Most states made ballot drop boxes available through Election Day; only Georgia and North Dakota closed them earlier than Election Day.³²

In about one-quarter of states that used ballot drop boxes (22.2%), ballot drop box collections occurred once per day, although Iowa reported collecting ballots from drop boxes multiple times per day. Eleven states listed another frequency, citing some examples in which the cadence of

³¹ Information on whether states or any jurisdictions within states allow voters to return their completed mail ballots at ballot drop boxes was collected in item Q27 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on where ballot drop boxes were located was collected in item Q27a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

³² Information on the dates and times voters may use ballot drop boxes to return their ballots was collected in item Q27c of the 2024 Policy Survey.



collections varied by the date and the volume of ballots. Thirteen states reported that the cadence of collections varies by jurisdiction.³³

Among states that used ballot drop boxes, 14% directly mandated the number of ballot drop boxes per jurisdiction. The same percentage of states reported having state-level mandates that set the number of ballot drop boxes based on the population size or voter population for each jurisdiction. About 40% of states reported that jurisdiction officials had discretion concerning the number of ballot drop boxes used for the 2024 general election. A third of these states reported other approaches regarding how the number of ballot drop boxes used for each election is determined. Many states reported a “hybrid” approach that featured state mandates and flexibility at the jurisdiction level. For example, Georgia reported that state law mandates one ballot drop box per county, but each county had the discretion to add an additional ballot drop box for every 100,000 active registered voters.

Ballot Curing

Voters may sometimes make errors on their mail ballot envelopes that can prevent their ballot from being counted. The 2024 Policy Survey found that more than three-quarters (76.8%) of states allowed ballot curing for the 2024 general election; under this process, returned mail ballots that have been rejected for containing an error or for missing required information may have the mistake corrected by the voter so that their ballot is ultimately counted. The most commonly reported types of mail ballot errors that voters were permitted to correct were missing voter signatures (86%) and nonmatching voter signatures (72.1%). Around two-thirds (62.8%) of states that allowed ballot curing reported that ballots with a missing or incomplete required document (e.g., an affidavit, ballot statement, copy of the voter’s identification) could be cured.³⁴ Some states require a witness signature for mail ballots, and 20.9% of states that allowed ballot curing reported that a missing witness signature was an error that could be cured. Nine states reported that there were other reasons a mail ballot may be cured. Three of these states cited missing identification, and others identified unsealed ballot envelopes, missing postmarks, and missing witness addresses.

About one-third (30.2%) of states that allowed ballot curing reported that ballots needed to be cured by Election Day to be counted in the 2024 general election. One state, Louisiana, had a deadline that fell before Election Day, and the latest ballot curing deadlines were in December 2024 in California and Puerto Rico. Most states reported that notices to cure mail ballots are provided to voters by mail (86%), email (86%), and phone (79%). Over one-third (37.2%) of states reported using an online portal to notify voters. Almost one-third (32.6%) of states reported using other methods to inform voters.³⁵ For example, Oregon reported substantial flexibility regarding the state’s approach, stating that county election officials may use “any other means deemed necessary” to inform a voter of their ballot status. On average, states reported using about three methods to notify voters about the need for their ballot to be cured.

³³ Information on how often ballots are collected from ballot drop boxes was collected in item Q27b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

³⁴ Information on whether states allow voters to cure ballots was collected in item Q28 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on the types of mail ballot errors that may be cured was collected in item Q28a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

³⁵ Information on how voters are notified that they must cure errors or missing information on their mail ballots was collected in item Q28c of the 2024 Policy Survey.

Deadlines For Returning Mail Ballots

To ensure that all mail votes are cast by voters no later than Election Day, all states set a deadline for when voted mail ballots must be returned to election offices to be eligible for counting. Twenty-three states also reported having a deadline for voters to postmark their mail ballots. Most of these postmark deadlines fall on Election Day, with three states (North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah) requiring that ballots be postmarked the day before Election Day.

Mail ballot receipt deadlines varied more widely than postmark deadlines for the 2024 general election. Election Day was the most common receipt deadline, required by 34 states. Louisiana required that mail ballots be received by the day before Election Day. Twenty-one states allowed mail ballots to arrive after Election Day, though each of these states reported requiring them to be postmarked by either Election Day or the day before. The receipt deadline for these states ranged from one day after Election Day in Texas to 55 days after Election Day in Puerto Rico.³⁶

Electronic Transmission and Return of Mail Ballots

Some non-UOCAVA voters may receive mail ballots electronically, rather than through the mail.³⁷ Forty-one states reported circumstances under which at least some voters could receive their ballots electronically, although those circumstances varied substantially. The most common situations in which voters could receive ballots electronically were the voter having a disability (75.6% of states, with 36.5% restricting this to specific disabilities, and 39% allowing it for any disability) and during emergency situations that hinder normal in-person or mail voting (14.6% of states). Around one-quarter of states (26.8%) reported other circumstances, including the voter being an emergency responder (Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, and West Virginia), the voter requesting a replacement ballot soon before an election (Hawaii), and the voter residing on Tribal lands (Nevada). Only five states — Alaska, California, Guam, Maryland, and the U.S. Virgin Islands — allow electronic ballot transmission in any circumstance.

Because electronic ballot transmission specifically to voters with disabilities is an evolving area of election administration, the Policy Survey collected additional information from the 31 states that reported conducting electronic transmissions for this reason. Terminology for electronic ballot transmission to voters with disabilities varied, including “accessible absentee voting” (35.5% of states), “remote ballot marking” (12.9% of states), “remote access vote by mail” (3.2% of states), and other terms (almost half of states). Thirty of the 31 states offered this type of electronic ballot transmission statewide; Florida offered it only in certain jurisdictions. States most often reported transmitting electronic ballots through online portals (71%), followed by email (42%). Only two states reported transmitting ballots by fax. Most states (87%) that have some form of remotely accessible absentee voting process for voters with disabilities do not require a witness to be present while a voter marks their ballot.

Fewer states reported allowing electronic ballot returns than reported electronic ballot transmission. Of the 18 states that allowed voters to return ballots electronically, one-third allowed it for voters with any disability, one-third limited it to voters with specific disabilities, three allowed it only in emergency

³⁶ Information on mail ballot receipt and postmark deadlines was collected in item Q29 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

³⁷ Information on electronic ballot transmission and return for domestic civilian (non-UOCAVA) voters was collected in item Q32 of the 2024 Policy Survey.



situations, and seven allowed it under other circumstances. Examples of other circumstances included the voter being an emergency responder (Nebraska and West Virginia), the voter requesting a replacement ballot soon before an election (Hawaii), or the voter living on Tribal lands (Nevada). Among these states, 83.3% reported that the voter must attest that they are eligible, under penalty of law. Louisiana reported a similar requirement; however, the voter attests they are eligible not under penalty of law. Alaska reported that no attestation is required. The most commonly reported methods for voters to return ballots electronically were through an online ballot delivery portal (61% of states), fax (55.6% of states), and email (50% of states).

UOCAVA Voting

The legal framework established by UOCAVA requires that all states offer uniformed services members, their eligible family members, and overseas citizens the ability to vote by mail in all federal elections. Individuals covered by UOCAVA have the option of using the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), a form that serves as both a registration and ballot request. All states accept FPCAs submitted by mail. In addition, the 2009 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act amended UOCAVA, requiring that all states offer an electronic means for FPCA submission. UOCAVA voters may now submit their FPCA by fax, online (either by email or through the state's online voter registration portal), or by other modes as allowed by state law.

States use different methods to determine which individuals to report as registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in the EAVS. In nearly all states (89.3%), an individual with an active FPCA on file qualifies as a UOCAVA voter. Twenty states reported that an overseas registration or mailing address or an Army/Air Post Office, Fleet Post Office, or Diplomatic Post Office address on a voter's registration record is used to determine their UOCAVA status. Sixteen states reported that if a voter submitted a Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB) in a previous election, this could be used to determine UOCAVA status. Twenty-two states described employing other methods to determine UOCAVA status, with 15 indicating that an individual could self-identify as a UOCAVA voter on a form or application.

The length of time that a voter maintains their UOCAVA designation varies between states. Four states reported that UOCAVA designation remains until a voter is no longer eligible to receive a mail ballot under their FPCA. Fifteen states reported that voters maintain their UOCAVA status until they update their registration record or notify their election office. One state, Washington, reported that a voter maintains their UOCAVA designation indefinitely. Most states reported that UOCAVA designation is dependent on a time limit, measured by either calendar years (29 states) or general elections (7 states). Among states that reported a calendar year limit, most reported that UOCAVA voters maintain their status for one calendar year. Most states that reported a limit based on general elections reported that UOCAVA voters maintain their status for one general election cycle.

States are required to allow ballot transmission and return by mail for UOCAVA voters. In 2024, the most common additional methods for transmitting UOCAVA ballots were email (82% of states) and fax (71.4% of states). Thirty-five states (62.5%) reported accepting UOCAVA ballots returned through the state's online ballot delivery portal. After mail, email³⁸ and fax were the two most common methods by which states allowed UOCAVA voters to return their ballots (44.6% and 53.6%,

³⁸ Iowa, Louisiana, and Texas only allow email in certain circumstances.

respectively), followed by the state's online voter registration portal (30.4%) and other methods (32.1%).³⁹

UOCAVA Voting Deadlines

In addition to deadlines for mail ballots from non-UOCAVA voters, the 2024 Policy Survey asked states to report deadlines for ballots submitted by domestic uniformed services voters and UOCAVA voters outside the United States. States provided information on postmark and ballot receipt deadlines as applicable. In 2024, among states with postmark deadlines, 91% required that domestic uniformed services voters mail their ballots on or before Election Day. However, in Iowa and North Dakota, the postmark deadline was one day before Election Day. Just under half of states (46.4%) reported that ballots had to be received by Election Day.⁴⁰

For UOCAVA voters residing outside the United States, Election Day was the postmark deadline in 91% of the states with postmark deadlines. Again, Iowa and North Dakota reported having a postmark deadline of one day before Election Day for these voters. Ballots in 42.9% of the states were required to be received by Election Day.

For more information about how UOCAVA voters participated in the 2024 general election, including the number of ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected and use of FWABs, see [Chapter 4](#) of this report.

Provisional Voting

The EAC has issued best practices on the development of provisional voting procedures and notices to voters to ensure provisional voting procedures are fair, transparent, effective, and consistently applied to all voters. The EAC states in its "*Best Practices on Provisional Voting*" report:

Section 302 of [HAVA] creates the right for potential voters to cast provisional ballots in the event their names do not appear on the registration list or the voters' eligibility is challenged by an election official. The issuance of a provisional ballot is best described as a safety net or fail safe for the voter, in that:

- It maintains the person's intent to vote and [their] selections until election officials determine that the person does or does not have the right to cast a ballot in the election.
- It allows the determination of the voter's eligibility to be made at a time when more perfect or complete information is available either from the voter or from the election jurisdiction.⁴¹

HAVA specifies minimum requirements for notices to voters and provides opportunities for voters to resolve eligibility issues. Within the federal framework, states have different methods of complying with the provisional notification to voter requirements, using different technology and different

³⁹ Information on how a state transmits blank UOCAVA ballots was collected in item Q41 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on how a state allows UOCAVA voters to return their completed UOCAVA ballots was collected in item Q42 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁴⁰ Information on deadlines for ballots submitted by domestic uniformed services members was collected in item Q43 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁴¹ *EAC Best Practices: Provisional Voting*. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, July 2023, eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/EAC_Best_Practices_on_Provisional_Voting_508.pdf.



timetables. State and local election officials ultimately apply their policies, procedures, and state legal requirements when deciding whether to count a provisional ballot. For example, a state that has a stricter standard for the identification of voters than is contained in HAVA would apply its standard to determine if a given provisional ballot meets the state’s identification standard.

Table 3. States That Use Provisional Ballots Most Often Do So When a Voter’s Name Does Not Appear On the Voter List

Reason For Offering a Voter a Provisional Ballot	Percentage of States That Use Provisional Voting and Offer Provisional Ballots For the Listed Reason
A voter’s name does not appear on the voter list.	88.5%
A voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are attempting to vote.	78.8%
A voter does not have proper identification (as defined by state law).	75%
An election official asserts that an individual is not eligible to vote.	75%
Another person (not an election official) challenges a voter’s qualifications, and the poll worker is not able to resolve the challenge.	61.5%
A voter has changed their name or address (within the election jurisdiction) but has not updated their voter registration to reflect the new information.	61.5%
A voter was issued a mail ballot, chooses to vote in person instead, and does not have the mail ballot to surrender to poll workers.	57.7%
A federal or state judge extends the polling hours in a federal election.	50%
Other	36.5%
An individual registers to vote on the same day they cast a ballot in person.	19.2%

Source: Information on the circumstances under which a state uses provisional ballots was collected in item Q46a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

Fifty-two states reported using provisional ballots, though the reasons for offering provisional ballots varied.⁴² The most common reason for having a voter cast a provisional ballot was that their name did not appear on the voter list, followed by a person attempting to vote in a precinct where they were not a resident.⁴³ Table 3 provides a full list of reasons states use provisional ballots.

About 8% of the states that use provisional ballots reported provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct would be fully counted, and 40.4% of the states reported that they would be partially

⁴² States that reported not using provisional ballots were largely NVRA-exempt states.

⁴³ Information on whether states use provisional ballots was collected in item Q46 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on the circumstances under which a state will use provisional ballots was collected in item Q46a of the Policy Survey.

counted.⁴⁴ Slightly more than half of the states (52%) reported that these ballots would be rejected fully.

In-Person Voting

In the traditional image of voting in America, voters physically travel to their local polling place or election office and cast their ballots in person on Election Day. Voters may cast their ballots at a polling location to which they are assigned based on the address on their voter registration records, or, if state law allows, they may have the option to vote at any polling location within their jurisdiction. Although other methods of voting have become more common in recent years, in-person voting is still used by most voters in federal general elections.

In-Person Voting Before Election Day

Every state reported allowing individuals to vote in person before Election Day (not including the hand delivery of mail ballots). This type of voting generally falls into two categories:

- A voter who casts a ballot at a physical polling location, vote center, or an election office before Election Day.
- A voter who casts an in-person absentee ballot in person at an election office or other designated polling site before Election Day.

The first type of voting is usually referred to as “in-person early voting,” and the second type is usually referred to as “in-person absentee voting,” though these terms are not used consistently across states. Although some states use only one type of in-person voting before Election Day, others use both. Thirty-five states (62.5%) reported having in-person early voting, and 30 states (53.6%) reported having in-person absentee voting; among these states, 13 reported having both.⁴⁵ Seven states provided specific descriptions of their early voting practices. Nine states (16.1%) reported requiring a reason to vote in person before Election Day, a decrease from 12 that reported this policy in 2020.^{46, 47} In-person early voting tended to start in mid-to-late September 2024⁴⁸ and last until early November 2024, shortly before Election Day. In Idaho, Kansas, and Wisconsin, dates varied by jurisdiction. In Michigan, though the state required a minimum of nine days of early voting, jurisdictions were given the option to allow up to 30 days. Oregon, a vote-by-mail state, does not

⁴⁴ For example, a state might only count items on the ballot for which the voter would have been eligible had they voted in the correct precinct.

⁴⁵ Information on the terminology used to describe the process of voting in person before Election Day was collected in item Q34 of the 2024 Policy Survey.


⁴⁶ In Missouri, a reason is required for four weeks of the in-person mail voting period; voters may vote without providing a reason two weeks before the election. In Maine, voters may request a mail ballot without a reason up to the Thursday before Election Day. After that date through Election Day, voters who meet requirements for a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot but are required to provide a reason.

⁴⁷ Information on whether a reason is required for voters to participate in voting in person before Election Day was collected in item Q34a of the 2024 Policy Survey and item Q24a of the 2020 Policy Survey.

⁴⁸ Sixteen states listed a start date between September 10, 2024, and October 7, 2024, whereas the District of Columbia, Northern Mariana Islands, and Oklahoma listed a start date in the final three days of October.



Figure 6. In-Person Early Voting Is On the Rise Since the 2018 General Election



Source: Information on whether states offer in-person early voting was collected in item Q34 of the 2024 Policy Survey, item Q25 of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q24 of the 2020 Policy Survey, and item Q12 of the 2018 Policy Survey. In-person absentee voting has been classified as in-person early voting in this graph.

have early voting, but does allow in-person voting in specific circumstances. For example, if a voter loses or spoils their ballot, they may appear at a local election office to be issued a new ballot; this is allowed through 8:00 p.m. on the night of the election.⁴⁹

Although most states reported offering in-person early voting for the 2024 general election, in-person early voting has not been a widely available option in recent general elections. Figure 6 reports historical Policy Survey data from 2018 to 2024 that tracks the number of states that reported having in-person early voting along with the different terminologies states use to describe in-person early voting. This graph shows an expansion of in-person early voting has taken place over the past six years, with almost 10 more states reported adopting in-person early voting during that period.


⁴⁹ Information on the calendar dates for the beginning and the end of the early voting period was collected in item Q34b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

Vote Centers

Vote centers are physical locations where voters from multiple precincts may cast their ballots. Jurisdictions that use vote centers allow voters to cast their ballots at any vote center in their jurisdiction rather than needing to vote at a specifically assigned polling place. The 2024 Policy Survey asked whether any of a state's jurisdictions allow voters to cast ballots at any polling place or vote center in their jurisdiction and to describe how their vote centers operate.

About 70% of states reported using a vote center model, an increase from just over one-third in 2020. Half of those states indicated that they require the use of vote centers statewide, a slight increase from 2022. California, Delaware, Kansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas reported only

Figure 7. States' Use of Vote Centers Has Increased Substantially Since 2018



Source: Information on whether states use vote centers was collected in item Q35 of the 2024 Policy Survey, item Q26 of the 2022 Policy Survey, item Q25 of the 2020 Policy Survey, and item Q13 of the 2018 Policy Survey.



having vote centers in jurisdictions that meet certain requirements, whereas in one-third of states with vote centers, jurisdictions may choose whether or not to have them.⁵⁰

Figure 7 reports the availability of vote centers during a general election using historical Policy Survey data from 2018 to 2024. The adoption of vote center models has risen significantly over the past four general election cycles. In 2018, about 31% of states reported that at least some jurisdictions used a vote center model. Vote center usage increased moderately to 37.5% in 2020 before a sharp increase in 2022 (about 57%). As of 2024, the adoption of vote center models has continued to grow, with 69.6% of states reporting the usage of vote centers in at least some jurisdictions. Overall, within the span of four general elections, state implementation of vote centers has increased by 38.7 percentage points.

Poll Workers and Poll Worker Training

States that have significant levels of in-person voting rely on poll workers to assist voters who wish to cast their ballots in person. Poll workers are officials responsible for proper and orderly voting at a polling location. Poll workers perform duties that may include verifying the identities of voters; assisting voters with signing the register, affidavits, or other documents required to cast a ballot; providing voters with ballots or setting up voting systems; and other functions as dictated by state law.⁵¹ Most states (98.2%) reported using poll workers to assist with in-person voting.^{52, 53}

The 2024 Policy Survey asked states to report details on how their poll workers are trained to assist with elections. States differ in who develops poll worker training, with an almost even split between the state (27.3%) and local election officials (29.1%). Most states (43.6%) reported another arrangement for the development of poll worker training, with the majority reporting that poll worker training is developed at both the state and local levels.⁵⁴

Returning poll workers are required to undergo training at various intervals. Most states (45.4%) reported that returning poll workers must participate in training at least once for every election they assist with. Less-common responses selected by states included requiring training at least once per calendar year (5.5%) or at least once every two-year election cycle (14.6%), and 16.4% of states reported that training frequency varies by jurisdiction. Ten states reported another frequency of poll worker training. For example, Colorado clarified that the frequency of training depends on the type of training required for different job functions of poll workers. Illinois reported that poll worker training must take place after each appointment of new election judges.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Information on whether any jurisdictions within a state allow voters to cast ballots at any polling location or vote center in their jurisdiction was collected in item Q35 of the 2024 Policy Survey and item Q26 of the 2022 Policy Survey. Information on how vote centers operate was collected in item Q35a of the 2024 Policy Survey and item Q26a of the 2022 Policy Survey.

⁵¹ Poll workers do not include observers stationed at polling places, regular office staff who do not serve poll worker functions in an election, or temporary office staff not hired specifically to serve voters in either early or Election Day voting. Some states may use a different term for poll workers, such as election judges, booth workers, wardens, commissioners, or other similar terms.

⁵² Washington was the only state to report not using poll workers, because Washington offers all-mail elections.

⁵³ Information on whether states use poll workers was collected in item Q36 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁵⁴ Information on which body develops poll worker training was collected in item Q36a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁵⁵ Information on poll worker training frequency was collected in item Q36b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

The content of poll worker training also varied by state. The 2024 Policy Survey offered various topics for states to choose from, which are presented in Table 4. Among these, the most selected topics concerned procedures for opening and closing the polling place (78.2%), voter check-in procedures (76.4%), assisting voters with disabilities (76.4%), operating voting equipment (74.6%), and issuing provisional ballots (74.6%). Less common options selected by states included topics that vary by jurisdiction (58.2%), using electronic poll books (58.2%), assisting voters who speak languages other than English (52.7%), and administering vote centers (38.2%). Nine states selected a variety of other topics, such as cybersecurity, curbside voting, photo identification procedures, and ballot handling procedures.⁵⁶

Table 4. Opening and Closing Procedures, Voter Check-In, Voters With Disabilities, Voting Equipment, and Provisional Ballots Were the Most Common Topics Covered in Poll Worker Training

Topic	Percentage of States That Cover the Topic in Poll Worker Training
Procedures for opening and closing the polling place	78.2%
Voter check-in procedures	76.4%
Assisting voters with disabilities	76.4%
Operating voting equipment	74.6%
Issuing provisional ballots	74.6%
Varies by jurisdiction	58.2%
Using electronic poll books	58.2%
Assisting voters who speak languages other than English	52.7%
Administering vote centers	38.2%
Other	16.4%

Source: Information on topics covered under poll worker training was collected in item Q36c of the 2024 Policy Survey.

The 2024 Policy Survey asked states to report whether poll worker training was conducted in person. Most states (52.7%) reported that in-person training requirements vary by jurisdiction. Around one-third of states (31%) reported that in-person poll worker training is required, and 11% of states reported that, although in-person poll worker training is recommended, it is not required. An additional 5.5% of states reported that in-person poll worker training is not required.⁵⁷

Curbside Voting

Questions about curbside voting were introduced in the 2024 Policy Survey. Curbside voting enables voters to cast a ballot in person outside of a voting location, such as from their vehicle or along the

⁵⁶ Information on the content of poll worker training was collected in item Q36c of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁵⁷ Information on the location of poll worker training was collected in item Q36d of the 2024 Policy Survey.



path of travel to the voting area. Typically, election workers will bring the voter a poll book to sign, a ballot, and any other materials needed to cast a ballot privately and independently. Thirty-four states reported allowing curbside voting for the 2024 general election.⁵⁸ Twenty-seven of these states reported that curbside voting was allowed at all polling places. However, two states reported that decisions on how extensively to offer curbside voting at polling places were left to jurisdictions.⁵⁹

Curbside voting was offered to voters with a disability or injury in 27 states. Nineteen states reported that curbside voting was offered to voters with an illness. Thirteen states reported that curbside voting was offered to voters over a certain age. Fourteen states reported different examples of types of voters that were allowed to participate in curbside voting. For example, seven states reported that either curbside voting was offered to all voters or that there were no statutory limitations on who could request curbside voting.⁶⁰

Voter Identification

Under HAVA, Congress established minimum identification standards that an individual must meet to register to vote:

- Individuals who register to vote at their state's motor vehicle agency, another government agency, or using an online registration portal are typically authenticated by presenting appropriate documentation to the government agency and by the state matching the person's driver's license number, if the individual has one, or, if not, the last four digits of their social security number to an existing government record.
- Individuals who register by mail and who have not voted before for federal office in their state of residence are required to present, at some point before voting, either a current and valid photo identification or a copy of a utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the person's name and address.
- Individuals who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under UOCAVA or entitled to vote other than in person under the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act or other federal law are exempt from HAVA's identification requirements.⁶¹

For in-person, non-first-time voting, whether before or on Election Day, most states (69.6%) reported that they require voters to present an acceptable form of identification to cast a ballot in person. Among those states, 66.7% reported that photo identification was required as proof of their identity.⁶²

In the case that a voter does not have an acceptable form of identification at the voting location, 79.5% of states that require identification reported that the voter may cast a provisional ballot. Under half of states (43.6%) reported that the voter must return later to present appropriate identification to

⁵⁸ Information on whether curbside voting was offered was collected in item Q37 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁵⁹ Information on the coverage of curbside voting was collected in item Q37a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁶⁰ Information on the categories of voters that are permitted to participate in curbside voting was collected in item Q37b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁶¹ 52 USC 21083 (b)(3)(C)

⁶² Information on establishing a voter's identity during in-person voting was collected in item Q50 of the 2024 Policy Survey. Information on whether photo identification is required for voters to establish their identity for in-person voting was collected in item Q50a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

election officials before their ballot can be counted. In 28.2% of states, voters can sign an affidavit affirming their identity, with no other action required for the voter to vote. Additionally, in 18% of states, another person may formally vouch for the voter's identity.⁶³ These states cited examples such as another voter registered to vote in the same precinct, a precinct election official, an adult or poll worker who has known the voter for six months, or a village or county mayor.⁶⁴

Voters who are able to return at a later date and cast a provisional ballot because they did not present appropriate identification are required to present identification to election officials by a specific date. In American Samoa and Puerto Rico, the deadline by which voters were required to present appropriate identification and have their provisional ballots accepted and counted was Election Day in 2024. Fifteen states reported deadlines ranging from the day after Election Day to November 18, 2024.⁶⁵

Criminal Convictions and Voting

The NVRA allows states to remove voters from their voter list if the voter receives a disqualifying criminal conviction or is incarcerated. The Policy Survey asks four questions about removing voters from voter lists due to disqualifying criminal convictions or incarcerations and about the restoration of voting rights:

- Which populations have their voting eligibility suspended due to a criminal conviction or incarceration?
- For how long does a person with a criminal conviction lose their right to vote?
- What happens to the removed individual's registration record in the state's voter registration database?
- How can a person whose voting rights have been affected by a conviction or incarceration become an eligible voter again?

The District of Columbia, Maine, Puerto Rico, and Vermont reported in the 2024 Policy Survey that they do not limit a person's right to vote based on a criminal conviction or incarceration. Figure 8 reports the reasons (if any) that states may limit voting rights based on criminal behavior. Twenty-six states reported that the conviction of any felony limits a person's right to vote, whereas six


⁶³ Information on what happens if a person does not have acceptable identification at the polling site was collected in item Q50b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁶⁴ In some of these examples, an extra step was required to verify the voter's identity (e.g., in the case where a precinct election official was vouching for the voter's identity, both parties were required to sign an affidavit).

⁶⁵ Information on the deadline by which voters must present appropriate identification to verify their identity and have their provisional ballot accepted and counted was collected in item Q50c of the 2024 Policy Survey.



Figure 8. Almost Half of States Limit Voting Rights For Any Felony



Source: Information on which types of criminal convictions limit voting rights was collected in item Q51 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

states indicated that they only limit the voting rights of individuals convicted of certain felonies. Four states reported that they limit the voting rights of individuals who are convicted of other crimes that are not felonies (e.g., election-related crimes). Additionally, 12 states limit the right to vote for individuals who are incarcerated. Within the “Other” response option, 12 states clarified that incarceration limits the right for individuals to vote only if those individuals are convicted of a certain type of crime, such as a felony or a misdemeanor.⁶⁶

States’ policies regarding how long voting rights are affected due to conviction or incarceration varied. Of the states that limit voting rights for these reasons, most reported revoking the right to vote during the period of incarceration (86.5%) followed by any period of probation and parole (38.5%, a 24.3 percentage point decrease from 2020). Some states reported revoking voting rights

⁶⁶ Information on state policies for suspending or revoking voting rights due to criminal convictions was collected in item Q51 of the 2024 Policy Survey. This item does not distinguish a felony conviction from the subsequent period of incarceration.

until outstanding fines, restitution, or penalties are paid (17.3%), or for an additional period of time (3.85%; Louisiana and West Virginia), such as a statutorily mandated waiting period.⁶⁷

The EAVS asked states to report the number of voters removed from their voter list due to disqualifying felony convictions between the close of registration for the November 2022 general election and the close of registration for the November 2024 general election. To provide context for this EAVS item, the 2024 Policy Survey asked what happens to registration records when a person's voting rights are affected due to a criminal conviction or incarceration. Two-thirds of states (66.7%) reported that the registration record becomes inactive, which prevents the person from voting. About 10% of states reported that the registration record is removed from the database, and 7.8% reported that a hold or suspension is placed on the record, which also prevents the person from voting. Eight states (15.7%) specified some other process.⁶⁸ Of them, five reported that the voter registration record is placed in a "cancelled" or "removed" status, though the states' follow-up procedures differed.⁶⁹

The Policy Survey also asks states to indicate how individuals removed from voter lists due to disqualifying convictions can become eligible voters again under state law. Missouri, Rhode Island, and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported automatically restoring the previous voter registration of individuals with convictions or incarcerations once the period of disenfranchisement has passed, requiring no further action by the voter. Of the states that indicated requiring some type of action, 69.4% reported that a person is immediately eligible to vote and must reregister through the same process as the general public. Some states reported having other conditions, such as the voter presenting documentation during the registration process that shows that they have completed the voter registration requirements (12.2%) or restoring the voter's voting rights through a formal administrative process (18.4%). Ten states provided comments that further explained their policies.⁷⁰ In Louisiana, for example, an individual must appear in the office of the registrar and provide documentation from the appropriate election official demonstrating that the individual has not been incarcerated following a felony conviction within the last five years, nor is the individual under an order of imprisonment. In Pennsylvania, an individual is required to contact the county election office and notify them that they are no longer serving a felony sentence. However, they are not required to reregister.

Securing, Certifying, and Auditing Elections

Before and after votes are cast, election officials work to ensure the security of elections. These efforts involve procuring election equipment (e.g., voting systems, electronic poll books) that meet accepted standards, auditing election activities, and other tasks. The Policy Survey asks states to report on election technology, election certification, recounts, auditing activities, and security policies that they have instituted (e.g., cybersecurity protections, personal safety) to ensure the safety of employees at election offices. Such questions include:

⁶⁷ Information on the length of time a disqualifying felony conviction will restrict voting rights was collected in item Q51a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁶⁸ North Dakota does not have voter registration and is not included in these percentages.

⁶⁹ Information on what happens to the registration records of populations whose voting rights are affected due to criminal conviction or incarceration was collected in item Q51b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁷⁰ Information on state policies for restoring voting rights to individuals with disqualifying felony convictions was collected in item Q51c of the 2024 Policy Survey.



- What are state policies on voting system testing and certification?
- Are electronic poll books used in your state?
- What is the deadline for election certification?
- Why might a jurisdiction conduct a post-election recount of ballots?
- What types of auditing activities can be conducted?
- Have security policies been implemented to protect employees working in election offices?

Election Technology

Voting system testing and certification are required in most states (78.6%) by statute, and a few states (14.3%) indicated that they require testing and certification through a formal administrative rule or guidance. American Samoa, Mississippi, the Northern Mariana Islands, and South Dakota reported that voting system testing and certification before the system's approval for purchase is not required. The 2024 Policy Survey also asked states to describe their policies regarding the role of the EAC and federal testing and certification in determining which voting systems to use. States most commonly reported requiring testing by an EAC-accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL; 48.1%), using the EAC-adopted Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG; 46.2%), by federal certification with specific reference to EAC certification (38.5%), and by state certification independent of federal certification (38.5%; see Figure 9).⁷¹

Some states provided clarifying comments. The District of Columbia reported that it requires voting systems to meet or exceed HAVA standards or be federally certified. Similarly, Oregon reported that the system must be EAC-certified or examined by a federally accredited VSTL. Maine indicated that federal EAC certification according to VVSG is required or preferred, but testing based on another state certification program may be acceptable.


The 2024 Policy Survey asked whether any jurisdictions in the state use electronic poll books and whether testing and certification are required before electronic poll books' "approval for purchase." Electronic poll book testing and certification has historically not been as formalized as that for voting equipment, but it may be in future elections with KNOWiNK's Poll Pad 3.6 becoming the first federally certified electronic poll book in February 2025 and North Carolina becoming the first state to adopt the EAC's Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification requirements in March 2025.^{72, 73} Although there were no federally certified electronic poll books when the 2024 Policy Survey data were being collected, many states have their own process for testing or certifying these machines before approving them for purchase. Of the 43 states that reported using electronic poll books either

⁷¹ Information on voting system testing and certification policies was collected in items Q22 and Q22a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁷² "The EAC Announces First Federally Certified Electronic Poll Book During Election Technology Hearing." *Election Assistance Commission*, 20 Feb. 2025, eac.gov/news/2025/02/20/eac-announces-first-federally-certified-electronic-poll-book-during-election. Press release.

⁷³ "EAC Commissioners Issue Joint Statement on North Carolina Becoming First State to Adopt Federal Electronic Poll Book Requirements." *Election Assistance Commission*, 18 Mar. 2025, eac.gov/news/2025/03/18/eac-commissioners-issue-joint-statement-north-carolina-becoming-first-state-adopt. Press release.

Figure 9. States That Require Voting System Testing Most Commonly Require Testing From An EAC-Accredited VSTL



Source: Information on voting equipment testing and certification policy was collected in item Q22a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

statewide or in certain jurisdictions, 39.5% indicated that they do not require testing or certification before the electronic poll books' approval for purchase. In 30.2% of the states that reported having electronic poll book requirements, testing and certification are required by statute. An equal percentage of states reported that testing and certification are required by a formal administrative rule or guidance.⁷⁴

Election Certification and Recounts

State and federal election results are not final until the state completes their official canvass and certification. During the canvass, election officials verify that every valid vote cast is included in the results before certifying the election. The 2024 Policy Survey asked states to provide their election certification deadlines for the 2024 general election. The range was broad, with certification deadlines reported between November 7, 2024, and December 31, 2024.⁷⁵ Thirty-five states

⁷⁴ Information on electronic poll books and testing and certification of these poll books was collected in items Q23 and Q23a of the 2024 Policy Survey.


⁷⁵ Information on deadlines for certifying the 2024 general election results was collected in item Q47 of the 2024 Policy Survey.



reported being able to certify the election in November 2024, and the remaining 21 states had a certification deadline in December 2024. States provided clarifying comments on their specific policies regarding their certification deadline. For example, Delaware, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania reported not having a specific state certification deadline, and the District of Columbia and Guam noted that their reported deadlines were tentative. Additionally, Alaska commented that their reported date was a target deadline, and North Carolina noted their reported deadline was barring recounts or protests in individual races.

An election recount is a repeat tabulation of votes cast in an election, and it is used to determine the accuracy of an initial count. Many recounts may be of only one contest or portions of a contest. Recounts may be conducted for a variety of reasons, and repeat tabulations may be conducted in a variety of ways. The 2024 Policy Survey collected data on the reasons a recount could be conducted for the 2024 general election (Figure 10); these questions did not ask whether states actually conducted the recount for one of the specified reasons. Of the states that reported conducting recounts, the most common reason a recount may be conducted was following a court order (60.7%), and half of the states reported that a recount may be conducted at the request of an affected party or candidate. Less common reasons were if the results of a contest were within a specified margin; 46.4% of states reported that recounts were conducted automatically following a

Figure 10. Post-Election Recounts Can Most Often Be Conducted By Court Order



Source: Information on post-election recount policy was collected in item Q48 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

specified margin, and 30.4% of states noted that a recount could be conducted if the results were within a specified margin and an affected candidate or party requested a recount.

These results suggest a notable shift from the 2020 general election. The number of states that allow post-election recounts following a court order has increased by 50 percentage points. Additionally, automatic recounts are increasingly triggered when results fall within a certain margin. In 2020, 37.5% of states reported that recounts could be conducted automatically under this condition; by 2024, that figure had risen to 46.4%.⁷⁶

States conduct recounts in multiple ways. Most states (71.4%) reported that recounts can be conducted via a machine recount of paper ballots or voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), whereas 53.6% reported a manual recount of paper ballots or VVPAT.⁷⁷ Some states explained other ways or additional circumstances that determine how recounts are done; for example, Illinois and Tennessee specified that the method of recount is directed by court order. West Virginia reported that the individual requesting the recount specifies the method.

Election Audits and Election Security

The 2024 Policy Survey expanded the series of questions asking states to report their auditing activities, this time focusing on specific types of audits both before and after an election. These auditing activities are defined in Table 5.

Nearly all states (92.9%) reported conducting logic and accuracy testing, which examines whether voting systems are counting votes correctly before vote tabulation begins. Two-thirds of states also reported conducting some form of post-election tabulation audits, in which a sample of ballots are selected and retabulated, and the results are compared to the originally reported vote totals. The least common auditing activities were automated independent ballot audits (conducted in Florida, Guam, and Maryland) and ballot design audits (conducted in Guam and Puerto Rico).⁷⁸ Some states reported additional auditing procedures not listed in the survey options. North Carolina, for example, conducts audits of provisional ballots that were counted to ensure that the proper procedures were followed. Georgia implements ballot image auditing, which uses optical character recognition to obtain a tally of all contests. Vermont clarified that logic and accuracy testing only takes place in towns that use a machine tabulator. Figure 11 displays the different types of auditing activities that states conducted for the 2024 general election.

⁷⁶ Information on post-election recount policy was collected in item Q48 of the 2024 Policy Survey and in item Q34 of the 2020 Policy Survey. Some answer options in this question were revised between 2020 and 2024.

⁷⁷ Information on how recounts are conducted was collected in item Q48a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁷⁸ Information on the type of post-election audits that states conduct was collected in item Q49 of the 2024 Policy Survey.




Table 5. Auditing Activities Before and After An Election

Auditing Activity	Definition
Access audit	An assessment of whether legal procedures were followed to ensure the election’s accessibility to voters with disabilities.
Automated independent ballot audit	An audit that recounts all paper ballots through a different tabulation system to confirm the accuracy of the election results. This audit method provides a visualization of each ballot.
Ballot design audit	An assessment of the usability of the ballot(s) in an election, often focusing on voters with disabilities or voters who use ballots in languages other than English.
Ballot reconciliation audit	A comparison of the published election results with the number of voters who signed poll books during in-person voting or whose mail ballot envelopes were checked in.
Compliance or procedural audit	An audit that examines whether the established processes and procedures were followed throughout the election.
Eligibility audit	A process to verify that the ballots that were counted were legally cast.
Legal audit	An assessment of whether election practices comply with all applicable local, state, and federal laws.
Logic and accuracy testing	A test to examine whether voting systems are counting votes correctly before vote tabulation begins, usually by creating a test deck of ballots and running them through the systems.
Post-election tabulation audit	An audit in which a sample of ballots are selected and retabulated, and the results are compared to the originally reported vote totals.
Risk-limiting tabulation audit	A procedure for checking a sample of ballots (or voter-verifiable records) that provides a prespecified statistical chance of correcting the reported outcome of an election if the reported outcome is wrong (that is, if a full hand count would reveal an outcome different from the reported outcome).

Source: Information on the type of post-election audits states conduct was collected in item Q49 of the 2024 Policy Survey. States were able to specify other types of audits that were not listed in the question item.

Figure 11. The Most Common Auditing Activities Were Logic and Accuracy Testing And Post-Election Tabulation Audits



Source: Information on post-election auditing activities was collected in item Q49 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

The Policy Survey asked additional questions on the use of post-election tabulation audits. Of the states that use these audits, most indicated that they are conducted as a statutory requirement (86.5%), which represents a slight decline from 2022, when the statutory requirement of these audits peaked (92.9%). Missouri, Nebraska, and Utah reported that they conduct an audit as required by a formal administrative rule or guidance.⁷⁹ In Guam and Louisiana, post-election tabulation audits are optional under state law. The Policy Survey did not collect information on whether these audits were mandatory, triggered, or conducted only in certain circumstances.

The 2024 Policy Survey asked states to report which of the following post-election tabulation audits would be required for the 2024 general election. States could select multiple options as applicable:

- A traditional, manual tabulation audit that comes from a fixed percentage of randomly selected voting districts or voting systems and is compared to the results produced by the voting system;
- A traditional, machine tabulation audit that involves the same procedure as above but involves machine, rather than manual, counting;

⁷⁹ Information on whether states require post-election tabulation audits was collected in item Q49a of the 2024 Policy Survey.



- A risk-limiting tabulation audit designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome by using statistical methods to select the audit sample size; or
- Another type of audit.

Almost three-quarters (74.3%) of states reported requiring a traditional manual tabulation audit, and 17% reported requiring a traditional machine tabulation audit. The same percentage of states (17%) reported requiring a risk-limiting tabulation audit.⁸⁰ Seven states (20%) provided comments detailing alternative procedures.

Some states reported having additional steps in their tabulation audit processes. For example, New York noted that although an audit may be conducted using an automated audit tool (like machine tabulation), there is still a component that requires manual review based on the overall number of ballots being audited. South Carolina detailed a process in which an independent, third-party vendor uses ballot images to tabulate all ballots cast throughout the state, the results of which are compared to the results produced by the voting system vendor.

Finally, the 2024 Policy Survey introduced a question asking states to report whether security policies had been put in place to protect employees working in election offices. All 56 states reported that they have instituted such security policies. Several states provided additional information detailing these policies. For example, Delaware reported that the state maintains an election security group comprised of state and federal officials and agencies. The Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico reported having police officers on site for physical security. Additionally, several states highlighted specific training provided, including safe mail-handling procedures, de-escalation, and cybersecurity and cyber-regulation trainings.

⁸⁰ Information on the type of post-election tabulation audit that states require was collected in item Q49b of the 2024 Policy Survey.

Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Policy Survey Table 1: Voter Registration Policies

State	Registration Policies Allowed for 2024 General Election			
	Automatic and Electronic Registration Offered	Online Registration Offered	Same Day Registration Offered	Age Limit for Pre-Registration
Alabama [1]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	17.5
Alaska [2]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
American Samoa	No	No	Yes	17
Arizona	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Arkansas [3]	Yes	No	No	17
California	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Colorado [4]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Connecticut	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
Delaware [5]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
District of Columbia	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Florida	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Georgia	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	17.5
Guam [6]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Hawaii	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Idaho	No	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
Illinois	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Indiana [7]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	17
Iowa	No	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
Kansas	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Kentucky [8]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Louisiana [9]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Maine	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Maryland	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Massachusetts [10]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Michigan	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Minnesota	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Mississippi [11]	Yes	Yes, only updates	No	17
Missouri	No	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17.5
Montana [12]	No	No	Yes	17
Nebraska [13]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	–
Nevada	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
New Hampshire [14]	No	No	Yes	17
New Jersey	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	17



State	Registration Policies Allowed for 2024 General Election			
	Automatic and Electronic Registration Offered	Online Registration Offered	Same Day Registration Offered	Age Limit for Pre-Registration
New Mexico [15]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
New York [16]	No	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
North Carolina [17]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
North Dakota [18]	No	No	No	--
Northern Mariana Islands [19]	No	No	No	17
Ohio [20]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	17
Oklahoma	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	17.5
Oregon [21]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	16
Pennsylvania [22]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	17
Puerto Rico [23]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	14
Rhode Island [24]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
South Carolina [25]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	17
South Dakota [26]	Yes	No	No	17
Tennessee [27]	No	Yes, registration and updates	No	17
Texas [28]	No	Yes, only updates	No	17.8
U.S. Virgin Islands [29]	No	No	No	17
Utah [30]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Vermont [31]	No	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Virginia [32]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
Washington	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	16
West Virginia [33]	Yes	Yes, registration and updates	No	--
Wisconsin [34]	No	Yes, registration and updates	Yes	17
Wyoming [35]	No	No	Yes	16

Policy Survey Table 1 Calculation Notes:

Automatic and Electronic Registration Offered uses question Q8.

Online Registration Offered uses question Q9.

Same Day Registration Offered uses question Q11.

Age Limit for Pre-Registration uses question Q12.

Policy Survey Table 1 Notes:

General Notes:

- Q9, Q11, and Q12 were single-select questions. Q8 allowed states to select multiple responses.
- Same day registration is defined as a voter registering to vote on the same day that they cast a ballot in person.

- [1] During an interaction with the state government agency, the option to register to vote is offered, but it does not hinder the individual from interacting with the agency.
- [2] Same day registration is available for the presidential race only. Pre-registration is available for individuals who are 17 years old and within 90 days of turning 18.
- [3] When someone does business at a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), they are asked if they would like to register to vote. If the voter says yes, then their information is electronically sent to the county clerk's office for processing.
- [4] Beginning in January 2025, the pre-registration age became 15.
- [5] Pre-registrants become active voters at the point they will be at least 18 years of age by the date of the next general election.
- [6] Applicants who register at a DMV must opt for registration.
- [7] A person who is 17 years of age, but will be 18 years of age on or before the next general or municipal election in their precinct, may register to vote.
- [8] The pre-registration age limit depends on the year of the next election. Under KRS 116.045(1), an individual may register if they "will possess on the day of the next regular election, the qualifications set forth in statute, including being 18 years old." Since there are years in which there are no regular elections in Kentucky, there are occasional situations where 16-year-olds may register to vote.
- [9] Persons 16 years of age may only pre-register in person at the registrar of voters office or with their application for a Louisiana driver's license. Persons 17 years old may pre-register via any method.
- [10] There was a week during in-person early voting when voters could register and vote at the same time before the close of voter registration.
- [11] Voters who are 17 but will be 18 by the date of the general election may register to vote, vote in a primary election, and be registered for the general election.
- [12] Montana does not provide for online voter registration. However, when citizens use the Montana Department of Justice online driver license renewal system, they are afforded the opportunity to register to vote or update their voter registration.
- [13] During an interaction with the DMV, if there is a change of address for someone who is currently registered to vote, then that change of address is automatically sent for updating their existing voter registration record unless the voter checks a box to opt out. If the voter is not registered to vote, then they must answer affirmatively to the optional voter registration question if they want to be registered to vote. Nebraska has same day registration for former federal employees (§32-940), persons who become naturalized citizens after the close of voter registration (§32-942.01), and during the overlap of mail balloting period and close of voter registration. Additionally, during presidential years, we allow new residents who moved to Nebraska after the close of voter registration to register and vote for president only (§32-933). Individuals who turn 18 by the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of the current calendar year may register to vote and vote. For example, a 17-year-old who turned 18 on October 31, 2024, could have registered to vote starting on January 1, 2024. Seventeen-year-old individuals who will turn 18 by the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of the current calendar year can fully register to vote before they are 18 and have no change to their registration when they turn 18; they are fully eligible voters who can vote in primary statewide, special, city primary/general elections, and vote early in person for general elections while 17 years old.
- [14] A voter may pre-register at 17 years old as long as they will be 18 before the next election.
- [15] Individuals can register before they are 18 years old and the voter registration system puts them into "suspense" status until their 18th birthday.
- [16] Automatic voter registration was adopted and will begin in 2025. To register to vote online, voters must supply a valid state ID, last four digits of their SSN, or indicate they have neither. The voter registration deadline, the first day of early voting, and the absentee mail deadline were October 26, 2024 (10 days prior to Election Day) and was the only day an individual could have registered to vote and cast a ballot on the same day.
- [17] Same day registration is only available during the early in-person voting period, which runs from October 17 to November 2. Same day registration is not available on Election Day.



- [18] North Dakota does not have voter registration.
- [19] Any person desiring to register to vote in an election district may register with a registration clerk or other person authorized by the Commission or, if a person registers by mail, provide a picture identification form as part of the election registration packet. Election law states that the last day to register to vote is 60 days before Election Day. Any person may register as long as they meet all requirements, including registering at 17 years old and turning 18 years old on or before Election Day.
- [20] A voter who will be 18 on or before a general Election Day may register and vote in the primary election associated with the upcoming general election.
- [21] Oregon's registration cutoff is 21 days before each election. A voter could register that day and request an absentee ballot, which would be mailed to them. Additionally, by registering to vote, an individual is requesting a mail ballot since Oregon is a vote-by-mail state.
- [22] In addition to offering online voter registration, the Department of State partners with multiple state agencies through a web application programming interface (API) to receive voter registration applications during their business process.
- [23] Pre-registration is allowed for individuals ages 14 and older, provided they will be 18 years old by the date of the next general election.
- [24] Rhode Island allows for voters to do same day registration and vote for president and vice president only. This option is only available in years when the presidential race is on the ballot.
- [25] A person who will be 18 by the date of an election can begin registering 120 days prior to the voter registration deadline for the election, or if there is a primary associated with the election, 120 days prior to the voter registration deadline for the primary. There are theoretical situations in which a 16-year-old could register.
- [26] Voters attest to the fact they will be 18 on or before the next election. 12-4-1.2. Voter registration form — Certification. The voter registration form must include a certification of voter eligibility by which the applicant attests, under the penalty of perjury, that the applicant: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) will be 18 years or older on or before the next election; (3) has maintained residence in South Dakota for at least 30 days prior to submitting the registration form; (4) has not been judged mentally incompetent; (5) is not currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction; and (6) authorizes the cancellation of a previous registration, if applicable.
- [27] A 17-year-old who will be 18 years old by the next election in their jurisdiction can register to vote.
- [28] Texas' minimum pre-registration age is 17 years and 10 months.
- [29] The pre-registered voter must turn 18 by or on the election date.
- [30] A 17-year-old is eligible to vote in a primary if they will be 18 by the general election. The clerk processes any registration form for a 16- or 17-year-old, but they do not get a ballot until eligible.
- [31] A pre-registered person can vote in statewide elections but cannot take the oath until they turn 18.
- [32] Virginia's same day voter registration is an in-person transaction and leads the voter to cast a provisional ballot. There is not a permission within the Section that allows a same day registrant to request a mailed ballot.
- [33] Seventeen-year-olds are allowed to register and vote in the primary if they are 18 by the general election.
- [34] In Wisconsin, voters are allowed to register in the clerk's office any time through 5:00 p.m. the Friday before Election Day. They can also use an in-person absentee ballot to vote from two weeks prior to the election through the Sunday prior to the election, so there is an overlap of time where they may register to vote and complete their absentee ballot on the same day at the clerk's office. Individuals who are hospitalized may register and request a ballot to vote through an appointed agent on the same day any time from the Tuesday prior to Election Day through 5:00 p.m. on Election Day. Individuals who are 17 years old and will be turning 18 by the next upcoming election may pre-register to vote.
- [35] Wyoming has Election Day registrations. The state is exempt from the NVRA. W.S. 22-3-102(a)(ii) requires that an individual be at least 18 years of age on the day of the next general election provided

they shall not be permitted to vote until they have reached the age of 18. The individual must meet the other qualifications to register to vote.



Policy Survey Table 2: Mail Voting Policies

State	Excuse Required for Mail Voting	All-Mail Elections	Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters	State Allows Drop Boxes	Drop Box Operational Dates	
					First Date	Final Date
Alabama [1]	Yes	--	Persons with physician letter	No	--	--
Alaska	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/21/2024	11/05/2024
American Samoa	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Arizona	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	10/09/2024	11/05/2024
Arkansas [2]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
California	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/07/2024	11/05/2024
Colorado [3]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/20/2024	11/05/2024
Connecticut [4]	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Persons with physician letter	Yes	10/06/2024	11/05/2024
Delaware [5]	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities, Other	No	--	--
District of Columbia	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/11/2024	11/05/2024
Florida	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/21/2024	11/05/2024
Georgia [6]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/15/2024	11/01/2024
Guam [7]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Hawaii [8]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/18/2024	11/05/2024
Idaho [9]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/16/2024	11/05/2024
Illinois	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	09/26/2024	11/05/2024
Indiana [10]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/16/2024	11/05/2024
Iowa [11]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/16/2024	11/05/2024
Kansas [12]	No	--	Persons with disabilities	Yes	10/16/2024	11/05/2024
Kentucky	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/21/2024	11/05/2024

State	Excuse Required for Mail Voting	All-Mail Elections	Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters	State Allows Drop Boxes	Drop Box Operational Dates	
					First Date	Final Date
Louisiana [13]	Yes	--	Individuals over a specified age, Persons with disabilities	No	--	--
Maine [14]	No	--	Individuals over a specified age, Persons with disabilities	Yes	10/07/2024	11/05/2024
Maryland	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	09/21/2024	11/05/2024
Massachusetts [15]	No	--	Persons with physician letter	Yes	09/23/2024	11/05/2024
Michigan [16]	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	09/01/2024	11/05/2024
Minnesota [17]	No	Certain jurisdictions	Any registrant	Yes	09/20/2024	11/05/2024
Mississippi	Yes	--	Persons with physician letter	No	--	--
Missouri [18]	Yes	--	Persons with disabilities	No	--	--
Montana [19]	No	--	Any registrant	No	--	--
Nebraska [20]	No	Certain jurisdictions	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/27/2024	11/05/2024
Nevada	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/20/2024	11/05/2024
New Hampshire [21]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
New Jersey	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	09/21/2024	11/05/2024
New Mexico [22]	No	Certain jurisdictions	Any registrant	Yes	10/08/2024	11/05/2024
New York [23]	No	--	Persons with disabilities, Other	Yes	10/26/2024	11/05/2024
North Carolina [24]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
North Dakota [25]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/26/2024	11/04/2024
Northern Mariana Islands [26]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Ohio	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/08/2024	11/05/2024
Oklahoma [27]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Oregon [28]	No	Statewide	Other	Yes	10/16/2024	11/05/2024



State	Excuse Required for Mail Voting	All-Mail Elections	Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters	State Allows Drop Boxes	Drop Box Operational Dates	
					First Date	Final Date
Pennsylvania [29]	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	10/01/2024	11/05/2024
Puerto Rico [30]	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Rhode Island [31]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/01/2024	11/05/2024
South Carolina	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
South Dakota [32]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Tennessee [33]	Yes	--	Persons with physician letter	No	--	--
Texas	Yes	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands [34]	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	No	--	--
Utah	No	Statewide	Any registrant	Yes	10/15/2024	11/05/2024
Vermont	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	09/23/2024	11/05/2024
Virginia [35]	No	--	Any registrant	Yes	09/20/2024	11/05/2024
Washington [36]	No	Statewide	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/18/2024	11/05/2024
West Virginia	Yes	--	Persons with physician letter	No	--	--
Wisconsin	No	--	Persons with disabilities, Other	Yes	09/19/2024	11/05/2024
Wyoming	No	--	No permanent absentee voting	Yes	10/08/2024	11/05/2024

State	State Allows Mail Ballot Curing	Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots	Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots	Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots
Alabama [1]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Alaska	No	--	Election Day	11/15/2024
American Samoa	No	--	Election Day	Election Day
Arizona	Yes	11/10/2024	Not required	Election Day
Arkansas [2]	Yes	11/11/2024	Not required	Election Day
California	Yes	12/11/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Colorado [3]	Yes	11/13/2024	Not required	Election Day
Connecticut [4]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Delaware [5]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
District of Columbia	Yes	11/21/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
Florida	Yes	11/07/2024	Not required	Election Day
Georgia [6]	Yes	11/08/2024	Not required	Election Day
Guam [7]	No	--	Election Day	11/20/2024
Hawaii [8]	Yes	11/13/2024	Not required	Election Day
Idaho [9]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Illinois	Yes	11/19/2024	Election Day	11/19/2024
Indiana [10]	Yes	11/15/2024	Not required	Election Day
Iowa [11]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Kansas [12]	Yes	11/18/2024	Election Day	11/08/2024
Kentucky	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Louisiana [13]	Yes	11/04/2024	Not required	1 day before Election Day
Maine [14]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Maryland	Yes	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
Massachusetts [15]	Yes	11/05/2024	Election Day	11/08/2024
Michigan [16]	Yes	11/08/2024	Not required	Election Day
Minnesota [17]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Mississippi	Yes	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Missouri [18]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Montana [19]	Yes	11/06/2024	Not required	Election Day
Nebraska [20]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Nevada	Yes	11/12/2024	Election Day	11/09/2024
New Hampshire [21]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
New Jersey	Yes	11/16/2024	Election Day	11/11/2024
New Mexico [22]	Yes	11/22/2024	Not required	Election Day
New York [23]	Yes	11/22/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024



State	State Allows Mail Ballot Curing	Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots	Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots	Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots
North Carolina [24]	Yes	11/14/2024	Not required	Election Day
North Dakota [25]	Yes	11/17/2024	1 day before Election Day	11/17/2024
Northern Mariana Islands [26]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Ohio	Yes	11/09/2024	1 day before Election Day	11/09/2024
Oklahoma [27]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Oregon [28]	Yes	11/26/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Pennsylvania [29]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Puerto Rico [30]	Yes	12/31/2024	Election Day	12/30/2024
Rhode Island [31]	Yes	11/12/2024	Not required	Election Day
South Carolina	No	--	Not required	Election Day
South Dakota [32]	No	--	Not required	Election Day
Tennessee [33]	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Texas	Yes	11/12/2024	Election Day	11/06/2024
U.S. Virgin Islands [34]	No	--	Election Day	11/15/2024
Utah	Yes	11/15/2024	1 day before Election Day	Election Day
Vermont	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Virginia [35]	Yes	11/08/2024	Election Day	11/08/2024
Washington [36]	Yes	11/25/2024	Election Day	11/26/2024
West Virginia	Yes	11/12/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Wisconsin	Yes	11/05/2024	Not required	Election Day
Wyoming	No	--	Not required	Election Day

Policy Survey Table 2 Calculation Notes:

Excuse Required for Mail Voting uses question Q24.

All-Mail Elections uses questions Q25 and Q25a.

Populations Who May Register as Permanent Absentee Voters uses questions Q26 and Q26a.

State Allows Drop Boxes uses question Q27.

Drop Box Operational Dates, First Date and Final Date uses question Q27c.

State Allows Mail Ballot Curing uses question Q28.

Deadline for Curing Mail Ballots uses question Q28b.

Deadline for Postmarking Mail Ballots and Deadline for Receiving Mail Ballots uses question Q29.

Policy Survey Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q24, Q25, Q25a, Q26, Q27, and Q28 were single-select questions. Q26a allowed states to select multiple responses. Q27c and Q28b required calendar dates (MM/DD/YYYY).
- An all-mail election is an election in which all registered voters or all active registered voters are automatically sent a mail ballot. Some in-person voting may take place during all-mail elections. All-mail elections may be conducted statewide or only in certain jurisdictions within a state.
- A drop box is a locked container (located either indoors or outdoors) wherein voters (or voters' authorized representatives, if allowed by state law) may deliver their voted mail ballots for collection. Drop boxes are staffed or unstaffed and are operated or controlled by election officials. Drop boxes are separate from ballot boxes that are located at in-person polling places for voters to place their ballots immediately after voting in person.
- A cured mail ballot is defined as allowing returned mail ballots that are originally rejected for an error or for missing required information to be corrected and counted.

- [1] Absentee ballots being returned by mail to the absentee election manager must be received no later than 12:00 p.m. on Election Day. [Code of Alabama Â§ 17-11-18(a)]
- [2] Mailed ballots must be received by 7:30 p.m. on election night.
- [3] Postmarks do not count; ballots must be in the hands of the county clerk by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted.
- [4] There is no postmark rule in Connecticut.
- [5] In Delaware, "Other" refers to those eligible under UOCAVA. Ballots must be returned to the Department by the time of close of polls on the day of the election (for the General Election: by 8:00 p.m. local time on 11/5/2024).
- [6] Mail ballots must be received in office by close of polls on Election Day.
- [7] The Guam Election Commission (GEC) allows 10 business days to receive absentee ballots postmarked on or before November 5, 2024.
- [8] The mail ballot deadline is based on the receipt date, as opposed to postmark date. Ballots must be received by the County Elections Division by the close of voting on Election Day (7:00 p.m.).
- [9] Ballots must be received by the county elections office by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [10] Ballot receipt deadline was 6:00 p.m. local time on November 5, 2024.
- [11] Deadline is when polls close at 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [12] Mail ballots must have a postmark or other postal designation ballot and be placed in the mail on or before Election Day.
- [13] Ballots must be received by the registrar of voters by 4:30 p.m. the day before Election Day.
- [14] Drop boxes should be available as soon as the municipality receives their ballots, which may be before, but not later than, October 7, 2024. Mail ballots must be received by the municipal clerk by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [15] Only certain types of mail ballot errors may be cured (non-matching voter signature, missing voter signature, or missing/incomplete required document).
- [16] There is no formal start date for drop boxes.
- [17] The list of all-mail precincts is available at sos.state.mn.us/media/5630/mail-ballot-precincts.xlsx.
- [18] No postmark is required for mail ballots. Ballots must be received in-office by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [19] Domestic ballots must be received by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [20] Counties with populations under 10,000 can apply to the Secretary of State to have elections conducted entirely by mail for one or more precincts in their jurisdiction. Mail ballots must be received by close of polls on Election Day.
- [21] Postmark does not apply. All absentee ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.



- [22] Some counties do have all mail precincts. The criteria is as follows: 1-6-22.1. Mail ballot election precinct; absentee voting in lieu of polling place. A. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 1-1-11 and 1-1-12 NMSA 1978, not later than the first Monday in November of each odd-numbered year, a board of county commissioners may designate a precinct as a mail ballot election precinct if, upon a written request of the county clerk, it finds that the precinct has fewer than 100 voters and the nearest polling place for an adjoining precinct is more than 20 miles driving distance from the boundary for the precinct in question. Mail ballots must be received in the office of the county clerk by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [23] There is a cure process for all mail ballots received by County Boards of Election two to seven days post-election. A voter is given an opportunity to affirm their ballot was mailed on or before Election Day.
- [24] Mail ballots must be received by 7:30 p.m. on Election Day.
- [25] Ballots must be received by 13 calendar days after the Election Day.
- [26] Postmarking of ballots does not apply to the general election. If the ballots are not received on Election Day at the pickup times, then they will not be counted.
- [27] Ballots must be received at the County Election Board by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [28] Each county determines the schedule for drop sites.
- [29] Pennsylvania offers both permanent absentee and permanent mail-in programs. Every voter is eligible to register as a permanent mail-in voter. Only those voters who have certain physical disabilities are eligible to register as permanent absentee voters. County election boards define the times drop boxes are open based on county election board decisions. The first and last days of drop boxes can vary from county to county. The ballots must be received no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day to be counted.
- [30] Absentee ballots are received and counted through the last day of the canvassing process, provided they are postmarked on or before the date of the General Election (November 5, 2024). For the 2024 electoral cycle, the canvassing concluded on December 30, 2024. By law, the canvass must always conclude on or before December 31 of the election year.
- [31] Drop boxes must be closed on Election Day, November 5, 2024, at 8:00 p.m. Voters covered under UOCAVA had a ballot receipt deadline of November 12, 2024.
- [32] A voted ballot must be received by the County Election Official on Election Day in enough time to deliver the ballot to the voter's voting precinct before the polls close.
- [33] Ballots must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.
- [34] The U.S. post office rarely postmarks absentee ballots. They are only postmarked if the voter pays to return the ballot.
- [35] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter's absentee ballot properly postmarked must be returned by noon on the third day after the election.
- [36] Ballot drop boxes closed at 8:00 p.m. on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots were required to be postmarked by November 5, 2024, and received by the county elections office by November 25, 2024.
- [37] In Wisconsin, individuals may claim a need to be a permanent absentee voter for reasons of age (not specified), physical illness, infirmity, or disability for an indefinite period of time. Ballots can be cured by the voter or the witness for missing voter signature, missing witness signature, or missing witness address. They must be cured by no later than the close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day. Wisconsin does not track whether a ballot requires a voter to cure a ballot or which ballots were counted after being cured. Due to a recent court ruling, municipal clerks may choose to use drop boxes in their jurisdictions as a lawful method of absentee ballot return. *Priorities USA v. Wis. Elections Comm'n*, 2024 WI 32, 412 Wis. 2d 594, 8 N.W.3d 429. All ballots must be returned by close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day. Ballots must be received at the polling place or absentee central count location (if applicable) by no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.

[38] Drop boxes are not statutorily authorized. Some county clerks are using drop boxes, despite the fact that there is no statutory authorization. According to W.S. 22-9-118, all absentee ballots (UOCAVA and regular) must be received by the county clerk not later than 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.



Policy Survey Table 3: UOCAVA Voting

State	Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters		Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters	
	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt
Alabama	Not required	11/12/2024	Not required	11/12/2024
Alaska	Election Day	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/20/2024
American Samoa	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Arizona	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Arkansas	Election Day	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
California	Election Day	11/12/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Colorado [1]	Not required	11/13/2024	Not required	11/13/2024
Connecticut [2]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Delaware [3]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
District of Columbia	Election Day	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
Florida	Not required	Election Day	Not required	11/15/2024
Georgia	Election Day	11/08/2024	Election Day	11/08/2024
Guam [4]	Election Day	11/20/2024	Election Day	11/20/2024
Hawaii [5]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Idaho	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Illinois	Election Day	11/19/2024	Election Day	11/19/2024
Indiana [6]	Not required	Election Day	Election Day	11/15/2024
Iowa [7]	1 day before Election Day	11/11/2024	1 day before Election Day	11/11/2024
Kansas	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Kentucky	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Louisiana [8]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Maine [9]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Maryland	Election Day	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
Massachusetts [10]	Election Day	11/08/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
Michigan [11]	Not required	11/11/2024	Not required	11/11/2024
Minnesota	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Mississippi	Election Day	11/12/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Missouri [12]	Election Day	11/08/2024	Election Day	11/08/2024
Montana [13]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Nebraska [14]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Nevada	Election Day	11/09/2024	Election Day	11/09/2024
New Hampshire [15]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
New Jersey	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
New Mexico [16]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
New York [17]	Election Day	11/18/2024	Election Day	11/18/2024
North Carolina [18]	Not required	11/14/2024	Not required	11/14/2024

State	Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters		Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters	
	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt	Ballot Postmark	Ballot Receipt
North Dakota	1 day before Election Day	11/17/2024	1 day before Election Day	11/17/2024
Northern Mariana Islands [19]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Ohio	Not required	11/09/2024	Not required	11/09/2024
Oklahoma [20]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Oregon	Election Day	11/12/2024	Election Day	11/12/2024
Pennsylvania [21]	Not required	11/12/2024	Not required	11/12/2024
Puerto Rico [22]	Election Day	12/30/2024	Election Day	12/30/2024
Rhode Island	Not required	11/12/2024	Not required	11/12/2024
South Carolina [23]	Not required	11/07/2024	Not required	11/07/2024
South Dakota [24]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Tennessee [25]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Texas	Not required	11/12/2024	Not required	11/12/2024
U.S. Virgin Islands	Election Day	11/15/2024	Election Day	11/15/2024
Utah [26]	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day	Election Day
Vermont	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Virginia [27]	Election Day	11/08/2024	Election Day	11/08/2024
Washington	Not required	11/25/2024	Not required	11/25/2024
West Virginia	Not required	11/12/2024	Not required	11/12/2024
Wisconsin [28]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day
Wyoming [29]	Not required	Election Day	Not required	Election Day



State	UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods	UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods
Alabama	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail, Online
Alaska	Postal mail, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Fax
American Samoa	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Arizona	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Arkansas	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail
California	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other	Postal mail, Fax, Other
Colorado [1]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other
Connecticut [2]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Delaware [3]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
District of Columbia	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Florida	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Fax, Other
Georgia	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail
Guam [4]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Hawaii [5]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Idaho	Postal mail, Email, Online	Postal mail
Illinois	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Other
Indiana [6]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Iowa [7]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Kansas	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Kentucky	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail
Louisiana [8]	Postal mail, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Fax, Other
Maine [9]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Maryland	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Other
Massachusetts [10]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other
Michigan [11]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Minnesota	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail
Mississippi	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Missouri [12]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Montana [13]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Nebraska [14]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Nevada	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
New Hampshire [15]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail, Other
New Jersey	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
New Mexico [16]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
New York [17]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail
North Carolina [18]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
North Dakota	Postal mail, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Fax, Online

State	UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods	UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods
Northern Mariana Islands [19]	Postal mail	Postal mail
Ohio	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Other
Oklahoma [20]	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail, Fax
Oregon	Postal mail, Online, Other	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
Pennsylvania [21]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Puerto Rico [22]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Rhode Island	Postal mail, Online	Postal mail, Online
South Carolina [23]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
South Dakota [24]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Tennessee [25]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail
Texas	Postal mail, Email, Online	Postal mail, Email, Other
U.S. Virgin Islands	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail, Email, Fax
Utah [26]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Vermont	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail
Virginia [27]	Postal mail, Email	Postal mail, Other
Washington	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Other
West Virginia	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online
Wisconsin [28]	Postal mail, Email, Fax, Online, Other	Postal mail, Other
Wyoming [29]	Postal mail, Email, Fax	Postal mail

Policy Survey Table 3 Calculation Notes:

Deadline for Domestic Military UOCAVA Voters, Postmark and Receipt uses question Q43.

Deadline for Overseas UOCAVA Voters, Postmark and Receipt uses question Q44.

UOCAVA Ballot Transmission Methods uses question Q41.

UOCAVA Ballot Return Methods uses question Q42.

Policy Survey Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q42 and Q42 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q43 and Q44 required calendar dates (MM/DD/YYYY).

- [1] A postmark is not required, but the voter must mail the ballot no later than 7:00 p.m. MT on Election Day.
- [2] Ballots must be received by close of polls on Election Day, 8:00 p.m.
- [3] In Delaware, "Other" method refers to in-person issuance and reception/drop-off of ballots.
- [4] The Guam Election Commission (GEC) allowed 10 business days to receive absentee ballots postmarked on or before November 5, 2024.
- [5] Ballots must have been received by 7:00 p.m. on November 5, 2024.
- [6] The ballot receipt deadline reported for Q43 was 6:00 p.m. local time on November 5, 2024. The ballot receipt deadline reported for Q44 was 12:00 p.m. local time on November 15, 2024. If the board



is unable to determine the postmark date, then the absentee ballot may not be counted. (IC 3-12-1-17 Absentee ballot received from overseas voter by mail; arrival time; when to count Sec. 17. (a) This section applies only to an absentee ballot sent by mail. (b) Notwithstanding IC 3-11.5-4-7, an absentee ballot received from an overseas voter is not considered as arriving too late if both of the following apply: (1) The absentee ballot envelope is postmarked no later than the date of the election. (2) The absentee ballot is received no later than 12:00 p.m. 10 days following the election. (c) If the postmark on the absentee ballot envelope is unclear, then the county election board, by unanimous vote of the entire membership of the board, determines the postmark date. If the board is unable to determine the postmark date, then the absentee ballot may not be counted.

- [7] The receipt deadline was 12:00 p.m. on November 11, 2024.
- [8] The registrar of voters must receive UOCAVA ballots no later than 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [9] Ballots must be received by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day; postmark does not apply.
- [10] "Other" refers to UOCAVA voters who voted in the local election official's office.
- [11] Michigan determined the effective date based on the November 11 holiday. However, it is six days after Election Day.
- [12] State law specifies a UOCAVA vote is timely if postmarked by Election Day and received by 12:00 p.m. on the Friday immediately following Election Day.
- [13] Ballot must be sent by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day and received no later than 5:00 p.m. the day after the election.
- [14] Ballots must be received by close of polls on Election Day.
- [15] Postmark does not apply. All absentee ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [16] Ballots must be received in the office of the county clerk by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [17] Military ballots have an exception to the postmark deadline if there is a dated and witnessed signature on or before Election Day.
- [18] Ballots must be returned by email, fax, or online by 7:30 p.m. on Election Day. Ballots returned by mail must be mailed by 12:01 a.m. (local time for the voter) on Election Day and arrive by 5:00 p.m. on the day before county canvass.
- [19] If ballots are not received on Election Day at the set time, then they will not be counted.
- [20] Ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.
- [21] Q44 - Ballots returned by UOCAVA voters can be received by 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day after the election, provided the voter declares the ballot was submitted for delivery by 11:59 p.m. on the day before Election Day. Overseas voters whose intent to return is uncertain must have their ballot received by the close of polls on Election Day to be counted.
- [22] Absentee ballots are received and counted through the last day of the canvassing process, provided they are postmarked on or before the date of the General Election (November 5, 2024). For the 2024 electoral cycle, the canvassing concluded on December 30, 2024. By law, the canvass must always conclude on or before December 31 of the election year.
- [23] Ballots must be received by 5:00 p.m., two days following the general election.
- [24] A voted ballot must be received by the County Election Official on Election Day in enough time to deliver the ballot to the voter's voting precinct before the polls close.
- [25] The ballot must be received by the close of polls on Election Day.
- [26] Ballot receipt deadline is three days before the canvass.
- [27] Virginia Code § 24.2-709 states that the voter's absentee ballot properly postmarked must be returned by 12:00 p.m. on the third day after the election.
- [28] In Wisconsin, all ballots must be returned by close of polls on Election Day. UOCAVA ballots can be transmitted to the voter by postal mail, email, fax, online, or through an appointed agent. UOCAVA ballots can be returned by postal mail or in person. All ballots must be returned by close of polls (8:00 p.m.) on Election Day.
- [29] All ballots must be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.

Policy Survey Table 4: In-Person Voting

State	Terminology for Casting a Ballot In-Person Before Election Day	Excuse Required for Early Voting	Early Voting	
			First Day	Last Day
Alabama [1]	In-person absentee voting	Yes	09/11/2024	11/04/2024
Alaska [2]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/21/2024	11/04/2024
American Samoa	Other	Yes	09/10/2024	11/04/2024
Arizona [3]	In-person early voting	No	10/09/2024	11/01/2024
Arkansas	In-person early voting	No	10/21/2024	11/04/2024
California [4]	In-person early voting	No	10/07/2024	11/04/2024
Colorado	In-person early voting	No	10/14/2024	11/04/2024
Connecticut [5]	In-person absentee voting	Yes	10/21/2024	11/03/2024
Delaware	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/25/2024	11/03/2024
District of Columbia	In-person early voting	No	10/28/2024	11/03/2024
Florida [6]	In-person early voting	No	10/21/2024	11/03/2024
Georgia [7]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/15/2024	11/01/2024
Guam [8]	In-person absentee voting, Other	No	10/14/2024	10/28/2024
Hawaii [9]	Other	No	10/22/2024	11/04/2024
Idaho [10]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	09/25/2024	11/01/2024
Illinois	In-person early voting	No	09/26/2024	11/04/2024
Indiana [11]	In-person early voting, Other	No	10/08/2024	11/04/2024
Iowa	In-person absentee voting	No	10/16/2024	11/04/2024
Kansas [12]	In-person early voting	No	10/16/2024	11/04/2024
Kentucky	In-person absentee voting	Yes	10/23/2024	11/02/2024
Louisiana	In-person early voting	No	10/18/2024	10/29/2024
Maine [13]	In-person absentee voting	No	10/07/2024	10/31/2024
Maryland [14]	In-person early voting	No	10/24/2024	10/31/2024
Massachusetts [15]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/19/2024	11/01/2024
Michigan [16]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/26/2024	11/03/2024
Minnesota	In-person absentee voting	No	09/20/2024	11/04/2024
Mississippi	In-person absentee voting	Yes	09/21/2024	11/02/2024
Missouri [17]	In-person absentee voting	No	09/24/2024	11/04/2024
Montana	In-person absentee voting	No	10/07/2024	11/04/2024
Nebraska [18]	In-person early voting	No	10/07/2024	11/04/2024
Nevada	In-person early voting	No	10/19/2024	11/01/2024
New Hampshire [19]	In-person absentee voting, Other	Yes	09/21/2024	11/04/2024



State	Terminology for Casting a Ballot In-Person Before Election Day	Excuse Required for Early Voting	Early Voting	
			First Day	Last Day
New Jersey	In-person early voting	No	10/26/2024	11/03/2024
New Mexico [20]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/08/2024	11/02/2024
New York	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/26/2024	11/03/2024
North Carolina	In-person early voting	No	10/17/2024	11/02/2024
North Dakota	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/21/2024	11/04/2024
Northern Mariana Islands [21]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	Yes	10/29/2024	11/04/2024
Ohio	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/08/2024	11/03/2024
Oklahoma	In-person absentee voting	No	10/30/2024	11/02/2024
Oregon [22]	Other	Yes	10/16/2024	11/04/2024
Pennsylvania [23]	Other	No	10/01/2024	10/29/2024
Puerto Rico	In-person early voting	Yes	10/23/2024	11/04/2024
Rhode Island	In-person early voting	No	10/16/2024	11/04/2024
South Carolina	In-person early voting	No	10/21/2024	11/02/2024
South Dakota [24]	In-person absentee voting	No	09/20/2024	11/04/2024
Tennessee	In-person early voting	No	10/16/2024	10/31/2024
Texas	In-person early voting	No	10/21/2024	11/01/2024
U.S. Virgin Islands	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	10/14/2024	10/28/2024
Utah	In-person early voting	No	10/22/2024	11/01/2024
Vermont [25]	In-person early voting, In-person absentee voting	No	09/23/2024	11/04/2024
Virginia	In-person absentee voting	No	09/20/2024	11/02/2024
Washington [26]	In-person absentee voting	No	10/18/2024	11/04/2024
West Virginia	In-person early voting	No	10/23/2024	11/02/2024
Wisconsin [27]	In-person absentee voting	No	10/22/2024	11/03/2024
Wyoming	In-person absentee voting	No	10/08/2024	11/04/2024

State	Vote Centers		Curbside Voting Offered
	Uses Vote Centers	How Vote Centers Operate	
Alabama [1]	Yes, on Election Day only	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
Alaska [2]	No	--	No
American Samoa	No	--	Yes
Arizona [3]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	Yes
Arkansas	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
California [4]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Only jurisdictions that meet specific requirements	Yes
Colorado	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	No
Connecticut [5]	No	--	Yes
Delaware	Yes, during early voting only	Only jurisdictions that meet specific requirements	No
District of Columbia	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	Yes
Florida [6]	No	--	No
Georgia [7]	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	No
Guam [8]	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
Hawaii [9]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	Yes
Idaho [10]	Yes, during early voting only	At the jurisdiction's discretion	Yes
Illinois	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	Yes
Indiana [11]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
Iowa	No	--	Yes
Kansas [12]	Yes, during early voting only	Only jurisdictions that meet specific requirements	Yes
Kentucky	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	Yes
Louisiana	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	No
Maine [13]	No	--	No
Maryland [14]	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	No
Massachusetts [15]	No	--	No
Michigan [16]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	Yes
Minnesota	No	--	Yes
Mississippi	No	--	Yes
Missouri [17]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	Yes
Montana	No	--	Yes



State	Vote Centers		Curbside Voting Offered
	Uses Vote Centers	How Vote Centers Operate	
Nebraska [18]	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
Nevada	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
New Hampshire [19]	No	--	Yes
New Jersey	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	No
New Mexico [20]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	No
New York	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
North Carolina	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
North Dakota	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
Northern Mariana Islands [21]	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
Ohio	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
Oklahoma	Yes, during early voting only	Only jurisdictions that meet specific requirements	Yes
Oregon [22]	No	--	No
Pennsylvania [23]	No	--	No
Puerto Rico	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
Rhode Island	No	--	No
South Carolina	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
South Dakota [24]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	No
Tennessee	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Only jurisdictions that meet specific requirements	No
Texas	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Only jurisdictions that meet specific requirements	Yes
U.S. Virgin Islands	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	Yes
Utah	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	Yes
Vermont [25]	No	--	Yes
Virginia	No	--	Yes
Washington [26]	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	Statewide	Yes
West Virginia	Yes, during early voting only	Statewide	Yes
Wisconsin [27]	No	--	Yes
Wyoming	Yes, both during early voting and on Election Day	At the jurisdiction's discretion	Yes

Policy Survey Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Terminology for Casting a Ballot In-Person Before Election Day uses question Q34.

