When I worked at the Government Accountability Office (GAO)—an independent agency that has served as Congress’s watchdog for more than a century—then-Comptroller General Gene Dodaro was known for many things: his decades of public service, his unwavering commitment to the agency’s nonpartisan mission and, perhaps most impressive of all, his uncanny ability to remember the name of each GAO staff member. Over the years and in his final days as GAO’s leader, members of both parties have praised Dodaro’s nonpartisan work exposing waste, fraud and abuse in the federal government. Now, after more than 50 years of dedicated service and 15 as comptroller general, Dodaro’s historic GAO career has come to an end.

In executive branch departments where political appointees serve at the pleasure of the president, this type of leadership transition—which often happens when there is a change in administration—is likely to yield significant changes in agency policies and priorities. GAO, however, is an independent agency in the legislative branch that conducts objective, fact-based investigations in response to requests from Congress, and its leadership structure is “independent by design.”

Perhaps surprisingly, given GAO’s role as the congressional watchdog, Congress provided for the comptroller general to be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. But Congress also put in place several structural protections against potential bias or political interference, including that the comptroller general serves one 15-year term. Because a presidential term, by contrast, lasts only four years, and the 22nd Amendment prohibits an individual from being elected as president more than twice, a comptroller general’s service necessarily spans multiple administrations. Through this structure, Congress reduced the risk that the comptroller general, who helps Congress oversee and investigate executive branch programs, would be influenced by political pressure from a president.

Moreover, in establishing the process for appointing a comptroller general, Congress gave the president only one role: selecting a nominee. By contrast, Congress retained for itself authority to recommend individuals for, confirm and remove an individual from the position, and it assigned to the comptroller general the responsibility to designate an acting official in the event of a vacancy:

  • Commission: When the position of comptroller general is vacant, Congress must establish a bipartisan, bicameral congressional commission to recommend to the president at least three individuals for appointment.
  • Confirmation: After the president selects a nominee from the commission’s list (as every president to nominate a comptroller general under this process has done), the Senate must thoroughly consider the individual’s background and qualifications and decide whether to confirm them for the position.
  • Removal: Once a nominee is confirmed as comptroller general, Congress retains sole authority to remove them through either impeachment or passage of a joint resolution for cause.
  • Acting: Unlike executive branch agencies, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act does not apply to GAO. Rather, during a vacancy in both the positions of comptroller general and deputy comptroller general (a position that has not been filled since the 1970s), the comptroller general has exclusive authority to designate a GAO officer or employee to act as the comptroller general. 

Placing these important structural duties with the Congress and GAO, rather than the president, ensures that Congress retains ultimate control over GAO’s permanent leader and that GAO, regardless of whether it performs its duties under a confirmed or acting comptroller general, can continue its investigative functions without interruption or fear of reprisal.

These guardrails do not guarantee, however, that a president will not try to unlawfully interfere with any of the duties Congress has assigned to itself or to GAO.  Indeed, mere months into his second term and days after firing the Librarian of Congress, President Trump attempted to fire the legislative branch’s “chief advisor on copyright matters”—the Register of Copyrights—purportedly installing his own appointees in both positions. The register challenged her removal in court, stating that the White House Presidential Personnel Office had notified her of her immediate termination one day after she issued a report with which the president allegedly disagreed. The D.C. Circuit described these allegations as a “grave intrusion . . . into the constitutional powers of a coordinate branch of government,” holding that, in light of this likely violation of the separation of powers, the register could stay in place while her case proceeds.

GAO likewise has been the subject of the administration’s ire. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Russell Vought—“the cabinet officer functionally, if not actually, closest to the President”—has stated that GAO “shouldn’t exist” and called GAO opinions finding violations of the law “non-events with no consequence.” Meanwhile, OMB General Counsel Mark Paoletta has instructed an agency to disregard a GAO opinion and told GAO that OMB will cooperate with GAO investigations only if they “do not unduly impede OMB’s ability to implement the President’s agenda.” 

Both despite and because of these attempts to discredit GAO’s nonpartisan work, it is all the more important for Congress to ensure, through both the commission and confirmation processes, that GAO’s incoming leader is independent, nonpartisan and dedicated to GAO’s core mission. But the process of researching, recommending, nominating and confirming a comptroller general takes time: during the two most recent vacancies, the acting comptroller general served in the position for at least two years before the new comptroller general was sworn in.

During this process, it is incumbent on the comptroller general to ensure that the agency’s temporary leader furthers its nonpartisan work. Pursuant to a GAO memorandum, of which CREW has requested a copy, GAO’s Chief Operating Officer Orice Williams Brown has now assumed the role of acting comptroller general. Brown, a civil servant who has worked at GAO for more than 30 years and has several years of experience overseeing GAO’s day-to-day operations, has an “unwavering commitment to public service” and is expected to continue the agency’s nonpartisan work. 

If Brown steps down or is otherwise unable to serve before the position is filled, the statute provides two additional safeguards to prevent executive intrusion into GAO’s functions: making clear that it is solely the comptroller general’s—not the president’s—duty to designate the acting leader of the agency, and that the acting official must be a GAO officer or employee. Nonetheless, given the gravity of this position, the president’s recent attempts to remove other legislative branch officials, the administration’s disagreement with and attempts to discredit GAO opinions, the responsibility of “governments at all levels . . . to develop continuity plans that identify . . . succession and delegation of authority” and the historical precedent of multiple-year vacancies in the office, the public has a strong interest in understanding what order of succession GAO has determined will apply if another vacancy occurs before the president appoints and the Senate confirms a comptroller general. 

We’ve requested this information so that the public can understand and trust that, even in unanticipated conditions, GAO will perform its objective investigations, recommend improvements to federal government performance and accountability and continue to provide substantial returns on investment for the American taxpayer.

Read our request for GAO’s order of succession.

NOTE: At the time of this publication, Christie Wentworth is Senior Policy Counsel for CREW. From 2017 through January 2021, Christie served as an appropriations law attorney at GAO.

Photo of GAO headquarters by ajay_suresh under Creative Commons license