Excuse Required for Early Voting uses question Q34a.

Early Voting, First Day and Last Day use question Q34b.

Vote Centers, Uses Vote Centers uses question Q35.

Vote Centers, How Vote Centers Operate uses question Q35a.

Curbside Voting Offered uses question Q37.

Policy Survey Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q34 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q34a, Q35, Q35a, and Q37 were single-select questions. Q34b required calendar dates (MM/DD/YYYY).
- [1] Alabama does not have early voting. In-person absentee voting opened on September 11 and closed on November 4.
 - [2] There are several absentee in-person and early vote locations also available on Election Day. A list of locations are available on the division's website.
 - [3] The emergency voting period between 7:00 p.m. on November 1, 2024, and 5:00 p.m. on November 4, 2024, required the voter to sign an affidavit attesting to the fact they were experiencing an emergency that would prevent them from voting on Election Day.
 - [4] The dates that early voting was offered varied by jurisdiction.
 - [5] Absentee voting is available at the town clerk's office beginning 30 days before the election and ending the day before the election. Early voting is available at early voting sites beginning 14 days before the election and ending two days before the election.
 - [6] The stated early voting dates represent the maximum days that a county may offer early voting. The mandatory early period starts 10 days before an election and ends three days before the election.
 - [7] The start of early voting was pushed back a day for the 2024 general election due to a state holiday.
 - [8] Early voting services were available Monday to Saturday.
 - [9] Voter service centers were also open on Election Day, November 5, 2024.
 - [10] The timeline and availability of early voting is up to the local jurisdiction's discretion. If offering early voting, then it must be available two weeks prior to Election Day. However, early voting may start when ballots are ready.
 - [11] Early voting ends at 12:00 p.m. on November 4, 2025.
 - [12] Each county may provide in-person voting between eight and 20 days prior to Election Day. All counties must offer in-person voting beginning one week prior to Election Day and ending at 12:00 p.m. the day before Election Day.
 - [13] Any voter may request and vote an absentee ballot without a reason as soon as ballots become available (at least 30 days prior to Election Day) through the Thursday prior to Election Day. After that date and through Election Day, voters who meet the requirements to get a special circumstances absentee ballot may still vote by absentee ballot, but they must have a reason.
 - [14] Section 10-301.1(d)(1) of the Election Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, states that early voting centers shall be open for voting "beginning the second Thursday before a primary or general election through the Thursday before the election".
 - [15] In-person absentee voting before Election Day requires an excuse but early voting does not. In-person voting period applies to in-person early voting. In-person absentee voting may occur once ballots are available until 12:00 p.m. the day before Election Day.



- [16] The state requires a minimum of nine days of early voting; however, counties/jurisdiction can elect to have at most 30 days.
- [17] For the first four weeks of the absentee period (9/24/24 through 10/21/24) a valid excuse was required for in-person absentee voting. During the final two weeks (10/22/24 through 11/4/24) no excuse was needed for in-person voting.
- [18] Early voting is typically only available during regular business hours during weekdays, although some jurisdictions may extend their hours or open on weekends to accommodate early voting.
- [19] New Hampshire does not have "Early Voting" but rather absentee voting. A voter can request an absentee ballot anytime during the year, but will not receive their general ballot until the ballots are ready. Absentee ballots are not opened or cast until Election Day. The first date that is provided is for the UOCAVA federal deadline.
- [20] In-person absentee voting starts in the office of the county clerk October 8 through October 18, then expanded early voting (additional locations) starts October 19 through November 2.
- [21] The period for early voting by personal appearance begins the seventh day preceding an election and extends through the last day before Election Day; provided that the period for early voting for the Northern Mariana Islands begins on the 46th day preceding the election and extends through the last day before the election at 4:00 p.m. A permanent polling place for early voting must remain open during the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on weekdays and 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays; except that the Commission may extend the voting hours as necessary to accommodate emergency early voting.
- [22] Oregon does not have early voting, but allows in-person voting in specific circumstances. For example, if the voter loses their ballot or otherwise spoils it, then they can appear at the county elections office and be issued a new ballot. That happens through 8:00 p.m. on election night.
- [23] The first day of early voting varies depending on when the local election offices have ballots available.
- [24] At any time prior to an election, a voter may apply for an absentee ballot in person at the office of and to the person in charge of the election during regular office hours or until 5:00 p.m. on the day before the election, whichever is later.
- [25] Early voting may end on the last day the local jurisdiction has office hours.
- [26] Washington is a vote-by-mail state. In-person voters were issued a vote-by-mail ballot packet at a voting center that they could deposit into a ballot drop box or mail. Alternatively, voters could use a disability access unit to vote in person before Election Day.
- [27] In Wisconsin, statute determines the start and end dates of when in-person absentee voting can be held; however, each municipality determines what days and times in that time frame they will offer the option to their voters. The listed dates are the time frame in which in-person absentee voting can be held.

Policy Survey Table 5: Election Certification and Audits

State	2024 General Election Certification Deadline	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2024 General Election				
		Access Audit	Automated Independent Ballot Audit	Ballot Design Audit	Ballot Reconciliation Audit	Compliance or Procedural Audit
Alabama	11/27/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Alaska	11/30/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
American Samoa	11/12/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Arizona	11/25/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Arkansas	11/20/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
California	12/13/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Colorado	11/29/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Connecticut	11/27/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Delaware	11/07/2024	No	No	No	No	No
District of Columbia	12/02/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Florida	11/19/2024	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Georgia	11/22/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Guam	11/20/2024	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hawaii	11/25/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Idaho	11/26/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Illinois	11/26/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Indiana	11/26/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Iowa	12/02/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Kansas	12/02/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Kentucky	11/25/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Louisiana	11/21/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Maine	11/25/2024	No	No	No	No	Yes
Maryland	12/05/2024	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Massachusetts [1]	11/20/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Michigan	11/25/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Minnesota	11/21/2024	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mississippi	12/06/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Missouri	12/10/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Montana	12/02/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Nebraska	12/02/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Nevada	11/26/2024	No	No	No	No	No
New Hampshire	12/04/2024	No	No	No	No	No
New Jersey	12/05/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
New Mexico	11/26/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No



State	2024 General Election Certification Deadline	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2024 General Election				
		Access Audit	Automated Independent Ballot Audit	Ballot Design Audit	Ballot Reconciliation Audit	Compliance or Procedural Audit
New York	12/09/2024	No	No	No	No	No
North Carolina	11/26/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
North Dakota	11/22/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Northern Mariana Islands	11/25/2024	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Ohio	11/20/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Oklahoma	11/12/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Oregon	12/12/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Pennsylvania	12/11/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Puerto Rico	12/31/2024	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Rhode Island	12/17/2024	No	No	No	No	No
South Carolina	11/14/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
South Dakota	11/12/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Tennessee	12/05/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Texas	12/09/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
U.S. Virgin Islands	11/20/2024	No	No	No	Yes	No
Utah	11/25/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Vermont	11/12/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Virginia	12/02/2024	No	No	No	No	No
Washington [2]	11/26/2024	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
West Virginia	12/05/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Wisconsin [3]	12/01/2024	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Wyoming	11/13/2024	No	No	No	No	No

State	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2024 General Election					
	Eligibility Audit	Legal Audit	Logic and Accuracy Testing	Post-Election Tabulation Audit	Risk-Limiting Audit	Other Types of Audits
Alabama	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Alaska	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
American Samoa	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Arizona	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Arkansas	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
California	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Colorado	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Connecticut	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Delaware	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
District of Columbia	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Florida	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Georgia	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Guam	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Hawaii	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Idaho	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Illinois	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Indiana	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Iowa	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Kansas	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Kentucky	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Louisiana	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Maine	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Maryland	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Massachusetts [1]	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Michigan	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Minnesota	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Mississippi	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Missouri	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Montana	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Nebraska	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Nevada	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
New Hampshire	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
New Jersey	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
New Mexico	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
New York	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No



State	Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2024 General Election					
	Eligibility Audit	Legal Audit	Logic and Accuracy Testing	Post-Election Tabulation Audit	Risk-Limiting Audit	Other Types of Audits
North Carolina	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
North Dakota	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Northern Mariana Islands	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Ohio	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Oklahoma	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Oregon	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Pennsylvania	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Puerto Rico	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Rhode Island	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
South Carolina	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
South Dakota	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Tennessee	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Texas	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
U.S. Virgin Islands	No	No	No	No	No	No
Utah	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Vermont	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Virginia	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Washington [2]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
West Virginia	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Wisconsin [3]	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Wyoming	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Policy Survey Table 5 Calculation Notes:

2024 General Election Certification Deadline uses question Q47.

Types of Audit Activities Conducted for 2024 General Election, all columns use question Q49.

Policy Survey Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Q49 allowed states to select multiple responses. Q47 required a calendar date (MM/DD/YYYY).
- * An election audit may refer to (1) A systematic, independent, documented process for obtaining records, statements of fact, or other relevant information and assessing them objectively to determine the extent to which specified requirements are fulfilled. (2) The verification of statistical or an exact agreement of records from different processes or subsystems of a voting system. (3) A review of a system and its controls to determine its operational status and the accuracy of its outputs.

- [1]** Local election officials must certify their election results and transmit them to the Secretary of the Commonwealth within 15 days after the election. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Commonwealth tabulates the totals and presents them to the governor and the council for certification.
- [2]** In Washington, in addition to the mandatory recounts, if a contest is within a specified margin, then a group of five or more voters may request a recount for an issue or question.
- [3]** Wisconsin law permits a recount to occur under circumstances within specified margins, by candidate request within specified margins, or when ordered by a court of law. When conducting a recount, the Board of Canvassers may decide between hand count or machine count and can also choose that one reporting unit is done one way while another reporting unit is done another way. A court may order the count be done in a particular way if a reason can be proven by a petitioner.



Chapter 3. Voter Registration: The NVRA and Beyond

Key Findings

Section A of the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) collected data on voter registration between the 2022 and 2024 general elections and included several changes compared to previous EAVS iterations. Election officials were asked questions related to registration and list maintenance, including the number of people registered and eligible to vote in the 2024 general election; registration transactions processed and the source of these transactions; confirmation notices sent pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and for other purposes; the reason for sending confirmation notices; and records removed, merged, or linked in the voter lists. Notable findings from Section A of the 2024 EAVS include:

- State motor vehicle offices and automatic voter registration (AVR) are the two most commonly utilized methods of voter registration. Combined, they accounted for 58.6% of all registration transactions processed. Motor vehicle offices comprised 32.2% of transactions processed and AVR comprised an additional 26.4%.
- Online registration accounted for 14.4% of all registration transactions processed. The total number of online registration transactions processed was almost the same as those received in person, by mail, email, and fax, combined.
- The total number of active registrations for the 2024 general election was more than 211 million, accounting for 86.6% of the citizen voting age population (CVAP). Nearly two-thirds of the states reported a lower active registration rate in 2024 than in 2020.
- Over 103 million registration transactions were processed for the 2024 general election. The most common types of registration transactions processed were updates to existing registration records (57.4%) and new valid registrations (25.3%).
- States reported sending nearly 40 million confirmation notices between the 2022 and 2024 general elections. The most common reason for sending confirmation notices was as part of a routine mailing to all registered voters (47.5%).
- The most common reasons for removing voters from the voter list were failing to return a confirmation notice and not voting in two consecutive federal general elections (33.5%) as well as moving out of the voting jurisdiction (30.8%).



Introduction

Americans are required to register to vote in 49 states,¹ all U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia, making registration the first step toward election participation for most voters.² Registration serves multiple purposes: it allows election officials to confirm whether a person is eligible to vote; permits officials to efficiently allocate resources such as ballots, poll workers, and voting equipment, depending on the number of voters registered within each precinct and jurisdiction;³ and allows the tracking of voter participation.

Congress passed the NVRA in 1993 to “establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.”⁴ This act, commonly known as the “Motor Voter Law,” requires that states offer the opportunity to register to vote at their motor vehicle offices (known as the Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] in many states) and when residents are applying for a driver’s license — including renewals. The law also requires states to offer voter registration by mail, in person at offices that provide public assistance or state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to individuals with disabilities, and at armed services recruitment offices. The NVRA also provides guidelines on registration list maintenance and sets limits on how voters can be removed from voter lists.

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 charged the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with collecting data on voter registration and list maintenance procedures. The EAC meets its statutory requirement to report to Congress on the impact of the NVRA via Section A of EAVS.⁵ This chapter of the EAVS not only fulfills this requirement but also provides insight on the changes in registration behaviors of Americans during federal elections and the state policies affecting the registration process.

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

² North Dakota is the only state that does not require voter registration.

³ What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2024 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 cities and townships in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.

⁴ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

⁵ Before 2014, the EAC administered a separate survey called the NVRA Survey, which collected similar information. This survey was consolidated with the EAVS for the 2016 general election. Before the creation of the EAC, the NVRA Survey was administered by the Federal Election Commission.

Laws and Policies Regulating and Protecting Voter Registration

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)

The NVRA is the primary federal law governing voter registration in the United States. In this law, Congress provides a clear statement regarding the importance of voter registration:

- “(1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right;
- (2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right; and
- (3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.”⁶

The primary purposes of the NVRA are:

- “(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office;
- (2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act [NVRA] in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office;
- (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
- (4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”⁷

The NVRA was fully implemented after the 1994 general election. Several states are not covered by the NVRA. North Dakota is exempt because it does not have voter registration. U.S. territories are also not subject to the NVRA, and the states of Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt because they had same day registration (SDR) in 1993 and have continued to make this option available to voters uninterrupted since that time.

The NVRA’s first purpose is to expand opportunities for voters to register by creating more uniform processes for voter registration nationwide and designating more places and methods to register to vote. The NVRA requires states to allow multiple methods and places to register to vote, including: (1) motor vehicle offices when a person obtains, renews, or updates the address on their driver’s license; (2) through the mail, using a standard registration application;⁸ (3) at all state offices providing public assistance (e.g., the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]); (4) at all offices that provide state-funded programs focused on providing services to people with disabilities; (5) at recruitment offices of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (6) at other state-designated offices such as public libraries and local government offices. All of these offices are mandated under

⁶ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

⁷ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

⁸ States can make available the standard National Mail Voter Registration Form provided by the EAC (eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form) or their own version of a mail registration form following the NVRA’s requirements.



the NVRA to provide their users with information on voter registration, to assist in the registration process when required, and to offer to transmit completed voter registration applications to the appropriate election official.

The NVRA also sets some fundamental guidelines on voter registration that states must follow. For example, states may set their own deadline for citizens to register to vote in a general election for federal offices, but that deadline can never be more than 30 days before the date of the election. The NVRA also sets the process that states need to follow to maintain and update their voter lists and to conduct removal processes.

Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)

HAVA was enacted with the goal of updating the voting administration system in the United States and creating a commission to assist in the administration of federal elections. In addition to legislating the update of the administration process for federal elections in the United States, HAVA mandates that states create and maintain a “computerized statewide voter registration list” that serves as “the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections for Federal office in the State.”⁹ The computerized registration list must be centralized and “defined, maintained and administered at the State level.”¹⁰ However, although the registration list is administered at the state level, any local election official must have access to the registration list and is required to enter any updated voter registration information in the computerized system. HAVA also specifies that the maintenance of the implemented computerized registration list should be carried out according to the NVRA’s mandates, and that duplicate names or registrations should be removed from the state’s registration list.

State Voter Registration Policies

States have wide latitude on how to conduct their voter registration activities — as long as state policies comply with federal laws like the NVRA and HAVA. This flexibility allows states to adapt their laws as they see appropriate to better serve the interests of their citizens and permits them to adapt when unforeseen circumstances arise.

State laws on voter registration, however, can take years from when they are first proposed to when they are approved and then fully implemented. This delay allows the state and election officials to make the preparations necessary to include the changes in the voter registration process. For example, Maine approved an act to update the voter registration process to allow for online registration on July 9, 2021.¹¹ This act was set to take effect on November 1, 2023, making the 2024 general election the first federal general election wherein Maine citizens were allowed to register to vote fully online.

The Voter Registration Process

The typical voter registration process is depicted in Figure 1. U.S. citizens can register to vote using different methods — some of them mandated by federal law (e.g., mail registration) and others offered at the discretion of the state (e.g., online registration). Once a registration application is

⁹ 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

¹⁰ 52 U.S.C. § 21083.

¹¹ mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP0804&item=4&snum=130.

completed and submitted, the state or local election office must confirm the eligibility of the applicant.¹² Eligible applicants are added to the voter list and notified of their registration status, whereas applicants who submitted ineligible or incomplete applications are contacted for further information to complete their applications.

Figure 1. The Voter Registration Process



Voter registration also serves as a means to assign each voter to a precinct — a bounded geographic area to which voters are assigned according to their residential address as listed on their voter registration record — so that voters receive the correct ballot during an election. The voter registration system tracks each voter’s electoral participation so that an individual can be given credit for voting in an election, which helps ensure that each registered voter casts only one ballot that is counted per election.

Every person who submits a valid registration is considered an active, registered voter. However, at times, a question arises as to whether a person still resides at the address at which they are registered. The election official may receive a notification via the U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address service that the voter has a new residential address. In these situations, the state or local election office may send the registrant a confirmation of address notice. If the person

¹² In order to be eligible to register to vote for federal elections, federal law requires that an individual must be a U.S. citizen and be at least 18 years old. Some states have additional eligibility requirements, such as requiring residency within the state or jurisdiction for a certain period of time before an individual may register to vote.



responds to the confirmation notice, then the election office will take action as necessitated given the response of the recipient. For example, a voter who indicates they have moved out of the election jurisdiction will be removed from the voter list.

In many states, if the person fails to return the form or the form is returned to the election office as undeliverable, then the person is placed on a list of inactive voters. Inactive voters are still included on voter lists and within the registration totals in most jurisdictions.¹³ However, before they can vote, inactive voters are typically required to show approved documentation of their eligibility (most commonly, proof that they live at an address within the voting jurisdiction). In some cases, inactive voters may be required to cast a provisional ballot when their eligibility cannot be established at the polls.

The NVRA also requires states to maintain their voter lists by removing registrants who are no longer eligible to vote. This process is referred to as “list maintenance.” When an individual is removed from the voter list due to a change in residence under the NVRA process, this is called “address list maintenance.” More details about list maintenance processes and procedures are available in the “[Registration List Maintenance](#)” section of this chapter. Election offices may share data with other state agencies or entities that maintain death records or felony and prison records for the purposes of identifying potentially ineligible voters.¹⁴

Changes in Section A for the 2024 EAVS

The evolution of voter registration practices and data collection prompted EAC’s revision of Section A of the EAVS in 2024. This section covers voter registration and had seen few changes since the 2008 EAVS. From late 2021 to early 2022, the EAC convened a working group of state and local election officials to gather their insights on terms that needed updates, voter registration data collection practices, and potential revisions to survey questions. Based on the feedback from the working group, the EAC revised Section A of the EAVS and created a guide discussing these changes in detail.¹⁵ Although the changes were not scheduled to take effect until the 2024 EAVS, the guide was released in July 2022 and shared with state EAVS points of contact to allow ample time for EAVS respondents to prepare for the upcoming reporting changes.

One of the main changes to Section A is the shift of focus from “registration form” to “registration transaction” to acknowledge the fact that voter registration processes are now less reliant on paper forms and mainly based on electronic record processing. Additionally, the definition of “registration transaction” provided in the 2024 EAVS highlights the fact that “multiple transactions may be

¹³ Information on whether states differentiate between active and inactive voters was collected in item Q13 of the Policy Survey. According to the 2024 Policy Survey, six states (Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico) do not distinguish between active and inactive voters in their registration records. In survey comments in EAVS, Oregon reported, “Do not track number of inactive voters.” Wisconsin reported, “Wisconsin is NVRA-exempt; Wisconsin does not have inactive registered voters,” and Wyoming reported, “In Wyoming, voters designated as ‘inactive’ are not considered registered and eligible voters. They may be eligible upon re-registration or may be inactive due to becoming ineligible (e.g., committed a felony, moved out of state).”

¹⁴ More information about state policies on voter registration database linkages is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

¹⁵ “Planned Changes to Section A of the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS).” *Election Assistance Commission*, July 2022, [eac.gov/sites/default/files/EAVS%202024/Planned_Changes_to_2024_EAVS_Section_A_\(Final%20Text\)_508c.pdf](https://eac.gov/sites/default/files/EAVS%202024/Planned_Changes_to_2024_EAVS_Section_A_(Final%20Text)_508c.pdf).

performed on one voter registration record during the period between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election,” so all changes to registrations are reported in the EAVS.

Other changes to Section A of the EAVS include the addition of “automatic registration” and “polling places and voting sites” as sources of voter registration to cover the increasingly widespread practices of automatic registration and same day registration (SDR), and the inclusion of “registration updates” and “other registrations” (A7 and A9 respectively) as categories to break down registrations by source. The 2024 EAVS also includes for the first time items covering the reason for sending confirmation notices (A11), and the number of voter registration records merged or linked (A13). In item A1, covering total registrations, the EAVS added a category to cover registered and eligible voters who do not fit in the categories of active or inactive voters (A1d). Finally, some of the definitions in Section A were updated and some items condensed to better reflect current practices of voter registration. The full report of changes in Section A can be found on EAC’s website in the report “Planned Changes to Section A of the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS).”

Voter Registration Rates

The NVRA requires each state to report its total number of registered and eligible, active, and inactive registrants for each federal general election.¹⁶ In addition to active and inactive registrants, the 2024 EAVS added a new category for jurisdictions to report other registered and eligible registrants who could not be classified as active or inactive. Most states report the total “registered and eligible” voters as the sum of active, inactive, and other registrants. However, data on registered and eligible voters as reported in the EAVS should be used with caution, as these totals can include registrants who are no longer eligible to vote in that state but who have not been removed from the voter lists because the removal process laid out by the NVRA can take up to two election cycles to be completed.^{17, 18}

States reported that a total of 234,504,358 citizens were registered and eligible to vote in the 2024 general election.¹⁹ This represents a 2.9% increase compared to the number of people who were

¹⁶ Ten states (American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) did not report inactive registrants. North Dakota does not have voter registration and thus did not have any data to report.

¹⁷ Illinois reported 38,280 fewer “registered and eligible” voters in their state (item A1a of the EAVS) than the sum of active, inactive, and other registrants (items A1b, A1c, and A1d of the EAVS). Florida, Ohio, and Utah reported 1,530; 5,226; and 22 more “registered and eligible” voters than the sum of active, inactive, and other registrants, respectively.

¹⁸ Maine reported zero registered voters in eight of its 497 jurisdictions. One of the jurisdictions with no registered voters is an “artificial” jurisdiction created in the EAVS where the state reports all of its UOCAVA data. The other seven jurisdictions stated that their registration data were reported with another jurisdiction in the state. Kalawao County in Hawaii did not report registered voters because Maui County administers Kalawao County’s elections, and Kalawao’s registrants are reported in Maui’s data. North Dakota did not report the number of registered voters because the state does not require voter registration.

¹⁹ The total number of registered voters was collected in item A1a in the 2024 EAVS.



registered to vote for the 2020 general election.²⁰ Nationally, 90% of all registrants were designated as active, 10.6% of registrants were designated as inactive, and 0.3% were designated as “Other.”²¹

Thirteen states used the new registration category “Other” included in the 2024 EAVS.²² Jurisdictions provided a description for what type of registration was reported in the “Other” category. These descriptions varied by jurisdiction and state, but some of the most cited were registered voters in their state’s address confidentiality program, pending registrants (usually registrants that had pending ID verification or other information), temporary registrants, and suspense registrants.

The number of active registrants has continued to increase and reached 211,144,275 active registrations in 2024, accounting for 86.6% of the 2023 CVAP.^{23, 24} The majority of states reported active registration rates of 80% or more of their 2023 CVAP (see [Table 1](#) of [Appendix A](#) in this chapter).²⁵ However, compared to the active registration rate in 2020, the national active registration rate experienced a decrease of 1.6 percentage points (from 88.2% in 2020 to 86.6% in 2024).²⁶

²⁰ The percentage change in total number of registered voters between 2020 and 2024 was calculated as $A1a(2024)/A1a(2020)$. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

²¹ The percentage of active, inactive, and “Other” registrants was collected in items A1b, A1c, and A1d of the 2024 EAVS, respectively, and each of them was divided by the total number of registered voters (item A1a of EAVS). North Dakota was not included in these calculations because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming did not provide data about inactive registrants in item A1c. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington reported data for “Other” registrants in item A1d. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages; because of this, the percentage of active, inactive, and “Other” registrants does not total 100%. Casewise deletion only uses data from states that provide information for the numerator and the denominator of the calculation, and, in the case of inactive and “Other” registrations, there are several states that do not have or track data on these registrations. They were thus excluded from the percentage of inactive/“Other” registrant calculation as appropriate, whereas all states were included in the percentage of active registrations.

²² Among states that reported data in A1d, Arizona, Arkansas, and Delaware reported zero total “Other” registrations.

²³ The total number of active registrants was collected in item A1b in the 2024 EAVS. The active CVAP voter registration rate was calculated as $A1b/CVAP \times 100$. North Dakota was not included in the calculation because it does not have voter registration. American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included in the calculation because there is no CVAP information from the Census Bureau for these territories. For more information on the rationale to use these numbers to create the active CVAP voter registration rate, see the callout box “Calculating Registration Rates” in this chapter. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

²⁴ This report uses the one-year American Community Survey (ACS) state CVAP estimate for 2023 instead of the five-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP is as current as possible. The CVAP estimates for 2024 were not available by the time this report was finalized.

²⁵ The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated as $A1b/CVAP \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

²⁶ The 2020 active CVAP registration rate uses the same calculation as 2024. The 2020 active CVAP registration rate uses the 2019 CVAP as the denominator for consistency with the 2024 calculation. The percentage point change between the 2020 and 2024 active CVAP voter registration rates was calculated by subtracting the 2020 active CVAP voter registration percentage from the 2024 active CVAP voter registration percentage.

Calculating Registration Rates

As with voter turnout, there are different ways to calculate voter registration rates depending on the indices used for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

Registration Rate Numerator

- **Total Registrants.** The number of people that states reported as being registered and eligible to vote (A1a in the EAVS). This total includes active and inactive registrants. This metric overrepresents the actual number of registrants within a state because some of the people included (particularly inactive registrants) may not be eligible to vote in that jurisdiction anymore but are still in the state's voter list until the list maintenance process is completed.
- **Active Registrants.** The number of people that states reported as being eligible to cast a ballot without the need to provide additional eligibility evidence at the polls (A1b in the EAVS). This total excludes inactive registrants and other eligible registrants who do not fall in this category.

Registration Rate Denominator

- **Voting Age Population (VAP).** The estimate of the number of individuals ages 18 or older provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
- **Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP).** The estimate of the number of American citizens ages 18 or older provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. This estimate is more accurate than the VAP because it restricts the inclusion criteria to being a U.S. citizen, which is mandatory to vote in federal elections.
- **Voting-Eligible Population (VEP).** The estimate created by subtracting from the CVAP the citizens who are ineligible to vote (e.g., individuals with disqualifying felony convictions) and individuals who are in the military or citizens living overseas. This estimate is provided by the U.S. Elections Project and is available at the state level but not at the jurisdiction level like the VAP and the CVAP estimates.

The combination of active registrants and the CVAP helps calculate the registration rate at the jurisdiction level as opposed to the VEP, and provides a higher level of accuracy than using the total registrations and/or the VAP. This calculation has some limitations, such as the potential overrepresentation of total registrants in the active registrant list due to challenges for states to keep their voter lists fully up to date. When analyzing EAVS data, the EAC recommends using the following method to calculate voter registration rates:


$$\frac{A1b \text{ of EAVS}}{CVAP} \times 100 = \text{Active CVAP Voter Registration Rate}$$

See [Chapter 2](#) of this report for a discussion of state policies on voter registration and list maintenance.



As shown in Figure 2, total and active registration as a percentage of the CVAP has increased over the last 10 general elections. Active registrations accounted for less than 80% of the CVAP for the 2006, 2012, and 2014 general elections, and then increased up to its EAVS-high of 88.2% in the 2020 general election.²⁷ Similarly, total registrations as a percentage of the CVAP has experienced

Figure 2. Evolution of Active and Total Registrations as a Percentage of the Citizen Voting Age Population



Source: The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated as Q022006a/CVAP x 100 for 2006, A3a/CVAP x 100 for years 2008 to 2016, and A1b/CVAP x 100 for years 2018 to 2024. The percentage of total registration by CVAP was calculated as Q022006Total/CVAP x 100 for 2006, and A1a/CVAP x 100 for years 2008 to 2024. All calculations use the one-year ACS state CVAP estimate for the year prior to the general election to account for the unavailability of the election-year CVAP at the time of reporting the EAVS. The CVAP for 2006 to 2014 was obtained by totaling the estimated numbers of native and naturalized citizens over 18 years of age reported by the corresponding one-year ACS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

²⁷ The percentage of active CVAP voter registration was calculated as Q022006a/CVAP x 100 for 2006, A3a/CVAP x 100 for years 2008 to 2016, and A1b/CVAP x 100 for years 2018 to 2024. All calculations use the one-year ACS state CVAP estimate for the year prior to the general election to account for the unavailability of the election-year CVAP at the time of reporting the EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

growth over the past two decades and has had results of over 90% since the 2016 general election until its EAVS-high 96.2% in the 2024 general election.²⁸

At the state level, 64.7% of the states reported a lower active registration rate in 2024 than they did in 2020.²⁹ West Virginia and Nevada reported the largest increases in active registration rates between 2020 and 2024 (6.4% and 5.3%, respectively), and Puerto Rico and Ohio reported the largest drops in active registration rates (18.5% and 13.3%, respectively).³⁰

How Americans Registered to Vote for the 2024 General Election

States offer citizens multiple options to register to vote as provided by federal and state laws. A registration transaction can result in a new registration record when the voter is registering for the first time in a jurisdiction, but it can also involve an update to the registration record when the voter is already registered to vote in the jurisdiction but some of their information (e.g., address, name, political party affiliation) has changed. In the period between the close of voter registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election, states reported processing 103,512,313 registration transactions — 189,200 fewer than reported in the same period leading up to the 2020 general election.^{31, 32}

Motor vehicle offices recorded the largest number of registration transactions with 31,829,586 total registration transactions processed nationwide, followed by automatic voter registrations (AVR) with 26,099,956 registration transactions.³³ Together, motor vehicle offices and AVRs accounted for

²⁸ The percentage of total registration by CVAP was calculated as $Q022006Total/CVAP \times 100$ for 2006, and $A1a/CVAP \times 100$ for years 2008 to 2024. All calculations use the one-year ACS state CVAP estimate for the year prior to the general election to account for the unavailability of the election-year CVAP at the time of reporting the EAVS. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

²⁹ The percentage point change between the national active registration rate of 2024 and 2020 was calculated by subtracting the national active registration rate of 2024 from the same rate in 2020. The percentage of states reporting a lower active registration rate in 2024 was calculated by subtracting the active registration rate for 2024 from the active registration rate in 2020 (both calculated as $A1b/CVAP \times 100$) and categorizing the positive results as increases and the negative results as decreases. North Dakota was not included because it does not have voter registration. The U.S. territories of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were not included because the U.S. Census Bureau does not provide an estimate for their CVAP.

³⁰ The percentage of active CVAP voter registration change was calculated as the 2024 percentage of active CVAP voter registration ($A1b/CVAP \times 100$) for the 2024 EAVS divided by the 2020 percentage of active CVAP voter registration ($A1b/CVAP \times 100$) for the 2020 EAVS. One unit was subtracted from the result of the division, and the result was multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage change.

³¹ The total number of registration transactions processed during the two-year period leading to the 2024 general election was reported in item A3a in the 2024 EAVS. The 2020 EAVS recorded data on registration forms processed during the two-year period leading to the 2020 general election in item A3a in the 2020 EAVS. Because of the change from "registration forms processed" in 2020 to "registration transactions processed" in 2024, these comparison results should be taken with caution.

³² North Dakota did not provide data on the total number of registration transactions processed because the state does not require voter registration.

³³ The numbers of motor vehicle office and AVR registration transactions were obtained from items A4e and A4d of the 2024 EAVS, respectively.



Changes to Voter Registration Reporting in EAVS

The 2024 EAVS shifted the focus from “registration forms” to “registration transactions” to acknowledge that most counties and states rely on electronic record processing. This change is supported by the results of item Q15 of the Policy Survey wherein 44.6% of the states reported that voter registration applications and updates are stored as registration transactions, and 46.4% reported storing them as a combination of registration transactions and forms.

For the first time, the EAVS includes “automatic registration” and “polling places and voting sites” as registration sources, and “registration updates” and “other registrations” as categories to break down registration by source. According to items Q8 and Q8a of the Policy Survey, all states that had some form of automatic voter registration for the 2024 general election reported that their state motor vehicle offices participated in the program. This consideration is important, as registrations at motor vehicle offices have been the largest source of registration in the EAVS for years, and these registrations included automatic registrations in many states that used this practice. However, starting in 2024, registrations at motor vehicle offices as recorded in the EAVS do not include automatic registrations, which may affect how they compare with previous EAVS iterations.

58.6% of all registration transactions reported — of which 32.2% came from motor vehicle offices and 26.4% from AVR.³⁴ Online registrations accounted for 14.4%; registrations by mail, fax, and email combined accounted for 8.5%; and in-person registrations accounted for 6.4% of the total registration transactions.³⁵ The rest of the registration transactions that were processed during this

³⁴ The percentage of registration transactions received at motor vehicle offices and AVR was calculated as $(A4d+A4e)/A3a \times 100$. Alabama, American Samoa, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data on items A3a, A4d, and/or A4e. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. The breakdown of the national percentage was calculated as $A4e/A3a$ for the portion received from motor vehicle offices and as $A4d/A3a$ for the portion received through AVR. The breakdown percentages use casewise deletion and states that did not have data for A4d and A4e were not included.

³⁵ The percentage of registration transactions received by mail, fax, or email was calculated as $A4a/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions received in person was calculated as $A4b/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions received online was calculated as $A4c/A3a \times 100$. Alabama, Guam, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, and West Virginia were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registration transactions received by mail, fax, or email because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4a. Alabama, Guam, Hawaii, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and West Virginia were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registration transactions received in person because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4b. Alabama, American Samoa, Arkansas, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, South Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registration transactions received online because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4c. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

period were from sources such as registration drives (3.7%), polling places and polling sites (3.4%), and other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA (2.4%), such as public libraries.³⁶

Online registration continues to be one of the most popular methods of voter registration and accounted for nearly the same percentage of registration transactions nationwide as in 2022, but it is far from its EAVS-high recorded in 2020 when it accounted for 28.2% of registrations (see Figure 3).³⁷ The online registration spike in 2020 was likely the combination of multiple factors, including the negative impact of COVID-19 on in-person based voter registration sources (e.g., motor vehicle offices, state agencies, registrar's offices) and the expansion of remote registration options to compensate for in-person limitations.

In 2024, 45 states reported that they allow for online voter registration and registration updates, an increase from 41 states in 2022, and the largest number of states using this registration method compared to previous EAVS iterations.³⁸ Oklahoma only allowed online registration updates in 2022, and Maine, New York, and Puerto Rico did not allow any online registration activity in 2022 — but these four states reported allowing both online voter registration and registration updates in the 2024 Policy Survey.


³⁶ The percentage of registration transactions received at registration drives was calculated as $A4j/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions received at polling places and polling sites was calculated as $A4k/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received at other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated as $A4i/A3a \times 100$. Alabama, American Samoa, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registration transactions received at registration drives because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4j. Alabama, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Guam, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registration transactions received at polling places and polling sites because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4k. Alabama, American Samoa, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation of the percentage of registration transactions received at other state agencies not mandated by the NVRA because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4i. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

³⁷ The percentage of registration transactions received online in 2020 was calculated as $A4c/A3a \times 100$. American Samoa, Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4c. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

³⁸ Data on online registration policy were collected in item Q9 in the 2024 Policy Survey, and item Q6 in the 2022 Policy Survey. More information about states with online registration and changes over time is found in Chapter 2 of this report.



Figure 3. Registration Transactions from Motor Vehicle Offices and Automatic Voter Registration Account for More than Half of Registration Transactions



Source: The percentage of registration transactions received at motor vehicle offices and AVR was calculated as $(A4d+A4e)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS and as $A4d/A3a \times 100$ for the 2022 and 2020 EAVS (EAVS did not collect data on AVR before 2024). The percentage of registration transactions received by other means was calculated as $(A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l+A4m+A4n)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS and as $(A4e+A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2022 and 2020 EAVS. The percentage of registration transactions received online was calculated as $A4c/A3a \times 100$ for all years. The percentage of registration transactions received by mail/fax/email was calculated as $A4a/A3a \times 100$ for all years. The percentage of registration transactions received in person was calculated as $A4b/A3a \times 100$ for all years. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

At the state level, 76.9% of states reported an increase in the percentage of voter registration transactions processed online in 2024 compared to 2022.³⁹ However, most increases and decreases

³⁹ The comparison of voter registration transactions processed online between 2022 and 2024 was calculated as the percentage of registration transactions processed online in 2024 ($A4c/A3c \times 100$) minus the percentage of registration transactions processed online in 2022 ($A4c/A3c \times 100$). Alabama, American Samoa, Arkansas, Guam, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4c in 2022 or 2024.

in the percentage of voter registration transactions processed online were relatively small, with changes of less than 10 percentage points in either direction, with the exception of Arizona, Nebraska, and California, which experienced decreases ranging from 10 to 11.9 percentage points, and West Virginia, Minnesota, and the District of Columbia which experienced increases ranging from 11.9 to 18.8 percentage points.⁴⁰

The percentage of registration transactions received by mail, fax, and email combined had a slight decrease in 2024 compared to 2022 and registered a new low in EAVS at 8.5% (see Figure 3). However, mail, fax, and email registrations are still widely used and together accounted for more than 20% of all reported registration transactions processed in five states: Connecticut, Montana, Nevada, New York, and the Northern Mariana Islands.⁴¹ In-person registrations at election or registrar's offices for the 2024 general election saw a small increase of 0.5 percentage points compared to 2022 and accounted for 6.4% of registration transactions nationwide.⁴² At the state level, there was considerable variation in the percentage of registration transactions that in-person registrations accounted for, with 10 states reporting that in-person registration transactions accounted for less than 2% and nine states reporting that it accounted for more than 20% (see Table 2 in Appendix A of this chapter for more details).

Automatic Voter Registration and Motor Vehicle Office Registrations

The implementation of AVR policies has spread in the last decade since states began implementing AVR in 2016. AVR allows for non-registered individuals to be added to the voter lists and for registered voters to get their registration updated during an interaction with a designated state agency, such as the motor vehicle office, unless the person actively declines. The main differences between the types of AVR policies are the point at which the individual must decline or “opt out” of being registered — either at the point of service or later through a mailer sent to the individual — and which state agencies participate in the AVR program.

Most states that reported having some form of AVR in the 2024 Policy Survey required the individual to choose whether they wanted to opt out at the point of service.⁴³ Additionally, all states with AVR reported that state motor vehicle offices participated in the program, and only 25% of the states reported that other state agencies (e.g., state public assistance or social services agencies) also provided AVR.⁴⁴

The 2024 EAVS asked jurisdictions to report automatic registrations separately from the agency that processed them to gain insight into how many registration transactions originated through AVR programs. AVR accounted for 26,099,956 registration transactions in 2024, representing 43.2% of all

⁴⁰ The percentage point difference of online registrations between 2022 and 2024 was calculated as the percentage of online registrations in 2024 minus the percentage of online registrations in 2022.

⁴¹ The percentage of registration transactions received by mail, fax, or email was calculated as $A4a/A3a \times 100$. The Northern Mariana Islands reported that all 445 registration transactions for the 2024 general election originated from mail, fax, or email.

⁴² The percentage point difference of in-person registrations was calculated as the percentage of in-person registrations in 2024 minus the percentage of in-person registrations in 2022. The percentage of registration transactions received in person was calculated as $A4b/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

⁴³ Data on state AVR policy were collected in item Q8 in the 2024 Policy Survey. A more complete analysis of states' AVR policies is found in Chapter 2 of this report.

⁴⁴ Data on state agencies participating in AVR were collected in item Q8a in the 2024 Policy Survey.



registration transactions processed in states that reported AVR data.^{45,46} At the state level, there was a wide range of AVR usage. Alaska, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island reported the highest percentages of AVR nationwide, as AVR accounted for 75% to 88.3% of all registration transactions in these states. On the other end of the spectrum, Utah (0%), Florida (1.9%), and Washington (4.6%) reported that AVR accounted for less than 5% of all registration transactions processed in their states.⁴⁷

Motor vehicle offices have been the most popular registration source since the EAVS started collecting these data in 2006.⁴⁸ This registration source achieved its all-time EAVS high in 2022, when it accounted for 55% of all registration transactions processed nationwide.⁴⁹ In 2024, however, motor vehicle offices accounted for 37.7% of all registration transactions processed.⁵⁰ This change is likely related to the fact that the 2024 EAVS started collecting data on AVR as a stand-alone category, and that motor vehicle offices participate in AVR in all states that reported having this policy.

Among states that reported AVR in 2024, motor vehicle office registrations accounted for 17% of all registration transactions, while they accounted for 59.6% of all registration transactions processed in

⁴⁵ Total AVR registration transactions were obtained from item A4d. The percentage of AVR registration transactions was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$. Alabama, American Samoa, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data in item A3a and/or item A4d. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁴⁶ Some states that reported having some form of AVR in Q8 of the Policy Survey did not provide data on the number of AVR transactions processed in A4d. In most cases they responded "Data Not Available" to item A4d and some explained in comments that they could not separate AVR from non-AVR transactions from motor vehicle offices or other agencies.

⁴⁷ The percentage of AVR registration transactions was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$. Iowa and Ohio reported 0% and 0.4% of AVR registration transactions, respectively, but were not included among the states with the lowest AVR registration rates because they did not report using AVR in the Policy Survey and their responses to A4d may not reflect actual AVR use. The states of Florida, Utah, and Washington reported using some form of AVR in the Policy Survey, however, Utah reported zero total AVR transactions in item A4d of EAVS.


⁴⁸ "The History, Evolution, and Future Directions of the Election Administration and Voting Survey." *Election Assistance Commission*, May 2025, eac.gov/research-and-data/eavs-retrospective.

⁴⁹ The percentage of motor vehicle office registration transactions from 2022 was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$. American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wisconsin were not included in the calculation because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4d in 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁵⁰ The percentage of motor vehicle office registration transactions was calculated as $A4e/A3a \times 100$. Alabama, American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4e. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

states that did not report AVR (see Figure 4).⁵¹ These results are very different than those from 2022 — before AVR data were collected separately — when registrations at motor vehicle offices

Figure 4. States that Reported AVR in 2024 Display Notable Decrease in Reported Motor Vehicle Office Registrations in 2024 Compared to 2022



Source: The percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle offices was calculated as $A4e/A3a \times 100$ for 2024 and as $A4d/A3a \times 100$ for 2022. States were categorized as having AVR data in 2024 when the state level total for the item covering AVR (A4d) in the 2024 EAVS was larger than zero, and they were categorized as not having “AVR Data in 2024” when the total at the state level was zero, missing, or when all jurisdictions responded with missingness codes (e.g., “Data Not Available”). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the overall percentages.

⁵¹ The percentage of motor vehicle office registration transactions was calculated as $A4e/A3a \times 100$. States were categorized as “reporting AVR” when the state level total for the item covering all AVR (A4d) was larger than zero, and they were categorized as “not reporting AVR” when the total was zero, missing, or when all jurisdictions responded with missingness codes (e.g., “Data Not Available”). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



accounted for more than half of the total registrations for the two groups of states.⁵² Further statistical analyses support these results, as the percentage of registration transactions that motor vehicle office registrations accounted for was significantly different between 2022 and 2024 among states that reported AVR in 2024, but not for states that did not report AVR.⁵³

Because of the impact of AVR on the number of registrations reported as received at motor vehicle offices, combining AVR and motor vehicle office registrations is recommended when comparing registrations by source over time. Although AVR includes registration transactions that originated in agencies other than motor vehicle offices for some states, those are likely to be a small portion of all AVR, since less than one in three states that reported AVR data indicated using it in agencies other than motor vehicle offices.⁵⁴

Same Day Registration

Same day registration (SDR) allows voters to register to vote and cast their ballot in person on the same day. SDR can be offered on Election Day, in which case it may be referred to as Election Day registration, or it can be offered during in-person early voting.⁵⁵ SDR is authorized by state laws and, thus, is only allowed in some states and territories. Some states reported allowing SDR in very particular circumstances; Missouri, for instance, reported offering SDR only to “military voters or new residents who moved into Missouri after the voter registration deadline.”⁵⁶

In 2024, 29 states reported allowing some form of SDR. Twenty-three states reported allowing voters to register to vote on Election Day, 23 states reported allowing for SDR during in-person early voting, 10 states reported allowing SDR during an overlap between the start of early voting and the close of voter registration, and five states reported allowing SDR in very specific cases.⁵⁷ The states that indicated allowing SDR were the same as in 2022, with the exception of Alaska, New York,

⁵² The percentage of motor vehicle office registration transactions for 2022 was calculated as $A4d/A3a \times 100$ in the 2022 EAVS. States were categorized as “reporting AVR” when the state level total for the item covering AVR (A4d) in the 2024 EAVS was larger than zero, and they were categorized as “not reporting AVR” when the total was zero, missing, or when all jurisdictions responded with missingness codes (e.g., “Data Not Available”). Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁵³ Paired *T* tests were conducted to compare changes between 2022 and 2024. The difference noted as significant was statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level, while the difference noted as non-significant was statistically insignificant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

⁵⁴ Data on state agencies participating in AVR were collected in item Q8a in the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁵⁵ Some states may have an overlap between their mail voting period and the close of their voter registration, during which it is possible for a person to register on the same day that they cast a mailed ballot; however, this is not considered SDR for purposes of the EAVS, and many states have noted in the past that it is not possible to track the number of mail voters who register to vote on the same day that they cast their mailed ballot. In-person early voting refers to any opportunity for voters in a state to cast a vote in person before Election Day. See Chapter 2 of this report for a discussion of the different types of in-person early voting opportunities available in states.

⁵⁶ Missouri reported this special situation in item Q11a of the 2024 Policy Survey.

⁵⁷ These results were obtained from item Q11a of the 2024 Policy Survey. More information about state policies on SDR can be found in Chapter 2 of this report.

Missouri, and Rhode Island, which did not allow SDR in 2022 but did in 2024,⁵⁸ and Nebraska, which allowed some form of SDR for the 2022 general election but not for the 2024 general election.⁵⁹

The total number of SDRs recorded in 2024 was 2,627,300 and accounted for 4.8% of the total registration transactions processed by states reporting SDRs.^{60, 61} Election Day SDR accounted for 60.2% of all SDRs reported and pre-Election Day SDR accounted for 44.7% of the total SDRs reported in states that allowed them.⁶²

The use of SDR varied considerably between states, and the NVRA-exempt states — which gained NVRA exemption for allowing SDR continuously since 1993⁶³ — were among the states where SDR accounted for the largest percentages of registration transactions. Wyoming reported that 69.1% of the registration transactions processed for the 2024 general election were SDRs, whereas Wisconsin and Idaho reported that SDRs accounted for 58% and 37.6% of all the registration transactions processed, respectively.⁶⁴ Among states subject to the provisions of the NVRA, Maine had the highest proportion of SDR registrations (20%)⁶⁵ followed by Montana with 13.3%. However, SDR accounted for less than 5% of the registration transactions processed for the majority of NVRA states.

⁵⁸ Alaska and Rhode Island only allow SDR for voting for the U.S. president and vice president, thus they do not allow for SDR in midterms when these races are not in the ballot. Puerto Rico only conducts general elections in presidential elections, thus they did not respond to the question about SDR in the 2022 Policy Survey.

⁵⁹ These results were obtained from item Q11 of the 2024 Policy Survey and item Q8 of the 2022 Policy Survey.

⁶⁰ The total number of SDRs received during the two-year period leading to a federal general election was reported in item A2a in the 2024 EAVS. The total corresponds to the 26 states that reported SDR data. Nebraska, which reported in the Policy Survey not allowing for SDR, reported 241 such registrations. American Samoa, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New York, which allow for SDR, did not provide data in item A2a for 2024.

⁶¹ The percentage of registration transactions that were SDRs was calculated as $A2a/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of SDR corresponds to the 26 states that reported SDRs and total registrations received. American Samoa, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New York, which allow for SDR, did not provide data in item A2a and/or item A3a and were excluded from the calculation. Nebraska, which reported in the Policy Survey not allowing for SDR, was included in the calculation because the state reported 241 such registrations. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁶² The percentage of SDRs received that were Election Day SDRs was calculated as $A2b/A2a \times 100$. The percentage of SDRs received that were pre-Election Day SDRs was calculated as $A2c/A2a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%. The percentage of SDRs that were Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 22 states that reported allowing Election Day SDR and provided data for it. Idaho, which allows for Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2b for 2024. The percentage of SDRs that were pre-Election Day SDRs corresponds to the 21 states that reported allowing pre-Election Day SDR and provided data for it. American Samoa, Idaho, New York, and North Carolina, which allow for some form of pre-Election Day SDR, did not provide data in item A2c for 2024.

⁶³ Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are exempt from the NVRA for this reason. North Dakota is NVRA-exempt because it does not require voter registration, and the U.S. territories are NVRA-exempt.

⁶⁴ The percentage of registration transactions that were SDRs was calculated as $A2a/A3a \times 100$.

⁶⁵ Maine started using SDR more than 50 years ago and has a history of SDR accounting for a large percentage of their registrations. However, Maine did not seek an NVRA exemption because the state did not offer SDR in every voting place at the time the NVRA was implemented. The state has complied with the NVRA since 1995, when the law took effect.



The 2024 EAVS included a new registration category to collect the number of registration transactions originated at “polling places and voting sites.” At the national level, registrations at polling places accounted for 3.4% of all the registration transactions processed in 2024.^{66, 67} Similar to the results of overall SDR, registration transactions at polling places accounted for the largest percentage of total registration transactions among NVRA-exempt states. Idaho reported that 52.6% of the state’s registration transactions processed were received at polling places and voting sites, whereas for Minnesota and Wisconsin, these registrations accounted for 24.7% and 19.4%, respectively.⁶⁸ Among NVRA states, Hawaii and Connecticut reported the highest percentages of registration transactions received at polling places, with 8.7% and 7.1%, respectively.

Other Modes of Registration

In addition to in-person, online, mail/fax/email, AVR, and motor vehicle office registrations, states reported data on registration transactions received from other sources, which in 2024 accounted for 14.9% of the registration transactions processed at the national level.⁶⁹ Some of these modes of registration are mandated by the NVRA, such as registration through armed forces recruitment offices, public assistance offices, and state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, which together accounted for 1.2% of the national registrations for the 2024 general election (see [Table 2](#) of [Appendix A](#) in this chapter for a breakdown of registrations received by each of these methods).⁷⁰ States also reported registrations completed through other modes that are not required by the NVRA and that are authorized at the discretion of the state, such as at registration drives (3.7%) and other agencies required by the state (2.4%).⁷¹

⁶⁶ The percentage of registration transactions received at polling places was calculated as $A4k/A3a \times 100$. Alabama, American Samoa, District of Columbia, Georgia, Guam, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming were not included in the calculation because they did not report data on item A3a and/or item A4k. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁶⁷ Although registration transactions at polling places and voting sites may be associated in many cases with SDR, 11 states that reported not having SDR did report data on these types of registrations; however, states with SDR reported the highest percentages of registrations received at polling places and voting sites.

⁶⁸ The percentage of registration transactions received at polling places was calculated as $A4k/A3a \times 100$.

⁶⁹ The percentage of registrations received by other sources different than in-person, online, mail/fax/email, AVR, and motor vehicle offices was calculated as $(A4f+A4g+A4h+A4i+A4j+A4k+A4l+A4m+A4n)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS. American Samoa, Alabama, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico were not included in the calculation because they did not report data in A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A4j, A4k, A4l, A4m, and A4n. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁷⁰ The percentage of registrations received from NVRA-mandated sources other than in person, mail/fax/email, and motor vehicle offices was calculated as $(A4f+A4g+A4h)/A3a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

⁷¹ The percentage of registrations received from registration drives was calculated as $A4j/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations received from state agencies not mandated by the NVRA was calculated as $A4i/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

Types of Registration Transactions Processed for the 2024 General Election

Registration transactions are processed by election offices and can reach one of several outcomes. Registrations from people who are eligible and not already registered are considered new registrations and are added to the voter list. Registration transactions from people already registered to vote that involve a change in their name, party affiliation, address, or other personal information are processed as updates to existing registrations.⁷² Registration transactions from citizens already registered to vote at the same address with the same name and personal information are considered duplicates. Registration transactions that do not meet the requirements of eligibility are considered invalid or rejected. When allowed by state law, registration transactions submitted by individuals under 18 years old are processed as pre-registrations so that the individual will be registered when they become of voting age.

All registration transactions received are processed and scrutinized by election officials to ensure that the information is correct, that only eligible voters are added to the voter lists, and to avoid the creation of duplicate registration records. After the registration transaction's review by election officials, and following the NVRA's guidelines, states must notify the applicant of the result of their submission. For example, a successful registration may result in a notification in the form of a registration card mailed to the applicant; a notice of rejection or request for additional documents may be mailed to unsuccessful applicants.

Valid Registrations

Figure 5 displays the results of the registration transactions processed by the states between the close of registration for the November 2022 election and the close of registration for the November 2024 general election. Of the 103,512,313 registration transactions processed during this time period, the most common type of transaction was updates to existing valid registrations.⁷³ These updates usually involved a change of name (such as after a marriage or divorce), party affiliation, or change of address; updates to existing registrations accounted for 57.4% of the registration transactions processed at the national level.⁷⁴ In previous EAVS iterations, updates to registrations were covered in two separate items, depending on whether the update involved a cross-jurisdiction change of address or not. The two items were combined in the 2024 EAVS for easier reporting and show a small increase when compared to previous elections, as the percentage

⁷² Multiple updates can be performed to a single person's registration record during the two-year period covered in this item, and thus a single registration record can have several registration transactions associated with it. For example, if a person changes their address and a few months later submits a request to change their party affiliation, then these would be considered as two different registration transactions. However, if several updates are performed on the same date, then some states and jurisdictions would count this as a single registration transaction.


⁷³ The number of total registration transactions was reported in item A3a of the 2024 EAVS.

⁷⁴ The percentage of registration transactions processed that were updates to existing registrations was calculated as $A3e/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



of registration transactions that were updates to existing registration records in 2024 was 5.4 percentage points higher than in 2022 and 1.6 percentage points higher than in 2020.⁷⁵

Figure 5. Most Registration Transactions Were Updates to Existing Registrations or New Valid Registrations



Source: The percentage of registration transactions processed that were updates to existing registrations was calculated as $A3e/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were new valid registrations was calculated as $A3b/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were duplicate registrations was calculated as $A3d/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were labelled as "Other" registrations was calculated as $(A3g+A3h+A3i)/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were invalid or rejected was calculated as $A3f/A3a \times 100$. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of age was calculated as $A3c/A3a \times 100$. The registration transactions processed received that were not categorized were calculated as $(1 - [A3b+A3c+A3d+A3e+A3f+A3g+A3h+A3i]/A3a) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

New valid registrations — registration transactions received from eligible people in a jurisdiction where they were not previously registered and that resulted in a new registration record being added

⁷⁵ The percentage point difference was calculated as the percentage of registration transactions that were updates to existing registrations in the 2024 EAVS ($A3e/A3a \times 100$) minus the percentage of registrations that were updates ($[A3f+A3g]/A3a \times 100$) in 2022 and 2020. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

to the voter list — made up 25.3% of the registrations received.⁷⁶ Other types of valid registration transactions included those from states that allow for underage citizens to pre-register to vote so that they are automatically added to the voter list when they turn 18 years old. These pre-registrations accounted for 1.5% of the total registration transactions processed among states that allowed them.⁷⁷ Finally, 6.5% of the registration transactions were labelled as “Other.” This category in the EAVS is used by states to report registrations that were not covered among the standard categories.⁷⁸ Some examples of the use of the “Other” category for registration transactions processed include “Pending applications” and “Registration reactivations.”

Rejected and Duplicate Registrations

Some of the registration transactions processed by states do not result in the creation or the update of a registration record. The EAVS collects data on two types of unsuccessful registration transactions: rejected and duplicate registrations. The first type includes registrations that contain incomplete information, incorrect information, information that cannot be validated against existing government records, or transactions from people who do not meet eligibility requirements. In the period between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election, states reported rejecting 2,841,852 registration transactions, accounting for 3% of the total registration transactions processed.⁷⁹ This is comparable to the percentage of registrations that were rejected in 2022 (2.5%) and 2020 (2.9%).⁸⁰

Duplicate registration transactions include registrations that are exact matches to existing registration records; these can be registrations submitted by people who did not realize they were already registered to vote or who submitted multiple registration transactions through different modes (e.g., submitted a registration with the exact same information through the mail and online). States reported processing 10,397,795 duplicate registration transactions between the 2022 and the 2024 general elections, which accounted for 12.7% of the total registration transactions processed.⁸¹

⁷⁶ The percentage of registration transactions processed that were new registrations was calculated as $A3b/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁷⁷ The percentage of registration transactions processed that were pre-registrations of individuals under 18 years of age was calculated as $A3c/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

⁷⁸ The percentage of registration transactions that were categorized as “Other” was calculated as $(A3g+A3h+A3i)/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. Not all the registration transactions accounted for in the “Other” category may be valid; however, they were included in this section because they cannot be fully identified as rejected or duplicate either.

⁷⁹ The total number of rejected registration transactions was collected in item A3f of the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were invalid or rejected was calculated as $A3f/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

⁸⁰ The percentage of registrations received that were invalid or rejected was calculated as $A3e/A3a \times 100$ for 2020 and 2022. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages. Paired *T* tests between each pair of election years did not yield significant results at the $p < 0.05$ level, meaning that the results were not significantly different from each other.

⁸¹ The total number of duplicate registration transactions processed was collected in item A3d of the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of registration transactions processed that were duplicate registrations was calculated as $A3d/A3a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



As with rejected registration transactions, the percentage of duplicate registration transactions processed in 2024 was comparable to the rates seen in 2022 (12.7%) and 2020 (9.7%).⁸²

A majority of states provided a breakdown of the total, rejected, and duplicate registration transactions they processed and the source of those registrations (e.g., online, in person, or at motor vehicle offices).⁸³ With a few exceptions, the percentage of registration transactions processed that were duplicates comprised at least 10% of the registrations received by each source; the exceptions were polling places (8.5%), in-person registrations (7.6%), online registrations (7%), and registration transactions received from “Other” sources (4.7%).⁸⁴ Registration transactions processed by the state motor vehicle offices had the largest duplicate registration rate with 18.8% of all registration transactions processed being classified as duplicates. For rejected registration transactions, most registration sources had a rejection rate below 10%, with the exception of registration transactions from state agencies not mandated by the NVRA (15.7%), armed forces recruitment offices (16.1%), state-funded agencies primarily serving individuals with disabilities (16.8%), and public assistance offices mandated by the NVRA (21.2%).⁸⁵

Registration List Maintenance

The NVRA requires states to maintain an “accurate and current voter registration roll” to “protect the integrity of the electoral process.”⁸⁶ To facilitate this maintenance, the NVRA requires that any

⁸² The percentage of registration transactions processed that were duplicate registrations for the 2022 and 2020 EAVS used the same calculation as the 2024 percentage. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages. Paired *T* tests between each pair of election years did not yield significant results at the $p < 0.05$ level, meaning that the results were not significantly different from each other.

⁸³ Seventeen states did not provide the source breakdown for duplicate registrations and 17 states did not provide the source breakdown for rejected registrations. Data from these states were not included in the ensuing calculations in the paragraph.

⁸⁴ The duplicate registration rate refers to the percentage of registration transactions processed from a source and categorized as duplicate. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as $A6a/A4a \times 100$. For in-person registrations, this was calculated as $A6b/A4b \times 100$. For online registrations, this was calculated as $A6c/A4c \times 100$. For automatic registrations, this was calculated as $A6d/A4d \times 100$. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as $A6e/A4e \times 100$. For public assistance offices, this was calculated as $A6f/A4f \times 100$. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, this was calculated as $A6g/A4g \times 100$. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated as $A6h/A4h \times 100$. For other agencies designated by the state, this was calculated as $A6i/A4i \times 100$. For registration drives, this was calculated as $A6j/A4j \times 100$. For polling places or voting sites, this was calculated as $A6k/A4k \times 100$. For other registration sources, this was calculated as $(A6l+A6m+A6n)/(A4l+A4m+A4n) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.


⁸⁵ The rejection rate refers to the percentage of registration transactions processed from a source and categorized as invalid or rejected. For mail/fax/email, this was calculated as $A8a/A4a \times 100$. For in-person registrations, this was calculated as $A8b/A4b \times 100$. For online registrations, this was calculated as $A8c/A4c \times 100$. For automatic registrations, this was calculated as $A8d/A4d \times 100$. For motor vehicle offices, this was calculated as $A8e/A4e \times 100$. For public assistance offices, this was calculated as $A8f/A4f \times 100$. For state-funded agencies serving individuals with disabilities, this was calculated as $A8g/A4g \times 100$. For armed forces recruitment offices, this was calculated as $A8h/A4h \times 100$. For other agencies designated by the state, this was calculated as $A8i/A4i \times 100$. For registration drives, this was calculated as $A8j/A4j \times 100$. For polling places or voting sites, this was calculated as $A8k/A4k \times 100$. For other registration sources, this was calculated as $(A8l+A8m+A8n)/(A4l+A4m+A4n) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages.

⁸⁶ 52 U.S.C. § 20501.

change of address submitted to a motor vehicle office must serve as notification of a change of address for voter registration, unless the individual indicates that the change is not for voter registration purposes. The law also requires states to conduct a uniform and nondiscriminatory general program to remove the records of ineligible voters. States have considerable freedom to choose when, where, and how these functions are performed, but must follow the guidelines listed in the NVRA, which describe the need to use confirmation notices and to complete (with few exceptions) systematic removal programs “not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office,”⁸⁷ and to keep a detailed list of instances in which it is appropriate to remove a record from the voter lists.

The NVRA’s list maintenance process, shown in Figure 6, specifies the steps that states need to follow to confirm eligibility from registered voters and to remove them from the voter lists when registered voters are no longer eligible to vote in a jurisdiction. One key tool in this process that states may use to keep their voter lists up to date is confirmation notices. These are postage-paid and pre-addressed return cards that are sent to registrants who a state suspects are no longer eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which they are registered. If the registrant does not return the confirmation notice, then they can be added to the inactive registrant list and would typically be asked to provide proof of residency before voting. If the registrant fails to return the confirmation notice and does not participate in the subsequent two consecutive federal general elections, then the

Figure 6. The NVRA’s Voter Registration List Maintenance Process



⁸⁷ 52 U.S.C. § 20507.



NVRA grants the state the capability to remove the registrant from the voter list. If the registrant has not moved out of the voting jurisdiction, then they must complete and return the confirmation notice no later than the registration deadline of the next election to remain on the list of active registrants.

The NVRA mandates that registrants may only be removed from the voter lists in these circumstances:

- Upon the death of the registrant;
- Upon the registrant's written confirmation that their address has changed to a location outside the registrar's jurisdiction;
- On the request of the registrant;
- For mental incapacity of the registrant, as provided in state law;
- On criminal conviction of the registrant, as provided in state law; or
- On the registrant's failure to respond to certain confirmation mailings plus failure to appear to vote in two consecutive federal general elections subsequent to the mailing.

Because registration removal can take up to two federal general election cycles to complete for some registration records, particularly in states that are subject to the NVRA, it is inevitable that voter lists will contain some number of voter records for individuals who are no longer eligible to vote.

NVRA-exempt states do not need to adhere to these guidelines to complete list maintenance of their voter lists. However, they do have similar processes in place to guarantee that their voter lists are up to date and only non-eligible voters are removed from their voter lists. For example, jurisdictions in New Hampshire conduct a verification of voter lists after state elections if requested by a number of registered voters or the board of supervisors — or at least once every 10 years. When registered voters fail to reregister to confirm their eligibility during the verification period, they are sent a notice to their last known address detailing the steps to follow to remain on the voter list. If the recipient does not follow the steps, then the board of supervisors can remove them from the voter list.^{88, 89} Voters who are eligible to vote may register to vote and cast their ballots at the polls on Election Day in New Hampshire as well as in every NVRA-exempt state.

Confirmation Notices

Nationally, 39,670,903 confirmation notices were sent between the 2022 general election and the month before the 2024 general election, accounting for 19.5% of the active voters reported by states in 2024.⁹⁰ This percentage was higher than what was reported by states in 2022 (13.7%) and in

⁸⁸ New Hampshire Statute § 654:38. [gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/LXIII/654/654-38.htm](https://www.gencourt.nh.gov/rsa/html/LXIII/654/654-38.htm).

⁸⁹ New Hampshire Statute § 654:39. [gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/LXIII/654/654-39.htm](https://www.gencourt.nh.gov/rsa/html/LXIII/654/654-39.htm).

⁹⁰ The total number of confirmation notices sent was reported in item A10a of the 2022 EAVS. The percentage of active registered voters who received a confirmation notice was calculated as A10a/A1b x 100. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In 2024, 48 states reported the number of confirmation notices sent during the period of registration for the 2024 general election. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and, thus, does not use confirmation notices. Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming are NVRA-exempt. Iowa, Indiana, and Maine responded "Data Not Available," with Indiana and Maine reporting that they could not track that information. Forty-one states reported the status of the

2020 (14.3%).⁹¹ Table 1 shows that unreturned confirmation notices accounted for 69.7% of the total confirmation notices sent. These are confirmation notices that were not returned by the voter confirming if they were — or were not — eligible to vote, nor were these confirmation notices returned by the postal service as undeliverable. Unreturned confirmation notices allow states to move the addressees of these notices to the inactive registration list if the state uses that designation. States reported that 8.4% of confirmation notices were returned as undeliverable, and confirmation notices returned by voters accounted for the lowest percentages of confirmation notices sent (see Table 1).⁹²

Table 1. Most Confirmation Notices Sent Were Unreturned by Voters

Result of Confirmation Notice	Percentage of Total Confirmation Notices Sent
Unreturned (neither received back from voter nor returned as undeliverable)	69.7%
Not categorized	17.8%
Other	10.6%
Confirmation notices returned undeliverable	8.4%
Returned by voter confirming registration with address update	4.4%
Returned by voter confirming invalid registration	2.9%
Returned by voter confirming registration with no address update	2.9%

Source: The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as $A10f/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were not categorized was calculated as $(1 - [A10b+A10c+A10d+A10e+A10f+A10g+A10h+A10i])/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were labeled as “Other” was calculated as $(A10g+A10h+A10i/A10a) \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned undeliverable was calculated as $A10e/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming valid registration with an address update was calculated as $A10c/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming registration should be invalidated was calculated as $A10d/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned confirming valid registration with no address update was calculated as $A10b/A10a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

confirmation notices sent. In addition to the states that did not report on confirmation notices, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Jersey did not break down the number of confirmation notices sent by status.

⁹¹ The number of confirmation notices sent as a percentage of the active registrants in 2022 and 2020 was calculated as $A8a/A1b \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. Paired *T* tests between each pair of election years showed that the percentage of confirmation notices sent in 2024 was significantly higher than those sent in 2020 and in 2022 at the $p < 0.05$ level.

⁹² The percentage of unreturned confirmation notices was calculated as $A10f/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent that were returned undeliverable was calculated as $A10e/A10a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



The 2024 EAVS included for the first time a set of items requesting jurisdictions to report how many confirmation notices they sent for each of the reasons provided in the survey. The reasons listed in the EAVS include reasons covered by the NVRA to send confirmation notices (e.g., failing to vote in the two most recent federal elections) as well as other reasons for which some states send confirmation notices (e.g., voter may have a duplicate voter registration record).⁹³

Among states that tracked data on the reasons why confirmation notices were sent, the most common reported reason was as part of a routine mailing to all registered voters (47.5%), followed by confirmation notices sent to voters who may have moved from the address listed in their voter record (including notifications from the National Change of Address reports) with 27.5% of the confirmation notices.⁹⁴ Interestingly, 32.5% of the states that provided data on reasons to send confirmation notices reported that a single reason of those listed accounted for more than 90% of all the confirmation notices they sent, with “Other” and notices to voters who may have changed their address being the most common.⁹⁵

Voters Removed from the Voter Lists and Merged Registration Records

Between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election, states reported removing 21,298,175 records from their voter lists.⁹⁶ This was equal to 9.1% of the total number of voters who were registered in the United States as of the close of registration for the 2024 general election.⁹⁷ At the state level, 62.3% of the states reported removing a number of registrants that added up to between 3% and 10% of their total registered voters. There were some exceptions to this trend: Utah’s removals accounted for the lowest percentage of total registrants at 0.8%, and Puerto Rico reported the highest percentage of removals at 22.2% (see [Table 5 of Appendix A](#) in this chapter).

States also reported the reasons for removing records from their voter lists. These reasons for removal are shown in Figure 7. The most common reason was failing to return a confirmation notice

⁹³ Forty states assigned confirmation notices by the reason they were sent into one or more categories in item A11 of the 2024 EAVS. Alaska, American Samoa, Connecticut, Guam, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming did not categorize confirmation notices by reason sent in item A11 of the 2024 EAVS.

⁹⁴ The percentage of confirmation notices sent as part of routine mailing was calculated as $A11j/A10a \times 100$. The percentage of confirmation notices sent because the voter may have moved was calculated as $A11b/A10a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.


⁹⁵ The percentage of confirmation notices sent for each category was calculated as the total reported by a category divided by A10a and multiplied by 100.

⁹⁶ The total number of registrants removed from the voter lists was reported in item A12a of the 2024 EAVS. Fifty-two states reported data for the items related to voter removal. North Dakota does not require citizens to register to vote and thus does not have registrants to remove from the voter list. Guam did not report total registration removals in item A12a, only the number of voters removed because the voter failed to respond to a notice and vote in two federal general elections in item A12e. The Northern Mariana Islands responded “Does Not Apply” to the total number of voters removed. Mississippi reported the total number of registrants removed from the voter lists in item A12a but responded “Data Not Available” to sub-items A12b to A12k.

⁹⁷ Registrants removed as a percentage of total registrants was calculated as $A12a/A1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

and not voting in two consecutive federal general elections, which accounted for 33.5% of all removals, followed by removals because the voter moved outside of the jurisdiction (30.8%).⁹⁸ The majority of states reported that a registrant could be removed from the voter list if the registrant

Figure 7. Three Removal Reasons Accounted for the Majority of the Voter Registration Removals



Source: The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as $A12e/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because the registrant moved outside of the jurisdiction was calculated as $A12b/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of death was calculated as $A12c/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of a duplicate voter registration record was calculated as $A12h/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of other reasons was calculated as $(A12f+A12i+A12j+A12k)/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because the voter requested to be removed was calculated as $A12g/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying criminal conviction or incarceration was calculated as $A12d/A12a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

⁹⁸ The percentage of registrations removed because of no response to confirmation notices (and not voting in the following two general elections) was calculated as $A12e/A12a \times 100$. The percentage of registrations removed because the registrant moved outside of the jurisdiction was calculated as $A12b/A12a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.



received a disqualifying criminal conviction and/or was incarcerated,⁹⁹ but only 1.5% of the removals were done for this reason.¹⁰⁰ Four states reported that 5% or more of their registration removals happened due to criminal convictions: Kentucky (5%), Iowa (6.1%), South Dakota (7.1%), and Georgia (9.7%).

The 2024 EAVS added “Duplicate voter registration record” as a new reason for removing a registration from the voter list to account for cases where a duplicate record is found in the voter list and is completely removed rather than merged or linked with another registration record. This type of removal accounted for 8.1% of all registration removals reported by states.¹⁰¹ For most states, removing registration records because they were duplicates comprised less than 5% of all records removed from their voter lists. Vermont (20.8%) and Texas (50.9%) reported the highest percentages of registration records removed because they were duplicates.

The 2024 EAVS also added a question about the number of registration records that were merged or linked between the close of registration of the 2022 general election through the close of registration of the 2024 general election. Merged or linked records account for cases where two or more records in the voter list are found to contain the same name and information, and rather than removing the duplicate record(s) from the database (like those discussed in the previous paragraph), they are merged or linked. In response to a 2024 Policy Survey item that covered this topic, 73.2% of states reported merging records when a duplicate is found in their system, whereas the remaining states reported either performing another action (14.3%), not having a standard procedure at the state level (7.1%), or removing the duplicate record (5.4%).¹⁰²

When reporting registration records merged or linked, jurisdictions were asked to report the number of records that were merged but not to include the record that was kept in the system. For example, if a jurisdiction found two registration records with the same information and merged them together, then this would count as one merged or linked record. Overall, 64.4% of jurisdictions reported data about the number of registration records merged or linked, whereas 25.8% responded “Data Not Available” and 9.8% responded “Does Not Apply.”¹⁰³ Nationally, of those states reporting these data, 1,898,841 voter registration records were merged or linked. To put this total in perspective, this number is equal to 11% of the registration records removed leading to the 2024 general election, or 1% of all registered and eligible voters.¹⁰⁴ At the state level, California (759,961), Wisconsin

⁹⁹ The District of Columbia, Maine, Puerto Rico, and Vermont reported criminal conviction and/or incarceration was not a reason for voter removal in item Q51 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹⁰⁰ The percentage of registrations removed because of a disqualifying felony conviction was calculated as $A12d/A12a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentage.

¹⁰¹ The percentage of registrations removed because of a duplicate voter registration record was calculated as $A12h/A12a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage.

¹⁰² Data on action taken with duplicate records were collected in item Q21 of the 2024 Policy Survey.

¹⁰³ The percentage of jurisdictions providing each response used data from item A13a from the EAVS. Alabama, Alaska, American Samoa, Connecticut, Guam, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming did not provide data for A13a.

¹⁰⁴ The total number of merged registration records used item A13a. The number of merged registration records as a percentage of removed registrations was calculated as $A13a/A12a \times 100$. The number of

(338,719), and Ohio (321,348) reported the most merged registration records. Interestingly, Wisconsin reported more merged registration records than removed registration records and explained in the survey that "If a duplicate voter record is created, those records are merged, not inactivated."

merged registration records as a percentage of total registrations was calculated as $A13a/A1a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

Voter Registration Table 1: Registration History

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs	Active Regs	Active Regs (% of CVAP)	Active Regs (% of Total)	Inactive Regs	Inactive Regs (% of Total)
Alabama	2024	3,871,866	3,868,040	3,466,606	89.5%	89.6%	401,434	10.4%
	2022	3,829,788	3,692,639	3,283,842	85.7%	88.9%	408,797	11.1%
	2020	3,731,336	3,717,798	3,438,213	92.1%	92.5%	279,585	7.5%
Alaska	2024	540,681	611,078	565,242	104.5%	92.5%	45,836	7.5%
	2022	533,852	648,790	601,795	112.7%	92.8%	46,995	7.2%
	2020	533,151	646,093	595,647	111.7%	92.2%	50,446	7.8%
American Samoa	2024	--	15,948	15,948	--	100.0%	--	--
	2022	--	14,314	14,314	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	16,341	16,341	--	100.0%	0	0.0%
Arizona	2024	5,384,019	5,075,337	4,366,786	81.1%	86.0%	708,551	14.0%
	2022	5,216,518	4,833,160	4,143,929	79.4%	85.7%	689,231	14.3%
	2020	5,137,474	4,728,109	4,275,729	83.2%	90.4%	452,380	9.6%
Arkansas	2024	2,270,663	1,835,723	1,359,659	59.9%	74.1%	476,064	25.9%
	2022	2,237,649	1,805,777	1,475,838	66.0%	81.7%	329,939	18.3%
	2020	2,235,415	1,831,414	1,408,061	63.0%	76.9%	423,353	23.1%
California	2024	26,042,367	25,720,597	22,836,602	87.7%	88.8%	2,883,995	11.2%
	2022	26,028,290	26,942,532	21,958,218	84.4%	81.5%	4,984,314	18.5%
	2020	26,032,160	26,157,616	21,795,538	83.7%	83.3%	4,348,374	16.6%
Colorado	2024	4,390,366	4,583,280	4,074,612	92.8%	88.9%	508,668	11.1%
	2022	4,303,604	4,355,778	3,839,814	89.2%	88.2%	515,964	11.8%
	2020	4,244,210	4,211,528	3,803,762	89.6%	90.3%	407,766	9.7%
Connecticut	2024	2,660,107	2,520,650	2,292,818	86.2%	91.0%	227,832	9.0%
	2022	2,659,979	2,491,987	2,259,575	84.9%	90.7%	232,412	9.3%
	2020	2,619,474	2,524,717	2,335,860	89.2%	92.5%	188,857	7.5%
Delaware	2024	770,737	788,441	742,370	96.3%	94.2%	46,071	5.8%
	2022	754,114	762,908	702,029	93.1%	92.0%	60,879	8.0%
	2020	725,178	739,672	711,287	98.1%	96.2%	28,385	3.8%
District of Columbia	2024	508,689	612,904	469,969	92.4%	76.7%	142,935	23.3%
	2022	502,670	674,728	508,855	101.2%	75.4%	165,873	24.6%
	2020	536,768	625,683	517,890	96.5%	82.8%	107,793	17.2%
Florida [1]	2024	16,313,597	15,740,083	14,028,831	86.0%	89.1%	1,708,841	10.9%
	2022	15,855,982	15,574,971	14,497,121	91.4%	93.1%	1,077,850	6.9%
	2020	15,507,315	15,231,808	14,517,002	93.6%	95.3%	701,422	4.6%
Georgia	2024	7,917,054	8,234,335	7,174,961	90.6%	87.1%	1,059,374	12.9%
	2022	7,786,111	7,813,860	6,955,386	89.3%	89.0%	858,474	11.0%
	2020	7,581,837	7,618,436	7,194,889	94.9%	94.4%	423,547	5.6%

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs	Active Regs	Active Regs (% of CVAP)	Active Regs (% of Total)	Inactive Regs	Inactive Regs (% of Total)
Guam	2024	--	62,098	62,098	--	100.0%	--	--
	2022	--	60,463	60,463	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	55,896	55,896	--	100.0%	--	--
Hawaii	2024	1,053,254	861,333	765,998	72.7%	88.9%	95,335	11.1%
	2022	1,044,019	861,475	764,102	73.2%	88.7%	97,373	11.3%
	2020	1,014,035	832,466	759,971	74.9%	91.3%	72,495	8.7%
Idaho [2]	2024	1,445,124	1,178,750	1,178,750	81.6%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	1,373,714	1,004,608	1,004,608	73.1%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	1,282,630	1,029,763	1,029,763	80.3%	100.0%	--	--
Illinois [3]	2024	9,036,650	8,970,541	8,104,485	89.7%	90.3%	817,109	9.1%
	2022	9,087,338	8,775,224	7,899,591	86.9%	90.0%	791,457	9.0%
	2020	9,088,036	9,789,893	9,103,542	100.2%	93.0%	686,351	7.0%
Indiana	2024	5,058,179	4,840,856	4,288,091	84.8%	88.6%	552,765	11.4%
	2022	5,030,200	4,767,111	4,197,437	83.4%	88.0%	569,674	12.0%
	2020	4,978,356	4,692,091	4,170,353	83.8%	88.9%	521,738	11.1%
Iowa	2024	2,387,401	2,256,774	2,016,967	84.5%	89.4%	239,807	10.6%
	2022	2,379,570	2,234,666	1,880,415	79.0%	84.1%	354,251	15.9%
	2020	2,348,787	2,243,758	2,094,770	89.2%	93.4%	148,988	6.6%
Kansas	2024	2,146,714	2,031,119	1,871,857	87.2%	92.2%	159,262	7.8%
	2022	2,128,111	1,975,321	1,830,216	86.0%	92.7%	145,105	7.3%
	2020	2,103,748	1,924,772	1,764,949	83.9%	91.7%	148,624	7.7%
Kentucky	2024	3,414,611	3,548,136	3,219,361	94.3%	90.7%	328,775	9.3%
	2022	3,405,618	3,590,227	3,137,031	92.1%	87.4%	453,196	12.6%
	2020	3,367,502	3,565,428	3,319,307	98.6%	93.1%	246,121	6.9%
Louisiana	2024	3,398,688	3,046,376	2,734,059	80.4%	89.7%	312,317	10.3%
	2022	3,439,830	3,018,815	2,830,594	82.3%	93.8%	188,221	6.2%
	2020	3,463,372	3,093,004	2,963,901	85.6%	95.8%	129,103	4.2%
Maine	2024	1,126,987	1,223,468	1,041,826	92.4%	85.2%	181,642	14.8%
	2022	1,100,974	1,145,159	929,124	84.4%	81.1%	216,035	18.9%
	2020	1,078,770	1,138,576	1,135,008	105.2%	99.7%	3,568	0.3%
Maryland	2024	4,411,478	4,555,217	4,231,112	95.9%	92.9%	320,634	7.0%
	2022	4,417,293	4,440,808	4,149,909	93.9%	93.4%	290,899	6.6%
	2020	4,316,921	4,298,942	4,142,347	96.0%	96.4%	156,595	3.6%
Massachusetts	2024	5,136,750	5,142,343	4,369,280	85.1%	85.0%	773,063	15.0%
	2022	5,121,488	4,884,076	4,173,942	81.5%	85.5%	710,134	14.5%
	2020	5,057,192	4,812,909	4,400,254	87.0%	91.4%	412,655	8.6%
Michigan [4]	2024	7,646,222	8,440,236	7,267,666	95.0%	86.1%	1,172,570	13.9%
	2022	7,640,514	8,226,745	7,297,900	95.5%	88.7%	928,845	11.3%
	2020	7,562,464	8,105,524	7,209,300	95.3%	88.9%	896,224	11.1%



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs	Active Regs	Active Regs (% of CVAP)	Active Regs (% of Total)	Inactive Regs	Inactive Regs (% of Total)
Minnesota	2024	4,258,921	3,853,668	3,853,668	90.5%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	4,221,515	3,624,200	3,624,200	85.9%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	4,157,556	3,731,016	3,731,016	89.7%	100.0%	--	--
Mississippi	2024	2,222,109	2,131,726	1,965,948	88.5%	92.2%	165,778	7.8%
	2022	2,226,474	2,081,999	1,922,707	86.4%	92.3%	159,292	7.7%
	2020	2,246,323	2,143,149	1,982,632	88.3%	92.5%	160,517	7.5%
Missouri	2024	4,698,865	4,388,787	4,075,977	86.7%	92.9%	312,810	7.1%
	2022	4,675,531	4,234,799	3,816,663	81.6%	90.1%	418,136	9.9%
	2020	4,650,318	4,338,133	3,963,980	85.2%	91.4%	374,153	8.6%
Montana [5]	2024	888,190	800,573	691,534	77.9%	86.4%	107,822	13.5%
	2022	857,649	757,914	661,320	77.1%	87.3%	96,594	12.7%
	2020	831,760	747,439	675,971	81.3%	90.4%	71,468	9.6%
Nebraska [6]	2024	1,420,996	1,263,487	1,190,813	83.8%	94.2%	72,674	5.8%
	2022	1,411,320	1,242,930	1,141,470	80.9%	91.8%	101,460	8.2%
	2020	1,388,950	1,266,730	1,168,708	84.1%	92.3%	98,022	7.7%
Nevada	2024	2,243,354	2,256,275	2,052,976	91.5%	91.0%	202,810	9.0%
	2022	2,193,360	2,200,151	1,840,748	83.9%	83.7%	359,403	16.3%
	2020	2,111,932	2,039,162	1,835,401	86.9%	90.0%	203,761	10.0%
New Hampshire	2024	1,117,113	1,008,952	1,008,603	90.3%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	1,103,239	909,067	909,067	82.4%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	1,070,215	1,087,145	1,087,145	101.6%	100.0%	--	--
New Jersey	2024	6,397,695	6,630,364	6,066,940	94.8%	91.5%	563,424	8.5%
	2022	6,433,068	6,430,740	5,934,029	92.2%	92.3%	496,711	7.7%
	2020	6,170,130	6,310,564	5,896,836	95.6%	93.4%	413,728	6.6%
New Mexico	2024	1,552,694	1,415,984	1,254,851	80.8%	88.6%	156,424	11.0%
	2022	1,545,938	1,375,200	1,198,896	77.6%	87.2%	176,304	12.8%
	2020	1,522,171	1,360,871	1,255,669	82.5%	92.3%	105,202	7.7%
New York	2024	13,945,400	13,579,416	12,429,981	89.1%	91.5%	1,149,435	8.5%
	2022	14,109,037	13,131,592	12,125,966	85.9%	92.3%	1,005,626	7.7%
	2020	13,810,830	13,555,618	12,362,997	89.5%	91.2%	1,191,845	8.8%
North Carolina [7]	2024	8,017,902	7,854,464	6,986,365	87.1%	88.9%	853,624	10.9%
	2022	7,808,186	7,422,396	6,488,756	83.1%	87.4%	933,640	12.6%
	2020	7,729,644	7,372,608	6,607,121	85.5%	89.6%	765,487	10.4%
North Dakota	2024	589,860	--	--	--	--	--	--
	2022	576,588	--	--	--	--	--	--
	2020	567,545	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	2024	--	19,329	19,329	--	100.0%	--	--
	2022	--	19,272	19,272	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	18,526	18,526	--	100.0%	--	--

State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs	Active Regs	Active Regs (% of CVAP)	Active Regs (% of Total)	Inactive Regs	Inactive Regs (% of Total)
Ohio	2024	8,948,378	8,074,098	7,054,966	78.8%	87.4%	983,368	12.2%
	2022	8,943,128	8,029,950	8,029,950	89.8%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	8,879,469	8,073,829	8,073,829	90.9%	100.0%	--	--
Oklahoma	2024	2,953,778	2,442,211	2,095,952	71.0%	85.8%	346,259	14.2%
	2022	2,903,864	2,295,906	2,021,787	69.6%	88.1%	274,119	11.9%
	2020	2,875,059	2,259,107	2,021,846	70.3%	89.5%	237,261	10.5%
Oregon [8]	2024	3,212,722	3,060,374	3,060,374	95.3%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	3,200,314	2,985,820	2,985,820	93.3%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	3,162,204	2,944,588	2,944,588	93.1%	100.0%	--	--
Pennsylvania	2024	9,930,217	9,175,133	8,407,874	84.7%	91.6%	767,259	8.4%
	2022	9,918,163	8,873,144	8,033,385	81.0%	90.5%	839,759	9.5%
	2020	9,810,201	9,035,061	8,280,348	84.4%	91.6%	754,713	8.4%
Puerto Rico [9]	2024	2,670,201	1,987,317	1,987,317	74.4%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	2,674,230	--	--	--	--	--	--
	2020	2,579,596	2,355,894	2,355,894	91.3%	100.0%	--	--
Rhode Island	2024	824,795	792,075	734,885	89.1%	92.8%	57,190	7.2%
	2022	827,415	815,417	722,684	87.3%	88.6%	92,733	11.4%
	2020	800,798	809,117	735,195	91.8%	90.9%	73,922	9.1%
South Carolina	2024	4,065,128	3,851,187	3,417,493	84.1%	88.7%	433,694	11.3%
	2022	3,940,745	3,740,723	3,376,917	85.7%	90.3%	363,806	9.7%
	2020	3,892,341	3,854,209	3,535,061	90.8%	91.7%	319,148	8.3%
South Dakota	2024	683,617	690,306	627,248	91.8%	90.9%	63,058	9.1%
	2022	659,768	660,327	599,919	90.9%	90.9%	60,408	9.1%
	2020	653,394	635,256	578,683	88.6%	91.1%	56,573	8.9%
Tennessee	2024	5,329,651	4,825,601	4,458,851	83.7%	92.4%	366,750	7.6%
	2022	5,248,512	4,549,183	4,218,165	80.4%	92.7%	331,018	7.3%
	2020	5,129,580	4,436,727	4,226,928	82.4%	95.3%	209,799	4.7%
Texas	2024	20,149,798	18,623,931	16,611,078	82.4%	89.2%	2,012,853	10.8%
	2022	19,375,866	17,672,143	15,847,341	81.8%	89.7%	1,824,802	10.3%
	2020	18,875,542	16,955,519	15,279,870	81.0%	90.1%	1,675,649	9.9%
U.S. Virgin Islands	2024	--	56,304	31,171	--	55.4%	25,133	44.6%
	2022	--	39,910	39,910	--	100.0%	--	--
	2020	--	53,341	53,341	--	100.0%	--	--
Utah	2024	2,327,211	2,039,862	1,793,182	77.1%	87.9%	246,658	12.1%
	2022	2,251,328	1,614,198	1,690,442	75.1%	104.7%	123,071	7.6%
	2020	2,134,249	1,861,977	1,713,297	80.3%	92.0%	148,680	8.0%
Vermont [10]	2024	523,322	500,986	460,415	88.0%	91.9%	40,571	8.1%
	2022	518,387	501,665	446,098	86.1%	88.9%	55,567	11.1%
	2020	498,705	489,277	440,920	88.4%	90.1%	48,357	9.9%



State	Year	CVAP Total	Reported Regs	Active Regs	Active Regs (% of CVAP)	Active Regs (% of Total)	Inactive Regs	Inactive Regs (% of Total)
Virginia	2024	6,397,071	6,380,686	5,898,922	92.2%	92.4%	481,764	7.6%
	2022	6,354,439	6,105,868	5,736,016	90.3%	93.9%	369,852	6.1%
	2020	6,226,623	5,975,561	5,763,187	92.6%	96.4%	212,374	3.6%
Washington	2024	5,604,117	5,597,156	5,013,112	89.5%	89.6%	520,000	9.3%
	2022	5,529,508	5,303,997	4,805,394	86.9%	90.6%	498,603	9.4%
	2020	5,409,035	5,255,466	4,892,871	90.5%	93.1%	362,595	6.9%
West Virginia	2024	1,404,377	1,210,415	1,118,468	79.6%	92.4%	91,947	7.6%
	2022	1,408,767	1,153,208	1,055,475	74.9%	91.5%	97,733	8.5%
	2020	1,420,289	1,269,024	1,062,685	74.8%	83.7%	206,339	16.3%
Wisconsin [11]	2024	4,518,555	3,933,068	3,933,068	87.0%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	4,480,576	3,670,188	3,670,188	81.9%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	4,412,888	3,834,164	3,834,164	86.9%	100.0%	--	--
Wyoming [12]	2024	442,989	296,960	296,960	67.0%	100.0%	--	--
	2022	436,049	301,931	301,931	69.2%	100.0%	--	--
	2020	434,852	303,049	303,049	69.7%	100.0%	--	--
U.S. Total	2024	244,271,230	234,504,358	211,144,275	86.6%	90.0%	23,184,185	10.6%
	2022	241,710,190	226,339,980	203,660,564	85.4%	90.0%	22,794,555	11.1%
	2020	237,998,330	228,004,364	209,441,338	88.2%	91.9%	18,523,963	9.1%

Voter Registration Table 1 Calculation Notes:

CVAP Total uses the one-year ACS CVAP estimate. The 2024 data uses the 2023 CVAP, the 2022 data uses the 2021 CVAP, and the 2020 data uses the 2019 CVAP.

Reported Registrations uses question A1a for each year.

Active Registrations uses question A1b for each year.

Active Registrations (% of CVAP) uses $A1b/CVAP \times 100$ for each year.

Active Registrations (% of Total) uses $A1b/A1a \times 100$ for each year.

Inactive Registrations uses question A1c for each year.

Inactive Registrations (% of Total) uses $A1c/A1a \times 100$ for each year.

Voter Registration Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Because each percentage was calculated independently, the active registration (% of total) and inactive registration (% of total) rates may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.

- The citizen voting age population (CVAP) is an estimate of the number of U.S. citizens ages 18 years or older in the state. This report uses the one-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimate for 2023 instead of the five-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. The estimate for the year 2024 was not available by the time this report was finalized. For consistency, the CVAP used for the 2020 and 2022 general elections was the one-year ACS state estimate for 2019 and 2021, respectively.
 - Some states may report an active CVAP registration rate of 100% or more. This is because the 2023 CVAP was used to calculate the 2024 registration rate and because due to federal law, some ineligible voters may take up to two full election cycles to be removed from the voter registration rolls.
 - The Reported Registrations column includes both active and inactive voters (if the state uses such a distinction).
- [1] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official. Differences may exist between survey data and official data/reports generated and/or filed by a specific date or deadline. For official election data and voter registration statistics, refer to statistics: dos.fl.gov/elections/data-statistics/.
 - [2] Idaho does not have inactive voters.
 - [3] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [4] Voters reported in A1 are eligible to vote. Those defined as “inactive” need only to confirm their address before receiving a ballot. Participation in past elections is not a factor in defining eligibility.
 - [5] The total number of registered/eligible voters consists of active and inactive voters. Montana reports a total registered/eligible voters of 800,573. The difference between this number and what is reported in EAVS is provisional and pending voters.
 - [6] Nebraska does not have “inactive” voters.
 - [7] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
 - [8] Oregon does not track the number of inactive voters.
 - [9] In Puerto Rico, voters classified as inactive must first reactivate their voter status before being allowed to cast a ballot. This process requires the voter to verify their address and update their registration information with the Puerto Rico State Election Commission (Comisión Estatal de Elecciones [CEE]). Depending on the circumstances, reactivation may involve completing a specific form or providing a document that confirms their residence. Once their status is updated, the voter is allowed to vote in their assigned precinct without restrictions. This process differs from the classification under the NVRA in the United States, which refers to voters who are still eligible but require address verification before voting. For the 2024 elections in Puerto Rico, the voter registration deadline was September 21, 2024. Any voter who did not update their registration before this date would remain classified under their previous status until the next registration period.
 - [10] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
 - [11] Wisconsin is not subject to the NVRA and does not have inactive registered voters. Military voters are included in the reported registration numbers even though they are not required to “register” in Wisconsin because they still have a voter record created.
 - [12] In Wyoming, voters designated as “inactive” are not considered registered and eligible voters. They may be eligible upon re-registration or may be inactive due to becoming ineligible (e.g. felony, moved out of state).



Voter Registration Table 2: Total Registration Transactions Processed by Source

State	Total Registration Transactions Processed	Transaction Source					
		Mail/Email/Fax		In Person at Election Office		Online	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	1,398,811	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	1,023,321	43,492	4.3%	5,709	0.6%	74,777	7.3%
American Samoa	4,349	102	2.3%	4,247	97.7%	--	--
Arizona	2,348,267	392,070	16.7%	80,181	3.4%	187,232	8.0%
Arkansas	582,332	100,944	17.3%	81,164	13.9%	--	--
California	14,007,455	1,114,740	8.0%	281,968	2.0%	1,875,868	13.4%
Colorado	3,832,931	270,637	7.1%	64,193	1.7%	711,329	18.6%
Connecticut	732,283	324,610	44.3%	56,270	7.7%	100,450	13.7%
Delaware	512,441	19,257	3.8%	8,419	1.6%	58,518	11.4%
District of Columbia	119,133	2,641	2.2%	1,775	1.5%	35,537	29.8%
Florida [1]	4,334,144	311,264	7.2%	98,600	2.3%	922,758	21.3%
Georgia [2]	3,220,893	295,040	9.2%	120,113	3.7%	472,770	14.7%
Guam	70,129	--	--	--	--	1,801	2.6%
Hawaii	218,289	20,745	9.5%	--	--	64,242	29.4%
Idaho [3]	322,227	11,637	3.6%	21,323	6.6%	114,533	35.5%
Illinois [4]	5,328,462	383,693	7.2%	141,376	2.7%	604,779	11.3%
Indiana [5]	1,707,923	25,311	1.5%	15,163	0.9%	268,640	15.7%
Iowa	1,444,451	14,713	1.0%	23,747	1.6%	55,042	3.8%
Kansas	919,021	86,712	9.4%	66,624	7.2%	258,594	28.1%
Kentucky	2,299,601	33,088	1.4%	283,242	12.3%	396,623	17.2%
Louisiana [6]	770,881	103,887	13.5%	117,796	15.3%	351,721	45.6%
Maine [7]	311,687	13,500	4.3%	182,616	58.6%	38,045	12.2%
Maryland [8]	6,491,862	430,121	6.6%	43,462	0.7%	957,250	14.7%
Massachusetts [9]	3,961,950	52,170	1.3%	55,269	1.4%	333,331	8.4%
Michigan [10]	4,087,579	90,849	2.2%	150,914	3.7%	105,735	2.6%
Minnesota [11]	1,372,437	28,734	2.1%	49,865	3.6%	281,390	20.5%
Mississippi	927,908	181,712	19.6%	297,895	32.1%	8,091	0.9%
Missouri	460,206	48,267	10.5%	25,442	5.5%	98,001	21.3%
Montana	369,784	80,123	21.7%	86,899	23.5%	--	--
Nebraska [12]	493,947	67,499	13.7%	17,842	3.6%	112,492	22.8%
Nevada	1,510,352	310,553	20.6%	63,662	4.2%	232,780	15.4%
New Hampshire	722,299	6,358	0.9%	246,047	34.1%	--	--
New Jersey [13]	3,565,787	61,596	1.7%	--	--	284,001	8.0%
New Mexico	496,770	44,676	9.0%	28,707	5.8%	108,367	21.8%
New York	2,590,306	711,503	27.5%	133,738	5.2%	211,758	8.2%

State	Total Registration Transactions Processed	Transaction Source					
		Mail/Email/Fax		In Person at Election Office		Online	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Carolina [14]	3,772,641	631,695	16.7%	577,000	15.3%	414,635	11.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	445	445	100.0%	--	--	--	--
Ohio	3,741,987	546,590	14.6%	391,743	10.5%	852,037	22.8%
Oklahoma [15]	767,584	61,466	8.0%	72,740	9.5%	163,987	21.4%
Oregon	1,569,926	97,107	6.2%	46,968	3.0%	319,483	20.4%
Pennsylvania [16]	4,014,449	202,695	5.0%	39,820	1.0%	928,617	23.1%
Puerto Rico	1,331,331	--	--	1,219,637	91.6%	111,694	8.4%
Rhode Island [17]	532,095	11,334	2.1%	15,924	3.0%	29,432	5.5%
South Carolina	1,051,212	55,062	5.2%	59,490	5.7%	234,633	22.3%
South Dakota	196,381	17,047	8.7%	31,244	15.9%	--	--
Tennessee	1,262,606	151,824	12.0%	101,743	8.1%	399,865	31.7%
Texas	5,133,464	504,722	9.8%	375,519	7.3%	188,117	3.7%
U.S. Virgin Islands	24,802	0	0.0%	24,802	100.0%	--	--
Utah	949,986	83,413	8.8%	8,345	0.9%	188,573	19.9%
Vermont [18]	87,935	1,012	1.2%	9,346	10.6%	19,085	21.7%
Virginia	3,232,808	139,561	4.3%	82,880	2.6%	422,465	13.1%
Washington	1,992,906	325,881	16.4%	61,891	3.1%	322,373	16.2%
West Virginia [19]	496,219	--	--	--	--	146,043	29.4%
Wisconsin [20]	705,403	49,895	7.1%	151,736	21.5%	356,696	50.6%
Wyoming [21]	87,915	3,496	4.0%	84,106	95.7%	--	--
U.S. Total	103,512,313	8,565,489	8.5%	6,209,202	6.4%	14,424,190	14.4%



State	Transaction Source							
	Automatic Registration Program		Motor Vehicle Agencies		Public Assistance Offices		Disability Services Offices	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	767,554	75.0%	90,747	8.9%	4,013	0.4%	53	0.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	--	--	1,371,677	58.4%	19,384	0.8%	67	0.0%
Arkansas	--	--	347,185	59.6%	5,753	1.0%	499	0.1%
California	9,145,723	65.3%	17	0.0%	76,253	0.5%	657	0.0%
Colorado	2,202,812	57.5%	0	0.0%	24,511	0.6%	187	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	202,620	27.7%	1,161	0.2%	--	--
Delaware	118,781	23.2%	271,411	53.0%	107	0.0%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	66,231	55.6%	--	--	2,729	2.3%	--	--
Florida [1]	83,137	1.9%	2,632,761	60.7%	7,467	0.2%	543	0.0%
Georgia [2]	--	--	2,217,557	68.8%	19,207	0.6%	1	0.0%
Guam	--	--	65,885	93.9%	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	--	--	93,566	42.9%	--	--	--	--
Idaho [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois [4]	845,826	15.9%	1,785,604	33.5%	45,717	0.9%	6,050	0.1%
Indiana [5]	--	--	897,025	52.5%	14,585	0.9%	609	0.0%
Iowa	0	0.0%	113,967	7.9%	1,712	0.1%	71	0.0%
Kansas	--	--	410,682	44.7%	8,651	0.9%	82	0.0%
Kentucky	--	--	1,338,645	58.2%	239,055	10.4%	1,352	0.1%
Louisiana [6]	--	--	166,477	21.6%	19,065	2.5%	2,196	0.3%
Maine [7]	36,870	11.8%	10,668	3.4%	--	--	--	--
Maryland [8]	4,497,829	69.3%	--	--	29,198	0.4%	441	0.0%
Massachusetts [9]	3,114,094	78.6%	275,844	7.0%	17,581	0.4%	491	0.0%
Michigan [10]	--	--	3,723,916	91.1%	723	0.0%	70	0.0%
Minnesota [11]	159,428	11.6%	145,596	10.6%	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	--	--	422,884	45.6%	13,754	1.5%	945	0.1%
Missouri	--	--	277,934	60.4%	10,356	2.3%	130	0.0%
Montana	--	--	76,033	20.6%	6,995	1.9%	1,081	0.3%
Nebraska [12]	--	--	286,450	58.0%	241	0.0%	67	0.0%
Nevada	836,797	55.4%	0	0.0%	1,080	0.1%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [13]	1,737,116	48.7%	--	--	7,935	0.2%	33,595	0.9%
New Mexico	--	--	160,266	32.3%	10,704	2.2%	19	0.0%
New York	--	--	1,185,420	45.8%	9,692	0.4%	4,746	0.2%
North Carolina [14]	1,509,247	40.0%	--	--	35,012	0.9%	1,237	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

State	Transaction Source							
	Automatic Registration Program		Motor Vehicle Agencies		Public Assistance Offices		Disability Services Offices	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	16,118	0.4%	980,724	26.2%	152,835	4.1%	6,764	0.2%
Oklahoma [15]	--	--	422,291	55.0%	17,663	2.3%	242	0.0%
Oregon	400,245	25.5%	263,497	16.8%	2,778	0.2%	1,013	0.1%
Pennsylvania [16]	--	--	2,090,892	52.1%	43,408	1.1%	344	0.0%
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [17]	469,899	88.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina	--	--	672,466	64.0%	29,265	2.8%	132	0.0%
South Dakota	--	--	137,091	69.8%	4,447	2.3%	53	0.0%
Tennessee	--	--	587,286	46.5%	10,942	0.9%	360	0.0%
Texas	--	--	3,598,016	70.1%	65,121	1.3%	528	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	--	--	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Utah	0	0.0%	702,296	73.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Vermont [18]	--	--	48,728	55.4%	273	0.3%	--	--
Virginia	--	--	2,489,651	77.0%	3,002	0.1%	185	0.0%
Washington	92,249	4.6%	953,329	47.8%	34,015	1.7%	228	0.0%
West Virginia [19]	--	--	312,482	63.0%	--	--	--	--
Wisconsin [20]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	26,099,956	43.2%	31,829,586	37.7%	996,390	1.0%	65,038	0.1%



State	Transaction Source					
	Armed Forces Recruitment Offices		Other State Agencies		Registration Drives	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	0	0.0%	38	0.0%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arizona	28	0.0%	2,933	0.1%	267,909	11.4%
Arkansas	16	0.0%	1,216	0.2%	8,460	1.5%
California	9,567	0.1%	43,345	0.3%	155,461	1.1%
Colorado	5	0.0%	--	--	16,112	0.4%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	0	0.0%	3	0.0%	4,690	0.9%
District of Columbia	0	0.0%	4,524	3.8%	--	--
Florida [1]	671	0.0%	7,109	0.2%	211,833	4.9%
Georgia [2]	4	0.0%	--	--	--	--
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	--	--	--	--	--	--
Idaho [3]	--	--	--	--	1,361	0.4%
Illinois [4]	--	--	33,287	0.6%	--	--
Indiana [5]	0	0.0%	129	0.0%	6,219	0.4%
Iowa	32	0.0%	39	0.0%	--	--
Kansas	70	0.0%	1,687	0.2%	10,143	1.1%
Kentucky	1,951	0.1%	--	--	5,645	0.2%
Louisiana [6]	2,423	0.3%	7,316	0.9%	--	--
Maine [7]	--	--	--	--	17,499	5.6%
Maryland [8]	123	0.0%	249,691	3.8%	--	--
Massachusetts [9]	--	--	10,568	0.3%	--	--
Michigan [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Minnesota [11]	--	--	--	--	9,436	0.7%
Mississippi	1,065	0.1%	--	--	--	--
Missouri	53	0.0%	0	0.0%	--	--
Montana	18	0.0%	--	--	21,628	5.8%
Nebraska [12]	1	0.0%	--	--	--	--
Nevada	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	35,128	2.3%
New Hampshire	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Jersey [13]	8,196	0.2%	1,171,469	32.9%	--	--
New Mexico	0	0.0%	17	0.0%	144,014	29.0%
New York	--	--	129,552	5.0%	36,591	1.4%
North Carolina [14]	33	0.0%	3,832	0.1%	378,805	10.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--

State	Transaction Source					
	Armed Forces Recruitment Offices		Other State Agencies		Registration Drives	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	455	0.0%	129,604	3.5%	347,645	9.3%
Oklahoma [15]	7,068	0.9%	44	0.0%	--	--
Oregon	--	--	4,895	0.3%	--	--
Pennsylvania [16]	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	344,313	8.6%
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island [17]	--	--	--	--	5,506	1.0%
South Carolina	34	0.0%	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	2	0.0%	569	0.3%	3,235	1.6%
Tennessee	1,885	0.1%	8,701	0.7%	--	--
Texas	37	0.0%	36,499	0.7%	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Utah	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	10,448	1.1%
Vermont [18]	--	--	--	--	9,491	10.8%
Virginia	10	0.0%	16,795	0.5%	31,781	1.0%
Washington	17,212	0.9%	5,744	0.3%	20,824	1.0%
West Virginia [19]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wisconsin [20]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	50,961	0.1%	1,869,606	2.4%	2,104,177	3.7%



State	Transaction Source					
	Polling Places and Voting Sites		Other Sources		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	1,398,811	100.0%
Alaska	36,938	3.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Arizona	9,355	0.4%	16,567	0.7%	864	0.0%
Arkansas	341	0.1%	36,752	6.3%	2	0.0%
California	196,025	1.4%	1,080,463	7.7%	27,368	0.2%
Colorado	224,672	5.9%	318,473	8.3%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	51,635	7.1%	--	--	-4,463	-0.6%
Delaware	5,159	1.0%	26,096	5.1%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	--	--	5,696	4.8%	0	0.0%
Florida [1]	38,462	0.9%	19,539	0.5%	0	0.0%
Georgia [2]	--	--	96,201	3.0%	0	0.0%
Guam	--	--	2,443	3.5%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	18,946	8.7%	--	--	20,790	9.5%
Idaho [3]	169,419	52.6%	3,954	1.2%	0	0.0%
Illinois [4]	189,658	3.6%	1,277,811	24.0%	14,661	0.3%
Indiana [5]	0	0.0%	397,186	23.3%	83,056	4.9%
Iowa	--	--	1,235,128	85.5%	0	0.0%
Kansas	--	--	75,418	8.2%	358	0.0%
Kentucky	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Louisiana [6]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Maine [7]	--	--	12,489	4.0%	0	0.0%
Maryland [8]	249,403	3.8%	34,344	0.5%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts [9]	--	--	102,602	2.6%	0	0.0%
Michigan [10]	--	--	15,372	0.4%	0	0.0%
Minnesota [11]	339,280	24.7%	358,708	26.1%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	1,562	0.2%
Missouri	--	--	23	0.0%	0	0.0%
Montana	1,658	0.4%	95,349	25.8%	0	0.0%
Nebraska [12]	938	0.2%	8,417	1.7%	0	0.0%
Nevada	30,352	2.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	86,679	12.0%	383,215	53.1%	0	0.0%
New Jersey [13]	106,267	3.0%	155,612	4.4%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
New York	165,532	6.4%	--	--	1,774	0.1%
North Carolina [14]	--	--	221,145	5.9%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%

State	Transaction Source					
	Polling Places and Voting Sites		Other Sources		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Ohio	51,644	1.4%	398,975	10.7%	-133,147	-3.6%
Oklahoma [15]	19,055	2.5%	3,028	0.4%	0	0.0%
Oregon	--	--	433,940	27.6%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania [16]	--	--	364,359	9.1%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Rhode Island [17]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
South Carolina	--	--	130	0.0%	0	0.0%
South Dakota	2,632	1.3%	63	0.0%	-2	0.0%
Tennessee	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	42,789	0.8%	322,116	6.3%	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah	25,744	2.7%	411	0.0%	-69,245	-7.3%
Vermont [18]	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Virginia	46,478	1.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Washington	--	--	159,159	8.0%	1	0.0%
West Virginia [19]	--	--	37,694	7.6%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [20]	137,180	19.4%	9,896	1.4%	0	0.0%
Wyoming [21]	--	--	313	0.4%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	2,246,241	3.4%	7,709,087	9.1%	1,342,390	1.3%

Voter Registration Table 2 Calculation Notes:

- Total Registration Transactions Processed uses question A3a.
- Transaction Source, Mail/Email/Fax, Total uses question A4a.
- Transaction Source, Mail/Email/Fax, % uses A4a/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, In Person at Election Office, Total uses question A4b.
- Transaction Source, In Person at Election Office, % uses A4b/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Online, Total uses question A4c.
- Transaction Source, Online, % uses A4c/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Automatic Registration Program, Total uses question A4d.
- Transaction Source, Automatic Registration Program, % uses A4d/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, Total uses question A4e.
- Transaction Source, Motor Vehicle Agencies, % uses A4e/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Public Assistance Offices, Total uses question A4f.
- Transaction Source, Public Assistance Offices, % uses A4f/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Disability Services Offices, Total uses question A4g.
- Transaction Source, Disability Services Offices, % uses A4g/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, Total uses question A4h.
- Transaction Source, Armed Forces Recruitment Offices, % uses A4h/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Other State Agencies, Total uses question A4i.
- Transaction Source, Other State Agencies, % uses A4i/A3a x 100.
- Transaction Source, Registration Drives, Total uses question A4j.



Transaction Source, Registration Drives, % uses $A4j/A3a \times 100$.

Transaction Source, Polling Places and Voting Sites, Total uses question A4k.

Transaction Source, Polling Places and Voting Sites, % uses $A4k/A3a \times 100$.

Transaction Source, Other Sources, Total uses the sum of questions A4l, A4m, and A4n.

Transaction Source, Other Sources, % uses $(A4l+A4m+A4n)/A3a \times 100$.

Transaction Source, Not Categorized, Total uses $A3a - (\text{sum of } A4a \text{ to } A4n)$.

Transaction Source, Not Categorized, % uses $(A3a - [\text{sum of } A4a \text{ to } A4n])/A3a \times 100$.

Voter Registration Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - States have latitude in which registration application sources are offered to their citizens, so long as they do not conflict with federal law. Not all states offer each of the application sources that the EAVS collects data for.
 - Questions A4l, A4m, and A4n were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if they offered another application source aside from those listed in questions A4a-A4k or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A4a-A4k.
 - Negative numbers in the Not Categorized application source indicate that the sum of registrations received for each source accounted for more than the total number of registrations reported received by the state.
 - Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications received through each source may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
 - The 2024 EAVS was the first year that states and jurisdictions were asked to report data on registration applications received through automatic registration programs and at polling places and voting sites. Respondents were also asked to report data on registration transactions, whereas prior to 2024, these questions collected data on registration forms. Both these changes affected how states reported their registration data compared to previous EAVS years.
- [1] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official. Differences may exist between survey data and official data/reports generated and/or filed by a specific date or deadline. Although there is no automatic registration program in Florida, three counties (Gadsden, Polk and Sumter) misreported registration in this category. For official voter registration statistics, including registration by methods, refer to voter registration reports under Data & Statistics at dos.fl.gov/elections/data-statistics/.
- [2] In Georgia, all transactions that occur at the Department of Driver Services (DDS) are used for voter registration purposes unless the voter affirmatively opts out or is ineligible (i.e., U.S. citizenship is not verified). Interacting with DDS is by far the most common method of voter registration in Georgia. DDS transactions are reported in the Motor Vehicle Agencies category rather than Automatic Registration Program.
- [3] Idaho's system only tracks mail, in-person, online, registration drive, and polling place registration sources.

- [4] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
- [5] The data reported in A4a-l consist of data from CEB-9 section 2 (A4j) and the statewide voter registration system (A4a-i and A4k-m). Indiana uses the three "other" fields (A4l, A4m, A4n) for "in county voter registration application NVRA code 46965 and voters with print disabilities voter registration and absentee ballot application NVRA code 53042" (A4l), "federal" (A4m) and "no NVRA number" (A4n); unknown was not included in the total calculation of A4a-l, counties do not always manually track the information requested in A4j and therefore are not included in the sums that should match up to A3a.
- [6] Voters submit registration applications for new registrations as well as for updates or changes to existing registrations. The A4 totals reflect both new registrations and changes to registrations.
- [7] NVRA agency registrations are not reported by individual agency, and thus, are not available for reporting in A4-A7f-i. Instead, aggregated agency totals are reported in A4l-A7l and described as NVRA agency registration totals. There were 2,339 registrations completed at NVRA agencies that are included in the 12,489 registrations summarized under "Other Sources" in Voter Registration Table 2.
- [8] The total provided in A3a is the sum of new, duplicate, and updated registrations (A3b, A3d, and A3e). The data reported in A4l include two registration categories. The first is from volunteer groups and the second is from high school registration drives.
- [9] Individuals who complete eligible transactions at some state agencies are automatically registered to vote unless they opt out.
- [10] Registrations reported in A4c reflect individuals who registered online using the Michigan voter information center website. Regarding registrations through automatic voter registrations in A4d, Michigan data do not separate registrations received from the Secretary of State transaction (DMV) based on whether it is an AVR transaction or another registration received at the Secretary of State; the vast majority of registrations through the Secretary of State are AVR transactions.
- [11] An automatic voter registration law was implemented in April 2024. A4d reflects registrations from Driver and Vehicle Services (DVS) after that date. Registrations from DVS before implementation of automatic voter registration are reported in A4e.
- [12] Registrations received from drives by advocacy groups or political parties in A4j are not separately categorized and are included in A4a.
- [13] A4d includes automatic registration and manual updates through the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC). For A4e, there is no way to differentiate between automatic and manual updates through MVC. "In person" registrations in A4b is not a current NVRA code. The number of registrations from registration drives from advocacy groups or political parties is not tracked
- [14] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
- [15] Oklahoma does not currently have automatic voter registration. Oklahoma does not track registrations submitted through registration drives.
- [16] The application sources are entered by county users when processing the applications except when received online. The figures provided in A4d (registration transactions received through an automatic registration program) represent initial voter registration applications made through the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation's motor voter program. Although the motor voter program was changed from an "opt-in" to an "opt-out"-based system in 2023, the Department of State has included all initial applications received from the motor voter program during the applicable two-year period.
- [17] All registration transactions received through the Rhode Island DMV are part of AVR. Voter registrations received from public assistance offices mandated as registrations sites under NVRA are received and tracked by the State Board of Elections. The numbers are tracked by agency and not by city/town. The State Board of Elections received 3,986 voter registration forms during the time frame covered by this survey (2022-close of registration 2024).



- [18]** Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [19]** Mail-in and in-person voter registration applications are not currently differentiated within the statewide voter registration system.
- [20]** Wisconsin only tracks fax or email registrations for military voters because although they are not required to register, a record is created as a registration in the system. Military voters' data may be received by fax or email, whereas non-military voters can only submit registrations online, by mail, or in person. Registration applications falling under other sources come from care facilities and registrations received at the polling place on Election Day. Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not receive registrations from NVRA agencies. Election Day registrations in A4k are underreported in some jurisdictions because of miscoded registrations.
- [21]** Multiple changes may have occurred on the same form. A3a includes a total, but the total could be less. For example, a voter could have submitted one form to change their party and address. The data currently reflect that change as two forms.

Voter Registration Table 3: Registration Transactions Processed

State	Total Registration Transactions Received	Registration Category					
		New Valid Registrations		Updates to Existing Registrations		Pre-Registrations (Under 18 years of age)	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	1,398,811	572,632	40.9%	821,765	58.7%	--	--
Alaska [1]	1,023,321	52,456	5.1%	954,489	93.3%	--	--
American Samoa	4,349	1,745	40.1%	2,604	59.9%	--	--
Arizona [2]	2,348,267	607,128	25.9%	1,287,885	54.8%	13,801	0.6%
Arkansas	582,332	246,974	42.4%	335,246	57.6%	0	0.0%
California [3]	14,007,455	4,308,269	30.8%	6,004,615	42.9%	244,996	1.7%
Colorado	3,832,931	498,308	13.0%	2,830,596	73.8%	96,461	2.5%
Connecticut	732,283	386,014	52.7%	320,173	43.7%	25,280	3.5%
Delaware	512,441	71,902	14.0%	416,270	81.2%	13,925	2.7%
District of Columbia	119,133	69,688	58.5%	45,486	38.2%	1,937	1.6%
Florida [4]	4,334,144	1,337,303	30.9%	2,871,542	66.3%	86,387	2.0%
Georgia	3,220,893	757,440	23.5%	2,425,291	75.3%	27,307	0.8%
Guam	70,129	12,090	17.2%	17,288	24.7%	1,658	2.4%
Hawaii	218,289	64,468	29.5%	152,570	69.9%	2,641	1.2%
Idaho	322,227	181,741	56.4%	139,388	43.3%	0	0.0%
Illinois [5]	5,328,462	981,482	18.4%	3,699,481	69.4%	9,277	0.2%
Indiana	1,707,923	357,741	20.9%	1,086,141	63.6%	41,120	2.4%
Iowa	1,444,451	116,644	8.1%	500	0.0%	14,770	1.0%
Kansas	919,021	218,739	23.8%	583,135	63.5%	2,028	0.2%
Kentucky	2,299,601	220,093	9.6%	1,771,199	77.0%	--	--
Louisiana [6]	770,881	263,705	34.2%	477,961	62.0%	15,474	2.0%
Maine	311,687	106,978	34.3%	190,754	61.2%	2,944	0.9%
Maryland [7]	6,491,862	524,189	8.1%	5,913,899	91.1%	52,917	0.8%
Massachusetts	3,961,950	465,616	11.8%	2,636,169	66.5%	84,741	2.1%
Michigan [8]	4,087,579	604,606	14.8%	1,612,923	39.5%	218	0.0%
Minnesota	1,372,437	471,657	34.4%	655,043	47.7%	48,495	3.5%
Mississippi	927,908	344,991	37.2%	292,131	31.5%	--	--
Missouri	460,206	460,197	100.0%	--	--	--	--
Montana	369,784	78,669	21.3%	289,121	78.2%	1,806	0.5%
Nebraska [9]	493,947	164,491	33.3%	273,382	55.3%	--	--
Nevada	1,510,352	145,494	9.6%	1,278,843	84.7%	7,266	0.5%
New Hampshire	722,299	61,210	8.5%	660,064	91.4%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	3,565,787	425,782	11.9%	2,545,955	71.4%	62,754	1.8%
New Mexico	496,770	118,141	23.8%	356,924	71.8%	9,513	1.9%
New York	2,590,306	680,259	26.3%	1,431,413	55.3%	93,469	3.6%
North Carolina [10]	3,772,641	1,410,905	37.4%	1,214,706	32.2%	--	--



State	Total Registration Transactions Received	Registration Category					
		New Valid Registrations		Updates to Existing Registrations		Pre-Registrations (Under 18 years of age)	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	445	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	3,741,987	1,198,459	32.0%	1,719,109	45.9%	3,297	0.1%
Oklahoma [11]	767,584	388,669	50.6%	359,459	46.8%	6,435	0.8%
Oregon	1,569,926	240,611	15.3%	1,269,562	80.9%	58,168	3.7%
Pennsylvania	4,014,449	842,187	21.0%	2,185,139	54.4%	--	--
Puerto Rico	1,331,331	98,311	7.4%	1,214,311	91.2%	--	--
Rhode Island	532,095	53,040	10.0%	412,580	77.5%	3,462	0.7%
South Carolina	1,051,212	594,568	56.6%	456,644	43.4%	--	--
South Dakota	196,381	62,588	31.9%	127,112	64.7%	6,315	3.2%
Tennessee	1,262,606	634,912	50.3%	428,162	33.9%	0	0.0%
Texas	5,133,464	2,900,357	56.5%	2,165,514	42.2%	--	--
U.S. Virgin Islands	24,802	1,720	6.9%	23,076	93.0%	6	0.0%
Utah [12]	949,986	41,425	4.4%	44,370	4.7%	10,053	1.1%
Vermont [13]	87,935	81,993	93.2%	3,355	3.8%	--	--
Virginia	3,232,808	563,781	17.4%	1,491,436	46.1%	46,752	1.4%
Washington	1,992,906	473,192	23.7%	993,858	49.9%	93,252	4.7%
West Virginia	496,219	53,343	10.7%	440,750	88.8%	--	--
Wisconsin [14]	705,403	524,103	74.3%	130,911	18.6%	3	0.0%
Wyoming [15]	87,915	42,288	48.1%	45,627	51.9%	--	--
U.S. Total	103,512,313	26,185,294	25.3%	59,105,927	57.4%	1,188,928	1.5%

State	Registration Category							
	Duplicate Registrations		Invalid or Rejected Registrations		Other Registrations		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	571	0.0%	3,843	0.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Alaska [1]	4,893	0.5%	11,483	1.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
American Samoa	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Arizona [2]	394,803	16.8%	44,650	1.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	58	0.0%	54	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
California [3]	2,178,551	15.6%	544,262	3.9%	694,529	5.0%	32,233	0.2%
Colorado	315,695	8.2%	91,871	2.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	816	0.1%
Delaware	2,044	0.4%	--	--	8,300	1.6%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	1,803	1.5%	219	0.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
Florida [4]	74	0.0%	38,837	0.9%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
Georgia	--	--	10,855	0.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Guam	--	--	39,093	55.7%	--	--	0	0.0%
Hawaii	27	0.0%	--	--	--	--	-1,417	-0.6%
Idaho	--	--	1,098	0.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Illinois [5]	147,406	2.8%	157,776	3.0%	311,738	5.9%	21,302	0.4%
Indiana	205,412	12.0%	17,509	1.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Iowa	30,080	2.1%	--	--	1,282,457	88.8%	0	0.0%
Kansas	24,196	2.6%	17,560	1.9%	--	--	73,363	8.0%
Kentucky	--	--	308,309	13.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Louisiana [6]	6,541	0.8%	7,200	0.9%	--	--	0	0.0%
Maine	11,011	3.5%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Maryland [7]	--	--	857	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	744,880	18.8%	30,544	0.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Michigan [8]	1,869,580	45.7%	252	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Minnesota	197,188	14.4%	54	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	290,786	31.3%
Missouri	--	--	9	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Montana	188	0.1%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Nebraska [9]	55,478	11.2%	596	0.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
Nevada	61,229	4.1%	17,520	1.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	1,012	0.1%	13	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Jersey	173,005	4.9%	348,340	9.8%	9,951	0.3%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	8,071	1.6%	4,121	0.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
New York	272,130	10.5%	113,214	4.4%	--	--	-179	0.0%
North Carolina [10]	1,031,350	27.3%	115,680	3.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Registration Category							
	Duplicate Registrations		Invalid or Rejected Registrations		Other Registrations		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	445	100.0%
Ohio	548,518	14.7%	139,329	3.7%	265,317	7.1%	-132,042	-3.5%
Oklahoma [11]	3,361	0.4%	9,660	1.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Oregon	1,585	0.1%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	378,187	9.4%	568,619	14.2%	40,317	1.0%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	903	0.1%	17,806	1.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	62,913	11.8%	100	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
South Carolina	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
South Dakota	147	0.1%	45	0.0%	174	0.1%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	148,594	11.8%	50,938	4.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	--	--	67,593	1.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah [12]	--	--	39	0.0%	28,538	3.0%	825,561	86.9%
Vermont [13]	2,587	2.9%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Virginia	1,074,543	33.2%	56,296	1.7%	--	--	0	0.0%
Washington	427,038	21.4%	5,566	0.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
West Virginia	2,084	0.4%	42	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [14]	10,059	1.4%	--	--	40,327	5.7%	0	0.0%
Wyoming [15]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	10,397,795	12.7%	2,841,852	3.0%	2,681,649	6.5%	1,110,868	1.1%

Voter Registration Table 3 Calculation Notes:

- Total Registration Transactions Received uses question A3a.
- New Valid Registrations, Total uses question A3b.
- New Valid Registrations, % uses $A3b/A3a \times 100$.
- Updates to Existing Registrations, Total uses question A3e.
- Updates to Existing Registrations, % uses $A3e/A3a \times 100$.
- Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), Total uses question A3c.
- Pre-Registrations (Under 18 Years of Age), % uses $A3c/A3a \times 100$.
- Duplicate Registrations, Total uses question A3d.
- Duplicate Registrations, % uses $A3d/A3a \times 100$.
- Invalid or Rejected Registrations, Total uses question A3f.
- Invalid or Rejected Registrations, % uses $A3f/A3a \times 100$.
- Other Registrations, Total uses the sum of questions A3g, A3h, and A3i.
- Other Registrations, % uses $(A3g+A3h+A3i)/A3a \times 100$.
- Not Categorized, Total uses $A3a - (\text{sum of A3b to A3i})$.
- Not Categorized, % uses $(A3a - [\text{sum of A3b to A3i}])/A3a \times 100$.

Voter Registration Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - Questions A3g, A3h, and A3i were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another registration category aside from those listed in questions A3b-A3f or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A3b-A3f.
 - Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration category indicate that the sum of registrations received for each category accounted for more than the total number of registrations reported received by the state.
 - Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of applications in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
 - Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration category.
 - The 2024 EAVS was the first year that respondents were asked to report data on registration transactions, whereas prior to 2024, these questions collected data on registration forms. Previous EAVS surveys also had two sub-items to report data on updates to existing registrations. Both these changes affected how states reported their registration data compared to previous EAVS years.
- [1] Data reported in A3f includes applications that were submitted and incomplete.
- [2] Data for A3d are not tracked by at least one county.
- [3] Some counties are unable to distinguish between new, duplicate, or updated online registrations.
- [4] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official. Differences may exist between survey data and official data/reports generated and/or filed by a specific date or deadline. Also refer to voter registration reports under Data & Statistics at dos.fl.gov/elections/data-statistics/.
- [5] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
- [6] Address changes across jurisdictions are counted as new registrations. Citizens who are 16 and 17 years old can apply to register to vote, but cannot vote until they are 18 years old.
- [7] The total provided in A3a is the sum of new, duplicate, and updated registrations (A3b, A3d, and A3e). Maryland does not consider the registration changes listed in A3f as registrations, and therefore the source of these changes is not recorded. For A3c, individuals can register to vote starting at age 16; however, they are not considered "pre-registered." Sixteen- and 17-year-olds are considered registered voters — they just cannot vote until their 18th birthday.
- [8] The vast majority of duplicate transactions are motor vehicle transactions in which the voter is already registered at the current address, but the transaction is used to update the digital signature image on file with a newer version of the signature if one is provided during the transaction. Regarding pre-registrations in A3c, Michigan used to count pre-registrations as those who registered at age 17.5 or older when they would be 18 for the upcoming election (the only type of pre-registration previously allowed). Under a new law enacted for the 2024 election cycle, 16- and 17-year-olds can pre-register even if they will not yet be 18 in an upcoming election, and become registered when eligible. For this year's survey, Michigan is reporting the new type of pre-registration figure, which leads to the lower



figure. Registrations for voters between 17.5 and 18 years are now considered registered, but they are ineligible to vote until their 18th birthday.

- [9] Nebraska law does not allow for pre-registrations of people not of voting age.
- [10] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
- [11] The introduction of online voter registration has greatly reduced the occurrence of duplicate, rejected, and invalid voter registrations.
- [12] Some counties were unable to report the total number in A3a according to the registration categories in A3b-i.
- [13] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [14] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and therefore is not required to collect data on rejected registrations.
- [15] Multiple changes may have occurred on the same form. A3a includes a total, but the total could be less. For example, a voter could have submitted one form to change their party and address. The data currently reflect that change as two forms. Counties do not receive forms for out-of-county address changes. Those numbers are reflected in new jurisdictions as new registrations.

Voter Registration Table 4: Voter List Maintenance — Confirmation Notices

State	Confirmation Notices Sent		Result of Confirmation Notice					
			Valid with No Address Update		Valid with Address Update		Invalid	
	Total	% of Active Voters	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	24,690	0.7%	30	0.1%	21,063	85.3%	--	--
Alaska [1]	101,382	17.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--
American Samoa	4,349	27.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Arizona [2]	7,543,039	172.7%	24,314	0.3%	21,197	0.3%	7,760	0.1%
Arkansas	491,272	36.1%	58,671	11.9%	3,929	0.8%	26,959	5.5%
California	3,906,035	17.1%	132,061	3.4%	87,725	2.2%	123,326	3.2%
Colorado	523,868	12.9%	3,283	0.6%	3,390	0.6%	11,399	2.2%
Connecticut	202,712	8.8%	19,936	9.8%	132,661	65.4%	14,953	7.4%
Delaware	56,820	7.7%	2,535	4.5%	3,876	6.8%	20,889	36.8%
District of Columbia	428,875	91.3%	23,204	5.4%	9,654	2.3%	27,360	6.4%
Florida [3]	3,017,064	21.5%	44,600	1.5%	81,013	2.7%	64,925	2.2%
Georgia	1,201,530	16.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	69,847	9.1%	54	0.1%	--	--	7	0.0%
Idaho [4]	265,771	22.5%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois [5]	3,804,086	46.9%	30,059	0.8%	24,558	0.6%	98,302	2.6%
Indiana [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	202,428	10.8%	395	0.2%	255	0.1%	33,826	16.7%
Kentucky [7]	97,539	3.0%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Louisiana [8]	557,900	20.4%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maine [9]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland [10]	1,559,430	36.9%	7,882	0.5%	2,949	0.2%	28,109	1.8%
Massachusetts [11]	580,433	13.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Michigan	330,598	4.5%	4,332	1.3%	17,952	5.4%	66,859	20.2%
Minnesota [12]	68,791	1.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	100,185	5.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [13]	441,184	10.8%	1,941	0.4%	183,766	41.7%	9,305	2.1%
Montana [14]	827,991	119.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nebraska	123,673	10.4%	4,082	3.3%	12,234	9.9%	18,573	15.0%
Nevada	360,619	17.6%	10,925	3.0%	829	0.2%	2,644	0.7%



State	Confirmation Notices Sent		Result of Confirmation Notice					
			Valid with No Address Update		Valid with Address Update		Invalid	
	Total	% of Active Voters	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
New Hampshire	11,521	1.1%	289	2.5%	47	0.4%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	417,183	6.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--
New Mexico	163,795	13.1%	126	0.1%	0	0.0%	21	0.0%
New York [15]	164,889	1.3%	12,713	7.7%	8,054	4.9%	20,714	12.6%
North Carolina [16]	707,618	10.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	3,007,458	42.6%	360,971	12.0%	317,413	10.6%	148,565	4.9%
Oklahoma [17]	326,603	15.6%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Oregon	357,959	11.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania [18]	1,038,074	12.3%	31,919	3.1%	27,168	2.6%	47,019	4.5%
Puerto Rico [19]	451,716	22.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Rhode Island	74,331	10.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Carolina [20]	167,212	4.9%	10,557	6.3%	--	--	3	0.0%
South Dakota	18,459	2.9%	1	0.0%	103	0.6%	209	1.1%
Tennessee	280,046	6.3%	2,542	0.9%	4,118	1.5%	13,569	4.8%
Texas	2,204,835	13.3%	74,446	3.4%	384,106	17.4%	55,454	2.5%
U.S. Virgin Islands [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah [22]	273,511	15.3%	5,407	2.0%	1,533	0.6%	4,903	1.8%
Vermont [23]	89,540	19.4%	22,556	25.2%	21,782	24.3%	45,202	50.5%
Virginia	521,339	8.8%	30,232	5.8%	24,603	4.7%	41,129	7.9%
Washington	1,148,793	22.9%	1,003	0.1%	4	0.0%	3,380	0.3%
West Virginia	88,475	7.9%	35,361	40.0%	18,096	20.5%	7,832	8.9%
Wisconsin [24]	1,265,435	32.2%	12,229	1.0%	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	39,670,903	19.5%	968,656	2.9%	1,414,078	4.4%	943,196	2.9%

State	Result of Confirmation Notice							
	Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable		Unreturned Confirmation Notices		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	3,597	14.6%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Alaska [1]	27,246	26.9%	48,367	47.7%	25,769	25.4%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	--	--	4,349	100.0%
Arizona [2]	277,349	3.7%	7,093,855	94.0%	118,564	1.6%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	41,354	8.4%	358,480	73.0%	--	--	1,879	0.4%
California	283,813	7.3%	2,773,307	71.0%	12,183	0.3%	493,620	12.6%
Colorado	15,953	3.0%	489,843	93.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
Connecticut	17,359	8.6%	23,869	11.8%	--	--	-6,066	-3.0%
Delaware	19,125	33.7%	10,395	18.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	84,318	19.7%	284,339	66.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Florida [3]	425,243	14.1%	2,174,425	72.1%	210,197	7.0%	16,661	0.6%
Georgia	--	--	--	--	--	--	1,201,530	100.0%
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	0	0.0%	69,786	99.9%	--	--	0	0.0%
Idaho [4]	83	0.0%	--	--	--	--	265,688	100.0%
Illinois [5]	69,197	1.8%	1,165,836	30.6%	47,902	1.3%	2,368,232	62.3%
Indiana [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	16,243	8.0%	--	--	--	--	151,709	74.9%
Kentucky [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--	97,539	100.0%
Louisiana [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	557,900	100.0%
Maine [9]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland [10]	--	--	1,520,490	97.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
Massachusetts [11]	--	--	--	--	--	--	580,433	100.0%
Michigan	72,203	21.8%	169,252	51.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
Minnesota [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	68,791	100.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	100,185	100.0%
Missouri [13]	62,723	14.2%	--	--	--	--	183,449	41.6%
Montana [14]	28,941	3.5%	799,050	96.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
Nebraska	17,859	14.4%	68,111	55.1%	2,814	2.3%	0	0.0%
Nevada	26,446	7.3%	75,443	20.9%	244,332	67.8%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	1,536	13.3%	9,649	83.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
New Jersey	--	--	--	--	--	--	417,183	100.0%
New Mexico	10,663	6.5%	152,985	93.4%	--	--	0	0.0%



State	Result of Confirmation Notice							
	Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable		Unreturned Confirmation Notices		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
New York [15]	9,666	5.9%	78,634	47.7%	--	--	35,108	21.3%
North Carolina [16]	258,582	36.5%	424,361	60.0%	24,675	3.5%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	191,023	6.4%	2,059,249	68.5%	70,656	2.3%	-140,419	-4.7%
Oklahoma [17]	50,748	15.5%	227,222	69.6%	48,633	14.9%	0	0.0%
Oregon	--	--	--	--	357,959	100.0%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania [18]	135,645	13.1%	318,154	30.6%	478,169	46.1%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico [19]	125,282	27.7%	320,506	71.0%	--	--	5,928	1.3%
Rhode Island	--	--	--	--	74,331	100.0%	0	0.0%
South Carolina [20]	2,135	1.3%	153,402	91.7%	1,115	0.7%	0	0.0%
South Dakota	12,525	67.9%	5,614	30.4%	7	0.0%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	144,997	51.8%	114,820	41.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	225,875	10.2%	973,033	44.1%	--	--	491,921	22.3%
U.S. Virgin Islands [21]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utah [22]	107	0.0%	71,787	26.2%	9,713	3.6%	180,061	65.8%
Vermont [23]	--	--	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Virginia	10,194	2.0%	415,181	79.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
Washington	15,560	1.4%	1,128,846	98.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
West Virginia	--	--	--	--	27,186	30.7%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [24]	227,174	18.0%	--	--	1,026,032	81.1%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
U.S. Total	2,910,764	8.4%	23,578,291	69.7%	2,780,237	10.6%	7,075,681	17.8%

Voter Registration Table 4 Calculation Notes:

- Confirmation Notices Sent, Total uses question A10a.
- Confirmation Notices Sent, % of Active Voters uses A10a/A1b x 100.
- Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid with No Address Update, Total uses question A10b.
- Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid with No Address Update, % uses A10b/A10a x 100.
- Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid with Address Update, Total uses question A10c.
- Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Valid with Address Update, % uses A10c/A10a x 100.
- Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, Total uses question A10d.
- Confirmation Notices Received From Voter, Invalid, % uses A10d/A10a x 100.
- Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, Total uses question A10e.

Confirmation Notices Returned Undeliverable, % uses $A10e/A10a \times 100$.

Unreturned Confirmation Notices, Total uses question A10f.

Unreturned Confirmation Notices, % uses $A10f/A10a \times 100$.

Other, Total uses the sum of questions A10g, A10h, and A10i.

Other, % uses $(A10g+A10h+A10i)/A10a \times 100$.

Not Categorized, Total uses $A10a - (\text{sum of } A10b \text{ to } A10i)$.

Not Categorized, % uses $(A10a - [\text{sum of } A10b \text{ to } A10i])/A10a \times 100$.

Voter Registration Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - Questions A10g, A10h, and A10i were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another confirmation notice status aside from those listed in questions A10b-A10f or if there were registration applications that could not be categorized in questions A10b-A10f.
 - Negative numbers in the Not Categorized confirmation notices category indicate that the sum of confirmation notices for each category accounted for more than the total number of confirmation notices reported by the state.
 - Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
 - Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each confirmation notice category.
 - States that are exempt from the NVRA are not required to send confirmation notices pursuant to the NVRA, although they may send confirmation notices (or other similar notices) pursuant to state law or practice. States that do not use confirmation notices typically use other sources of data to identify potentially ineligible voters.
 - The 2024 EAVS was the first survey year that data for valid confirmation notices returned from voters were categorized according to whether or not the notice required an address update. This change affected how states reported their registration data compared to previous EAVS years.
-
- [1] Returned and completed notices are totaled in A10 because Alaska does not track the number of notices that had a registration change versus no address change. Alaska merely tracks the total number of notices returned.
 - [2] Some jurisdictions are either unable to break down A10b and A10c or are unable to track returned notices confirming registration changes or updates.
 - [3] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
 - [4] Status of confirmation notices is not typically tracked in the system. Data on notices with an undeliverable status are included where available.
 - [5] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [6] Indiana's statewide voter registration system is unable to track the information on confirmation notices requested. Indiana is working to update the system to provide this information for future reporting.



- [7] At the time of the data submission, Kentucky had not yet finished scanning and categorizing the returned confirmation notices. Therefore, the only data reported are the number of notices sent.
- [8] Confirmation notices are sent pursuant to 52 USC § 20507(d)(2). The Department of State only collects the total number of sent confirmation notices.
- [9] The Maine elections division conducts mass confirmation notice mailings in compliance with NVRA. The last one was completed more than 90 days before the November 2022 general election. The next one is planned for 2025.
- [10] Data on confirmation notices returned undeliverable is reported with data on unreturned confirmation notices.
- [11] Massachusetts cannot provide data on the results of confirmation notices.
- [12] Data on confirmation notices are tracked when sent but not when returned.
- [13] Missouri does not track all the information requested.
- [14] Confirmation notices include voter registration confirmation cards sent to voters due to legislative redistricting. In 2021, Montana changed the list maintenance statute from every two years to annually. The totals reported include voter confirmation cards (VCC) sent to voters. In 2023 and 2024, Montana completed legislative redistricting, which caused most counties to send a new VCC to every registered voter.
- [15] Some jurisdictions were unable to provide complete data on confirmation notices.
- [16] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
- [17] Oklahoma tracks how many confirmation notices are sent, how many are returned from voters inside the county, how many are returned from voters outside the county, and how many are returned undeliverable or not returned. There is currently no way to track how many are returned with or without changes to the voter's address.
- [18] The figure reported in A10a includes, but is not limited to, initial notices sent to voters who appear to have moved based upon information received pursuant to the national change of address program and notices sent to voters whose voter registration card is returned as undeliverable.
- [19] Puerto Rico received 5,928 notices back from voters but does not have detailed information on how each voter specifically responded.
- [20] Confirmation status statistics are only tracked for notices that are sent because the voter failed to vote in the two most recent federal general elections and the voter had not made contact with the election office in the prescribed period.
- [21] The U.S. Virgin Islands sends confirmation notices to voters but was unable to report data.
- [22] Some counties were unable to provide data for A10b-f.
- [23] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [24] Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA; however, the state sent notices to voters who have not voted in a four-year period, as well as Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) mover mailings. Notices are sent to voters who register to vote or whose voter information may be out of date.

Voter Registration Table 5: Voter List Maintenance — Removal Actions

State	Voters Removed		Reason for Removal					
	Total	% of Reg. Voters	Moved Out of Jurisdiction		Voter Deceased		Failure to Return Confirmation Notice	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	114,647	3.0%	13,212	11.5%	90,402	78.9%	--	--
Alaska	48,917	8.0%	2,501	5.1%	10,572	21.6%	28,126	57.5%
American Samoa	1,316	8.3%	0	0.0%	153	11.6%	1,162	88.3%
Arizona	402,712	7.9%	87,870	21.8%	104,426	25.9%	158,095	39.3%
Arkansas	171,642	9.4%	9,151	5.3%	39,510	23.0%	115,820	67.5%
California	3,177,057	12.4%	938,602	29.5%	378,349	11.9%	1,704,720	53.7%
Colorado	389,334	8.5%	51,622	13.3%	104,494	26.8%	160,239	41.2%
Connecticut [1]	349,232	13.9%	170,008	48.7%	17,089	4.9%	--	--
Delaware	78,687	10.0%	37,387	47.5%	21,877	27.8%	11,391	14.5%
District of Columbia	133,044	21.7%	19,016	14.3%	8,876	6.7%	103,349	77.7%
Florida [2]	1,694,154	10.8%	898,199	53.0%	355,633	21.0%	323,306	19.1%
Georgia	466,063	5.7%	34,769	7.5%	146,022	31.3%	174,396	37.4%
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--	10,842	--
Hawaii	21,825	2.5%	2,285	10.5%	16,059	73.6%	0	0.0%
Idaho	31,659	2.7%	8,566	27.1%	17,783	56.2%	89	0.3%
Illinois [3]	1,002,943	11.2%	247,950	24.7%	181,969	18.1%	295,020	29.4%
Indiana [4]	888,506	18.4%	3,811	0.4%	0	0.0%	168,838	19.0%
Iowa	81,201	3.6%	22,504	27.7%	52,699	64.9%	--	--
Kansas	115,766	5.7%	10,756	9.3%	44,246	38.2%	52,254	45.1%
Kentucky	255,035	7.2%	10,926	4.3%	100,269	39.3%	127,436	50.0%
Louisiana	271,082	8.9%	103,533	38.2%	79,103	29.2%	52,569	19.4%
Maine	131,800	10.8%	101,771	77.2%	26,117	19.8%	--	--
Maryland	264,617	5.8%	44,869	17.0%	88,132	33.3%	123,312	46.6%
Massachusetts	742,265	14.4%	441,784	59.5%	93,758	12.6%	120,203	16.2%
Michigan	357,708	4.2%	37,942	10.6%	198,526	55.5%	96,900	27.1%
Minnesota	217,788	5.7%	74,237	34.1%	69,299	31.8%	72,894	33.5%
Mississippi	148,200	7.0%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	298,494	6.8%	38,260	12.8%	123,284	41.3%	114,107	38.2%
Montana	36,428	4.6%	10,164	27.9%	16,512	45.3%	4,206	11.5%
Nebraska	94,640	7.5%	43,841	46.3%	28,860	30.5%	18,299	19.3%
Nevada	191,396	8.5%	33,943	17.7%	42,620	22.3%	68,704	35.9%
New Hampshire	61,097	6.1%	29,754	48.7%	17,681	28.9%	--	--
New Jersey	287,971	4.3%	47,843	16.6%	111,692	38.8%	110,580	38.4%
New Mexico	108,388	7.7%	6,086	5.6%	29,516	27.2%	67,304	62.1%



State	Voters Removed		Reason for Removal					
	Total	% of Reg. Voters	Moved Out of Jurisdiction		Voter Deceased		Failure to Return Confirmation Notice	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
New York	952,635	7.0%	307,462	32.3%	192,580	20.2%	367,856	38.6%
North Carolina [5]	971,554	12.4%	485,075	49.9%	154,321	15.9%	265,661	27.3%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	716,258	8.9%	146,456	20.4%	191,848	26.8%	298,422	41.7%
Oklahoma	250,679	10.3%	101,027	40.3%	50,456	20.1%	83,719	33.4%
Oregon [6]	111,621	3.6%	11,513	10.3%	70,487	63.1%	4,417	4.0%
Pennsylvania	914,900	10.0%	409,148	44.7%	197,082	21.5%	279,578	30.6%
Puerto Rico	440,981	22.2%	314,420	71.3%	118,453	26.9%	--	--
Rhode Island	92,851	11.7%	10,036	10.8%	16,490	17.8%	60,757	65.4%
South Carolina	392,900	10.2%	198,974	50.6%	74,833	19.0%	110,141	28.0%
South Dakota	29,257	4.2%	1,359	4.6%	9,058	31.0%	13,964	47.7%
Tennessee	381,930	7.9%	189,099	49.5%	116,555	30.5%	61,499	16.1%
Texas	1,798,955	9.7%	86,732	4.8%	294,267	16.4%	451,140	25.1%
U.S. Virgin Islands	1,053	1.9%	83	7.9%	934	88.7%	0	0.0%
Utah [7]	17,196	0.8%	262	1.5%	--	--	45,342	263.7%
Vermont [8]	45,202	9.0%	0	0.0%	9,687	21.4%	23,397	51.8%
Virginia [9]	784,573	12.3%	536,460	68.4%	141,328	18.0%	61,151	7.8%
Washington	363,792	6.5%	35,506	9.8%	105,093	28.9%	124,595	34.2%
West Virginia	60,055	5.0%	8,441	14.1%	30,987	51.6%	17,606	29.3%
Wisconsin [10]	280,746	7.1%	77,937	27.8%	87,927	31.3%	90,000	32.1%
Wyoming	55,423	18.7%	960	1.7%	4,293	7.7%	49,911	90.1%
U.S. Total	21,298,175	9.1%	6,504,112	30.8%	4,482,207	21.2%	6,693,317	33.5%

State	Reason for Removal					
	Voter's Request		Felony or Conviction		Mental Incompetence	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	807	0.7%	5,079	4.4%	110	0.1%
Alaska	5,830	11.9%	1,888	3.9%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	--	--	1	0.1%	--	--
Arizona	37,389	9.3%	13,608	3.4%	687	0.2%
Arkansas	517	0.3%	3,474	2.0%	87	0.1%
California	31,898	1.0%	10,035	0.3%	2,441	0.1%
Colorado	60,643	15.6%	11,331	2.9%	--	--
Connecticut [1]	--	--	1,099	0.3%	--	--
Delaware	3,552	4.5%	3,432	4.4%	--	--
District of Columbia	--	--	--	--	--	--
Florida [2]	46,820	2.8%	45,064	2.7%	1,155	0.1%
Georgia	10,108	2.2%	45,145	9.7%	284	0.1%
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	2,255	10.3%	23	0.1%	0	0.0%
Idaho	--	--	681	2.2%	--	--
Illinois [3]	5,935	0.6%	3,608	0.4%	--	--
Indiana [4]	--	--	0	0.0%	--	--
Iowa	946	1.2%	4,957	6.1%	95	0.1%
Kansas	621	0.5%	1,782	1.5%	19	0.0%
Kentucky	2,435	1.0%	12,811	5.0%	1,158	0.5%
Louisiana	13,200	4.9%	5,013	1.8%	226	0.1%
Maine	616	0.5%	--	--	--	--
Maryland	4,452	1.7%	2,074	0.8%	28	0.0%
Massachusetts	9,055	1.2%	2,240	0.3%	--	--
Michigan	9,940	2.8%	--	--	--	--
Minnesota	--	--	--	--	--	--
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri	3,654	1.2%	13,773	4.6%	1,715	0.6%
Montana	2,196	6.0%	867	2.4%	1	0.0%
Nebraska	642	0.7%	2,814	3.0%	0	0.0%
Nevada	31,981	16.7%	515	0.3%	61	0.0%
New Hampshire	--	--	123	0.2%	--	--
New Jersey	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	185	0.2%	5,062	4.7%	--	--
New York	6,645	0.7%	5,662	0.6%	93	0.0%
North Carolina [5]	3,763	0.4%	23,530	2.4%	--	--
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Reason for Removal					
	Voter's Request		Felony or Conviction		Mental Incompetence	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	27,040	3.8%	8,930	1.2%	24	0.0%
Oklahoma	807	0.3%	3,184	1.3%	214	0.1%
Oregon [6]	24,648	22.1%	--	--	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	26,766	2.9%	46	0.0%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	606	0.1%
Rhode Island	3,107	3.3%	1,255	1.4%	4	0.0%
South Carolina	172	0.0%	7,411	1.9%	141	0.0%
South Dakota	632	2.2%	2,076	7.1%	1	0.0%
Tennessee	3,955	1.0%	8,572	2.2%	0	0.0%
Texas	11,974	0.7%	3,359	0.2%	831	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	36	3.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Utah [7]	--	--	--	--	--	--
Vermont [8]	2,714	6.0%	--	--	--	--
Virginia [9]	21,840	2.8%	22,680	2.9%	1,114	0.1%
Washington	73,581	20.2%	3,169	0.9%	322	0.1%
West Virginia	701	1.2%	1,503	2.5%	9	0.0%
Wisconsin [10]	824	0.3%	5,923	2.1%	1,956	0.7%
Wyoming	35	0.1%	62	0.1%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	494,917	2.6%	293,862	1.5%	13,382	0.1%

State	Reason for Removal					
	Duplicate Voter Registration Record		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	5,037	4.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Alaska	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Arizona	1	0.0%	636	0.2%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	2,958	1.7%	125	0.1%	0	0.0%
California	--	--	111,012	3.5%	0	0.0%
Colorado	1,005	0.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Connecticut [1]	--	--	--	--	161,036	46.1%
Delaware	1,048	1.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	1,803	1.4%	--	--	0	0.0%
Florida [2]	17,513	1.0%	6,483	0.4%	-19	0.0%
Georgia	52,406	11.2%	2,932	0.6%	1	0.0%
Guam	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hawaii	1,203	5.5%	--	--	0	0.0%
Idaho	181	0.6%	4,359	13.8%	0	0.0%
Illinois [3]	2,136	0.2%	258,976	25.8%	7,349	0.7%
Indiana [4]	--	--	1,836	0.2%	714,021	80.4%
Iowa	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Kansas	4,381	3.8%	1,707	1.5%	0	0.0%
Kentucky	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Louisiana	--	--	17,438	6.4%	0	0.0%
Maine	2,900	2.2%	396	0.3%	0	0.0%
Maryland	430	0.2%	1,320	0.5%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	46,361	6.2%	28,864	3.9%	0	0.0%
Michigan	--	--	14,400	4.0%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	1,358	0.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	148,200	100.0%
Missouri	793	0.3%	2,908	1.0%	0	0.0%
Montana	2,202	6.0%	280	0.8%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	0	0.0%	184	0.2%	0	0.0%
Nevada	12,903	6.7%	669	0.3%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	182	0.3%	13,357	21.9%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	2,866	1.0%	14,989	5.2%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	235	0.2%	--	--	0	0.0%
New York	21,270	2.2%	51,067	5.4%	0	0.0%
North Carolina [5]	4,600	0.5%	34,604	3.6%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--



State	Reason for Removal					
	Duplicate Voter Registration Record		Other		Not Categorized	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	37,425	5.2%	6,109	0.9%	4	0.0%
Oklahoma	8,230	3.3%	3,042	1.2%	0	0.0%
Oregon [6]	--	--	556	0.5%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania	957	0.1%	1,323	0.1%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	7,502	1.7%	--	--	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	1,202	1.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
South Carolina	1,152	0.3%	76	0.0%	0	0.0%
South Dakota	3	0.0%	2,146	7.3%	18	0.1%
Tennessee	2,250	0.6%	--	--	0	0.0%
Texas	915,981	50.9%	34,671	1.9%	0	0.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0.0%	--	--	0	0.0%
Utah [7]	--	--	160	0.9%	-28,568	-166.1%
Vermont [8]	9,404	20.8%	--	--	0	0.0%
Virginia [9]	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Washington	4,462	1.2%	17,064	4.7%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	808	1.3%	--	--	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [10]	--	--	16,179	5.8%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	--	--	162	0.3%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	1,175,148	8.1%	650,030	3.7%	1,002,042	4.7%

Voter Registration Table 5 Calculation Notes:

- Voters Removed, Total uses question A12a.
- Voters Removed, % of Reg. Voters uses A12a/A1a x 100.
- Moved Out of Jurisdiction, Total uses question A12b.
- Moved Out of Jurisdiction, % uses A12b/A12a x 100.
- Voter Deceased, Total uses question A12c.
- Voter Deceased, % uses A12c/A12a x 100.
- Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, Total uses question A12e.
- Failure to Return Confirmation Notice, % uses A12e/A12a x 100.
- Voter's Request, Total uses question A12g.
- Voter's Request, % uses question A12g/A12a x 100.
- Felony or Conviction, Total uses question A12d.
- Felony or Conviction, % uses A12d/A12a x 100.
- Mental Incompetence, Total uses question A12f.
- Mental Incompetence, % uses question A12f/A12a x 100.
- Duplicate Voter Registration Record, Total uses question A12h.
- Duplicate Voter Registration Record, % uses question A12h/A12a x 100.
- Other, Total uses the sum of questions A12i, A12j, and A12k.

Other, % uses $(A12i+A12j+A12k)/A12a \times 100$.

Not Categorized, Total uses $A12a - (\text{sum of } A12b \text{ to } A12k)$.

Not Categorized, % uses $(A12a - [\text{sum of } A12b \text{ to } A12k])/A12a \times 100$.

Voter Registration Table 5 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - Items that are displayed as a dash (–) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - Questions A12i, A12j, and A12k were not mandatory. States and jurisdictions only reported data in these items if there was another reason for registration removals aside from those listed in questions A12b-A12h or if there were registration removals that could not be categorized in questions A12b-A12h.
 - Negative numbers in the Not Categorized registration removals category indicate that the sum of registration removals for each category accounted for more than the total number of registration removals reported received by the state.
 - Because each percentage was calculated independently, the percentage of confirmation notices in each category may not sum to 100% for some states or at the national level.
 - Not all states track data to be able to provide responses for each registration removal category. In addition, not all states may remove registrations for the listed reason.
 - The 2024 EAVS was the first year that data on registrations removed for being duplicates were collected. This change affected how states reported their registration data compared to previous EAVS years.
-
- [1] The items not reported are data the state does not track.
 - [2] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
 - [3] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [4] The data reported in A12b-k consist of data from the ad hoc report (A12b-d, A12i-k) and the statewide voter registration system (A12e). Indiana provided the number of voter records cancelled due to being in inactive status for more than two federal general elections for question A12e. These statistics represent the majority of cancellations for this reason, based on the county user selecting the option to run this process in batch. County users have the option to also cancel voters one-by-one for this reason, but those statistics are not included in the counts for question A12e.
 - [5] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
 - [6] Duplicate voter registrations are merged into a single records, not cancelled. Voters convicted of a felony are inactivated and may update their registration once they have served their term of imprisonment. Inactivation prevents a ballot from being automatically mailed to a voter.
 - [7] Some counties do not track data on voter registration removals.
 - [8] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.



- [9] For clarification on Virginia's "Failure to Return Confirmation Notice" procedures, see Virginia Code § 24.2-428.2.
- [10] In Wisconsin, voters are only included in the data on voter registration removals if they remain removed as of the time the data for this report was pulled. Voters who were removed during the period and subsequently re-registered during the period are not included. Wisconsin is exempt from the NVRA and does not classify inactive voters per NVRA definitions. Only active voters are registered and eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Wisconsin's count of registered voters for this report includes military voters, even though they are not required to "register" in Wisconsin.

Chapter 4. Military and Overseas Voting in the 2024 General Election

Key Findings

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Section B collected data from states and municipalities on individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) during the 2024 federal general election. Election officials were asked a variety of questions relating to UOCAVA voting practices, including the total number of registered UOCAVA voters, the use of the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), the quantity and method of ballots transmitted to and returned by UOCAVA voters, and the use of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).¹ Notable findings from EAVS Section B include:

- Nearly half (48.8%) of registered UOCAVA voters held legal voting residence in four states: Florida (202,141), Virginia (174,315),² California (165,341), and Washington (124,410). Florida, Virginia, and Washington had more uniformed services members than overseas citizens; California had more overseas citizens than uniformed services members. More than 45% of EAVS jurisdictions had 10 or fewer registered UOCAVA voters and 91% of jurisdictions had at least one registered UOCAVA voter.
- Continuing a trend that began with the 2016 EAVS, overseas citizens made up a larger percentage of registered UOCAVA voters than did uniformed services members. In 2024, the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was more than double the number of ballots transmitted to voters who were uniformed services members.
- Email was the most popular mode for states to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters for the 2024 general election (52%), followed by postal mail (32.9%), and online systems (27%). The percentage of ballots transmitted via email dropped by about 10 percentage points from 2020 (62.3%).
- The majority (59.9%) of overseas citizens received their ballot via email, compared to just over a third of uniformed service members (38%). About 806,743 (68.4%) of transmitted ballots for the 2024 general election were returned to states. This is about 13% lower than the 911,614 returned ballots from 2020.
- Usage of the FWAB decreased by 19.1% compared to 2020. Usage of the FWAB resulted in an additional 20,065 UOCAVA voters' ballots being counted in the 2024 election, and 7,795 FWABs were not counted in the 2024 election. Of this number, 3,534 FWABs were not counted

¹ The response rate among local jurisdictions for EAVS Section B was 99.9%; this response rate excludes jurisdictions in Maine, which reported UOCAVA data at the state level and not the jurisdiction level, and Kalawao County in Hawaii, which has its elections administered by Maui County in Hawaii. One county in Arkansas and the Northern Mariana Islands did not provide Section B data. In addition, the response rate for individual items varied. Results reported in this chapter include only states for which data are available for a given question. State and national totals include all available jurisdiction-level data. National-level percentages reported in this chapter used casewise deletion.

² In 2024, Virginia discovered a flaw in its code query for past UOCAVA values that, when compared to those past values, creates the appearance of inflated 2024 values for Virginia.



because they were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.

Introduction

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) to collect data from states³ and to report on absentee voting by uniformed services members and overseas citizens.⁴ Since 2014, the EAC has fulfilled this reporting mandate in partnership with the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the agency designated to administer UOCAVA on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Through a memorandum of understanding between the EAC and FVAP, Section B of the EAVS is administered on behalf of both agencies. This agreement allows both the EAC and FVAP to fulfill congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voting while reducing the data collection and reporting burden on state and local election officials. States are required to report certain election data to the EAC after each federal election.⁵

This chapter examines UOCAVA data from the 2024 EAVS, including use of the FPCA by UOCAVA voters, ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by states, ballots returned by UOCAVA voters, UOCAVA ballots counted, UOCAVA ballots rejected, and usage of the FWAB by UOCAVA voters. Where appropriate, information about state laws and procedures related to UOCAVA voting that was collected as part of the EAC's 2024 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) is presented to provide context for the EAVS results. [Chapter 2](#) of this report contains a full analysis of UOCAVA data collected in the 2024 Policy Survey.

Federal Laws Regulating Military and Overseas Voting

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA)

UOCAVA protects the voting rights of active duty military members who are stationed away from their voting residence, the spouses and other eligible family of active duty military members, U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States, and other uniformed services members. UOCAVA requires all states, most territories, and the District of Columbia to allow these citizens to register to vote and to cast an absentee ballot for all federal elections.⁶ Many of the estimated 1.31 million active duty members and approximately 549,000 military spouses and voting-age dependents are

³ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term "state" can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and four U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Due to the Northern Mariana Islands not being covered under UOCAVA, data on UOCAVA voting are unavailable from this territory.

⁴ The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901. The EAC works with FVAP to collect comprehensive data from the states on all of the ballots sent and received by voters covered under UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(11)).

⁵ Section 703(a), HAVA amended section 102 of UOCAVA.

⁶ Throughout this report, the term "uniformed services voter" refers to U.S. citizens who are active members of the uniformed services or a spouse or dependent family member thereof. "Overseas citizen" refers to non-military U.S. citizens who reside overseas.

stationed away from their legal voting residence.⁷ For these Americans, as well as the estimated 2.8 million voting-age U.S. citizens who live, study, or work overseas,⁸ the absentee voting process is different from and can be more challenging than the voting process for non-military voters residing in the United States.

Citizens protected by UOCAVA include:

- Members of the uniformed services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force (including Space Force), Coast Guard, U.S. Public Health Service [USPHS] Commissioned Corps, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Commissioned Officer Corps) who are stationed away from their legal voting residence;
- Members of the U.S. Merchant Marine;
- Eligible family members of the above; and
- U.S. citizens residing outside of the United States

Among the challenges UOCAVA sought to address was the wide variability in rules and procedures governing registration and voting across states, which made it difficult for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to navigate the voting process.⁹ UOCAVA established the FPCA, which serves as a combination registration and ballot request application that is accepted in all U.S. states and territories. In addition, the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be cast by UOCAVA voters who make a timely request for, but do not receive, an absentee ballot generated by the jurisdiction.¹⁰ Although states and localities still maintain and administer elections according to their own laws and procedures for registration and absentee voting among uniformed services members and overseas citizens, the provisions of UOCAVA established some uniformity in the absentee voting process for these voters.

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009

Historically, UOCAVA ballots were transmitted from election offices to voters primarily through the mail. Given long mail transmission times and high mobility rates for this population of voters, this practice meant that many UOCAVA voters were unable to receive and return their absentee ballot before state ballot return deadlines. The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act amended UOCAVA to establish additional requirements to protect military and overseas citizens' voting rights.¹¹ These new rules required that all states, territories, and the District of Columbia provide UOCAVA voters with an option to request and receive registration and absentee ballot request materials electronically, directed states to establish an electronic means of transmitting

⁷ Information was provided by FVAP to Fors Marsh via email on March 14, 2025, and was current as of September 2024.

⁸ Federal Voting Assistance Program, "2022 Overseas Citizen Population Analysis," at fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/2022-OCPA-Report_Combined_Final_20230925.pdf. The 2024 Overseas Citizen Population Analysis (OCPA) was unavailable at the time of this report's publication.

⁹ The U.S. Department of Justice. (2023, April 5). *The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act*. justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act.

¹⁰ Section 103 of UOCAVA provides a mechanism for uniformed services members and overseas citizens to cast a FWAB (see 52 U.S.C. § 20303).

¹¹ Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 statutory language can be found at fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/moveact.pdf. State-specific information can be found at fvap.gov/guide.




blank ballots to UOCAVA voters, and required states to provide free access to a system whereby voters can verify the status of their ballot. Additionally, absentee ballots must be transmitted no less than 45 days before a federal election to all UOCAVA voters who submit an absentee ballot request before this deadline. These additional provisions aimed to ensure uniformed services members and overseas citizens not only have the right to vote, but that they have sufficient time to receive and return their absentee ballots ahead of state deadlines.

The UOCAVA Voting Process

Although the specific path may differ depending on the policies and procedures in one's state of voting residence and on a voter's particular situation and preferences, in general, the UOCAVA voting process can be summarized in seven basic steps, as illustrated in Figure 1.¹²

Figure 1. The UOCAVA Voting Process



1. Register and request an absentee ballot: UOCAVA-eligible citizens can do this either by completing a state application form or an FPCA, the federal form that functions as both a registration and absentee ballot request and is accepted in all states and U.S. territories.
2. Submit the registration and ballot request: Completed applications must be submitted to the appropriate state or local election office by mail or by an electronic means permitted by the state. All states accept FPCAs by mail; states may also accept FPCAs via email, fax, the state's online voter registration portal, or by another mode.
3. Application processing: Once received, registration and absentee ballot request applications are processed by the election office. If an application meets all requirements and is accepted, then it remains valid as a registration and ballot request. UOCAVA voters can use

¹² Adapted from an FVAP infographic. For more detailed information about state policies related to UOCAVA voting, see [Chapter 2](#) of this report.

the FPCA as a single ballot request form for all federal elections during the calendar year in which it is submitted. State laws vary on how long this request is valid beyond the initial year.

4. **Ballot transmission:** Election officials transmit absentee ballots to registered UOCAVA voters no later than 45 days before a federal election (ballots may be transmitted later if the ballot request is submitted by the state deadline but less than 45 days before an election).¹³ Ballots may be transmitted to a voter by mail or through some other state-approved electronic means of transmission, as requested by the voter.
5. **Complete and return absentee ballot:** UOCAVA voters complete and return their absentee ballot to the appropriate election office for processing. Ballots may be returned and submitted for processing either by mail or through some other electronic means allowed by a state.
6. **Ballot processing and counting:** Completed absentee ballots that are returned and submitted for counting to an election office must be received by state deadlines and meet other state requirements. State policies on when completed ballots must be postmarked and when they must be returned to an election office to be eligible to be counted vary widely.
7. **Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB):** The FWAB is an emergency or “back-up” ballot available for citizens covered under UOCAVA. It is used to vote in any election for federal offices and as otherwise permitted by state law. UOCAVA requires that to use a FWAB, a voter must be a member of the uniformed services or Merchant Marine (or eligible family member), or a U.S. citizen overseas who is absent from their place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to vote, and must not have received their requested regular absentee ballot from their state. Depending on state law, the FWAB may also be used to request voter registration and/or an absentee ballot.

UOCAVA stipulates that voters may also return the state-issued absentee ballot after returning the FWAB, as the state ballot may include state or local races or referenda. Only one ballot is counted for each voter.

UOCAVA Registration and Ballot Requests

For the 2024 general election, registered overseas citizens outnumbered registered uniformed services members covered by UOCAVA. Uniformed services members or their eligible family members accounted for 39.8% of registered UOCAVA voters and overseas citizens accounted for 59.3% of this population.¹⁴ This continues a trend that began with the 2016 general election.

¹³ The UOCAVA ballot transmission date is set by the MOVE Act of 2009. Because 45 days before a federal general election always falls on a Saturday, the day that UOCAVA ballots are transmitted on or before is what some refer to as “UOCAVA Saturday.”

¹⁴ The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2024 EAVS. The number of registered and eligible uniformed services UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1b; the percentage of uniformed services UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1b by B1a. The number of registered and eligible overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1c; the percentage of overseas citizen UOCAVA voters was calculated by dividing B1c by B1a. Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating the national percentage. In total, 739 jurisdictions in 12 states did not report data in B1; this count excludes jurisdictions in Maine, which reported UOCAVA data at the state level and not the jurisdiction level, and jurisdictions in North Dakota, as they do not use voter registration. A total of 16,060 registered and eligible voters reported in B1a were not classified as either uniformed services members or overseas citizens. These percentages exclude the 12 states that did not report the number of registered UOCAVA voters and the two states that did not subdivide this number by UOCAVA voter type.



Table 1. Nine Jurisdictions Accounted For 15.6% of All Registered UOCAVA Voters

Jurisdictions With More Than 15,000 UOCAVA Voters	
Jurisdiction	Number of Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters in 2024
Los Angeles County, CA	39,195
King County, WA	37,279
Fairfax County, VA	25,464
Virginia Beach City, VA	23,513
New York County, NY	18,704
Miami-Dade County, FL	18,561
Pierce County, WA	18,070
San Diego County, CA	16,184
Okaloosa County, FL	15,984

Source: Information on the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2024 EAVS.

Registered UOCAVA voters' legal voting residences¹⁵ are disproportionately concentrated in just a few U.S. states. In 2024, the states with the largest numbers of registered UOCAVA voters were Florida (202,141), Virginia (174,315),¹⁶ California (165,341), and Washington (124,410).¹⁷ Together, these four states represented 48.8% of all registered UOCAVA voters reported in the 2024 EAVS. Twenty-six local jurisdictions¹⁸ reported having 10,000 or more registered UOCAVA voters, and nine

¹⁵ According to FVAP's guidance for service members, "Your voting residence is within your state of legal residence or domicile. It is the address that you consider your permanent home and where you had a physical presence. Your state of legal residence is used for state income tax purposes, determines eligibility to vote for federal and state elections, and qualification for in-state tuition rates." For more information, see fvap.gov/military-voter/voting-residence.


¹⁶ Virginia noted in survey comments in its 2024 EAVS submission that the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in the state was underreported in previous years' submissions.

¹⁷ The total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters in a state was calculated by totaling B1a across all jurisdictions for each state.

¹⁸ What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2024 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 cities and townships in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao's data are included with Maui's data.

jurisdictions reported more than 15,000 registered and eligible UOCAVA voters. These nine jurisdictions, shown in Table 1, accounted for 15.6% of all registered UOCAVA voters.

Figure 2. Most Jurisdictions Had Fewer Than 50 Registered UOCAVA Voters



Source: Information for the number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters was collected in item B1a of the 2024 EAVS.

Conversely, of the 5,173 local jurisdictions for which the number of registered UOCAVA voters was available, 81% reported fewer than 100 registered UOCAVA voters, including 449 (8.7%) jurisdictions that reported having zero UOCAVA voters. Figure 2 shows the number of registered UOCAVA voters by jurisdiction.


Election offices reported receiving 621,957 FPCAs ahead of the 2024 general election, which was a notable decline from the 764,691 FPCAs that states reported receiving ahead of the last presidential general election in 2020. Overall, 22.3% of these registration and absentee ballot requests came from uniformed services members, and 75.4% were submitted by overseas citizens.¹⁹ States reported rejecting 2.7% of the FPCAs received — 23.2% of these were rejected because the

¹⁹ Data on the total number of FPCAs submitted were collected in item B2a of the 2024 EAVS. For 2024, the percentage of FPCAs received from uniformed services members was calculated as B2b/B2a x 100. The percentage of FPCAs received from overseas citizens was calculated as B2c/B2a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages.



election office received the form after their state’s absentee ballot request deadline.²⁰ The FPCA rejection rate among uniformed services members was slightly higher than among overseas citizens (although not to a statistically significant degree), with 3.9% of military FPCAs rejected compared to 2.3% of FPCAs submitted by overseas citizens.²¹

Figure 3. Steady Increase in the Percentage of UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted to Overseas Citizens Relative to Uniformed Services Members Since 2014



Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as B1b/B1a x 100 for 2014 and 2016, and B5b/B5a x 100 for 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as B1c/B1a x 100 for 2014 and 2016, and B5c/B5a x 100 for 2018, 2020, 2022, and 2024. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages; percentages may not total 100% for each year.

²⁰ The total number of FPCAs rejected was collected in item B3a in the 2024 EAVS; the percentage of FPCAs rejected was calculated as B3a/B2a x 100. The percentage of FPCAs rejected because they were received late was calculated as B4a/B3a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.

²¹ The percentage of rejected FPCAs from uniformed services voters was calculated as B3b/B2b. The percentage of rejected FPCAs from overseas citizens was calculated as B3c/B2c. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages.

Of the UOCAVA ballots transmitted, 26.3% were sent to uniformed services members and 70.7% were transmitted to overseas citizens.²² Figure 3 shows that the percentage of ballots transmitted to overseas citizens has continued to rise steadily over the last several election cycles, increasing by 18.9 percentage points since the 2016 general election and by 10.6 percentage points since the last presidential general election in 2020.

UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted

In 2024, election offices in 49 states, four U.S. territories,²³ and the District of Columbia reported transmitting 1,327,324 ballots to UOCAVA voters.²⁴ Seven states transmitted 50,000 or more UOCAVA ballots: Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington.

Although the nationwide percentage of ballots sent to overseas citizens was greater than the percentage sent to uniformed services members, the proportion of ballots sent to overseas citizens or uniformed services members varied by state. Alaska, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, and Washington reported that the majority of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed service members. However, most other states reported the majority of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens, with Alabama, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont all reporting that more than 90% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to overseas citizens. American Samoa and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported that more than 99% of UOCAVA ballots were transmitted to uniformed services voters. Figure 4 shows the percentage of ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters versus overseas citizens by states.

Modes of UOCAVA Ballot Transmission

Over the last several election cycles, the modes by which absentee ballots have been transmitted to voters have changed substantially. Since the passage of the MOVE Act, transmission of ballots to UOCAVA voters has increasingly occurred electronically. Email was the most popular method of ballot transmission for the 2024 general election, with 52% of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters via email, 32.9% transmitted via postal mail, 27% transmitted through online systems, and 0.3% sent to voters through some other mode of transmission.²⁵ By comparison,

²² The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as $B5b/B5a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as $B5c/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level when calculating national percentages. An additional 3% of the transmitted ballots could not be classified by voter type.


²³ Iowa did not report data on the number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters in the 2024 EAVS.

²⁴ The number of transmitted UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B5a of the 2024 EAVS. The number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters was reported by 5,859 of 6,461 jurisdictions.

²⁵ The percentage of ballots transmitted by email was calculated as $B7a/B5a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of ballots transmitted by postal mail was calculated as $B6a/B5a \times 100$. The percentage of ballots transmitted by online systems was calculated as $B9a/B5a \times 100$. Because less than 1% of ballots were transmitted by fax, the percentage of ballots transmitted by fax were combined with those transmitted by other methods and calculated as $(B8a+B10a)/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate national percentages. When combining results of ballots transmitted by fax and transmitted through other means, any state that did not report information for ballots transmitted through other means was assumed to have answered with zero ballots.




Figure 4. Nine States Transmitted More UOCAVA Ballots to Uniformed Services Members Than to Overseas Citizens



Source: The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to overseas citizens was calculated as $B5c/B5a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters was calculated as $B5b/B5a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of uncategorized ballots was calculated as $(B5a-B5b-B5c)/B5a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages; percentages may not total 100%. Iowa did not report data on the number of ballots transmitted. Connecticut is not included because the state did not break down ballot transmissions by UOCAVA population.

during the previous presidential election cycle in 2020, among states that provided data on transmission by mode, 62.3% of ballots were transmitted via email, with 32% of UOCAVA ballots transmitted via postal mail. Figure 5 displays the percentage of ballots transmitted by mail, email, or other modes for the 2024 general election.

Figure 5. Modes of Ballot Transmission Differ for Overseas Citizens and Uniformed Services Members



Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted overall were calculated as $B7a/B5a \times 100$ for email, $B6a/B5a \times 100$ for postal mail, $B9a/B5a \times 100$ for online modes, and $(B8a+B10a)/B5a \times 100$ for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted to uniformed services voters were calculated as $B7b/B5b \times 100$ for email, $B6b/B5b \times 100$ for postal mail, $B9b/B5b \times 100$ for online modes, and $(B8b+B10b)/B5b \times 100$ for other modes. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots transmitted for overseas citizens were calculated as $B7c/B5c \times 100$ for email, $B6c/B5c \times 100$ for postal mail, $B9c/B5c \times 100$ for online modes, and $(B8c+B10c)/B5c \times 100$ for other modes. Other modes included ballots transmitted by fax (B8c) because less than 1% of ballots were transmitted by this mode. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages; percentages may not total 100%.

Modes of ballot transmission differed based on UOCAVA voter type. Uniformed services members preferred postal transmission (52.1%) to email transmission (38%), whereas 16.4% received ballots via online systems. For ballots transmitted to overseas citizens, most ballots were transmitted by email (59.9%) while ballots transmitted by online systems accounted for 31.2%, and 27% were transmitted by postal mail.



Overall, 0.8% of all ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters were returned as undeliverable, including mailed ballots returned to sender, emailed ballots that bounced back, and ballots that were undeliverable by other modes, such as being sent to an incorrect fax number.²⁶

UOCAVA Ballots Returned and Submitted for Counting

States reported 806,743 regular absentee ballots²⁷ being returned and submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters for the 2024 election, comprising 68.4% of transmitted UOCAVA ballots.²⁸ This is a decrease of 13 percentage points from 2020, when 911,614 regular absentee ballots were returned by UOCAVA voters.²⁹ The UOCAVA ballot return rate does not show any type of geographic or regional pattern.

Of the ballots returned to election offices, 27.7% were returned by uniformed services members and 71.1% were returned by overseas citizens.³⁰ Overall, 65.8% of absentee ballots returned and submitted for counting by UOCAVA voters were returned to the election office via postal mail, 31.6% were returned via online systems, 27% were returned by email, 9.5% were returned by fax, and 5.2% were returned through some other mode.³¹ Data on mail ballot returns were unavailable in or not provided by seven states. Among the states that reported UOCAVA ballots returned by email, 27% of ballots were returned through email, and 51.6% were returned via postal mail.³²

²⁶ The percentage of ballots returned as undeliverable was calculated as $B17a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate the national percentage. States and jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they can capture and report undeliverable ballots, both overall and by mode of transmission.

²⁷ Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, and Puerto Rico did not report data on the number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters in the 2024 EAVS.

²⁸ The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B11a in the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned was calculated as $B11a/B5a \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to calculate the national percentage. FWABs were reported separately from regular UOCAVA absentee ballots and were not included in these figures. Because more than one ballot may be transmitted to an individual voter (e.g., because the original was returned undeliverable or was spoiled and replaced), this rate likely underestimates the rate of ballot return by UOCAVA voters.


²⁹ The total number of returned UOCAVA ballots was collected in item B9a for the 2020 EAVS. The change in absentee ballots being returned from 2020 to 2024 was calculated as $(B9a [2020] - B11a [2024])/B11a [2024] \times 100$.

³⁰ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services members was calculated as $B11b/B11a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizens was calculated as $B11c/B11a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate national percentages.

³¹ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail was calculated as $B12a/B11a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email was calculated as $B13a/B11a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by fax was calculated as $B14a/B11a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned via online systems was calculated as $B15a/B11a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by some other mode was calculated as $B16a/B11a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating these percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%.

³² Twenty-six states reported at least one email ballot returned (item B13a in the 2024 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by email was calculated as $B13a/B11a \times 100$ among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B13a in the 2024 EAVS). The percentage of ballots returned by mail was calculated as $B12a/B11a \times 100$ among states reporting at least one email ballot returned (item B13a in 2024 EAVS). Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate these percentages.

Figure 6. Majorities of UOCAVA Voters Use Postal Mail as the Primary Mode of Ballot Return



Source: The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode overall were calculated as $B12a/B11a \times 100$ for postal mail and $B13a/B11a \times 100$ for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for overseas citizens were calculated as $B12c/B11c \times 100$ for postal mail and $B13c/B11c \times 100$ for email. The percentages of UOCAVA ballots returned by mode for uniformed services members were calculated as $B12b/B11b \times 100$ for postal mail and $B13b/B11b \times 100$ for email. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages, and because percentages for each type of voter and each mode of return were calculated independently — and only states that reported data for a given mode of return were included in the analysis — the percentages do not total 100%. Other modes of ballot return are not shown here.

Although postal mail was the most common mode of ballot return for both uniformed services members and overseas citizens, uniformed services members used email return far less than overseas citizens, with just 10.8% using email to return an absentee ballot compared to 36.3% of overseas citizens.³³ Figure 6 displays the method of ballot return for UOCAVA voters by type.

Among states that reported data on UOCAVA ballots both transmitted and returned by voters, 772,579 of the regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters were counted in the 2024

³³ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by uniformed services members was calculated as $B13b/B11b \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned by email by overseas citizens was calculated as $B13c/B11c \times 100$. Of note, three of the states with the largest numbers of UOCAVA voters — California, Florida, and Virginia — do not allow email return of absentee ballots. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to calculate the national percentages.



general election.³⁴ Of these votes, 69.7% were cast by overseas citizens and 27.5% by uniformed services voters.³⁵ The overall rejection rate for regular absentee ballots returned by UOCAVA voters was 3.7%, a 77% increase from the 2.1% reported in 2020. The overall rejection rate did not differ significantly across UOCAVA voter types.³⁶

Figure 7 shows the percentage of UOCAVA ballots received that were rejected in each state. The states that are colored in dark blue represent the states that reported the highest percentage of rejected ballots, and the states that are colored in light blue reported the lowest percentage of rejected ballots. Rejection rates were highest in Mid-Atlantic states like Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania, in southern states including Arkansas and Louisiana, and in mountain states such as Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wyoming.

Rejected ballots were divided into four reasons for rejection: missed deadline, problem with voter signature, lacked postmark, and other reasons.³⁷ By far, the most common reason for rejection was that a ballot was received after a state's deadline for UOCAVA absentee ballot receipt. Of the 30,401 returned UOCAVA ballots rejected, 14,370 were rejected because they were received after the state deadline, which was 49% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections.³⁸ Voter signature problems were responsible for 16.2% of all UOCAVA ballot rejections, 2.3% of ballot rejections were the result of postmark issues, and 34.6% of rejections were caused by some other issue.³⁹

Uniformed services members' and overseas citizens' UOCAVA ballots were rejected for similar reasons. Missing the deadline was the most common reason for rejection among both populations — 56.4% for uniformed services members and 46.4% for overseas citizens. Signature

³⁴ Alabama and Puerto Rico were excluded from the reported total number of counted UOCAVA ballots in this section because these states did not provide data on the number of UOCAVA ballots returned in B11a. Alabama reported counting 131,961 and Puerto Rico reported counting 803 regular UOCAVA absentee ballots in B18a.

³⁵ The total number of UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters and counted was collected in item B18a of the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of ballots that were returned by overseas citizens was calculated as $B18c/B18a \times 100$. The percentage of ballots that were returned by uniformed services members was calculated as $B18b/B18a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate national percentages. An additional 153,727 (2.8%) UOCAVA absentee ballots counted were not classified by voter type.


³⁶ The rejection rate for UOCAVA ballots was calculated as $B24a/B11a \times 100$ for the 2024 EAVS and $B18a/B9a$ for the 2020 EAVS. The percentage of ballots rejected from uniformed services voters was calculated as $B24b/B11b \times 100$. The percentage of ballots rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as $B24c/B11c \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages. The rejection rate for returned ballots was 3.3% for uniformed services members, 3.9% for overseas citizens, and 3.2% among rejected ballots not classified by voter type.

³⁷ Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Puerto Rico did not report the number of ballots rejected. The number of ballots rejected was reported for 72.5% of jurisdictions nationwide. Most of these jurisdictions also subdivided rejected ballots by reason for rejection.

³⁸ The total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received after the state deadline was item B25a of the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for being received late was calculated as $B25a/B24a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate the national percentage.

³⁹ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of signature issues was calculated as $B26a/B24a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of postmark issues was calculated as $B27a/B24a \times 100$. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons was calculated as $B28a/B24a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate the national percentages.

Figure 7. UOCAVA Ballot Rejection Rates Vary Significantly Across States



Source: The percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were rejected includes regular UOCAVA absentee ballots that were rejected (item B24a in the 2024 EAVS) divided by the total number of regular UOCAVA absentee ballots received (item B11a in the 2024 EAVS). Cutoff points in the graph are quartiles.

issues were the cause of 23.2% of ballot rejections for ballots returned by uniformed services members and 13.4% of ballot rejections for overseas citizens.⁴⁰

Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots

If a regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time for a UOCAVA individual to vote, then the FWAB functions as a backup ballot that can be used to vote for all federal offices and, in some states, state and local offices as well.

⁴⁰ The percentage of UOCAVA ballots from uniformed service members rejected because of signature issues was calculated as B26b/B24b x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected from uniform service members because of postmark issues was calculated as B27b/B24b x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected from uniformed service members for other reasons was calculated as B28b/B24b x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots from overseas citizens rejected because of signature issues was calculated as B26c/B24c x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected from overseas citizens because of postmark issues was calculated as B27c/B24c x 100. The percentage of UOCAVA ballots rejected from overseas citizens for other reasons was calculated as B28c/B24c x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.



The Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB)

The FWAB is a special type of UOCAVA ballot that may be used as a backup in the event that a voter's regular absentee ballot does not arrive in time to vote. In most states, a UOCAVA voter must have registered and requested an absentee ballot in order to use the FWAB.

The 28,140 FWABs submitted in 2024 made up a relatively small proportion (3.6%) of all the UOCAVA ballots returned and represented a 17.4% decrease in the volume of FWABs reported compared to the 2020 election.⁴¹ FWAB usage remains a relatively small proportion of the UOCAVA methods of voting among both uniformed services members and overseas citizens. However, the FWAB resulted in 20,065 additional UOCAVA voters' ballots being counted in the 2024 general election, with 23% of these additional voters being from uniformed services members and 74.6% being from overseas citizens.⁴² No territory reported receiving FWABs during the 2024 presidential election.⁴³

More than one-quarter (7,795 or 27.7%) of the 28,140 FWABs submitted in the 2024 general election were not counted. Of these, 3,534 FWABs — 40.9% of the rejected FWABs — were replaced by a regular absentee ballot, making the backup ballot unnecessary.⁴⁴ The rate of uncounted FWABs returned by uniformed services members (40.9%) was nearly double the rate of uncounted FWABs returned by overseas citizens (23.2%).⁴⁵ The other major reason FWABs went

⁴¹ The percentage of all ballots returned that were FWABs was calculated as $(B29a/(B11a+B29a)) \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate the national percentage. The total number of FWABs received was collected in item B29a in the 2024 EAVS and in item B23a for the 2020 EAVS. In 2020, states reported receiving 33,027 FWABs. For 2024, the total number of FWABs returned was based on the 76.1% of jurisdictions for which this information was available. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina, and Vermont reported FWABs with regular UOCAVA ballots because they could not separate the two types.

⁴² The total number of FWABs counted was item B30a of the 2024 EAVS. The number of FWABs counted from uniformed services members was item B30b, and the number of FWABs counted from overseas citizens was item B30c. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by uniformed services members was calculated as $B30b/B30a \times 100$. The percentage of counted FWABs returned by overseas citizens was calculated as $B30c/B30a \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate the national percentages.

⁴³ American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands reported receiving zero FWABs. The Northern Mariana Islands did not report data on FWABs because this territory is not covered under UOCAVA.

⁴⁴ The number of FWABs rejected because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted was item B32a of the 2024 EAVS. The percentage of FWABs that were rejected for this reason was calculated as $B32a/(B31a+B32a+B33a) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to calculate the national percentage.

⁴⁵ The total percentage of FWABs rejected was calculated as $(B31a+B32a+B33a)/B29a \times 100$. The percentage of FWABs rejected from uniformed services members was calculated as $(B31b+B32b+B33b)/B29b \times 100$. The percentage of FWABs rejected from overseas citizens was calculated as $(B31c+B32c+B33c)/B29c \times 100$. Casewise deletion was used at the state level to calculate the national percentages.

uncounted (and the only other reason states reported via the EAVS) was because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline (17% of rejected FWABs).⁴⁶

⁴⁶ The percentage of FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the deadline was calculated as $B31a / (B31a + B32a + B33a) \times 100$. Casewise deletion at the state level was used to calculate the national percentage.



Appendix A: Descriptive Tables

UOCAVA Table 1: Registered and Eligible UOCAVA Voters

State	Registered UOCAVA Voters						
	All UOCAVA Voters	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska [1]	12,630	8,395	66.5%	4,235	33.5%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	149	148	99.3%	1	0.7%	0	0.0%
Arizona	22,232	6,203	27.9%	16,029	72.1%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	2,778	1,019	36.7%	1,759	63.3%	0	0.0%
California	165,341	32,387	19.6%	132,933	80.4%	21	0.0%
Colorado	62,753	21,243	33.9%	41,510	66.1%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	2,125	182	8.6%	1,943	91.4%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	5,878	149	2.5%	5,729	97.5%	0	0.0%
Florida [2]	202,141	124,197	61.4%	77,944	38.6%	0	0.0%
Georgia	24,088	7,813	32.4%	16,275	67.6%	0	0.0%
Guam	139	40	28.8%	99	71.2%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	4,346	390	9.0%	3,956	91.0%	0	0.0%
Idaho	5,668	2,560	45.2%	2,894	51.1%	214	3.8%
Illinois [3]	32,134	4,381	13.6%	27,623	86.0%	130	0.4%
Indiana	8,615	1,679	19.5%	6,936	80.5%	0	0.0%
Iowa	4,299	--	--	--	--	4,299	100.0%
Kansas	5,644	1,419	25.1%	4,224	74.8%	1	0.0%
Kentucky	6,027	2,543	42.2%	3,484	57.8%	0	0.0%
Louisiana	6,641	2,629	39.6%	4,012	60.4%	0	0.0%
Maine [4]	6,817	930	13.6%	5,887	86.4%	0	0.0%
Maryland	24,452	5,110	20.9%	19,342	79.1%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	27,611	822	3.0%	26,789	97.0%	0	0.0%
Michigan	26,734	5,188	19.4%	21,546	80.6%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	17,656	2,870	16.3%	14,786	83.7%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [5]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana	5,678	2,124	37.4%	3,554	62.6%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	2,728	709	26.0%	2,019	74.0%	0	0.0%
Nevada	12,913	3,935	30.5%	8,978	69.5%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	7,113	1,507	21.2%	5,606	78.8%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	30,046	2,328	7.7%	27,718	92.3%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	6,641	1,933	29.1%	4,708	70.9%	0	0.0%

State	Registered UOCAVA Voters						
	All UOCAVA Voters	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
New York	64,574	3,328	5.2%	61,246	94.8%	0	0.0%
North Carolina [6]	38,276	13,984	36.5%	24,292	63.5%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio [7]	19,839	4,609	23.2%	14,450	72.8%	780	3.9%
Oklahoma	6,191	3,412	55.1%	2,779	44.9%	0	0.0%
Oregon	21,939	4,499	20.5%	17,440	79.5%	0	0.0%
Pennsylvania [8]	36,114	7,477	20.7%	28,637	79.3%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico [9]	1,464	833	56.9%	631	43.1%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	3,561	228	6.4%	3,333	93.6%	0	0.0%
South Carolina	10,398	3,702	35.6%	6,696	64.4%	0	0.0%
South Dakota	3,488	1,367	39.2%	2,121	60.8%	0	0.0%
Tennessee	14,216	6,960	49.0%	7,256	51.0%	0	0.0%
Texas	65,876	21,460	32.6%	35,153	53.4%	9,263	14.1%
U.S. Virgin Islands	5	1	20.0%	4	80.0%	0	0.0%
Utah	7,094	898	12.7%	4,844	68.3%	1,352	19.1%
Vermont [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [11]	174,315	133,379	76.5%	40,936	23.5%	0	0.0%
Washington	124,410	71,869	57.8%	52,541	42.2%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	1,753	659	37.6%	1,094	62.4%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin	26,767	17,557	65.6%	9,210	34.4%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	1,827	816	44.7%	1,011	55.3%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	1,364,124	541,871	39.8%	806,193	59.3%	16,060	1.2%

UOCAVA Table 1 Calculation Notes:

All UOCAVA Voters uses question B1a.

Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B1b.

Uniformed Services Members, % uses B1b/B1a x 100.

Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B1c.

Overseas Citizens, % uses B1c/B1a x 100.

Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B1a-(B1b+B1c).

Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B1a-[B1b+B1c])/B1a x 100.



UOCAVA Table 1 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.

- [1] Data reported in B1 also include voters who had an incomplete application but indicated UOCAVA status.
- [2] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
- [3] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
- [4] UOCAVA records are maintained centrally by the state, not by municipalities.
- [5] Missouri's database does not store information breaking down uniformed versus non-military status UOCAVA voters.
- [6] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
- [7] Some counties were unable to distinguish between different UOCAVA voter types.
- [8] Pennsylvania does not register voters as UOCAVA voters. Eligibility for the UOCAVA protections is identified based on voters' ballot applications.
- [9] In addition to UOCAVA categories — uniformed services members, eligible dependents, U.S. Merchant Marine members, and overseas civilian voters — Puerto Rico also provides absentee voting options for voters who are physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day but are not classified as overseas citizens. This includes Puerto Rico residents who are temporarily in the United States for work, study, or other personal reasons but maintain their official residence in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico does not have specific data exclusively related to UOCAVA voters. However, UOCAVA voters have more rights and protections under federal law compared to Puerto Rico residents who are physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day but are not classified as overseas citizens. Although both groups can vote absentee, UOCAVA voters are entitled to additional safeguards under UOCAVA, including extended deadlines and alternative ballot transmission methods. The responses are exclusively related to UOCAVA voters and do not include non-UOCAVA citizens who were physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day.
- [10] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [11] Virginia discovered in 2024 a flaw in its code query for past years' UOCAVA values that, when compared to those past values, creates the appearance of inflated 2024 values.

UOCAVA Table 2: Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA)

State	FPCAs Received						
	Total	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	2,191	924	42.2%	1,267	57.8%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	7	7	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Arizona	22,461	6,275	27.9%	16,186	72.1%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	313	153	48.9%	160	51.1%	0	0.0%
California	80,510	14,470	18.0%	65,958	81.9%	82	0.1%
Colorado [1]	11,518	1,012	8.8%	10,506	91.2%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	2,125	182	8.6%	1,943	91.4%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	5,897	136	2.3%	5,761	97.7%	0	0.0%
Florida [2]	37,392	12,808	34.3%	24,584	65.7%	0	0.0%
Georgia [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	70	17	24.3%	53	75.7%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	4,318	386	8.9%	3,932	91.1%	0	0.0%
Idaho [4]	3,085	795	25.8%	2,290	74.2%	0	0.0%
Illinois [5]	24,856	3,264	13.1%	21,426	86.2%	166	0.7%
Indiana	8,336	1,606	19.3%	6,730	80.7%	0	0.0%
Iowa [6]	4,299	--	--	--	--	4,299	100.0%
Kansas	5,660	1,423	25.1%	4,236	74.8%	1	0.0%
Kentucky	5,275	3,962	75.1%	1,313	24.9%	0	0.0%
Louisiana [7]	814	--	--	--	--	814	100.0%
Maine [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	24,351	5,110	21.0%	19,241	79.0%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	21,894	477	2.2%	21,417	97.8%	0	0.0%
Michigan	20,174	2,640	13.1%	17,534	86.9%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	17,672	2,847	16.1%	14,825	83.9%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	2,081	1,128	54.2%	961	46.2%	-8	-0.4%
Missouri [9]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana [10]	5,093	3,213	63.1%	1,880	36.9%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	2,627	667	25.4%	1,960	74.6%	0	0.0%
Nevada	11,691	3,182	27.2%	8,509	72.8%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	1,440	289	20.1%	1,151	79.9%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	29,001	1,984	6.8%	27,017	93.2%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	3,479	1,056	30.4%	2,423	69.6%	0	0.0%
New York	37,571	2,268	6.0%	35,303	94.0%	0	0.0%



State	FPCAs Received						
	Total	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
		Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Carolina [11]	34,091	12,073	35.4%	22,018	64.6%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	383	127	33.2%	256	66.8%	0	0.0%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	21,095	6,864	32.5%	13,438	63.7%	793	3.8%
Oklahoma	5,468	2,919	53.4%	2,549	46.6%	0	0.0%
Oregon [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	31,937	5,934	18.6%	26,003	81.4%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	39	23	59.0%	16	41.0%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	2,630	228	8.7%	2,402	91.3%	0	0.0%
South Carolina [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	257	110	42.8%	121	47.1%	26	10.1%
Tennessee	12,853	5,941	46.2%	6,912	53.8%	0	0.0%
Texas	69,232	20,676	29.9%	38,069	55.0%	10,487	15.1%
U.S. Virgin Islands	20	5	25.0%	15	75.0%	0	0.0%
Utah	4,027	174	4.3%	844	21.0%	3,009	74.7%
Vermont [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [15]	32,625	8,159	25.0%	24,466	75.0%	0	0.0%
Washington	3,764	502	13.3%	3,262	86.7%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	1,154	437	37.9%	717	62.1%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [16]	5,257	477	9.1%	4,780	90.9%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	924	409	44.3%	515	55.7%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	621,957	137,339	22.3%	464,949	75.4%	19,669	3.2%

State	FPCAs Rejected							
	Total	% of FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	52	2.4%	24	2.6%	28	2.2%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--	0	--
Arizona	91	0.4%	21	0.3%	70	0.4%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	5	1.6%	6	3.9%	2	1.3%	-3	-60.0%
California	7,233	9.0%	2,694	18.6%	4,472	6.8%	67	0.9%
Colorado [1]	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
District of Columbia	130	2.2%	3	2.2%	127	2.2%	0	0.0%
Florida [2]	1,271	3.4%	203	1.6%	652	2.7%	416	32.7%
Georgia [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	32	45.7%	8	47.1%	24	45.3%	0	0.0%
Hawaii	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois [5]	81	0.3%	26	0.8%	49	0.2%	6	7.4%
Indiana	72	0.9%	21	1.3%	51	0.8%	0	0.0%
Iowa [6]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	14	0.2%	3	0.2%	11	0.3%	0	0.0%
Kentucky	632	12.0%	262	6.6%	370	28.2%	0	0.0%
Louisiana [7]	3	0.4%	--	--	--	--	3	100.0%
Maine [8]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maryland	44	0.2%	15	0.3%	29	0.2%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Michigan	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	280	1.6%	59	2.1%	221	1.5%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [9]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Montana [10]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nebraska	108	4.1%	51	7.6%	57	2.9%	0	0.0%
Nevada	35	0.3%	11	0.3%	24	0.3%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
New Jersey	9	0.0%	2	0.1%	7	0.0%	0	0.0%
New Mexico	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
New York	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
North Carolina [11]	91	0.3%	34	0.3%	57	0.3%	0	0.0%



State	FPCAs Rejected							
	Total	% of FPCAs Received	Uniformed Services Members		Overseas Citizens		Not Categorized by Voter Type	
			Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
North Dakota	42	11.0%	19	15.0%	23	9.0%	0	0.0%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	1,286	6.1%	529	7.7%	726	5.4%	31	2.4%
Oklahoma	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
Oregon [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	153	0.5%	37	0.6%	116	0.4%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	23	59.0%	12	52.2%	11	68.8%	0	0.0%
Rhode Island	4	0.2%	0	0.0%	4	0.2%	0	0.0%
South Carolina [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	4	1.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	4	100.0%
Tennessee	386	3.0%	198	3.3%	188	2.7%	0	0.0%
Texas	3,035	4.4%	790	3.8%	1,998	5.2%	247	8.1%
U.S. Virgin Islands	15	75.0%	0	0.0%	15	100.0%	0	0.0%
Utah	67	1.7%	10	5.7%	57	6.8%	0	0.0%
Vermont [14]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [15]	2	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	0.0%	0	0.0%
Washington	100	2.7%	9	1.8%	91	2.8%	0	0.0%
West Virginia	14	1.2%	6	1.4%	8	1.1%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [16]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wyoming	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	--
U.S. Total	15,315	2.7%	5,053	3.9%	9,491	2.3%	771	5.0%

UOCAVA Table 2 Calculation Notes:

- FPCAs Received, Total uses question B2a.
- FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B2b.
- FPCAs Received, Uniformed Services Members, % uses B2b/B2a x 100.
- FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B2c.
- FPCAs Received, Overseas Citizens, % uses B2c/B2a x 100.
- FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B2a-(B2b+B2c).
- FPCAs Received, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % uses (B2a-(B2b+B2c))/B2a x 100.
- FPCAs Rejected, Total uses question B3a.
- FPCAs Rejected, % of FPCAs Received uses B3a/B2a x 100.
- FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, Total uses question B3b.
- FPCAs Rejected, Uniformed Services Members, % of Received from Uniformed Services uses B3b/B2b x 100.
- FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, Total uses question B3c.
- FPCAs Rejected, Overseas Citizens, % of Received from Overseas Citizens uses B3c/B2c x 100.
- FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, Total uses B3a-(B3b+B3c).

FPCAs Rejected, Not Categorized by Voter Type, % of Total FPCAs Rejected uses $(B3a-[B3b+B3c])/B3a \times 100$.

UOCAVA Table 2 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from the states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FPCAs received or rejected categories indicate that the sum of FPCAs for uniformed services members and overseas citizens in that category account for more than the total number of FPCAs reported by the state in the corresponding category.
-
- [1] FPCAs are not rejected.
 - [2] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
 - [3] Data related to FPCAs appear the same as other applications in our database and we are unable to isolate it.
 - [4] Data on rejected FPCAs are not tracked.
 - [5] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [6] Iowa is unable to track data on FPCA breakdown between the two types of UOCAVA voters.
 - [7] The Department of State only collects data for FPCA totals.
 - [8] UOCAVA records are maintained centrally by the state, not by municipalities.
 - [9] Missouri's database does not store information on received or rejected FCPAs.
 - [10] Montana does not track data on rejected FPCAs.
 - [11] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
 - [12] Data on FPCAs received are also reported in item A7m. Data on rejected FPCAs are not tracked.
 - [13] Data are not available to break down FPCAs for UOCAVA voter type.
 - [14] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
 - [15] Virginia discovered in 2024 a flaw in its code query for past years' UOCAVA values that, when compared to those past values, creates the appearance of inflated 2024 values.
 - [16] Wisconsin law does not require local election officials to collect data on rejected FPCAs and rejected absentee applications.



UOCAVA Table 3: UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted, Returned, Counted, and Rejected

State	UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted	UOCAVA Ballots Returned	UOCAVA Ballots Counted		UOCAVA Ballots Rejected	
			Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
Alabama	140,558	--	131,961	--	649	--
Alaska	12,358	9,807	9,611	98.0%	196	2.0%
American Samoa	149	132	132	100.0%	4	3.0%
Arizona	22,452	18,602	18,086	97.2%	514	2.8%
Arkansas	2,529	2,077	1,477	71.1%	133	6.4%
California	167,779	88,081	82,549	93.7%	5,481	6.2%
Colorado	55,483	33,084	32,072	96.9%	1,012	3.1%
Connecticut	6,406	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	2,240	1,703	1,601	94.0%	102	6.0%
District of Columbia	5,738	5,063	5,063	100.0%	0	0.0%
Florida [1]	127,687	94,582	92,268	97.6%	3,378	3.6%
Georgia	24,036	18,334	17,511	95.5%	823	4.5%
Guam	107	50	49	98.0%	1	2.0%
Hawaii	4,318	3,015	3,004	99.6%	11	0.4%
Idaho	4,251	3,127	3,081	98.5%	46	1.5%
Illinois [2]	26,437	19,663	19,186	97.6%	346	1.8%
Indiana	8,465	7,198	7,147	99.3%	25	0.3%
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	5,619	5,081	5,048	99.4%	32	0.6%
Kentucky [3]	4,636	3,018	--	--	--	--
Louisiana [4]	6,765	4,489	4,118	91.7%	371	8.3%
Maine [5]	6,745	6,321	6,309	99.8%	12	0.2%
Maryland	25,409	18,743	18,248	97.4%	495	2.6%
Massachusetts	27,611	24,181	24,038	99.4%	143	0.6%
Michigan	23,946	22,029	21,116	95.9%	913	4.1%
Minnesota	17,660	14,020	13,161	93.9%	859	6.1%
Mississippi	2,081	1,817	--	--	--	--
Missouri	11,223	7,661	7,413	96.8%	248	3.2%
Montana [6]	5,452	4,239	4,169	98.3%	70	1.7%
Nebraska	2,632	2,360	2,301	97.5%	59	2.5%
Nevada	13,477	11,091	11,011	99.3%	80	0.7%
New Hampshire	7,121	6,124	5,808	94.8%	254	4.1%
New Jersey	30,042	13,853	13,644	98.5%	203	1.5%
New Mexico	6,657	5,800	5,769	99.5%	31	0.5%
New York [7]	80,664	55,807	49,765	89.2%	6,042	10.8%

State	UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted	UOCAVA Ballots Returned	UOCAVA Ballots Counted		UOCAVA Ballots Rejected	
			Total	% of Returned	Total	% of Returned
North Carolina [8]	37,702	31,621	31,508	99.6%	113	0.4%
North Dakota	1,706	1,524	1,507	98.9%	17	1.1%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	21,759	17,470	16,976	97.2%	627	3.6%
Oklahoma	6,247	4,208	4,080	97.0%	128	3.0%
Oregon	21,939	16,677	16,442	98.6%	235	1.4%
Pennsylvania	37,298	28,934	27,432	94.8%	1,502	5.2%
Puerto Rico [9]	1,109	--	803	--	--	--
Rhode Island [10]	5,410	3,402	3,391	99.7%	11	0.3%
South Carolina [11]	10,339	8,956	8,921	99.6%	35	0.4%
South Dakota	6,835	3,188	2,966	93.0%	226	7.1%
Tennessee	14,102	11,374	10,937	96.2%	437	3.8%
Texas	69,825	53,325	50,977	95.6%	2,306	4.3%
U.S. Virgin Islands	5	0	0	--	0	--
Utah	8,140	6,421	6,312	98.3%	88	1.4%
Vermont [12]	2,761	2,114	2,133	100.9%	8	0.4%
Virginia [13]	37,901	31,216	30,777	98.6%	439	1.4%
Washington	135,891	58,853	57,896	98.4%	957	1.6%
West Virginia	1,789	1,594	1,586	99.5%	8	0.5%
Wisconsin	16,082	13,334	12,673	95.0%	661	5.0%
Wyoming	1,751	1,380	1,310	94.9%	70	5.1%
U.S. Total	1,327,324	806,743	905,343	96.3%	30,401	3.7%

UOCAVA Table 3 Calculation Notes:

UOCAVA Ballots Transmitted uses question B5a.

UOCAVA Ballots Returned uses question B11a.

UOCAVA Ballots Counted, Total uses question B18a.

UOCAVA Ballots Counted, % of Returned uses B18a/B11a x 100.

UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, Total uses question B24a.

UOCAVA Ballots Rejected, % of Returned uses B24a/B11a x 100.

UOCAVA Table 3 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.



- Items that are displayed as a dash (--) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- [1] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
 - [2] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
 - [3] FWABs and FPCAs are commingled so acceptance totals cannot be determined by ballot type.
 - [4] Registrars may transmit multiple ballots to a voter (e.g., the voter did not receive the original ballot or the original ballot is returned as undeliverable).
 - [5] UOCAVA records are maintained centrally by the state, not by municipalities.
 - [6] Montana implemented a new UOCAVA electronic absentee system for the 2024 election cycle.
 - [7] Total ballots transmitted may exceed total ballots requested as counties may send UOCAVA voters their ballot using multiple methods or multiple times to ensure the ballot is received. Although the UOCAVA data reflect information provided by the counties, the data do not address the variable that voters may return more than one ballot. The following further addresses this item: (1) If voters have electronic access to their ballot, then they could potentially download and print the documents more than once and subsequently return them to the county boards; (2) Some county boards mail a ballot to every UOCAVA voter, regardless of their transmission preference. Due to this, voters who already received their ballot electronically, completed it, and returned it may subsequently receive a physical ballot in the mail. This may result in such voters returning this additional ballot. (3) Additional data collected by the New York State Board of Elections have shown that more than UOCAVA voters may return multiple ballots, although the data do not report how many ballots each of these voters returned.
 - [8] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
 - [9] In addition to UOCAVA categories — uniformed services members, eligible dependents, U.S. Merchant Marine members, and overseas civilian voters — Puerto Rico also provides absentee voting options for voters who are physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day but are not classified as overseas citizens. This includes Puerto Rico residents who are temporarily in the United States for work, study, or other personal reasons but maintain their official residence in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico does not have specific data exclusively related to UOCAVA voters. However, UOCAVA voters have more rights and protections under federal law compared to Puerto Rico residents who are physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day but are not classified as overseas citizens. Although both groups can vote absentee, UOCAVA voters are entitled to additional safeguards under UOCAVA, including extended deadlines and alternative ballot transmission methods. The responses are exclusively related to UOCAVA voters and do not include non-UOCAVA citizens who were physically outside of Puerto Rico on Election Day.
 - [10] All UOCAVA voters are sent an official ballot in the mail. UOCAVA voters that provide an email address receive instructions and a PIN to access their ballot through a secure portal. The reported data reflect that some UOCAVA voters may receive more than one transmitted ballot.
 - [11] Data are not available to separate FWABs from regular UOCAVA ballots.
 - [12] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
 - [13] Virginia discovered in 2024 a flaw in its code query for past years' UOCAVA values that, when compared to those past values, creates the appearance of inflated 2024 values.

UOCAVA Table 4: Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB)

State	Total FWABs Received	FWABs Counted		FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted		FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons		FWABs Not Categorized	
		Total	% of Total Rec'd	Total	% of Total Rec'd	Total	% of Total Rec'd	Total	% of Total Rec'd
Alabama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alaska	165	18	10.9%	43	26.1%	104	63.0%	0	0.0%
American Samoa	0	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
Arizona	1,011	369	36.5%	635	62.8%	7	0.7%	0	0.0%
Arkansas	24	8	33.3%	5	20.8%	6	25.0%	5	20.8%
California [1]	1,539	1,196	77.7%	42	2.7%	300	19.5%	1	0.1%
Colorado	193	162	83.9%	0	0.0%	31	16.1%	0	0.0%
Connecticut	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Delaware	109	80	73.4%	19	17.4%	10	9.2%	0	0.0%
District of Columbia	347	294	84.7%	18	5.2%	35	10.1%	0	0.0%
Florida [2]	1,195	809	67.7%	65	5.4%	321	26.9%	0	0.0%
Georgia [3]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Guam	0	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
Hawaii	28	18	64.3%	5	17.9%	2	7.1%	3	10.7%
Idaho [4]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Illinois [5]	369	343	93.0%	6	1.6%	12	3.3%	8	2.2%
Indiana	563	482	85.6%	27	4.8%	40	7.1%	14	2.5%
Iowa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kansas	152	128	84.2%	1	0.7%	23	15.1%	0	0.0%
Kentucky [6]	69	--	--	--	--	--	--	69	100.0%
Louisiana [7]	12	12	100.0%	--	--	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Maine [8]	96	96	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Maryland	739	479	64.8%	41	5.5%	219	29.6%	0	0.0%
Massachusetts	570	567	99.5%	0	0.0%	3	0.5%	0	0.0%
Michigan	740	12	1.6%	698	94.3%	30	4.1%	0	0.0%
Minnesota	299	267	89.3%	9	3.0%	23	7.7%	0	0.0%
Mississippi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Missouri [9]	191	191	100.0%	--	--	--	--	0	0.0%
Montana	2	2	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Nebraska	94	94	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Nevada	187	152	81.3%	0	0.0%	35	18.7%	0	0.0%
New Hampshire	62	58	93.5%	3	4.8%	1	1.6%	0	0.0%
New Jersey	8,597	8,551	99.5%	--	--	40	0.5%	6	0.1%



State	Total FWABs Received	FWABs Counted		FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted		FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons		FWABs Not Categorized	
		Total	% of Total Rec'd	Total	% of Total Rec'd	Total	% of Total Rec'd	Total	% of Total Rec'd
New Mexico	6	6	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
New York	3,782	1,115	29.5%	1,542	40.8%	1,125	29.7%	0	0.0%
North Carolina [10]	530	526	99.2%	--	--	4	0.8%	0	0.0%
North Dakota	34	33	97.1%	0	0.0%	1	2.9%	0	0.0%
Northern Mariana Islands	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ohio	345	295	85.5%	24	7.0%	47	13.6%	-21	-6.1%
Oklahoma	197	135	68.5%	24	12.2%	38	19.3%	0	0.0%
Oregon [11]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pennsylvania	418	401	95.9%	0	0.0%	17	4.1%	0	0.0%
Puerto Rico	0	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
Rhode Island	37	18	48.6%	19	51.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
South Carolina [12]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Dakota	9	2	22.2%	2	22.2%	6	66.7%	-1	-11.1%
Tennessee	326	155	47.5%	81	24.8%	90	27.6%	0	0.0%
Texas	2,695	727	27.0%	213	7.9%	1,576	58.5%	179	6.6%
U.S. Virgin Islands	0	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
Utah	223	205	91.9%	3	1.3%	15	6.7%	0	0.0%
Vermont [13]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virginia [14]	1,254	1,210	96.5%	--	--	39	3.1%	5	0.4%
Washington	843	786	93.2%	--	--	45	5.3%	12	1.4%
West Virginia	39	32	82.1%	3	7.7%	4	10.3%	0	0.0%
Wisconsin [15]	38	20	52.6%	6	15.8%	12	31.6%	0	0.0%
Wyoming	11	11	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
U.S. Total	28,140	20,065	71.5%	3,534	49.9%	4,261	15.3%	280	1.0%

UOCAVA Table 4 Calculation Notes:

Total FWABs Received uses question B29a.

FWABs Counted, Total uses question B30a.

FWABs Counted, % of Total Received uses B30a/B29a x 100.

FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, Total uses question B32a.

FWABs Rejected Because a Valid Ballot was Accepted and Counted, % of Total Rec'd uses B32a/B29a x 100.

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, Total uses the sum of questions B31a and B33a.

FWABs Rejected for Other Reasons, % of Total Rec'd uses $(B31a+B33a)/B29a \times 100$.

FWABs Not Categorized, Total uses $B29a-(B30a+B31a+B32a+B33a)$.

FWABs Not Categorized, % of Total Rec'd uses $(B29a-[B30a+B31a+B32a+B33a])/B29a \times 100$.

UOCAVA Table 4 Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Casewise deletion at the state level was used in calculating national percentages. The percentage calculations at the national level (U.S. Total) only used data from those states that provided data for the numerator and denominator of the calculation.
 - Items that are displayed as a dash (–) indicate that all jurisdictions within the state responded "Data Not Available," "Does Not Apply," or "Valid Skip" to the EAVS item(s) used in the calculation or left the item(s) blank.
 - The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
 - Negative numbers in the Not Categorized FWABs category indicate that the sum of counted and rejected FWABs accounted for more than the total number of FWABs received as reported by the state.
 - The EAVS tracks data on FWABs that were rejected because they were received after the ballot receipt deadline (B31), because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted (B32), and for other reasons (B33).
- [1] Some counties were unable to track data on FWABs separately.
- [2] Responses reflect data submitted by each respective county election official.
- [3] Data related to FWABs appear the same as other ballots in our database and we are unable to isolate it.
- [4] Data on FWABs received, counted, and rejected are not tracked separately.
- [5] Data provided come from 108 different election authorities and not from a single source. Data available might not be able to gather a completely accurate picture because there are different available data within each election authority.
- [6] FWABs and FPCAs are commingled so rejection reasons cannot be determined by type.
- [7] The Department of State does not track data on FWABs rejected because a valid ballot was accepted and counted. Other reasons for FWAB rejection include not legible, no signature, or incomplete.
- [8] UOCAVA records are maintained centrally by the state, not by municipalities.
- [9] Missouri's database does not compile information on rejected FWABs.
- [10] The results of this survey include point-in-time data from multiple datasets and log files and thus may differ slightly from other publicly posted datasets.
- [11] Data on FWABs are not tracked separately from UOCAVA ballots.
- [12] Data are not available to separate FWABs from regular UOCAVA ballots.
- [13] Some jurisdictions may have entered incorrect or incomplete data; therefore, some calculations and datasets may be misconstrued. We have updated the data as best we can.
- [14] Virginia discovered in 2024 a flaw in its code query for past years' UOCAVA values that, when compared to those past values, creates the appearance of inflated 2024 values.
- [15] In Wisconsin, jurisdictions are not required to record data on ballots returned after Election Day. Many jurisdictions, however, do record them. Counts reported in B31 represent ballots reported in this way.



Chapter 5. Survey Methodology

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has conducted the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) following each federal general election since the 2004 election cycle. The EAVS project collects a wealth of data on election administration in the United States, including the policies that govern elections, voter registration, voting by individuals covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), mail voting, in-person voting, poll workers and polling places, provisional voting, election technology, and turnout. Data from all U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia are included in the EAVS.¹ The EAVS helps the EAC meet its mandate under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and the review of procedures with respect to the administration of federal elections.

There are two surveys that are part of the EAVS project. First, the 2024 Election Administration Policy Survey (Policy Survey) collected data on the laws, procedures, and policies that governed the general election in the states. This survey was administered from August to December 2024 and collected information to provide context to the data reported through the EAVS. Second, the 2024 EAVS, which collected data on registrations, voters, and ballots during the 2024 general election, was administered from November 2024 to March 2025. The data collected through the EAVS allow states to satisfy their data reporting requirements established by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and UOCAVA. The data provide a detailed snapshot of how general elections are administered in the United States every two years.

This report relies on EAVS and Policy Survey data submitted and certified by the chief election officials in 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. Data for each state were collected at the jurisdiction level, with 100% of the 6,461 jurisdictions nationwide submitting at least partial data in 2024.² [Appendix A](#) of this chapter shows the number of jurisdictions and the response rate by state (overall and for each section of the EAVS).

For those wishing to conduct historical analysis of EAVS and Policy Survey data, in May of 2025, the EAC released time series data sets that include data from 2004 to 2022. Future iterations of this

¹ Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, the term “state” can be understood to apply to the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) that submit Election Administration Policy Survey and EAVS data. Puerto Rico provides EAVS data only in presidential election years, as it does not hold elections for federal candidates in midterm election years. American Samoa did not participate in the 2016 EAVS. The Northern Mariana Islands participated in the EAVS for the first time in 2020.

² What constitutes a jurisdiction for EAVS reporting is defined by how each state chose to provide data. For the 2024 EAVS, most states reported data at the county level (or county equivalent, such as parishes for Louisiana). The territories, the District of Columbia, and Alaska each reported as a single jurisdiction. Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia reported data for independent cities in addition to counties. Rhode Island reported data at both the city and town levels. Wisconsin reported data at the city, town, and village levels. Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont reported data at the town or township level. Maine also reported its UOCAVA data in Section B as a separate jurisdiction because this information is only collected at the state level. Michigan reported data at the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 cities and townships in the state. Elections for Kalawao County in Hawaii are administered by Maui County; although Kalawao is included as a jurisdiction in the EAVS data, Kalawao’s data are included with Maui’s data.



data will include data from the 2024 project. The time series data files and documentation may be accessed at eac.gov/research-and-data/eavs-retrospective.

Survey Questions

The 2024 Policy Survey consisted of 129 questions (52 required questions, 51 follow-up questions based on a state's responses to the required questions, and 26 optional comments boxes). Of these, 93 were single-select or multi-select questions, 35 were open-ended with a text response (including calendar dates), and one was a hybrid single-select and text question.

The 2024 EAVS consisted of 531 questions (324 required, 56 follow-up questions based on a jurisdiction's responses to the required questions, 110 optional questions based on whether a jurisdiction had additional data to provide, and 41 comments boxes, one of which was required). Of these questions, 349 were fill-in-the-blank with a numerical response, 50 were item descriptions, 71 were single-select questions, and 61 were open-ended with a text response.

The six sections of the EAVS survey have remained consistent since the 2008 project, although questions are periodically removed, updated, or reordered. Beginning in 2018, the Policy Survey replaced the previous Statutory Overview with a set of primarily closed-ended questions on states' election policies. The full set of EAVS and Policy Survey questions since the project began in 2004 can be found at eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys.

The following sections detail the data collected by these surveys and the changes that were made to the survey questionnaires from the 2022 versions. In 2024, the primary changes to the survey questions involved:

- Implementing changes to Section A (voter registration and list maintenance) to bring it into better alignment with registration practices.
- Adding Policy Survey questions that could be used to validate EAVS items, especially new or revised items in Section A.
- Adding Policy Survey and EAVS questions to gather data on new topics that had previously not been collected.
- Clarifying instructions to make completion easier for election officials and to improve data quality.

Policy Survey

Since 2008, the EAVS has been accompanied by a survey that collects information on states' election policies and practices to provide greater context for the jurisdiction-level data collected through the EAVS. This originally took the form of the Statutory Overview, which consisted of open-ended questions on statutory requirements for various parts of the election process, asking states to report information on their election laws and policies. However, the open-ended format made it difficult to interpret states' statutory language, identify patterns in election practices, and draw meaningful comparisons between states.

Beginning with the 2018 EAVS, the Statutory Overview was significantly redesigned and renamed the Policy Survey. The survey now uses closed-ended questions and is intended to capture states' broad policies rather than to represent a comprehensive overview of state statutory language. This allows for greater ease in interpreting the results, creating comparisons across states, and providing

context in understanding the EAVS data. The Policy Survey questions are designed to map onto the EAVS data questions so that the two surveys can be used in concert. Thus, the Policy Survey responses are intended to represent a state’s election law, policy, or practice as it applies to the election for which the data are collected.

The 2024 Policy Survey collected information on how the state answers the EAVS; voter registration and list maintenance; election technology; mail voting; in-person voting; voting by citizens covered by UOCAVA; provisional voting; election certification, recounts, and audits; voter identification; how criminal convictions affect voting; and election security. Questions that were added to the Policy Survey for 2024 included:

New Question For 2024	Description
Q3	State election website URLs for the main voter website, the voter registration webpage, and webpage for voters with disabilities
Q6	How a state’s voter registration system (VRS) is used
Q7	State’s VRS connectivity mode
Q11b	Locations where same day voter registration (SDR) is permitted
Q13b	Whether the state tracks data on other categories of registered voters aside from active and inactive
Q15	Whether the state tracks data on registration forms or registration transactions
Q16	Does the state track data on duplicate and/or invalid voter registrations
Q17	Registration sources available to voters in the state
Q20	Whether voters in the state are made ineligible to vote because of mental incompetence
Q21	What happens when duplicate voter registration records are identified
Q27e	How the number of drop boxes per jurisdiction is determined
Q28c	How voters are notified when their returned mail ballot needs to be cured
Q28d	Description of steps voters must take to cure a mail ballot
Q32b	Whether online ballot transmission for voters with disabilities is available statewide or only in certain jurisdictions
Q33	Circumstances under which domestic civilian voters may return their ballots electronically
Q33a	How a state verifies that domestic civilian voters are eligible to return their ballots electronically
Q33b	Methods available for eligible domestic civilian voters to return their ballots electronically
Q36	Whether a state used poll workers to assist with in-person voting
Q36a	Which election officials are responsible for developing a poll worker training curriculum
Q36b	How often poll workers must be trained
Q36c	Topics covered in the poll worker training curriculum
Q36d	Whether poll worker training must be completed in person
Q37	Whether a state offered curbside voting
Q37a	Which polling places offered curbside voting
Q37b	Which voters were eligible to vote curbside
Q38	How a state determined which voters were reported as UOCAVA voters in EAVS Section B



New Question For 2024	Description
Q39	How long a voter keeps their UOCAVA designation
Q52	Has the state instituted security policies to protect election workers

Other questions underwent revisions, which included rewording, updated answer options, and clarifications to instructions. Because of new questions added to the Policy Survey, many of these questions were also renumbered in 2024. Questions that were significantly revised from the 2022 Policy Survey included:

Significantly Revised For 2024	2022 Numbering	Description
Q2	Q2	Changes in list of jurisdictions since previous EAVS
Q5	Q4	Voter registration system data transfers with government entities
Q8	Q5	Automatic registration processes
Q8a	Q5a	Agencies that participate in automatic registration
Q9a	Q6a	Personal information voters must supply to use a state's online registration system
Q10	Q7	Features of state's election website
Q13	Q10	Whether state differentiates between active and inactive voters
Q13a	Q10a	State's definition of active and inactive voters
Q19	Q13	Data sources used to identify potentially ineligible voters on state's voter registration roll
Q25a	Q17a	Whether all-mail elections are conducted statewide or in certain jurisdictions only
Q26a	Q18a	Who can register to be a permanent absentee voter in the state
Q27a	Q19a	Type of locations at which drop boxes were available
Q27b	Q19b	Drop box collection frequency
Q27c	Q19c	Dates and times during which drop boxes were available to voters
Q27d	Q19d	Drop box security measures
Q28	Q20	Whether state allows for mail ballot curing
Q28a	Q20a	Types of mail ballot errors that could be cured
Q29	Q21	Postmark and receipt deadlines for mail ballots from domestic civilian voters
Q31	Q23	Postmark requirements for mail ballots from domestic civilian voters
Q34b	Q25b	Dates during which in-person voting before Election Day was available
Q35	Q26	Election periods during which vote centers were available
Q43	Q30	Postmark and receipt deadlines for mail ballots from domestic UOCAVA voters

Significantly Revised For 2024	2022 Numbering	Description
Q44	Q31	Postmark and receipt deadlines for mail ballots from overseas UOCAVA voters
Q46a	Q33a	Circumstances under which provisional ballots were made available to voters
Q48	Q35	Circumstances for which an election recount may be conducted
Q49	Q36	Auditing activities conducted for the general election
Q51	Q38	Populations whose voting eligibility is affected by criminal conviction and/or incarceration
Q51b	Q38b	What happens to the voter registration records of individuals whose eligibility is affected by criminal conviction and/or incarceration

The following questions had no change except for renumbering, wording updates to standardize the use of terminology across questions, and, for some, the addition of a comment section and/or response option of “Does Not Apply”:

2024 Numbering	2022 Numbering	Description
Q4	Q3	Voter registration system type
Q4a	Q3a	Frequency of information transfer from local databases to state voter registration system
Q9	Q6	Whether a state has an online voter registration system
Q11	Q8	Whether the state allows for same-day voter registration
Q11a	Q8a	Situations in which same-day voter registration is permitted
Q12	Q9	Whether preregistration is permitted for individuals under age 18
Q12a	Q9a	How preregistration applications are processed
Q14	Q11	Which election officials are responsible for modifying voter registration records
Q18	Q12	Whether a state sends confirmation notices
Q18a	Q12a	Which voters are sent confirmation notices
Q22	Q14	Whether a state requires voting system testing and/or certification
Q22a	Q14a	Type of voting system testing and/or certification required
Q23	Q15	Whether electronic poll books were used in the state
Q23a	Q25a	Whether a state requires testing and/or certification of electronic poll books prior to purchase
Q24	Q16	Whether mail voting requires an excuse
Q25	Q17	Whether all-mail elections are conducted in the state
Q26	Q18	Does a state allow for permanent absentee voters
Q27	Q19	Whether a state allows for drop boxes to collect mail ballots
Q28b	Q20b	Deadline for curing mail ballots
Q30	Q22	How long state tracks data on mail ballots that arrive after the deadline



2024 Numbering	2022 Numbering	Description
Q32	Q24	Circumstances under which domestic civilian voters were permitted to receive ballots electronically
Q32a	Q24a	Terminology state used to describe online ballot transmission for voters with disabilities
Q32c	Q24b	Methods for transmitting online ballots to voters with disabilities
Q32d	Q24c	Witness requirements for online ballots transmitted to voters with disabilities
Q34	Q25	Terminology used for in-person voting before Election Day
Q34a	Q25a	Whether in-person voting before Election Day requires an excuse
Q35a	Q26a	Whether vote centers were used statewide or only in certain jurisdictions
Q40	Q29	Length of time for which a Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) qualifies a UOCAVA voter to receive an absentee ballot
Q41	Q27	UOCAVA ballot transmission methods
Q42	Q28	UOCAVA ballot return methods
Q45	Q32	Whether postmark requirements for mail ballots from UOCAVA voters differ from requirements for domestic civilian mail ballots
Q46	Q33	Whether a state used provisional ballots
Q46b	Q33b	Deadline for adjudicating provisional ballots cast for the general election
Q46c	Q33c	How provisional ballots cast in the wrong jurisdiction are handled
Q46d	Q33d	What person or persons are responsible for reviewing provisional ballots within the state
Q46e	Q33e	Whether provisional ballot eligibility reviewers are the same as those who count provisional ballots
Q47	Q34	Certification date for general election
Q48a	Q35a	How recounts are conducted
Q49a	Q36a	Whether post-election tabulation audits were required
Q49b	Q36b	Type of post-election tabulation audit conducted
Q50	Q37	Whether voter identification was required for in-person voters (excluding first-time voters)
Q50a	Q37a	Whether photo identification was required
Q50b	Q37b	Procedures if voters did not have acceptable identification
Q50c	Q37c	Deadline for voters to adjudicate questions about their identity
Q51a	Q38a	How long voting rights are affected for individuals who have a criminal conviction and/or incarceration
Q51c	Q38c	How voting rights are restored for individuals whose eligibility has previously been affected by criminal conviction and/or incarceration

No questions were removed from the Policy Survey between 2022 and 2024.

Section A: Voter Registration

Section A of the EAVS collects data on voter registration. This includes the number of persons registered and eligible to vote in the November 2024 general election; active, inactive, and other types of registered and eligible voters; voters who used SDR; registration transactions processed between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election; confirmation notices sent (by outcome and by reason); records removed from the voter registration rolls; and registration records merged or linked.

In 2024, the EAC implemented the changes to Section A that had been announced in July 2022 when the EAC published a report titled “Planned Changes to 2024 EAVS.” This report outlined the reasoning for these changes and how the EAC consulted with election officials in making these changes. This report is available at eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys. These changes included:

- An additional item in A1 to track data on registered and eligible voters who were not designated as either active or inactive;
- An update to the definition of “same day voter registration” in A2;
- A change from tracking registration forms to tracking registration transactions in A3-A9;
- Combining the two items that tracked data on updated registration transactions into a single item in A3;
- The addition of items in A4-A9 to track data on updates to existing valid registrations, other types of registrations, registrations submitted through an automatic registration program, and registrations submitted at polling places and other voting sites;
- An update to the definition of “confirmation notices” in A10-A11;
- Separating the item in A10 that previously collected data on all confirmation notices received back confirming registration into two items to track the number of such confirmations with no address change separately from confirmations with an updated address;
- A new item in A11 to track confirmation notices by the reason for sending the notice;
- An update to the terminology of A12 to track data on voter registration records removed rather than voters removed and an addition of an item to this question to track data on records removed because they were duplicates; and
- A new item to track data on voter registration records merged or linked (rather than removed) because they were duplicates in A13.

Section B: UOCAVA

Section B of the EAVS collects data on voters covered by UOCAVA. This includes the number of registered UOCAVA voters; FPCAs received and rejected; UOCAVA ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballots (FWAB) received, counted, and rejected. Most questions in Section B were divided by type of voter (uniformed services members and overseas citizens) and by method of ballot transmission and return (postal mail, email, fax, online, and other).

In 2014, the UOCAVA section of the EAVS was expanded to include questions from the Federal Voting Assistance Program’s (FVAP) Quantitative Post-Election Voting Survey of Local Election Officials (Quant PEVS-LEO). The goal of combining surveys was to reduce the burden on election officials by asking them to answer a single set of questions about UOCAVA voting rather than



responding to two surveys that captured many of the same data points. The current format of Section B is the result of a memorandum of understanding between the EAC and FVAP that allows both agencies to collect, share, and evaluate data on the voting experiences of citizens covered under UOCAVA and to fulfill their congressionally mandated requirements to study UOCAVA voters.

In 2024, changes made to this section included dedicated items to report data on UOCAVA ballots that were transmitted and returned by fax and online; in previous years, these modes were reported as “other.” The addition of these ballot transmission and return modes necessitated renumbering many of the questions in Section B. In addition, the instructions for the questions on UOCAVA ballots returned by voters (B11-B17) and returned and counted (B18-B23) were updated to clarify that ballots should be reported according to the mode by which they were returned, not the mode by which they were transmitted.

Section C: Mail Voting

Section C of the EAVS collects data on mail voting. This includes the number of mail ballots transmitted, returned, counted, and rejected; the number of ballots sent to permanent mail voters; the number of mail ballot drop boxes and the number of mail ballots returned at drop boxes; and the number of mail ballots that entered the ballot curing process.

Two changes were made to the questions in this section in 2024. First, a definition of in-person early voting was added to the instructions of question C5, which collects data on the number of ballot drop boxes available during early voting. This definition clarified which types of voters and ballots should not be reported in Section C. Second, new items were added to question C7 to track data on the total number of mail ballots that entered the cure process and the number of these ballots that were not successfully cured. This change allows for more accurate analysis of ballot curing rates.

Section D: In-Person Polling Operations

Section D of the EAVS collects data on in-person polling operations. This includes the number of precincts and polling places, the number of poll workers and the level of difficulty involved in recruiting poll workers, and the number of poll workers who served for the first time in the 2024 general election.

For 2024, none of the question wording in Section D was changed. A definition of in-person early voting was added to the instructions of questions D2-D4, which track data on the number of polling places in total and during early and Election Day voting.

Section E: Provisional Ballots

Section E of the EAVS collects data on provisional voting, including provisional ballots submitted, provisional ballot adjudication, the reasons provisional ballots were cast, and reasons for rejection of provisional ballots.

In 2024, an additional item was added to question E2 (provisional ballots cast according to reason for casting) to track data on provisional ballots cast because the voter was newly registered through same day or Election Day registration. This had been a common reason for states to report data in one of the “other” items in E2 in the 2022 EAVS.

Section F: Voter Participation and Election Technologies

Section F of the EAVS collects data on voter participation and election technologies. This includes total participation in the 2024 general election, how many ballots were cast and counted by mode of participation, the source of voter participation data, election equipment used, use of electronic and paper poll books, voter registration systems used, and the locations where votes were tallied. Respondents were also invited to share general comments regarding their state or jurisdiction's Election Day experiences, noteworthy successes, and the challenges they overcame in administering the November 2024 general election.

In 2024, additional instructions were added to question F1 on participation by mode to provide guidance on reporting data on mail voters in jurisdictions that conducted all-mail elections. Significant changes were also made to the section on voting systems: electronic poll books were added as an equipment type to collect data on whether they were used in each EAVS jurisdiction and, if so, the makes/models of electronic poll books used and how many were deployed to assist with the election. The questions in this section that asked for information on what type(s) of voting equipment or ballot counting method was used to support were revised for greater clarity. The previous question on the use of electronic and paper poll books was reordered within Section F and sub-questions were added to track whether electronic poll books were used to encode ballot marking device (BMD) cards. Finally, a new question, F11, was added to collect information on VRSs that were deployed at voting sites, including how many and the makes, models, and versions of deployed VRSs.

Data Collection Procedures

In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the EAC submitted the questions for the 2024 Policy Survey and the EAVS to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and for public comment. Public comments were collected from November 15, 2023, to January 15, 2024, and from March 4, 2024, to April 3, 2024. The questions were approved under OMB Control No. 3265-0006, with an expiration date of April 30, 2027. The survey questions were made available publicly on the EAC's website on April 18, 2024. Targeted communications with state points of contact (POC) responsible for completing the surveys began on July 19, 2024, and continued regularly throughout the data collection period. These targeted communications aimed to keep states aware of data collection deadlines and resources available to assist them with completing the survey.

The EAC is committed to incorporating feedback from POCs into EAVS process improvements. Feedback was gathered from POCs representing 48 states and territories between the close of data collection for the 2022 EAVS and the beginning of data collection for the 2024 EAVS.

The following sections describe each aspect of the EAVS data collection process in more detail.

Needs Assessment

To better understand how state-level officials respond to the EAVS and where they need support, the EAC undertook a systematic assessment of the needs of EAVS POCs in August and September 2023. The goal of these interviews was to better understand each state's EAVS reporting process (including how data are collected, which templates are used, the state's use of technical assistance resources, and data quality) and how improvements could be made to the 2024 EAVS.



All state POCs that completed the 2022 EAVS were invited to participate and interviews with personnel from 22 states were completed. The EAC created semi-structured interview guides for each participant that also left room for the interviewer to probe further. During these needs assessment calls, the EAC also encouraged state POCs to review and provide comments on the draft 2024 survey questions when they were available for public comment.

In addition, the EAC fielded a customer satisfaction survey to state and territory POCs after they certified their state's 2022 data submission, with all POCs receiving at least three reminders to complete the survey. The survey included both closed-ended and open-ended items that collected feedback on all aspects of the EAVS project, including the project website, the data collection templates, submitting and reviewing data, and general comments. Customer satisfaction survey submissions were received from 27 states and territories. In total, personnel from 36 states and territories provided feedback in the months following the completion of the 2022 EAVS.

The information collected through these customer satisfaction survey submissions and needs assessment conversations helped the EAC's outreach plan design, shaped the training opportunities provided to each state, and identified states that needed specialized support to complete the 2024 EAVS. Based on these conversations, the EAC implemented the following changes:

- Improved the design and usability of the data collection templates,
- Adapted plans for the training resources offered on the project website to better meet the needs of POCs, and
- Completed additional outreach about the changes to Section A that were implemented for 2024.

Collecting the Policy Survey Data

Invitations to complete the 2024 Policy Survey were sent to POCs from the 56 states on August 1, 2024. The Policy Survey data were collected in advance of EAVS data collection to reduce respondent burden and to allow the EAC to create customized data validation rules for the 2024 EAVS data. The Policy Survey was completed through an online survey. Periodic reminders were issued to POCs during the data collection period. When the answer options within a question did not fully capture a state's policy, POCs were encouraged to provide comments with further explanation. All 56 states, territories, and districts submitted their Policy Survey data by December 20, 2024.

Once received, each Policy Survey submission was reviewed for completeness and accuracy. State and territory POCs were also able to update or correct Policy Survey responses through the end of the EAVS data collection period. The EAC made Policy Survey data updates for 54 states before the end of the EAVS data collection period.

The EAC incorporated states' Policy Survey submissions directly into the EAVS data collection template validations. This meant that a state's 2024 EAVS data collection templates could not be released until the state's Policy Survey submission was finalized.

Collecting the EAVS Data

The EAVS data collection period was opened to 46 states on November 12, 2024. The data collection was opened to the 10 remaining states once their Policy Survey submissions were received and their templates were created; all data collection templates were released to states by January 3, 2025. The EAVS data collection period ended on March 31, 2025. Data submissions from 56 states were received by that date, with a response rate of 100% of states.

To build on the needs assessment conversations that were completed in August and September 2023, the EAC completed pre-survey outreach calls with officials from states that had newly designated POCs for the 2024 EAVS or that had requested further follow-up after the needs assessment calls. POCs from 20 states were invited to participate in the outreach calls, and 18 calls were completed in July and August of 2024. During these interviews, the EAC provided an overview of the project timeline and the types of data collected in the Policy Survey and the EAVS, notified the POCs of the help desk support and other resources that would be provided as part of the 2024 EAVS, and probed POCs on data issues from the 2022 EAVS. These conversations helped ensure that the EAC was prepared to provide adequate support to states as they completed their EAVS data collection.

Data Collection Templates

Given the diversity in how states respond to the EAVS, creating data templates that accommodate the needs of all states and all local jurisdictions is especially challenging. The 2024 EAVS data were collected using two data collection templates:

- The Microsoft Excel template was a flat data format that allowed POCs to copy and paste large amounts of data, such as from a report generated from the state's centralized election database. Each EAVS item was listed in a column in the Excel template and each EAVS jurisdiction within the state was listed in a row. States with multiple jurisdictions were required to submit their data via the Excel template.
- The online template was an item-by-item survey hosted online that guided respondents through entering their responses. This template was primarily intended to be used by jurisdictions that entered EAVS data or by states and territories that reported as a single jurisdiction. The data from the online template were exported to an Excel file that matched the format of the Microsoft Excel data collection template.

The EAC pre-populated data into the online template for five states and into the Excel template for one state. Pre-filled data were provided by state POCs via the Excel template or via an email request that provided details on which items were to be populated.

Both data collection templates employed a variety of error-checking data validations to reduce response burden and to increase data quality.

Data Validation

One of the key issues associated with any data collection project is ensuring that the data collected are as accurate as possible. Given the number of survey questions, their complexity and detail, and the variety of approaches in how state and local jurisdictions track election data and provide survey responses, it can be easy to make data entry mistakes or report data in an incorrect survey item. All 2024 EAVS data collection templates included built-in internal and external validation checks that flagged specific types of potential errors within a data submission.

The validation checks were designed to flag common data issues so that respondents were aware of them before submitting their data to the EAC. In response to these validations, states and jurisdictions were encouraged to review their data, make corrections if needed, and use the comment fields to explain any peculiarities and give context to the data that were being reported.



In addition, once a state submitted data for review by the EAC, additional data reviews were conducted by trained data analysts. These reviews checked for missing data, internal math and logic issues, conflicts with Policy Survey responses, and significant changes compared to 2020 EAVS data.³ The results of this review were provided to state POCs in a written memo.

A complete list of all validation checks that were built into the data collection templates and additional data validations that were conducted for draft submissions can be found in Appendices B and C of this chapter. In general, there were five types of data validations.

Math Validations

Many items in the EAVS asked respondents to report a total and then divide that total into subcategories. The math validations within the templates checked that the sum of the subcategories equaled the reported total of the overall category. For example, if the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted in the 2024 general election did not match the sum of the number of voters who used different modes of voting, then the respondent was asked to review the numbers reported in these items.⁴

Logic Validations

Logic validations identified when a value in the survey was incompatible with a response provided in another related question in the survey. For example, if the number of mail ballots that a jurisdiction reported counting for the 2024 election exceeded the number of mail ballots the jurisdiction's voters had returned, then the respondent was asked to review these items.⁵

Policy Survey Validations

These validations identified instances in which an EAVS item conflicted with the Policy Survey data that had been submitted by the state. For example, if a state reported having an online voter registration system through which an individual could submit a voter registration application, but reported "Does Not Apply" to EAVS items relating to the number of voter registration transactions submitted online, then the validations would highlight that a conflict existed between the respondent's EAVS and Policy Survey data and would ask the respondent to review the EAVS items and contact the EAC if the Policy Survey response needed to be updated.⁶

Missing Items

Except for most comment boxes and "other" subcategories for reporting data beyond what was specified in a question, all items in the EAVS required a response. An alert appeared if a response to a required item was not provided. For example, if a respondent reported the total number of registered voters in their jurisdiction but not the number of active and inactive registered voters, then the latter items would be flagged with a request that the respondent report "Does Not Apply" (if their

³ The 2020 EAVS was used as a point of comparison in the data reviews because it was the most recent presidential election.

⁴ The total number of voters participating in the 2024 general election was reported in item F1a in the 2024 EAVS. The number of voters who participated using different modes of voting were reported in items F1b through F1h.

⁵ The number of mail ballots counted by a jurisdiction was reported in item C8a in the 2024 EAVS. The number of mail ballots returned by voters was reported in item C1b.

⁶ Data on states' policies regarding online voter registration were reported in item Q9 of the 2024 Policy Survey. The numbers of total, new, duplicate, updated, rejected, and other registrations received through online registration systems were reported in items A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c, A8c, and A9c, respectively, of the 2024 EAVS.

state did not have an applicable law or policy), “Data Not Available” (if the data for an item were not tracked), or zero (if no instance of an item occurred for the 2024 general election) rather than leave the item blank.⁷

Valid Skips

The EAC introduced a valid skip code in EAVS beginning with the 2020 dataset. This code was automatically filled in by the template validations when an item did not require an answer because of a response to a previous item in the survey. The use of the valid skip code is distinct from the use of the “Does Not Apply” code (for when a jurisdiction does not have a law or policy in place that allows for the type of election participation in the question) and the “Data Not Available” code (for when the data for a type of election participation is not tracked). For instance, if a jurisdiction indicated in EAVS question F3a that it did not use direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems without a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), then items F3b through F3d — relating to the make and model of equipment, the number deployed, and the usage of the equipment — were filled as “Valid Skip” by the template validations.

Finalizing and Certifying Data Submissions

After the EAC reviewed each state’s draft EAVS data submission, additional targeted data reviews were conducted on subsequent EAVS submissions until the EAC was satisfied that major data quality issues had been sufficiently addressed by the state’s POC(s). Once the data submission had been finalized, the EAC generated a copy of the appendix tables that accompany the Executive Summary and Chapters 1-4 of this report and show how the state’s data would be portrayed in those tables; this analysis was shared with the state POC(s) to conduct a final review. During this review, state POCs were invited to provide final data corrections, to determine whether the data underlying the analysis were incorrect, and to add footnotes and explanations to be printed alongside the tables. The footnotes that were provided by state POCs to accompany the appendix tables have been reproduced in this report as closely as possible to the language requested by POCs, with minor edits for proofreading and clarity.

Once the state POCs approved of the analysis and provided any requested footnotes, the EAC requested that the state’s chief election officer certify their state’s 2024 Policy Survey and EAVS submissions as accurate and complete. Fifty-five states certified their data submissions by May 30, 2025.⁸

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance was provided through the duration of the Policy Survey and the EAVS data collection periods. Help desk support was provided for 20 hours each week from August 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024, and for 40 hours each week from January 2, 2025, to March 31, 2025. State and local EAVS respondents could request assistance via email or phone. A team of trained technical assistants provided support on all aspects of the survey data collection processes. A total of 468 support tickets were received from all 56 states, territories, and districts. The most common

⁷ The total number of registered and eligible voters for the 2024 general election was reported in item A1a in the EAVS. The number of active registered voters was item A1b. The number of inactive registered voters was item A1c.

⁸ Kansas did not sign the 2024 EAVS certification form.



inquiries were technical questions related to use of the data collection templates, correct usage of the data missingness codes, and inquiries related to the updated Section A questions.

Resources for EAVS Respondents

In addition to providing direct, customized technical assistance, the EAC made a wide variety of written and video training resources available to survey respondents on demand. A website was established to house these resources and to provide a secure place for state EAVS POCs to upload data submissions and other documents for the EAC to review.

The resources on this website included PDF copies of the Policy Survey and EAVS questions; a link to the online template; six videos that outlined the questions and instructions in the six sections of the EAVS; two video webinars that provided guidance on the overall EAVS process and on the updates that had been made to Section A of the EAVS; a one-page quick fact sheet about the EAVS project timeline and resources; 12 newsletters that were released between August 2024 and March 2025; an extensive user guide that provided step-by-step instructions for both data collection templates; a policy guide approved by the EAC commissioners that provided information to election officials responsible for completing EAVS; a glossary of EAVS and Policy Survey terms and their definitions; Excel crosswalks that documented survey changes to the EAVS and Policy Survey from 2022 to 2024; and a copy of the report that the EAC published in July 2022 about the forthcoming changes to Section A.

The website also contained a section that was restricted to state POCs. This section had copies of the state's EAVS and Statutory Overview/Policy Survey submissions from 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022; a table that tracked the online template progress for each jurisdiction within the state; and the capacity for POCs to upload files and data submissions for the EAC to review.

Data Reporting and Calculations

In 2024, most EAVS data were reported at the local jurisdiction level. For the purposes of this report, if a state had multiple EAVS jurisdictions, then state totals were calculated by totaling the data from all jurisdictions within the state. National totals were calculated by totaling the state-level totals.

Whenever possible, this report uses percentages and rates rather than raw numbers to make comparisons across states and across election years. For these calculations, items were combined as necessary to create the numerator and denominator and to produce a percentage or rate. For example, the following formula was used to calculate the percentage of transmitted mailed ballots that were returned by voters for the 2024 general election:

$$\frac{\text{Total number of mail ballots returned by voters (C1b)}}{\text{Total number of mail ballots transmitted by election offices (C1a)}} \times 100$$

Percentages at the national level were calculated using casewise missing data deletion at the state level. Only states that had data for both the numerator and denominator for a calculation were included when reporting percentages at the national level. Responses of "Does Not Apply," "Data Not Available," and "Valid Skip" were considered missing for purposes of creating these calculations. Casewise deletion was used in the analysis for this report to avoid overinflating the denominator of the calculations. This is especially applicable when states do not track data for a particular item, or when election policy differences mean that not all states can provide data for an item. For example, online registration is not available in every state, so the calculation of the nationwide percentage of

registrations that were received online will only use data from states that reported at least one online registration. Otherwise, the national percentage would include in the denominator (in this case, the total number of registrations received) data from states that do not have online registration, thus underestimating the percentage of online registrations that were received.⁹

This decision rule means that there were instances in which the percentages reported at the national level for a given calculation in this report did not use data from every state. Because each category was calculated independently of others and only states that reported data in both the numerator and the denominator were included in the analysis, casewise deletion also created instances in which percentages do not total 100%. Those cases in which data were not available for every state to calculate the percentage at the national level are noted in the footnotes throughout this report.

The use of casewise deletion for calculating national percentages does not affect the state-level percentages calculated in this report.

Recommendations for Analyzing and Interpreting the EAVS Data

The most up-to-date version of the 2024 EAVS and Policy Survey data can always be found on the EAC's website (eac.gov/research-and-data/datasets-codebooks-and-surveys). If the EAC is notified by a state of an error or omission in the state's data, then the agency will issue the updated EAVS and Policy Survey data sets on its website with an errata note of changes that have been made to the newly issued data sets. Updated data sets will be issued on a quarterly basis.

There are four types of data missingness codes used in the 2024 Policy Survey and EAVS data:

- **Valid Skip (-77):** This code indicates that no response is expected based on a previous survey response. For instance, in the Policy Survey, if a state answered "no" to Q9 to indicate that it does not provide an option for voters to register to vote online, then item Q9a, which collected further information on the specifics of a state's online registration system, would be marked as -77. In the EAVS, if a state indicates in item A4c, which asks for the total number of registration forms submitted online, that this question does not apply, then items A5c, A6c, A7c, A8c, and A9c — which collect data on new, duplicate, updated, invalid, and other types of registrations submitted online — would be marked as -77.
- **Does Not Apply (-88):** This code indicates that a question does not apply to a state, because the state does not have an applicable policy in place. For instance, a response of -88 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state does not have online registration.
- **Data Not Available (-99):** This code indicates that the data for an item cannot be tracked. For instance, a response of -99 in item A4c of the EAVS indicates that the state accepts online voter registrations but cannot track the number of these registrations that were submitted by voters.

⁹ The total number of registration applications received between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election was collected in item A3a. The total number of registration transactions received online between the close of registration for the 2022 general election and the close of registration for the 2024 general election was collected in item A4c. The application of casewise deletion means that only states that reported at least one registration in both items on a statewide level were included in the calculation of the percentage of registration applications received through online sources.



- Refused (-100): This code indicates that a response was expected but was not provided. This code is only used in the Policy Survey data.

When summing the EAVS data, either at a state or a national level, analysts should take care to treat these missingness codes as missing items and not as negative numbers.

Users of the EAVS data are also encouraged to refer to the comments that accompany all the EAVS items and many of the Policy Survey items. During data collection, the EAC encouraged all respondents to use these comments to provide context to their responses. In many cases, these comments contain valuable information about how state and jurisdiction respondents formulated their responses, why some responses do not align with the data validations outlined in this chapter, or context about how the 2024 general election was conducted in a state or jurisdiction. If data users have further questions about the data that have been submitted, then they are encouraged to contact states or jurisdictions directly.

The EAC also encourages data users to take care when calculating percentages to ensure that the correct EAVS items are used. [Appendix D](#) of this chapter contains recommendations for how to calculate EAVS rates using the 2024 data. These recommendations align with how rates were calculated throughout this report.

This report used the one-year American Community Survey (ACS) state estimates for the 2023 citizen voting age population (CVAP) for state- and nation-level calculations instead of the five-year estimate to ensure that the CVAP was as current as possible. However, for any jurisdiction level analysis reported that involves the CVAP, this report used the five-year estimate due to its more complete coverage of the counties in the United States. The CVAP estimates for 2024 were not available by the time this report was finalized. Once they are released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2024 CVAP estimates can be found at data.census.gov/. Data analysts should import both state- and county-level geographies and merge them into the EAVS data using the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code. For states that have sub-county jurisdictions, these jurisdictions need to be aggregated at the county level to merge with the CVAP data.¹⁰ For this report, the state-level CVAP was used for Alaska, as the state reported its data in a single EAVS jurisdiction. Finally, the Census Bureau does not provide CVAP estimates for the U.S. territories (except for Puerto Rico), so no CVAP estimate was available for American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

¹⁰ These are the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Additionally, Illinois reported six cities independently of their corresponding counties (i.e., Bloomington, Chicago, Danville, East St. Louis, Galesburg, and Rockford), and Missouri reported Kansas City independently of its corresponding county.

Appendix A: Survey Response Rates

State	EAVS Response Rate	Section A Response Rate	Section B Response Rate	Section C Response Rate	Section D Response Rate	Section E Response Rate	Section F Response Rate
Alabama	91.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	99.9%	25.7%
Alaska	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
American Samoa	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Arizona	99.8%	100.0%	99.4%	100.0%	99.7%	100.0%	100.0%
Arkansas	99.6%	100.0%	99.6%	99.9%	99.3%	98.7%	99.1%
California	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Colorado	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Connecticut	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Delaware	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
District of Columbia	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Florida	99.7%	100.0%	99.2%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Georgia	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Guam	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Hawaii [1]	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Idaho	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Illinois	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indiana	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Iowa	99.7%	100.0%	98.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Kansas	97.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.8%	89.5%	98.9%	82.8%
Kentucky	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Louisiana	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Maine [2]	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Maryland	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Massachusetts	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Michigan [3]	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Minnesota	99.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mississippi	97.8%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	80.7%
Missouri	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Montana	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Nebraska	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Nevada	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New Hampshire	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New Jersey	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New Mexico	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
New York	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
North Carolina	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
North Dakota	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



State	EAVS Response Rate	Section A Response Rate	Section B Response Rate	Section C Response Rate	Section D Response Rate	Section E Response Rate	Section F Response Rate
Northern Mariana Islands	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Ohio	99.7%	100.0%	99.2%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Oklahoma	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Oregon	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Pennsylvania	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Puerto Rico	96.8%	90.4%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Rhode Island	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South Carolina	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South Dakota	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
Tennessee	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.1%	100.0%	100.0%
Texas	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
U.S. Virgin Islands	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Utah	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.8%
Vermont	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Virginia	99.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	95.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Washington	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
West Virginia	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Wisconsin	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Wyoming	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
U.S. Total	99.8%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.6%	100.0%	98.7%

Appendix A Calculation Notes:

EAVS Response Rate uses responses to all items listed below.

Section A Response Rate uses responses to questions A1a, A1b, A1c, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, A3d, A3e, A3f, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A4j, A4k, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, A5h, A5i, A5j, A5k, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A6j, A6k, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, A7j, A7k, A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A8f, A8g, A8h, A8i, A8j, A8k, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, A9g, A9h, A9i, A9j, A9k, A10a, A10b, A10c, A10d, A10e, A10f, A11a, A11b, A11c, A11d, A11e, A11f, A11g, A11h, A11i, A11j, A11k, A12a, A12b, A12c, A12d, A12e, A12f, A12g, A12h, and A13a.

Section B Response Rate uses responses to questions B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B8a, B8b, B8c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B10a, B10b, B10c, B11a, B11b, B11c, B12a, B12b, B12c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B17a, B17b, B17c, B17d, B17e, B17f, B18a, B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B22a, B22b, B22c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a, B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, B26c, B27a, B27b, B27c, B29a, B29b, B29c, B30a, B30b, B30c, B31a, B31b, B31c, B32a, B32b, and B32c.

Section C Response Rate uses responses to questions C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C2a, C3a, C4a, C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C7b, C7c, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l, C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, and C9q.

Section D Response Rate uses responses to questions D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D8, D8 Comment, and D9a.

Section E Response Rate uses responses to questions E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, and E3j.

Section F Response Rate uses responses to questions F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F2_1, F2_2, F2_3, F2_4, F2_5, F3a, F4a, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, F9a, F9b, F9c, F9d, F9e, F9f, F10a, F10b, F10c, F10d, F10e, F11a, F12a, F12b, F12c, F12d, and F12e.

Appendix A Data Notes:

General Notes:

- Response rates were calculated as the percentage of jurisdictional responses within a state that were not left blank (i.e., had a numerical response of zero or greater or a response of "Data not available," "Does not apply," or "Valid skip"). Percentages were rounded to one decimal place.
- The percentages shown in this table are rounded to one decimal place. Percentages that round to less than 0.1% are displayed as 0.0%.
- Item descriptions, optional "other" categories, and optional survey comments were not included in the response rate calculation.

[1] Information for Kalawao County, Hawaii, was reported with Maui County.

[2] Maine reported its UOCAVA data on a statewide level, not a jurisdiction level.

[3] Michigan reported data at the county level, but most election administration activities take place in the 1,520 cities and townships in the state.



Appendix B: Data Collection Template Validation Rules

Table 1: Math Validation Rules

Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of A1b + A1c + A1d should equal A1a	The sum of active (A1b), inactive (A1c), and other (A1d) registered voters should be equal to the total number of registered voters (A1a).
The sum of A2b + A2c should equal A2a	The sum of SDRs received on Election Day (A2b) and SDRs received prior to Election Day (A2c) should be equal to the total number of SDRs received (A2a).
The sum of A3b-i should equal A3a	The sum of the numbers you report in A3b-i should equal the total number of registration transactions you report in A3a.
The sum of A4a-n should equal A3a	The sum of the numbers you report in A4a-n should equal the total number of registration transactions you reported in A3a.
The sum of A5a-n should equal A3b + A3c	The sum of the numbers you report in A5a-n should equal the sum of registration transactions you reported in A3b and A3c.
The sum of A6a-n should equal A3d	The sum of the numbers you report in A6a-n should equal the total number of registration transactions you reported in A3d.
The sum of A7a-n should equal A3e	The sum of the numbers you report in A7a-n should equal the total number of registration transactions you reported in A3e.
The sum of A8a-n should equal A3f	The sum of the numbers you report in A8a-n should equal the total number of registration transactions you reported in A3f.
The sum of A9a-n should equal the sum of A3g, A3h, and A3i	The sum of the numbers you report in A9a-n should equal the sum of registration transactions you reported in A3g, A3h, and A3i.
The sum of A5a + A6a + A7a + A8a + A9a should equal A4a	The amounts you report in A5a, A6a, A7a, A8a, and A9a should equal the total number of registration transactions received by mail, fax, or email you reported in A4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5b + A6b + A7b + A8b + A9b should equal A4b	The amounts you report in A5b, A6b, A7b, A8b, and A9b should equal the total number of registration transactions in person at the election/registrar's office you reported in A4b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5c + A6c + A7c + A8c + A9c should equal A4c	The amounts you report in A5c, A6c, A7c, A8c, and A9c should equal the total number of registration transactions submitted through a public-facing online registration system you reported in A4c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5d + A6d + A7d + A8d + A9d should equal A4d	The amounts you report in A5d, A6d, A7d, A8d, and A9d should equal the total number of registration transactions received through automatic registration programs you reported in A4d. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5e + A6e + A7e + A8e + A9e should equal A4e	The amounts you report in A5e, A6e, A7e, A8e, and A9e should equal the total number of registration transactions received from motor vehicle offices you reported in A4e. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5f + A6f + A7f + A8f + A9f should equal A4f	The amounts you report in A5f, A6f, A7f, A8f, and A9f should equal the total number of registration transactions received from public assistance offices you reported in A4f. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of A5g + A6g + A7g + A8g + A9g should equal A4g	The amounts you report in A5g, A6g, A7g, A8g, and A9g should equal the total number of registration transactions received from state-funded agencies you reported in A4g. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5h + A6h + A7h + A8h + A9h should equal A4h	The amounts you report in A5h, A6h, A7h, A8h, and A9h should equal the total number of registration transactions received from armed forces recruitment offices you reported in A4h. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5i + A6i + A7i + A8i + A9i should equal A4i	The amounts you report in A5i, A6i, A7i, A8i, and A9i should equal the total number of registration transactions received from other agencies designated by the state but not mandated by the NVRA you reported in A4i. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5j + A6j + A7j + A8j + A9j should equal A4j	The amounts you report in A5j, A6j, A7j, A8j, and A9j should equal the total number of registration transactions received from registration drives you reported in A4j. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5k + A6k + A7k + A8k + A9k should equal A4k	The amounts you report in A5k, A6k, A7k, A8k, and A9k should equal the total number of registration transactions received from polling places and voting sites you reported in A4k. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5l + A6l + A7l + A8l + A9l should equal A4l	The amounts you report in A5l, A6l, A7l, A8l, and A9l should equal the total number of registration transactions received from "Other" sources you reported in A4l. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5m + A6m + A7m + A8m + A9m should equal A4m	The amounts you report in A5m, A6m, A7m, A8m, and A9m should equal the total number of registration transactions received from "Other" sources you reported in A4m. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A5n + A6n + A7n + A8n + A9n should equal A4n	The amounts you report in A5n, A6n, A7n, A8n, and A9n should equal the total number of registration transactions received from "Other" sources you reported in A4n. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A10b-i should equal A10a	The amounts you report in A10b-i should equal the total number of confirmation notices sent to registered voters you reported in A10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A11a-n should equal A10a	The amounts you report in A11a-n should equal the total number of confirmation notices sent to registered voters you reported in A10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of A12b-k should equal A12a	The amounts you report in A12b-k should equal the total number of voters removed you reported in A12a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B1b-c should equal B1a	The amounts you report in B1b-c should equal the total number of registered and eligible UOCAVA voters you reported in B1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B2b-c should equal B2a	The amounts you report in B2b-c should equal the total number of FCPAs received from UOCAVA voters you reported in B2a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B3b-c should equal B3a	The amounts you report in B3b-c should equal the total number of rejected FPCAs from UOCAVA voters you reported in B3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B5b-c should equal B5a	The amounts you report in B5b-c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6b-c should equal B6a	The amounts you report in B6b-c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by postal mail you reported in B6a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B7b-c should equal B7a	The amounts you report in B7b-c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by email you reported in B7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B8b-c should equal B8a	The amounts you report in B8b-c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by fax you reported in B8a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B9b-c should equal B9a	The amounts you report in B9b-c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by an online ballot delivery portal you reported in B9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B10b-c should equal B10a	The amounts you report in B10b-c should equal the total number of absentee ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters by other methods you reported in B10a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6a, B7a, B8a, B9a, and B10a should equal B5a	The amounts you report in B6a, B7a, B8a, B9a, and B10a should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6b, B7b, B8b, B9b, and B10b should equal B5b	The amounts you report in B6b, B7b, B8b, B9b, and B10b should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all uniformed services voters you reported in B5b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B6c, B7c, B8c, B9c, and B10c should equal B5c	The amounts you report in B6c, B7c, B8c, B9c, and B10c should equal the total number of ballots transmitted to all overseas citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B11b-c should equal B11a	The amounts you report in B11b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B11a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B12b-c should equal B12a	The amounts you report in B12b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by postal mail you reported in B12a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B13b-c should equal B13a	The amounts you report in B13b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by email you reported in B13a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B14b-c should equal B14a	The amounts you report in B14b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by fax you reported in B14a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B15b-c should equal B15a	The amounts you report in B15b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by online ballot delivery portal you reported in B15a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B16b-c should equal B16a	The amounts you report in B16b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office by other methods you reported in B16a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B12a, B13a, B14a, B15a, and B16a should equal B11a	The amounts you report in B12a, B13a, B14a, B15a, and B16a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned to your office you reported in B11a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B12b, B13b, B14b, B15b, and B16b should equal B11b	The amounts you report in B12b, B13b, B14b, B15b, and B16b should equal the total number of transmitted ballots returned by all uniformed services voters you reported in B11b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B12c, B13c, B14c, B15c, and B16c should equal B11c	The amounts you report in B12c, B13c, B14c, B15c, and B16c should equal the total number of transmitted ballots returned by all overseas citizen voters you reported in B11c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B17b-f should equal B17a	The amounts you report in B17b-f should equal the total number of ballots returned undeliverable you reported in B17a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B18b-c should equal B18a	The amounts you report in B18b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B18a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19b-c should equal B19a	The amounts you report in B19b-c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail you reported in B19a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B20b-c should equal B20a	The amounts you report in B20b-c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by email you reported in B20a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B21b-c should equal B21a	The amounts you report in B21b-c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by fax you reported in B21a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B22b-c should equal B22a	The amounts you report in B22b-c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by online ballot delivery portal you reported in B22a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B23b-c should equal B23a	The amounts you report in B23b-c should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA ballots returned by other methods you reported in B23a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19a, B20a, B21a, B22a, and B23a should equal B18a	The amounts you report in B19a, B20a, B21a, B22a, and B23a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots counted by your office you reported in B18a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19b, B20b, B21b, B22b, and B23b should equal B18b	The amounts you report in B19b, B20b, B21b, B22b, and B23b should equal the total number of uniformed services voters' ballots counted by your office you reported in B18b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B19c, B20c, B21c, B22c, and B23c should equal B18c	The amounts you report in B19c, B20c, B21c, B22c, and B23c should equal the total number of overseas citizen voters' ballots counted by your office you reported in B18c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B24b-c should equal B24a	The amounts you report in B24b-c should equal the total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B24a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B25b-c should equal B25a	The amounts you report in B25b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because they were received after the deadline you reported in B25a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B26b-c should equal B26a	The amounts you report in B26b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected because of a problem with the voter signature you reported in B26a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B27b-c should equal B27a	The amounts you report in B27b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for lack of a postmark you reported in B27a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B28b-c should equal B28a	The amounts you report in B28b-c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots rejected for other reasons reported in B28a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B18a and B24a should equal B11a	The sum of B18a and B24a should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by voters that you reported in B11a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.

Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of B18b and B24b should equal B11b	The sum of B18b and B24b should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by uniformed services voters that you reported in B11b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B18c and B24c should equal B11c	The sum of B18c and B24c should equal the total number of UOCAVA ballots returned by overseas citizen voters that you reported in B11c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these items do not sum as expected.
The sum of B25a, B26a, B27a, and B28a should equal B24a	The amounts you report in B25a, B26a, B27a, and B28a should equal the total number of rejected UOCAVA ballots you reported in B24a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B25b, B26b, B27b, and B28b should equal B24b	The amounts you report in B25b, B26b, B27b, and B28b should equal the total number of rejected ballots from uniformed services voters you reported in B24b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B25c, B26c, B27c, and B28c should equal B24c	The sum of the amounts you report in B25c, B26c, B27c, and B28c should equal the total number of rejected ballots from overseas citizen voters you reported in B24c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B29b-c should equal B29a	The amounts you report in B29b-c should equal the total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B29a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B30b-c should equal B30a	The amounts you report in B30b-c should equal the total number of FWABs counted you reported in B30a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B31b-c should equal B31a	The amounts you report in B31b-c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected because they were received after the deadline you reported in B31a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B32b-c should equal B32a	The amounts you report in B32b-c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected because the voter's regular absentee ballot was received and counted you reported in B32a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B33b-c should equal B33a	The amounts you report in B33b-c should equal the total number of FWABs rejected for other reasons you reported in B33a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B30a, B31a, B32a, and B33a should equal B29a	The amounts you report in B30a, B31a, B32a, and B33a should equal the total number of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B29a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B30b, B31b, B32b, and B33b should equal B29b	The sum of the amounts you report in B30b, B31b, B32b, and B33b should equal the total number of FWABs returned by uniformed services voters you reported in B29b. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of B30c, B31c, B32c, and B33c should equal B29c	The sum of the amounts you report in B30c, B31c, B32c, and B33c should equal the total number of FWABs returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B29c. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.



Math Validation Rule	Error Text
The sum of C1b-i should equal C1a	The amounts you report in C1b-i should equal the number of total mail ballots transmitted you reported in C1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C4b-c should equal C4a (excepting responses of Data Not Available and Does Not Apply)	The number of Election Day drop boxes you report in C4b and C4c should equal the total number of drop boxes you reported in C4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C5b-c should equal C5a (excepting responses of Data Not Available and Does Not Apply)	The number of early voting drop boxes you report in C5b and C5c should equal the total number of drop boxes you reported in C5a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C7b-c should equal C7a (excepting responses of Data Not Available and Does Not Apply)	The sum of the amounts you report in C7b and C7c should sum to the total number of mail ballots that entered the cure process you reported in C7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of C9b-t should equal C9a	The numbers you report in C9b-t should equal the total number of rejected mail ballots you reported in C9a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D3b-c should equal D3a (excepting responses of Data Not Available and Does Not Apply)	The sum of the amounts you report in D3b-c should equal the total number of physical polling places for Election Day in your jurisdiction you reported in D3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D4b-c should equal D4a (excepting responses of Data Not Available and Does Not Apply)	The sum of the amounts you report in D4b-c should equal the total number of physical polling places for early voting in your jurisdiction you report in D4a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of D7b-g should equal D7a (excepting responses of Data Not Available and Does Not Apply)	The numbers you report in D7b-g should equal the total number of poll workers in your jurisdiction you reported in D7a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E1b-e should equal E1a	The amounts you report in E1b-e should equal the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E2a-l should equal E1a	The amounts you report in E2a-l should equal the total number of voters who submitted provisional ballots you reported in E1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of E3b-m should equal E3a	The amounts you report in E3b-m should equal the total number of rejected provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
E1d should be equal to E3a	The amount you report in E1d should equal the total number of rejected provisional ballots you reported in E3a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.
The sum of F1b-h should equal F1a	The sum of the amounts you report in F1b-h should equal the total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted you reported in F1a. Please correct your responses or use the comments section to explain why these subitems do not add up.

Table 2: Logic Validation Rules

Logic Validation Rule	Error Text
A2a cannot exceed A1a	The number of SDRs you report in A2a cannot exceed the total number of registered voters you report in A1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in A2a exceeds the value in A1a.
B3a cannot exceed B2a	The number of rejected FPCAs you report in B3a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs received you reported in B2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B3a exceeds the value in B2a.
B4a cannot exceed B3a	The number of FPCAs rejected because they were late you report in B4a should not exceed the total number of FPCAs rejected you reported in B3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B4a exceeds the value in B3a.
B11a cannot exceed B5a	The number of ballots returned you report in B11a should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B11a exceeds the value in B5a.
B11b cannot exceed B5b	The number of ballots returned from uniformed services members you report in B11b should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to uniformed services members you reported in B5b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B11b exceeds the value in B5b.
B11c cannot exceed B5c	The number of ballots returned from overseas citizen voters you report in B11c should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to overseas citizen voters you reported in B5c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B11c exceeds the value in B5c.
B17a cannot exceed B5a	The number of ballots returned as undeliverable you report in B17a should not exceed the number of ballots transmitted to UOCAVA voters you reported in B5a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B17a exceeds the value in B5a.
B18a cannot exceed B11a	The total number of ballots counted you report in B18a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B11a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B18a exceeds the value in B11a.
B18b cannot exceed B11b	The total number of ballots counted you report in B18b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you reported in B11b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B18b exceeds the value in B11b.
B18c cannot exceed B11c	The total number of ballots counted you report in B18c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B11c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B18c exceeds the value in B11c.
B19a cannot exceed B12a	The number of ballots counted you report in B19a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by UOCAVA voters you reported in B12a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B19a exceeds the value in B12a.
B19b cannot exceed B12b	The number of ballots counted you report in B19b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by uniformed services members you reported in B12b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B19b exceeds the value in B12b.



Logic Validation Rule	Error Text
B19c cannot exceed B12c	The number of ballots counted you report in B19c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by postal mail by overseas citizen voters you reported in B12c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B19c exceeds the value in B12c.
B20a cannot exceed B13a	The number of ballots counted you report in B20a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by UOCAVA voters you reported in B13a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B20a exceeds the value in B13a.
B20b cannot exceed B13b	The number of ballots counted you report in B20b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by uniformed services members you reported in B13b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B20b exceeds the value in B13b.
B20c cannot exceed B13c	The number of ballots counted you report in B20c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by email by overseas citizen voters you reported in B13c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B20c exceeds the value in B13c.
B21a cannot exceed B14a	The number of ballots counted you report in B21a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by fax by UOCAVA voters you reported in B14a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B21a exceeds the value in B14a.
B21b cannot exceed B14b	The number of ballots counted you report in B21b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by fax by uniformed services members you reported in B14b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B21b exceeds the value in B14b.
B21c cannot exceed B14c	The number of ballots counted you report in B21c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by fax by overseas citizen voters you reported in B14c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B21c exceeds the value in B14c.
B22a cannot exceed B15a	The number of ballots counted you report in B22a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned online by UOCAVA voters you reported in B15a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B22a exceeds the value in B15a.
B22b cannot exceed B15b	The number of ballots counted you report in B22b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned online by uniformed services members you reported in B15b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B22b exceeds the value in B15b.
B22c cannot exceed B15c	The number of ballots counted you report in B22c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned online by overseas citizen voters you reported in B15c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B22c exceeds the value in B15c.
B23a cannot exceed B16a	The number of ballots counted you report in B23a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by UOCAVA voters you reported in B16a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B23a exceeds the value in B16a.
B23b cannot exceed B16b	The number of ballots counted you report in B23b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by uniformed services members you reported in B16b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B23b exceeds the value in B16b.

Logic Validation Rule	Error Text
B23c cannot exceed B16c	The number of ballots counted you report in B23c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by other modes by overseas citizen voters you reported in B16c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B23c exceeds the value in B16c.
B24a cannot exceed B11a	The total number of ballots rejected you report in B24a should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by UOCAVA voters you reported in B11a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B24a exceeds the value in B11a.
B24b cannot exceed B11b	The total number of ballots rejected you report in B24b should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by uniformed services members you reported in B11b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B24b exceeds the value in B11b.
B24c cannot exceed B11c	The total number of ballots rejected you report in B24c should not exceed the total number of ballots returned by overseas citizen voters you reported in B11c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in B24c exceeds the value in B11c.
C2a cannot exceed C1a	The number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters you report in C2a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted in C1a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C2a exceeds the value in C1a.
C4a cannot exceed C3a	The number of drop boxes used during Election Day you report in C4a cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C4a exceeds the value in C3a.
C5a cannot exceed C3a	The number of drop boxes used during early voting you report in C5a cannot exceed the total number of drop boxes in C3a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C5a exceeds the value in C3a.
C6a cannot exceed C1b	The total number of mail ballots returned via drop box you report in C6a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments sections to explain why the value in C6a exceeds the value in C1b.
C7a cannot exceed C1b	The total number of mail ballots that entered the cure process that you report in C7a cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots returned by voters in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C7a exceeds the value in C1b.
The sum of C8a and C9a should equal C1b	The sum of the amounts you report in C8a and C9a should equal the number of mail ballots returned by voters you report in C1b. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of C8a and C9a do not match the value in C1b.
D3a cannot exceed D2a	The number of physical polling places used during Election Day you report in D3a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D3a exceeds the value in D2a.
D4a cannot exceed D2a	The number of physical polling places used during early voting you report in D4a cannot exceed the total number of physical polling places in D2a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D4a exceeds the value in D2a.
If D5a > 0 or D6a > 0, then D7a > 0	Because you reported using poll workers in D5a and/or D6a, you should provide the total number of poll workers used in the jurisdiction in D7a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.



Logic Validation Rule	Error Text
D5a cannot exceed D7a	The number of poll workers serving during Election Day you report in D5a cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D5a exceeds the value in D7a.
D6a cannot exceed D7a	The number of poll workers serving during early voting you report in D6a cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D6a exceeds the value in D7a.
D9a cannot exceed D7a	The number of poll workers serving for the first time in this election in D9a cannot exceed the total number of poll workers in D7a. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in D9a exceeds the value in D7a.
The sum of B18a and B30a should equal F1c	The sum of counted absentee UOCAVA ballots reported in B18a and counted FWABs reported in B30a should equal the total number of counted UOCAVA votes reported in F1c. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the sum of B18a and B30a do not match the value in F1c.
C8a should equal F1d+F1g	The number of counted absentee ballots reported in C8a should equal the total number of counted mail votes reported in F1d and F1g. Please review your responses or use the comments section to explain why the value in C8a does not match the value in F1d+F1g.
If E1b > 0 or E1c > 0, then F1e > 0	Because you reported in E1b and/or E1c that your jurisdiction counted some provisional ballots, you should provide data on the number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted in F1e. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1a cannot exceed A1a	The total number of voters who cast a ballot that was counted, as reported in F1a, cannot exceed the total number of registered voters as reported in A1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1d cannot exceed C1a	The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted, as reported in F1d, cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1g cannot exceed C1a	The number of voters who cast a mail ballot that was counted in an all-mail election jurisdiction, as reported in F1g, cannot exceed the total number of mail ballots transmitted, as reported in C1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
F1e cannot exceed E1a	The number of voters who cast a provisional ballot that was counted, as reported in F1e, cannot exceed the total number of provisional ballots cast, as reported in E1a. Please review your responses and add comments as necessary.
If F3a = Yes, then F3b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F3a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F3b.
If F3a = Yes, then F3c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs without VVPAT in F3a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F3c.
If F4a = Yes, then F4b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F4a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F4b.
If F4a = Yes, then F4c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using DREs with VVPAT in F4a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F4c.
If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F5a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F5b.

Logic Validation Rule	Error Text
If F5a = Yes, then F5c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using ballot marking devices in F5a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F5c.
If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using scanners in F6a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F6b.
If F6a = Yes, then F6c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using scanners in F6a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F6c.
If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using electronic poll books in F8a, you should report data on the make(s) and model(s) of this equipment in F8b.
If F8a = Yes, then F8c_1 ≠ 0 or Does Not Apply	Because you reported using electronic poll books in F8a, you should report data on the number of machines deployed in F8c.

Table 3: Policy Survey Validation Rules

Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q8_1 = 1 OR Q8_2 = 1 OR Q8_3 = 1 OR Q8_4 = 1 OR Q8_5 = 1, then A4d, A5d, and A7d ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Online Template:</u> Because your state reported having some form of automatic registration in Q8 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4d, A5d, and A7d. Instead, please report the total, new, duplicate, updated, invalid, and other types of automatic registration transactions processed. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p> <p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having some form of automatic registration in Q8 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4d, A5d, and A7d. Instead, please report the total, new, duplicate, updated, invalid, and other types of automatic registration transactions processed. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p> <p><u>Online Template:</u> N/A</p>
If (Q8_1 = 1 OR Q8_2 = 1 OR Q8_3 = 1 OR Q8_4 = 1 OR Q8_5 = 1) AND Q16_1 = 1, then A6d ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having some form of automatic registration in Q8 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A6d. Instead, please report the total, new, duplicate, updated, invalid, and other types of automatic registration transactions processed. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p> <p><u>Online Template:</u> N/A</p>
If (Q8_1 = 1 OR Q8_2 = 1 OR Q8_3 = 1 OR Q8_4 = 1 OR Q8_5 = 1) AND Q16_2 = 1, then A8d ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having some form of automatic registration in Q8 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A8d. Instead, please report the total, new, duplicate, updated, invalid, and other types of automatic registration transactions processed. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>



Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q9 = 1 OR Q9 = 2, then A4c ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Online Template:</u> Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c, or A8c. Instead, please report the total number of online registration transactions received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p> <p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4c. Instead, please report the total number of online registration transactions received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>
If Q9 = 1, then A5c ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Online Template:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A5c. Instead, please report the number of new online registration transactions received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>
If Q9 = 1, then A6c ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Online Template:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A6c. Instead, please report the number of duplicate online registration transactions received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>
If Q9 = 1 OR Q9 = 2, then A7c ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Online Template:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A7c. Instead, please report the number of online registration transactions that are updates to existing registrations, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>
If Q9 = 1, then A8c ≠ Does Not Apply	<p><u>Online Template:</u> N/A</p> <p><u>Excel Template:</u> Because your state reported having an online voter registration system in Q9 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A8c. Instead, please report the total number of invalid online registration transactions received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>
If Q11 = 1, then A2a ≠ Does Not Apply	<p>Because your state reported having a form of same-day registration in Q11 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A2a. Instead, please report the total number of same-day registrations received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.</p>

Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q11a_1 = 1, then A2b ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported having same-day registration on Election Day in Q11a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A2b. Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations received on Election Day, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q11a_2 = 1 OR Q11a_3 = 1 then A2c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported having same-day registration during in-person early voting in Q11a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A2c. Instead, please report the number of same-day registrations received prior to Election Day, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q12 = 1, then A3c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported having preregistration for persons under 18 years of age in Q12 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A3c. Instead, please report the number of preregistration transactions received, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q13 = 1, then A1b ≠ Does Not Apply and A1c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported differentiating between active and inactive voters in Q13 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A1b and A1c. Instead, please report the number of active and inactive voters in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q13b = 1, then A1d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported tracking data on other types of registered and eligible voters aside from active and inactive in Q13b of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A1d. Instead, please report the number of other registered voters in this item, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q16_1 = 1, then A3d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported tracking data on duplicate registration transactions in Q16 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A3d. Instead, please report the number of duplicate registration transactions in this item, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q16_1 = 1, then A6a, A6b, A6e ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported tracking data on duplicate registration transactions in Q16 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A6a, A6b, or A6e. Instead, please report the number of duplicate registration transactions in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q16_2 = 1, then A3f ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported tracking data on invalid or rejected registration transactions in Q16 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A3f. Instead, please report the number of invalid or rejected registration transactions in this item, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q16_2 = 1, then A8a, A8b, A8e ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported tracking data on invalid or rejected registration transactions in Q16 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A8a, A8b, or A8e. Instead, please report the number of invalid or rejected registration transactions in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_1 = 1, then A4a, A7a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration using mail, fax, or email in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4a or A7a. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_2 = 1, then A4b, A7b ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration in person in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4b or A7b. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_3 = 1, then A4c, A7c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration using a public-facing online registration system in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4c or A7c. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_4 = 1, then A4d, A7d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration through an automatic registration program in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4d or A7d. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_5 = 1, then A4e, A7e ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at motor vehicles offices in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4e or A7e. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_6 = 1, then A4f, A7f ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at public assistance offices mandated by the NVRA in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4f or A7f. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q17_7 = 1, then A4g, A7g ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at state-funded agencies primarily serving persons with disabilities in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4g or A7g. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_8 = 1, then A4h, A7h ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at armed forces recruitment offices in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4h or A7h. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_9 = 1, then A4i, A7i ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at other agencies designated by the state not mandated by the NVRA in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4i or A7i. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_10 = 1, then A4j, A7j ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at registration drives in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4j or A7j. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_11 = 1, then A4k, A7k ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration at polling places and voting sites in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4k or A7k. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q17_12 = 1, then A4l, A7l ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing individuals to register to vote and/or update their registration using other sources in Q17 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A4l or A7l. Instead, please report the appropriate data in these items, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18_1 = 1 OR Q18_2 = 1 OR Q18_3 = 1, then A10a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported using confirmation notices in Q18 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A10a. Instead, please report the total number of confirmation notices sent, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_1 = 1 & Q18a_10E = 2, then A11c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have not voted in two consecutive elections in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11c. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q18a_2 = 1, then A11b ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose address may have changed in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11b. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_3 = 1 OR Q18a_4 = 1, then A11d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have received a disqualifying criminal conviction and/or who have been incarcerated in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11d. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_5 = 1, then A11f ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have been declared mentally incompetent in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11f. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_6 = 1, then A11h ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters who surrendered their driver's license in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11h. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_7 = 1, then A11a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters whose mail from an election office was returned undeliverable in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11a. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_8 = 1, then A11e ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have requested to be removed from the voter registration rolls in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11e. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q18a_9 = 1, then A11i ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending confirmation notices to voters who have not made contact with the election office in the prescribed period in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11i. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q18a_10 = 1, then A11j ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported sending routine confirmation notices to all registered voters in Q18a of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A11j. Instead, please report the number of confirmation notices sent for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q21 = 1, then A13a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported merging records when a duplicate voter registration record is identified in the database in Q21 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A13a. Instead, please report the number of duplicate registration records merged, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q25a = 1, then F1g > 0	Because your state reported using a statewide all-vote-by-mail system in Q25a of the Policy Survey, you must report data on the number of voters who cast a ballot in a jurisdiction that votes entirely by mail in F1g. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q26 = 2 OR Q26 = 3, then C2a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing some or all registered voters to be designated as permanent absentee voters in Q26 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to C2a. Instead, please report the number of mail ballots transmitted to permanent absentee voters, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q28 = 1, then C7a ≠ Does Not Apply, C7b ≠ Does Not Apply, C7c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing for mail ballot curing in Q28 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to C7a, C7b, and/or C7c. Instead, please report the data requested, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q31_2 = 1 OR Q31_3 = 1 OR Q31_4 = 1 OR Q31_5 = 1 OR Q31_6 = 1 OR Q31_7 = 1 OR Q31_8 = 1 OR Q31_9 = 1, then C9k ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported requiring some form of postmark requirement for mail ballots in Q31 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to C9k. Instead, please report the number of mail ballots rejected because they did not have the required postmark, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q34_1 = 1 OR Q34_2 = 1 OR Q34_3 = 1, then D4a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q34 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to D4a. Instead, please report the number of polling places used during early voting, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q34_1 = 1 OR Q34_2 = 1 OR Q34_3 = 1, then D4b ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q34 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to D4b. Instead, please report the number of polling places other than election offices used during early voting, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q34_1 = 1 OR Q34_2 = 1 OR Q34_3 = 1, then D4c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q34 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to D4c. Instead, please report the number of polling places located at election offices used during early voting, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q34_1 = 1 OR Q34_2 = 1 OR Q34_3 = 1, then D6a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q34 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to D6a. Instead, please report the number of poll workers used during early voting, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q34_4 = 0, then F1f ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing a form of in-person voting prior to Election Day in Q34 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to F1f. Instead, please report the number of voters who cast ballots during in-person early voting that were counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q41_1 = 1, then B6a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by postal mail in Q41 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B6a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by postal mail, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q41_2 = 1, then B7a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by email in Q41 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B7a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by email, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q41_3 = 1, then B8a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by fax in Q41 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B8a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by fax, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q41_4 = 1, then B9a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots using an online portal via ballot delivery system in Q41 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B9a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by online portal, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q41_5 = 1, then B10a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported transmitting UOCAVA ballots by other modes in Q41 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B10a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots transmitted by other modes, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q42_1 = 1, then B12a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by postal mail in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B12a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_2 = 1, then B13a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by email in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B13a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by email, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_3 = 1, then B14a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by fax in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B14a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by fax, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_4 = 1, then B15a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots online via ballot delivery portal in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B15a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by online portal, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_5 = 1, then B16a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by another mode in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B16a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by other modes, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_1 = 1, then B19a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by postal mail in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B19a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by postal mail and counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_2 = 1, then B20a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by email in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B20a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by email and counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_3 = 1, then B21a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by fax in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B21a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by fax and counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q42_4 = 1, then B22a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots online via a ballot delivery portal in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B22a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA ballots returned by online portal and counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q42_5 = 1, then B23a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported allowing UOCAVA voters to return their ballots by another mode in Q42 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to B23a. Instead, please report the number of UOCAVA voter ballots returned by other modes and counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46 = 1, then E1a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q46 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E1a. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots cast, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46 = 1, then E1b ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q46 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E1b. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots cast that were counted in full, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46 = 1, then E1d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q46 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E1d. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots cast that were rejected, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46 = 1, then E3a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q46 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E3a. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots rejected, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46 = 1, then F1e ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q46 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to F1e. Instead, please report the total number of voters who cast provisional ballots that were counted, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46 = 1, then F12c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported offering provisional ballots in Q46 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to F12c. Instead, please report the location where provisional ballots were tallied, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q46a_1 = 1, then E2a ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a person does not appear on the list of eligible voters, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2a. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_2 = 1, then E2b ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter does not have proper identification, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2b. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_3 = 1, then E2c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when an election official asserts a voter is not eligible, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2c. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_4 = 1, then E2d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a person who is not an election official asserts a voter is not eligible and the challenge cannot be resolved, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2d. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_5 = 1, then E2e ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter is not a resident of the precinct in which they are attempting to vote, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2e. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_6 = 1, then E2f ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter's registration has not been updated with their current name and address, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2f. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_7 = 1, then E2g ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a voter who was issued a mail ballot does not surrender the mail ballot when they wish to vote in person, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2g. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.



Policy Survey Validation Rule	Error Text
If Q46a_8 = 1, then E2h ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when a federal or state judge extends polling hours, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2h. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_9 = 1, then E2i ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered when an individual registers to vote on the same day they cast a ballot in person, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2i. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for this reason or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46a_10 = 1, then E2j ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported in Q46a of the Policy Survey that provisional ballots may be offered for reasons other than those listed in E2a-E2i, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E2j. Instead, please report the number of provisional ballots that were cast for other reasons or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46c = 2, then E1c ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported partially counting provisional ballots in some instances in Q46c of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E1c. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots counted in part, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q46c = 3, then E3d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported rejecting provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct in Q46c of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to E3d. Instead, please report the total number of provisional ballots rejected for this reason, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.
If Q51_6 = 0, then A12d ≠ Does Not Apply	Because your state reported that criminal convictions or incarceration can affect individuals' voting eligibility in Q51 of the Policy Survey, you may not respond Does Not Apply to A12d. Instead, please report the total number of persons who were removed from the voter rolls because of disqualifying felony conviction, or, if that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available. If the Policy Survey response is incorrect, then please contact your state POC and the EAVS technical assistance team.

Table 4: Policy Survey Pre-Fills

Policy Survey Response	Pre-Filled Response In EAVS
Q8_6 = 1	A4d, A5d, A6d, A7d, A8d and A9d = Does Not Apply
Q9 = 3	A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c, A8c and A9c = Does Not Apply
Q11 = 2	A2a, A2b, and A2c = Does Not Apply
Q11 = 1 AND Q11a_1 = 0 AND Q11a_4 = 0	A2b = Does Not Apply

Policy Survey Response	Pre-Filled Response In EAVS
Q11 = 1 AND Q11a_2 = 0 AND Q11a_3 = 0 AND Q11a_4 = 0	A2c = Does Not Apply
Q12 = 2	A3c = Does Not Apply
Q13 = 2	A1c = Does Not Apply
Q13b = 2	A1d = Does Not Apply
Q16_1 = 0 OR Q16_3 = 1	A3d, A6a-n = Does Not Apply
Q16_2 = 0 OR Q16_3 = 1	A3f, A8a-n = Does Not Apply
Q17_1 = 0	A4a, A5a, A6a, A7a, A8a, and A9a = Does Not Apply
Q17_2 = 0	A4b, A5b, A6b, A7b, A8b, and A9b = Does Not Apply
Q17_3 = 0	A4c, A5c, A6c, A7c, A8c, and A9c = Does Not Apply
Q17_4 = 0	A4d, A5d, A6d, A7d, A8d, and A9d = Does Not Apply
Q17_5 = 0	A4e, A5e, A6e, A7e, A8e, and A9e = Does Not Apply
Q17_6 = 0	A4f, A5f, A6f, A7f, A8f, and A9f = Does Not Apply
Q17_7 = 0	A4g, A5g, A6g, A7g, A8g, and A9g = Does Not Apply
Q17_8 = 0	A4h, A5h, A6h, A7h, A8h, and A9h = Does Not Apply
Q17_9 = 0	A4i, A5i, A6i, A7i, A8i, and A9i = Does Not Apply
Q17_10 = 0	A4j, A5j, A6j, A7j, A8j, and A9j = Does Not Apply
Q17_11 = 0	A4k, A5k, A6k, A7k, A8k, and A9k = Does Not Apply
Q17_12 = 0	A4l, A5l, A6l, A7l, A8l, A9l, A4m, A5m, A6m, A7m, A8m, A9m, A4n, A5n, A6n, A7n, A8n, and A9n = Does Not Apply
Q18_4 = 1	A10a-A10i and A11a-A11n = Does Not Apply
Q18a_1 = 0	A11c = Does Not Apply
Q18a_1 = 1 AND Q18a_1OE ≠ 2	A11c = Does Not Apply
Q18a_2 = 0	A11b = Does Not Apply
Q18a_3 = 0 AND Q18a_4 = 0	A11d = Does Not Apply
Q18a_5 = 0	A11f = Does Not Apply
Q18a_6 = 0	A11h = Does Not Apply
Q18a_7 = 0	A11a = Does Not Apply
Q18a_8 = 0	A11e = Does Not Apply
Q18a_9 = 0	A11i = Does Not Apply
Q18a_10 = 0	A11j = Does Not Apply
Q23 = 2	F8a = No, F9a-g = No
Q25 = 2	F1g = Does Not Apply
Q26 = 1	C2a = Does Not Apply
Q27 = 2	C3a = Does Not Apply, C4a-c = Does Not Apply, C5a-c = Does Not Apply, C6a = Does Not Apply
Q28 = 2	C7a = Does Not Apply, C7b = Does Not Apply, C7c = Does Not Apply
Q29_Postmark_NA = 1 OR Q31_1 = 1	C9k = Does Not Apply
Q34_4 = 1	D4a-c = Does Not Apply, D6a = Does Not Apply, F1f = Does Not Apply



Policy Survey Response	Pre-Filled Response In EAVS
Q36 = 2	D5a = Does Not Apply, D6a = Does Not Apply, D7a-g = Does Not Apply, D8a = Does Not Apply, D9a = Does Not Apply
Q41_1 = 0	B6a-c = Does Not Apply
Q41_2 = 0	B7a-c = Does Not Apply
Q41_3 = 0	B8a-c = Does Not Apply
Q41_4 = 0	B9a-c = Does Not Apply
Q41_5 = 0	B10a-c = Does Not Apply
Q42_1 = 0	B12a-c = Does Not Apply and B19a-c = Does Not Apply
Q42_2 = 0	B13a-c = Does Not Apply and B20a-c = Does Not Apply
Q42_3 = 0	B14a-c = Does Not Apply and B21a-c = Does Not Apply
Q42_4 = 0	B15a-c = Does Not Apply and B22a-c = Does Not Apply
Q42_5 = 0	B16a-c = Does Not Apply and B23a-c = Does Not Apply
Q43_Postmark_NA = 1 AND Q44_Postmark_NA = 1	B27a-c = Does Not Apply
Q46 = 2	E1a-e = Does Not Apply, E2a-l = Does Not Apply, E3a-m = Does Not Apply, F1e = Does Not Apply, and F3d_3, F4d_3, F5d_3, F6d_3, F7d_3, F12c = Does Not Apply
Q46a_1 = 0	E2a = Does Not Apply
Q46a_2 = 0	E2b = Does Not Apply
Q46a_3 = 0	E2c = Does Not Apply
Q46a_4 = 0	E2d = Does Not Apply
Q46a_5 = 0	E2e = Does Not Apply
Q46a_6 = 0	E2f = Does Not Apply
Q46a_7 = 0	E2g = Does Not Apply
Q46a_8 = 0	E2h = Does Not Apply
Q46a_9 = 0	E2i = Does Not Apply
Q46c = 1 OR Q46c = 2	E3d = Does Not Apply
Q51_6 = 1	A12d = Does Not Apply

Table 5: Valid Skips

If...	Items Filled
A4c = Does Not Apply	A5c, A6c, A7c, A8c, and A9c = Valid Skip (-77)
A4d = Does Not Apply	A5d, A6d, A7d, A8d, and A9d = Valid Skip (-77)
A4f = Does Not Apply	A5f, A6f, A7f, A8f, and A9f = Valid Skip (-77)
A4g = Does Not Apply	A5g, A6g, A7g, A8g and A9g = Valid Skip (-77)
A4h = Does Not Apply	A5h, A6, A7h, A8h, and A9h = Valid Skip (-77)
A4i = Does Not Apply	A5i, A6i, A7i, A8i, and A9i = Valid Skip (-77)
A4j = Does Not Apply	A5j, A6j, A7j, A8j, and A9j = Valid Skip (-77)
A4k = Does Not Apply	A5k, A6k, A7kj, A8k, and A9k = Valid Skip (-77)

If...	Items Filled
A10a = Does Not Apply	A10b-i = Valid Skip (-77)
A10a = Does Not Apply	A11a-n = Valid Skip (-77)
A12a = Does Not Apply	A12b-k = Valid Skip (-77)
B1a = Does Not Apply	B1b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B5a = 0	B5b-B28c = Valid Skip (-77)
B7a = Does Not Apply	B7b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B8a = Does Not Apply	B8b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B9a = Does Not Apply	B9b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B10a = Does Not Apply	B10b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B13a = Does Not Apply	B13b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B14a = Does Not Apply	B14b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B15a = Does Not Apply	B15b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B16a = Does Not Apply	B16b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B20a = Does Not Apply	B20b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B21a = Does Not Apply	B21b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B22a = Does Not Apply	B22b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B23a = Does Not Apply	B23b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B27a = Does Not Apply	B27b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
B28a = Does Not Apply	B28b-c = Valid Skip, and B28_Other = Valid Skip (-77)
C4a = Does Not Apply	C4b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
C5a = Does Not Apply	C5b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
C7a = Does Not Apply	C7b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
D3a = Does Not Apply	D3b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
D4a = Does Not Apply	D4b-c = Valid Skip (-77)
D7a = Does Not Apply	D7b-g = Valid Skip (-77) and D9a = Valid Skip (-77)
F3a = No	F3b_1-F3d_4 = Valid Skip (-77)
F4a = No	F4b_1-F4d_4 = Valid Skip (-77)
F5a = No	F5b_1-F5d_5 = Valid Skip (-77)
F6a = No	F6b_1-F6d_5 = Valid Skip (-77)
F7a = No	F7d_1-F7d_5 = Valid Skip (-77)
F8a = No	F8b_1-F8c_3 = Valid Skip (-77)



Table 6: Other Pre-Fills

If...	Items Filled
State = Maine	Section B = Data Not Available for all jurisdictions except UOCAVA-ME
State = North Dakota	Section A and B1 = Does Not Apply
State = Northern Mariana Islands	Section B = Does Not Apply
Jurisdiction = Kalawao County, HI	All items = Data Not Available
Jurisdiction = UOCAVA-ME, ME	All items = Data Not Available except for Section B and contact information

Table 7: Special Conditions and Data Missingness

Validation Rule	Error Text
A1a ≠ Does Not Apply unless State = North Dakota	Please provide the total number of people who were registered and eligible to vote in your jurisdiction in the November 2024 general election. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
A3a ≠ Does Not Apply unless State = North Dakota	Please provide the total number of registration transactions received in your jurisdiction between the close of registration for the November 2022 general election and the close of registration for the November 2024 general election. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B1a-c cannot be Does Not Apply unless State = North Dakota	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B2a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B3a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B4a cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B5a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B6a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B11a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B12a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B17a-b cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B18a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B19a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B24a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B25a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.

Validation Rule	Error Text
B26a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B29a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
B30a-c cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the requested information on UOCAVA voters. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
C1a cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the total number of mail ballots transmitted to voters for the November 2024 general election. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
C8a cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the total number of mail ballots returned and counted for the November 2024 general election. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
C9a cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the total number of mail ballots returned and rejected for the November 2024 general election. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
D1a cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the total number of precincts in your jurisdiction for the November 2024 general election. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
F1a cannot be Does Not Apply	Please provide the total number of voters who cast a ballot (regardless of mode) that was counted for the November 2024 general election in your jurisdiction. If that data are not tracked, then respond Data Not Available.
F5b_1 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking Device (Los Angeles County) unless Jurisdiction = Los Angeles County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F5b_2 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking Device (Los Angeles County) unless Jurisdiction = Los Angeles County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F5b_3 cannot be VSAP Ballot Marking Device (Los Angeles County) unless Jurisdiction = Los Angeles County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F6b_1 cannot be IBML (Los Angeles County) or LRC-1000 (Los Angeles County) unless Jurisdiction = Los Angeles County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F6b_2 cannot be IBML (Los Angeles County) or LRC-1000 (Los Angeles County) unless Jurisdiction = Los Angeles County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F6b_3 cannot be IBML (Los Angeles County) or LRC-1000 (Los Angeles County) unless Jurisdiction = Los Angeles County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be On-Site Voter Registration Database (North Carolina State Board of Elections) unless State = North Carolina	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be On-Site Voter Registration Database (North Carolina State Board of Elections) unless State = North Carolina	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.



Validation Rule	Error Text
F8b_3 cannot be On-Site Voter Registration Database (North Carolina State Board of Elections) unless State = North Carolina	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be SiteBook (Maricopa County, Arizona Elections Department) unless State = Arizona and Jurisdiction = Maricopa County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be SiteBook (Maricopa County, Arizona Elections Department) unless State = Arizona and Jurisdiction = Maricopa County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be SiteBook (Maricopa County, Arizona Elections Department) unless State = Arizona and Jurisdiction = Maricopa County	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be CO SoS (Colorado Secretary of State) unless State = Colorado	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be CO SoS (Colorado Secretary of State) unless State = Colorado	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be CO SoS (Colorado Secretary of State) unless State = Colorado	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be GBS Valid Voter (Illinois) unless State = Illinois	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be GBS Valid Voter (Illinois) unless State = Illinois	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be GBS Valid Voter (Illinois) unless State = Illinois	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be IA SoS (Iowa Secretary of State) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be IA SoS (Iowa Secretary of State) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be IA SoS (Iowa Secretary of State) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be Iowa Precinct Atlas Consortium (Iowa) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be Iowa Precinct Atlas Consortium (Iowa) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be Iowa Precinct Atlas Consortium (Iowa) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be MI BoE (Michigan Board of Elections) unless State = Michigan	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be MI BoE (Michigan Board of Elections) unless State = Michigan	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be MI BoE (Michigan Board of Elections) unless State = Michigan	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be OR SoS (Oregon Secretary of State) unless State = Oregon	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be OR SoS (Oregon Secretary of State) unless State = Oregon	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.

Validation Rule	Error Text
F8b_3 cannot be OR SoS (Oregon Secretary of State) unless State = Oregon	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be WA SoS (Washington Secretary of State) unless State = Washington	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be WA SoS (Washington Secretary of State) unless State = Washington	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be WA SoS (Washington Secretary of State) unless State = Washington	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_1 cannot be Badger Book (Wisconsin Election Commission) unless State = Wisconsin	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_2 cannot be Badger Book (Wisconsin Election Commission) unless State = Wisconsin	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F8b_3 cannot be Badger Book (Wisconsin Election Commission) unless State = Wisconsin	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be AVID - Access Voter Information Database (INEXL & Arizona) unless State = Arizona	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be GARVIS - Georgia Registered Voter & Information System (Georgia) unless State = Georgia	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be IN-SVRS (GoCivix, Inc. & Indiana) unless State = Indiana	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be I-Voters (Iowa & Arikkan, Inc.) unless State = Iowa	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be MDVoters (Maryland) unless State = Maryland	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be SCRE - State of Colorado Registration and Elections (Colorado) unless State = Colorado	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be SC SEC's VREMS (Kopis, LLC & South Carolina) unless State = South Carolina	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be SEIMS (North Carolina) unless State = North Carolina	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be SVRS - Statewide Voter Registration System (Minnesota) unless State = Minnesota	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.
F11b cannot be VRIS - Voter Registration Information System (Massachusetts) unless State = Massachusetts	You have selected a make and model which is not used in your jurisdiction. Please correct your response.



Validation Rule	Error Text
<p>Required items cannot be left blank. Flag the following if item is blank: A1a, A1b, A1c, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, A3d, A3e, A3f, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A4j, A4k, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, A5h, A5i, A5j, A5k, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A6j, A6k, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, A7j, A7k, A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A8f, A8g, A8h, A8i, A8j, A8k, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, A9g, A9h, A9i, A9j, A9k, A10a, A10b, A10c, A10d, A10e, A10f, A11a, A11b, A11c, A11d, A11e, A11f, A11g, A11h, A11i, A11j, A11k, A12a, A12b, A12c, A12d, A12e, A12f, A12g, A12h, A13a, B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B8a, B8b, B8c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B11a, B11b, B11c, B12a, B12b, B12c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B17a, B17b, B17c, B17d, B17e, B17f, B18a, B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B22a, B22b, B22c, B24a, B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, B26c, B27a, B27b, B27c, B29a, B29b, B29c, B30a, B30b, B30c, B31a, B31b, B31c, B32a, B32b, B32c, C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C2a, C3a, C4a, C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C7b, C7c, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l, C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, C9q, D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D8, D8Comments, D9a, E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, E3j, F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F2, F3a, F4a, F5a, F6a, F7a, F8a, F9a, F9b, F9c, F9d, F9e, F9f, F9g, F10a, F10b, F10c, F10d, F10e, F10g, F11a, F12a, F12b, F12c, F12d, and F12e.</p>	<p>Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, then please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, then please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, then please enter Does Not Apply and explain it in the comments section.</p>
<p>If A1d > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A1d_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A3g to A3i is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A3g_other to A3i_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A4l to A4n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A4l_other to A4n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A5l to A5n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A5l_other to A5n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.</p>

Validation Rule	Error Text
<p>If any of A6l to A6n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A6l_other to A6n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A7l to A7n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A7l_other to A7n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A8l to A8n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A8l_other to A8n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A9l to A9n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A9l_other to A9n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A10g to A10i is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A10g_other to A10i_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A11l to A11n is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A11l_other to A11n_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of A12i to A12k is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item A12i_other to A12k_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of B28a to B28c is filled, response to corresponding open-ended item B28_other is required and vice versa</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of B33a to B33c is filled, response to corresponding open-ended item B33_other is required and vice versa</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>
<p>If any of C1g to C1i is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item C1g_other to C1i_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)</p>	<p>Please provide a description and a response for the “Other” category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the “Other” items, then you can leave them blank.</p>



Validation Rule	Error Text
If any of C9r to C9t is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item C9r_other to C9t_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.
If E1e is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item E1e_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.
If any of E2j to E2l is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item E2j_other to E2l_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.
If any of E3k to E3m is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item E3k_other to E3m_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.
If F1h is > 0, response to corresponding open-ended item F1h_other is required and vice versa (i.e., if response is provided for the open-ended text item, a number in the corresponding item is expected)	Please provide a description and a response for the "Other" category you entered information in. If you do not have any information to enter in the "Other" items, then you can leave them blank.
If F2e_5 is selected in the Online Survey or Excel template, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F2_other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F3b_1 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F3b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F3b_2 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F3b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F3b_3 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F3b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F4b_1 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F4b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F4b_2 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F4b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F4b_3 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F4b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F5b_1 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F5b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F5b_2 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F5b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F5b_3 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F5b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F6b_1 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F6b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.

Validation Rule	Error Text
If F6b_2 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F6b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F6b_3 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F6b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F8b_1 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F8b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F8b_2 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F8b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F8b_3 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F8b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F11b_1 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F11b_1other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F11b_2 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F11b_2other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F11b_3 = Other, response to corresponding open-ended item F11b_3other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F3a = Yes, then F3b_1, F3c_1, F3d_1, F3d_2, F3d_3 and F3d_4 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter Does Not Apply and explain in the comments section.
If F4a = Yes, then F4b_1, F4c_1, F4d_1, F4d_2, F4d_3 and F4d_4 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter Does Not Apply and explain in the comments section.
If F5a = Yes, then F5b_1, F5c_1, F5d_1, F5d_2, F5d_3, F5d_4 and F5d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter Does Not Apply and explain in the comments section.
If F6a = Yes, then F6b_1, F6c_1, F6d_1, F6d_2, F6d_3, F6d_4 and F6d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter Does Not Apply and explain in the comments section.
If F7a = Yes, then F7d_1, F7d_2, F7d_3, F7d_4 and F7d_5 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter Does Not Apply and explain in the comments section.



Validation Rule	Error Text
If F8a = Yes, then F8b_1 and F8c_1 cannot be blank	Please respond to item [insert item number here]. If you do not have the information to respond, please enter Data Not Available. If you collect the information but no response fits in this category, please enter "0". If this question does not apply to you, please enter Does Not Apply and explain in the comments section.
If F9g = Yes, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F9g_other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
If F10g = Yes, a response to the corresponding open-ended item F10g_other is required	Please provide a description for the "Other" category you selected.
<p>Flag any negative value in numeric items: A1a, A1b, A1c, A1d, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, A3d, A3e, A3f, A3g, A3h, A3i, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A4j, A4k, A4l, A4m, A4n, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, A5h, A5i, A5j, A5k, A5l, A5m, A5n, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A6j, A6k, A6l, A6m, A6n, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, A7j, A7k, A7l, A7m, A7n, A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A8f, A8g, A8h, A8i, A8j, A8k, A8l, A8m, A8n, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, A9g, A9h, A9i, A9j, A9k, A9l, A9m, A9n, A10a, A10b, A10c, A10d, A10e, A10f, A10g, A10h, A10i, A10j, A10k, A10l, A10m, A10n, A10o, A10p, A10q, A10r, A10s, A10t, A10u, A10v, A10w, A10x, A10y, A10z, A11a, A11b, A11c, A11d, A11e, A11f, A11g, A11h, A11i, A11j, A11k, A11l, A11m, A11n, A11o, A11p, A11q, A11r, A11s, A11t, A11u, A11v, A11w, A11x, A11y, A11z, A12a, A12b, A12c, A12d, A12e, A12f, A12g, A12h, A12i, A12j, A12k, A12l, A12m, A12n, A12o, A12p, A12q, A12r, A12s, A12t, A12u, A12v, A12w, A12x, A12y, A12z, B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B8a, B8b, B8c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B11a, B11b, B11c, B12a, B12b, B12c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B17a, B17b, B17c, B17d, B17e, B17f, B18a, B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B22a, B22b, B22c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a, B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, B26c, B27a, B27b, B27c, B28a, B28b, B28c, B29a, B29b, B29c, B30a, B30b, B30c, B31a, B31b, B31c, B32a, B32b, B32c, B33a, B33b, B33c, C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C1g, C1h, C1i, C2a, C3a, C4a, C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C7b, C7c, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l, C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, C9q, C9r, C9s, C9t, D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D9a, E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E1e, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E2j, E2k, E2l, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, E3j, E3k, E3l, E3m, F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F1h, F3c_1, F3c_2, F3c_3, F4c_1, F4c_2, F4c_3, F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, F8c_3, and F11a.</p>	<p>Negative numbers are not allowed as responses in EAVS. If you intended to respond Does Not Apply (-88) or Data Not Available (-99), then please select the appropriate checkbox instead.</p>

Validation Rule	Error Text
<p>Flag any value with decimals in numeric items: A1a, A1b, A1c, A1d, A2a, A2b, A2c, A3a, A3b, A3c, A3d, A3e, A3f, A3g, A3h, A3i, A4a, A4b, A4c, A4d, A4e, A4f, A4g, A4h, A4i, A4j, A4k, A4l, A4m, A4n, A5a, A5b, A5c, A5d, A5e, A5f, A5g, A5h, A5i, A5j, A5k, A5l, A5m, A5n, A6a, A6b, A6c, A6d, A6e, A6f, A6g, A6h, A6i, A6j, A6k, A6l, A6m, A6n, A7a, A7b, A7c, A7d, A7e, A7f, A7g, A7h, A7i, A7j, A7k, A7l, A7m, A7n, A8a, A8b, A8c, A8d, A8e, A8f, A8g, A8h, A8i, A8j, A8k, A8l, A8m, A8n, A9a, A9b, A9c, A9d, A9e, A9f, A9g, A9h, A9i, A9j, A9k, A9l, A9m, A9n, A10a, A10b, A10c, A10d, A10e, A10f, A10g, A10h, A10i, A10j, A10k, A10l, A10m, A10n, A10o, A10p, A10q, A10r, A10s, A10t, A10u, A10v, A10w, A10x, A10y, A10z, A11a, A11b, A11c, A11d, A11e, A11f, A11g, A11h, A11i, A11j, A11k, A11l, A11m, A11n, A11o, A11p, A11q, A11r, A11s, A11t, A11u, A11v, A11w, A11x, A11y, A11z, A12a, A12b, A12c, A12d, A12e, A12f, A12g, A12h, A12i, A12j, A12k, A12l, A12m, A12n, A12o, A12p, A12q, A12r, A12s, A12t, A12u, A12v, A12w, A12x, A12y, A12z, B1a, B1b, B1c, B2a, B2b, B2c, B3a, B3b, B3c, B4a, B5a, B5b, B5c, B6a, B6b, B6c, B7a, B7b, B7c, B8a, B8b, B8c, B9a, B9b, B9c, B11a, B11b, B11c, B12a, B12b, B12c, B13a, B13b, B13c, B14a, B14b, B14c, B15a, B15b, B15c, B16a, B16b, B16c, B17a, B17b, B17c, B17d, B17e, B17f, B18a, B18b, B18c, B19a, B19b, B19c, B20a, B20b, B20c, B21a, B21b, B21c, B22a, B22b, B22c, B23a, B23b, B23c, B24a, B24b, B24c, B25a, B25b, B25c, B26a, B26b, B26c, B27a, B27b, B27c, B28a, B28b, B28c, B29a, B29b, B29c, B30a, B30b, B30c, B31a, B31b, B31c, B32a, B32b, B32c, B33a, B33b, B33c, C1a, C1b, C1c, C1d, C1e, C1f, C1g, C1h, C1i, C2a, C3a, C4a, C4b, C4c, C5a, C5b, C5c, C6a, C7a, C7b, C7c, C8a, C9a, C9b, C9c, C9d, C9e, C9f, C9g, C9h, C9i, C9j, C9k, C9l, C9m, C9n, C9o, C9p, C9q, C9r, C9s, C9t, D1a, D2a, D3a, D3b, D3c, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D6a, D7a, D7b, D7c, D7d, D7e, D7f, D7g, D9a, E1a, E1b, E1c, E1d, E1e, E2a, E2b, E2c, E2d, E2e, E2f, E2g, E2h, E2i, E2j, E2k, E2l, E3a, E3b, E3c, E3d, E3e, E3f, E3g, E3h, E3i, E3j, E3k, E3l, E3m, F1a, F1b, F1c, F1d, F1e, F1f, F1g, F1h, F3c_1, F3c_2, F3c_3, F4c_1, F4c_2, F4c_3, F5c_1, F5c_2, F5c_3, F6c_1, F6c_2, F6c_3, F8c_1, F8c_2, F8c_3, and F11a.</p>	<p>Numbers with decimals are not allowed as valid responses. Please review your response to the item and enter a valid number.</p>



Appendix C: Post-Submission Validation Rates

Table 1: Validation Rates and Outlier Thresholds

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold For Flagging Result For Further Review
Percentage of registrations that were new and valid	$\frac{A3b}{A3a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percentage of registrations that were duplicates	$\frac{A3d}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percentage of registrations that were invalid or rejected	$\frac{A3f}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percentage of registrations that were updates	$\frac{A3e}{A3a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percentage of registrations received by mail, fax, or email	$\frac{A4a}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percentage of registrations received in person	$\frac{A4b}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percentage of registrations received online	$\frac{A4c}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percentage of registrations received at motor vehicle agencies (excluding automatic registrations)	$\frac{A4e}{A3a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Confirmation notices sent as percent of active registered voters	$\frac{A10a}{A1b} \times 100$	<1% >35%
Percentage of registrations removed as percent of total registrants	$\frac{A12a}{A1a} \times 100$	<1% >99%
Percentage of FPCAs that were rejected	$\frac{B3a}{B2a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned	$\frac{B11a}{B5a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned that were counted	$\frac{B18a}{B11a} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percentage of UOCAVA ballots returned that were rejected	$\frac{B24a}{B11a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percentage of FWABs counted	$\frac{B30a}{B29a} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percentage of FWABs rejected	$\frac{(B31a + B32a + B33a)}{B29a} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percentage of mailed ballots returned	$\frac{C1b}{C1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percentage of mailed ballots unreturned	$\frac{C1f}{C1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percentage of mailed ballots returned via drop box	$\frac{C6a}{C1b} \times 100$	>95%

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold For Flagging Result For Further Review
Percent of returned mail ballots that entered the ballot curing process	$\frac{C7a}{C1b} \times 100$	>20%
Percentage of mailed ballots counted	$\frac{C8a}{C1b} \times 100$	<10% >100%
Percentage of mailed ballots rejected	$\frac{C9a}{C1b} \times 100$	<0.5% >90%
Percentage of poll workers under age 18	$\frac{D7b}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of poll workers ages 18 to 25	$\frac{D7c}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of poll workers ages 26 to 40	$\frac{D7d}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of poll workers ages 41 to 60	$\frac{D7e}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of poll workers ages 61 to 70	$\frac{D7f}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of poll workers ages 71+	$\frac{D7g}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of poll workers who served for the first time	$\frac{D9a}{D7a} \times 100$	>50%
Percentage of provisional ballots rejected	$\frac{E1d}{E1a} \times 100$	<0.5% >95%
Percentage of turnout by active registration	$\frac{F1a}{A1b} \times 100$	<35% >95%
Percent of ballots cast in person on Election Day	$\frac{F1b}{F1a} \times 100$	<10% >90%
Percent of ballots cast by mail	$\frac{F1d + F1g}{F1a} \times 100$	<5% >95%
Percent of ballots cast in person before Election Day	$\frac{F1f}{F1a} \times 100$	<1% >95%
Percent of ballots cast by UOCAVA voters	$\frac{F1c}{F1a} \times 100$	<0.1% >50%
Percent of ballots cast that were provisional	$\frac{F1e}{F1a} \times 100$	<0.01% >25%
Total number of voting systems deployed	$F3c_1 + F3c_2 + F3c_3 + F4c_1 + F4c_2 + F4c_3 + F5c_1 + F5c_2 + F5c_3 + F6c_1 + F6c_2 + F6c_3$	<1
Number of electronic poll books used	$F8c_1 + F8c_2 + F8c_3$	<1



Table 2: Comparisons to 2020 EAVS Data

EAVS Rate	Calculation	Threshold For Flagging Result For Further Review
2024 total registrations as percentage of 2020's registrations	$\frac{A1a [2024]}{A1a [2020]} \times 100$	<50% >150%
2024 total registrations as percentage of 2022's registrations	$\frac{A1a [2024]}{A1a [2022]} \times 100$	<50% >150%
2024 total registrations as percentage of 2023's CVAP	$\frac{A1a [2024]}{CVAP [2023]} \times 100$	<70% >130%
2024 registrations removed as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{A12a [2024]}{A9a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 UOCAVA registrants as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{B1a [2024]}{B1a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 UOCAVA ballots transmitted as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{B5a [2024]}{B5a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 UOCAVA ballots returned as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{B11a [2024]}{B9a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 UOCAVA ballots counted as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{B18a [2024]}{B14a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 mailed ballots transmitted as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{C1a [2024]}{C1a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 mailed ballots returned as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{C1b [2024]}{C1b [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 mailed ballots counted as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{C8a [2024]}{C3a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >200%
2024 provisional ballots cast as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{E1a [2024]}{E1a [2020]} \times 100$	<10% >500%
2024 total turnout as percentage of 2020's	$\frac{F1a [2024]}{F1a [2020]} \times 100$	<50% >150%
2024 total turnout as percentage of 2023's CVAP	$\frac{F1a [2024]}{CVAP [2023]} \times 100$	<30% >95%

Appendix D: How To Calculate Selected EAVS Rates

The EAVS item numbers in this table correspond to the question numbering for the 2024 EAVS. To determine item numbering for previous EAVS surveys, please refer to the survey instrument and data codebook for each year.

EAVS Rate	Calculation
Total CVAP registration rate	$\frac{A1a}{CVAP} \times 100$
Active CVAP registration rate	$\frac{A1b}{CVAP} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were new and valid	$\frac{A3b}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were duplicates	$\frac{A3d}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were updates	$\frac{A3e}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of registrations that were rejected	$\frac{A3f}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registrations that were received by mail, fax, or email	$\frac{A4a}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registrations that were received in person at election or registrar offices	$\frac{A4b}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registrations that were submitted by individual voters through public-facing online registration systems	$\frac{A4c}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registrations that were received through automatic registration programs	$\frac{A4d}{A3a} \times 100$
Percentage of total registrations that were received through motor vehicle agencies (excluding automatic registration programs)	$\frac{A4e}{A3a} \times 100$
Voter registration records removed as a percentage of total registrants	$\frac{A12a}{A1a} \times 100$
Percentage of FPCAs that were rejected	$\frac{B3a}{B2a} \times 100$
Percentage of total transmitted UOCAVA ballots that were returned by voters	$\frac{B11a}{B5a} \times 100$
Percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were counted	$\frac{B18a}{B11a} \times 100$
Percentage of returned UOCAVA ballots that were rejected	$\frac{B24a}{B11a} \times 100$
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were counted	$\frac{B30a}{B29a} \times 100$
Percentage of FWABs returned by UOCAVA voters that were rejected	$\frac{(B31a + B32a + B33a)}{B29a} \times 100$
Percentage of transmitted mail ballots that were returned by voters	$\frac{C1b}{C1a} \times 100$
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were counted	$\frac{C8a}{C1b} \times 100$



EAVS Rate	Calculation
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were rejected	$\frac{C9a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of returned mail ballots that were returned via drop box	$\frac{C6a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of returned mail ballots that entered the ballot curing process	$\frac{C7a}{C1b} \times 100$
Percentage of poll workers who served for the first time in the 2024 general election	$\frac{D9a}{D7a} \times 100$
Percentage of provisional ballots that were counted, either in full or in part	$\frac{(E1b + E1c)}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$
Percentage of provisional ballots that were rejected	$\frac{E1d}{(E1b + E1c + E1d + E1e)} \times 100$
Voter turnout rate by CVAP	$\frac{F1a}{CVAP} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast at a physical polling place on Election Day	$\frac{F1b}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast as mail ballots	$\frac{(F1d + F1g)}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast in-person before Election Day	$\frac{F1f}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast by UOCAVA voters	$\frac{F1c}{F1a} \times 100$
Percentage of ballots that were cast by provisional voters	$\frac{F1e}{F1a} \times 100$

A Report from the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
to the 119th Congress





U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

2025 Annual Report

— EAC.gov —





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Executive Summary



Executive Summary

As the only federal agency solely focused on election administration, the EAC works to test and certify the nation’s election equipment, support election officials, and serve voters. Ultimately the agency’s focus is to make elections safe, secure, accurate, and accessible. Per Section 207 of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is required to submit an Annual Report to Congress.

This report details the agency’s activities during FY 2025, as well as the 2025 calendar year, and our efforts to further the mission of the EAC. The EAC’s contributions and accomplishments helped support successfully administered elections in 2024 and 2025.

Election Technology and Security

During FY 2025, the EAC’s Election Technology Office achieved significant milestones in support of testing and certifying the nation’s voting equipment. A major highlight was the certification of two voting systems to the latest Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VMSG) available—

★ **Mission:** To improve the administration of federal elections.

★ **Vision:** Instill confidence and trust in elections that are safe, secure, accurate, accessible, and conducted with the highest standards of integrity.

VMSG 2.0. Due to significant investment and dedication of EAC staff, the agency met and exceeded expectations and timelines shared with the public.

As of December 2025, there are five additional systems in test to VMSG 2.0 and the EAC will continue progress toward their certification throughout 2026. These are important steps toward seeing 2.0 systems in voting locations nationwide. Through this process, the EAC completed the biennial review of Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTL) accreditation. This includes review of materials and



EAC Commissioner Christy McCormick recites the Pledge of Allegiance with California Secretary of State Dr. Shirley Weber (left) and attendees of the EAC and Vet the Vote’s Poll Workers Helping Americans Vote event by the USS Iowa. Photo credit: Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk





on-site visits to make sure appropriate testing processes and procedures are in place.

The Testing and Certification Division also worked to draft VVSG 2.1 in collaboration with stakeholders and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). As part of this effort, the EAC convened five meetings of the Technical Guidelines Development Committee to collect feedback directly from members. The VVSG 2.1 initiative reflects the agency’s commitment to regularly reviewing the standards to ensure they remain relevant to current and future voting system technologies.

This year, the EAC formally closed out VVSG 1.0 by guiding the final remaining systems through certification under the lifecycle policy, completing the transition away from the standard.

The EAC’s Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program (ESTEP) marked a turning point with the certification of the nation’s first electronic poll book at the federal level. This provided a roadmap to implement similar evaluation and testing programs for other election technology. The EAC is leading the way in this area with the Electronic Ballot Delivery Systems Pilot Program, the Voluntary Voter Registration Systems Guidelines version 0.5, and a report on expanding

security testing of election night reporting systems, all of which are expected to be completed in 2026.

The agency’s Field Services Program continued to expand its role as a post-certification resource for election officials, strengthening oversight of fielded voting systems through direct engagement. The program logged over 500 communications during the fiscal year, reflecting a sustained effort to provide support, answer questions from state and local officials, and serve as a bridge between jurisdictions and the EAC. The program conducted briefings with 12 state and county election departments and processed a total of 48 hash value requests spanning nine states, 30 counties, and two townships.

Assisting Election Officials and Voters

The EAC supports election officials and voters in several ways, from no-cost training programs to resources, election administration data, poll worker information, and more. The topics and formats of this support are often based on direct feedback from stakeholders. In addition to the resources on eac.gov, the agency manages vote.gov, a portal where users can access state-specific registration and voting



The EAC co-hosts the State Certification Testing of Election Systems National Conference (SCTESNC) 2025, held June 3-4, 2025, in Washington, DC, with Indiana’s Voting System Technical Oversight Program (VSTOP) and Georgetown University’s Tech and Public Policy Program.





information. In October 2024, 3 million visitors used the site for voter registration information leading up to the general election. From October 2024 through November 2025, 5.8 million visitors went to [vote.gov](https://www.vote.gov) with most visits to state-specific information on how to register to vote.

In FY 2025, the agency continued to grow the Learning Lab, an online training platform for state and local election officials. Its mission is to provide no-cost, accessible, and practical training to all election officials — spanning geographic locations, jurisdiction sizes and types, and levels of experience in election administration. As of September 25, 2025, there were 1,001 election officials within the Learning Lab on-demand platform representing 48 states and two territories.

The EAC training team estimates that election officials on the platform represent 525 localities and serve over 80 million voters. As of September 25, 2025, users had completed 3,188 training modules. The EAC also offers in-person training to election officials. During the fiscal year, the EAC trained more than 3,400 participants at in-person workshops across 23 election official conferences, including 19 state conferences.

As required by HAVA, in June 2025, the EAC published the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Report. It covers topics such as voter participation, voter registration, voter list maintenance, and election technology, as well as early and Election Day polling place operations for the general election. These results reflect a 100% response rate from all 50 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. The EAC has identified at least 70 external citations on the EAVS published in 2025 alone.

The EAC’s Clearinghouse Community, part of the Clearinghouse Network launched in 2023, is a collaborative peer-to-peer platform that connects state and local election officials nationwide. As of December 2025, the community had a total of over 1,500 verified election officials representing all 50 states, Washington DC, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 2025, the Community added 685 new users, a 90% growth rate. Just counting the local election officials, members serve 102.3 million voters, or 58% of all registered voters in the United States.

In FY 2025, the EAC continued to support HAVA’s requirement for voters with disabilities to be able to mark,



EAC Commissioners hear from Dean Logan, the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, at the 2024 Post-Election Hearing on December 10, 2024.





cast, and verify their ballots privately and independently. The Commission expanded its resources to help election offices comply with federal accessibility laws and serve the 40.2 million eligible U.S. voters with disabilities.

Highlighting Best Practices

The EAC fulfills its role as a national clearinghouse for information on election administration in many ways, including developing resources for election administrators at the state and local level. In FY 2025, the [EAC added more than 20 materials](#) to the agency’s robust election administration library with best practices on key topics such as voter list maintenance, election technology, procurement and implementation, disaster preparedness, and more. The Commission also continued to increase the use of popular resources such as the Election Scenario Test Deck.

Another way the EAC supports its clearinghouse role is by hosting the annual Clearinghouse Awards. The “Clearies” recognize efforts and contributions of election officials and their offices in implementing best practices across various categories of election administration. The EAC has received around 785 entries since the Clearies started nine years ago, demonstrating the program’s continued success.

For the 2024 competition, a panel of election official judges from the EAC’s advisory boards evaluated an unprecedented 258 submissions across all categories. In April 2025, the EAC presented Clearie Awards to 53 programs, with honorees ranging from counties with 25,000 registered voters to states with over 22.9 million. Additionally, the EAC acknowledged 44 election offices with Clearie Honorable Mention awards to further promote best practices to election administrators.

External Outreach

In FY 2025, the Commissioners attended and presented at over 100 conferences and events to meet with state and local election officials, U.S. and international policymakers, students, and voters. EAC staff represented the agency at 28 conferences, providing in-person training, highlighting best practices, and sharing information in support of the EAC’s mission to improve federal elections.

To meet stakeholders where they are, Commissioners and staff went to state professional association meetings of local election officials, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), and individual meetings with election officials nationwide.



EAC Commissioner Christy McCormick and Commissioner Ben Hovland meet with election officials in Guam for the LLC and Standards Board Region 6 meeting in March 2025.





Administering Grant Funds

An important function of the EAC is the administration of federal HAVA grants. In FY 2025, the EAC disbursed and administered \$ 15 million of new HAVA Election Security funds. These funds are critical for states to modernize voting infrastructure. Reports on how funds are spent show that states use funds to upgrade voting machines, improve cybersecurity systems, provide election officials with cybersecurity training, and implement post-election audits, among other uses. The EAC regularly publishes grants guidance and provides resources, including in-person assistance, training, virtual technical support, and subject-specific webinars.

During the fiscal year, the EAC provided 50 training sessions on HAVA grant management and conducted eight on-site visits, including three U.S. territories. On-site visits provide one-on-one training and dedicated support ensures the funds are being spent appropriately, and requirements are being met. To further this effort, the agency published four grant resources on the 2024 revisions to the Uniform Guidance, allowable food and refreshment costs, managing earned interest, and how to request HAVA funds. Grants staff also worked with state grantees

to close 15 audit recommendations during the fiscal year with an additional six recommendations expected to be closed by January 2026.

EAC Advisory and Oversight Boards

The EAC’s four advisory boards met throughout 2025 to provide feedback and foster collaboration between the agency and election officials and experts in the field. The Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) convened multiple times and provided technical feedback on the EAC’s proposed changes for the VVSG 2.1 and feedback on the EAC’s election technology programs. The Standards Board, Local Leadership Council (LLC), and Board of Advisors shared lessons learned from the 2024 elections and feedback on EAC programs and resources. The EAC also provided briefings on the Executive Order on Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections. To dive deeper into diverse needs of election officials across the county, the EAC held four regional meetings for the LLC and Standards Board members. Insights from board members contribute to the EAC’s strategic focus and guide future priorities.



Commissioners McCormick and Hicks meet with Local Leadership Council Region 2 members in Des Moines, Iowa.





About the EAC



Meet the Commissioners

Vice Chair Thomas Hicks, Chairman Donald Palmer, Commissioner Ben Hovland, and Commissioner Christy McCormick, in the EAC Hearing Room.



As outlined in HAVA, the Commission is comprised of four members recommended by the bicameral leaders of Congress, appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission selects a Chair and Vice Chair from among its members, representing different political parties, for a one-year term. Any action which the Commission is authorized to carry out under HAVA may be carried out only with the approval of at least three of its members.

Each year in February, the Chair and Vice Chair roles rotate among the EAC Commissioners. On February 24, 2025, Donald L. Palmer was named Chairman and Thomas Hicks was named Vice Chair. In February 2026, Thomas Hicks will begin a year-long rotation as Chairman and Commissioner Christy McCormick will serve as Vice Chair.





Chairman's Message



During my term as Chair, the Commission has made considerable progress in its support of the election community. Two primary goals have guided our work: implementing more robust systems for the next generation of voting technology and developing professional standards for elections.

The security of our election systems is paramount. We successfully certified the first two VVSG 2.0 voting systems, which enhances the cybersecurity and auditability of equipment across the country. We look forward to certifying more next generation systems and seeing their acquisition across the country.

The EAC's core mission mandate — developing standards and certifying voting systems — has remained central to the security of national infrastructure protection. The agency has continued to evolve, expanding testing, piloting new technologies, adapting to technological advances, and providing technical guidance directly to jurisdictions.

In late 2025, the Congress passed and the president signed legislation in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) modifying the Help America Vote Act, requir-

ing the EAC to conduct penetration testing of all election systems. In 2025, the EAC developed the foundation to improve penetration testing of election systems to better improve the security of the nation's elections. With continued bipartisan support and adequate resources, the EAC will remain a trusted partner for election administrators and the public.

Another major milestone for the agency was the certification of our first poll book and the expansion of the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program (ESTEP) to include evaluation of electronic ballot delivery, election night reporting, and voter registration systems. These initiatives will help states improve the accuracy of voter registration and foster national standards similar to the successful Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).

Cybersecurity remains a complex and evolving challenge. Starting with the fundamentals, we encouraged election offices to adopt best practices such as regular backups, multifactor authentication, and ongoing device maintenance.





The EAC supported these efforts through best practice products, grants and expanding penetration and vulnerability testing for voting systems and related technologies, and the expanded offering of on-the-ground support through our Field Services staff.

In 2025, the EAC co-hosted the 14th Annual State Certification Testing of Election Systems National Conference showcasing not only the agency’s work in this field to a record-setting attendance, but also highlighting emerging research and methods used in the field.

The EAC has been working with election officials throughout the fiscal year to create a set of professional auditing principles and guidelines to review all phases of the election process to promote transparency and confidence in the election administration process. These guidelines will lay the groundwork for audit pilots and the implementation of standards in the year to come. Trust in elections must be earned through professionalism, transparency, and effective communication.

The EAC also conducted three research studies on election administration that were formally reported to the Congress on ways to improve elections, including ways to increase the accuracy of voter lists using third-party commercial data. Other important topics included election worker recruitment, training, retention, and evaluation and a report measuring the impact of Election Security Grants made available from Congress.

This year we have also continued to expand to our professional education resources for the election community. The EAC’s Learning Lab, which now has over 1,000 participants from 48 states and two territories, is constantly expanding in services to include more topics and in-person trainings across the country.

The growing EAC Clearinghouse Network online community now has over 1,500 members representing all 50 states and territories. This community allows election officials from across the nation to share information, communicate with each other, and seek feedback on election administration, research, and study.

It is a priority to ensure that all jurisdictions, especially smaller or rural ones, have access to adequate resources and support. Funding is a persistent concern, and election

infrastructure must be continually improved. While federal support has been essential, state and local governments are key to providing consistent and adequate funding.

Now is a critical time to start planning to fund the transition to the new VVSG 2.0 voting systems. The federal government obviously has a role in encouraging localities across the country to upgrade to the standards Congress has asked the EAC to develop. In the past, Congress has played a key role in funding election infrastructure as seen when it attached over \$3 billion in grants to HAVA to jump-start the initial purchase of VVSG 1.0 systems nationwide over 20 years ago. This kind of support should continue as we look to upgrade our systems to better meet the technological expectations of the public and Congress.

In 2025, the EAC again answered the call from election officials across the country to help raise awareness of the need for poll workers and assist in recruitment efforts. Since 2020, National Poll Worker Recruitment Day has highlighted the importance of poll workers and been used by election offices across the country as a recruitment opportunity. In 2025, 33 state election offices, and election offices and other organizations in 45 states took part in National Poll Worker Recruitment Day. EAVS data shows election offices are finding it easier to build this recruiting network for election workers. The EAC’s efforts are a contributing factor to that progress.

Throughout 2026, the EAC will join the nation as we celebrate the 250th anniversary of our independence. With the signing of the Declaration of Independence, we laid the foundation for our democracy and the right to representative government that we enjoy today. As we reflect on one of our country’s founding documents and the evolution of the voting experience, the EAC will celebrate the history of voting in America and how we can continue to assist election officials and improve the voter experience this year and beyond.

Donald L. Palmer
Chairman
U.S. Election Assistance Commission





Donald L. Palmer, Chairman



Donald Palmer was nominated by President Donald J. Trump and confirmed by unanimous consent of the U.S. Senate on January 2, 2019, to serve as an EAC Commissioner. Mr. Palmer currently serves as Chairman of the EAC and the Designated Federal Officer (DFO) for the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC).

During his first term as EAC Chairman, Mr. Palmer and the Commission instituted a standards development and testing process to establish security, functionality, and accessibility standards for electronic poll books as part of a larger EAC testing program. The initiative resulted in the establishment of the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program (ESTEP) for the testing of election supporting technology, including ballot delivery, election night reporting, and voting technologies related to HAVA. Mr. Palmer provided leadership in the updating of the EAC testing program manual to include penetration testing requirements for testing campaigns of all voting systems submitted to EAC-accredited laboratories.

Mr. Palmer has served as the Designated Federal Officer (DFO) of the EAC's Standards Board, the Board of Advisors, and the Local Leadership Council on different occasions, and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) during the implementation phase of Voluntary Voter System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0, including the adoption of the EAC Lifecycle Policy for the transition to a new generation of voting systems.

Mr. Palmer is a former Bipartisan Policy Center Fellow where he advanced the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. Mr. Palmer is a former Secretary of the Virginia State Board of Elections and served as the Commonwealth's Chief Election Official from 2011 to 2014. During his tenure, he implemented an online voter registration system and testing program aligned with the EAC to review the security and usability of voting systems and electronic poll books. He was a state leader in exchanging voter registration information to maintain accurate voter registration lists. He also served as Florida's Director of Elections where he successfully transitioned the state from electronic voting machines to paper-based digital voting machines prior to the 2008 presidential election and expanded the Florida voting system state certification program.

Prior to his work in election administration, he served as a trial attorney with the Voting Section in the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, where he enforced the nation's federal voting laws, including HAVA and the Voting Rights Act. Palmer is a military veteran, retiring from the U.S. Navy after two decades as an Intelligence Officer and Judge Advocate General.

Mr. Palmer earned his J.D. at the Stetson University College of Law and his master's degree at George Washington University.





Thomas Hicks, Vice Chair



Thomas Hicks was nominated by President Barack H. Obama and confirmed by unanimous consent of the United States Senate on December 16, 2014, to serve on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Mr. Hicks currently serves as the Vice Chair of the EAC and the Designated Federal Officer (DFO) of the Local Leadership Council.

Mr. Hicks has focused his efforts on voter access. Under his leadership, the EAC developed a pocket-sized voter card that serves as a guide on voting rights for voters with disabilities. The card is provided in both Braille and large print. The EAC has worked with advocacy groups and election officials to distribute the card.

Mr. Hicks continues to stress the need for more young people to become involved as poll workers and in the voting process, and he was featured in a New York Times publication with a profile highlighting his efforts. Mr. Hicks is a frequent speaker at conferences in the United States and overseas.

Prior to his appointment to the EAC, Mr. Hicks served in senior roles on the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on House Administration. Mr. Hicks was responsible for issues relating to campaign finance, election reform, contested elections, and oversight of both the EAC and the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

Prior to joining the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Hicks worked at the nonprofit Common Cause and the Office of Congressional Relations for the Office of Personnel Management.

Mr. Hicks received his J.D. from the Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, and his B.A. in Government from Clark University (Worcester, MA). He also studied at the University of London (London, England) and the University of Adelaide (Adelaide, Australia).





Christy A. McCormick, Commissioner



Christy A. McCormick was confirmed by unanimous consent of the U.S. Senate on December 16, 2014, to serve as a Commissioner. Ms. McCormick has served as Chairwoman three times and currently serves as the DFO for the Board of Advisors.

She led the Commission's restructuring after several years without commissioners, created the first election data summit, and the first election accessibility summit focused on language. Ms. McCormick has met with voters and legislators across the country and observed elections in nearly all the states and numerous countries.

From 2006 until her appointment with the EAC, Ms. McCormick served as a Senior Trial Attorney prosecuting discrimination violations of federal voting statutes in the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Ms. McCormick was detailed by the Deputy Attorney General to be Senior Attorney Advisor and Acting Deputy Rule of Law Coordinator in the Office of the Rule of Law Coordinator at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq from 2009 to 2010, where she worked

as the U.S. elections expert overseeing the Iraq national elections (including an extensive election recount), and on numerous U.S. and coalition Rule of Law efforts.

Before joining the DOJ, Ms. McCormick was a Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Elizabeth A. McClanahan in the Court of Appeals of Virginia from 2003 to 2006. Ms. McCormick was an Assistant Attorney General and Assistant to the Solicitor General in the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia from 2001 to 2003. She was a member of the U.S. Supreme Court legal teams for *Black v. Virginia* (defending the Commonwealth's criminal statute against cross-burning) and *Hicks v. Virginia* (defending a First Amendment challenge to a state trespassing policy), and in cases on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. She was a Judicial Law Clerk in Virginia's Seventh Judicial Circuit Court from 1999 to 2001.

Ms. McCormick received her B.A. from the University of Buffalo, a J.D. with honors from the George Mason University School of Law (now Antonin Scalia Law School), and attended the William & Mary Law School.





Benjamin W. Hovland, Commissioner



Benjamin W. Hovland was confirmed by unanimous consent of the U.S. Senate on January 2, 2019, to serve on the EAC. Mr. Hovland has served as Chair of the EAC twice in the 2020 and 2024 presidential election years.

Mr. Hovland's leadership during an unprecedented time for election administration has helped transform the EAC to better support election officials and voters across the United States. In 2020, the EAC administered nearly \$825 million in federal grant money and strategically pivoted resources to help election officials respond to the pandemic and enhance election security. This included efforts such as the first-ever National Poll Worker Recruitment Day, which led national recruitment efforts to alleviate concerns about a significant shortage in poll workers.

During Mr. Hovland's first term as Chairman, the EAC adopted an updated version of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVG). Known as VVG 2.0, this represents the first major overhaul of the standards in 15 years and a major leap forward for future election systems. Other ini-

tiatives under his leadership include innovative programs and platforms designed to facilitate collaboration among election officials nationwide.

Mr. Hovland's career in elections spans over 20 years and includes service as Acting Chief Counsel for the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, where he was a driving force behind Congress appropriating \$380 million in Help America Vote Act (HAVA) funds to enhance election security to the states in 2018. While at the Senate, he focused on the federal government's role in election administration and campaign finance regulation.

Earlier in his career, as the Deputy General Counsel for the Missouri Secretary of State's office, he focused on legal issues related to the administration of state and federal elections, including recounts, poll worker training, voter registration list maintenance, statewide database matching, voter education resources, and ballot initiative litigation.






Commissioner Stakeholder Engagement

Throughout 2025, the Commissioners engaged with state and local election administrators across the country. With 100 visits between the four Commissioners, they traveled to 40 states and three U.S. territories to better understand how the EAC can best serve the needs of election officials. During these visits, the EAC Commissioners and staff also provided state and local election officials with training and raised awareness of the resources available from the EAC. This is discussed in more detail later in the report.

In addition to supporting domestic election officials, the Commissioners met with election officials in 11 foreign countries to highlight election administration best practices from the United States and further learn how elections are conducted abroad.

For the 2024 general election, the EAC hosted a group of international election observers representing six countries. The delegates learned how elections operate in the United States through discussions, briefings, and visits to voting locations. The EAC also facilitated meetings with other federal agencies and national partners as part of this mission.





Executive Director's Letter

As the EAC's Executive Director, it is a privilege to reflect on the tremendous progress and commitment to our mission of improving the administration of federal elections. Our small but dedicated team has focused on refining internal processes, allowing the EAC to be even more impactful and provide trusted resources to our stakeholders.

This year, the EAC achieved measurable progress toward our agency goals. We have made meaningful operational improvements that have increased our team's responsiveness and enhanced transparency and accountability. By leaning into AI and process improvements, we have seen small changes such as streamlined approvals over purchase cards to large changes, such as the ability to analyze large data sets more quickly. We have continued to embrace the highest standards of performance management, and our teams have cross-trained so, despite decreasing our overall staff count, we are still able to meet our mandates. We have been guided by accountability and dedicated to ensuring the responsible use of taxpayer funds.



In 2025, we placed stakeholder responsiveness at the core of our efforts. We held 22 events in nine states that focused on a variety of topics such as disaster preparedness and poll worker recruitment. By attentively listening to input from our advisory boards, we focused on the areas of greatest interest and continuously adapted to meet changing needs to better serve the community. We heard that election officials find toolkits helpful and responded with an updated social media toolkit. We heard there was a need for resources to help election officials with procurement, so we responded with a request for proposal (RFP) template generator and library of successful RFPs. We remained nimble and adjusted our priorities to meet the needs of our stakeholders.

Another continuing area of focus is facilitating connections between election officials so they can share best practices and learn from one another. We've demonstrated success by facilitating roundtables, regional meetings, and holding the first-ever Ideas Lab. The Ideas Lab brought together 81 federal advisory board members to develop ideas, processes, and solutions for election administration challenges. The participants generated 230 challenges and then formed teams to create 16 overarching ideas for improving election administration — highlighting more opportunities for the EAC to develop resources and facilitate solutions.

As a small agency, the EAC has historically launched programs successfully through a pilot approach. This allows us to demonstrate proof of concept before fully committing to a program. In 2025, at an EAC hearing, the Commissioners voted to continue offering field services, a quality monitoring program that assists states and local jurisdictions in the verification of EAC certified fielded voting systems. The team has deployable subject matter experts that offer hash verification, anomaly reporting, and training. These efforts are critical to the continuing progress in advancing election security.





Recognizing the critical role of data and research for understanding elections, EAC hosted the 2025 EAC Data Summit. This event brought together experts, practitioners, and researchers to strengthen our collective understanding of election data and research. It highlighted not only the EAC's leading role in the field of election research but explored how that data can be applied in the field to improve election administration.

The EAC published the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey that showed how election technology use is growing, methods Americans are using to cast their ballot, and how many election offices are finding it easier to recruit poll workers. This data, compiled directly from election officials, informs the EAC's work and priorities, and offers the most comprehensive picture of our federal elections.

At the core of the EAC's work are the election officials who work, day in and day out, to serve voters. This fiscal year included the 2024 general election with millions of ballots counted and the attention of a nation focused on the work they do. But there are no off years in elections and in 2025, we saw officials make improvements and continue serving their communities in local and state elections.

The EAC [highlighted the voices of these public servants in a video](#), where election officials shared their dedication to the integrity of elections and their profession. Their passion and dedication should give all Americans confidence in the security and accuracy of our elections.

Dustin Czarny, a local election official from New York, summed up that sentiment well saying, "It's been the honor of my life to be an elections commissioner, to be able to safeguard democracy for my friends, my neighbors and to be able to work with the Election Assistance Commission."

The EAC shares that passion, and we thank election officials for their unwavering dedication to public service and our elections.

The progress the EAC made this year would not be possible without the leadership of our Commissioners and the dedication of our staff. Looking ahead to 2026, I am confident that the EAC will continue to enhance the security and accuracy of elections, provide unbiased information and resources, and deliver excellent service.

Brianna Schletz

Executive Director

U.S. Election Assistance Commission





EAC Staff

At the end of the calendar year, the EAC's staff included 68 full-time employees, including four Commissioners. The agency continues to focus on strengthening the security and integrity of elections across the country. Throughout 2025, EAC staff provided critical support and needed resources for election officials, improved the efficiency of internal operations, and responded to stakeholders.



EAC Commissioners and EAC staff gather in the agency's Washington, DC hearing room.

Chief AI Officer

In June 2025, the EAC established a dedicated Chief AI Officer (CAIO) to lead agency-wide AI strategy and governance. The CAIO, supported by leadership, is implementing internal policies that enable responsible and accelerated adoption of AI tools across the EAC workforce. These efforts align with federal directives under EO 14179 and OMB Memorandum M-25-21, positioning the EAC to leverage government-wide AI initiatives such as USAi and other partnerships announced in August 2025.

Building on early efficiencies gained through the deployment of various frontier models, the EAC is expanding its use of AI to streamline internal processes, improve data analysis, and enhance service delivery to election officials. This includes piloting AI-driven solutions for knowledge management, document automation, and predictive analytics to better anticipate operational needs.




EAC Commissioners present a staff award to Steven Daitch, Chief AI Officer, when he was a Senior Election Subject Matter Expert in February 2025.





The EAC's Organizational Chart



Former EAC Chairman Ben Hovland passes the gavel to current Chairman Donald Palmer in February 2025.






EAC Appropriations

On March 15, 2025, Congress passed the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act of 2025 which provided the EAC with \$27.72 million in agency operating funds for FY 2025, including \$1.25 million made available to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The EAC utilized nearly every dollar of that funding with a year-end obligation rate of approximately 99.4%.

As part of that same funding package, the EAC also received \$15 million in HAVA Election Security formula grant funding which, per statutory requirements, was obligated within 45 days, and quickly distributed to the states and territories by the EAC. The funds were dedicated for the improvement of election administration and security. The minimum award amount is \$272,727 for states and \$54,545 for territories with a 20% state match requirement (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and U.S. Virgin Islands are exempt from the match requirement).

Salaries and Expenses Funding, FY 2018 – FY 2025





General Counsel Updates

Votes Taken by the Commission

As required by HAVA Section 207(4), the following section documents all votes taken from October 1, 2024, through November 14, 2025. The following also includes votes taken through the calendar year.

Subject	Result of Vote	Decided by a Vote of	Date Transmitted	Certified Date
Appointment approval of Camden Kelliher as the U.S. Election Assistance Commission General Counsel for a term of four (4) years	Approve	4-0	12/10/2024	12/10/2024
Renewal of Charters for Board of Advisors, Standards Board, TGDC, and Local Leadership Council	Approve	4-0	4/7/2025	4/9/2025
Recommending Approval of the Report on Election Worker Recruitment, Training, Retention, and Evaluation	Approve	4-0	1/7/2025	1/10/2025
Approving the Report on Measuring the Impact of Recent Grants to Election Administrators Under the Help America Vote Act	Approve	4-0	1/15/2025	1/17/2025
Recommending Approval of the EAC Board of Advisors Membership and Appointment Policy Statement	Approve	4-0	1/21/2025	1/24/2025
Appointment of Donald Palmer as the Designated Federal Officer to the Technical Guidelines Development Committee; Appointment of Thomas Hicks as the Designated Federal Officer to the Local Leadership Council; Appointment of Christy McCormick as the Designated Federal Officer to the Board of Advisors; and Appointment of Benjamin Hovland as the Designated Federal Officer to the Standards Board	Approve	4-0	2/19/2025	2/19/2025
Approving the appointment of Donald Palmer as the Chairman and Thomas Hicks as the Vice Chairman	Approve	4-0		2/19/2025
Vote to Continue Field Services	Approve	4-0		2/19/2025
Approval of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission Paper Ballot Policy	Approve	4-0	5/22/2025	5/27/2025
Adopting the Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report	Approve	4-0	6/17/2025	6/19/2025
Considering the Delegation of Authority of Maintenance of the Federal Form	Fail	2-2	8/11/2025	8/15/2025
Considering Approval of the Voter List Maintenance Study	Approve	4-0	8/25/2025	8/25/2025
Consideration of Louisiana’s Request to Update Box 6 of the State-Specific Instructions on the National Mail Voter Registration Form	Fail	2-2	8/27/2025	9/5/2025





Subject	Result of Vote	Decided by a Vote of	Date Transmitted	Certified Date
Considering the Approval of Sarah Dreyer as EAC Inspector General	Approve	4-0	9/15/2025	9/17/2025
Consideration of Changes to Federal Form to Facilitate Verification of Eligibility and Citizenship of Applicants, Documentary Proof of Citizenship	Fail	2-2	9/3/2025	9/5/2025
Consideration of EAC Continuity of Operations	Fail	2-2	9/25/2025	9/29/2025
Considering Louisiana's Request to Update Box 6 of the State-Specific Instructions on the National Mail Voter Registration Form Option 1(B)	Fail	2-2	11/3/2025	11/14/2025

Executive Order (EO) 14248 on Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections

On March 25, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 14248 on Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections, charging the EAC with various responsibilities and addressing issues of election integrity. The EAC has worked to address relevant sections of the EO, subject to judicial rulings. Throughout the year, the EAC provided briefings to HAVA-mandated Federal Advisory Committees and sought consultation with state chief election officials. As part of this process, the EAC held five public meetings of the EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee to receive technical advice on proposed updates to the VVSG prior to additional input from the EAC advisory boards required by statute.

Related to the EO, on July 16, 2025, the EAC received a petition for rulemaking submitted by America First Legal Foundation asking the Commission to amend EAC Regulations and the National Mail Voter Registration Form to require documentary proof of United States citizenship to register to vote in federal elections. The EAC sought public comment on the petition and received nearly 135,000 unique comments representing approximately 390,000 signatories. As of December 2025, the EAC was reviewing the submissions.





Recommendations



Recommendations

- ★ **1. The EAC recommends the Congress consider legislative efforts to strengthen election security and cybersecurity by establishing an independent security testing program and a coordinated vulnerability disclosure initiative facilitated by the agency.**

The EAC was consulted on proposals to address the fundamental and urgent need to bolster the cybersecurity of our election systems through independent security testing of elections infrastructure and identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities in elections technology. As the only bipartisan and independent federal agency charged with aiding states in the administration of elections, the EAC would welcome the opportunity to help achieve the national security objectives approved by Congress.

Election officials face a growing list of cybersecurity-related obligations and challenges. Legislation supporting this concept would reinforce and augment the strong security measures already in place, providing additional layers of protection over election systems and further strengthening public confidence in the election process.





Recommendations

★ 2. Authorize and appropriate funds to develop ways to improve voter registration system accuracy and interoperability.

The EAC recommends Congress authorize and appropriate funds to research ways to improve voter list maintenance pursuant to its mandate under HAVA Section 241.

HAVA Section 241 authorizes the EAC to conduct studies on election administration issues, including maintaining secure and accurate lists of registered voters. Accurate lists is essential for administering secure and efficient elections. Accurate voter rolls help reduce voting lines, decrease the number of provisional ballots cast, and ensure that only eligible electors can vote. This not only improves the efficiency of the voting process but also enhances voter confidence in the integrity of the election system.

In FY 2025, the EAC completed a pilot study under HAVA Section 241 to research the use of third-party commercial data to improve voter list accuracy. The research suggests that using credit bureau data may be a useful supplemental tool for list maintenance. This study is an example of how the EAC can contribute to research and recommendations that help improve voter list maintenance processes across the country. With additional Congressional investment, the EAC can address questions related to the accuracy of the data and its utility for voter list maintenance purposes, as well as policy and practical administration considerations, including potential changes in state law.

Federal laws such as the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and HAVA establish baseline requirements for voter list maintenance, but the specific activities and frequency of updates vary by state. These laws mandate voter list maintenance activities at the state and local level.





Recommendations

★ 3. Authorize and appropriate funds to allow the EAC to sustain and expand state and local election official professional training and workforce development programs.

The EAC recommends Congress authorize and appropriate funds to sustain and expand efforts to address election workforce professionalization. Pursuant to its mandate under HAVA, the EAC will use these funds to implement in-person and virtual voluntary training for election officials, study workforce development, and recommend programming to address workforce needs.

U.S. election administration is a rapidly evolving and growing field with a workforce that includes tens of thousands of state and local election officials responsible for performing an increasing number of highly complex duties in service to their constituents. As competencies and skills necessary to perform critical election operations change, an aging election workforce needs relief from a new generation of election professionals. Additional funding will enable the EAC to sustain and expand its training and workforce development programs to enhance professionalization among the election workforce and build organizational resiliency in the field of election administration.





Recommendations

★ 4. Amend HAVA to include the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).

The EAC recommends Congress amend HAVA to include CNMI.

The 2002 HAVA legislation provides specific provisions and classifications for Washington, DC, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Congress has included CNMI in recent HAVA Election Security Grant appropriations. By amending HAVA to include CNMI, it would provide the territory with the support they need to serve voters.





Recommendations

★ 5. Authorize and appropriate funds to research the rising cost of elections.

The EAC recommends Congress authorize and appropriate funds to research the cost of elections, pursuant to its mandate under HAVA Section 241.

In most states, the cost of elections is primarily borne by counties and local jurisdictions. The actual cost of running elections nationwide is challenging to determine due to differences in accounting processes and data tracking methods that are maintained by more than 8,000 election jurisdictions. Recent reports indicate that election spending ranges from \$4 to \$6 billion in any given year, with 2020 potentially reaching \$10 billion. It is estimated that between 2003-2020, the federal government funded about 4% of all election costs. Looking ahead, research estimates a national figure of \$53.3 billion needed to conduct elections over the next decade, or \$5.3 billion when converted to an annual basis.

Understanding the actual cost to administer elections more accurately could enable policymakers and election officials to make more informed decisions regarding election spending based on comprehensive and accurate data.





Recommendations

★ 6. Appropriate HAVA modernization funds for states and territories to procure VVSG 2.0 version systems.

The EAC recommends that Congress provide dedicated funding to support the implementation and certification of voting systems that comply with the VVSG 2.0. This funding will ensure that states and jurisdictions can upgrade their voting systems to meet the latest standards for security, accessibility, and reliability.

When HAVA was enacted, it provided approximately \$3.5 billion in federal funds to replace punch card and lever-voting systems with more modern, electronic systems. This initial funding was crucial in modernizing the nation's voting infrastructure and enhancing the integrity of the electoral process.

Since the passage of HAVA, the EAC has continued to develop and update the VVSG to reflect technological advancements and emerging security threats. The latest iteration, VVSG 2.0, is a comprehensive set of standards to ensure that voting systems are secure, accessible, and reliable. However, the transition to VVSG 2.0-compliant systems requires substantial investment. Two voting systems are currently certified to VVSG 2.0 and with more in the process, a congressional investment now would inform election offices as they begin planning for procurement.





Recommendations

★ 7. Amend HAVA to improve the efficiency of the TGDC appointment process.

The statutorily mandated Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) is charged with helping the Executive Director of the Commission develop the voluntary voting system guidelines. Currently, the TGDC is chaired by the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). All other members are appointed jointly by the Commission and the Director of NIST.

As the voluntary voting system guidelines are the core responsibility of the EAC and only a secondary consideration for the Director of NIST, there have been long delays in getting members of the committee appointed. Currently, there are five pending nominations for the 14-member committee, limiting the feedback and ability to reach a quorum to conduct business.

As such, the EAC recommends removing the joint appointment language allowing the EAC to appoint members. This would create efficiencies in allowing vacancies to be filled faster, ensuring full membership when the TGDC is required to meet.

The EAC recommends that Congress amend section 221(c)(1) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. § 20961(c)(1)) as follows:

“The Development Committee shall be composed of the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (who shall serve as its chair), together with a group of 14 other individuals appointed jointly by the Commission and the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, consisting of the following:...”



EAC Commissioners speak at the TGDC meeting in January 2025.





Recommendations

★ 8. Encourage the sharing of election administration best practices and development of a program to host overseas visitors to learn more about U.S. federal elections.

The EAC recommends Congress consider legislative efforts to enable the agency to better share election administration best practices internationally by hosting foreign delegations to the United States.

Through previous interactions with overseas visitors and on trips overseas, the Commissioners learned that countries across the globe look to EAC programs, like the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), as the gold standard for election technologies. The EAC has provided briefings to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), as well as responded to requests from visiting countries.

A formal program would allow the EAC to continue and expand this work, highlighting our election infrastructure as one that should be emulated around the world.



EAC Chairman Palmer represents the U.S. at the Inter-American Meeting of Electoral Management Bodies in Chile in September 2025.





Election Technology and Security



Election Technology and Security

A core responsibility of the EAC is to set standards, test, and certify the nation's voting equipment. The EAC's testing and certification of voting systems is rigorous and comprehensive. This program supports state and local officials in their mission of safe and secure elections. The EAC is responsible for developing voluntary security and accuracy standards and providing a certified stamp of approval for voting systems used by American voters. This process ensures voting systems are held to stringent standards for security, reliability, accessibility, and accuracy.

As the only federal agency dedicated to election administration, the EAC is a critical resource for the security of both the voting systems and the supporting technologies election offices to check in voters, manage voter registration lists, and post-election night results.

The EAC's Election Technology Office includes the Testing and Certification division, Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program (ESTEP), and Field Services. Staff on these teams collaborate to be responsive to the needs of

election officials and achieve significant milestones that strengthen the integrity and efficiency of election equipment and voting systems.

Testing and Certification and the First Voting Systems Certified to VVSG 2.0

In July 2025, the EAC announced a historic achievement with the first voting system certified to the agency's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0. [Hart InterCivic's Verity Vanguard 1.0](#) was certified as the first voting system to complete certification to the latest standards. Since VVSG 2.0 was unanimously adopted, the EAC has been diligently working toward this achievement. Smartmatic's VSR1 2.1 achieved certification to VVSG 2.0 in November 2025. Multiple other VVSG 2.0 systems, including VotingWorks VxSuite 4.0, remained under active test campaigns throughout 2025, signaling strong momentum toward widespread adoption.

Jay Phelps, Director of the EAC Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, speaks at the TGDC meeting in January 2025.





The EAC’s Testing and Certification division also oversaw the completion of Dominion’s Democracy Suite 5.20 and Clear Ballot’s ClearVote 2.5 under VVSG 1.0 marking the last systems certified outside the VVSG Lifecycle Policy Maintenance Exceptions, closing the chapter on legacy standards while initiating full migration to VVSG 2.0.

Throughout FY 2025, the EAC communicated about the remaining steps before voters see VVSG 2.0 certified systems at voting locations. These steps include state-level testing and certification, funding, procurement planning, staff training, and public testing as part of the process for jurisdictions to deploy new voting equipment. As this process moves forward, the EAC will continue to support election offices to ensure the systems in use at voting locations are secure and accurate.

The first voting system certified to VVSG 2.0 marks a major milestone in the EAC’s commitment to advancing the next generation of voting systems. Hart Verity Vanguard 1.0 is the first system certified to these standards, but it will not be the last. The EAC staff has done great work to make this new standard a reality. – Joint statement from the EAC Commissioners



The EAC also completed the successful biennial accreditation renewals for all Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTL), including Pro V&V and SLI Compliance, ensuring continued compliance with ISO/IEC 17025 and EAC standards. These renewals reinforced the foundation for rigorous testing and certification processes.

At the end of September, the EAC initiated a formal End-of-Life (EoL) review of certified systems that are no longer supported or active for potential decommissioning or withdrawal from service. This action marks a significant advancement in the agency’s efforts to modernize election technology and reinforce the integrity of the voting process. Manufacturers were directed to identify systems that have reached the end of their operational lifecycle and submit them for classification. This review ensures that the certified system landscape remains current and supports election officials in making informed, secure technology decisions.

Systems Certified in FY 2025			
Voting System	Manufacturer	Date Certified	VVSG Version
Verity Vanguard 1.0	Hart InterCivic Inc.	7/07/2025	VVSG 2.0
VSR1 2.1	Smartmatic	11/26/2025	VVSG 2.0
Democracy Suite 5.20	Liberty Vote (Formerly Dominion)	2/04/2025	VVSG 1.0
ClearVote 2.5	Clear Ballot Group Inc.	11/20/2025	VVSG 1.0





Systems Under Test		
Voting System	Manufacturer	VVSG Version
VxSuite 4.0	VotingWorks	VVSG 2.0
Verity Vanguard 1.1	Hart InterCivic Inc.	VVSG 2.0
Optio 1.0	Unisyn Voting Solutions	VVSG 2.0
Verity Voting 2.7.8	Hart InterCivic Inc.	VVSG 1.0
Verity Voting 2.8	Hart InterCivic Inc.	VVSG 1.0
Frontier 1.0	Liberty Vote USA	VVSG 2.0
EVS 7.0.0.0	Election Systems & Software (ES&S)	VVSG 2.0

Initial Work Toward VVSG 2.1

Beyond certifications, the EAC began the review process for the VVSG 2.1, incorporating stakeholder feedback from previous year’s public comment periods, collaborating with NIST for security and accessibility updates, and integrating Requests for Interpretation to clarify requirements. These efforts ensure future standards remain agile and responsive to evolving technology.

This effort is following the process laid out in HAVA and is currently with the TGDC, which is working through recommendations and critical topics. A draft of VVSG 2.1 was circulated to the TGDC for review with engagement over four public meetings and working sessions.

Internal Improvements to Better Assist Stakeholders

The Testing and Certification division also prioritized modernizing internal processes. Workflow automation was implemented for certification approvals, reducing turnaround time and improving transparency. Standard Operating Procedures were updated to streamline document review and lifecycle compliance, and modernization initiatives were launched to enhance internal systems and efficiency.

Stakeholder engagement remained a key focus, with technical presentations delivered to industry and state election officials, support provided for crosswalk efforts between federal and state testing requirements, and increased outreach to vendors preparing for VVSG 2.0 compliance. These activities strengthened collaboration and readiness across the election technology ecosystem.

Collectively, these accomplishments reflect the EAC’s strategic focus on lifecycle compliance, cybersecurity resilience, and continuous improvement, laying the groundwork for future innovations in election technology certification.

Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program (ESTEP)

Building upon the success of its voting system testing and certification program, the EAC developed the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program (ESTEP). This program is responsible for the development of federal standards for election supporting technologies, such as electronic pollbooks. It provides guidance and manuals for how to interpret the standards, runs pilot programs to test new approaches, and finalizes the standards based on what we learn from those pilots. In December 2023, the EAC unanimously approved ESTEP as a permanent program, and since then, has certified the first electronic poll books and achieved significant progress with pilot programs for other election technologies.

“The EAC test campaign has more structure to it than most state campaigns. The EAC provides oversight with weekly meetings and review of any issues that might arise during the test campaign cycle. This helps provide consistency not only throughout that particular project but the program as a whole.
- Mike Santos, Voting System Test Lab Director of SLI Compliance on the EAC’s Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification process while testifying at the EAC public hearing on election technology.





The EAC prioritized the pilot for electronic poll books given their extensive and growing use across the country. According to the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS), 41 states and territories reported utilizing electronic poll books, with 19 states reporting usage in all jurisdictions. Given the millions of voters who use this equipment each election, the EAC recognized the need to establish a uniform set of standards on the national level for electronic poll book testing and usage.

On February 19, 2025, the EAC announced KNOWiNK's Poll Pad 3.6 as the first to complete the EAC's Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program, making it the first federally certified electronic poll book. The EAC highlighted this achievement during a public meeting featuring ESTEP staff, and representatives from KNOWiNK and SLI, the VSTL that was part of the process.

On December 15, 2025, the EAC also certified KNOWiNK's Poll Pad 4.0.2. One additional electronic poll book, Tenex Software Solutions Precinct Central Touchpad 6.1.3, is in the testing process to be certified.

The Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program has proven to be useful beyond the federal level. In 2025, North Carolina became the first state to adopt the agen-

cy's Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification requirements for its own certification program. Recognizing how important this implementation is, **the EAC Commissioners issued a joint statement.**

"This milestone underscores the value of having a federal election technology certification program to support safe, secure, accurate, and accessible elections and comes just weeks after announcing the first federally certified electronic poll book. North Carolina is leading the way for other states to adopt the Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program requirements that evaluate the integrity and security of electronic poll books. The North Carolina State Board of Elections helped pave the way for this EAC program as a pilot participant and provided electronic poll book systems to further the EAC's research efforts on their capability to comply with federal requirements. The Board's participation and feedback was invaluable as the EAC refined requirements and implementation of this program. Since most election jurisdictions utilize electronic poll books, the EAC hopes this federal certification program informs future policy decisions and encourages other states and manufacturers to implement these standards to better serve election officials and voters."



Commissioner Hicks joins other speakers at "Cybersecuring Democracy: What We Learned from the 2024 U.S. Election" on January 13, 2025. Photo by Bruce Guthrie





In February 2025, ESTEP issued guidance of pre-election testing of other election supporting technologies. In addition to applicable election laws, these documents provide recommendations to assist officials with the development of baseline processes for pre-election testing for electronic poll books, electronic ballot delivery systems, and election night reporting systems.

ESTEP also advanced new pilot programs following the successful model for electronic poll books. In 2025, the EAC made significant progress developing guidelines for electronic ballot delivery systems. With feedback from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), state officials, manufacturers, and the EAC's FACA boards, the agency developed the Voluntary Electronic Ballot Delivery Requirements 0.9. These requirements will test ballot delivery systems for functionality, security, and accessibility. The Maryland State Board of Elections, Democracy Live, Enhanced Voting, and Voatz participated in the pilot program. Testing concluded in December 2025, with a final report expected in early 2026.

The EAC laid groundwork for a voter registration systems pilot program that is expected to launch in early 2026. ESTEP staff met with election offices from Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, and Wisconsin, and manufacturers Civix, ES&S, KNOWiNK, MTX Group, and Stonewall Solutions to learn more about their election technology and how it operates. Additional conversations with NIST, NASS, NASED, and the EAC's FACA boards will continue to advance the Voluntary Voter Registration Systems Guidelines version 0.5 in 2026.

For election night reporting systems, the EAC commissioned a report to explore options for expanding security testing of election-supporting technologies. The resulting framework outlines potential approaches for scalable, repeatable testing of a wide range of election technologies. Two states, two vendors, and external security researchers worked to develop this proof of concept. A comprehensive report with recommendations for next steps is expected in Fall 2026.



Brooke Watters, EAC Testing and Certification Director, presents to the TGDC in January 2025.





Quality Monitoring and Field Services — Providing on the Ground Support to Election Offices

In February 2025, the EAC held a public hearing to review the initial work and future of the Quality Monitoring and Field Services Program. Following this discussion, the Commissioners unanimously approved a recommendation that the Field Services Program continue at the agency and remain available to states as a voluntary resource. The EAC affirmed its view that the program provides an added layer of confidence and security in protecting the integrity of election systems.

Building on this foundation, the Field Services Program continued expanding its role as a post-certification resource for election officials, strengthening oversight of fielded voting systems through direct engagement. The program logged over 500 communications during the fiscal year, reflecting a sustained effort to provide support, answer questions from state and local officials, and serve as a bridge between jurisdictions and the EAC. Program briefings were conducted with 12 state and county elec-

Our interaction with the Field Services team has been absolutely fantastic, from the pre-planning to the actual visit... We do not have an internal testing and certification program, so we rely on the EAC and their work to initially allow any system to be [used] in the state of Nebraska. So, to have something like this to show us that what we bought is still what we bought is very important.
- Nebraska Deputy Secretary of State Wayne Bena at the February 2025 EAC Public Hearing on Election Technology

tion departments. These early conversations established the foundation for collaboration, familiarized officials with Field Services support, and reinforced the program's value as an ongoing partner.

Hash verification remained a central focus of the program. A total of 48 hash value requests were processed, spanning nine states, 30 counties, and two townships. Requests came from states such as Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota,

Jon Panek, EAC Chief Election Technology Officer, speaking at the NASS 2025 Winter Conference on January 31, 2025. Photo by Philip Smith, 1LPhoto.com





North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Utah, and Washington. Responding to each request ensured that deployed systems matched their certified version and reinforced this emerging best practice in election technology and chain of custody. The wide range of jurisdictions participating highlights both the demand for and trust in this service.

The program published its first Field Services reports in January 2025, documenting site visits in Hawaii and Douglas County, Nebraska. Field Services later published a report documenting a site visit to Delaware County, Pennsylvania, in September 2025. Staff observed election procedures including Logic and Accuracy Testing, hash verification of election equipment, and voting system and facility security. These reports demonstrate how Field Services can provide detailed, transparent accounts of industry best practices and reinforce confidence in election integrity.

Additional site visits took place throughout the year, with reports currently being prepared for Benton County, Washington; Cerro Gordo County, Iowa; Scott County, Iowa; and Cochise County, Arizona. Each visit involved observation of hash verification of voting system components, security protocols, and other election procedures. These forthcoming reports will demonstrate that despite the wide variation in equipment, as well as state and local regulations, common practices can be applied universally.

Beyond reports, Field Services conducted other on-site engagements. These involved in-person briefings in Arizona and Pennsylvania as well as observations of risk limiting audits in Washington and voting system certification testing in Texas. These engagements underscore the program’s flexibility in meeting the needs of jurisdictions.

The Field Services Program is evolving into an essential resource for state and local election officials. By documenting practices, verifying system integrity, and fostering direct collaboration, the program not only strengthens compliance but also contributes to the broader mission of continuous improvement in election security.

48 hash verifications logged from
2 vendors & **9** different states,
 including
30 counties & **2** townships.

The states were:

Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota,
 North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia,
 Utah, & Washington.



The Field Services Team engaged election
 offices in over **500** communications
 with state and local offices during the fiscal year.





Assisting Election Officials and Voters



Assisting Election Officials and Voters

Election Administrator Competencies Overview

Election officials must understand a variety of topics to run elections, regardless of jurisdiction size. To illustrate this, the EAC created a “wheel of competencies” from election preparation to election night and beyond. The EAC uses this comprehensive framework to guide the development of EAC resource topics.



Training for Election Officials

The EAC created the Learning Lab professional development training program to support state and local election officials. Its mission is to provide affordable, accessible, and practical training to all election officials — spanning various geographies, jurisdiction sizes and types, and levels of experience in election administration.



The program operates in two formats:

- ✓ **Learning Lab on-demand platform:** Online, self-paced training modules focus on foundational election administration concepts and practices.
- ✓ **Live training:** Interactive workshops that foster collaboration and peer learning.

Thanks for providing the trainings! Great information and a great starting point to have new staff (or interns) review before learning specific office procedures.
- Florida Election Official





On-Demand Training

The EAC developed an online training platform to provide no-cost, on-demand training to election officials, and fill a gap in professional development. Each training is written with clear learning objectives focused on foundational aspects of election administration. Most training courses can be completed within 15 minutes or less. This short format increases flexibility for trainees and allows them to receive quality information without overburdening their schedules.

As of December 2025, the Learning Lab offered **32 training courses** divided into **seven categories**:

- ✓ Election Office Administration
- ✓ Accessibility
- ✓ Communications
- ✓ Voting Systems & Election Technology
- ✓ Voting
- ✓ Post-Election
- ✓ Federal Government and Elections

Thank you for the Learning Lab! It is always good to refresh and enhance what we may already know. I have some more things to look at in our office and improve since taking the training. - Ohio Election Official

User Engagement, Growth & Impact

As of September 25, 2025, there were **1,001 election officials** within the Learning Lab representing **48 states and two territories**. The EAC estimates that local election officials on the platform represent 525 localities and serve over **80 million voters** nationwide. To date, users have completed **3,188 training modules**.

State Election Office Partnerships

The EAC partnered with two states to promote Learning Lab on-demand content directly to election officials through activities of state election offices. These include the **New Jersey Division of Elections**, which invited the EAC to present information highlighting accessibility content to county election officials during a monthly call, and the **Idaho Secretary of State's office**, which promoted the platform directly to election officials during state election official training.

The Learning Lab is great and I encourage anyone working in election administration to take full advantage of the Lab!
- Virginia Election Official



EAC Senior Election Subject Matter Expert Adam Podowitz-Thomas leads a workshop based on the Learning Lab's *Communicating with the Public About Elections* training module for over 360 Mississippi election officials.






In-Person Training

More than 3,400 participants across 23 election official conferences, including 19 state conferences, attended EAC-provided no-cost in-person trainings. Additionally, the EAC conducted trainings at two Election Center events and two regional meetings of the EAC Standards Board and Local Leadership Council.

The broad geographic reach of the EAC and Election Center events means that, in addition to the state-based engagements reflected on the map below, the EAC reached election officials from nearly every state, territory, and DC.

Loved how interactive the trainings were [and] that we weren't just listening to someone read to us from a manual. – Connecticut Election Official

Great job getting us thinking of our processes and how we can improve them. – Michigan Election Official



The EAC conducted trainings on six different subjects in FY 2025:

- ✓ Accessibility
- ✓ Audit communications
- ✓ Chain of custody
- ✓ Contingency management
- ✓ Election communications
- ✓ Poll worker training

Together, these on-demand and in-person trainings empower election officials with the knowledge and skills needed to administer safe, secure, accurate, and accessible elections.





Clearinghouse Community – A Dedicated Space for Election Administrators

The EAC’s Clearinghouse Community, part of the Clearinghouse Network launched in 2023, is a collaborative peer-to-peer platform that connects state and local election officials nationwide. As of December 2025, the community had a total of over 1,500 verified election officials representing all 50 states, Washington, DC, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

In 2025, the Community added 685 new users, a 90% growth rate. Just counting the local election officials, members serve 102.3 million voters, or 58% of all registered voters in the United States.



U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
CLEARINGHOUSE COMMUNITY

Key Features

Search

If election officials have questions about a particular topic, they can use the search bar to access community members, events, resources and even search within documents to find the information they need.

Feed

Users can view the latest resources and conversations as well as ask questions, share comments, and find new ideas.

Members

Election officials can find hundreds of colleagues from across the country by searching the member directory for common jurisdiction sizes, skills, interests, and more.

Resources

All resources that are uploaded to the community can be downloaded—from EAC materials to those created by other election officials.

Events

Users can post and find events that are open to election officials across the country, including events and webinars hosted by the EAC.

The Clearinghouse Community is a way to get easy answers to your questions... posting a question on the Clearinghouse Community will get you ten responses faster than having to research on your own. - Experienced election official from Rhode Island





User Engagement

In an August 2025 EAC poll, **nearly three-quarters (72%)** of users stated they follow conversations on the platform, use the Clearinghouse Community to learn about EAC information and resources, and find the platform an easy way to stay informed about agency events. Over the fiscal year, there have been over **260 posts** which together garnered **36,450 views**, **550 comments**, and **2,200 reactions**.

I am always interested in connecting with other election administrators. The Clearinghouse Community is an easy way to do this on a national level. - Experienced election official from Washington

Sharing Best Practices

The Clearinghouse Community supports the EAC’s HAVA-mandated function to maintain a repository of election administration information. Throughout FY 2025, the EAC and election officials uploaded 430 resources, bringing the total to over **600 available resources** on the platform. Together, these best practices have received **over 8,400 views**, with the highest engagement including ballot chain-of-custody, improving difficult customer interactions, and poll worker recruitment.

I find value in the day-to-day conversations and postings. Although each state has slightly different procedures the ideas from the community give us a starting point on any issues we have. - Experienced election official from Minnesota

EAC staff, Ed Golembiewski and Ben Jackson, present a workshop based on the EAC Learning Lab’s Effective Poll Worker Training module for approximately 60 New Jersey election officials during the New Jersey Association of Election Officials 2025 Annual Conference in Atlantic City. Photo by John Belleville

Election Official Resources in Key Areas

The EAC fulfills its role as a national clearinghouse for information on election administration in many ways, including by developing resources for state and local election administrators. In FY 2025, the EAC added more than 20 new materials to its robust election administration library. These resources provide best practices on key topics such as voter list maintenance, election technology, procurement and implementation, disaster preparedness, and more. The agency also continued to increase the usage of popular resources such as the Election Scenario Test Deck.

One treasure trove I think that the EAC has is the Clearinghouse. You have a massive database of best practices throughout the country, including multiple sizes of jurisdictions and multiple different aspects of election administration. That Clearinghouse really is a fantastic tool. - Ricky Hatch, County Clerk and Auditor, Weber County, Utah, at the EAC’s 2024 Post-Election Hearing





Disaster Preparedness and Continuity of Operations

EAC Roundtable on Disaster Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery

In September 2025, the EAC convened a group of election officials in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to discuss methods and tools election administrators can use to mitigate the effects of natural and man-made disasters. It included discussions on how election officials can respond and recover from hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and other emergencies that can disrupt voting. The meeting featured 16 state and local election officials, representing 15 jurisdictions from across the country.

Insights derived from this meeting and from other conversations the EAC has held with stakeholders will inform upcoming work products the agency will develop to help election officials prepare for future emergencies.

Elections must go on, no matter the circumstances. When disasters happen, election administrators are on the front lines of serving their communities. Careful planning can mitigate some of the most significant impacts, but election officials must be ready to ensure voters can safely and securely cast a ballot, regardless of the conditions they face.

The officials who joined this discussion have faced a wide range of challenges throughout their careers and their thoughtful comments and inspiring stories help inform the work of the agency and will provide valuable insight to the thousands of election officials across the country. - Joint statement from the EAC Commissioners on the September 2025 meeting

EAC Chairman Donald Palmer and Commissioners Thomas Hicks and Ben Hovland meet with election officials in Ft. Lauderdale, FL.



Training: Election Scenario Test Deck

The EAC's Election Scenario Test Deck provides a variety of relatable scenarios election officials can use to exercise their existing continuity of operations plans or other contingency plans. In 2025, the EAC distributed more than 3,500 decks to election offices across the country. This is a sharp increase from the 250 decks the agency distributed as of the FY 2024 Annual Report, showing how valuable election offices have found these cards to be since they were released in Summer 2024.

The agency created two expansion packs based on feedback and ideas from election officials — one on disaster preparedness and the other specifically to prepare poll workers for any unexpected scenarios leading up to and on Election Day. These are expected to be released in spring 2026.



Vice Chair Thomas Hicks holds up the EAC's TTX cards.



Procurement and Implementation

No piece of technology lasts forever. Inevitably computers and voting systems will need replacement and will be a significant expense for election offices. Election officials may also need to go through a bidding process for services like ballot printing and absentee ballot mailing depending on the jurisdiction. In response to direct feedback during the Standards Board and Local Leadership Council meetings, the EAC released resources to streamline these efforts for election offices, which live on the new [Procurement and Implementation EAC web page](#).

EAC Request For Proposal (RFP) Template Generator

The EAC's RFP Template Generator is a web tool that allows an election administrator to create a basic RFP template to procure certain election equipment. Based on a few inputs, the tool creates an RFP template that can be easily customized by an election office or purchasing department.

The tool relies on language from RFPs issued by election jurisdictions that have resulted in successful contracts.



EAC Senior Election Subject Matter Expert Kimberly Smith conducts a communications training with New Mexico election officials in June 2025.





RFP Library

As a resource for election officials' procurement efforts, the EAC maintains a library of over 100 past real-world RFPs issued by state and local election offices to purchase election technology, services, equipment, and supplies. The RFP Library is organized by 18 different procurement types, such as "Voting System" and "Electronic Poll Books."

Voter Education

In FY 2025, the EAC continued to update and promote videos, which are one of the most prevalent ways people consume information, to support election officials' voter education efforts.

"Be Election Ready" Video Series

The "Be Election Ready" six-part video series guides voters through every step of the voting process, starting with registration and making a plan to vote. Each video is about two minutes long and designed to allow election officials, civic organizations, and others to share them with their communities. In addition to full-length videos, the EAC created 30-second versions.

Topics include registering to vote, making a plan to vote, voting by mail, voting in person, trusted sources of information, and election results. While each video is universally applicable to all voters in the country, the EAC encourages election offices to customize them with an election office's logo and use the editable scripts to provide information specific to their community.



"Ever Wondered About Election Security?" Video

Election security is consistently one of the most popular topics election officials are asked about by the public. The EAC released an updated version, "Ever Wondered About Election Security?" showing the stages and measures taken in elections to ensure an eligible voter's ballot is secure. It also examines the security measures in place for vote by mail ballots, election night reporting, and voting technology overall. The EAC broke up this six-minute video into one-minute and 30-second clips on specific topics to allow election offices to easily share them with the voters they serve.



Minnesota Election officials participate in an EAC training on chain of custody in June 2025.





Accessibility

In FY 2025, the EAC continued to support HAVA’s requirement for voters with disabilities to be able to mark, cast, and verify their ballots privately and independently. The agency increased its resources designed to assist election offices in complying with federal accessibility laws and to serve the 40.2 million eligible U.S. voters with disabilities.

Accessible Voting Machines Calculator

While one accessible voting machine per voting location is the minimum number to satisfy the requirements of HAVA, this may not be enough to accommodate the disabled population that the location serves.

The EAC created an Accessible Voting Machines Calculator with the University of Rhode Island’s Engineering for Democracy Institute to help election officials and policy-makers determine how many accessible voting machines

should be deployed at voting locations to achieve minimal wait times. This tool automatically simulates voter wait times based on information entered about a specific voting location, including the steps required to vote, how the location is set up, and the voting equipment used.

Election Official Accessibility Training Series

The EAC enhanced its collection of training videos to ensure election officials have the information they need to make the voting process accessible with topics on voter registration, in-person voting, and vote by mail. Election officials may earn a certificate when taking this training in the EAC’s Learning Lab. Poll workers and other election stakeholders may watch these videos on the [EAC’s YouTube Channel](#).

This series complements the other EAC accessibility training videos created with the [Carl and Ruth Shapiro Family National Center for Accessible Media at GBH \(NCAM\)](#).



EAC staff Ben Jackson and Liz Beatrice present on advancing accessibility through election supporting technology at the State Certification Testing of Election Systems National Conference (SCTESNC) on June 3, 2025, in Washington, DC.





EAC Resources Released in FY 2025

- ✓ **Accessible Voting Machines Calculator:** This tool helps determine how many accessible voting machines should be deployed at a voting location to minimize wait times for voters.
- ✓ **Communicating About Audits:** This provides quick tips for communicating about election audits with the public, and an activity prompt election officials can use to practice.
- ✓ **Disaster and Recovery Response Resources:** This EAC web page includes resources for voters and election officials after experiencing a natural disaster.
- ✓ **Election Incident Response Contacts at U.S. Federal Agencies:** List of U.S. federal agencies that election officials can contact to report incidents.
- ✓ **Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program Guidance for Pre-Election Testing:** A set of recommendations for conducting pre-election testing on ESTEP technologies.
- ✓ **“Ever Wondered About Election Security?”:** Updated video from 2018 to show the stages and measures taken in elections to ensure an eligible voter’s ballot is secure.
- ✓ **Funding Election Administration:** Joint guide from the EAC and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) describing various federal, state, and local funding mechanisms for elections.
- ✓ **Guide to Election Certification:** Updated the information under “Certification” on the EAC’s Election Results, Canvass, and Certification webpage.
- ✓ **Overview of Election Laws:** This overview of federal laws related to elections is intended to provide context for election administration and is not to be construed as legal advice.
- ✓ **Overview of Voting Systems Testing and Certification in the United States:** Joint guide from the EAC and NCSL which provides an overview of voting systems through definitions, standards, policies, and programs.
- ✓ **Post-Election Tabulation Audit Guide:** This guide is for election officials looking to start, improve, or better understand election audits.
- ✓ **Post-Election Tabulation Audits: A Brief Overview:** This covers the basics of post-election tabulation audits, including defining an audit, discussing why audits are performed, and describing what is needed to audit.
- ✓ **Procurement and Implementation:** This EAC web page offers resources designed to help election officials with their procurement efforts and election technology implementation.
- ✓ **RFP Library:** Has numerous examples to browse through past real-world RFPs on 18 different types of purchases.
- ✓ **RFP Template Generator:** This generator creates Request for Proposal (RFP) templates for various types of election technology.
- ✓ **Sample Handout: Election Audits:** This editable one-pager describes common election audits for a general audience, with placeholders that election officials can fill in to reflect their own processes.
- ✓ **State Election Profiles:** These one-page documents on each state offer a comprehensive overview of state election policies in a standardized format, with national comparison points for key election policies.
- ✓ **United States Postal Service Price Updates:** In November 2025, the EAC issued a memo to election officials about the price updates for 2026 that may impact election operations for the midterm elections.
- ✓ **VVSG 1.0 vs 2.0 Comparison:** Reference sheet highlighting key differences between VVSG 1.0 and 2.0 standards.





Election Administration Research and Data


Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)

The continual process of improving our elections relies in part on having timely and accurate data on the diverse ways Americans cast their ballots. In 2002, Congress charged the EAC collect information on the state of American elections and to make that information widely available to policymakers, advocates, scholars, journalists, and the general public.

Since 2004, the EAC has sponsored a biennial survey as its primary tool for fulfilling its information collection mission.

The Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) is conducted every two years following the federal general election and is comprised of more than 600 questions reaching over 6,400 election jurisdictions. The EAVS and the accompanying Policy Survey capture data from jurisdictions across 50 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia.

In June 2025, the EAC published the 2024 EAVS Report, the nation's most comprehensive source of election administration data. It covers topics such as voter participation, voter registration, voter list maintenance, and election technology, as well as early and Election Day polling place operations for the general election. These results reflect a 100% response rate from all 50 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. The EAC has identified at least 75 external citations on the EAVS published in 2025 alone.






ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY 2024 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT



Voter Registration



103M

Registration transactions by election offices

Processing registrations and sending confirmations are part of routine voter list maintenance.

40M confirmation notices sent

Voting Methods

In-person Early Voting	32.26%
Election Day	34.86%
Mail Ballot	31.44%
Provisional	00.85%
UOCAVA	00.51%
Other	00.07%

Over 98%

Of election jurisdictions used voting equipment that marks a paper ballot or an auditable paper record.



158M



Nearly 65% of the citizen voting age population participated in the general election.



770,000

Individuals served as poll workers for the 2024 general election.

Voting Systems and Election Supporting Technology



93% of states, territories, and DC require voting system testing and certification.



40% of jurisdictions used electronic poll books to assist with voting.

SCAN HERE:



www.eac.gov





Changes in Section A for the 2024 EAVS

The advancement of voter registration practices and data collection prompted EAC’s revision of Section A of the 2024 EAVS. From late 2021 to early 2022, the EAC convened a working group of state and local election officials to gather their insights on terms that needed updates, voter registration data collection practices, and potential revisions to survey questions. Based on the feedback from the working group, the EAC revised Section A of the EAVS.

One of the main changes to Section A is the shift of focus from “registration form” to “registration transaction” to acknowledge the fact that voter registration processes are now less reliant on paper forms and mainly based on electronic record processing. Other changes to Section A include the addition of “automatic registration” and “polling places and voting sites” as sources of voter registration, among other changes.

Making the EAVS More Efficient for Survey Responders

Without the participation of thousands of election officials reflected in the EAVS report, we would not have the detailed picture of the general election that we do. Their dedication to serving voters and incredible work throughout 2024 resulted in professionally run elections.
- Joint statement from the EAC Commissioners

The EAC understands the EAVS is a large time and resource commitment for election officials to complete. For the upcoming survey, the EAC convened six working groups, comprised of 38 election officials from 18 states, to help make filling out the EAVS easier on election officials and improve the quality of data collected.


Additionally, the EAC reached out to 2024 EAVS points of contact at the state and local level to conduct pre-survey outreach calls, usability testing of the EAVS and Policy Survey templates, and to review terms in the EAVS Glossary. The EAC also posted videos that dive deeper into each section of the EAVS and completed eight webinars, requested by state election officials, to answer more detailed questions.

Report on the 20-Year Evolution of the EAVS

For more than 20 years, the EAC has conducted the EAVS following each federal general election. In May 2025, the EAC released a report on [The History, Evolution, and Future Directions of the Election Administration and Voting Survey \(EAVS\)](#). The report explains the reasons for EAVS data collection, changes in survey questions and data collection methods over time, uses of the EAVS project data, and prospects for the EAVS.

The EAC also published comprehensive time series data files to increase the usability of the data. These include data from 2004 to 2022 for the EAVS and its companion survey, the Policy Survey. Previously, these datasets had been available for only one election at a time, which made it difficult to track election trends.

The time series data files allow users to better explore election changes and understand how election administration in the United States has evolved. The year-specific EAVS project data files provide a snapshot of each individual election, and the time series data files show the story of election administration over time.





2025 EAC Data Summit: Election Administration by the Numbers

To discuss the results of the 2024 EAVS and groundbreaking election research, the EAC partnered with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Election Data and Science Lab to host an event on July 9, 2025, with election officials, academics, and other key stakeholders. The “2025 EAC Data Summit: Election Administration by the Numbers,” featured panel discussions on election funding, using data for list maintenance, workforce development, and how election officials and researchers can best work together. The summit was livestreamed and posted on the EAC’s YouTube channel.



Not only does the information in the EAVS assist election officials, policymakers, researchers and the public about how the election is run, it also provides the Congress with that insight... and the ability to monitor how the elections and the voting laws are being implemented across the United States.” - EAC Chairman Donald Palmer at the 2025 Data Summit

Prompted by Orange County, California, successfully using a third-party credit bureau’s address database to supplement records, the EAC researched the use of this method as part of a pilot program with participation from 11 local and state jurisdictions. The resulting report, “Voter List Maintenance Study: The Use of Third-Party Commercial Data for Accurate Voter Lists,” found that using credit bureaus may be a useful supplemental tool for list maintenance. [This EAC report](#) details the study, recommendations, and conclusions.

Voter List Maintenance Study: The Use of Third-Party Commercial Data for Accurate Voter Lists

Election officials have told the EAC that voter list maintenance is among their highest priorities, as it ensures accurate and current voter registration databases. While federal law sets basic requirements, each state determines the specifics of what and how often activities are performed.

The results of this study were sent to Congress in fulfillment of the EAC’s obligations under HAVA. They were also discussed along with effective voter registration and list maintenance processes at the 2025 annual meetings for the EAC’s advisory boards — the Board of Advisors, Standards Board, and Local Leadership Council.



Speakers provide opening remarks at the 2025 EAC Data Summit: Election Administration by the Numbers on July 9, 2025, in Cambridge, MA.





Helping America Vote: Election Administration in the United States

The agency wrote a book in cooperation with the National Conference of State Legislatures, entitled “Helping America Vote: Election Administration in the United States.” This 19-chapter resource serves as a comprehensive resource that walks readers through every phase of the electoral process — from registering voters and designing ballots to counting votes and certifying results. With insights from experienced election officials and grounded in nonpartisan research, the guide explores the variety and complexity inherent to America’s decentralized election system.

EAC Research Reports Released in FY 2025

- ✓ **2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Report:** This report is an analysis of data from all 50 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia that covers topics related to the administration of federal elections.
- ✓ **Election Worker Recruitment, Training, Retention, and Evaluation Report:** This report is a comprehensive review of the statutory requirements for serving as a poll worker in the United States and a presentation of the innovative approaches that federal, state, and local agencies utilize to recruit, train, retain, and evaluate poll workers and poll worker programs.
- ✓ **Helping America Vote: Election Administration in the United States (NCSL/EAC):** This comprehensive guide provides a clear, nonpartisan overview of how elections are managed across the country.
- ✓ **Measuring the Impact of Recent Grants to Election Administrators Under the Help America Vote Act Report:** This report reviews federal Election Security Grants disbursed by the EAC since 2018 and represents the first comprehensive effort to analyze the effects of this federal election funding on election administration.
- ✓ **The History, Evolution, and Future Directions of the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS):** This report provides a retrospective on the history of the EAVS project. It explains the reasons for this data collection, changes in survey questions and data collection methods over time, uses of the project data, and prospects for EAVS.
- ✓ **Voter List Maintenance Study: The Use of Third-Party Commercial Data for Accurate Voter Lists:** This report covers the purpose of, and common data sources used, in voter list maintenance as well as the findings of a pilot program using a third-party credit bureau’s address database to supplement records.



Commissioner Hicks speaks with graduates at the CEATS Commencement ceremony in May 2025.





2024 Clearinghouse Awards

The EAC serves as a clearinghouse for best practices in election administration. One of the ways the agency fulfills this duty is through the annual Clearinghouse Awards, also known as the “Clearies.” This program recognizes the efforts and contributions of election officials and their offices in implementing best practices across various categories of election administration. Over its nine years of operation, the program has received approximately 785 entries, demonstrating its continued successful engagement with the election community.

For the 2024 competition alone, the EAC received an unprecedented 258 submissions across all categories. A panel of election official judges from the EAC’s advisory boards evaluated these submissions. In April 2025, **the EAC presented Clearie Awards to 53 programs**, with honorees ranging from counties with 25,000 registered voters to states with over

22.9 million. Additionally, the EAC **acknowledged 44 election offices with Clearie Honorable Mention awards** to further promote best practices to election administrators.

In a joint statement, the EAC Commissioners said:

“This year’s Clearinghouse Award-winning programs truly shined amid the high voter turnout in 2024. They are examples of the outstanding work election officials did to support tens of millions of voters during the presidential election. After nearly a decade, the Clearinghouse Awards continue to grow with a record number of entries received this year. These programs show how state and local election offices are the incubators of innovation. We are pleased to lift their ideas up and celebrate them on a national stage.”



Commissioner Hovland presents Carol Beecher, Director of Elections, State of Alaska, with a Clearinghouse Award. June 2025.





2024 Clearinghouse Award Winners

Communications: Distinguished Voter Education and Communications Initiatives – Small/Medium Jurisdictions

- ✓ City of Monroe Clerk-Treasurer’s Office, Michigan – Ready, Set, Vote
- ✓ Dubuque County Elections, Iowa – Voting Artwork
- ✓ Huron County Board of Elections, Ohio – Boxed Ballot
- ✓ Indian River County Supervisor of Elections, Florida –MVP Program (Mobile Voter Program)

Communications: Distinguished Voter Education and Communications Initiatives – Large Jurisdictions

- ✓ Buncombe County Election Services, North Carolina – The NC Together Video Project
- ✓ Charleston County Board of Voter Registration and Elections, South Carolina – “Owlbert Learns to Vote”
- ✓ Durham County Board of Elections, North Carolina – Durham County DCo Votes Mobile App

- ✓ Ottawa County, Michigan Clerk/ROD, Michigan – “Not a Podcast – Ballots and Banter”
- ✓ Thurston County Auditor’s Office, Washington State – Your Neighbors, Your Elections

Communications: Distinguished Voter Education and Communications Initiatives – State Level

- ✓ Nebraska Secretary of State – MY VOTE. MY ID. LET’S BRING IT
- ✓ Office of the Lieutenant Governor of Utah – 12 Days of Election Improvements “Votemas” Social Media Campaign
- ✓ South Carolina State Election Commission – Prep for the Polls Voter Education Program
- ✓ Vermont Secretary of State’s Office – Election Security in Vermont Video PSA
- ✓ Washington Office of the Secretary of State – “Mark the Ballot” Public Education Campaign



The EAC Commissioners present a Clearie Award to winners at the LLC Annual Meeting, April 21-22, 2025.





Security: Innovation and New Tools in Election Security and Technology

- ✓ California Secretary of State – De-escalation Training Program for Election Staff
- ✓ Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk – Electronic Chain of Custody Solution for Elections
- ✓ Pierce County Elections – Securing Democracy’s Inbox: An Air-Gapped Protocol for Processing Voter Email Attachments
- ✓ Tazewell County Clerk & Recorder of Deeds, Illinois – Election Judge Badge

Contingency Planning: Exemplary Contingency Planning and Emergency Response Efforts – Small/Medium Jurisdictions

- ✓ Ann Arbor City Clerk’s Office, Michigan – “More Days, More Ways” – Planning for a Safe and Secure Election in Ann Arbor, Michigan

- ✓ Coconino County Elections Department, Arizona – Empowering Poll Workers Through Situational Awareness Training: A Model for Collaboration Between Elections and Law Enforcement
- ✓ Lexington County Voter Registration and Elections, South Carolina – Election Training

Contingency Planning: Exemplary Contingency Planning and Emergency Response Efforts – Large Jurisdictions

- ✓ Buncombe County Election Services, North Carolina – Buncombe County, NC, Helene Disaster Response
- ✓ North Carolina State Board of Elections – Voting Through Helene and High Water
- ✓ Office of the Idaho Secretary of State – A Proactive and Collaborative Approach to Election Security & Threat Response
- ✓ Wake County Board of Elections, North Carolina – Wake County Election Day Emergency Action Plan

The EAC Commissioners present a Clearie Award to winners at the Standards Board Annual Meeting, April 24-25, 2025.





Election Administration: Innovations or New Practices in Election Administration – Small/Medium Jurisdictions

- ✓ County of Monterey, Elections Department, California – Books and Ballots Program
- ✓ Election Division, City of Flint Clerk’s Office, Michigan – Absent Voter Counting Board reorganization – documentation and communications

Election Administration: Innovations or New Practices in Election Administration – Large Jurisdictions

- ✓ Fairfax County Office of Elections, Virginia – Poll-book Unclear? No Need to Fear! A Worksheet Leads the Way for Processing Nonroutine Voters
- ✓ Jefferson County Clerk & Recorder, Colorado – A Signature Solution: Helping First-Time Voters Make Their Votes Count
- ✓ Prince William County Office of Elections, Virginia – Publishing Results Tapes Online

Election Administration: Innovations or New Practices in Election Administration – State Level

- ✓ Arizona Secretary of State – Arizona Election Administration Student Fellowship Program
- ✓ Maryland State Board of Elections – Text2Cure

Help America Vote Act (HAVA) Grants: Outstanding Use of HAVA Grants in Election Modernization

- ✓ Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections, Florida – Enhancing Election Accessibility and Efficiency with HAVA Grants
- ✓ Sutter County Elections, California – Sutter Translate!

Accessibility: Best Practices for Improving Accessibility for Voters with Disabilities

- ✓ Charleston County Board of Voter Registration and Elections, South Carolina – Voter Accessibility Advisory Committee

- ✓ Floyd County Elections, Georgia – Voter Accessibility Town Hall
- ✓ Salt Lake County Clerk Election Division, Utah – Try Before You Vote: Accessible Voter Outreach
- ✓ South Carolina State Election Commission – Voter Education Videos With American Sign Language Subtitles
- ✓ Washington Office of the Secretary of State, Elections Division – Partnering with our community to add ASL into the visual Video Voters’ Guide

Poll Workers: Best Practices in Recruiting, Retaining, and Training Poll Workers – Small/Medium Jurisdictions

- ✓ Guam Election Commission – 2024 Guam College Poll Worker Program
- ✓ Porter County Elections & Registration, Indiana – Improving Poll Worker Support
- ✓ Washington County Board of Elections, Maryland – Election Judge Recruitment Open House

Poll Workers: Best Practices in Recruiting, Retaining, and Training Poll Workers – Large Jurisdictions

- ✓ City of Minneapolis Elections & Voter Services, Minnesota – Student Election Judge Interpreter Training
- ✓ Fairfax County Office of Elections, Virginia – No More Waits, No Misplaced Tapes: Closing the Polls Faster on Election Night
- ✓ Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, California – Multilingual Election Worker Recruitment Tool
- ✓ Louisiana Secretary of State’s Office – Poll Worker Recruitment Card
- ✓ Pima County Elections Department, Arizona – Pima County Elections Training Program





“I Voted” Stickers: Creative and Original
“I Voted” Stickers – Small/Medium Jurisdictions

- ✓ Currituck County Board of Elections, North Carolina – “I Voted” Sticker Contest
- ✓ Harrison Township Clerk, Michigan – Boat Town “I Voted” Sticker
- ✓ Mesa County Elections Department, Colorado – Mesa County Elections 2024 Sticker Contest



“I Voted” Stickers: Creative and Original
“I Voted” Stickers – Large Jurisdictions

- ✓ Board of Elections, City of New York, New York – Battle of the Boroughs
- ✓ Division of Elections, Alaska – Alaska Celebrates Five Regions – One State
- ✓ Supervisor of Elections Office, Palm Beach County, Florida – Two Unique Accessible Braille Stickers for Voters





Stakeholder Engagement, Outreach, and Events



Stakeholder Engagement, Outreach, and Events

In FY 2025, the Commissioners attended and presented at over **100 conferences** and events to meet with state and local election officials, U.S. and international policymakers, students, and voters. EAC staff represented the agency at **28 conferences**, providing in-person training, highlighting best practices, and sharing information in support of the EAC's mission to improve federal elections.

To meet stakeholders where they are, Commissioners and staff went to state professional association meetings of local election officials, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), the National Association of State Election Directors NASED, and individual meetings with election officials across the country.

Election Official Engagement

As the only federal agency solely devoted to the administration of elections, the EAC utilizes this role to gather election officials together across all states and U.S. territories.

The EAC Organizes Ideas Lab to Solve Election Administration Challenges

The EAC held the first-ever Ideas Lab in April 2025, which brought together 81 federal advisory board members to develop ideas, processes, and solutions for election administration challenges. During the Ideas Lab, participants generated 230 challenges, narrowed to 53 high-priority issues, and formed teams to create 16 big ideas for improving election administration. The EAC is already leveraging these outputs to launch new projects, strengthen existing efforts, and guide future initiatives to support election officials.

Election officials participate in the EAC's Ideas Lab event in April 2025.



EAC Event Highlights

In furtherance of stakeholder engagement, the **EAC hosted 22 events in 9 states**, including Guam and the District of Columbia. From public hearings to annual meetings of the agency's federal advisory boards, virtual meetings and more, the EAC featured 75 bipartisan and nonpartisan election officials and subject matter experts. Most events were live streamed, receiving a total of 6,400 YouTube views.

2025 Data Summit: Election Administration by the Numbers

On July 9, 2025, the EAC partnered with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Election Data & Science Lab to bring together a wide variety of academics and practitioners to share the latest research and innovations in election administration. Held at the Samberg Conference Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, election officials, academics, and other stakeholders participated in panel discussions on the results of the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS), election funding, voter list maintenance, workforce development, and more.

During the 2024 election, over 770,000 poll workers were utilized. This large figure represents a significant component of the election process that warrants further examination. Additionally, over 98% of jurisdictions employed equipment that used a paper ballot or included a paper auditing trail, which is considered a key measure for maintaining election security. Finally, 40% of jurisdictions reported using e-poll books during this election cycle. This figure represents an all-time high when compared across previous years." - Dr. Raymond Williams, EAC Director of Research on findings from the 2024 EAVS at the 2025 Data Summit

EAVS data and other election research are extremely helpful when considering changes to policies, processes, or laws. This data is often used to support new initiatives; for example, provisional ballot data from EAVS and other states has been used to push for Election Day registration. Conversely, data can also be used to argue against legal changes based on outcomes observed in other jurisdictions. - Michelle Tassinari, First Deputy Secretary of State and Director & Legal Counsel, Elections Division, Massachusetts at the 2025 EAC Data Summit

The State Certification Testing of Election Systems National Conference (SCTESNC) 2025

The State Certification Testing of Election Systems National Conference (SCTESNC) 2025, held June 3-4, 2025, in Washington, DC, was co-hosted by the EAC with Indiana's Voting System Technical Oversight Program (VSTOP) and Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy's Tech and Public Policy Program.

Discussions focused on the opportunities and challenges in election technology. It included EAC Commissioners and staff, as well as state and local election officials, technology specialists, academic researchers, and representatives from the two accredited Voting System Test Laboratories. The EAC participated in panels on common data formats and future technology communication considerations, guidance for pre-election testing of technology, and advancing accessibility through technology testing. The event was a tremendous success, with record-breaking attendance and participation, underscoring the increasing significance of election technology.



Speakers participate in the 2024 EAVS Overview Panel Discussion at the 2025 EAC Data Summit on July 9, 2025.





Case Studies on the New Initiatives in the EAC’s Election Technology Division

On February 19, 2025, the EAC held the hearing “Case Studies on the New Initiatives in the EAC’s Election Technology Division.” During the meeting, the Commissioners announced that KNOWiNK’s Poll Pad 3.6 was the first electronic poll book to be certified as part of the EAC’s Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program.

KNOWiNK Chief Strategy Officer Steele Shippy was at the hearing to discuss the manufacturer’s experience going through the certification program. He was joined on a panel by Mike Santos, Voting System Test Lab Director of SLI Compliance, and Elizabeth Beatrice, an EAC Election Technology Specialist who leads the electronic poll book testing efforts under Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program Director (ESTEP) Jay Phelps.

The meeting’s second panel focused on the agency’s Field Services Program, which works directly with state and local election jurisdictions on the verification of EAC-certified fielded voting systems to make sure they meet standards so staff can address anomalies. This panel included Wayne Bena, Nebraska Deputy Secretary of State for Elections, and Brian Kruse, Douglas County Election Commissioner, who discussed the benefits of working with the EAC and lessons learned from their experiences.

2024 Post-Election Hearing

On December 10, 2024, the EAC held its 2024 Post-Election Hearing in Los Angeles County, California. During the hearing, state and local election officials from nine states joined the Commissioners for in-depth panel discussions on the 2024 elections. They shared their experiences on election security, contingency planning, and serving voters. While election administration was successful overall, they noted the wide range of challenges their offices faced, including the response to natural disasters like Hurricane Helene, ballot drop box fires, and hoax bomb threats made to voting locations.

The event also featured a presentation on research into how effective video resources are in building and keeping voter trust, given by Thad Kousser, a Political Science Professor from the University of California San Diego. The research found a significant increase in trust and confidence among those who watched relevant videos, especially when the video was customized for a state.

On February 19, 2025, the EAC announced KNOWiNK’s Poll Pad 3.6 as the first to complete the EAC’s Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program, making it the first federally certified electronic poll book.





Promoting Poll Worker Recruitment

National Poll Worker Recruitment Day

National Poll Worker Recruitment Day, held on August 12, 2025, established by the EAC to increase awareness of the vital role poll workers play in our democracy and to encourage people across the country to sign up to support elections at their local election offices. The initiative highlights how poll workers support election processes, assist voters, and strengthen public trust in democracy by engaging directly with their communities. Federal support for the day helps energize and amplify election offices nationwide by providing resources, boosting online visibility, and guiding people on how to get involved.

Participation in 2025 was broad and impactful, with 33 state election offices and, local election offices and organizations in 45 states taking part through statewide initiatives, social media posts, and other outreach efforts. Social media engagement surged, totaling 7.7k impres-

sions and 463 interactions across X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, LinkedIn, and Facebook.

Offices emphasized the importance of contacting local election officials, supporting elections, providing training resources for new poll workers, and sharing stories from participating jurisdictions across the country. The EAC also launched updated toolkits and customizable templates to help states and localities promote involvement year-round.

In recognition of National Poll Worker Recruitment Day, Chairman Donald Palmer was interviewed on August 17, 2025, during the Jacksonville Jumbo Shrimp's Triple AAA baseball game in Florida (shown below). The interview was featured on the game's TV broadcast on FanDuel Sports Network and promoted helpamericavote.gov.





Poll Workers Helping Americans Vote Campaign



Over the past fiscal year, the EAC launched an initiative that offers jurisdictions an opportunity to join in a national effort to recognize poll workers for the critical role they play in Helping Americans Vote. As a part of this effort, the EAC created a video on the agency’s YouTube channel and a customizable social media toolkit to raise awareness and invite election offices to participate in the campaign.

The customizable graphics on helpamericavote.gov cater to X, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram, but the graphics and messaging can be used for emails, websites, flyers, posters, and other communications.



“Who are the Americans helping voters on Election Day? They’re your friends, neighbors, coworkers, teachers, and military veterans. These dedicated poll workers help ensure a smooth voting experience for everyone.”

EAC Joint Secretary of State and State Election Director Poll Worker Videos

Chairman Donald Palmer, Vice Chair Thomas Hicks, and Commissioner Ben Hovland filmed videos with eight secretaries of state and state election directors. Each video thanked poll workers for their service to their state and local community and included a call-to-action to visit that state’s website for poll worker recruitment. Through the promotional efforts of these election offices, these videos have reached an estimated 22% of the nation’s poll workers.

EAC Poll Worker Recruitment Videos	
State	State Election Official
Arkansas	Cole Jester, Secretary of State
California	Dr. Shirley Weber, Secretary of State
Florida	Cord Byrd, Secretary of State
Louisiana	Nancy Landry, Secretary of State
Maryland	Jared DeMarinis, State Administrator of Elections
Mississippi	Michael Watson, Secretary of State
New Hampshire	David Scanlan, Secretary of State
North Carolina	Sam Hayes, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections





Poll Worker Events with Vet the Vote

The EAC partnered with Vet the Vote on three poll worker appreciation and education events as part of the “Poll Workers Helping Americans Vote” campaign in FY 2025. These events expressed gratitude to poll workers for their dedication to community service and their role in ensuring the integrity of the voting process. They also served as an educational platform to inform current service members, veterans, and their families about opportunities to participate as poll workers in future elections.

WWII Museum Event in New Orleans, Louisiana

On August 12, 2025, the EAC in partnership with Vet the Vote held an event to highlight National Poll Worker Recruitment Day. A focus of the event was acknowledging the more than 165,000 military veterans and their family members recruited by Vet the Vote to serve as election workers in 2024. Attendees included EAC Chairman Donald Palmer and Vice Chair Thomas Hicks as well as Vet the Vote Program Director Lorén Westerfield and Louisiana Secretary of State Nancy Landry. The event also had representation from commissioners and election workers from eight Louisiana parishes. The keynote speaker was Brigadier General John T. Plunkett from the Louisiana National Guard who spoke on how service to the community is an extension of service to country.



EAC Chairman Donald Palmer, Vice Chair Thomas Hicks, and Commissioner Christy McCormick are joined by California Secretary of State Dr. Shirley Weber. Photo Credit: Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk

Battleship USS Iowa Event in Los Angeles, California

On May 15, 2025, the EAC and Vet the Vote held a poll worker appreciation and education event on the Battleship USS Iowa dockside pier in the Los Angeles area of, California. EAC Chairman Donald Palmer, Vice Chair Thomas Hicks, and Commissioner Christy McCormick were joined by Program Director of Vet the Vote Lorén Westerfield, and California Secretary of State Dr. Shirley Weber.

USS Orleck Pier Event in Jacksonville, Florida

On December 5, 2024, the EAC, in collaboration with Vet the Vote, organized a poll worker appreciation and education event on the USS Orleck Pier in Jacksonville, Florida. Attendance included many poll workers from Florida and Georgia, five Florida Supervisors of Elections, three Georgia Election Directors, a Georgia Registrar, and Florida Secretary of State Cord Byrd. To add more fun to the day, mascots from local sports teams were also present.



Commissioner Hovland speaking at the poll worker recruitment event in Jacksonville, Florida aboard the USS Orleck on December 5, 2024.





EAC Stakeholder Engagement Events in FY 2025

- ✓ 2024 Post-Election Hearing – Los Angeles, CA
- ✓ EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee Meeting – Rockville, Maryland
- ✓ Case Studies on the New Initiatives in the EAC’s Election Technology division – Washington, DC
- ✓ EAC Local Leadership Council Annual Meeting – Charlotte, North Carolina
- ✓ EAC Standards Board Annual Meeting – Charlotte, North Carolina
- ✓ EAC Board of Advisors Annual Meeting – Washington, DC
- ✓ EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee Virtual Meeting
- ✓ 2025 EAC Data Summit: Election Administration by the Numbers – Cambridge, Massachusetts
- ✓ EAC Public Meeting on Voting System Certification to VVSG 2.0 – Washington, DC
- ✓ EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee Virtual Working Session #1 on the VVSG
- ✓ EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee Virtual Working Session #2 on the VVSG
- ✓ EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee Virtual Working Session #3 on the VVSG
- ✓ WWII Museum Event – New Orleans, Louisiana
- ✓ USS Orleck Pier Event – Jacksonville, Florida
- ✓ Battleship USS Iowa Event – Los Angeles, California
- ✓ The State Certification Testing of Election Systems National Conference (SCTESNC) 2025 – Washington, DC
- ✓ EAC Ideas Lab – Charlotte, North Carolina
- ✓ Disaster Preparedness Roundtable – Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
- ✓ Local Leadership Council and Standards Board Regional Meetings
 - ✓ Region 1 Meeting: Los Angeles, California
 - ✓ Region 2 Meeting: Des Moines, Iowa
 - ✓ Region 5 Meeting: Cambridge, Massachusetts
 - ✓ Region 6 Meeting: Guam





Administering Grant Funds




Administering Grant Funds

An important function of the EAC is the administration of federal HAVA grants. The EAC’s grants staff consists of three full-time employees who manage the end-to-end grantmaking process from the distribution of funds, to grantee support, training, and completing mandatory reporting to ensure funds are spent appropriately. In FY 2025, the EAC disbursed and administered \$15 million of new HAVA Election Security funds. These funds are critical for states to modernize critical voting infrastructure to upgrade voting systems, cybersecurity systems, provide election officials with cybersecurity training, implement post-election audits, and make other necessary improvements to the administration of elections.

Since 2003, the EAC has administered \$4.7 billion in formula funds under HAVA sections 101 and 251 and \$24.9 million in discretionary awards. HAVA formula grant recipients include the 50 states, District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories (American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) collectively referred to as “states” for the purposes of grants analysis, using the population-based formula provided in HAVA.

HAVA Grant Program Funding FY 2018 – FY 2025



HAVA provides no-year funds, which are distributed to the states in advance of spending and are available until expended. About 70% of the HAVA Election Security Funds appropriated since 2018 have been spent with about 98% of those funds budgeted for planned activities. As of September 2025, 14 states have spent nearly all their HAVA funds (90%+), while 49 states have spent more than 50%. Due to varying factors, seven states have expended less than 50% of available HAVA funds at the close of FY 2025.





Reasons for state expenditure rates vary by state. States have consistently reported to the EAC that the following factors impact their spending of HAVA funds:

- ✓ the availability of future funds,
- ✓ difficulty providing required matching dollars (required matching dollars for the grant increased from 5% in FY 2018 to 20% as of FY 2020),
- ✓ state legislative timing, and
- ✓ budget planning for statewide implementation of large-scale purchases like replacing outdated voting systems.

Election Security Grant Total Expenditures



The EAC regularly publishes guidance and provides resources, including in-person assistance, training, virtual technical support, and subject-specific webinars. In 2025, the EAC provided 50 training sessions and conducted eight on-site visits, including to three U.S. territories. These on-site visits provide one-on-one training and dedicated support to the grantees to make sure the funds are being spent appropriately, and requirements are being met.

To further support these efforts, the agency published four grant resources on the 2024 revisions to the Uniform Guidance, allowable food and refreshment costs, managing earned interest, and how to request HAVA funds. Grants staff also worked with state grantees to close 15 audit recommendations during the fiscal year with six more expected to be closed by January 2026.

During FY 2024, the EAC reinstated the Help America Vote College Program (HAVCP) for the first time since 2010, awarding \$1 million in total to 21 grantees from across the country, including local election offices, colleges and universities, and nonprofit organizations. The EAC provided two types of HAVCP grants: a two-year Poll Worker Grant and a one-year Service Day Grant. The two-year poll worker grantees developed programs focused on building deep connections with students and local election offices. Many grantees structured student engagement from outreach to training and through service as a poll worker and post-event analysis.

Grantees will submit performance reports in May 2026 for the second year of the program which ends on January 31. Additionally, to strengthen the impact and legacy of their HAVCP programs, eight grantees will extend their efforts through FY 2026, providing support for midterm elections.





Communicating with Election Officials, Voters, and Stakeholders



Communicating with Election Officials, Voters, and Stakeholders

Vote.gov

Already well-known to the public as a trusted source for official voting information, vote.gov is now managed entirely by the EAC. In addition to the agency's array of resources for election officials and voters, anyone can use vote.gov to find their state election websites and state-specific voting information that can help them register to vote.

The partnership between the EAC and GSA on vote.gov started in 2020 and in 2025, the EAC assumed management of the site in addition to continuing to provide subject matter expertise. Moving vote.gov entirely under the EAC's purview centralizes resources in one agency and helps voters access accurate information about election administration and voting procedures while significantly reducing cost and administrative overhead. Consolidating essential information into a single centralized resource managed by one agency reduces redundancy and improves the accuracy of election information.

In October 2024, 3 million visitors used the site for voter registration information leading up to the general election. From October 2024 through November 2025, 5.8 million visitors went to vote.gov with most visits to state specific information on how to register to vote.

To improve functionality and make vote.gov a one-stop-shop for voters to find voter registration and election information, the EAC began collaborating with the National Design Studio (NDS) on the redesign and modernization of the website. The updated site is expected to launch in 2026.

EAC Website and Social Media Statistics

Website: [EAC.gov](https://eac.gov)

The EAC has continued improvements to make eac.gov a one-stop-shop for election officials to find election administration best practices and research. In 2025, the EAC laid the groundwork to make the site more user focused by integrating natural language search, calculators to find

efficiencies in election processes, and developing tools to make it easier to use and compare state election data. More improvements will be available on eac.gov throughout 2026 including AI tools to help visitors find and use information on the site.

In FY 2025, the EAC website attracted a total of 1.6 million users who generated 2.8 million page views. The most visited web page after the EAC homepage was "Register and Vote in Your State." This page offers voters state-specific links for voter registration deadlines and options, voting methods, and contact details for state and local election officials.

The third-most visited page was the National Mail Voter Registration Form, followed by the "Become a Poll Worker" page. This page, which can be reached through helpamericavote.gov, provides a "Poll Worker Recruitment Lookup Tool" to find requirements, hours, pay, training, and ways to sign up directly with their state or local election office. The agency drives traffic to this page for National Poll Worker Recruitment Day to help election officials with poll worker recruitment efforts.

For election official-facing web pages, the most visited during this time was the "Election Results, Canvass, and Certification" page. This page contains information about how election results change from unofficial to official as well as best practices and resources to help election officials communicate this essential process to voters. "Voting Systems Under Test" was the second-most visited page for election officials, which features a list and status of all voting systems currently in for EAC certification. The third-most visited web page for election officials during the 2025 fiscal year was, "Poll Watchers." This includes a list of websites providing example guidance from the national, state, and local level.

National Mail Voter Registration Form

The EAC is responsible for maintaining and updating the National Mail Voter Registration Form, also known as the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) form or the federal form. Updates to the form are required based on





Total eac.gov page views from
Oct. 1 - Sept. 30, 2025:

2,797,197



Most visited pages:

Register And Vote in Your State

(490,993)

National Mail Voter Registration Form

(138,157)

Poll Worker Resources for Voters

(135,248)



Most visited election official pages:

Election Results, Canvass, and Certification

(98,457)

Voting Systems Under Test

(54,734)

Poll Watchers

(37,630)

changes in state laws or state-specific instructions. During FY 2025, the EAC oversaw updates for three states: Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington. Updates to the form are expected for Alaska, Connecticut, New Mexico, and Rhode Island in early 2026.

The form web page on the EAC's website was accessed about 138,000 times throughout FY 2025.

Social Media

The EAC continues to increase its engagement with the public and support the work of election officials in an evolving social media landscape. The EAC has over 27,000 followers across all platforms. Short-form video, stories, and live-streamed video continue to be an effective way of reaching and engaging the public and increasing the reach of new EAC resources and initiatives. The EAC saw a 212% (8,420 video views) leap in total video views on social media and a 60% increase in post-link clicks.

The EAC elevated the voices of election officials and election offices on social media through the 2024 Clearinghouse Awards, National Poll Worker Recruitment Day, and National Voter Registration Day. Leading up to the 2024 general election, the EAC shared posts across platforms from state election offices to amplify their voices.

Press Releases, Requests, and Press Mentions

In FY 2025, the EAC circulated 27 press releases and media advisories on important EAC news and events. The EAC's campaigns around the release of the 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) report, 2024 Clearinghouse Award winners, and National Poll Worker Recruitment Day contributed to the 15,800 mentions of the EAC in print and broadcast media from national, state, and local outlets. These press mentions can also be attributed to President Trump's Executive Order titled "Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections," issued on March 25, 2025, which references the EAC, and coverage of the 2024 presidential election, which occurred within the fiscal year.

The agency's Commissioners and leadership provided media interviews throughout the year using their expertise on topics such as election technology, voter list maintenance,



poll worker recruitment, and the administration of the 2024 elections. In May 2025, an opinion piece by Chairman Palmer was featured in Stars and Stripes, in which he discussed how veterans and their family members can and often do serve as poll workers, and how their military experience applies to and benefits this civic duty.

EAC Newsletter

The EAC distributes an electronic newsletter each month with updates on events, new resources and reports, and training opportunities. Over the past fiscal year, the EAC's distribution list has grown from 7,000 to 37,800 state and local election officials, board members, stakeholders, members of the press, and the public. This increase in readership is due in part to the agency's involvement in a new email platform that easily allows the public to sign up for the EAC's newsletter when they register for newsletters at similar participating federal government agencies. With this larger distribution list, the agency is able to reach more voters and election officials, which will be especially helpful heading into the 2026 midterm elections.

Congressional Inquiries

HAVA calls on the EAC to work closely with Congress. In 2025, Commissioners and staff fulfilled this responsibility by proactively engaging congressional partners and raising the profile of the EAC among members of Congress. These efforts included keeping stakeholders informed of agency efforts, testifying before Congress, educating members and staff on the EAC's work, and providing timely responses to inquiries from both the U.S. House and Senate. In preparation for the 2026 midterm elections and amid an evolving elections landscape, key areas of congressional interest and EAC focus involved strengthening election security, support for election officials, and enhancing the integrity of U.S. elections.

In 2025, EAC Commissioners and staff conducted more than 50 briefings and in-person meetings with members of Congress and their staff. As part of the agency's government affairs efforts, the EAC also frequently provided congressional offices with technical assistance related to proposed legislation on HAVA and other election-related measures.



37,800

**Newsletter Subscribers as of
December 2025**

As a result of extensive technical assistance, the EAC played a role in the adoption of a component of the Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for Elections through Independent Testing Act (SECURE IT Act). The first part of the bill pertaining to penetration testing of election systems further bolsters the agency's existing voting system penetration testing program and assists the EAC in advancing standards for accrediting testing entities. This portion of the measure was signed into law in the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. Senators Mark Warner (D-VA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) shepherded this effort through the Senate's legislative process over a two-year period.

The agency also promptly responded to official congressional inquiries with detailed responses. Commissioners submitted answers to hearing-related official questions for the record from members of Congress on a broad range of issues, including election integrity, artificial intelligence, poll worker initiatives, and the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VMSG). Commissioners and staff also closely monitored legislative activity, including more than 125 election-related measures in 2025 alone.

The EAC shared winners of the agency's 2024 Clearing-house Awards for best practices in election administration, known as the "Clearies," with more than 40 congressional offices to recognize election offices in members' jurisdictions.





The agency also communicated legislative recommendations to Congress, including draft legislative language, to advance its mission and improve services provided to the election community.

Additionally, EAC grants staff engaged in congressional requests related to grants services and HAVA funds. The information provided included guidance on HAVA requirements, details on grant operations, and programmatic data and analysis.

Congressional Testimony



EAC Chairman Donald Palmer

Committee on House Administration: Full Committee Hearing: “Why the Wait? Unpacking California’s Untimely Election Counting Process”

Tuesday, April 29, 2025

Written testimony can be viewed here:

<https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=118157>



Chairman Palmer speaking as a witness in front of the House Committee on House Administration, April 29, 2025. Photo courtesy of the Committee on House Administration.



Other Reporting

Report	Submitted Date(s)
1353 Travel Reporting	3/10/2025
Agency Financial Report	1/16/2026
Annual Agency Ethics Program Questionnaire	1/31/2025
Annual Improper Payment Reporting	10/24/2025
Annual VVSG Standard Recommendations	11/16/2024
BOD 20-01 Vulnerability Disclosure Policy	12/3/2025
BOD 25-01: Implementing Secure Practices for Cloud Services	12/22/2025
Confidential Financial Disclosure reporting	2/18/2025
Congressional Budget Justification	5/30/2025
EAC Annual Report	1/31/2025
EAC DATA Act Report	4/1/2025
Federal Electronic Records & Email Management Report	3/14/2025
FOIA Report	12/12/2025
Freedom of Information Act Report	12/12/2025
Management Directive 715	3/6/2025
No Fear Act	10/31/2025
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (quarterly reports for CARES)	1/9/2024
Premium Class Travel Reporting	12/31/2025
Public Financial Disclosure reporting	5/15/2025
Quarterly FISMA CIO Data Call	1/31/2025, 4/25/2025, 8/1/2025, 12/18/2025
Quarterly Risk Management Assessment (RMA)	1/31/2025
Records Management Self-Assessment (RMSA) Report	3/14/2025
SAOP FISMA Metrics	11/14/2025
Section 608 Annual Obligations Report	5/14/2025
Section 634 Quarterly Obligations Report	2/14/2025, 5/14/2025, 8/14/2025
SemiAnnual OIG Report	12/1/24, 5/30/2025
Senior Agency Officials for Records Management (SAORM) Report	3/14/2025
Senior Federal Travel Reporting	4/30/25, 11/30/25
Student Loan Repayment Response	3/2025
The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report	6/30/2025
Travel Reporting Information Profile	11/30/2025
USASpending Upload for DATA Act	Monthly





Advisory Boards



Advisory Boards

As outlined in HAVA, the EAC is advised by three federal advisory committees: the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), the Standards Board, and the Board of Advisors. In addition to these boards, the EAC established the Local Leadership Council (LLC) in 2021 to gather critical input from local election official leadership from across the country.

In FY 2025, the EAC held in-person meetings for each of these boards. To allow for more discussion and collaboration on similar issues, the EAC held four regional meetings for LLC and Standards Board members for the first time. These spanned across the country and U.S. territories, including California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Guam.



Through these meetings, we heard from election officials from every region of our country on the most important issues they face in their states and jurisdictions. The feedback emphasized the necessity for more training opportunities, continued communication on updates to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0, as well as concern for consistent funding of elections, especially to drive planning for necessary upgrades to election equipment. These comments will be shared with our staff and factored into future programs and resources. These in-person interactions with our advisory boards are invaluable to ensure the EAC is meeting its mission to serve election administrators and voters.” - Joint statement from the EAC Commissioners following the April and May in-person annual meetings.





Board of Advisors

The Board of Advisors is a 35-member committee composed of HAVA-mandated representatives from the National Governors Association (NGA), National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), The National Association of State Election Directors (NASSED), National Association of Counties (NACo), the International Association of Government Officials (IGO), Election Center, International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials, and Treasurers, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board.

Other members include representatives from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Public Integrity, and the Civil Rights Division; the director of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP); four professionals from the field of science and technology, one each appointed by the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Majority and Minority leaders of the U.S. Senate; and eight members representing voter interests, with the chairs and the ranking minority members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on House Administration and the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration each appointing two members. Following the passage of HAVA, the National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks and the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials, and Treasurers merged to form the International Association of Government Officials.

Commissioner Christy McCormick served as the Designated Federal Officer for this board beginning in February 2025.

The EAC held the Board of Advisors’ annual meeting on May 5 and 6, 2025, in the EAC’s hearing room in Washington DC. The meeting included remarks from Senator Alex Padilla, Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and Representative Stephanie Bice, a member of the Committee on House Administration. Both serve on congressional oversight committees of the EAC. Board members also provided the EAC with recommendations and feedback on voter registration list maintenance, election audit standards, the implementation of the Executive Order to Protect the Integrity of American Elections, and other priorities of members.

The following members serve as executive officers for the Board of Advisors:

Name	Title	Location	Role
Hon. Scott Schwab	Secretary of State	Kansas	Chair
Christine Walker	Clerk	Jackson County, Oregon	Chair-Elect
Eric Fey	Director of Elections	St. Louis County, Missouri	Secretary



Board of Advisors members with the EAC Commissioners during their annual meeting in Washington, DC





The Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC)

The TGDC assists the EAC in developing the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. The Chairperson of the TGDC is the Director of the NIST. The TGDC is composed of 14 other members appointed jointly by the EAC and the Director of NIST. NIST has documentation of TGDC resolutions, meeting minutes, and additional information.

Beginning in February 2025, Chairman Palmer served as the Designated Federal Officer for the TGDC.

The TGDC held an in-person meeting at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, on January 14, 2025. During the meeting, members heard from EAC staff about VVSG

2.0 and considerations for a minor revision, resources for managing accessible voting equipment, and updates to the ESTEP. NIST staff provided information on the implementation of their Voting Program, and the release of new research.

Members met four other times in 2025 to provide feedback, make recommendations, and hear from EAC staff about a suggested update to the VVSG, Version 2.1. The input from these virtual meetings helped EAC staff refine the draft of the VVSG 2.1. As of publication of this annual report, discussions on next steps are ongoing.



TGDC members with the EAC Commissioners during their January 2025 meeting at NIST headquarters.





Standards Board

HAVA designates a 110-member Standards Board to assist the EAC in carrying out its mandates under the law. The board consists of 55 state election officials selected by their respective chief state election officials, as well as 55 local election officials selected through a process supervised by the chief state election official. HAVA prohibits any two members representing the same state to be members of the same political party. The board selects nine members to serve as an executive board, of which no more than five are state election officials; no more than five are local election officials, and no more than five are members of the same political party.

Beginning in February 2025, Commissioner Hovland served as the Designated Federal Officer for the Standards Board.

The board's in-person annual meeting was held in Charlotte, North Carolina, on April 24-25, 2025. During the meeting, members heard from the EAC about the implementation of the Executive Order to Protect the Integrity of American Elections. The annual meeting served as a critical opportunity to get feedback and share ideas on emerging topics in election administration. The meeting included information on election audit standards, voter registration and list maintenance, election official training opportunities, signature verification and best practices to work with motor vehicle offices, and improvements to the EAC's Election Administration and Voting Survey.

The EAC also used the annual meeting as an opportunity to recognize board members whose offices earned 2024 Clearinghouse Awards. To highlight their best practices, the EAC held a panel discussion with them to highlight their best practices and celebrate them amongst their election official colleagues.



Standards Board members during the 2025 annual meeting.





The following members serve as executive officers for the Standards Board:

Name	Title	Location	Role
Maria I.D. Pangelinan	Guam Election Commission Executive Director	Tamuning, GU	Chair
Dwight K. Shellman III	County Regulation & Support Manager	Denver, Colorado	Vice Chair
J. Bradley King	Co-Director, Indiana Elections Division	Indiana	Secretary
Kathy Placencia	Director of Elections	Rhode Island	Executive Officer
Nancy Boren	Director of Elections and Voter Registration	Georgia	Executive Officer
Lannie Chapman	County Clerk	Salt Lake County, Utah	Executive Officer
Derrin Robinson	County Clerk	Harney County, Oregon	Executive Officer
Jeff Hancock	County Clerk	Franklin County, Kentucky	Executive Officer
Jameson Shew	County Clerk	Douglas County, Kansas	Executive Officer

Standards Board members with the EAC Commissioners during the annual meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina.





Local Leadership Council (LLC)

The LLC was established by the EAC on June 8, 2021. This Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) board is made up of 100 local election officials who are current or former officers in each state’s local election official association. As leaders and officials who work firsthand to administer elections at the local level, the LLC provides recommendations and direct feedback to the EAC on a range of election administration topics.

Commissioner Thomas Hicks served as the Designated Federal Officer of the LLC beginning in February 2025.

LLC members met in person for the annual meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina, on April 21-22, 2025. The meeting was a valuable opportunity to hear directly from local election leaders from across the country. Members started the meeting with breakout regional meeting sessions facilitated by EAC staff. The results of which were shared with the EAC and the larger membership the following day. Feedback was also provided to the EAC about election audit standards, the need for election official training and in what areas, and the EAC’s Learning Lab platform. The EAC also briefed members on the implementation of the Executive Order to Protect the Integrity of American Elections.

The following members serve as executive officers for the LLC:

Name	Title	Location	Role
Donna Johnston	Registrar of Voters	Sutter County, California	Region 1 Chair
Carly Koppes	County Clerk and Recorder	Weld County, Colorado	Vice Chair
Tracy Overstreet	Election Commissioner	Hall County, Nebraska	Member
Julie Freese	County Clerk	Fremont County, Wyoming	Region 2 Chair
Jennifer Doinoff	Elections Administrator	Hays County, Texas	Region 3 Chair
Mark Earley	Supervisor of Elections	Leon County, Florida	Steering Committee Member
Ruie Lavoie	Election Director	Baltimore County, Maryland	Region 4 Chair
Tammy Smith	Administrator of Elections	Wilson County, Tennessee	Secretary
Nicholas Lima	Registrar/Director of Elections	City of Cranston, Rhode Island	Region 5 Chair
Maureen Bugdon	Superintendent of Elections	Atlantic County, New Jersey	Steering Committee Member



Members of the Local Leadership Council and the EAC Commissioners during the annual meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina.





Standards Board and Local Leadership Council Regional Meetings

Members of Regions 1, 2, and 5 of the Standards Board and Local Leadership Council met in FY 2025. During the meetings state and local election officials received training on Chain of Custody best practices from EAC Clearinghouse. The EAC led a discussion on audit procedures and processes along with hands on demos by local election officials. Members had open discussion on a variety of topics including poll worker training and recruitment followed by a recap of National Poll Worker Recruitment Day for Region 2. The EAC also convened Region 6 Standards Board members from the U.S. Territories for the first time. This meeting in Guam included training from EAC staff, assistance with HAVA grant compliance, and opportunities to provide feedback on the territories' unique election administration challenges.

The regional meetings enable small group discussions with election officials within the region being able to share ideas and give feedback to the EAC on needs for the not only nationwide but specific states and local offices within that region. The regional meetings also allow for more hands-on training that would meet the needs of the specific region.



Commissioners Hovland and McCormick with Standards Board Region 6 members in Guam.



Commissioners McCormick and Hicks with Local Leadership Region 2 members in Des Moines, Iowa.





FACA Board Members

Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) Member Roster

The TGDC was comprised of the following members as of September 16, 2025.

Chair

Craig Burkhardt

Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology & Acting Director
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland

Board of Advisors

Isaac Cramer

Executive Director
Charleston County Board of Voter Registration and Elections
Charleston, South Carolina

Appointment Pending Approval

Standards Board

Paul Lux

Supervisor of Elections
Okaloosa County
Crestview, Florida

Appointment Pending Approval

ANSI

Mary Saunders

Senior Vice President, Government Relations and Public Policy
American National Standards Institute
Washington, DC

IEEE

Appointment Pending Approval

NASED

Bryan Caskey

Deputy Secretary of State, Director of Elections
Office of the Kansas Secretary of State
Topeka, KS

Judd Choate

Director, Division of Elections
Colorado Department of State
Colorado Secretary of State
Denver, CO

U.S. Access Board

Benjamin Nadolsky

U.S. Access Board
Public Board Member
New York, New York

Appointment Pending Approval

Technical Experts

Diane Golden

Director of National Projects
Illinois Assistive Technology Program
Springfield, Illinois

David Wagner

Professor
EECS Departments
University of California-Berkeley
Berkeley, California

Chris Wlaschin

Senior Vice President & Chief
Information Security Officer
Election Systems & Software
Lincoln, Nebraska

Vacancy





Local Leadership Council

The Local Leadership Council was comprised of the following members as of November 21, 2025.



Alabama

Andrea Lecroy

Probate Judge
Marshall County

James Tatum

Probate Judge
Bullock County



Alaska

Amanda McColley

Fairbanks Elections Supervisor
Alaska Division of Elections

Jeffrey Congdon

Anchorage Elections Supervisor
Alaska Division of Elections



Arizona

Rayleen Richards

Elections Director
Navajo County

Scott Jarrett

Elections Director
Maricopa County



Arkansas

Phyllis Rhynes

County Clerk
Greene County

Vacant



California

Donna M. Johnston

Registrar of Voters
Sutter County

Ryan Ronco

Registrar of Voters
Placer County



Colorado

Carly Koppes

County Clerk and Recorder
Weld County

Lori Mitchell

County Clerk and Recorder
Chaffee County



Connecticut

Antoinette C. Spinelli

Town Clerk
City of Waterbury

Matthew R. Katra

Registrar of Voters
Borough of Naugatuck



Delaware

David Gilefski

Deputy County Director
New Castle County

Doris Young

County Director
Kent County



Florida

Mark Earley

Supervisor of Elections
Leon County

Wesley Wilcox

Supervisor of Elections
Marion County





Local Leadership Council Continued



Georgia

Charlotte R. Sosebee

Director of Elections & Voter Registration
Athens-Clarke County

Deidre Holden

Director of Elections & Voter
Registration, Paulding County



Hawaii

Jade Fountain-Tanigawa

County Clerk
Kauai County

Lyndon Yoshioka

Election Administrator
Kauai County



Idaho

Lon Colton

County Clerk
Oneida County

Vacant



Illinois

Don Gray

County Clerk
Sangamon County

Vacant



Indiana

Jessica Bailey

Clerk
Porter County

Shelley Septer

Clerk
Huntington County



Iowa

Denise Beyer

County Auditor
Allamakee County

Sara Doty

County Auditor
Des Moines County



Kansas

Jamie Shew

County Clerk
Douglas County

Rick Piepho

County Clerk
Harvey County



Kentucky

Kevin Mooney

County Clerk
Bullitt County

Susan Lamb

County Clerk
Fayette County



Louisiana

Bridget Hanna

Clerk of Court
Ascension Parish

Steve Raborn

Registrar of Voters
East Baton Rouge Parish





Local Leadership Council Continued



Maine

Kathleen M. Montejo

City Clerk
City of Lewiston

Lisa Goodwin

City Clerk
City of Bangor



Maryland

Barry Jackson

Election Director
Washington County

Ruie Lavoie

Election Director
Baltimore County



Massachusetts

Danielle M. Sicard

Town Clerk
Town of Easton

Sergio Cornelio

City Clerk
City of Everett



Michigan

Elizabeth Hundley

County Clerk
Livingston County

Mary R. Clark

Township Clerk
Delta Charter Township



Minnesota

Marilee Peterson

County Auditor-Treasurer
Sibley County

Michael Stalberger

County Elections Official
Blue Earth County



Mississippi

Leroy Lacy

Election Commissioner
Madison County

Van Lowry

Election Commissioner
Marion County



Missouri

Brianna Lennon

County Clerk
Boone County

Shane Schoeller

County Clerk
Greene County



Montana

Bradley Seaman

Missoula County Election Administrator
Missoula County

Toni Kramer

Lake County Election Administrator
Lake County



Nebraska

Amy Nelson

County Clerk
Fillmore County

Tracy Overstreet

Election Commissioner
Hall County





Local Leadership Council Continued



Nevada

Jessica Aguiar-Koepke

Deputy Clerk
Humboldt County

Vacant



New Hampshire

Sherry Farrell

Town Clerk
Town of Londonderry

Joan Dargie

Town Clerk
Town of Milford



New Jersey

Maureen Bugdon

Superintendent of Elections
Atlantic County

Shona Mack-Pollock

Superintendent of Elections
Passaic County



New Mexico

Amanda López Askin

County Clerk
Dona Ana County

Tanya Shelby

Chief Deputy Clerk
San Juan County



New York

Dustin Czarny

Commissioner
Onondaga County

Erik J. Haight

Commissioner of Elections
Dutchess County



North Carolina

Leigh Anne Price

Elections Director
Johnston County

Rachel Raper

Elections Director
Orange County



North Dakota

Darlene Carpenter

County Auditor
McHenry County

Dawn Rhone

County Auditor
Morton County



Ohio

Brian Sleeth

Director of Elections
Warren County

Sherry Poland

Director of Elections
Hamilton County



Oklahoma

Callee Sander

Election Board Secretary
Dewey County

Gwen Freeman

Election Board Secretary
Tulsa County





Local Leadership Council Continued



Oregon

Rochelle Long
County Clerk
Klamath County

Tracie Krevanko
County Clerk
Clatsop County

Pennsylvania

Thad Hall
Director of Elections
Mercer County

Tim Benyo
Chief Clerk and Director of Elections
Lehigh County

Rhode Island

Jacqueline S. Schulz
Registrar of Voters
Town of Portsmouth

Nicholas J. Lima
Registrar/Director of Elections
City of Cranston

South Carolina

Isaac Cramer
Executive Director Charleston County
Charleston County

Julian Young
Executive Director Florence County
Florence County

South Dakota

Julie Bartling
County Auditor
Gregory County

Thomas Oliva
Finance Officer
Hughes County

Tennessee

Tammy Smith
Administrator of Elections
Wilson County

Vacant

Texas

Jennifer Doinoff
Elections Administrator
Hays County

Shannon Lackey
Elections Administrator
Randall County

Utah

Marki Rowley
County Clerk
Millard County

Ricky Hatch
County Clerk/Auditor
Weber County

Vermont

Sara Haskins
Town Clerk/Treasurer
Town of Morrisville

Tracy Borst
Town Clerk/Treasurer
Town of Theford





Local Leadership Council Continued



Virginia

Angela Maniglia Turner

Director of Elections and General Registrar
City of Alexandria

Barbara Tabb

Prince George County



Washington

Garth Fell

County Auditor
Snohomish County

Skip Moore

County Auditor
Chelan County



West Virginia

Michelle Holly

County Clerk
Fayette County

Vacant

Wisconsin

Elena Hilby

City Clerk
City of Sun Prairie

Wendy Christensen

County Clerk
Racine County



Wyoming

Debra Lee

County Clerk
Laramie County

Julie Freese

County Clerk
Fremont County





Standards Board

The Standards Board was comprised of the following members as of November 24, 2025.



Alabama	
State	Local
Wes Allen Secretary of State Montgomery, AL	Laurie Shoultz Hall Probate Judge - Marengo County Linden, AL



Alaska	
State	Local
Carol Beecher Director Juneau, AK	Michaela Thompson Administrative Manager Anchorage, AK



American Samoa	
State	Local
Laloifi D. Saelua HAVA Manager Pago Pago, AS	Sinatagimaiava To Division Head I Pago Pago, AS



Arizona	
State	Local
Tonia A. Tunnell Deputy Assistant Secretary, Voter Registration & Special Projects, Phoenix, AZ	Eslir Musta Elections Director Flagstaff, AZ



Arkansas	
State	Local
Cole Jester Secretary of State Little Rock, AR	Alexandria Manning-Ewing Chicot County Clerk Lake Village, AR



California	
State	Local
NaKeshia Robinson Deputy Secretary of State, Help America Vote Act, Sacramento, CA	Dean Logan Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Norwalk, CA



Colorado	
State	Local
Dwight K. Shellman III County Regulation & Support Manager, Colorado State Elections Division, Denver, CO	Rene Warner Chief Deputy Clerk, Delta County Clerk & Recorder's Office, Delta, CO





Standards Board Continued



Connecticut	
State	Local
Gabe Rosenberg Chief of Staff and General Counsel Hartford, CT	Marianne Byrne Registrar of Voters Prospect, CT



Delaware	
State	Local
Anthony Albence State Election Commissioner Dover, DE	Ralph Artigliere Deputy County Director, Kent County Office Dover, DE



District of Columbia	
State	Local
Monica H. Evans Executive Director Washington, DC	Vacancy



Florida	
State	Local
Maria Matthews State Director, Division of Elections Tallahassee, FL	Paul Lux Supervisor of Elections, Okaloosa County Crestview, FL



Georgia	
State	Local
Bradford Raffensperger Secretary of State Atlanta, GA	Nancy Boren Director of Elections and Voter Registration Columbus, GA



Guam	
State	Local
Maria I.D. Pangelinan Guam Election Commission Executive Director, Tamuning, GU	Christiana J. Ramirez Guam Election Commission Program Coordinator, Tamuning, GU



Hawaii	
State	Local
Kristen Uyeda Ballot Operations Section Head Pearl City, HI	Rex Quidilla Election Administrator Honolulu, HI





Standards Board Continued



Idaho	
State	Local
Daniel Lee Voting Systems Specialist Boise, ID	Patty Weeks County Clerk Lewiston, ID



Illinois	
State	Local
Erica Christell Testing Lead, Voter Registration and Systems Division, Springfield, IL	Vacancy



Indiana	
State	Local
J. Bradley King Co-Director of the Indiana Election Division Indianapolis, IN	Nicole Browne Monroe County Clerk Bloomington, IN



Iowa	
State	Local
Eric R. Gookin Chief Operating Officer Des Moines, IA	Amanda Harlan Monroe County Auditor Albia, IA



Kansas	
State	Local
Bryan Caskey Director of Elections Topeka, KS	Jameson Shew Douglas County Clerk Lawrence, KS



Kentucky	
State	Local
Gregory McNeill Senior Advisor Frankfort, KY	Jeff Hancock Franklin County Clerk Frankfort, KY



Louisiana	
State	Local
Elisabeth Daigle ADA Compliance Officer Baton Rouge, LA	Mike Spence Caddo Parish Clerk of Court Shreveport, LA





Standards Board Continued



Maine	
State	Local
Shenna Bellows Secretary of State Augusta, ME	Wendy Rawski Clerk Eliot, ME



Maryland	
State	Local
Katherine Berry Deputy State Administrator Annapolis, MD	Guy Mickley Election Director, Howard County Board of Elections, Columbia, MD



Massachusetts	
State	Local
Debra O'Malley Assistant Director of Elections Boston, MA	Andrew T. Dowd Northborough Town Clerk Northborough, MA



Michigan	
State	Local
Jocelyn Benson Secretary of State Lansing, MI	Justin Roebuck Ottawa County Clerk West Olive, MI



Minnesota	
State	Local
Paul Linnell Director of Elections St. Paul, MN	Michael Stalberger Director, Property and Environmental Resources, Mankato, MN



Mississippi	
State	Local
Kyle Kirkpatrick Assistant Secretary of State Jackson, MS	Robert Coleman Yazoo County Circuit Clerk Yazoo City, MS



Missouri	
State	Local
Chrissy Peters Director of Elections Jefferson City, MO	Sara Zorich Director Jackson County Board of Elections Independence, MO





Standards Board Continued



Montana	
State	Local
Austin James Director of Elections/Chief Legal Helena, MT	Lexis Dockter Hill County Clerk and Recorder/Election Administrator, Havre, MT



Nebraska	
State	Local
Andrew Buller Assistant Deputy Secretary of State for Elections, Lincoln, NE	Brian Kruse Douglas County Election Commissioner Omaha, NE



Nevada	
State	Local
Francisco V. Aguilar Nevada Secretary of State Carson City, NV	Tami Rae Spero Humboldt County Clerk Winnemucca, NV



New Hampshire	
State	Local
Patricia Picuch State Election Director Concord, NH	Robert Dezmelyk Moderator, Town of Newton Newton, NH



New Jersey	
State	Local
Donna Barber Acting Director, Division of Elections Trenton, NJ	Beth Thompson Administrator, Hunterdon County Board of Elec- tions, Flemington, NJ



New Mexico	
State	Local
Mandy Vigil State Election Director Santa Fe, NM	Annie Hogland Curry County Clerk Clovis, NM



New York	
State	Local
Thomas Connolly Deputy Director Albany, NY	Cortney L. Spittler Republican Commissioner, Cattaraugus County Board of Elections, Little Valley, NY





Standards Board Continued



North Carolina	
State	Local
Vacancy	Tim Tsujii Director of Elections Winston Salem, NC



North Dakota	
State	Local
Erika White Elections Director Bismark, ND	Erica Johnsrud McKenzie County Auditor Wafford City, ND



Ohio	
State	Local
Chris Burnett Director of Elections Columbus, OH	Brian Sleeth Director, Warren County Board of Elections Lebanon, OH



Oklahoma	
State	Local
Carol J. Morris Director of Ballot Generation Services Oklahoma City, OK	Blair Gonzales Secretary, Grant County Election Board Medford, OK



Oregon	
State	Local
Tobias Read Secretary of State Salem, OR	Derrin Robinson Harney County Clerk Burns, OR



Pennsylvania	
State	Local
Sindhu Ramachandran Chief, Division of Election Security & Technology, Harrisburg, PA	Tonia Fernandez Election Supervisor Erie, PA



Puerto Rico	
State	Local
Norma Figueroa Morales Presidenta Javaca San Juan, PR	Yareli's Melendez Rivera Jefa de Presupuesto Toa Alta, PR





Standards Board Continued



Rhode Island	
State	Local
Kathy Placencia Director of Elections Providence, RI	Nick Lima Registrar/Director of Elections Cranston, RI



South Carolina	
State	Local
Vacancy	John Baucom Director, Spartanburg County Board of Voter Registration, Spartanburg, SC



South Dakota	
State	Local
Tom Deadrick Deputy Secretary of State Pierre, SD	Carri R. Crum Clay County Auditor Vermillion, SD



Tennessee	
State	Local
Mark Goins Coordinator of Elections Nashville, TN	Paige Burcham Dennis Obion County Election Commissioner South Fulton, TN



Texas	
State	Local
Christina Adkins Director of Elections Austin, TX	Laura Rogers Sherman County & District Clerk Stratford, TX



Utah	
State	Local
Shelly Jackson Deputy Director of Elections Salt Lake City, UT	Lannie Chapman County Clerk Salt Lake City, UT



Vermont	
State	Local
Sarah Copeland Hanzas Secretary of State Montpelier, VT	Sandra Pinsonault Dorset Town Clerk Dorset, VT





Standards Board Continued



Virgin Islands	
State	Local
Caroline F. Fawkes Supervisor of Elections Kingshill, VI	Terrell Alexandre STX Deputy Supervisor Christiansted, VI



Virginia	
State	Local
Susan Beals Commissioner of Elections Richmond, VA	Mark Coakley General Registrar Henrico, VA



Washington	
State	Local
Stuart Holmes Director of Elections Olympia, WA	Lori Larson Stevens County Auditor Colville, WA



West Virginia	
State	Local
Brittany Westfall Director of Elections Charleston, WV	Brian Wood Putnam County Clerk Winfield, WV



Wisconsin	
State	Local
Ahna Barreau Technology and Training Director Madison, WI	Lori Stottler Clerk, City of Janesville Jansville, WI



Wyoming	
State	Local
Chuck Gray Secretary of State Cheyenne, WY	Kayla White Albany County Clerk Laramie, WY





Board of Advisors

The Board of Advisors was comprised of the following members as of May 5, 2025.

Name	Title	Appointing Authority
Stephanie Enyart	USAB Public Member	Architectural and Transportation Barrier Compliance Board
Elver Ariza-Silva	USAB Public Member - Interim Chair	Architectural and Transportation Barrier Compliance Board
Brian Nieves	Deputy Chief of Staff & Senior Counsel for Policy Office of the Deputy Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice	Chief, Office of Public Integrity, U.S. Department of Justice
Andrew M. Warner	Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice	Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
J. Scott Wiedmann	Acting Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. Department of Defense	Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S. Department of Defense
Hans von Spakovsky	Senior Legal Fellow and Manager, Election Law Reform Initiative Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies The Heritage Foundation	House Administration Committee - Chair
Lucas Vebber	Deputy Counsel Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty	House Administration Committee - Chair
Gregory T. Moore	President and CEO, Promise of Democracy Foundation	House Administration Committee - Ranking Member
Thomas Ferrarese	Former Commissioner of Elections, Monroe County, NY	House Administration Committee - Ranking Member
Appointment to be Named		House Minority Leader
Christine Walker	Clerk, Jackson County, OR	International Association of Government Officials
Eric Fey	Director of Elections, St. Louis County Election Board	International Association of Government Officials
Isaac Cramer	Executive Director, Charleston County Board of Elections	National Association of Counties
Ricky Hatch	County Clerk/Auditor, Weber County, UT	National Association of Counties
The Honorable Steve Simon	MN Secretary of State and NASS President	National Association of Secretaries of State
The Honorable Scott Schwab	KS Secretary of State and NASS Immediate Past President	National Association of Secretaries of State





Board of Advisors Continued

Name	Title	Appointing Authority
Howard Knapp	Executive Director, South Carolina Election Commission	National Association of State Election Directors
Jonathan Brater	Director of Elections, Michigan Bureau of Elections	National Association of State Election Directors
Representative Pat Proctor	Representative, Kansas State House	National Conference of State Legislatures
Senator Cheryl Kagan	Senator, Maryland State Senate	National Conference of State Legislatures
Lisa M. Marra	State Election Director, Arizona Secretary of State	National Governors Association
Lawrence D. Norden	Vice President of the Elections and Government Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School	National Governors Association
Justin Riemer	Partner, First Street	Senate Majority Leader
Barbara Simons, PhD	Association for Computing Machinery	Senate Minority Leader
DeAnna Brangers	Republican Member, Kentucky State Board of Elections	Senate Rules & Administration Committee - Chair
Karen Rice Sellers	Executive Director, Kentucky State Board of Elections	Senate Rules & Administration Committee - Chair
Cathy Darling Allen	Retired Shasta County Clerk and Registrar of Voters	Senate Rules & Administration Committee - Ranking Member
Rosalind Gold	Chief Public Policy Officer, NALEO Education Fund	Senate Rules & Administration Committee - Ranking Member
Appointment to be Named		Speaker of the House
Dean Logan	Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, Los Angeles County, CA	The Election Center
Wesley Wilcox	Supervisor of Elections, Marion County, FL	The Election Center
J. Christian Adams	Commissioner, United States Commission on Civil Rights	United States Commission on Civil Rights
Victoria Nourse	Vice Chair, United States Commission on Civil Rights	United States Commission on Civil Rights
Tina Barton	Senior Election Expert, The Elections Group	United States Conference of Mayors
Liz Howard	Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice	United States Conference of Mayors





Appendix



Appendix

Election Security

State	Award	Expenditures	Percent Expended
Alabama	\$16,496,505.00	\$11,829,572.00	71.71%
Alaska	\$9,272,727.00	\$6,104,205.98	65.83%
American Samoa	\$1,854,545.00	\$1,783,820.12	96.19%
Arizona	\$19,843,701.00	\$16,994,639.25	85.64%
Arkansas	\$12,775,727.00	\$1,848,083.77	14.47%
California	\$88,174,316.00	\$55,127,573.91	62.52%
Colorado	\$16,821,719.00	\$11,538,880.05	68.60%
Connecticut	\$13,876,298.00	\$13,085,398.43	94.30%
Delaware	\$9,309,230.00	\$7,216,351.39	77.52%
District of Columbia	\$9,272,727.00	\$9,177,223.99	98.97%
Florida*	\$49,137,797.00	\$35,525,910.07	72.30%
Georgia	\$26,837,123.00	\$26,749,796.00	99.67%
Guam	\$1,854,545.00	\$1,324,074.59	71.40%
Hawaii	\$8,642,675.00	\$2,401,012.65	27.78%
Idaho	\$10,076,903.00	\$7,154,007.80	70.99%
Illinois	\$33,692,113.00	\$21,718,279.26	64.46%
Indiana*	\$19,999,694.00	\$19,148,482.00	95.74%
Iowa	\$13,058,814.00	\$7,407,755.16	56.73%
Kansas	\$12,581,243.00	\$7,782,708.01	61.86%
Kentucky	\$15,537,916.00	\$11,715,250.46	75.40%
Louisiana	\$15,797,602.00	\$0.00	0.00%
Maine	\$9,643,743.00	\$6,537,381.00	67.79%





Election Security Continued

State	Award	Expenditures	Percent Expended
Maryland	\$18,735,772.00	\$9,204,010.31	49.13%
Massachusetts	\$20,795,523.00	\$16,658,789.55	80.11%
Michigan	\$27,309,809.00	\$19,341,974.68	70.82%
Minnesota	\$17,589,253.00	\$10,667,869.80	60.65%
Mississippi	\$12,793,864.00	\$8,815,971.76	68.91%
Missouri	\$19,076,882.00	\$13,206,684.56	69.23%
Montana	\$9,406,262.00	\$6,707,357.76	71.31%
Nebraska	\$10,694,995.00	\$5,129,242.83	47.96%
Nevada	\$12,083,287.00	\$12,083,287.00	100.00%
New Hampshire	\$9,855,360.00	\$2,515,141.60	25.52%
New Jersey	\$25,065,815.00	\$15,759,419.21	62.87%
New Mexico	\$11,125,858.00	\$10,385,123.32	93.34%
New York	\$49,614,813.00	\$35,793,918.61	72.14%
North Carolina	\$26,957,573.00	\$24,422,309.79	90.60%
North Dakota	\$9,272,727.00	\$4,702,681.09	50.72%
Northern Mariana Islands	\$1,254,545.00	\$941,348.47	75.04%
Ohio	\$30,913,519.00	\$30,599,161.49	98.98%
Oklahoma	\$14,036,835.00	\$4,167,421.59	29.69%
Oregon	\$14,392,029.00	\$13,658,968.17	94.91%
Pennsylvania	\$34,336,130.00	\$31,345,936.55	91.29%
Puerto Rico	\$9,238,510.00	\$7,451,343.98	80.66%
Rhode Island	\$9,488,907.00	\$5,494,285.00	57.90%
South Carolina	\$16,276,484.00	\$15,069,321.57	92.58%





Election Security Continued

State	Award	Expenditures	Percent Expended
South Dakota *	\$9,000,000.00	\$4,358,129.10	48.42%
Tennessee	\$19,731,714.00	\$12,735,018.32	64.54%
Texas	\$60,176,832.00	\$37,245,094.91	61.89%
U.S. Virgin Islands	\$1,854,545.00	\$1,191,525.42	64.25%
Utah	\$12,001,444.00	\$6,597,489.40	54.97%
Vermont	\$9,000,000.00	\$4,984,768.22	55.39%
Virginia	\$23,709,257.00	\$22,100,016.00	93.21%
Washington	\$20,959,168.00	\$13,958,121.85	66.60%
West Virginia	\$10,939,657.00	\$10,639,846.00	97.26%
Wisconsin	\$18,209,648.00	\$14,070,707.88	77.27%
Wyoming	\$9,272,727.00	\$4,296,435.15	46.33%
Totals	\$1,019,727,407.00	\$715,850,061.47	70.20%

* Annual 2025 report has not been submitted as of 1/27/26; Expenditures reflect most recently submitted report.





Section 101

State	Award	Expenditures	Percent Expended
Alabama	\$4,989,605.00	\$4,823,431.00	96.67%
California	\$26,874,597.00	\$26,874,597.00	100.00%
Hawaii	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	100.00%
Kansas	\$24,033,425.00	\$24,033,425.00	100.00%
New Hampshire	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	100.00%
New York	\$16,494,325.00	\$14,699,430.14	89.12%
South Carolina	\$4,652,412.00	\$4,652,412.00	100.00%
Wyoming	\$5,000,000.00	\$5,000,000.00	100.00%
Totals	\$92,044,364.00	\$90,083,295.14	97.87%





251 Requirement Payments

State	Award	Expenditures	Percent Expended
Alabama	\$40,247,219.00	\$40,227,898.00	99.95%
Alaska**	\$13,021,803.00	\$13,021,803.00	100.00%
Arizona*	\$45,516,688.00	\$45,516,688.00	100.00%
California	\$296,305,593.00	\$296,305,593.00	100.00%
Hawaii	\$13,028,257.00	\$13,028,257.00	100.00%
Illinois	\$110,597,147.00	\$109,633,844.55	99.13%
Indiana**	\$54,440,282.00	\$54,440,282.00	100.00%
Kansas	\$24,033,425.00	\$24,033,425.00	100.00%
Kentucky	\$36,919,261.00	\$33,729,256.56	91.36%
Massachusetts	\$58,589,549.00	\$58,084,642.78	99.14%
Minnesota	\$43,962,194.00	\$43,962,194.00	100.00%
New Hampshire	\$13,028,257.00	\$10,719,407.82	82.28%
New Jersey	\$76,360,392.00	\$75,842,601.66	99.32%
New York	\$172,076,865.00	\$172,076,865.00	100.00%
Oklahoma	\$31,043,081.00	\$31,043,081.00	100.00%
Pennsylvania	\$112,821,809.00	\$112,509,698.68	99.72%
Puerto Rico	\$5,868,252.00	\$5,863,326.45	99.92%
South Carolina	\$36,384,617.00	\$36,384,617.00	100.00%
South Dakota*	\$13,028,257.00	\$13,028,257.00	100.00%
Tennessee	\$51,877,745.00	\$34,190,053.29	65.91%
Utah	\$18,491,597.00	\$17,978,216.57	97.22%
Vermont	\$12,453,257.00	\$12,453,257.00	100.00%
West Virginia	\$17,184,961.00	\$17,184,961.00	100.00%
Totals	\$1,297,280,508.00	\$1,271,258,226.36	97.99%





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WES ALLEN
SECRETARY OF STATE

August 5, 2025

Maureen Riordan
Acting Chief, Voting Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW – 4CON
Washington, DC 20530

VIA UNITED STATES MAIL AND ELECTRONIC EMAIL TRANSMISSION

Dear Chief Riordan,

The Secretary of State, Wes Allen, is in receipt of your July 22, 2025 correspondence, requesting information about Alabama's procedures for complying with the statewide voter list maintenance provisions of the National Voter Registration Act ("NVRA"), 52 U.S.C § 20501 *et seq.* Please accept the following response and enclosed information:

First, election integrity has been a top priority for Secretary Allen since the beginning of his tenure. His robust voter file maintenance efforts have made Alabama a proud leader, even among other conservative states. The Secretary's successes in this area have been hard fought. He has tackled long-running, complex issues, cut through red tape at both the state and local level, and defended his efforts in federal court. He is not done, either. The Secretary's work continues to ensure that Alabama's voter file does not include anyone who should not be registered.

In Alabama, the Secretary of State serves as "the chief elections official." Ala. Code § 17-1-3(a). The Secretary is also designated "the primary state official for federal contact for the implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002." Ala. Code § 17-4-60. The Secretary seeks comments and guidance from other election officials to ensure a coordinated effort that addresses the needs and concerns of all participants while effectively meeting the mandates of the law. *See* Ala. Code §§ 17-4-60 and 17-4-63.

As in other states, a person must meet certain requirements of age and citizenship to have the right to vote and register to vote in Alabama; specifically, "[o]nly a citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years and has resided in this state and in a county thereof for the time provided by law, if registered as provided by law, shall have the right to vote in the county of his or her residence." Ala. Const. Art. VIII § 177. *See also* Ala. Code § 17-3-30 ("Any person possessing the qualifications of an elector set out in Article 8 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as modified by federal law, and not laboring under any disqualification listed therein, shall be an elector, and shall be entitled to register and to vote at any election by the people.").

Voter registration is directly administered by Alabama's sixty-seven (67) county boards of registrars. The board of registrars in each county generally consists of three "reputable and suitable" electors of the county, appointed by the Governor, the State Auditor, and the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries who compose the state board of appointment. Ala. Code § 17-3-2. Registrars may be removed for cause by the Secretary of State. Ala. Code § 17-3-3. Current contact information for each county board of registrars is linked here: <https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/board-of-registrars-all-counties> and also enclosed for reference. Four (4) registrars have been removed for cause or opted to resign prior to being removed for cause since Secretary Allen assumed office in 2023.

Alabama Code Section 17-4-35 establishes the "Supervisor of Voter Registration," employed by the Secretary of State, who is responsible for, among other things, serving "as a liaison between the Secretary of State and the county boards of registrars on implementation of existing and future laws pertaining to voter registration[.]" providing "to the county boards of registrars such information as would allow them to determine which names should be stricken by them from voter lists in accordance with state law[.]" and "[assisting] the county boards of registrars in determining the names of any person or persons who are deceased, who are no longer qualified to vote in the election district where registered due to removal of residence from the county in which he or she is registered, or from the State of Alabama, who has been convicted of a disqualifying crime, or who is otherwise no longer qualified to vote as may be provided by law." The current Supervisor of Voter Registration is Candace Payne, whose contact information is (334) 353-7150 (phone) and Candace.Payne@sos.alabama.gov (email). Ms. Payne is stationed within Secretary Allen's Elections Division.

Alabama's Statewide Voter Registration File Act provides for a statewide, computerized voter file maintenance system that must comply with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and the NVRA and "shall serve as the single system for storing and managing the official list of registered voters throughout the state." Ala. Code § 17-4-33. *See also* Ala. Code §§ 17-4-30 to 17-4-39; §§ 17-4-60 to 17-4-63. Local boards of registrars shall provide to the Secretary of State the required information for each voter to establish and maintain the statewide list. Ala. Code § 17-4-36.

Alabama Code Section 17-4-3 requires purging of "the computerized statewide voter registration list on a continuous basis" of disqualified electors. Also, Section 17-4-6 requires "continuous purgation of the statewide voter registration list" based on information provided by state departments or agencies, i.e., the Alabama Department of Public Health, probate judges, and the Administrative Office of Courts, which transmit data on deaths, mentally incompetent declarations, and disqualifying felony convictions, respectively, to the Alabama Voter Registration System for cross-checking against records of registered voters as well as new applicants per Sections 17-4-4 and 17-4-33.

In February 2025, the State of Alabama purged 116,286 voters from its last NVRA process. The Alabama Code requires each county's board of registrars to conduct voter list maintenance activities involving a postcard notification system every four years with the most recent process conducted earlier in 2025. *See* Ala. Code § 17-4-30. This voter list maintenance activity statutorily requires obtaining information from the United States Postal Services' National Change of Address system. *See id.* Each board of registrars reviews this information to confirm whether the

voter has moved in the board's jurisdiction, to the jurisdiction of a different board in Alabama, or out of state. *See id.* The statute outlines the following process:

(1) If the board of registrars or Secretary of State determines from the change-of-address information that a registered voter has moved to a different residence address that is under the jurisdiction of the same board of registrars, the board of registrars shall change the registration records of that voter to show the new address, and the board of registrars or Secretary of State, within 90 days after identifying the potential change, shall send the voter a notice of the change by forwardable mail along with a postage prepaid, pre-addressed return card on which the registered voter may correct his or her current address information. The notice shall inform the voter that if the voter did not change his or her residence, he or she is required to return the pre-addressed card no later than the last day to register to vote before an election.

(2) If the board of registrars or Secretary of State determines from the change-of-address information that a registered voter has moved to a different residence address that is under the jurisdiction of a different board of registrars or to a residence address outside of the state, the board of registrars or Secretary of State, within 90 days after identifying the potential change, shall send the voter a notice of the change by forwardable mail along with a postage prepaid, pre-addressed return card on which the registered voter may verify or correct his or her current address information. The notice shall include both of the following:

a. A statement informing the voter that if the pre-addressed card is not returned within the time specified in the notice, the voter will be permitted to vote in that same jurisdiction during the period from the date the notice was mailed and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for federal office, provided the voter completes a voter registration update form. If the voter does not update his or her voter registration record or vote during the period ending on the day after the date of the second general election for federal office, the voter's name shall be removed from the list of eligible voters.

b. Information concerning how the voter may continue his or her eligibility to vote in another jurisdiction if the voter has changed his or her residence to an address outside of the jurisdiction of the board of registrars under which he or she is then registered.

Ala. Code § 17-4-30(b). As applicable, the mailer date and date of return is recorded in the voter registration database and updates are made accordingly based on information reported by registered voters. Ala. Code § 17-4-30(c), (d).

If the registered voter does not respond to the notice provided in this section within 90 days of the date on which the notice was mailed or if the notice is returned to the board of registrars as undeliverable, the board of registrars or its agent shall change the status of the voter to inactive and indicate in the statewide voter registration database the date the change is recorded and that the voter did not

respond to the mailing or that the mailing was returned as undeliverable, in a manner provided by rule by the Secretary of State.

Ala. Code § 17-4-30(e). In March of 2025, over 400,000 notices were sent to registered voters pursuant to this law as required to initiate the new four-year NVRA process. Alabama also inactivated 240,000 voter records, accordingly.

Additional voter list maintenance is also being performed by the boards of registrars pursuant to Act 2025-424, which codifies Secretary Allen's Alabama Voter Integrity Database ("AVID") program to ensure database integrity after the state withdrew from the Electronic Registration Information Center ("ERIC") in 2023. Individuals identified through AVID by the Secretary of State are communicated to the appropriate county board or boards of registrars to process any improperly registered voters for removal by majority vote. This information includes the names of deceased voters, potential duplicate voters, out-of-state voter crosschecks, and noncitizens.

Specifically, AVID involves the following components:

- (1) Working with other states, including Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, Louisiana, Kentucky, Texas, Ohio, and Virginia, for a current total of ten (10) participants to identify individuals who are registered to vote in Alabama but who are also registered to vote in another state, including individuals who may have voted in the same or a similar election in both states.
- (2) The Alabama Law Enforcement Agency's (ALEA) driver license and nondriver identification data, including foreign national designation data, to identify voters in Alabama who have moved and obtained a driver license or nondriver identification card in another state or who have registered to vote in Alabama and then applied for a foreign national driver license or nondriver identification card.
- (3) U.S. Social Security death data to identify deceased individuals who are registered to vote and may have died out of state;
- (4) National Change of Address data to identify individuals who are registered to vote in Alabama but have notified the USPS that they have relocated to a new county within the state or an address outside of Alabama; and
- (5) Data from the Department of Homeland Security's United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS-USCIS) to identify individuals who are registered to vote in Alabama but are ineligible to vote because they are noncitizens.

Since AVID's inception, Secretary Allen has verified and placed on the path to removal nearly 50,000 voters, who registered to vote in Alabama, but who moved to surrounding states since 2024. The following is a breakdown by state and year:

State	2024	2025
Tennessee	8,501	9,371
Georgia		11,626
Mississippi	7,052	2,200
Kentucky		5,457
Louisiana		5,196
Total		49,403

Using ALEA data, indicating relocation out of state, over 150,000 voters have been placed on the path to removal. Also, over 6,200 deceased individuals have been removed using Social Security death data and over 36,000 voters were identified who moved using the USPS NCOA file.

In June 2025, pursuant to Act 2025-424, and in compliance with Executive Order 14165, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025), which ordered States to redouble their efforts to root out noncitizen voter fraud, Secretary Allen negotiated and entered an official Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DHS-USCIS, to allow Alabama to gain access to the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program for voter registration and list maintenance purposes for the first time in Alabama's history. This effort will ensure that Alabama elections are decided only by the votes of eligible United States citizens. Specifically, this new AVID component will be used to verify U.S. citizenship and identify noncitizens registered to vote so that they can be removed from the state voter file. The MOA is in early implementation stages momentarily, with a number of registered voters already identified as potential noncitizens, whose status is undergoing additional verification steps per established DHS-USCIS protocol prior to removal by the applicable local boards or registrars.

While the DHS-USCIS MOA is a new component of AVID, it is important to note that Secretary Allen has been abundantly clear about his zero-tolerance policy for noncitizen voting and has endeavored to bring the problem to heel in Alabama, starting in 2023. To that end, the Secretary made repeated attempts to collaborate with the federal government, including a series of letters and meetings with the DHS-USCIS and other agencies, including representatives of the Biden Whitehouse. He was stonewalled repeatedly. In July 2024, the Secretary formally proposed access to federal citizenship data that could identify noncitizen voters in Alabama, but USCIS ignored the request until it was too late for meaningful cooperation before the November 2024 election. So, the Secretary found another solution at the time, working with Alabama agencies to find individuals on the voter roll who had self-identified as noncitizens. Registrars were not instructed to remove those voters, but to make them inactive. Voters on the list who were citizens or gained U.S. citizenship later could become active and vote by simply updating their registration—even on election day at the polls. Voters who were noncitizens were asked to self-remove from the voter rolls. The number of individuals who self-removed during this process totaled 109, some of whom specifically stated in writing that they were noncitizens.

Rather than supporting the Secretary's efforts, as you may be aware, the United States sued Alabama, *see United States v. Alabama*, No. 2:24-cv-1254-AMM (N.D. Ala. 2025), joining a separate lawsuit filed by various private, liberal-minded plaintiffs, and insisting that noncitizen

voting is not a problem.¹ Then, in March 2025, the new USDOJ administration dismissed the case, signaling support for “the efforts of states like Alabama that engage in voting security measures that ensure only citizens are voting in our elections. . . . [and] to permit Alabama the time and space to develop a legal, efficient, and effective process to remove noncitizens from their voting roll and secure the vote for their citizens in upcoming elections.” *U.S. Department of Justice Dismisses Biden-Era Lawsuit Against Alabama in order to have more Secure Elections*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (March 14, 2025), available online: <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-department-justice-dismisses-biden-era-lawsuit-against-alabama-order-have-more-secure>.

Because it is unquestionably a crime under federal law for noncitizens to vote, 18 U.S.C. § 611 (unlawful; punishment by fine and/or imprisonment up to one year); 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f) (knowingly making a false statement claiming citizenship in order to vote; punishment by fine and/or imprisonment up to five years), Alabama saw federal prosecutions pursued against individuals related to the Secretary’s noncitizen letter process. *See, e.g., United States v. Francisco*, Case No. 3:24-cr-00356-LCB-HNJ (N.D. Ala. 2025) (prosecution under § 1015(f) of a Guatemalan national who resided in Russellville, Alabama, without legal immigration status, assumed a false identity, and registered to vote in Alabama on February 10, 2016, and, in fact, voted multiple times during the 2016 and 2020 election cycles). The Secretary’s public statement concerning this criminal case is available here: <https://www.sos.alabama.gov/newsroom/secretary-state-wes-allens-statement-undocumented-individual-charged-connection-voting>. See also, Secretary Allen’s April 11, 2023, press release regarding arrests of three individuals: <https://www.sos.alabama.gov/newsroom/alabama-secretary-state-assists-law-enforcement-arrest-three-individuals-identity-theft>. During the course of the Secretary’s noncitizen letter process in 2024, numerous referrals were also made by the Secretary to the Alabama Attorney General’s Office for further investigation at the state-level of individuals identified as potential noncitizens registered to vote/unlawfully voting.

Secretary Allen’s administration has also initiated/accomplished the following significant voter file maintenance projects beyond AVID:

HAVA Project

Upon assuming office, the Secretary identified over 342,057 individuals whose voter registration records lacked a verified driver license or social security number, with approximately 25,000 of those records lacking both a driver license or social security number. To address this deficiency, Secretary Allen developed a plan to meet the requirements of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, and instructed the boards of registrars to notify individuals in their respective counties with missing identifiers and require them to provide current, verifiable information. If the individual could not provide a verifiable required identifier, then they were instructed to complete

¹ *See, e.g., United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Alabama*, No. 2:24-cv-1329-AMM at 25 (N.D. Ala. filed Oct. 2, 2024) (“[T]he likely percent of non-citizen voters in recent US elections is 0.”); *id.* at 25 n.6 (“Alabama has provided no evidence of harm[.]”); Complaint, *United States v. Alabama*, No. 2:24-cv-1329-AMM (N.D. Ala. filed Sept. 27, 2024) at ¶1 (“[T]here is no evidence of widespread non-citizen voting in the United States.”).

a written explanation or declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, as to why neither their driver license/non-driver ID number or the last four (4) digits of their social security number can be provided. This project eliminated 260,076 of the problematic voter registration records from the state's voter file. The Secretary is directing a second project phase to address the 82,000 remaining insufficient records, which will involve registrars inactivating voters who do not provide a valid driver license number/non-driver identification number, the last four digits of a valid social security number, or complete a declaration. These individuals may become active registered voters and vote by simply updating their registration information to include a valid driver license/social security number (even on election day at the polls). Otherwise, they will remain inactive.

Experian Pilot

To help accomplish the address confirmation program required by Section 8 of the NVRA and Alabama Code Section 17-4-30, Secretary Allen utilized Experian's TrueTrace product in Alabama for the first time to compare credit bureau data with the statewide voter file. Hundreds of thousands of voters were located who were tied to a different address. This effort was modeled after the U.S. Election Assistance Commission's [Experian Pilot Project](#). Also, 4,006 of deceased voters removed through AVID are attributable to TrueTrace data.

Over 100-Year-Old Registrant Review

In order to ensure voter rolls are as accurate, up-to-date, and reliable as possible, Secretary Allen led an effort to have the boards of registrars review, verify for accuracy, and/or correct, as appropriate, registrants whose voter records indicated that they are more than 100 years old. Some of these registrants' records required updates as they were determined to be deceased. Registrars were directed to verify voter system information for these over 100-year-old registrants by letter, by phone, and/or by reviewing obituaries. Registrars also used the voter registration system's Social Security verification feature to determine whether Social Security Administration data reflected the voter as deceased. Data indicates this project has substantially reduced the number of over 100-year-old registrants from 4,205 in February 2023 to 1,346 in May 2025.

Moving to your inquiries about Alabama's reported Election Assistance Commission's Election Administration and Voting Survey ("EAVS") and other statistical data:

1. *In the EAVS data for Question A1b, Alabama listed 3,466,606 Total Active Voters for 2024. According to the Secretary of State's website, the statistics show 3,492,761 active voters in November 2024: [Voter Registration Statistics - 2024](#). Please explain the discrepancy.*

This discrepancy is due to data reflecting different dates. "November 2024: [Voter Registration Statistics - 2024](#)" is voter registration data pulled at the end of the month or November 30, 2024. Thus, the November 2024: Voter Registration Statistics 2024 information reflects data from weeks after the November 2024 general election while the reported number is from the day of the election.

2. *In the EAVS data for Question A1c, Alabama listed 401,434 inactive voters for 2024. According to the Secretary of State's website, the statistics show 387,354 inactive voters in November 2024: Voter Registration Statistics - 2024. Please explain the discrepancy.*

This discrepancy is due to data reflecting different dates. "November 2024: Voter Registration Statistics – 2024" is voter registration data pulled at the end of the month or November 30, 2024. Thus, the November 2024: Voter Registration Statistics – 2024 information reflects data from weeks after the November 2024 general election while the reported number is from the day of the election.

3. *In the EAVS data for Question A3d, Alabama had 571 voters (.02 percent) with duplicate registrations, significantly below the nationwide average of 12.7 percent. Please explain why duplicate registrations are such a low percentage of total registration transactions. Please explain what actions Alabama is taking to identify duplicate registrations and to remove those duplicates from the registration transactions.*

Your letter notes that Alabama's duplicate voter registrations are reportedly significantly below the national average. While Alabama incorporates processes into Alabama's statewide voter system to successfully identify, address, and prevent duplicates during the voter registration/update process, and Secretary Allen has directed efforts to have registrars actively and periodically work to eliminate duplicate records using available processes in the system, after further inquiry, the reported number should be 5,873 duplicate removals. Alabama's EAVs report will be updated to reflect this correction as soon as possible.

There are three basic ways duplicate checking occurs in Alabama's system:

- (1) Voter additions/updates (from a paper application) and voter additions/updates (from a scanned batch of voter applications) all require registrars to perform a statewide duplicate search before adding or updating a voter.
- (2) Voters who add or update their information through Alabama's online registration portal have a statewide duplicate check performed automatically by registrars immediately upon opening the incoming online record.
- (3) Registrars run batch reports to check for any additional voters that match across their county and across the state and resolve them as duplicates. focusing on voters registered at a single address, and then reviewing their names and associated demographics. Those registrants who are clearly identifiable as the same individuals (i.e., they share the same DOB, DLN, SSN) are processed by accepting the most recent record and marking all others as duplicate in the system. The same process is used to clean up incomplete or address errors in the system.

Please note that duplicates identified during the voter registration/update process may not be captured in the total number of reported transactions as they were never fully added to the system as duplicates.

4. *Alabama failed to respond to EAVS Questions A4 -- A9. Please provide data responsive to these questions or explain, in detail, why it is not possible for the State to respond to each request.*

Alabama’s boards of registrars’ offices generally do not reliably record or distinguish the types of voter registration transactions specifically reflected in the A4 – A9 question categories. For example, question A8 asks about invalid registrations. While registrars should maintain those records, there is not an accurate way to collect and report data from the system concerning who submitted an invalid registration, i.e., no established mechanism to report that specific metric. While the sources of voter registration are generally tracked and recorded in the system by registrars, there is no reliable distinction made between the other categories that this question seeks. Therefore, any statistic provided in response to these questions would be inaccurate.

Data reflecting the general sources of registration the system tracks as entered by local registrars is provided below. This information should be most responsive to A4; however, the accuracy and completeness of the data is subject to the input methodology employed by each local registrar/registrars’ office:

Registration Source	Transactions
(a) Mail, Email, Fax	20,832
(b) In person	62,719
(c) Online	223,943
(d) Automatic	N/A
(e) Driver License Issuance	762,121
(f) NVRA Public Assistance	33,657
(g) Disability Assistance Programs	N/A*
(h) Armed Forces Recruitment	77
(i) State Designated Agencies	3,075
(j) Registration Drives	16,309
(k) Polling Places/Voting Sites	24,771
(l) Other: Schools/Universities	4,941
(m) Other: Unknown	4,356
Total Registration Transactions	1,156,801

*included in NVRA Public Assistance (f).

Alabama’s EAVs report will be updated to reflect this additional information as soon as possible.

5. *In the EAVS data, Question A12a shows that Alabama removed only 114,647 registrants, which is 2.96 percent of registered voters. Your removals are over three times below the national average. Please explain why the number of removals is low in Alabama relative*

to the national average, and what actions the State is taking to ensure that voters who should not be on the voter roll are being removed.

This discrepancy may be the result of the way system data is collected and was pulled when reporting. Alabama’s voter system does not directly capture “removal” metrics that match the question. The limited reporting functionality of the system was used to report the previously reported 114,647. However, upon closer review of available data with the system vendor, the Secretary presents the following categories, including disqualification, suspense, and not eligible system records, which may be interpreted as removals for the timeframe in question (November 8, 2022 through October 21, 2024), with, again, the understanding that accuracy of the data is generally subject to how it was coded by the local registrars:

Confirmation Mailing	718
Criminal Conviction (Moral Turpitude)*	5,952
Death Notice	90,807
Duplicate	5,873
Mental Incompetence	77
Moved	12,016
Noncitizen (U.S.)	60
NVRA Compliant Purge	259
Purged	108
Voter Request**	980
Transfer Notice	754
Other, including Suspense/Not Eligible Removals	2,866
Total	117,470

*Including 63 removals classified in “pending felony review” status.

**Includes self-removal requests resulting from noncitizen letter process.

Alabama’s EAVs report will be updated to reflect this correction as soon as possible.

- Alabama did not respond to EAVS Question A12e concerning failure to respond to a sent confirmation notice and not voting in the two most recent federal elections. Please provide responsive data or explain why Alabama is unable to respond to this request.*

Alabama’s system does not provide a way to track voters who do not respond to notices. When NVRA notices are sent, the voter is flagged in the system as having received it and the “NVRA” designation is assigned to that voter. If the voter makes any kind of update over the next four years, the flag is removed. The system cannot generate a report to accurately reflect the number of individuals who did or who did not respond to a mailer.

If the question is asking about voters that are removed every four years as a result of the NVRA purge, then Alabama can provide that data; however, again, the system does not strictly track or generate reports of who did not respond to a mailer and did not vote in an election. The question specifically asks about voters removed in the timeframe of November 2022 and close of voter registration for November 2024 election. But, as you know, the NVRA purge should take place after each presidential election. Data from the 2021 and 2025 NVRA cycles in Alabama is provided below:

2021 NVRA Cycle	
136,251 removed (January 2021)	
394,762 confirmation mailers (April 2021)	
2025 NVRA Cycle	
116,286 removed (February 2025)	
432,964 mailers to moves out of county/state	
43,303 mailers to moves within county	
244,483 voters made NVRA-Inactive (June 2025)	

Your letter additionally requests information regarding removals for a different time period, October 21, 2022 through the present, for the following specific reasons: noncitizen, adjudicated incompetent, and felony conviction. Alabama’s voter system, again, does not directly capture “removal” metrics that match the question, and all data is subject to how it was coded by the local registrars. The system most closely reflects the following categories, which may be interpreted as removals, and are coded for reasons that match as closely as possible the reason categories requested:

Criminal Conviction (Moral Turpitude)*	9,322
Mental Incompetence	121
Noncitizen (U.S.)	73
Voter Request**	1,739

*Including 120 removals classified in “pending felony review” status.

**Includes self-removal requests resulting from noncitizen letter process.

As to your request for a “current electronic copy of the State of Alabama’s computerized statewide voter registration list[,]” the Secretary of State is prepared to provide the current electronic statewide voter list, including voter history information, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i). A Memorandum of Agreement between the USDOJ and the Alabama Secretary of State is requested to outline specific data sharing terms and to ensure compliance with applicable federal and state laws. Secretary Allen looks forward to beginning negotiations so that this information can be provided to your Department as soon as possible.

Finally, Alabama has a proven track record of being one of, if not the most conservative states in the Republic on voter registration and voter file maintenance. When comparing state percentages of voter removals, one may ask why there are so many ineligible voters on their rolls to be removed to begin with? Alabama does not allow automatic voter registration or day-of-election voter registration, which some conservative states, and most liberal states, do offer. You will notice in those states that enacted such policies, the number of new registrations skyrocketed. Secretary Allen takes voter registration requirements seriously and is ensuring that individuals meet those requirements prior to becoming registered to vote in Alabama.

Please do not hesitate to contact me at (334) 353-7857 or Mike.Jones1@sos.alabama.gov should you have any questions or require further assistance from this Office.

Sincerely,



Michael L. Jones, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosures

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-60

Catchline: Implementation of Federal Acts.

- (a) The Secretary of State shall be the primary state official for federal contact for the implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
- (b) The State Department of Public Safety shall integrate voter registration into driver's license application and renewal or updating procedures and shall coordinate its driver's license database with the state voter registration list and the Social Security Administration's database in accordance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
- (c) The state through the Secretary of State's office shall allow citizens to register to vote by mail. The voter registration application may be designed by the Secretary of State provided it meets the requirements of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Secretary of State may, however, choose to use federally prescribed forms.
- (d) State agencies which provide food stamps, Medicaid, services related to the Women and Infant Children program (WIC), services related to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and agencies providing services to the disabled shall provide voter registration opportunities to their clientele in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.
- (e) Recruitment offices of the Armed Forces of the United States shall provide voter registration opportunities to their clientele in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.
- (f) Other public offices and agencies which may provide the voter registration services provided by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 include public libraries, public schools, offices of municipal clerks, probate offices, state and local revenue offices, unemployment compensation offices, offices providing services to the disabled other than those required in subsection (d) to provide voter registration services, and federal and nongovernmental offices which agree to provide the voter registration services.
- (g) Voter registration, confirmation documents, and any other documents necessary to be prescribed by the Secretary of State to meet the requirements of the National

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-1-3

Catchline: Chief Elections Officials.

(a) The Secretary of State is the chief elections official in the state and shall provide uniform guidance for election activities. The Secretary of State is granted rule making authority for the implementation of Chapter 2 under the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act.

(b) The judge of probate is the chief elections official of the county and shall serve as chair of the appointing board.

History: (Act 2003-313, p. 733, §1; §17-1-8; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §2.)

Voter Registration Act of 1993 shall be prepared and furnished as provided for in Section 17-3-57.

(h) The Secretary of State, by rule, may prescribe forms in furtherance of state election laws deemed helpful to disabled voters and voters speaking an alternative language to English who, according to the most recent decennial census, comprise more than five percent of the voting age population for any county in Alabama.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §2; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-250; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §22.)

Section: 17-4-63

Catchline: Rules, Forms, and Instructions; Inter-Agency Agreements.

The Secretary of State shall promulgate rules and prescribe forms and instructions as shall be necessary to implement the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 in Alabama or the Help America Vote Act of 2002, including any rules and forms necessary for the administration of the acts by state departments and agencies. The Secretary of State is further authorized to enter into inter-agency agreements with other government agencies for the implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §8; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-255; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §22.)

Constitution of Alabama

Section: 177

Catchline: Suffrage and Elections.

(a) Only a citizen of the United States who has attained the age of eighteen years and has resided in this state and in a county thereof for the time provided by law, if registered as provided by law, shall have the right to vote in the county of his or her residence. The Legislature may prescribe reasonable and nondiscriminatory requirements as prerequisites to registration for voting. The Legislature shall, by statute, prescribe a procedure by which eligible citizens can register to vote.

(b) No person convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, or who is mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil and political rights or removal of disability.

(c) The Legislature shall by law provide for the registration of voters, absentee voting, secrecy in voting, the administration of elections, and the nomination of candidates.

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-3-30

Catchline: Qualifications of Electors Generally.

Any person possessing the qualifications of an elector set out in Article 8 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as modified by federal law, and not laboring under any disqualification listed therein, shall be an elector, and shall be entitled to register and to vote at any election by the people.

History: (Code 1876, §224; Code 1886, §319; Code 1896, §1556; Code 1907, §290; Acts 1920, No. 5, p. 4; Code 1923, §361; Code 1940, T. 17, §12; Acts 1953, No. 330, p. 385; Code 1975, §17-3-1; Acts 1978, No. 584, p. 667, §1; §17-3-9; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §9.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-3-2

Catchline: Qualifications and Appointment of Registrars; Chair. (Amended by Act 2025-22) [Effective until October 1, 2025.]

AMENDED BY ACT 2025-22, EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2025. SEE ACT FOR REVISED LANGUAGE.

(a) Registration shall be conducted in each county by a board of three reputable and suitable persons to be appointed, unless otherwise provided by law, by the Governor, Auditor, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, or by a majority of them acting as a state board of appointment. The registrars shall be qualified electors, residents of the county, shall have a high school diploma or equivalent, and possess the minimum computer and map reading skills necessary to function in the office. The Secretary of State shall prescribe guidelines to assist the state board of appointment in determining the qualifications of registrars. The registrars shall not hold an elective office during their term. One of the members shall be designated by the state board of appointment as chair of the board of registrars for each county.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), the Legislature may provide by local law for the appointment of additional members to the board of registrars for a county that has two courthouses.

(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply in any county having a population of not less than 600,000 inhabitants according to the 1970 or any succeeding federal decennial census, and any currently effective local law or general law of local application providing for the appointment of any member of the board of registrars in the county shall remain in full force and effect and shall not be repealed by operation of this chapter.

History: (Code 1896, §1561; Code 1907, §300; Acts 1920, No. 78, p. 124; Code 1923, §370; Acts 1932, Ex. Sess., No. 157, p. 177; Code 1940, T. 17, §21; Code 1975, §17-4-40; Acts 1978, No. 584, p. 667, §6; Acts 1992, No. 92-223, p. 551, §1; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-150; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §7.)

Section: 17-3-3

Catchline: Terms of Office; Removal from Office.

The registrars appointed under this article may be removed for cause by the Secretary of State at any time before the end of their term of office, upon submitting written reasons therefor to the registrar removed and to the members of the state board of appointment. If not so removed, the registrar may hold office for four years from the date of appointment and until a successor is appointed.

History: (Code 1907, §301; Acts 1920, No. 78, p. 124; Code 1923, §371; Code 1940, T. 17, §22; Code 1975, §17-4-41; Acts 1978, No. 584, p. 667, §7; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-151; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §7.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-3-2

Catchline: Qualifications and Appointment of Registrars; Chair. [Effective October 1, 2025.]

(a)(1) Registration shall be conducted in each county by a board of three reputable and suitable individuals to be appointed, unless otherwise provided by law, by the Governor, Auditor, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, or by a majority of them acting as a state board of appointment. In making appointments on or after October 1, 2025, the state board of appointment shall consider the racial, gender, urban, rural, and economic diversity of the that county.

(2) The registrars shall:

- a. Be qualified electors and be residents of the county;
- b. Have a high school diploma or equivalent;
- c. Possess excellent communication skills evident by reportable experience in areas such as electronic mail, online communications, and use of multi-line telephones;
- d. Demonstrate intermediate level experience and proficiency in data processing and use of computer programs used in the current day-to-day workplace, including, but not limited to, web-based operating systems;
- e. Demonstrate the ability to download and upload reports and files and conduct spreadsheet manipulation; and
- f. Demonstrate the ability to operate office equipment, including printers, copiers, scanners, and cameras.

(3) The Secretary of State shall prescribe guidelines to assist the state board of appointment in determining the qualifications of registrars. The registrars shall not hold an elective office during their term. One of the members shall be designated by the state board of appointment as chair of the board of registrars for each county.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Legislature may provide by local law for the appointment of additional members to the board of registrars for a county that has two courthouses.

(c) This section shall not apply in any county having a population of not less than 600,000 inhabitants according to the 1970 or any succeeding federal decennial census, and any currently effective local law or general law of local application providing for the appointment of any member of the board of registrars in the county shall remain in full force and effect and shall not be repealed by operation of this chapter.

History: (Code 1896, §1561; Code 1907, §300; Acts 1920, No. 78, p. 124; Code 1923, §370; Acts 1932, Ex. Sess., No. 157, p. 177; Code 1940, T. 17, §21; Code 1975, §17-4-40; Acts 1978, No. 584, p. 667, §6; Acts 1992, No. 92-223, p. 551, §1; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-150; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §7; Act 2025-22, §1.)

Board of Registrars: All Counties

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Board of Registrars: All Counties

County	Email	Mailing Address	Physical Address	Phone
Autauga	Autauga@vote.alabama.gov	P.O. Box 680036, Prattville, Alabama 36068-0036	218 N. Court Street Prattville, Alabama 36067-3041	(334) 358-6740
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Baldwin	Baldwin@vote.alabama.gov	PO Box 1507 Bay Minette, Alabama 36507-1507	1100 Fairhope Avenue Fairhope, Alabama 36532	(251) 928-3002 Ext. 2617
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Perry	Perry@vote.alabama.gov	PO Box 555 Marion, Alabama 36756-0555	300 Washington Street Ste 102 Marion, Alabama 36756	(334) 683-2218 Ext. 5
Pickens	Pickens@vote.alabama.gov	PO Box 173 Carrollton,	155 Reform Street, Suite 303	(205) 367-2071

		Alabama 35447-0173	Carrollton, Alabama 35447	
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Washington	Washington@vote.alabama.gov	PO Box 1224 Chatom, Alabama 36518-1224	45 Court St. Chatom, Alabama 36558	(251) 847-3255
Wilcox	Wilcox@vote.alabama.gov	PO Box 661 Camden, Alabama 36726-0661	219 Claiborne Street Camden, Alabama 36726	(334) 682-9753
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Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-35

Catchline: Supervisor of Voter Registration.

The Supervisor of Voter Registration shall be employed by the Secretary of State under the terms and conditions of the state Merit System and the salary and benefits shall be set by the Secretary of State out of funds appropriated for such purpose. The Supervisor of Voter Registration shall work at the direction of the Secretary of State. In addition to those duties assigned by the Secretary of State, the Supervisor of Voter Registration shall have the following duties:

- (1) To keep the minutes of the meetings of the Voter Registration Advisory Board, conduct the day-to-day business activities of the Voter Registration Advisory Board, and give progress reports on such activities at its meetings.
- (2) To serve as a liaison between the Secretary of State and the county boards of registrars on implementation of existing and future laws pertaining to voter registration.
- (3) To provide to the county boards of registrars such information as would allow them to determine which names should be stricken by them from voter lists in accordance with state law.
- (4) To provide assistance to the county boards of registrars in determining the names of any person or persons who are deceased, who are no longer qualified to vote in the election district where registered due to removal of residence from the county in which he or she is registered, or from the State of Alabama, who has been convicted of a disqualifying crime, or who is otherwise no longer qualified to vote as may be provided by law.
- (5) To establish and maintain a statewide voter registration list including all registered voters of the state as such information is reported to the Supervisor of Voter Registration by the boards of registrars or judges of probate of the various counties.
- (6) To maintain all information furnished to the Supervisor of Voter Registration relating to the inclusion or deletion of names from the lists of registered voters.
- (7) To acquire by purchase, lease, or contract, the use of such equipment as is required to establish a fully centralized statewide voter registration list which will allow the computerization of all of the offices of the boards of registrars throughout

the state upon legislative approval of funds for such computerization, the communication of necessary information between the boards of registrars and the Supervisor of Voter Registration; storage and instant comparison of names and other identifying information contained in voter lists, automatically identifying duplicate entries, produce in printed forms selected names or lists of names with identifying information, and do such other tasks as may be designated for it by the Supervisor of Voter Registration.

(8) To recommend procedures and administrative rules to the Secretary of State and prepare forms necessary to properly carry out such duties set forth herein.

(9) To secure from each county voter registration information and from any state department, agency, board, bureau, or commission, or from any other sources, information regarding the death, conviction of disqualifying crime, or removal of residence from the county or state of any registered voter.

(10) To furnish, at a reasonable reproduction cost and within 14 days of receipt of the request, voter registration lists limited to the names, addresses, and political subdivisions or voting places to candidates for election or political party nomination to further their candidacy, political party committees or officials thereof for political purposes only, incumbent officeholders to report to their constituents; nonprofit organizations which promote voter participation and registration for that purpose only; and for no other purpose and to no one else; failure to furnish the requested voter registration list within 14 days of receipt of a request shall result in no charge to the requesting entity and the cost shall be absorbed by the Secretary of State.

(11) To perform such duties pertaining to voter registration as may be assigned by the Secretary of State.

(12) To supervise persons employed by the Secretary of State, subject to the state Merit System laws and entitled to the rights of benefits thereunder, as may be necessary to carry out this article.

(13) To train, counsel, advise, and evaluate registrars in the performance of their lawful functions.

(14) To provide military and overseas voters with voter registration applications and absentee ballot applications and otherwise assist such voters with information helpful in becoming registered, changing registration, and obtaining absentee ballots.

(15) To provide information relating to procedures for registering and voting an absentee ballot.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §2; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-211; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-33

Catchline: Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List.

(a) The State of Alabama shall provide, through the Secretary of State, a nondiscriminatory, single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered by the Secretary of State, with advice from the Voter Registration Advisory Board and the President of the Alabama Probate Judges Association, which contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the state. The computerized list shall comply with the following requirements:

- (1) It shall serve as the single system for storing and managing the official list of registered voters throughout the state.
- (2) It shall contain the name, address, and voting location, as well as other information deemed necessary by the Voter Registration Advisory Board or the Secretary of State, of every legally registered voter in the state.
- (3) A unique identifier shall be assigned to each legally registered voter in the state.
- (4) It shall contain the voting history of each registered voter.
- (5) It shall be coordinated with the driver's license database of the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency and the appropriate state agency to assist in the removal of deceased voters.
- (6) Any election official in the state, including any local election official, may obtain immediate electronic access to the information contained in the computerized list.
- (7) All voter registration information obtained by any registrar in the state shall be electronically entered into the computerized list on an expedited basis at the time information is provided to the registrar.
- (8) The Secretary of State shall provide such support as may be required so that registrars are able to enter voter registration information.
- (9) It shall serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections.
- (10) Following each state and county election, the Secretary of State shall provide one electronic copy of the computerized voter list free of charge to each political party that satisfied the ballot access requirements for that election. The electronic copy of the computerized voter list shall be provided within 30 days of the

certification of the election or upon the completion of the election vote history update following the election, whichever comes first. In addition, upon written request from the chair of a political party, the Secretary of State shall furnish up to two additional electronic copies of the computerized voter file during each calendar year to each political party that satisfied the ballot access requirements during the last statewide election held prior to that calendar year. The electronic copies provided pursuant to this section shall contain the full, editable data as it exists in the computerized voter list maintained by the Secretary of State.

(11) The list shall be maintained so that it is technologically secure.

(b)(1) The Secretary of State, or judge of probate, or absentee election manager, or municipal clerk, or registrar shall include the name and omit all other information of a registered voter on any generally available list of registered voters, except for those lists provided to federal and state agencies, upon the written signed affidavit of the registered voter to the board of registrars of the county in which the individual is registered or intends to register, affirming one of the following:

a. That the registered voter, or a minor who is in the legal custody of the registered voter, is or has been the victim of domestic violence as provided in Article 7, commencing with Section 13A-6-130, of Chapter 6 of Title 13A.

b. That a domestic violence order is or has been issued by a judge or magistrate pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Order Enforcement Act, to restrain access to the registered voter or a minor who is in the legal custody of the registered voter.

c. That the registered voter is a federal or state prosecutor, federal, state, probate, or municipal judge, legislator, or law enforcement officer as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 36 or the spouse of a federal or state prosecutor, federal, state, probate, or municipal judge, legislator, or law enforcement officer as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 36.

(2) The Secretary of State shall develop and provide to each county the affidavit to be completed under this subsection.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §1; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-210; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §18; Act 2010-537, p. 918, §1; Act 2014-221, p. 704, §1; Act 2021-335, §1.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-30

Catchline: Periodic Updating of the Statewide Voter Registration Database.
(Amended by Act 2025-424)

AMENDED BY ACT 2025-424, EFFECTIVE MAY 19, 2025. SEE ACT FOR REVISED LANGUAGE.

(a) Beginning in February 2025, and in February of every fourth year thereafter, the board of registrars, or the Secretary of State, if acting as the board's agent pursuant to subsection (h), shall use change-of-address information supplied by the United States Postal Service through the National Change of Address database and by at least one other voter registration database, including, but not limited to, the Electronic Registration Information Center or NVRA designated agency, to identify registered voters whose addresses may have changed.

(b)(1) If the board of registrars or Secretary of State determines from the change-of-address information that a registered voter has moved to a different residence address that is under the jurisdiction of the same board of registrars, the board of registrars shall change the registration records of that voter to show the new address, and the board of registrars or Secretary of State, within 90 days after identifying the potential change, shall send the voter a notice of the change by forwardable mail along with a postage prepaid, pre-addressed return card on which the registered voter may correct his or her current address information. The notice shall inform the voter that if the voter did not change his or her residence, he or she is required to return the pre-addressed card no later than the last day to register to vote before an election.

(2) If the board of registrars or Secretary of State determines from the change-of-address information that a registered voter has moved to a different residence address that is under the jurisdiction of a different board of registrars or to a residence address outside of the state, the board of registrars or Secretary of State, within 90 days after identifying the potential change, shall send the voter a notice of the change by forwardable mail along with a postage prepaid, pre-addressed return card on which the registered voter may verify or correct his or her current address information. The notice shall include both of the following:

a. A statement informing the voter that if the pre-addressed card is not returned within the time specified in the notice, the voter will be permitted to vote in that

same jurisdiction during the period from the date the notice was mailed and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for federal office, provided the voter completes a voter registration update form. If the voter does not update his or her voter registration record or vote during the period ending on the day after the date of the second general election for federal office, the voter's name shall be removed from the list of eligible voters.

b. Information concerning how the voter may continue his or her eligibility to vote in another jurisdiction if the voter has changed his or her residence to an address outside of the jurisdiction of the board of registrars under which he or she is then registered.

(c) The board of registrars or Secretary of State shall record and maintain in the statewide voter registration database the dates on which the notice is mailed to a registered voter and the card is subsequently returned to the board by the registered voter.

(d) The board of registrars shall update the statewide voter registration database using the information reported to the board by the registered voters on the prepaid, pre-addressed return cards provided for in this section.

(e) If the registered voter does not respond to the notice provided in this section within 90 days of the date on which the notice was mailed or if the notice is returned to the board of registrars as undeliverable, the board of registrars or its agent shall change the status of the voter to inactive and indicate in the statewide voter registration database the date the change is recorded and that the voter did not respond to the mailing or that the mailing was returned as undeliverable, in a manner provided by rule by the Secretary of State.

(f) The names of persons to be removed from the list of registered voters pursuant to this section shall be published in accordance with Section 17-4-10.

(g) The Secretary of State may adopt rules as necessary to implement this section.

(h) The Secretary of State may act as an agent for a board of registrars, only upon receiving the written consent of the county commission, in implementing this section.

History: (Acts 1995, No. 95-769, p. 1816, §2; §17-4-201; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §18; Act 2021-534, §1.)

Section: 17-4-31

Catchline: State to Reimburse County Commissions for Certain Costs.

The state shall reimburse each county commission for all the postage costs associated with voter lists maintenance activities provided for in Section 17-4-30 and one-half of the cost of the publication of the names of individuals to be removed from the list of registered voters as required in Section 17-4-10. The reimbursement shall be made from the Election Expenses Account in the State Treasury upon approval by the Secretary of State on warrants drawn by the state Comptroller.

History: (Acts 1995, No. 95-769, p. 1816, §3; §17-4-202; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §18; Act 2021-534, §1.)

Section: 17-4-32

Catchline: Judge of Probate to Have Access to Current List of Registered Voters; No State Entities to Pay Costs for Access to List.

The judge of probate shall have access to and be provided with the current list of registered voters within his or her county at no cost within seven days after making the request. If computer access to the list of registered voters is available, upon request for access, the judge of probate shall be provided with immediate on-line availability to the list. No agency, department, or office of the State of Alabama shall pay any cost associated with printing or computer access to a list of registered voters available to a judge of probate under this section.

History: (Acts 1995, No. 95-769, p. 1816, §4; §17-4-20; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §18.)

Section: 17-4-33

Catchline: Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List.

(a) The State of Alabama shall provide, through the Secretary of State, a nondiscriminatory, single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered by the Secretary of State, with advice from the Voter Registration Advisory Board and the

President of the Alabama Probate Judges Association, which contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the state. The computerized list shall comply with the following requirements:

- (1) It shall serve as the single system for storing and managing the official list of registered voters throughout the state.
- (2) It shall contain the name, address, and voting location, as well as other information deemed necessary by the Voter Registration Advisory Board or the Secretary of State, of every legally registered voter in the state.
- (3) A unique identifier shall be assigned to each legally registered voter in the state.
- (4) It shall contain the voting history of each registered voter.
- (5) It shall be coordinated with the driver's license database of the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency and the appropriate state agency to assist in the removal of deceased voters.
- (6) Any election official in the state, including any local election official, may obtain immediate electronic access to the information contained in the computerized list.
- (7) All voter registration information obtained by any registrar in the state shall be electronically entered into the computerized list on an expedited basis at the time information is provided to the registrar.
- (8) The Secretary of State shall provide such support as may be required so that registrars are able to enter voter registration information.
- (9) It shall serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections.
- (10) Following each state and county election, the Secretary of State shall provide one electronic copy of the computerized voter list free of charge to each political party that satisfied the ballot access requirements for that election. The electronic copy of the computerized voter list shall be provided within 30 days of the certification of the election or upon the completion of the election vote history update following the election, whichever comes first. In addition, upon written request from the chair of a political party, the Secretary of State shall furnish up to two additional electronic copies of the computerized voter file during each calendar year to each political party that satisfied the ballot access requirements during the last statewide election held prior to that calendar year. The electronic copies provided pursuant to this section shall contain the full, editable data as it exists in the computerized voter list maintained by the Secretary of State.
- (11) The list shall be maintained so that it is technologically secure.

(b)(1) The Secretary of State, or judge of probate, or absentee election manager, or municipal clerk, or registrar shall include the name and omit all other information of a registered voter on any generally available list of registered voters, except for those lists provided to federal and state agencies, upon the written signed affidavit of the registered voter to the board of registrars of the county in which the individual is registered or intends to register, affirming one of the following:

a. That the registered voter, or a minor who is in the legal custody of the registered voter, is or has been the victim of domestic violence as provided in Article 7, commencing with Section 13A-6-130, of Chapter 6 of Title 13A.

b. That a domestic violence order is or has been issued by a judge or magistrate pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Order Enforcement Act, to restrain access to the registered voter or a minor who is in the legal custody of the registered voter.

c. That the registered voter is a federal or state prosecutor, federal, state, probate, or municipal judge, legislator, or law enforcement officer as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 36 or the spouse of a federal or state prosecutor, federal, state, probate, or municipal judge, legislator, or law enforcement officer as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 36.

(2) The Secretary of State shall develop and provide to each county the affidavit to be completed under this subsection.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §1; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-210; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §18; Act 2010-537, p. 918, §1; Act 2014-221, p. 704, §1; Act 2021-335, §1.)

Section: 17-4-34

Catchline: State Voter Registration Advisory Board.

(a) As an oversight board for the system, there is created and established a State Voter Registration Advisory Board composed of nine members, to be appointed as follows:

Three members by the Governor, one of whom shall reflect the racial, ethnic, gender, and age diversity of the state.

Three members by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, one of whom shall reflect the racial, ethnic, gender, and age diversity of the state.

Three members by the State Auditor, one of whom shall reflect the racial, ethnic, gender, and age diversity of the state.

Such appointments shall be made no later than September 30, 2003. Persons appointed to the Voter Registration Advisory Board shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority and shall have knowledge of the workings of voter registration and election laws and shall receive no compensation for their services other than reimbursement for traveling and other expenses actually incurred in the performance of their official duties. The expenses shall be paid in the manner and amount as is provided for other state officers and employees and persons traveling on official business for state departments and agencies. The appointees shall meet within 30 days after their appointments to select one of their number as chair who shall serve for two years. Thereafter, the Voter Registration Advisory Board shall elect a new chair every four years. The Voter Registration Advisory Board shall meet regularly at least once during each quarter and at such special meetings as may be called, from time to time, by the chair.

(b) The Voter Registration Advisory Board shall have the following duties:

- (1) To oversee the statewide voter registration list created in this chapter.
- (2) To advise and consult with the Secretary of State concerning the statewide voter registration file maintenance system created in this chapter.
- (3) To recommend to the Legislature and the Governor any needed improvements or legislation in regard to the statewide voter registration file.
- (4) To make studies of conditions and problems pertaining to voter identification and registration in the state.
- (5) To keep abreast of the latest developments in the field of voter identification and registration.
- (6) To promote honesty, fairness, and integrity in lists of qualified voters, the voter registration process, and the election process in the State of Alabama.

History: (Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §19.)

Section: 17-4-35

Catchline: Supervisor of Voter Registration.

The Supervisor of Voter Registration shall be employed by the Secretary of State under the terms and conditions of the state Merit System and the salary and benefits shall be set by the Secretary of State out of funds appropriated for such purpose. The Supervisor of Voter Registration shall work at the direction of the Secretary of State. In addition to those duties assigned by the Secretary of State, the Supervisor of Voter Registration shall have the following duties:

- (1) To keep the minutes of the meetings of the Voter Registration Advisory Board, conduct the day-to-day business activities of the Voter Registration Advisory Board, and give progress reports on such activities at its meetings.
- (2) To serve as a liaison between the Secretary of State and the county boards of registrars on implementation of existing and future laws pertaining to voter registration.
- (3) To provide to the county boards of registrars such information as would allow them to determine which names should be stricken by them from voter lists in accordance with state law.
- (4) To provide assistance to the county boards of registrars in determining the names of any person or persons who are deceased, who are no longer qualified to vote in the election district where registered due to removal of residence from the county in which he or she is registered, or from the State of Alabama, who has been convicted of a disqualifying crime, or who is otherwise no longer qualified to vote as may be provided by law.
- (5) To establish and maintain a statewide voter registration list including all registered voters of the state as such information is reported to the Supervisor of Voter Registration by the boards of registrars or judges of probate of the various counties.
- (6) To maintain all information furnished to the Supervisor of Voter Registration relating to the inclusion or deletion of names from the lists of registered voters.
- (7) To acquire by purchase, lease, or contract, the use of such equipment as is required to establish a fully centralized statewide voter registration list which will allow the computerization of all of the offices of the boards of registrars throughout the state upon legislative approval of funds for such computerization, the communication of necessary information between the boards of registrars and the Supervisor of Voter Registration; storage and instant comparison of names and

other identifying information contained in voter lists, automatically identifying duplicate entries, produce in printed forms selected names or lists of names with identifying information, and do such other tasks as may be designated for it by the Supervisor of Voter Registration.

(8) To recommend procedures and administrative rules to the Secretary of State and prepare forms necessary to properly carry out such duties set forth herein.

(9) To secure from each county voter registration information and from any state department, agency, board, bureau, or commission, or from any other sources, information regarding the death, conviction of disqualifying crime, or removal of residence from the county or state of any registered voter.

(10) To furnish, at a reasonable reproduction cost and within 14 days of receipt of the request, voter registration lists limited to the names, addresses, and political subdivisions or voting places to candidates for election or political party nomination to further their candidacy, political party committees or officials thereof for political purposes only, incumbent officeholders to report to their constituents; nonprofit organizations which promote voter participation and registration for that purpose only; and for no other purpose and to no one else; failure to furnish the requested voter registration list within 14 days of receipt of a request shall result in no charge to the requesting entity and the cost shall be absorbed by the Secretary of State.

(11) To perform such duties pertaining to voter registration as may be assigned by the Secretary of State.

(12) To supervise persons employed by the Secretary of State, subject to the state Merit System laws and entitled to the rights of benefits thereunder, as may be necessary to carry out this article.

(13) To train, counsel, advise, and evaluate registrars in the performance of their lawful functions.

(14) To provide military and overseas voters with voter registration applications and absentee ballot applications and otherwise assist such voters with information helpful in becoming registered, changing registration, and obtaining absentee ballots.

(15) To provide information relating to procedures for registering and voting an absentee ballot.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §2; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-211; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20.)

Section: 17-4-36

Catchline: Duties of Boards of Registrars; Voter Registration Identification Number.

(a) In order to establish the statewide voter file and to ensure its continued accuracy, it shall be the duty of the boards of registrars, on forms or in a rule prescribed by the Secretary of State:

(1) To provide the Secretary of State the name, driver's license number or non-driver's identification number, if such number is known, the last four digits of the Social Security number, if such number is known, date of birth, address, race, sex, and political subdivision or voting place of each registered voter in their respective counties within one month after a written request from the Secretary of State.

(2) To provide the Secretary of State the name, driver's license number or non-driver's identification number, if such number is known, the last four digits of the Social Security number, if such number is known, date of birth, address, race, sex, political subdivision or voting place, place of previous registration, if applicable, and date of registration of each newly registered voter as such voter is registered.

(3) To provide to the Secretary of State the name, driver's license number or non-driver's identification number, if such number is known, the last four digits of the Social Security number, if such number is known, date of birth, address, race, sex, political subdivision or voting place, and date of reidentification of every voter who reidentifies, pursuant to this chapter.

(b) Where an applicant for voter registration is unable to produce either a driver's license number, a non-driver's identification number, or the last four digits of the

Social Security number, the state voter registration list shall assign a unique number which shall serve as the registrant's voter registration identification number.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §5; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-214; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20.)

Section: 17-4-37

Catchline: Applicability of Chapter.

All voter registration, voter reidentification, and the purging of voters from the voter roll shall be done pursuant to this chapter.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §6; §17-4-215; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20.)

Section: 17-4-38

Catchline: Dissemination of Information on Voter Registration.

(a) The Secretary of State shall ensure that all applicants obtain requested voter lists in a timely manner. Methods shall be established for the transmission of tapes, discs, or lists to any applicant. Hindrances shall not be created or devised to delay transmission of tapes, discs, or lists to any applicant.

(b) Except as provided in this section, there shall be a uniform charge for the production of voter lists. The reproduction costs of the basic electronic copy of the statewide file shall be reasonable as determined by the Secretary of State and a fee schedule shall be conspicuously posted in the office of the Secretary of State. Costs of printed copies of lists are as otherwise provided by law.

(c) Access to the lists and voter history information contained on the central computer in the office of the Secretary of State is accessible to anyone making application, except Social Security numbers which are not to be released.

(d) Proceeds from the sale of tapes, discs, lists, labels, or other materials from the Secretary of State shall be retained by the Secretary of State for use in voter registration.

(e) The Secretary of State shall provide, without charge, each legislator one copy of the voter list in his or her district within 90 days of his or her assuming office.

(f) Upon application and without charge, the Administrative Office of Courts shall be provided with an electronic copy of the statewide voter list no more than once a year for its use in the production of a master jury list or for any other lawful purpose.

(g) Upon application and without charge, the chief elections officer of any other state shall be provided with an electronic copy of the statewide voter list no more than once a year for any lawful purpose, on the condition that the chief elections officer of the requesting state agrees to reciprocate and provide a copy of the statewide voter list of that state to the chief elections officer of this state upon request and without charge, to be used for any lawful purpose. The Secretary of State may enter into an agreement with any other state, at any time, regarding the exchange of statewide voter lists.

(h) Resale of any portion of the list by the Administrative Office of Courts, or the office of the chief elections officer of any other state, shall be strictly prohibited.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §5; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-252; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20; Act 2009-726, p. 2175, §1; Act 2015-290, §1; Act 2015-459, §1.)

Section: 17-4-38.1

Catchline: Collecting, Sharing, and Verifying Information; Costs; Rulemaking Authority. (Amended by Act 2025-424)

AMENDED BY ACT 2025-424, EFFECTIVE MAY 19, 2025. SEE ACT FOR REVISED LANGUAGE.

(a) State agencies shall provide to the Secretary of State, on a schedule to be determined by the Secretary of State, any information and data that the Secretary of State considers necessary in order to maintain the statewide voter registration database established pursuant to Section 17-4-33, except where prohibited by federal law or federal regulation. The Secretary of State shall ensure that any information or data provided to the Secretary of State that is confidential in the possession of the entity providing the data remains confidential while in the possession of the Secretary of State.

(b) The Secretary of State may enter into agreements to share information or data with other states or group of states, as the Secretary of State considers necessary, in order to maintain the statewide voter registration database. Information or data that the Secretary of State may share pursuant to this subsection includes, but is not limited to, an electronic copy of the statewide voter list and data obtained pursuant to subsection (a). Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Secretary of State shall ensure that any information or data provided to the Secretary of State that is confidential in the possession of the state providing the data remains confidential while in the possession of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may provide such otherwise confidential information or data to county boards of registrars for legitimate governmental purposes related to the maintenance of the statewide voter registration database.

(c) A county board of registrars shall contact a registered elector by mail to verify the accuracy of the information in the statewide voter registration database regarding that elector if information provided under subsection (a) or (b) identifies a residential address for the elector that lies outside of the county in which the elector is registered to vote, except when the information provided under subsection (a) or (b) indicates that the elector registered to vote in another jurisdiction, within or without the State of Alabama, at a date subsequent to the date the elector registered to vote in the jurisdiction of the county board of registrars.

(d) The costs associated with agreements entered into by the Secretary of State as provided for in subsection (b) may be rendered by the Secretary of State to the Department of Finance and paid from the voter registration fund.

The cost of production and mailing required in subsection (c) shall be rendered by the Secretary of State to the Department of Finance and paid from the voter registration fund.

(e) The Secretary of State may promulgate rules in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act to implement this section.

History: (Act 2015-459, §2.)

Section: 17-4-39

Catchline: Maintenance of State Voter Registration List. (Amended by Act 2025-424)

AMENDED BY ACT 2025-424, EFFECTIVE MAY 19, 2025. SEE ACT FOR REVISED LANGUAGE.

It shall be the responsibility of the board of registrars to enter in a timely manner the names of the electors who vote in each election into the state voter registration list.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §6; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-253; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-60

Catchline: Implementation of Federal Acts.

(a) The Secretary of State shall be the primary state official for federal contact for the implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

(b) The State Department of Public Safety shall integrate voter registration into driver's license application and renewal or updating procedures and shall coordinate its driver's license database with the state voter registration list and the Social Security Administration's database in accordance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

(c) The state through the Secretary of State's office shall allow citizens to register to vote by mail. The voter registration application may be designed by the Secretary of State provided it meets the requirements of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Secretary of State may, however, choose to use federally prescribed forms.

(d) State agencies which provide food stamps, Medicaid, services related to the Women and Infant Children program (WIC), services related to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and agencies providing services to the disabled shall provide voter registration opportunities to their clientele in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.

(e) Recruitment offices of the Armed Forces of the United States shall provide voter registration opportunities to their clientele in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.

(f) Other public offices and agencies which may provide the voter registration services provided by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 include public libraries, public schools, offices of municipal clerks, probate offices, state and local revenue offices, unemployment compensation offices, offices providing services to the disabled other than those required in subsection (d) to provide voter registration services, and federal and nongovernmental offices which agree to provide the voter registration services.

(g) Voter registration, confirmation documents, and any other documents necessary to be prescribed by the Secretary of State to meet the requirements of the National

Voter Registration Act of 1993 shall be prepared and furnished as provided for in Section 17-3-57.

(h) The Secretary of State, by rule, may prescribe forms in furtherance of state election laws deemed helpful to disabled voters and voters speaking an alternative language to English who, according to the most recent decennial census, comprise more than five percent of the voting age population for any county in Alabama.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §2; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-250; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §22.)

Section: 17-4-61

Catchline: Additional Personnel.

The Secretary of State may hire a computer programmer or other necessary personnel to carry out the additional responsibilities placed on his or her office by state implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The programmer and other personnel employed shall be under the state Merit System.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §3; §17-4-251; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §22.)

Section: 17-4-62

Catchline: Voter Registration Fund.

There is established a separate trust fund in the State Treasury to be known as the Voter Registration Fund. All receipts collected under this article by the Secretary of State are to be deposited in this fund. The receipts shall be disbursed only by warrant of the state Comptroller drawn upon the State Treasury supported by itemized vouchers approved by the Secretary of State. No funds shall be withdrawn or expended except as budgeted and allotted according to Sections 41-4-80 to 41-

4-96, inclusive, and 41-19-1 to 41-19-12, inclusive, and only in amounts as stipulated in the general appropriations act, or other appropriations acts.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §7; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-254; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §22.)

Section: 17-4-63

Catchline: Rules, Forms, and Instructions; Inter-Agency Agreements.

The Secretary of State shall promulgate rules and prescribe forms and instructions as shall be necessary to implement the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 in Alabama or the Help America Vote Act of 2002, including any rules and forms necessary for the administration of the acts by state departments and agencies. The Secretary of State is further authorized to enter into inter-agency agreements with other government agencies for the implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

History: (Acts 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 94-826, p. 158, §8; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-255; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §22.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-36

Catchline: Duties of Boards of Registrars; Voter Registration Identification Number.

(a) In order to establish the statewide voter file and to ensure its continued accuracy, it shall be the duty of the boards of registrars, on forms or in a rule prescribed by the Secretary of State:

(1) To provide the Secretary of State the name, driver's license number or non-driver's identification number, if such number is known, the last four digits of the Social Security number, if such number is known, date of birth, address, race, sex, and political subdivision or voting place of each registered voter in their respective counties within one month after a written request from the Secretary of State.

(2) To provide the Secretary of State the name, driver's license number or non-driver's identification number, if such number is known, the last four digits of the Social Security number, if such number is known, date of birth, address, race, sex, political subdivision or voting place, place of previous registration, if applicable, and date of registration of each newly registered voter as such voter is registered.

(3) To provide to the Secretary of State the name, driver's license number or non-driver's identification number, if such number is known, the last four digits of the Social Security number, if such number is known, date of birth, address, race, sex, political subdivision or voting place, and date of reidentification of every voter who reidentifies, pursuant to this chapter.

(b) Where an applicant for voter registration is unable to produce either a driver's license number, a non-driver's identification number, or the last four digits of the Social Security number, the state voter registration list shall assign a unique number which shall serve as the registrant's voter registration identification number.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §5; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-214; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §20.)

Code of Alabama

Section: 17-4-3

Catchline: County Board of Registrars to Purge Disqualified Electors.

(a) Each county board of registrars shall purge the computerized statewide voter registration list on a continuous basis, whenever it receives and confirms information that a person registered to vote in that county has died, become a nonresident of the state or county, been declared mentally incompetent, been convicted of any offense designated pursuant to Section 17-3-30.1 as a felony involving moral turpitude for the purposes of Article VIII of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 since being registered, or otherwise become disqualified as an elector. Except as provided below, a person convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense shall be notified by certified mail sent to the voter's last known address of the board's intention to strike his or her name from the list. No person convicted of a disqualifying crime may be stricken from the poll list while an appeal from the conviction is pending.

(b) On the date set in the notice, or at a later date to which the case may have been continued by the board, the board shall proceed to consider the case of the elector whose name it proposes to strike from the registration list and make its determination. Any person whose name is stricken from the list may appeal from the decision of the board without giving security for costs, and the board shall forthwith certify the proceedings to the judge of probate who shall docket the case in the probate court.

(c) An appeal from the judge of probate shall be as appeals set forth in Section 17-3-55.

(d) In the event the Board of Pardons and Paroles is supervising a person convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense on probation or parole, and the person has received face-to-face counseling from the supervising officer regarding voter disqualification and executed documentation explaining the loss and restoration of civil and political rights, upon receipt of the documentation, signed by the disqualified elector, the county board of registrars shall be exempt from providing notice as otherwise required by this section. The document administered by the Board of Pardons and Paroles and to be signed by the disqualified elector shall contain the following statement: "Any person convicted of a disqualifying felony loses his or her civil and political rights, which includes the right to vote. Restoration

of these rights may be applied for through the Central Montgomery Office of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, but only upon completion of the requirements of Section 15-22-36.1."

(e) The Board of Pardons and Paroles shall provide signed documentation to county boards of registrars to indicate those persons under probation or parole supervision with the board who have been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense and been counseled regarding voter disqualification and the restoration of civil and political rights, and may otherwise share privileged records and files with county boards of registrars for the limited purpose of implementing the requirements of this section.

(f) When the board has sufficient evidence furnished it that any elector has permanently moved from one precinct to another within the county, it shall change the elector's precinct designation in the voter registration list, and shall give notice by mail to the elector of the precinct in which the elector is registered to vote.

(g) The Secretary of State and the Board of Pardons and Paroles may promulgate rules in accordance with the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act as necessary to implement this section.

History: (Acts 1984, No. 84-389, p. 896, §1; §17-4-180; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §16; Act 2017-378, §2.)

Section: 17-4-4

Catchline: Information of Deaths, Incompetency, and Convictions to Be Furnished to Boards of Registrars; Rulemaking Authority.

(a) In addition to all other duties now required by law, the Office of Vital Statistics of the State Department of Public Health shall furnish to the board of registrars of the county in which such district is located, once each month, a report of the death of all persons over 18 years of age who resided in such registration district.

(b) In addition to all other duties now required by law, the judges of probate of the several counties of this state shall furnish to the board of registrars of their respective counties, once each month, a list of all residents of the county, 18 years of age or over, who have been declared mentally incompetent.

(c) In addition to all other duties required by law, the clerks of the circuit and district courts of this state shall furnish to the board of registrars of each county, once each

month, a list of all residents of that county who have been convicted of any offense designated pursuant to Section 17-3-30.1 as a felony involving moral turpitude for the purposes of Article VIII of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. Any person who willfully fails to perform such duties shall forfeit the sum of one hundred dollars (\$100) for each such failure. Such sum may be recovered in an action by law by any citizen of the county in which the officer acts, one half to his or her own use and one half to the use of the state.

(d) The Secretary of State and the Board of Pardons and Paroles may promulgate rules in accordance with the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act as necessary to implement this section.

History: (Acts 1935, No. 434, p. 914; Code 1940, T. 17, §45; Code 1975, §17-4-61; Acts 1978, No. 584, p. 667, §27; §17-4-131; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §16; Act 2017-378, §2.)

Section: 17-4-6

Catchline: Information to Be Provided by State Departments or Agencies.

(a) To continuously and automatically identify the names of persons to be purged from the voters' list, the appropriate state departments or agencies shall provide to the Secretary of State, as such information is recorded by the departments, the names and identifying information set out below of any person age 18 or older who:

(1) Has died, with date of birth and Social Security number (if such number is known), last known address with county of residence, and date of death, as provided by the Office of Vital Statistics of the State Department of Public Health.

(2) Has been convicted of a felony, with date of birth and Social Security number (if such number is known), last known address with county of residence, and date of conviction, as provided by the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Systems.

(b) The Secretary of State, upon the receipt of the information pursuant to subsection (a), shall disseminate the information to the appropriate board of

registrars to facilitate the continuous purgation of the statewide voter registration list.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §3; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-212; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §16.)

Section: 17-4-33

Catchline: Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List.

(a) The State of Alabama shall provide, through the Secretary of State, a nondiscriminatory, single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered by the Secretary of State, with advice from the Voter Registration Advisory Board and the President of the Alabama Probate Judges Association, which contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the state. The computerized list shall comply with the following requirements:

- (1) It shall serve as the single system for storing and managing the official list of registered voters throughout the state.
- (2) It shall contain the name, address, and voting location, as well as other information deemed necessary by the Voter Registration Advisory Board or the Secretary of State, of every legally registered voter in the state.
- (3) A unique identifier shall be assigned to each legally registered voter in the state.
- (4) It shall contain the voting history of each registered voter.
- (5) It shall be coordinated with the driver's license database of the Alabama State Law Enforcement Agency and the appropriate state agency to assist in the removal of deceased voters.
- (6) Any election official in the state, including any local election official, may obtain immediate electronic access to the information contained in the computerized list.
- (7) All voter registration information obtained by any registrar in the state shall be electronically entered into the computerized list on an expedited basis at the time information is provided to the registrar.
- (8) The Secretary of State shall provide such support as may be required so that registrars are able to enter voter registration information.

(9) It shall serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections.

(10) Following each state and county election, the Secretary of State shall provide one electronic copy of the computerized voter list free of charge to each political party that satisfied the ballot access requirements for that election. The electronic copy of the computerized voter list shall be provided within 30 days of the certification of the election or upon the completion of the election vote history update following the election, whichever comes first. In addition, upon written request from the chair of a political party, the Secretary of State shall furnish up to two additional electronic copies of the computerized voter file during each calendar year to each political party that satisfied the ballot access requirements during the last statewide election held prior to that calendar year. The electronic copies provided pursuant to this section shall contain the full, editable data as it exists in the computerized voter list maintained by the Secretary of State.

(11) The list shall be maintained so that it is technologically secure.

(b)(1) The Secretary of State, or judge of probate, or absentee election manager, or municipal clerk, or registrar shall include the name and omit all other information of a registered voter on any generally available list of registered voters, except for those lists provided to federal and state agencies, upon the written signed affidavit of the registered voter to the board of registrars of the county in which the individual is registered or intends to register, affirming one of the following:

a. That the registered voter, or a minor who is in the legal custody of the registered voter, is or has been the victim of domestic violence as provided in Article 7, commencing with Section 13A-6-130, of Chapter 6 of Title 13A.

b. That a domestic violence order is or has been issued by a judge or magistrate pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Order Enforcement Act, to restrain access to the registered voter or a minor who is in the legal custody of the registered voter.

c. That the registered voter is a federal or state prosecutor, federal, state, probate, or municipal judge, legislator, or law enforcement officer as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 36 or the spouse of a federal or state prosecutor, federal, state, probate, or municipal judge, legislator, or law enforcement officer as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 36.

(2) The Secretary of State shall develop and provide to each county the affidavit to be completed under this subsection.

History: (Acts 1989, No. 89-649, p. 1279, §1; Act 2003-313, p. 733, §2; §17-4-210; amended and renumbered by Act 2006-570, p. 1331, §18; Act 2010-537, p. 918, §1; Act 2014-221, p. 704, §1; Act 2021-335, §1.)